11.2015
NATO RESPONSE TO RUSSIA AFTER
CRIMEA
CONSEQUENCES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE EUROPEAN AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
DIMITRIOS DAGDEVERENIS, BRIDGING EUROPE
bridgingeurope.net
Working Paper No. 38
NATO Response to Russia After Crimea
Consequences and challenges for the European and international security
by Dimitrios Dagdeverenis
INTRODUCTION
The present paper deals with the changes in the European security caused by Russia’s
involvement in the Ukraine conflict, particularly after the invasion and annexation of Crimea in
March 2014. It aims to answer two questions: (1) What are the consequences for the European
security due to Russia’s stance, and, (2) what are the long-term challenges in the WesternRussian relations regarding international security issues.
A starting point for answering these questions is NATO’s response in Russia’s stance in
Ukraine. Through a careful look at the response of the particular organization we can reach
useful conclusions regarding changes in European security and wider security challenges for
Western – Russian relations. The choice of focusing on NATO is justified considering its
leading role in European (and up to some point) in global security.
The paper is structured in three parts. In the first part we see NATO’s decisions and measures
after the invasion and annexation of Crimea by Russia. In the second part we look at the
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Dimitrios Dagdeverenis is Policy Analyst at Briding Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European Affairs,
with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views expressed
are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is
associated. The paper was first published by Sen Foundation.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net)
© Bridging Europe 2015
Page |1
Working Paper No. 38
changes in European security by examining the significance and the content of NATO’s
response. In the third part we attempt to sketch some challenges for Western-Russian relations
with regards to international security.
1) NATO RESPONSE IN UKRAINE
NATO considered Russia’s military meddling in Ukraine as a major threat to the Euro-Atlantic
security. NATO highlighted that Russia has violated the international law principles of
territorial integrity and sovereignty that are the foundations of the post-war European order.
Russia’s stance in Ukraine was considered as a straightforward challenge of this order.1
NATO has repeatedly condemned Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine and in April 2014
suspended all practical political and military cooperation with Russia. In addition, NATO
members decided to increase preparedness and military capabilities of the organization as well
as to enhance its military presence in the Eastern flank.
Regarding the improvement of military capabilities two elements stand out: the increase in
defence spending and the significant reinforcement of NATO Response Force. At the NATO
Wales summit in September 2014 NATO countries pledged to increase their defence spending
to 2% of their GDP within ten years. Despite the weaknesses of the 2% metric (the main
1
This approach is stated in several NATO declarations and NATO officials’ statements
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Dimitrios Dagdeverenis is Policy Analyst at Briding Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European Affairs,
with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views expressed
are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is
associated. The paper was first published by Sen Foundation.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net)
© Bridging Europe 2015
Page |2
Working Paper No. 38
criticism is that it does not provide a clear picture on how and to what degree the increase in
military spending will result in increased military capabilities), the political significance of this
decision is remarkable. This pledge means that NATO members decided to address a wider
challenge of the European security that emerged after the end of cold war – namely the
decrease in defence spending and who will bear the cost of European security.2
At the Wales Summit NATO adopted a Readiness Action Plan which includes a series of
measures that fall into two categories: i) assurance measures, that refer to heightened NATO
presence and activity at the Eastern members of the Alliance for deterrence and assurance
purposes, and, ii) adaptation measures, that refer to changes in NATO’s military posture and
capabilities.3
Although the Readiness Action Plan does not refer exclusively to the Russian threat, its focus
on the Eastern flank is crystal clear. Under the Plan NATO’s forces and exercises in Eastern
members have increased. For example, the Baltic Air Policing mission was reinforced with
more aircrafts, surveillance AWACS flights over the airspace of Eastern NATO members were
increased, maritime patrols in the Black, Baltic and Mediterranean Seas were intensified and six
For an analysis of the 2% metric see, Jan Techau, “The politics of two percent. NATO and the security vacuum in
Europe”, Carnegie Europe, September 2015
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_252_Techau_NATO_Final.pdf (accessed October 10, 2015)
3
“Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in Wales”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 5 September 2014, last modified 31 July
2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm (accessed October 10, 2015)
2
