Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism
Author(s): Jeffrey W. Legro
Source: International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter, 1997), pp. 31-63
Published by: The MIT Press
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Whichnormsmatter?Revisitingthe
"failure"ofinternationalism
W. Legro
Jeffrey
in internahave in recentyearsshownan interest
relationstheorists
International
period.'This contemporary
tionalnormsand rulesnotequaled sincetheinterwar
thatofthe1920sand 1930s:
better-than
literature
is,ofcourse,quitedifferent-i.e.,
power.The
depth,empiricalbacking,and explanatory
it has greaterintellectual
of thepost-coldwarera,is
bolsteredbytheopportunities
promiseof thisresearch,
enhancinghuman
theenvironment,
thatnormsencouraging
freetrade,protecting
thespreadanduse ofheinousweaponsmayhavea substantial
rights,
andcontrolling
relations.But pessimistsalso
of international
impacton theconductand structure
shookat idealistsin an
exist.Some have takenup thestickE. H. Carrskillfully
arenais notso
international
earlierperiod,arguingthattheanarchicpower-shaped
have relativelylittle
norms and institutions
malleable and that international
norms;
ofinternational
On theone hand,we arepointedto thecentrality
influence.2
How do we make
on theother,we are cautionedthatnormsare inconsequential.
claims?Whichis right?
senseofthesedivergent
to whatthe
Contrary
I arguethatneither
ofthepolarizedpositionsis sustainable.
in the
matter
Butnormsdo notnecessarily
skepticsassert,normsdo indeedmatter.
on norms
haveargued.Theliterature
waysoroftentotheextentthattheirproponents
has generally
theirimpactbecauseof severalconceptualand methodmisspecified
on showingthatnorms"matter,"
analysts
byconcentrating
ologicalbiases.In short,
thewaysthey
to thecriticalissuesof whichnormsmatter,
have givenshortshrift
and how muchtheymatterrelativeto otherfactors.The resulthas been a
matter,
toJamesDavis,ColinElman,HeinGoemans,
below,I am grateful
Fortheirhelpon theideaspresented
at seminars
at
Paul Kowert,JohnOdell,Ido Oren,RichardPrice,BrianTaylor,MarkZacher,participants
and severalanonymous
and BrownUniversity's
WatsonInstitute,
Olin Institute
HarvardUniversity's
Organization.
forInternational
reviewers
1989;Ray 1989;Nadelmann1990;GoertzandDiehl
1. Forexamples,see Axelrod1986; Kratochwil,
1992; Finnemore1993; Reed and Kaysen 1993; Thomson1993, 1994; Mayall 1990; Goldsteinand
Keohane1993;Jackson1993;Sikkink1993;Paul,1995;Price1995;Klotz1995;Gelpi1995;Katzenstein
1996a;andCortellandDavis inpress.
1996;Finnemore
1994-95,7.
2. Carr1946.Foran example,see Mearsheimer
51, 1,Winter1997,pp. 31-63
Organization
International
? 1997byThe 10 Foundation
andtheMassachusetts
Institute
ofTechnology
32 International
Organization
norms.The
misguidedsenseof therangeand depthof theimpactof international
butrecentanalyseshaveoveremphasocialfocusofnormanalysisis indeedcentral,
sizedinternational
whileneglecting
normsthatarerootedinothertypes
prescriptions
andsubnational
has
ofsocialentities-e.g.,regional,
national,
groups.Thisoversight
that can
led scholarsto ignore significant
subsystemicsocial understandings
contradict
andoverwhelm
international
prescriptions.
To assess thepromiseand limitsof focusingon norms,I drawon a setof cases
involving
theuse offorcewheretheconventional
wisdomexpectslittleimpactfrom
the study
international
prescriptions-that
is, "least likely"cases.3Furthermore,
and WorldWarII years)thatthestandard
focuseson a timeperiod(theinterwar
sees as decisivelyrefuting
ideational
historiography
ofinternational
relations
theory
In the1920sand 1930s,theinternational
internationalism.4
community
stigmatized
as heinousandimmoral:submarine
attacksagainstmerchant
threetypesofwarfare
andtheuse of chemicalweapons.These
ships,thebombingof nonmilitary
targets,
prohibitory
normsareinteresting
(and similarto current
efforts)
becausetheywere
oftheinternational
notsimplypartofthe"deep structure"
systemor "invisible"to
theparticipants
butinsteadwereexplicitobjectsof construction
by statesthatlater
ofadherence
versusviolation.
WorldWarII,
hadtoweighthedesirability
Yet,during
had varyingeffects.
warfare
theseprohibitions
Participants
ignoredthesubmarine
restrictions
almostimmediately.
Theyrespectedstrategic
bombingrulesformonths
on chemicalweapons,despite
and thenviolatedthem.But theyupheldlimitations
and preparations,
thewar.Whyweresome normsapparexpectations
throughout
andnotothers?
entlyinfluential
I arguethatinternational
normswere
totheconventional
Contrary
historiography,
fortheuse of forceduringWorldWarII. The prohibitions
consequential
shaped
states'calculationsand tactics,inspiredleaders'justifications
and rationalizations,
and,mostfundamentally,
appearto be a keyreasonwhycertainmeansof warfare
forrestraint.
wereevenconsidered
Yetwhileinternational
normscertainly
mattered,
intheuse offorce.
a normexplanation
cannotaccountforthevariation
thatoccurred
The explanation
is notthatstrategic
security
concernsoverwhelmed
socialprescripthemilitary
of theweaponsnoropportunities
effectiveness
for
tions,sinceneither
relativestrategic
advantagecan explainthedifferential
adherenceof statesto the
threenorms.Instead,it lies in an understanding
of organizational
culture.This
approachdoesemphasizecollectiveprescriptions,
butthefocusis onnationalsociety
ratherthanon international
norms.The dominant
beliefsin military
organizations
aboutthe appropriate
ways to fightwars shapedhow soldiersthoughtaboutand
forwar,whichinturnshapedthevarying
prepared
impactofnormson stateaims.
This analysishas severalimplications
forinternational
relationstheory.
First,it
demonstrates
thevalueofproviding
clearconcepts,ofexamining
and
botheffective
ineffective
norms,and of consideringalternative
explanations-methodological
andintrepretivist
normresearch.Second,
additionsthatcan advancebothpositivist
3. See Eckstein1975;andKing,Keohane,andVerba1994,209-10.
4. Forexample,see Bull 1972.
Norms 33
its resultsshow the benefitsof analyzingcompetingnorm,belief,and cultural
politics.Althoughmanyrecentaccountshave usefully
patternsin international
in the
injunctions
focusedon globalnorms,fewhave examinedsuchinternational
prescriptions
(i.e., thoseof organizacontextof nationalnorms.Yettheseintrastate
tionalculture)can wield greatinfluence.This, of course,is not to suggestthat
normsor relativepower
bureaucraticculturealways supersedesinternational
constraints,
but it does highlightthe need for conceptualtools to weigh the
andmaterial
structures.
typesofcultural
orsynthetic
effects
ofdifferent
cross-cutting
oftheextant
The articletakesshapein fourparts.First,itoutlinesthelimitations
normliterature
anddevelopsan approachthatseeksto addressthoseshortcomings.
culture.
It
viewbasedon organizational
Second,itdiscussesthelogicofa competing
on
explainstatepreferences
thenassesseshowpersuasively
thesetwoperspectives
theuse offorceinWorldWarII. Finally,itaddressesthe
adherence
tonormslimiting
especiallyfuture
work
relations
theory,
forinternational
implications
oftheargument
on norms.
On norms
scholarshaveshowna
andmethodological
orientations,
Acrossa rangeoftheoretical
of theproper
in thewaysthatnorms-collectiveunderstandings
renewedinterest
behaviorof actors-operatein international
politics.Normsareseenas continuous,
entities:
theydo notjustexistornotexistbutinsteadcome
rather
thandichotomous,
in termsof
in varyingstrengths.
portray
normsas consequential
Analyststypically
In anyof
or enablingactorsor theirenvironments.5
eitherconstituting,
regulating,
is thatnormsthatare morerobustwillbe more
theseroles,thecentralproposition
interests,
influential
regardlessof whetherthe dependentvariableis identity,
individualbehavior,or collectivepracticesand outcomes.Yet in exploringthese
hasbeenpronetothreetypesofbiases.6
theextantnormliterature
relationships,
independent
of thevery
The firstis a failureto conceptualizenormrobustness
to norms,thusleadingto tautology.
This failureis compounded
effectsattributed
ofnormsinthe
becauseanalysts
mustconfront
nota dearth
butan apparent
profusion
a normto
one can almostalwaysidentify
international
arena.Giventhisavailability,
Sincedifferent
normscan havecompeting
effect.
"explain"or "allow" a particular
tounderstand
orevencontradictory
itis important
whysomenormsare
imperatives,
one emphasizes
situations.
Thus,whether
moreinfluential
thanothersin particular
orthelinguistic/discursive
facetofnorms,
thebehavioral
avoidingcircular
reasoning
of the effectsto be
requiresa notionof normrobustnessthatis independent
explained.This is notan easy task.For example,AlexanderWendtsuggeststhat
social structures
(of sharedknowledge)varyin thedegreeto whichtheycan be
1989,26; andDessler1989,454-58.
5. See Kratochwil
andRuggie1986;Kratochwil
to thissection.For a developeddiscussionon the
6. Thanksto Paul Kowertforhis contribution
see KowertandLegro1996.
andweaknessesofnormresearch,
strengths
Organization
34 International
ways,both
In different
buthe does notspecifywhatdefinesthistrait.7
transformed,
linka norm'spotencyto itsinstitutionalKratochwil
RobertKeohaneandFriedrich
of
therobustness
ization.8But thispushestheproblemback to one of theorizing
ordefinition
byeffect.
an exercisethathas beenproneto ambiguity
institutions,
froma bias towardthe
to explorenormssuffer
A secondproblemis thatefforts
normthat"worked."Moststudiesofnormsfocuson a single,specificnorm-or,at
are
most,on a small set of norms.Typically,the normsunderconsideration
"effective"normsthatseem to have obvious consequences.9Yet, in orderto
thesuccessor
hownormsoperate,studiesmustallowformorevariation:
understand
failure,existenceor obsolescenceof norms.Researchon normshas tendedto
thatmight
andunderstandings
prohibitions,
rules,principles,
overlooktheemerging
have had influencebut did not. These cases, analyzed in conjunctionwith
ofthislineof
arecriticaltothedevelopment
cases ofnormeffectiveness,
comparable
is as important
as
Whynormsdidnotemergeor werenotconsequential
thinking.10
whytheydidorwere.
The final(butless pervasive)problemof manystudiesis a neglectof alternative
to norms.The
ideationalones,fortheeffectsattributed
particularly
explanations,
international
crediting
dangersof notdoingso are apparent.One risksspuriously
identities,
normswithconsequences(e.g., the shapingor enablingof particular
explainedbyothertypesoffactors.
beliefs,oractions)thatarebetter
interests,
I attempt
to avoid thesebiases by developingan explicitschemeforassessing
suchas
normsthatseemto havebeenveryeffectual,
by comparing
normstrength;
chemicalwarfare
(CW), withthosethatwereless so, suchas those
thoseproscribing
a
contrasting
submarine
warfare
andstrategic
bombing;andbyexplicitly
concerning
and,toa lesser
cultureexplanation
organizational
normapproachwithan alternative
realistaccount.
degree,a conventional
basedonthree
I proposea conceptualization
ofthenorms,
To gaugetherobustness
11Thesethreetraitsare,inprinciple,
andconcordance.
criteria:
durability,
specificity,
refers
to
as theyareto formalones.Specificity
as applicableto informal
institutions
Is therea
anduse aredefinedand understood.
how well theguidelinesforrestraint
simpleand
or is it relatively
laboriouscode thatis overlycomplexor ill-defined
entailor how to implement
precise?Do countriesargueaboutwhattherestraints
of the
is thus assessed by examiningactors'understandings
them?Specificity
oftheprohibition.
andclarity
simplicity
denoteshow longtheruleshavebeenin effectandhowtheyweather
Durability
Are
Have thenormshad long-standing
legitimacy?
challengesto theirprohibitions.
the norm?
and reproducing
violatorsor violationspenalized,thus reinforcing
7. Wendt1995,80.
1989,62.
