Report of the Committee on
Technical Committee on
Boiler Combustion System Hazards
Fluidized Bed Boilers
Technical Correlat:mg Committee
Shelton Ehrlich, (:hair
Palo Alto, CA
Dale E. Dressel, Chair
Monsanto Co., MO
William H. Axtman, G~ty Gull Assoc., Inc., VA
David D. Cole, Texas-New Mexico Power C'o., TX
Arnold (Red) Conrod, Nova Scotia Power Corp., Canada
JRoseph N. Darguzas, Sargent & Lundy, IL
obert F. Eng, Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., NJ
Robert Fleck, Montana-Dakota Utilities, ND
Richard J. Gendreau, Stone & Webster Engr, Corp., MA
Gerhardt O. Goldbach, Combustion Power Co., CA
Robert M. Herdman, ABB C,ombustion Engr, CT
DonaldJ. Knotts, Black & Veatch, MO
David L. Kraft, Babcock & Wilcox Co., OH
,ames K. Lafontalne, Pennsylvania Electric, PA
eonard E. Little, Riley Stoker Corp., MA
Donald L. Lueckenotte, Burns & Mcr)onneU, MO
Thomas M. Mcgee, U.S. Generating Co., MD
Robert H. Melvin, AC Power ACE Operation, CA
Thomas Modrak, Raytheon Engr and Constructors, PA
Brain W. Moore, Hartford Steam Boiler Insp/Insurance Co., CT
Russell N. Mosher, American Boiler Mfrs. Assn., VA
John A. Ness, IBEW, MN
Rep. Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
W. Ben O'Brien, Tennessee Valley Audlority, AL
Michael C. Polagye, Factory Mutual Research Corp., MA
Robert S. Rand,~Balley Controls, OH
Donald L. Wietzke, Ahlstrom Pyropower Corp., CA
Peter J. Gore Willse, Industrial Risk Insurers, CT
Rep. Industrial Risk Insurers
James M. witt, Jr., Southern Co. Services Inc, AL
Merton W. Bunker, Jr., Secretary
Nat'l Fire Protection Assn., MA
(Nonvoting)
Courtney D. Alvey, Lndlerville, MD
William H. Axtman, (:;ray Gull Assoc., Inc., VA
JohnnyW. (Bill) Bass, Forney Int'l Inc., TX
~lames R. Bostick, Bailey Controls Co., OH
haddeus Bukowski, Underwriters Laboratories Inc., IL
Paul L. Cioffi, Babcock & Wilcox, OH
William E. Cunningham, Jr., Raytheon Engr & Constructors, MA
John C. deRuyter, The DuPont Co., DE
Robert S. Elek, Kemper Nat'l Insurance Cos., OH
Ronald E. Fringeli, M&M Protection Consultants, OH
Steven K. Funk, The DuPont Co., TX
Rep. American Petroleum Inst.
Gordon G. Gaetke, Union Carbide, Corp., WV
Masaaki Kinoshita, Mitsubishi Heavy IndUstries Ltd, Japan
James IL Lafontaine, Pennsylvania Electric, PA
Dona'ld J. L. Lin, Quilin Inc., TX
Francis X. Maskol, Honeywell, Inc., PA
Peter B. Matthews, Hartford Steam Boiler lnsp & Ins Co., CT
Russell N. Mosher, American Boiler Mfrs, A~ssn.,VA
rryJ. Moskal, ABB Combustion Engr, Inc., CT
ichael C. Polagye, Factory Mutual Research Corp., MA
James L. Sherman, Baltimore (;:~ & Electric Co., MD
Robert F. Tomczak, Tampa Electric Co., FL
Rep. Edison Electric Inst.