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Dimitrios Dagdeverenis is Policy Analyst at Briding Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European Affairs,
with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views expressed
are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is
associated. The paper was first published by Sen Foundation.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net)
© Bridging Europe 2015
Page |3
Working Paper No. 38
new command structures were established in Eastern NATO members boosting NATO’s
operational capabilities.4
After Russia’s military involvement and aggression in Ukraine we can observe an enhanced
cooperation between NATO and Eastern European non-member countries – another
development which indicates the Alliance’s focus on the East and Russia. On 1 April 2014
NATO’s foreign ministers committed to support Ukraine, to intensify the cooperation within
the framework of the Distinctive Partnership and to adopt measures that boosted Ukraine’s
ability to provide its own security. They also agreed to deepen cooperation with NATO
partners in Eastern Europe.5 Similar commitments regarding increased cooperation with
Eastern NATO partners were repeated in NATO Wales Summit.6
Since April 2014 we can see NATO’s intention to deepen its cooperation with Ukraine and
abide by its commitments to support the country. This is evident in training programmes, joint
exercises, provision of technical equipment to Ukraine armed forces, support for defence
“NATO’s Readiness Action Plan”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Fact Sheet, December 2014
http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_12/20141202_141202-facstsheet-rap-en.pdf (accessed
October 10, 2015)
“NATO’s Readiness Action Plan”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Fact Sheet, May 2015,
http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_05/20150508_1505-Factsheet-RAP-en.pdf
(accessed
October 10, 2015)
5
“Statement by NATO Foreign Ministers”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1 April 2014
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_108501.htm (accessed October 10, 2015)
6
“Wales Summit Declaration”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
4
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Dimitrios Dagdeverenis is Policy Analyst at Briding Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European Affairs,
with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views expressed
are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is
associated. The paper was first published by Sen Foundation.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net)
© Bridging Europe 2015
Page |4
Working Paper No. 38
reforms and sending a civil experts mission with advisory role in the country. 7 Furthermore,
five Trust Funds were established to provide assistance to Ukraine in security and defence,
while similar cooperation is being developed with Georgia and Moldova.8 We should also
mention that increased cooperation is also observed between NATO and non-NATO countries
Sweden and Finland in the fields of information sharing and joint exercises as a result of the
concerns of these countries due to Russia’s behavior.9
2. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE EUROPEAN SECURITY
It is now undeniable that European security has changed as a result of Russia’s actions in
Ukraine. Based on our observations regarding NATO response we will attempt to highlight
some of the main consequences for European security.
“NATO flexes its muscle in response to Crimea crisis”, EurActiv.com, 2 April 2014, last modified 8 January 2015,
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/nato-flexes-its-muscle-response-crimea-crisis-301302
(accessed
October 12, 2015)
8
“Prospects for NATO-Russia relations”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Keynote address by NATO Deputy
Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow at the 2015 Leangkollen Conference, Oslo, 2 February 2015,
last modified 6 February 2015
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_117055.htm (accessed October 10, 2015)
9
“NATO moves closer to EU, Sweden, Finland”, EurActiv.com, 15 May 2015, last modified 18 May 2015
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/nato-moves-closer-eu-sweden-finland-314597 (accessed October
12, 2015)
7
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Dimitrios Dagdeverenis is Policy Analyst at Briding Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European Affairs,
with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views expressed
are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is
associated. The paper was first published by Sen Foundation.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net)
© Bridging Europe 2015
Page |5
Working Paper No. 38
i) Emergence of Russia as a threat and “return”/reassurance of the military dimension in
the concept of threat. The conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s involvement confirmed the
significance of the military dimension in the concept of threat. The European security
environment is beginning to be characterized and explained in terms of “traditionalist” security
definitions, such as Walt’s approach which defines security as the study of the threat, use and
control of military force.10
Indeed, Russia is perceived as a threat through a military prism and the rivalry has strong
military features. Russia is a threat for European security in military terms. Therefore, the
significance of military force and the military dimension in European security is increased.