8. Keohane1989,4-5; Kratochwil
9. See, forexample,Ray 1989; Finnemore1993; Jackson1993; Thomson1994; Price 1995; Klotz
1996.
1995;andPriceandTannenwald
10. ExamplesincludeNadelmann1990;andMcElroy1992.
indiscussions
ofnorms
andinthe
bytraits
often
implicit
itis influenced
11. Thoughthisis myownschema,
forexample,Keohane1989,4-5; Smith1989,234-36; andYoung1989,23.
institutionalist
literature,
Norms 35
it,as is seen,forexample,incases
invalidate
Violationsofa normdo notnecessarily
fordoingso.
actorsare sociallyor self-sanctioned
of incest.The issue is whether
and
These questionscan be assessed by examiningthe historyof a prohibition
ofandreactiontoviolations.
agents'relatedunderstanding
discussions
Concordancemeanshowwidelyacceptedtherulesarein diplomatic
The concordance
agreement).
and treaties(thatis, the degreeof intersubjective
a normmay
toreaffirm
maybe a swordthatcutsbothways.Publicefforts
dimension
Whichis thecase may
be a sign,notthatitis viable,butinsteadthatitis weakening.
is morereinforcing
dependon its context.In thecases examinedhere,affirmation
seems
becausethefocusis largelyon "nascent"orevolvingnormswhereaffirmation
of the
Do statesseem to concuron theacceptability
to robustness.
to contribute
topublicratification?
reputations
theirapprovalbycommitting
rules?Do theyaffirm
thusdiminishing
on theiracceptanceofprohibitions,
Do statesputspecialconditions
violating
neverevenconsidering
concordance?
Ordo theytaketherulesforgranted,
theirprescriptions?
These questionscan be assessedby reviewingtherecordsof
discussionsthatinvolvethenorms.
nationalandinternational
ofthenormapproachdevelopedaboveis thattheclearer,
Overall,theexpectation
is, thegreaterwill be its
moredurable,and morewidelyendorseda prescription
ceterisparibus,
in WorldWarII, thissuggests,
impact.Withrespectto thevariation
thatstates'adherence
tonormsis mostlikelyinareaswherenormsaremostrobustin
wherenormsareless
Conversely,
andconcordance.
termsof specificity,
durability,
we
robust,stateswillbe moreinclinedtowardviolations.If a normaccountis right,
are mostdeveloped.States'
in thoseareas whereprohibitions
shouldsee restraint
as part
offuture
use shouldshiftas theaccordbecomesmoreingrained
expectations
to the normin making
of international
society.Leaders shouldmake reference
thenormmay
Alternatively,
decisionsandrecognizethepenaltiesofnonadherence.
be so robust,violationof it is not even considered.Countriesshouldreactto
of principles,
especiallyones thatare clear,long-standing,
constrain
transgressions
havenotbeenconcludedor
andwidelyendorsed.In thoseareaswhereagreements
is morelikelyto breakdown.The costsof violation
arethinlydeveloped,restraint
to cutcornerson restrictions.
Leaderswill attempt
will be seen as nonprohibitive.
In short,the
or identity.
withself-interest
The relatednormswill notbe identified
willbe minimal.
andpractices
ofprohibitions
on actors,decisionmaking,
effect
Organizationalculture
thevaryinguse of forcein WorldWarII
An alternative
approachto understanding
An organizational
of culturaland organization
theory.
comes froma conjunction
ideas, and
cultureapproachfocuseson the way thatthepatternof assumptions,
and
beliefsthatprescribeshow a groupshouldadaptto its externalenvironment
manageits internalaffairsinfluencescalculationsand actions.'2In a sense,this
12. Thisdefinition
is looselybasedon Schein1985,9.
36 International
Organization
cultureis, in
approachfocuseson "norms"thatdominatespecificorganizations:
a setofcollectively
heldprescriptions
abouttherightwayto thinkandact.'3
effect,
an organizational
cultureperspective
highlights
Appliedto military
bureaucracies,
how government
agenciestaskedwithvagueformalpurposes("providesecurity")
on modesofwarfare
condition
thinking
concentrate
thatsubsequently
organizational
andbehavior.Theirdominant
way of wartendsto becomesucha locus of activity
understand
meansbecomeends.14Cultureshapeshoworganizations
that,in effect,
filter
forperception
andcalculationmuchthe
itactsas a heuristic
theirenvironment:
or a schemastructures
samewaya theoretical
thought
paradigmshapesintellectual
Culturealso has materialconsequences.Collectivebeliefs
individualcognition.15
dictatewhich capabilitiesare perceivedas betterand are worthyof support.
will channelresourcesto weaponssuitedto culture.Thoseweapons
Organizations
withcultureandthatare
willappearmorefeasiblethanthosethatareincompatible
andattention.16
subsequently
deprivedoffunding
Thiscultural
thetraditional
viewofmilitaries
from,
viewis relatedto,butdifferent
logic as foundin GrahamAllison'sandBarryPosen's
based on a formalstructural
of thetraditional
approachis thatsimilarunits
influential
studies.The assumption
shouldexhibitsimilarbehavior.17
This,of
withinthecontextof similarstructures
course,is thecentralparadigmthatculturalapproachesaim to correctby stressing
beliefscan differ
andconsequently
so can behavior.
that,despitesimilarstructures,
as similarorganizations
thatmilitaries,
Traditional
organization
theoryanticipates
will display
seekingto maximizeautonomyand size and reduce uncertainty,
commoncharacteristics.
They will preferoffensivestrategiesand resistcivilian
in operationalplanningand implementation.18
Escalationis expected
intervention
offensebecause restraint
conflictswiththe verynatureof autonomy-seeking,
While researchhas indicatedthat
militaryorganizations.
oriented,war-winning
soldiersdo notalwaysdesirewar,afterthedecisionforwar has been made,this
andare
assertsthatmilitaries
areexpectedto covetoperational
autonomy
argument
cancostlivesand
andrestraint
inclinedtouse all meansattheirdisposal:gradualism
areinconsistent
withsuchhallowedprinciples
as concentration
offorceandthegoal
The proposition
are
of totalvictory.'9
thatfollowsfromthislogic is thatmilitaries
likelyto fosterescalationin any usable means of warfare.From a traditional
we havelittlereasonto expectanyadherencein warto
organizational
perspective,
is an anomaly.Butrestraint-aided
by
normsprohibiting
theuse offorce.20
Restraint
organizational
complicity-didoccurinWorldWarII.
see Johnston
1995. Kier 1996
affairs,
13. For a thoughtful
reviewof theworkon culturein security
cultureandmilitary
doctrine.
providesan excellentanalysisoforganizational
14. See Wilson1989,especially32.
15. See Kuhn1970;andKhong1992.
16. LevittandMarch1988,322.
see Posen 1984,37. Also see Allison1971.
17. Foran explicitstatement,
18. Forexample,see Posen 1984,41-59.
19. Betts1977.
20. See VanEvera1984,chap.7; andPosen 1992,16-19.
Norms 37
theoryin generalis a failureto
An additionalproblemrelatedto bureaucratic
viewscometo shapestatedesires.21
organizational
explainhow andwhyparticular
consistof multipleagencies,so thequestionis whichbureaucracies
Governments
impact
hereis thata bureaucracy's
willmatter
andwhen?The briefansweroffered
salience,consistingof at least three
varies withwhat I call its organizational
has monopolypoweron expertise,
dimensions:
theextentto whichthebureaucracy
of theissue, and thetimeperiodavailableforaction.Whenone
thecomplexity
has a monopolyon expertise
andno competitors,
itfacesless pressure
organization
the
biases. In termsof complexity,
to changeand no checkson organizational
thedegreeto whichspecialistknowledgeis requiredfor
intricacy
ofan issueaffects
willbe in
seniorauthorities
decisions.Themorecomplextheissue,theless effective
in operationsand themoreorganizational
preferences
objectingto or intervening
effect.
bureaucratic
willbe felt.The timeframefordecisionmakingcan also affect
plans.
so is timeforadjusting
prearranged
Whendecision-making
cyclesareshort,
will have a highsaliencein
organizations
These traitsall suggestthatmilitary
choiceson theuse of forcein war.Militariesare key playersin such situations
becausetheygenerallyhave monopolycontroloverexpertisein theuse of force,
andthe
bynonspecialists,
arecomplexandnoteasilyunderstood
military
operations
timeperiodsforaltering
plansarelimited.Civiliansmayhaveauthority
prearranged
to theirwishes and efforts,
military
to make finalchoices,but oftencontrary
salienceof the
propensity
can prevailin themidstof wardue to theorganizational
armedforces.
because it shapes organizational
In sum, organizational
cultureis important
by noncultural
and capabilitiesin waysunexpected
perception,
identity,
priorities,
culturewillbe
withthedominant
war-fighting
Thosemeanscompatible
approaches.
developedand advocatedby the military;thosethatare not will sufferbenign
can remainfairlyconsistent,
neglect.Even as theculturaltendenciesof militaries
salienceinwarmayleadtochangeinnationalpolicy
theirheightened
organizational
on theuse of force.Withregardto WorldWarII, thisview predictsthat,ceteris
a particular
formof
paribus,a statewill favoradherenceto normsproscribing
cultureof its military
to the war-fighting
combatif thatformis antithetical
with
violationsregarding
meansthatarecompatible
Stateswillprefer
bureaucracy.
meansof warfaredoes notcorrespond
cultures.Wherea particular
organizational
and
thereshouldbe weakplanning
withthemilitary's
dominant
war-fighting
culture,
littleadvocacyby the top militaryleadershipfor escalation.Culturallyshaped
of thosemeans.Organizaand exerciseswillattestto thelimitedutility
maneuvers
willbe biasedagainstuse. On theotherhand,violationis
tionalintelligence
findings
philosophythat
likelywherea means of warfareis centralto the war-fighting
governsmilitarythinking.In this case, we can expect energeticadvocacy;
andcapabilities;
andoptimistic
intelligence
reports
plans,strategies,
well-developed
The
formofwarfare.
bothon theneedforandtheexpectedimpactoftheprohibited
21. See Krasner1972;andArt1973.
38 International
Organization
resisttheuse ofmeans
organizational
cultureapproachis less plausibleifmilitaries
compatiblewiththeirculture;if militarybiases have no influenceon national
arespuriousandseemtochangeeasilyunderthe
perspectives;
orifmilitary
cultures
normsor thedemandsof thestrategic
swayof otherfactors,
suchas international
situation.
Normsand organizationalculturein WorldWar II
powerof the two approaches,I relyon two
To assess the relativeexplanatory
of each approach'sabilityto predict
methods.The firstis a macrocorrelation
ofcases.The secondis an in-depth
analysisofsomeofthe
outcomesacrossa number
ofthecausalmechanisms.
history
toillustrate
thevalidity
bombing,and CW in World
The cases I examinerelateto submarines,
strategic
WarII. Thesearea goodfocusbecausetheywerethethreemaintypesofcombatthat
in theinterwar
stateshad consideredforlimitation
period.These threealso make
because theyallow forvariationin boththe
sense forassessingthepropositions
on the
"independent"
(normsand culture)and the "dependent"(statepreferences
suchas thepersonalities,
andthey"control"otherfactors,
the
use offorce)variables,
Withinthe
causesofconflict,
thestakesatrisk,andthegeneralinternational
setting.