PeterJ. Gore Wilise, Industrial Risk Insurers, CT
Rep. Industrial Risk Insurers
Henry IL Wong, Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., NJ
~
Alternates
ThomasJ. Boyd, Electric Power Research Inst., NC
(Alt.to S. Ehrlich)
DouglasJ. Campbell, Nova Scotia Power, Canada
(Alt. to A. Conrod)
Joe Combs, Tennessee Valley Audlority, KY
(Alt.to W. B. O'Brien)
Steven L. Edwards, Black & Veatch, MO
(Alt.to D.J. Knotts)
Blair E. Kerstetter, Riley Stoker Corp., MA
(Alt. to L. E. Little)
Gary E. Norman, ABB Combustion Engr, CT
(Alt.to R. M. Herdman)
JamesJ. Utt, Alflstrom Pyropower, CA
(Alt. to D. L. Wietzke)
Alternates
Tet.suya Fujino, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc., CA
(Alt. to M. Kinoshita)
Dennis P.Jenkins, Kemper Nat'l Insurance Cos., NC
(Alt. to R. S. Elek)
Kenneth N. Lawrence, Honeywell Inc., PA
(Alt. to F. X. Maskol)
W. Scott Matz, Fomey Int'l Inc., TX
(Alt. toJ. W. Bass)
John P. O'Rourke, ABB Combustion Engr, Inc., CT
(All. toJ.J. Moskal)
S. Sam Pagadala, M&M Protection Consultants, IL
(Alt. to R. E. Fringeli)
Richard J. Wachter, Industrial Risk Insurers, CT
(Alt. to P.J.G. Willse)
J. C. Waung, Babcock & Wilcox Co., OH
(Alt. to P. L. Cioffi)
William G. Yeich, Exxon Research and Engr, Co., NJ
(Alt. to S. K. Funk)
Staff Liaison, Merton W. Bunker, Jr.
This list represents the membership at the time the Committee was balloted
on the text of this edition. Since that time, changes in the membership
may have occurred.
Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for document~ covering the operation and reduction of combustion system hazards and tile prevention of boiler furnace explosions
offluldized bed boilers. Tlti-s includes all fuels at any heat iflpnt
rate.
Nonvoting
This portion of the Technical Committee Report of tile Committee
on Boiler Combustion System Hazards is presented for adoption.
Shelton Ehrlich, Palo Alto, CA
Thomas B. Hamilton, Hamilton Consfilting Services, NC
Robert P. Kaltenbach, Kansas City, MO
This Report on Comments was prepared by file Technical
Committee on Fiuidized Bed Boilers and documents its action on
tile comments received on its Report on Proposals on NFPA 85041993, Standard on Atmospheric Fluldized-Bed Boiler Operation as
published in file Report on Proposals for file 1996 Annual Meeting.
Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents covering dae reduction of combustion system
hazards in single and nmltiple burner boilers with a heat input rate
of 12,500,000 Btu/hr and above. This includes all fuels. Also
responsible for documefits covering file reduction of hazards in
pulverized fllel systems, fluidized bed boilers, heat recovery steam
generators, and stoker-fired boilers, at any heat input rate.
This Report on Comments has been submitted to letter ballot of
the Technical Committee on Fluidized Bed Boilers, which consists of
27 voting members. The results of the balloting can be found in file
report.
Tiffs Report on Comments has also been submitted to letter ballot
of tile Technical Correlating Committee on Boiler Combustion
System Hazards which consists of 25 voting members; of whom 22
voted affirmatively and 3 ballots were not returned (Messrs. Gaetke,
Lafontalne, Tomczak).
26
NFPA 8504 ~
(Log #CCA)
8504- 1 - (1-1.4, A-l-l.4): Accept
SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Boiler Combustion System
Hazards
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8504-3
RECOMMENDATION: Accept Proposal 8504-3 (Log #33) in the
Aamual 1996 Report ()n Propos~ds.
SUBSTANTIATION: The negative vote explanation on Proposal
8504-6 (Log #24) in die ROP illustrated the inconsistency between
t'roposals 8504-6 (Log #24) and 8504-3 (Log #33). Words were being
defined without a clarification of retroactivity. Accepting the
:Jroposal does darify the intent.
OMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.
NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27
VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:
AFFIRMATIVE: 20
NOT RETURNED: 7 Conrod, Gendreau, Goldbach, Knotts,
Lafontaine, Melvin, Wietzke
COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE:
M()ORE: I voted affirnaative, hut have die fi)llowing comment.
The revised wording for Paragraph 1-1.4" leaves out the words
"...existing equipment for the preparation and burning of fuel..."
which are in the 1993 Edition. With the newly accepted definition of
"alteration", the systems af£ected are tile "boiler system or
subsystem..." The above revision to Pa~lgraph 1-1.4" could present a
problem of interpretatior~ when an alteration is done to pressure
parts and riot the fllel train because the definition of alteration is not
limited to the fuel train.