This perception is conspicuous in the decisions regarding increase in defence spending of
NATO members (an issue that brings back to the fore the discussion on who is responsible for
security in Europe, security in military terms). It is also evident in the fact that in the concerns
that Eastern Allies have expressed about Russia the military dimension of the threat is
highlighted. For example, their demands for an increase of NATO military presence in their
territories reveal the perception that Russia is a military threat.
It is interesting to mention that the perception of Russia as military threat is stronger among
the Eastern NATO members, while similar concerns have been expressed by non-members
For an analysis of the “traditionalist” concept of security see, Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security
Studies”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.35, No.2 (Jun 1991): 211-239
10
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Dimitrios Dagdeverenis is Policy Analyst at Briding Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European Affairs,
with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views expressed
are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is
associated. The paper was first published by Sen Foundation.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net)
© Bridging Europe 2015
Page |6
Working Paper No. 38
such as Finland, Sweden and Georgia. This difference is understandable considering the
proximity of these countries to Russia and/or the presence of Russian/Russian speaking
populations in their territories.
In addition, a look at how the rivalry is expressed is illustrative of its military character. In
both sides we observe forward deployment of troops, more exercises and military flights, an
increase in close encounters between NATO and Russian warplanes, heated rhetoric – in a
word features that illustrate the militarization of Western-Russian relations.
ii) NATO remains the cornerstone of European security. The military features of the
Western-Russian rivalry mean that NATO (as a military organization) has increased its
importance as an actor in European security. The fact that the more powerful response to
Russia was articulated by NATO shows that European states consider the Alliance as the best
choice/forum for consultations, initiatives and policies regarding European security.
NATO will continue to play the leading role on European security developments and any
institutional arrangements regarding the architecture of European security. The conflict in
Ukraine showed once more EU’s weaknesses when it comes to military power, however it did
not resulted in a strong momentum towards bold security initiatives in the framework of the
EU. OSCE proved to be useful in the management and the de-escalation of the conflict,
however it does not seem that the particular organization can contribute significantly in the
European security architecture – especially with regards to the Russian threat.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Dimitrios Dagdeverenis is Policy Analyst at Briding Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European Affairs,
with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views expressed
are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is
associated. The paper was first published by Sen Foundation.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net)
© Bridging Europe 2015
Page |7
Working Paper No. 38
The leading role of NATO and its heightened importance for European security is also evident
in the attractiveness of the Alliance. Candidates for NATO membership reaffirmed their
commitment to this goal, some NATO partners started examining the prospect of full
membership, while all stated their will to enhance and deepen cooperation with the Alliance, as
a result of their concerns about Russia’s behavior.11 In addition, Eastern members despite the
fact that they would prefer a more dynamic response to Russia and their dissatisfaction with the
hesitance of the other allies for stationing permanent NATO troops in their territories,12 they
have not opted for a response outside NATO – either in the EU framework or any other
regional initiative. They still rely on NATO for their security against the Russian threat, as we
11
See for example:
“Wales Summit Declaration”, NATO
“NATO: A unique Alliance with a clear course”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Speech by NATO Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg at the German Marshall Fund, Brussels, 28 October 2014, last modified 13 November
2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/opinions_114179.htm (accessed October 10, 2015)
“NATO moves closer to EU, Sweden, Finland” , EurActiv.com
“Ukraine to request NATO membership”, EurActiv.com, 29 August 2014, last modified 1 September 2014,
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/ukraine-request-nato-membership-308084 (accessed October 12,
2015)
12
See for example: “Merkel pledges military support to Baltic states”, EurActiv.com, 19 August 2014,
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/merkel-pledges-military-support-baltic-states-307825
(accessed
October 12, 2015)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Dimitrios Dagdeverenis is Policy Analyst at Briding Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European Affairs,
with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views expressed
are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is
associated. The paper was first published by Sen Foundation.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net)
© Bridging Europe 2015
Page |8
Working Paper No. 38
can observe by looking their demands either for a tougher stance towards Russia13 or for
reinforcement of NATO troops in the eastern flank.14
iii) Exclusion of Russia from the formation of European security architecture. The
emergence of Russia as a threat and NATO’s decision (the leading organization in European
security) to terminate its cooperation with Russia means that the country is not considered
anymore as a (potential) partner.