I examine
I investigate
a totalofeightcases. In submarine
threecategories,
warfare,
I focusonBritainand
andtheUnitedStates.In strategic
bombing,
Britain,
Germany,
And in CW, the analysisconsidersBritain,Germany,and the Soviet
Germany.
Union. I selectedcountriesbecause theywere eitherthe centralpossessorsor
means of warfareor because theirbehaviorwas
potentialusers of a particular
anomalous.Forexample,whydidtheSovietUnionnotuse CW inJune1941whenit
Germaninvasionandimminent
defeat,hadtheweaponsin
was facinga devastating
I excludedcases that
its inventory,
and had adopteda "scorchedearth"strategy?
mightat firstglance seem relevantbecause theydid not allow a comparable
or becauseI couldnotverify
that
assessment
of thenormsandculturepropositions
realistconcerns(discussed
normsor culturewerenotepiphenomenal
to strategic
below). For example,I excluded both U.S. strategicbombing(includingthe
droppingof theatombomb)and CW use againstJapanbecause Japancould not
retaliateagainsttheUnitedStateswithcomparablemeans,thusremovinga key
condition
thatis presentin theothercases.Whilethelistofcases
balance-of-forces
examineddoes not comprisethe entireuniverseof possible cases, it is a
one.
representative
Macrocorrelation
is througha small-n
A firstway to assess the two alternative
propositions
of theirpredictions
versustheoutcomesacrossthecases. Thisrequires
comparison
ofthecontent
oftheirpredictions.
specification
Norms 39
Measuring norms.A normaccountrequiresa senseof therelativerobustness,
in thethree
oftheprohibitions
andconcordance,
basedon thespecificity,
durability,
I offerno preciseformulaon how to aggregatethethreeintoan
typesof warfare.
but
interpretive,
Likeall coding,thisexerciseis partly
overallmeasureofrobustness.
at all ordo
itimproveson manystudiesthatofferno wayto evaluatenormstrength
from
mustmeasureitindependently
so tautologically.
Anyevaluationofrobustness
for
comes
to
prior
norm's
evidence
robustness
from
the
period
the
effects.
Here,the
In
contrast,
the
phenomena.
international-level
1939 and describesprimarily
on adherence
to norms
variable(discussedbelow)is nationalpreferences
dependent
strategic
on submarine
warfare,
limiting
theuse offorceafter1939.Theprohibitions
bombing,
andCW eachdeservebriefdescription.
In submarine
warfare,
it was notso muchtheweaponitselfthatwas stigmatized
but its employment
againstcivilianships and personnel.What was considered
attention
to
andpassengershipswithout
ofmerchant
illegitimate
was thedestruction
the safetyof thoseon board-a practicethatcame to be knownas unrestricted
submarine
warfare.22
robustin its
warfareis notableas relatively
The normagainstsuchunrestricted
submarinewarfare
and concordance.The rulesregulating
durability,
specificity,
limitations
on attacksat sea
durable.Moderninternational
stoodout as relatively
of 1899. WhenGermanyused
dateback at least to theHague Peace Conference
inWorldWarI, itprovokeda significant
submarine
warfare
unrestricted
extensively
Overthecourseof
intheU.S. entrance
intotheconflict.
culminating
adversereaction
were repeatedlydiscussedin the
on submarines
the interwar
years,prohibitions
even
and generally
approved.Mostimportant,
contextof international
conferences
crumbledin the wake of risinginternational
as otherinternational
agreements
theillegality
ofunderwater
tensioninthelate1930s,countries
tookpainstoreaffirm
boat attackson merchant
ships.They gatheredin 1936 to approvethe London
Protocolon SubmarineWarfare,while the broaderLondon Naval Conference
whenthe LondonProtocolwas anonydissolvedin disagreement.
Significantly,
tookaction
mouslyviolated(byItaly)in 1937duringtheSpanishcivilwar,countries
unrestricted
attacks
andthe
stopped.23
topunishanyfurther
violations,
historians
havecalledtherulesexplicitandlegally
Despitethefactthatprominent
For example,the
binding,theprotocoldid presentsomeproblemsin specificity.24
clear.Whether
the
ofwhatconstituted
a "merchant
definition
ship"was notentirely
was
purposes,madeitan actualcombatant
armingofa vessel,eveniffordefensive
and
therightto armits merchants
hotlydisputed.Britainwas intenton retaining
rules,see Burns1971;
ofthesubmarine
accountsofthedevelopment
22. Forsolid,concise,secondary
andManson1993.
23. See Toynbee1938,339-49; andFrank1990.
in theStrategy
ofAmericanDefenseandDiplomacy,
24. See SamuelF. Bemis,"SubmarineWarfare
Library,
Box 1603A,
fortheU.S. Navy,15 December1961,Yale University
1915-1945,"Studyprepared
15-16; andMorison1951,8.
40 International
Organization
denied that such armamentsalteredtheircivilian status.25Nonetheless,even
defensivearmaments
compriseda threat
to submarines
thatwerehighlyvulnerable
on thesurfacewhileconducting
therequiredsearchand seizureprocedures.
The
rulesaboutproviding
forthesafetyofpassengersandcrewswhensinkingmerchant
vesselswerelikewise
vague.Becauseunderwater
boatshadsmallcrews,theycouldoften
notafford
toleavementosailtheshipintoport.Furthermore,
theycouldnotgenerally
take
thenoncombatant's
crewandpassengers
aboardbecauseofthelackofspace.Thesepeople
couldbeputintheir
onwhether
emergency
boats,butcountries
differed
thiswassafe.
Finally,intermsofconcordance,
theregimereceivedwidespread
Priorto
support.
the war, the submarinerules had been acceptedand reaffirmed
by a total of
forty-eight
states.AmongthemwereBritain,
Germany,
Japan,theSovietUnion,and
theUnitedStates,all centralcombatants
duringWorldWarII. Overall,in termsof
and concordance,
durability,
specificity,
thesubmarine
rulesrepresented
themost
robustinstitution
ofthethreeexaminedinthisstudy.
The secondnormconstrained
strategic
bombing.Statesmenmade considerable
efforts
duringtheinterwar
yearsto reducethequantity
of military
aircraft
and/or
to
findways to regulateconflictby agreeingon rules and restrictions.
The main
distinction
theyhopedto enforcewas betweenbombingciviliansand combatants.
Personsparticipating
directlyin thewar effort
weregenerallyseen as legitimate
targets
ofairpower.All otherswereto be considered
illegitimate
on whom
victims,
onlytheinhumane
andcriminal
woulddropbombs.26
Concordancewas low,however.Therewas littleconsensusamongnationson the
rules. No firmagreementon aerial bombingwas apparentin the discourseof
international
negotiations
or acceptedin treaty
languageduringtheinterwar
years.
AtthestartofWorldWarII, BritainandGermany
didagreeverballytoan appealfor
restraint
by U.S. PresidentRoosevelt,but this last-minute
accord raised,at a
minimum,
questionsofcommitment.27
Because concordance
was low,resulting
in theabsenceof a finalizedagreement,
is difficult
specificity
toevaluate.Generally,
theparticipants
however,
seemedtouse
the1923Hague Commissionof Jurists'
productas a benchmark.
Eventhoughthey
were the mostdetailedof the interwar
years,theserules,too, were troubledby
disagreement.
The mainpointofcontention
was whatexactlyconstituted
a military
objective.Werecivilianfactories
producing
partsforairplanesa legitimate
target?
Wasitacceptabletobombtroopbarrackssurrounded
byhospitalsandschools?Each
stateseemedtohavea different
wayofdifferentiating
civilianfromcombatant,
safe
zonefrombattlearea,legitimate
fromillegitimate
In theabsenceofclear
bombing.28
rules,we can onlyconcludethatspecificity
was indeedlow.
Normson strategic
bombingwerealso as fragileas anystudiedhere.29
Linkedto
theprohibition
againstattacking
citieswas an agreement
undefended
at the 1899
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
Burns1971,58.
Spaight1947,43.
On thisagreement,
see ibid.,259-60.
See Moore1924,194-202;andSpaight1947,43-47.
Parks1992arguesthattheruleswerelargelyillegitimate.
Norms 41
weaponsfromballoonsor "othernewweaponsofa
thatdropping
Hagueconference
did not
whiletherepresentatives
similarnature"was notallowable.Additionally,
elect to include specificlanguagerelatedto the airplaneat the 1907 Hague
citiesand
undefended
againstattacking
theprohibition
theydidreaffirm
conference,
Nonetheless,in WorldWar I some statesdid bomb cities.By the
dwellings.30
appeal was theonly
of WorldWarII, FranklinRoosevelt'slast-minute
beginning
To theextentthat
bombing.
torestrict
commitment
vestigeofstates'explicitexternal
very
theywerenotrespected
a de factoprohibition,
the1923Haguerulescomprised
in Chinaand Spainduringthe1930s.Overall,thenormsof air
wellin theconflicts
or CW.
warfare
to eithersubmarine
wereless developedthanthoserelating
warfare
to limittheuse offorcein thisperiod
efforts
The thirdmajortargetofdiplomatic
againstthe use of poison agentshad existedfor
was CW. While prohibitions
On theone hand,
normon gas use showedmixeddurability.
theinterwar
centuries,
law fromtheturnofthe
on chemicaluse hadbeena partofinternational
constraints
duringWorld
egregiously
On theother,stateshad violatedtheconstraints
century.
of gas werediscussedin a numberof
on theuse or manufacture
WarI. Limitations
conferences
duringthe 1920s and 1930s. The issue of limitson CW was first
fromusing,
Germany
in 1919thatprohibited
broachedattheParisPeace Conference
to
andequipment
poisonousgasesortherawmaterials
orimporting
manufacturing,
at the 1921-22 Washington
producethem.CW receivedconsiderableattention
theuse
buta provisionthatprohibited
ofArmaments,
on theLimitation
Conference
The 1925GenevaConference
ofpoisongasesinwarwas proposedbutneverratified.
and in
Trade in Armsand Ammunition
forthe Supervisionof the International
of War providedanotherforumin whichCW was discussed.After
Implements
proposalsto prohibitthe exportof poisonousgases and relatedmaterialswere
rejected,diplomatsdecidedto act again on theCW provisionsof theWashington
becameknownas theGeneva Protocol.It was the only
This agreement
treaty.31
stormy
periodandhada somewhat
on CW concludedduringtheinterwar
agreement
in 1935
inthoseyears.Forexample,Italyviolatedtheagreement
recordofadherence
in its war withEthiopia.The League of Nationsrespondedweaklywithlimited
In 1938,
economicsanctionsthatwerenotenforcedand werelargelyineffectual.32
whenJapanusedchemicalweaponsin China,theLeague ofNationsandmostother
politiessimplyignoredtheevent.33
Japan
Concordancewiththenormwas moderate.The problemwas thatneither
the 1925 protocolbeforethestartof warin
northeUnitedStatespubliclyratified
Britainand Franceagreedto respectthenormonlyin conflicts
1939.Furthermore,
andwhosealliesalso adheredtothe
theagreement
withotherpartiesthathadratified
inWorldWarII.
ramifications
Thisprovisionmighthavehad significant
agreement.
For example,sinceJapanengagedin CW in China and was an ally of Germany,
wouldno longerhavebeenguaranteed.
Britain'spledgeofrestraint
30.
31.
32.
33.
see Parks1992;Royse1928;andDe Saussure1971.