In the previous years there was cooperation between NATO and Russia in a range of issues,
including controversial ones.15 This was signaling that Russia had begun becoming part of the
European security system, while there were discussions for reshaping European security
institutions and institutional arrangements with greater inclusion of Russia.
This cooperation is now history and the prospects for its resumption are very few, at least in
the short-term. NATO reviews its military posture against Russia and this excludes Russia
“Poland, Baltics ask NATO to focus missile shield on Russia”, EurActiv.com, 26 August 2014,
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/poland-baltics-ask-nato-focus-missile-shield-russia-307967
(accessed October 12, 2015)
14
See for example: “Romania calls for more NATO warships in Black Sea”, EurActiv.com, 2 May 2014,
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-east/romania-calls-more-nato-warships-black-sea-301877
(accessed
October 12, 2015)
15
“NATO and Russia: a new strategic reality”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Remarks by NATO Deputy
Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow at the conference on “NATO after the Wales Summit”, Cardiff
University,
2
September
2014,
last
modified
26
November
2014,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_112406.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed October 10, 2015)
13
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Dimitrios Dagdeverenis is Policy Analyst at Briding Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European Affairs,
with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views expressed
are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is
associated. The paper was first published by Sen Foundation.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net)
© Bridging Europe 2015
Page |9
Working Paper No. 38
from that organization which has a leading role in the developments and the formation of
European security. In addition, the emergence of a European security system with institutions
and arrangements including greater Russian participation is nowhere in sight. Russia is
considered to be a problem for European security, not part of its solution.
3)
CHALLENGES
IN
THE
WESTERN
–
RUSSIAN
RELATIONSHIP
ON
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
Ukraine conflict and NATO response do not impact only on the European security order. The
shift in Western-Russian relations also has a deep impact on international security issues.
These issues cannot be seen as separate and unrelated with European security considering their
trans-territorial nature. In other words, these issues do not concern only a specific area: they
may be identified or linked with a specific area, however their impacts can be on a global scale.
For example, one can argue that Islamic-linked terrorism is related with specific places (e.g.
Middle East), however this does not mean that it does not pose a threat to European or
international security.
In addition, NATO is not strictly focused on the European-North Atlantic area. It has
important presence outside its borders – the so-called “out of area” operations. The label of
Russia as threat is not only a concern for European, but also for global security. Rivalry and
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Dimitrios Dagdeverenis is Policy Analyst at Briding Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European Affairs,
with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views expressed
are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is
associated. The paper was first published by Sen Foundation.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net)
© Bridging Europe 2015
P a g e | 10
Working Paper No. 38
tensions in Western-Russian relations pose a series of challenges in international security
issues that cannot be considered irrelevant with European security. Below, we will attempt to
sketch these challenges:
i) Undermining of Western-Russian cooperation in international security issues. During
previous years NATO and Russia had developed cooperation in a series of issues (Bosnia,
Kosovo, Afghanistan, war on terror, anti-piracy operations, etc). This cooperation is a thing of
the past and it is perhaps symbolic that the first “victim” of the suspended Russia-NATO
cooperation was the cancellation of a joint operation regarding the destruction of Syria’s
chemical arsenal. This was going to be the first joint operation in the framework of NATORussia Council – a body that was established to foster NATO-Russia cooperation.
Difficulties in cooperation are not confined in the NATO framework. The wider cooperation in
international security issues is being questioned. The mutual perception of the other as a threat
and the interpretation of each other policies and actions through a prism of rivalry make
cooperation difficult, despite the existence of common interests. Syria is an example in case:
both Russia and the West fight against the “Islamic State”, despite their wider differences in the
Syrian conflict. However, they were not able to formulate a common framework for operations
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Dimitrios Dagdeverenis is Policy Analyst at Briding Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European Affairs,
with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views expressed
are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is
associated. The paper was first published by Sen Foundation.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net)
© Bridging Europe 2015
P a g e | 11
Working Paper No. 38
against the terrorist organization – only measures to avoid clashes between US-coalition and
Russian warplanes over Syria.16
Therefore, we may see the emergence of a rival pattern of behavior between the West and
Russia, where the two parts would adopt conflicting policies and approaches. Within this
pattern of relations there is deep mistrust and severe constraints in flexibility regarding
cooperation, even in areas of common interest. Moreover, rival trends and behavior may
include issues that could result in increased security concerns – such as the Arctic issue.17
ii) Trends/developments in international security that fuel Western-Russian tensions.
The past cooperation between the West and Russia shows that there are common interests and
joint action and cooperation can be built upon these common interests in the field of security.
NATO proved that could serve as a framework for cooperation, however this is no longer the
case.
The question is whether another framework can be found in order common interests to be
translated into cooperation. The answer is probably negative. Syria, again, can serve as an
example. On the one hand there is the US-led coalition and on the other Russia, both carrying
out air strikes against the “Islamic State” (however Russia is also targeting Syrian opposition
forces). Apart from Russia’s counter-proposal for a wide coalition, she also develops its own
“US, Russia agree to safety measures for their warplanes over Syria”, The Washington Post, 20 October 2015
See for example, “Arctic security matters”, ed. Juha Jokela, European Union Institute For Security Studies,
Report No.24, 17 June 2015
16
17
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Dimitrios Dagdeverenis is Policy Analyst at Briding Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European Affairs,
with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views expressed
are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is
associated. The paper was first published by Sen Foundation.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net)
© Bridging Europe 2015
P a g e | 12
Working Paper No. 38
alliances – the agreement for information sharing among Russia, Iran, Iraq and Syria is
indicative of this trend. Therefore, there seems to be a lack of an international organization
where Western countries could work along with Russia in international security issues.
One could argue that cooperation could take place in the UN framework. This is true, however
given the way this organization works (the rule of unanimity in the Security Council) this
prospect seems difficult. It is more likely that the West and Russia will transfer their rivalry
and disagreements in the UN, thus preventing any substantive action. However, the UN still
offers a forum for consultation and exchange of views and common action in non-thorny
security issues could take place.
Potential cooperation in international security issues could take place even outside
international organizations. It could have the form of an “ad hoc” alliance on a specific issue,
such as the coalition against the Islamic State. However, this prospect also seems unlikely.
In fact, it is possible to see greater divergence instead of greater convergence between the West
and Russia in international security issues, even if they share common interests. Russia may
start building alliances with non-Western countries (e.g. the so-called “BRICS”). Political and
economic cooperation is already taking place and it is interesting to see whether this will
expand to include security issues and will have a military dimension. Another interesting issue
in this discussion is the Collective Security Treaty Organization (the “Russian NATO”). Could
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Dimitrios Dagdeverenis is Policy Analyst at Briding Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European Affairs,
with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views expressed
are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is
associated. The paper was first published by Sen Foundation.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net)
© Bridging Europe 2015
P a g e | 13
Working Paper No. 38
this organization start getting involved more actively in international security issues and
emerge as a potential rival and threat to the West?