On thedevelopment
ofbombingprohibitions,
see Moon 1993;andPriceforthcoming.
oftheprohibition,
Forstudiesofthedevelopment
See Fair 1985,45; SIPRI 1971b,180.
SIPRI 1971b,189-90.
Organization
42 International
TABLE 1.
Assessingnormrobustness
Submarine
warfare
Chemicalwarfare
Strategicbombing
Specificity
Medium
Veryhigh
Low
Durability
High
Low
Low
Concordance
Veryhigh
Medium
Low
Medium
Low
Overallrelativeassessment High
Prediction
Mostlikelyviolation
Mostlikelyadherence Mixedadherence/violation
would
however.
nations
Signatory
TheGenevaProtocol
precise,
was simpleandfairly
Itallowedonly
andalsoshowedrestraint.
iftheother
sidewasa signatory
notuseCW first
smallamounts
ofchemicals;
released
a fewminor
highexplosives
grayareas.Forexample,
was this a violation?The use of nonlethalgas (such as tear gas) was another
to
suchas theUnitedStates,wantedthefreedom
unresolved
area.Some countries,
theanti-CW
normwas
their
ownpopulaces.34
Overall,
gasestocontrol
employnonlethal
submarine
bombing
butlessthanthatlimiting
to strategic
morerobust
thanthatattached
effects.
Table 1 summarizes
theserelationships
alongwiththeirpredicted
warfare.
cultureis gaugedaccordMeasuring organizational cultures. Organizational
a particular
ingto theideas and beliefsabouthow to wage warthatcharacterized
is whether
thefavoredwayof
bureaucracy.
Specifically,
theissueofinterest
military
it
warincorporated
thespecificmeansprohibited
(violationoriented)or designated
A measureofeachculture
oras peripheral
oriented).
eitheras nonorganic
(adherence
planningdocuments,
is developedby reviewingavailableinternal
correspondence,
Thesemultiplesources
exercises,andmemoirsofindividualmembers.
regulations,
providea compositepictureof the hierarchyof legitimatebeliefswithinan
interpretation
Thisis a holisticexercisethatdependson thequalitative
organization.
of the specificcontentof each culture.While thismakesa priorigeneralizations
oriented.
itdoes allowforthecodingofa cultureas violationor adherence
difficult,
a certain
areoftenaccusedofbeingposthoc andtautological:
Culturalexplanations
culturalbeliefcan alwaysbe foundafterthefactthat"explains"a givenaction.In
thiscase,however,
thesourcesI haveusedto measureculturedescribebureaucratic
anddatefromtheearlierinterwar
years,whiletheoutcomestobe explained
thinking
culture
involvenationalpreferences
duringthelaterwar.Thus theorganizational
For example,U.S. Navy culturewas orientedtoward
can be falsified.
hypothesis
warfare
theinterwar
to prohibitions
on unrestricted
submarine
throughout
adhering
period.Yet on the firstday of war the UnitedStatesswitchedto favoringsuch
culturehypothesis.
warfare.
Thiscase tendstodisconfirm
theorganizational
Althoughit is notpossiblehereto documenttheentirelogic of each military's
to theuse of stigmatized
cultureand itsrelationship
force,thebrief
organizational
34. Ibid.,102-4.
Norms 43
summariesbelow can give a snapshotof each cultureand whichpredictionnorm-followsfromit.35
totherespective
violationoforadherence
as a
theGermannavy,unlikemany,viewedthesubmarine
In submarine
warfare,
on
its
force
was
based
valuedcombattool,andbecausetheethosof itsunderwater
were
and
advice
tradeoffensive,
its plans,operations,
WorldWar I unrestricted
bya belief
theBritishnavy,longdominated
biasedinfavorofviolation.In contrast,
means
ancillary
a
strictly
submarines
considered
ofthebattleship,
in thesupremacy
it
raiding,
turn
to
submarine
incentives
to
ofcombat.EvenwhenBritainhadstrategic
was
adversary
main
expected
Navy's
the
Royal
period,
didnot.Duringtheinterwar
campaign,yetthenavyneverconsidered
to a submarine
Japan,a nationvulnerable
to the
British
navalculturefavoredadherence
submarine
strategy.
an anticommerce
in its
"battleship-bound"
Navy,
was
like
the
Royal
Navy,
Finally,
the
U.S.
rules.
to
an
unrestricted
It
little
consideration
interwar
period. gave
duringthe
thinking
commercecampaignagainstJapan,its mainexpectedopponent,despiteJapan's
predictsU.S. adherenceto
Thisculturalorientation
to sucha strategy.
vulnerability
therules.
in submarine
warfare,
theGermanarmy's
In contrast
to thenavy'sorientation
the
CW
norm.
highlighted
Army
thought
led
adherence
to
the
it
to
favor
culture
defensive
as
a
static
of
the
mobile
and
CW-perceived
offensive,
efficacy
was
mindset.The Britishmilitary
weapon-was seen as ill-suitedto thedominant
was
a
The
adherence
but
for
different
reasons.
Army
Royal
also inclinedtoward
hostile
to
that
was
CW,
particuforce
generally
antitechnology
tradition-governed
with
inWorldWarI. CW was morecompatible
experience
larlygivenitsinstitutional
CW
in
of
was
charge
Air
but
the
army
thinking,
Force's
bombing
strategic
theRoyal
and
high
firebombing
force
its
own
biases
toward
The
air
developed
development.
to
not a competitor,
explosives(even thoughgas was considereda complement,
bya faithin
thosemunitions).
Finally,theSovietUnion'sRedArmywas dominated
thatwas encouragedby its civil war experienceand
theoffensive,
an orientation
It
forthecountry.
orientation
ensuingdebatesabouttheproperpolitical-military
to meanssuch as CW, whichwas perceivedas
paid less attention
subsequently
totheCW rules.
favoredadherence
usefulindefense.Thisorientation
primarily
In strategic
Britain'sRoyalAirForcedevelopedarounda "faith"inthe
bombing,
of strategic
againstciviliansand theirmorale.
effectiveness
bombing,particularly
by this
all were affected
Personnel,plans,weaponsacquisition,and intelligence
ideology.This culturefavoreda violationof therules,evenas geopoliticalfactors
ittoyedwithstrategic
andpopularconcerncautionedagainstsuchaction.Although
from
as thewaryears
the
air
force
moved
such
concepts
German
away
bombing,
continental
traditionof
The
influenced
by
Germany's
Luftwaffe,
approached.
to
was morefocusedon contributing
factors,
ofcircumstantial
warfare
anda variety
enemymoralein
bytargeting
thegroundand sea campaignsthanachievingvictory
Thisculturewas moreinclinedtowardadherence
an unrestricted
bombingoffensive.
totheruleson strategic
bombing.
see Legro1995.
35. Fora moredetailedanalysisofthesecultures,
44 International
Organization
TABLE 2.
twoapproachesand thepatternofnormadherence
A macrocorrelation:
Predictionsa
Case
Norm
culture
Organizational
Outcome(N = 8)
Britain
Chemicalwarfare
Strategic
bombing
Submarine
warfare
Mixed(i/2)b
Violation(1)
Adherence
(1)
Adherence
(1)
Violation(1)
Adherence
(1)
Adherence
Violation
Adherencec
Germany
Chemicalwarfare
Strategic
bombing
Submarine
warfare
Mixed(1/2)
Violation(0)
Adherence
(0)
Adherence
(1)
Adherence
(1)
Violation(1)
Adherence
Adherencec
Violation
SovietUnion
Chemicalwarfare
Mixed(I/2)
Adherence
(1)
Adherence
UnitedStates
Submarine
warfare
Adherence
(0)
Adherence
(0)
Violation
fit
Correlational
3.5/8
7/8
andoutcomeis inparentheses.
It was scoredas follows:0 = no
aThematchbetweenprediction
match;1 = match;1/2= halfa match(see below).
a middlepositionon thenormrobustness
continuum.
It predicts
that
bThemixedpattern
represents
ofpreferences
formutualadherence
andviolawouldhaveshowna varying
chemicalwarfare
pattern
a partialorvarying
forrestraint
andis indeterminate
as to
tion.Sincethisviewalso predicts
preference
I havescoreditinfavorofthenormproposition
as halfa match.
thedominant
preference,
use,as allowed
cThoughthestateeventually
violatedthenorm,itdidso onlyaftertheotherside'sfirst
andthuswas codedas adherence.
bynormsin all threecategories,
versus
of expectedeffects
Predictions versus outcomes. A macrocomparison
ofnormsand
WorldWarII yieldsa first
lookattheinfluence
actualoutcomesduring
of
culture.For thisanalysis,"outcome"refersto thepreferences
organizational
betweenconsciousviolationof a
states,nottheiractions.We can thusdistinguish
normwiththosesituationswherestatesmay have respondedto theotherside's
violation(an allowableaction)or wheretheycrossedboundariesby accident.In
and actioncorrespondclosely.I measuredpreferences
by
practice,preferences
discussionsof thewartimeleadershipregarding
its desired
reviewingtheinternal
bodieswereoftensmallgroupsthatdebatedand
outcomes.Such decision-making
reacheda consensuson desiredends.
Table 2 summarizestherelativepredictivefitof the normand organizational
froman organizational
cultureperspective
matched
cultureapproaches.Predictions
moreconsistently
thanpredictions
froma normperspectheoutcomesignificantly
aremostrobust,
tive(7 versus3.5 of8). In thosecases wherenormative
prohibitions
forinstance,we shouldexpectadherenceor at least the slowestshifttowardthe
forviolation
Wherenormsare thinlydeveloped,a preference
oppositepreference.
Norms 45
betweennorm
therelationship
however,
shouldbe morelikely.As Table2 indicates,
on the use of forceseems weak. For example,in
robustnessand preferences
was mostrobust,nationsfirst
of restraint
wheretheinstitution
warfare,
submarine
was less developed,nations
favoredescalation.Yet in CW, wheretheinstitution
theconflict.
throughout
restraint
preferred
cultureand state
linkbetweenmilitary
consistent
Table 2 displaysa relatively
prohibitions
theuse offorce.Whenculturefavoredviolation,
regarding
preferences
And when culturewas inclinedtoward
againstuse generallywere disregarded.
norms.In bothabsolute
to international
adherence
statestendedtoprefer
adherence,
withthevariationin
culturecorrelatesstrongly
and relativeterms,organizational
on theuse offorce.
adherence
tothelimitations
Microassessmentof causal mechanisms
to the
A closerlook at thedetailsof WorldWarII is a necessarycomplement
in threeways.First,itprovidesa bettersenseof thecontentand
macrocomparison
culture.Second,as
such as normsand organizational
use of analyticalconstructs
byitselfdoesnottell
arequicktopointout,correlation
methodologists
sophisticated
checkingof
allowsforbetter
association.Microanalysis
us whatcausedtheapparent
Finally,suchanalysisis useful
thecausal mechanisms
positedby each approach.36
arenotspuriousowingto
relationships
forcheckingto makesurethatthepresumed
advantage.A
some otherinfluence.One clear possibilityis political-military
"strategicrealist"view would arguethatespeciallyin war,stateschoose means
violating
goals;stateswillprefer
tostrategic
totheirexpectedcontribution
according
fromdoingso.
orpoliticalbenefits
normswhentheyexpectto reaprelativemilitary
a state'sposition,escalationis probable.