In short, competitive trends and interests as well as mutual perceptions of the other as a threat
in the Western-Russian relationship may result in new developments in the field of
international security. These developments could include the emergence of new or the
transformation of existing organizations and/or institutional arrangements, mainly from the
side of Russia. It is likely that these developments and trends will follow the direction of rivalry
and competition instead of cooperation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY – SOURCES
“Arctic security matters”, edited by Juha Jokela. European Union Institute For Security Studies.
Report No.24, 17 June 2015
“Merkel pledges military support to Baltic states”. EurActiv.com. 19 August 2014,
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/merkel-pledges-military-support-balticstates-307825 (accessed October 12, 2015)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Dimitrios Dagdeverenis is Policy Analyst at Briding Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European Affairs,
with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views expressed
are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is
associated. The paper was first published by Sen Foundation.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net)
© Bridging Europe 2015
P a g e | 14
Working Paper No. 38
“NATO: A unique Alliance with a clear course”. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Speech by
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the German Marshall Fund, Brussels, 28
October
2014,
last
modified
13
November
2014,
http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/opinions_114179.htm (accessed October 10, 2015)
“NATO and Russia: a new strategic reality”. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Remarks by
NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow at the conference on
“NATO after the Wales Summit”, Cardiff University, 2 September 2014, last modified 26
November
2014,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_112406.htm?selectedLocale=en
(accessed
October 10, 2015)
“NATO flexes its muscle in response to Crimea crisis”. EurActiv.com. 2 April 2014, last modified
8 January 2015, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/nato-flexes-its-muscleresponse-crimea-crisis-301302 (accessed October 12, 2015)
“NATO moves closer to EU, Sweden, Finland”. EurActiv.com. 15 May 2015, last modified 18
May 2015 http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/nato-moves-closer-eu-swedenfinland-314597 (accessed October 12, 2015)
“NATO’s Readiness Action Plan”. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Fact Sheet, December
2014
http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_12/20141202_141202facstsheet-rap-en.pdf (accessed October 10, 2015)
“NATO’s Readiness Action Plan”. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Fact Sheet, May 2015,
http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_05/20150508_1505-FactsheetRAP-en.pdf (accessed October 10, 2015)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Dimitrios Dagdeverenis is Policy Analyst at Briding Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European Affairs,
with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views expressed
are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is
associated. The paper was first published by Sen Foundation.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net)
© Bridging Europe 2015
P a g e | 15
Working Paper No. 38
“Poland, Baltics ask NATO to focus missile shield on Russia”. EurActiv.com. 26 August 2014,
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/poland-baltics-ask-nato-focus-missileshield-russia-307967 (accessed October 12, 2015)
“Prospects for NATO-Russia relations”. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Keynote address by
NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow at the 2015 Leangkollen
Conference,
Oslo,
2
February
2015,
last
modified
6
February
2015
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_117055.htm (accessed October 10, 2015)
“Romania calls for more NATO warships in Black Sea”. EurActiv.com. 2 May 2014,
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-east/romania-calls-more-nato-warships-black-sea301877 (accessed October 12, 2015)
“Statement by NATO Foreign Ministers”. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 1 April 2014
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_108501.htm (accessed October 10, 2015)
Techau, Jan. “The politics of two percent. NATO and the security vacuum in Europe”. Carnegie
Europe,
September
2015
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_____________________________________________________________________________________
Dimitrios Dagdeverenis is Policy Analyst at Briding Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European Affairs,
with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views expressed
are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is
associated. The paper was first published by Sen Foundation.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net)
© Bridging Europe 2015
P a g e | 16
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_____________________________________________________________________________________
Dimitrios Dagdeverenis is Policy Analyst at Briding Europe
Bridging Europe working papers offer policy-oriented analysis into topical issues of European Affairs,
with the aim of enriching policy-making and contributing to the ongoing debate. The views expressed
are attributable to the author (s) in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is
associated. The paper was first published by Sen Foundation.
Available for free downloading from Bridging Europe website (www.bridgingeurope.net)
© Bridging Europe 2015
P a g e | 17