In thosesituations
whereviolationsfurther
willresultfromescalation,adherence
Likewise,whena relativeloss ordisadvantage
is morelikely.37
cases.
warfare
focuseson theGermanandBritishsubmarine
Mymicroassessment
Given space limitations,
these cases offermaximumanalyticalleverage.They
butthetwo countriesinvolvedhad different
comprisethesame formof warfare,
normand
The cases allowus to differentiate
on violationor adherence.
preferences
advanstrategic
regarding
whilealso checkingforspuriousness
culturalinfluences
fora normapproachbased
theyoffer"mostlikely"observations
tage.Furthermore,
and dependentvariables.The normwas most robustin
on both independent
in thatarea.
submarine
warfare,so thatnormeffectsshouldbe mostsignificant
of
fortheinfluence
a priorisupport
Moreover,
theBritishcase atleastseemstooffer
A careful
ofthenormhypothesis.
thepredictions
matched
norms:British
preferences
is
processreveals,however,thatthisrelationship
studyof the decision-making
cause.
culturewas themoreinfluential
andthatorganizational
problematic
36. GeorgeandMcKeown1985.
see Legro1995.
ofthisproposition,
37. Fora moredevelopeddiscussionandassessment
Organization
46 International
duringWorldWarII shouldhavebeen
German submarinewarfare.Restraint
ofthat
relativerobustness
warfare,
giventhestrong
mostlikelyas regardssubmarine
a countrywhose prior
trueforGermany,
norm.This expectationis particularly
theUnitedStates
violationof therulein WorldWarI had beenheavilysanctioned:
in thedefeatof the
to enterthewar,resulting
was provokedby thattransgression
An organizational
cultureview,however,would expecta bias
Kaiser's forces.38
quickly
towardescalation.Andin thiscase,thatwas whathappenedwhenGermany
cannotbe dismissedas
came to preferviolationof thenorm.Such a preference
whichwouldbe less
inGermany,
government
oftheauthoritarian
simplya reflection
norms.While the Holocaustclearlytestifiesto the
likelyto heed international
was willingto adhereto some
of theNazi regime,Germanyapparently
depravity
bombing)in its behaviorwithother
(forexamplein CW and strategic
limitations
cultureto haveplayedthe
states.The case studythatfollowsshowsorganizational
realistargument
mightcontend
centralrolein theoutcome.To be sure,a strategic
againstBritainand
advantageto Germany
warfare
thatsubmarine
gavea significant
ofthat
was therefore
merelya reflection
predilection
thatGermany's
organizational
is unconvincing,
however,because Germanychose to
advantage.This argument
no strategic
advantagefordoingso.
offered
escalateata timewhenthesituation
WhenAdolphHitlerinvadedPolandon 1 September1939,he hopedto avoida
goal in
clash withBritain.WhiletheFiihrer'smotiveswerecomplex,his primary
notinvasionof theBritishIsles.39Accordingly,
hegemony,
1939 was continental
ordersto
weresentto sea inAugusttheyweregivenstrict
whenGermansubmarines
Thisfit
and
merchant
ships.40
attacksagainstcivilian
submarine
obeyruleslimiting
of thoseprohibitions,
Germany'ssupportof therulesin 1930 and itsreaffirmation
in the1936 LondonProtocol
obligations,
manyothertreaty
evenwhilerenouncing
favoredadherence,
ofthewar,Germany
yet
Warfare.
Atthebeginning
on Submarine
warfare.
tounrestricted
submarine
withinsixweeksitturned
thisoutcomegiventhattheprohibition
timeexplaining
Normlogichas a difficult
considerthisfinding:
processsupports
robust.The decision-making
was relatively
the
turn
toward
constrain
ordefinitively
ationslinkedto thenormdidnotdetermine
in
werestillconsequential severalways.First,
however,
escalation.Theprohibitions,
merchant
shipswas left
attacking
whatever
stigmaofsubmarines
therulesreinforced
the
"rightness"
to
fromWorldWarI. Forexample,theLondonprotocolcontributed
that
British(andAmerican)opinion violations
reinforcing
oftheearlierrestrictions,
Germany's
calculation
reinforced
wereheinous.Thustherulesmayhavemarginally
continue
with its
Britain
resolve
to
the rules would give
that transgressing
in
U.S.
participation
and
or
provoke
spirit,
to fight,
addingto itsmorale
declaration
not
violation.
The
issue
was
the
manner
of
thewar.41
Second,therulesalso shaped
38. May 1959,416-37.
1947,3-5.
39. See Hinsley1951,4-9; Rich 1974,394-95; andOfficeofNavalIntelligence
Nordsee'(U27,
40. U.S. NationalArchives,RG 242, "OpbefehlNr. 2 furU-Boote 'Alarmiubung
U30)," Kiel 21.8.39,T-1022,PG32012-NID.Also see Padfield1984,191.
negative
an increasein Britishmoraleas a potential
thatmentions
41. Foran exampleofa document
Roll von derMarinenachrichtensee U.S. NationalArchives,RG 242, Korvettekapitan
violationeffect,
Norms 47
how to remainwithintheregimebuthow to circumscribe
it in the least costly
fashion.DuringthewartheThirdReichattempted
touse languageinstrumentally
so
as to avoid reminding
othershow Germanycreatednew enemiesin WorldWarI
throughits unrestricted
use of the U-boat.The terms"submarinewarfare"and
"unrestricted
submarine
warfare"wereprohibited
and replacedby "war against
merchant
ships."Eric Raeder,thecommander
in chiefof thenavy,proposedthat
whenthetimingwas rightGermanyshoulddeclarea "siege of England"because
"sucha military
systemwouldfree"Germany
fromitspromisesundertheLondon
Protocol.42
Third,consideration
of theinternational
normdid affectthetimingof
military
action.Germany
delayeditsescalationto allowtimeto offset
anynegative
international
reactions.On 23 September1939, Hitleragreedthatshipstraveling
withoutlightsin theEnglishChannelcould be firedon withoutwarning,
butthe
commandwas notimmediately
implemented.
The ForeignMinistry
appealedfora
four-daypropagandacampaignto influenceinternational
opinion before any
intensification
of thesubmarine
campaign.43
However,whilethesubmarine
norms
influenced
policyimplementation,
theydidnotdecidepreferences
orprevent
theuse
of unrestricted
warfare.To understand
Germany'sviolationof therules,we must
looktotheorganizational
cultureofitsnavy.
The Germannavy,likemany,was drawnintheinterwar
periodbythesirencall of
"battleship
supremacy"
thatheldthatthebig-gunsurfaceshipwas thekeyto naval
success.But to a degreenotseen in mostothercountries,
theThirdReichhad a
vibrant
pro-submarine
culture
withinitsmaritime
forces.Forexample,inBritainand
theUnitedStates,thesubmarine,
as a commerceraider,was relatively
particularly
ignoredin the interwarperiod,despitethe factthatboth countriesconsidered
Japan-an islandnationvulnerable
to an anticommerce
submarine
campaign-as a
In Germany,
primary
future
opponent.44
thesubmarine
culturewas suppressed
fora
good partof theinterwar
periodas a resultof international
treatiesand internal
politics,buttheU-boatarmenduredandevendevelopedintheinterwar
years.
The U-boat corps was centeredon an aggressiveanticommerce
doctrine.
Germany'ssuccessin usingtheU-boatagainstBritishtradein WorldWarI had
createda cultofbelievers.The submarine
forceattracted
someofthemostambitious
andtalented
officers,
seducedbyitspastexploitsandeliteattitude.45
KarlDonitz,the
chiefof theU-boatforce,soughtto infusehis menwithan offensive
anything-isHe also led therenewaloftheWorldWarI U-boatcreed,one that
possiblespirit.46
seemedatoddswitha pledgenottoattackmerchants
without
therules.The
breaking
inspektion,"Die (Welt) propagandaals Mittelzur Auswertung
militarisher
Erfolgeals Mittelzur
Abschwachung
derWirkung
militarischer
MiPerfolge,"
Winterarbeit
1937/8,
T-1022,Roll 1970.
42. U.S. OfficeofNaval Intelligence,
"Conference
BetweentheChief,Naval StaffandtheFuhreron
23 September
1939inZoppot,"9.
43. FRG BA-MA, RM 71200, "Kurze Aufzeichnung
uber das Ergebnisder Besprechungin der
Seekriegsleitung
am 27.9.39."
44. See Terraine1989,158;andBlair1975.
45. Robertson1956,16.
46. See FRG BA-MA,RM 87/3,Befehlshaber
derUnterseeboat,
15 September
Kriegstagebuch,
1939;
andDonitz1959,12-13.
48 International
Organization
GermanU-boats practicedattackingconvoys that in wartimewould include
merchantships. Even the acousticaldetectionarrayin the Germanboats was
The enthusiasm
role.47
forU-boatsbiasedthe
allegedlydesignedforan antishipping
verypeacetimeexercisesthatwereintended
as objectivetestsof combateffectiveness. The trialswerebased on unrealistic
conditions,
and officialsdrewpositive
fromambiguousresults.48
Donitzlaterusedtheseexercisestoarguethat
conclusions
From
theU-boatshouldbe thebackboneof thenavy'scampaignagainstBritain.49
of thewar,thenavypushedfora decisiveassaulton Britain.Raeder
thebeginning
pressedHitlerbothformoresubmarines
and foran end to restrictions
on theiruse
camequicklythereafter.
againstBritishtrade.Violationoftheprohibition
Some mightarguethatthisoutcomewas not so muchthe resultof cultural
dynamicsas a simplestrategicadvantage.Britain,as a landlockedisland,was
to unrestricted
submarine
vulnerable
warfare,
sinceitcouldstrangle
thesea linesof
commerce
on whichitdepended.Germany,
as a landpower,was less vulnerable
and
submarinewarfare.This view, however,ignoresthe
thus favoredunrestricted
thepossiblemilitary
strategic
politicalgoalsatthetimeandexaggerates
benefits.
Hitler'scentralaim in thisperiodof thewarwas to avoidprovoking
Britainand
therefore
allowfora settlement
shortofwar.The Fiihrer
calculatedthatBritainwas
not activelyfighting
back and therefore
mightbe willingto end hostilities.50
theirmerchant
Attacking
shipsmightpushtheBritishintoa cornerwherebloodshed
was theonlyoption.Equallyimportant,
Hitlerwishedto avoidantagonizing
neutral
countries
whosemerchant
shipstradedwithBritain.HavingBritainas an enemywas
bad enough.Provoking
theUnitedStatesmightfundamentally
alterthebalanceof
poweragainstGermany.
Againstsuchpossiblecosts,thepotential
military
gainshadtobe considered.
But
thesegainswererelatively
limited.The Reichhad
despitethegeostrategic
setting,
onlytwenty-six
oceangoingU-boatsat the startof war,a thirdof whichcould
be on stationsimultaneously.5'
Donitzarguedthatthreehundred
normally
wouldbe
neededto defeatBritain,recognizing
thateventhe "maximumdamage"expected
fromimmediate
unrestricted
warfare
wouldfallfarshortofvictory.52
Nevertheless,
despitetherisks,thenavypushedforimmediate
escalation.Raeder
andDonitzzealouslypromoted
theircase atthehighest
levelsofgovernment.
Donitz
in personon 28 September1939 that"in theU-boatwe have,and
toldtheFuihrer
alwayshave had, a weaponcapableof dealingBritaina mortalblow at hermost
vulnerablespot"-but thatmoreboats would be needed.53As evidence,naval
leadersuncritically
usedoverblown
reports
ofsubmarine
successeswhilepointing
to
47. See Padfield1984,158-60and 171-75;andSimpson1972,61.
48. Padfield1984,171-80.
Schniewind,
23
49. U.S. NationalArchives,RG 242, Memorandum
fromDonitzto Konteradmiral
by Donitz to OKM,
May 1939, T-1022, Roll 2138; and FRG BA-MA, RM 7/891,Memorandum
3 September
"Gedankenuiber
denAufbauderU-Bootswaffe,"
1939.
50. U.S. OfficeofNavalIntelligence
1947,3-5.
toOKM, 3 September
1939.
51. FRG BA-MA,RM 7/891,Memorandum
byD1onitz
52. Ibid.
53. Dontiz1959,123.
Norms 49
This occurredeven thoughForeignMinistry
of therules.54
Britishtransgressions
officialsarguedthatthe militaryadvantagesthatwould resultfromunrestricted
role
Becauseofthenavy'smonopolistic
werenotworththepoliticalcosts.55
warfare
itsinput
however,
in sea warfare,
andimplementation
evaluation,
in agendasetting,
In thefallof 1939,Raederwentso faras to
calculations.
decisivelyshapedstrategic
heedingthesubmarine
U-boatsmustsinkU.S. shipswithout
contendthatGermany's
ruleseventhoughitwouldriskwarwiththeUnitedStates.The Germannavalstaff
andfewer
actuallywelcomedU.S. entryintothewarbecauseitmeantmoretargets
warfare
despitetheill fitwith
Hitlerbitbybitgave in to unrestricted
restrictions.56
Britain(or the United
his overriding
strategicpoliticalaim of not antagonizing
resultsthatwereexpected.Bothfor
States)anddespitethemeagertacticalmilitary
cultureprovidesa robustexplanation.
andprocess,organizational
prediction
in thiscase, an outcome
restraint
Britishsubmarinewarfare.Britainpreferred
predict.
advantagepropositions
and strategic
culture,
thatthenorms,organizational
processin thiscase helpsto sortout therelative
Examiningthedecision-making
thatare
influenceof the threebecause it increasesthe numberof observations
British
of causal mechanisms.57
relevantand permitsdifferentiation
theoretically
rulesoccurredin two key stages:beforeand after
calculationson the submarine
Germanescalation.
to
and actionsbeforetheGermanescalationcan be attributed
Britishpreferences
severalcauses. The robustnessof the submarinenormand Britain'sparticularly
preference
itduringtheinterwar
periodindicatea strong
roleinpromoting
energetic
restraint
becauseBritainwas dependent
realismalso predicts
forrestraint.
Strategic
use couldonlybe
on tradeand defendedby a largesurfacefleet;hencesubmarine
werethe
culturevantagepoint,theexpectedeffects
harmful.
Froman organizational
same: the navy orthodoxysaw very limitedpossibilitiesfor employingthe
normadherence.
thusfavoring
submarine,
came after
A secondstage,one thatallowsus to sortoutthethreepropositions,
rulesin October1939,whenBritaincontinued
hadviolatedthesubmarine
Germany
A strategic
viewwouldexpectescalationat thispoint.Britain
to adhereto restraint.
tothenormbecauseitno longerhadto
adherence
no longerhadanyreasontoprefer
Germany
fearthatits own use wouldinducethemorecostlyGermanretaliation:
submarinescould play an
the rules. More important,
alreadyhad transgressed
was usingmerchant
shipsto importironore-a
role.Germany
immediate
strategic
bothSweden and, in the winter,
criticalmaterialforNazi war industries-from
shouldbe used to
In October,some proposedthatBritishsubmarines
Norway.58
1947;Dbnitz1959,123; andAssmann1950,665.
54. See U.S. OfficeofNavalIntelligence
14 October1939,and
totheForeignMinister,
Weizsacker
55. U.S. 1954,doc. no. 256,StateSecretary
17 October1939.
bytheStateSecretary
Weizsacker,
doc. no. 270,Memorandum
56. Herwig1976,197.
57. GeorgeandMcKeown1985,36.
fromFirstLord,19 September1939; and Roskill
58. See U.K. PRO, ADM 199/892,Memorandum
1968,156.
50 International
Organization
theironorewas
intercept
thistrade.BecauseoficeboundBalticportsin thewinter,
sent to Narvikand shippedthroughNorwegiancoastal watersand across the
submarinewarfarewould be
Skagerrakand Kattegat,areas whereunrestricted
effective
butwhereBritishsurfaceshipswereeithervulnerableor wouldviolate
waters.
Norwegian
A normperspectivepredictsexpectations,
thinking,
desires,and actionsthat
reflectthe prescriptions
of the submarinerulesor concernsaboutthe effectsof
afterGermanyhad escalated
them.Accordingto thisperspective,
transgressing
Britainshouldhavedonethesame,sincethenormwas oneofquidproquo restraint.
Ifonlytoreinforce
towardescalation,yetitdid
thenorm,Britainshouldhaveturned
not.
in Britain'sdecision-making
Some evidencesuggestsnormswere influential
a viewthatrecognizes
process,although
again,theywerenotdecisive.Specifically,
atleastone
andstrategic
concerns
boththeimpactofnormative
captures
prohibitions
clear that
partof the process.In the earlyfall of 1939, it became increasingly
warfare.
The BritishForeignOffice
Germanywas violatingtherulesof submarine
reportedincidentsrelatedto the
notedthat,as of 5 October,nine of thirty-one
listofillegalities."By
to a "formidable
submarine
ruleswereviolations,
amounting
was makingillegalattacks.59
theendof October,thenavyhad concludedGermany
froma
severalideaswereforwarded,
As Britainconsidered
howtorespond,
ranging
inthe
warfare
unrestricted
looserinterpretation
oftheLondonprotocoltopermitting
Baltic.60These proposals,however,were rejected.Not only was the idea of
wouldnotapprove
warfare
turned
downbuttheLordsoftheAdmiralty
unrestricted
of theprotocol'ssearchand seizure
even looseningBritain'sstrictinterpretation
to buildamong
rules.Britainwas concernedthatthegoodwillit was attempting
be employed.The Lords
neutralcountries
wouldbe dissipatedshouldsubmarines
sensiblyfearedthatsome accidentwould resultthatwould alienateimportant
countriessuch as Norwayand Sweden.6'Britainwantedto avoid antagonizing
neutralcountries
especiallywithregardto one issue,thecontrolofGermanexports.
a "contraband"
systemto limitThirdReichimports
Britainhad alreadyinstituted
and now wantedto do thesameto Germany'soutgoingtrade.To accomplishthis,
oftheneutral
countries
hadto
Britainwouldneedthesupport
andtherefore
however,
in mind.The Britishplan was to forgotit-for-tat
repliesto
keep theirinterests
Germany'sbreachesof theLondonProtocoland insteadallow theillegalitiesto
Germanexports.62
itwouldthenrespondbycontrolling
accumulate;
fromWilliamMalkin,ForeignOffice,24 October
59. See U.K. PRO, ADM 1/10584,Memorandum
Branch,October1939.
MinutebytheHead oftheMilitary
1939andADM 199/892,
ADM 199/878,008070/39,Minuteby DeputyChiefof
60. See thefollowingU.K. PRO documents:
MinutebyHead ofMilitary
Branch,October1939;and
theNaval Staff,
25 October1939;ADM 199/892,
ADM 199/892,
MinutebyDirectorofPlans,3 November1939.
Minuteby
MinutebyHead ofMilitary
Branch,andADM 199/892,
61. See U.K. PRO,ADM 199/892,
DirectorofPlans,thelatterofwhichwas approvedbytheFirstLord,FirstSea Lord,DeputyChiefofthe
NavalStaff.
62. See U.K. PRO, ADM 199/878,Minuteby DeputyChiefof theNaval Staff,andADM 199/892,
Branch.
MinutebyHead ofMilitary
Norms 51
While theseincidentsindicatethe influenceof boththe prohibitions
and the
theywereattheheart
strategic
concerns,
eventsthatfollowedcastdoubton whether
In December1939,Britaindidimplement
butin
exportcontrols
ofBritishrestraint.
not its submarineviolations.
responseto Germany's"illegal" miningactivity,
Furthermore,
whileBritainputplans(OperationWilfred)intomotionin earlyApril
mines,it maintainedits
1940 thatviolatedNorwegianwaterswithunderwater
restraints
on submarines.63
Thus even thoughGermanyconductedunrestricted
Britaindidnotturnto
warfare
andneutral
country
reactionbecameless ofa concern,
escalation.AlthoughtherulesallowedBritainto escalateunderthecircumstances,
restraint
obtainedfor five monthsbeyond Germanescalationwhile iron ore
shipments
continued
andevenduring
thefirst
daysoftheNazi invasionofNorwayin
April1940.Why?
The Britishnavy
Organizational
cultureoffers
an answerto thiscuriousrestraint.
was dominatedby a battleship
creedthatconsideredthebig surfaceshipas the
pivotalelementin thelargeclashesoffleetsthatwereexpectedto decidethewarat
ancillarytool. It gave little
sea. Navy leadershipsaw the submarineas a strictly
attention
to and sometimeseven disparagedcommercewarfare,especiallythe
in World
unrestricted
successof Germansubmarines
type.Despitethedevastating
War I, the Royal Navy's postwarassessmentcommitteereaffirmed
that the
As one captainnotedin his
"battleship
retainsherold predominant
position."T5
thecommittee
"hadmerelymadestatements,
hadnotexaminedthe
assertions:
diary,
shewas stillin the
warto findoutwhattheinfluence
ofthebig shipwas,orwhether
mustbe
positionshe used to be [in]. The thingi.e. the futureof the battleship
manner."65
The navy'sexercisesin theinterwar
approachedin a farmorescientific
gave submarines
years,whichweremeantto be objectivemeasuresofcompetence,
creedassumedthatsubmarines
littlechancetoprovetheirworth.Sincethedominant
wererelatively
thenavystructured
itsexercisesaccordingly
andrejected
ineffective,
officer
resultsthatsuggestedotherwise.
At theendof a 1939 exercise,a submarine
toa hallofonethousand
sailorsthattorpedoes
hadhit22 percent
accurately
reported
of
oftheirtargets.
Insteadofthenormalquestions,
AdmiralForbes,thecommander
theHome Fleet,stoodup, declaredthattheofficer
was clearlywrongand that3
The navy'sbattleship
cult
and thesessionended.66
percentwas thecorrectfigure,
also affectedits evaluationof the threatof enemysubmarines.
Ignoringreadily
availableevidence,manybelievedthatthedangerfromGermanU-boatshad been
mastered:
Britaindid notconducta singleexercisein protection
of a slow convoy
between1919and 1939.67
againstthesubmarine
63. Roskill1954,102 and 156-58.
27 March
64. See U.K. PRO, ADM 1/8586,"Final Reportof thePost-WarQuestionsCommittee,"
1920,as citedin Roskill1968,115.Also see Terraine1989,117-18.
Richmondfor10 November1919,as citedin
65. Diaryentryof Captain(laterSirAdmiral)Herbert
Roskill1968,115-16.
66. See Simpson1972,48-49, 57-58,and74-76; Hezlet1967,119;Mars 1971,33; andRoskill1976,
230 and430-31.
67. See Henry1976,381-82;Roskill1976,336-37 and477; andRoskill1954,45,355,and536.
52 International
Organization
In short,
itwas thebattleship
orthodoxy
thatdrovedecisionson whether
toviolate
thenormon submarine
warfare.
The deputychiefof thenavalstaffcommented
in
October1939 that"if it could be shownthatit was essentialforus to takefull
advantageof thelatitudeallowedby theSubmarineProtocolin orderto achieve
some war aim,thenI wouldsay thatwe shouldhave to do so but,at thepresent
I do notthinkthisis thecase."68In fact,hadthesubmarine
moment,
been
regulations
loosened,theunderwater
boatscould have been used effectively
forconsiderable
strategic
advantagebothoffthecoast of Norwayand in thesea channelbetween
Germanyand Sweden and Norway.69Even when the gray uniformsof the
werespottedon merchant
Wehrmacht
ships,BritainallowedGermanshippingto
intheKattegat
continue
duringtheearlystagesoftheReich'sinvasionofNorwayin
in thewatersthrough
April1940.As it had twenty
submarines
whichtheinvasion
fleetsailed,Britain'srestraint
in thisinstancehas beencalleda significant
"missed
opportunity."70
How normsmatter
To arguethatnormsdo not accountas well as organizational
cultureforthe
inWorldWarII is notto say suchprohibitions
differential
use ofprohibited
warfare
Therecordclearlysuggeststhatthenormsdidindeed"matter"in
weremeaningless.
atleastonefundamental
senseanda number
oflessconsequential
waysrelatedtothe
andactedwithregardtotheuse offorce.
waythatstatesthought,
communicated,
effectof normswas to
Constitutingheinous warfare.The mostfundamental
definewhichmeansofwarfare
wouldevenbe considered
Ratherthan
forrestraint.7'
inventory
theirarmories
andwarplansinsearchoffinding
heinousformsoffighting,
countries
considered
forrestraint
thoseformsthatalreadywerestigmatized
byextant
norms.Thisstigmatization
was nota simpleproduct
ofthetechnological
inhumanity
of a particularformof combat.Stateshardlyblinkedover the use of equally
formsofwarfare
inhumane
suchas high-explosive
artillery
shellsor flamethrowers.
And was it reallyless moralto bomb London thanto besiege Leningrad?Yet
whilebesieginga defendedcitywas not.No objective
bombingwas stigmatized
measureof inhumanity
set submarines,
strategic
bombing,and chemicalweapons
apart.Onlyrecognizednormsdictatedtheboundariesof acceptableuse. At times,
thesetooktheformof a moralconsideration:
it was "right"to use sucha
whether
theuse ofCW,one assistant
chiefof
weapon.Forexample,whenBritainconsidered
the armygeneralstaffarguedthat "such a departurefromour principlesand
traditions
wouldhave themostdeplorableeffects
notonlyon ourown peoplebut
evenon thefighting
services.Some of us wouldbeginto wonderwhether
itreally
68.
69.
70.
71.
U.K. PRO,ADM 199/878,
Minute08070/39byDeputyChiefoftheNavalStaff,
25 October1939.
See Roskill1954,334-35; King1958,55-56; andHezlet1967,125and 138-40.
Simpson1972,89.
Thisthesisis developedin greater
depthin Priceforthcoming.
Norms 53
mattered
whichside won."72More often,thespecialattention
givento thesethree
prohibitions
hadtodo withthematerial
consequencesofviolations
as seenabove.In
eithercase, theeffectof the international
normssuggeststheymaybe a critical
facilitating
forcein thelimitation
of otherwise
taken-for-granted
behavior.To find
whetherthisis in factthe case would entaila broaderinvestigation
thatwould
inusingmilitarily
includecases wheremutualrestraint
significant
weaponsobtained
butwhereno legacyof international
normsexisted.Thatsuchcases do notreadily
cometomindsuggeststherelevanceofnorms.
Restrictingpreparations. In some cases, normsalso affected
theway states
in Britainduringthe
preparedforwar.For example,popularanti-CWsentiment
1920sand 1930scombinedwithBritain'sacceptanceoftheGenevaProtocolseemed
to add slightly
to constraints
on developinggas warfare.Termswerechangedto
avoid any referenceto offensiveCW; trainingmaterialswere not writtenor
distributed
and exercisesnot conductedto avoid a perceptionthatBritainwas
preparing
fora chemicalwar.Eventheopendevelopment
ofcivildefensemeasures
in 1929 as beingill-timed
in lightof Britain'sratification
againstgas was deferred
thatyearoftheGenevaProtocol.73
The ForeignOfficeadamantly
opposedproposals
tousegas onIndia'snorthwest
inthemid-1920s.It
frontier
againstAfghantribesmen
in policyto be too quick.AustenChamberlain,
foundtheturnaround
theForeign
Secretary,
arguedthatsinceBritainhadvilified
Germany
forgas use inWorldWarI,
inthemindsofthe
werelesspresent
ithadtowaituntilits"chargesagainstGermany
the
public"beforeadvocatinggas use.74Yet one mustbe carefulnotto overstate
was pushed
influence
oftheantigasnorm.Although
Britain'soffensive
gas program
it was notstopped.AftertheGenevaProtocolwas signed,thework
underground,
under
was simplyconducted
doneintheOffensive
Munitions
previously
Department
of
theheadingof "chemicalweaponsagainstwhichdefenseis required."A variety
researchandweaponsdevelopment
foroffensive
warfare
evolvedundertheguiseof
thissemantic
cover.75
By thelate 1930s,anyconstraining
impactthatpublicopinion
as thethreat
ofwarwithGermany
rose.76
hadexertedonCW preparations
dissipated,
in theUnitedStates.AlthoughU.S.
Rules also inhibitedwartimepreparations
Navyculturehad ignoredcommercewarfarein theinterwar
years,once warwith
some navyofficialsbegan to acknowledgethe possible
Japanseemedimminent
benefits
Whenthenavalleadership
considered
ofusingsubmarines
againstshipping.
thematter,
itadvisedagainstchanging
therulesbecausedoingso wouldbe
however,
tointernational
law andU.S. policy"andinsteadrecommended
maintain"contrary
72. U.K. PRO,WO 193/732,
MinutefromAssistant
ChiefoftheImperialGeneralStaff(C) toChiefof
theImperialGeneralStaff,16 June1940.
73. See U.K. PRO, WO 188/390,"Lectureto StaffCollege,Camberly,"10 April 1931, and WO
188/446,"Preparation
of TrainingManuals on ChemicalWarfare,"30 September1930; Harrisand
Paxman1982,46-47; SIPRI 1971a,269 and300; Haber1986,300; andSpiers1986,47-49.
on
74. The quotation
is fromU.K. PRO, CAB 2/4,Minuteof215 and217 MeetingsoftheCommittee
ImperialDefense,22 Julyand 11November1926,as citedinSpiers1986,48.
75. HarrisandPaxman1982,42 and47.
76. Harris1980,60-61.
54 International
Organization
The
rendered
modification
advisable.77
inga traditional
postureuntilcircumstances
JapanesePearlHarborattacksoonprovidedsuchcircumstances.
principles
Influencingthird-partyreactions. Most apparent,international
ofotherparties.The rules
thereactions
affected
theexpectations
of statesregarding
of warfareset guidelinesfor what was consideredacceptablebehavior.States
ofothercountries
believedthatviolating
suchguidelinescouldcostthemthesupport
or even theirown populace. Germany,as mentionedabove, frettedthat its
unrestricted
submarine
warfarewouldantagonizeBritainor theUnitedStatesat a
withtheformer
andnonintervention
fromthe
timewhenit wantedaccommodation
bombingor use of chemical
latter.
Likewise,Britainponderedhow itsunrestricted
itdesperately
neededfromtheUnitedStates.
weaponswouldaffect
thesupport
warfare,
theseexpectedcosts
However,as seenin thecase ofGermansubmarine
but not necessarilythe
led statesto alterthe mannerof policy implementation
whenworried
thatitsunrestricted
direction
ofdecisions.So Britain,
campaignwould
alienateneutralcountries,
devisedschemesto blame escalationon theenemyin
ordertomitigate
politicaldamagewhilegoingaheadwiththebombing.78
Gaining advantage. Norms also figuredin state calculationsof gaining
in theface of
advantageovertheenemy.Britainconcludedthatits own restraint,
Germantransgressions,
would bringit favorwiththirdparties.It plannedto
this"normative
accumulate
capital"andthencashitin ata laterpoint.Forexample,
in thesummerof 1939 thecommander
of thesubmarine
force,RearAdmiralB. C.
Watson,wantedto announcedangerzones aroundBritishoverseaspossessions
wheresubmarinescould defendagainstinvasionby attackingconvoyswithout
restrictions.
The admiralty
deniedthe proposal.It fearedthatif Britaininitiated
on submarine
action,itcouldnotthenblametheGermansforviolatingrestrictions
thatwouldbe
attacksor respondwith"othermeasuresbesidesa stricttit-for-tat"
As discussedabove,Britain'splan to controlGerman
even moreadvantageous.79
exportswas also typicalofthisthinking.
intermsofsignaling
intentions.
Signaling intentions.Normsprovedinfluential
In thissensetheyhelptodefinea criticaldimension
oftheconcept"threat"thathas
prohibitions
relations
literature.80
Violating
playedso largea roleintheinternational
forexample,sought
was an indicatorof thenatureof one's ambitions.Germany,
withBritainafterits invasionof Polandin thefallof 1939. Even
accommodation
submarine
warfare
was to itsmilitary
thoughit believedthatitsuse of unrestricted
of Rules for
77. See U.S. NationalArchives,RG80, GeneralBoard StudyNo. 425, Amendment
Yale
MaritimeCommerce,
Box 133,Department
oftheNavy,15 May 1941; andSamuelF. Bemisstudy,
University
Library,
Box 1603A.
78. Terraine1985,143.
79. See U.K. PRO, ADM 1/10360,Rear Admiral(Submarines)to Secretaryof the Admiralty,
3 August1939,andADM /10360,Minute
"Remarkson theUse ofSubmarines
inDefenceofTerritory,"
07295/39byHead oftheMilitary
Branch,21 August1939.
80. Forexample,see Walt1987,25-26.
Norms 55
thatviolatingthe
because it acknowledged
advantage,Germanyfavoredrestraint
submarine
ruleswouldindicatetoBritainthatitaimedfortotalwar;accommodation
would thenbe impossible.Had thesenormsnot developedduringthe interwar
period,thestigmaof violationwouldnothavebeenso great.Normsworkedin the
frombombing
British
refrained
inthesummer
of 1940.Then,Germany
samemanner
was Hitler's
afterdefeating
France.One reasonforthisrestraint
citiesimmediately
bombingwouldhave scuttled
a deal withBritain;unrestricted
interest
in striking
of
as a recognizedthreshold
Hereagainthenormwas important
sucha possibility.
formsofcombat.
notapplicabletoconventional
violencewithsocialsignificance
Possible objections
powerof
therelativeexplanatory
demonstrate
Both macro-and microanalysis
inadherence
theuse offorce
toruleslimiting
cultureforthevariation
organizational
inWorldWarII. Severalpossibleobjectionstothisthesisdeservebriefattention.
and
normrobustness
durability,
by meansof specificity,
One is thatmeasuring
arguments
leadingto defectiveconclusions.The strongest
concordanceis faulty,
againstCW obtainedbecause thenormwas
along thisline suggestthatrestraint
forexample,arguesthattheCW normitselfwas
ThomasSchelling,
indeeddifferent.
distinctin thatit was simple and unambiguous(all or nothing),
qualitatively
point,and therefore
was moreproneto
represented
a moredistinctcoordination
bombingrules
succeed.8'This logic would suggestthatsubmarineand strategic
differed
onlyby a matterof degree:use
failedbecause adherenceand restraint
If this
againstsometargetswas acceptable,butuse againstotherswas prohibited.
in submarine
weretruewe would expectthatstatescrossedthe line of restraint
about
and miscommunication
bombingdue to uncertainties
warfareand strategic
boundaries
andtheirviolation.However,thiswas notthecase. Nationsoftenmade
limits
or escalationin thefaceof understood
restraint
explicitdecisionsregarding
and actions.To the extentstates misperceivedactions of the otherside or
and actionswere morea
inadvertently
violatedthenorms,thosemisperceptions
oforganizational
culturethana resultofnormquality.82
product
aspectof CW butin a different
RichardPricealso focuseson theall-or-nothing
was
bythisprohibition
waythanSchelling.He assertsthatthediscoursegenerated
In various
inthatitstigmatized
distinct
anyuse oftheweaponwhatever.
qualitatively
raised the thresholdof use. For example,
ways, oftenindirect,this distinction
statesmen
oftenrejectedproposalsto use chemicalweaponsduringthewaron the
andjudgments
ofreadinessboth
basisofinadequatepreparation,
butthepreparations
becauseit compelled
wereshapedby theCW norm.This discoursealso mattered
itsviolationbecausetheyassumedthatanyuse
leadersto considermorecarefully
attackson civilians.Appliedto
inevitablywould lead to unlimitedcatastrophic
because
suchlogicleadstotwoconclusions:
first,
submarines
andstrategic
bombing,
81. Schelling1960,74-75, and 1966,131-32,154-55,and 164.
82. Forevidenceon thisaccount,see Legro1994.
56 International
Organization
the normsin thoseareas were not absolutebut involvedcertainrestrictions
on
employment,
nationswere not inhibitedfrompreparations
in those areas; and,
thanCW
second,leadersassumedthatsomeuse in thoseareaswas less threatening
use.83Despiteitsmerits,
use wouldbe,becauseitwouldnotleadtototalcatastrophic
theimpactoftheall-or-nothing
CW normquality.National
thisargument
overstates
didvarybutnotso muchbynormtypeas by
preparedness
(andjudgments
thereof)
whereweaponbuildingfor
Thuseventhoseareasofwarfare
culture.
organizational
conventional
military
purposeswas notstigmatized,
somenationswereprepared
to
do so, whileotherswerenot.Forexample,Britainwas fullyequippedforstrategic
bombing,while Germanywas not. Nor is CW nonusereducibleto the fearof
Leaders had a similarfear in otherareas whereclear
catastrophic
retaliation.
boundarieswerein effect,
yettheymadeexplicitdecisionsto escalateto unlimited
In short,
unrestricted
use ofthosemeans.ThusBritaininitiated
strategic
bombing.84
the all-or-nothing
qualityof the normcannotby itselfexplain the adherence
inthecases studied.
preference
to thevariedpattern
of
A secondcommonobjectionis thatthekeycontributor
is military
effectiveness.
This view,relatedto strategic
restraint
realism,holdsthat
haditbeenuseful,it
gas was notusedsimplybecauseitwas notmilitarily
effective;
and strategic
wouldhavebeenemployedlikesubmarines
bombing.Thisinterpretaatthe
does notsquarewiththeevidenceandviewsoftheparticipants
tion,however,
had its limitations,
time.WhileCW certainly
towardtheend of WorldWarI the
wereincreasingtheiruse of gas significantly,
notreducingit due to
belligerents
ineffectiveness.85
Duringtheinterwar
periodcivilianexpertssuchas B. H. Liddell
Hart and J. F. C. Fuller highlighted
the utilityof gas.86CW was also widely
recognizedby militariesas havingsignificant
militaryutility.In Britainin the
summerof 1939, a reviewof gas requirements
concludedthat"withadded and
warmorethantheywere
improved
weaponschemicaltroopswillbe usedina future
inthelast."87Based on December1939teststheBritishconcluded,"we haveat our
disposala potential
weaponofgreatvalue."88Chemicalweaponswerenota decisive
factorinWorldWarI, butthenagain,neither
weretwoothermajorinnovations,
the
tankand the plane.89The advantagesCW offered,
as withtheseothertypesof
weapons,dependedon howandwhenitwas employed.
A finalobjectionis thatadherence
tonormsinWorldWarII mighthavebeenmore
a resultof nationalcultureor regimetypethanof organizational
culture.The
democraticpeace thesissuggeststhatdifferent
handlearmed
politicalstructures
83. Priceforthcoming.
84. See Bialer1980.
85. See Haber1986,260-61; Thuillier1939,74; Brown1968,32 and46; andQuester1986,44 45.
86. See, forexample,LiddellHart1928,25, 82, and85.
andDirectorofStaff
prepared
bytheDirectorofMilitary
Training
87. U.K. PRO,WO 193/740,
report
on Anglo-French
Committee
ChemicalWarfareConversations,
Studiesby requestof theIntra-service
ofEach Required,"7 July1939.
"Gases forUse in theFieldandtheQuantity
fromMOI to DDMO, "ChemicalWarfare-High
88. See U.K. PRO, WO 193/726,Memorandum
1940.
SprayTrials,"30 January
89. Spiers1989,80-81.
Norns 57
infundamentally
conflict
different
The problemwiththisidea is thatitis not
ways.90
confirmed
ina macro-ormicroanalytic
sense.Dictatorships
werewillingtoadhereto
norms(Germany
in thecases ofCW and strategic
were
bombing),anddemocracies
willingto violateeven robustones (the UnitedStatesin the case of submarine
warfare).
Conclusion
andimplications
The contemporary
surgein researchon intemational
normsinevitably
drawsour
attention
to thepast-particularly
theinterwar
years.Traditionally
thetwodecades
leading to World War II have compriseda paradigmaticcase showingthat
international
normsare ineffective
in criticalsituationsand thatpracticalefforts
basedon normeffectiveness
theKellogg-Briand
Pact
areutopian.To be sure,neither
northeLeagueofNationseffectively
prohibited
war.Buteveninthisdifficult
period
forinternational
notall prohibitions
wereineffectual.
institutions,
Oddlyenough,ina
totalwar,statesstruggling
forsurvivalalteredor transcended
theexpecteduse of
constructed
particularformsof militarypower,in partbecause of intentionally
international
prohibitions
on thosetypesofwarfare.
Yetbyconsidering
thequestion,whichnormsmatter?
thedrawbacksoffocusing
exclusively
on international
normsarealso apparent.
In WorldWarII, therobustness
of suchnormsdid notdirectly
relateto theirimpacton thethinking
and actionsof
actorsor to systemicoutcomes.But contrary
to therealistanswer,neither
relative
of stateswas theprimary
capabilitiesnorthesituations
catalyst.Instead,itwas the
how states
culturesof militariesthatmoresignificantly
structured
organizational
understood
theirsituations,
whattypesof capabilitiestheysaw as important,
and,
how desirableit was to violatethenormor maintainmutualrestraint.
ultimately,
thesecultureshad a markedautonomous
effect
relativeto bothnorms
Furthermore,
and to thebalanceof power-thatis, thewaymilitaries
and nationsthought
about
was notreducibleeitherto international
normsorto strategic
fighting
opportunities.
Of course,the responseto the prohibitions
duringWorldWar II was not a
As seenin thecases above,concernsabout
monocausalorganizational
culturestory.
I
international
andstrategic
prescriptions
advantagebothhadrolestoplay.Although
have assessed thesevariablesas competinghypotheses
models
here,a synthetic
forexample,developan explanation
ofnorminfluence
thattakesintoaccount
might,
boththerobustness
of international
and theimpactof national-level
prescriptions
socialunderstandings
suchas politicalororganizational
culture.
The present
has severalmethodological
andconceptual
for
argument
implications
thetreatment
of normsin international
relationstheory.
Mostimportant
is theneed
fora conceptualization
ofnormsthatis independent
oftheeffects
tothem.
attributed
more explicitcomparativeresearchthat examineseffectualand
Additionally,
ineffectual
normswouldlead toa better
ofwhycertainnormsseemto
understanding
90. Foran incisivereviewofthisliterature,
see Elmanforthcoming.
Organization
58 International
and othersnot.This line of research,thoughrejectedby some as
be so influential
of the social world,is being
and notapplicableto interpretation
pseudoscientific
in studying
socialunderstandparticular
primarily
pursuedbyeventhoseinterested
is always
The implicitcounterfactual
ings and theirenablingor causal effects.91
had not evolvedin a
social understanding
presentin such work:if a particular
and the like also would be
structures,
understandings,
way,identities,
particular
be moreexplicitlydeveloped.
I suggestonlythatsuch counterfactuals
different.
innormscholarship
ofwiderapplication
Finally,a moreacceptedpracticedeserving
forthesame effects.
explanations
is theexplicitrelativeassessmentof alternative
into
butalso offer
insights
totheargument
notonlylendcredibility
Suchassessments
frameworks.
explanatory
among"alternative"
theinteraction
the presentresults
and conceptualimplications,
Besides thesemethodological
relationsthathas focusedon
carrya warningfor much workin international
in globalsociety.Like thatof neoliberalinstitutionalists,
collectiveunderstandings
mywork
and sociologistswho studyglobalculture,
normtheorists,
constructivists,
Yetthisstudydivergesfromotherapproaches
stressescollectiveideationalfactors.92
level ideationalforce.The
culture,a different
organization
by also considering
importanceof that factorcautionsagainstan "autonomousinternationalism"
other
focusingexclusivelyon globalnorms.Principlesandbeliefsthatcharacterize
thanthoseof
maybe foundto be as or moreimportant
communities
subsystemic
society.
international
culture(as opposed to normsor strategic
I do not claim thatorganizational
ofstates.Itsinfluence
andpractices
concerns)willalwaysbe decisiveinthethinking
may vary across both issue-areaand history.The influenceof any particular
salience.Militaryservicesin
culturewill dependon itsorganizational
bureaucratic
Wheresimilar
investigated.
WorldWarII hada highsalienceineachofthecountries
The
deserveattention.93
perspectives
organizational
traitsof salienceare apparent,
Whilesuch
culturemightalso varyhistorically.
of organizational
relativeinfluence
normsin theinterwar
thaninternational
culturesmayhave been moreimportant
period,thesamemaynotbe truetoday.Afterall,manyscholarssee theworldtoday
moreinterdepenand potentially
morethickly
connected,
as more"international,"
thatare part and parcel of a more
dent.94Thus the collectiveunderstandings
orientanational-level
international
societymightoverride
developedcontemporary
however,requiresempirical
culture.Such a hypothesis,
tionssuchas bureaucratic
tools.
conceptual
researchandtheappropriate
and important
analyticchallenges.How should we
This task poses difficult
normative
(and other)frameworks?
therelativestrength
of different
conceptualize
needto offer"causal or quasi-causalaccountsof the
that"discursivists"
91. For a similarargument
see Yee 1996,102-3.
ofideationalfactors,"
effects
see Krasner1983; Keohane
and constructivism,
92. For examplesfromneoliberalinstitutionalism
in footnote
1, above.
see thereferences
1989;Wendt1992 and 1994.Forexamplesfromnormliterature,
For examplesfromsociology,see theworkof JohnMeyerandhis associatesin ScottandMeyer1994;
tothatliterature.
1996bprovidesa goodintroduction
Finnemore
93. Forexample,Bachman1991.In general,see Wilson1989.
94. See Ruggie1993;Rosenau1990;andBuzan,Jones,andLittle1993.
Norms 59
ones?How
ideologiesandbeliefswillsupersedesystemic
Whenis itthatunit-level
cross-levelideationalmodelsbe constructed?
Can synthetic
do thetwo interact?
to thesequeslittleattention
have paid relatively
relationstheorists
International
betweencollectivebeliefs
affairs,contradictions
tions.95Yet in contemporary
levelshavesurgedto thefore.Forexample,theinternational
embeddedat different
of individual
dominatedby a beliefin the importance
arena seems increasingly
thatcan conflict
manysocietiesretaina collectiveorientation
rights;nonetheless,
withthenormative
importof theindividual.The clashesof theUnitedStateswith
violationsareindicative
Singaporeover"caning"andwithChinaoverhumanrights
and globalinterdepenLikewise,bothnationalism
of theseopposingorientations.
between
thetwo
contradiction
ontherise,yetthepotential
denceseemtobesimultaneously
beliefsand
typesof collective
how different
Understanding
is readilyapparent.
trends
work.
forfuture
is a significant
challenge
then,
relatetooneanother,
customs
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