A96 ROC
3. Figure 9-3.3 Loss of atomizing media input should trip burner
and igniter header safety shutoffvalves, i.e., enter bottom OR.
SUBSTANTIATION: 1. 9-3.3.3 Correct punctuation and use
correct terminology.
2. %3.3.4 13se correct terminology arid add trip of igniters arid
sparks.
3. Figalre 9-3.3 should match description in paragraph 9-3.3.4.
COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Part.
1. Accept Items 1 and 2, reject Item 3.
2. In Item 2, add die word "associated" between "deenergize" and
"sparks".
COMMITTEE STATEMENT: 1. Rejected Item 3, bec~mse existing
language adequately addresses the submitter's concerns.
2. Edkorial.
NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27
VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:
AFFIRMATIVE: 20
NOT RETURNED: 7 Conrod, Gendreau, Goldbach, Knotts,
Lafontaine, Melvin, Wietzke
(Log #3)
8504- 4 - (9-3.3.5): Accept in Principle
SUBMITTER: R.S. Rand, Bailey Controls Co.
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8504-36
RECOMMENDATION: Clarify, by replacing 9-3.3.5 with:
"A master fuel trip shall initiate the tripping of all warm-up burner
header and all individual warm-up burner safety shutoffwalves, all
igniter header and all individual igniter safety shutoff valves; and
deenergize all sparks."
Acid a new paragrapll to read:
"The master fuel tlip relay sb:dl directly trip all warm-up burner
header and ;dl individual warm-np burner safety shutoffw,dves, all
igniter header ,and all individual igniter s,'ffety shutoffvalves; and
deenergize all sparks."
SUBSTANTIATION: "An interlock from the" is incorrect
terminology.
Both a logic trip ~md a MFI" relay trip are required. (See Figure
%3.3). The two methods are required so that the MFT relay is not a
single failurepoint.
COMMITrEEACTION: Accept in Principle.
Clarify, by replacing 9-3.3.5 with:
"A m~ster fuel trip shall trip all wa~m-up burner header and all
individual warm-up burner safety shutoffvalves, all igniter header
and :ill individual igniter safety shutoffwalves; and deenergize all
sparks."
Add a new paragraph to read:
"The master fuel trip relay shall directly trip all warm-up burner
header ,and all individual warm-up burner safety shutoff valves, ,all
igniter header and all individual igniter safety shutoffw,dves; ,arid
deenergize ,all sparks."
COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Text change in first paragraph to
clarify and simplify wording.
NUMBER OF COMMITFEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27
VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:
AFFIRMATIVE: 20
NOT RETURNED: 7 Conrod, Gendrean, Goldbach, Knotts,
Lafontaine, Melvin, Wietzke
(Log#l)
8504- 2 - (%3.3.2): Accept in Principle
SUBMITTEI~ R.S. Rand, Bailey Controls Co.
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8504-36
RECOMMENDATION: 1. Add and additional sentence to 9-3.3.2
to read:
"Burner fuel pressure shall be monitored to ensure each warm-up
burner is being operated wiflfin its capacity and stability limits as
designated by the burner marmfacturer and demonstrated by test."
2. After 9-3.3.2, add a new paragraph and renumber the following:
For g~ts fired warm-up burners, improper gas supply (metering)
pressure shall initiate tripping of die burner header and individual
warIll-Up burner safety slmtoffvalves, igniter header and individual
igniter safety shutoff v:,dves and deenergize sparks."
3. Table for Figures A-7-5.1.1 (a) d~rough (i) replace: "Main" widl
"Burner Header."
4. Table for Figures A-8-5.1.1 (a) dlrough (p) replace: "Main" widl
"Burner Header."
SUBSTANTIATION: Needed to clarify why burner fuel pressure
and gas supply header pressure are being monitored. See inputs 6,
10, and 11 of Figure %3.3.
The term "burner header safety shutoffvalve" is used in Section 9
including die figures. The piping drawings slmuld use die same
terminology.
COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.
1. Accet,~t Comment, but in item 2, add the word "associated"
between 'deenergize" and "sparks", arid add "[See A-7-5.1.1 (a) ]"
following the last sentence, daen r e n u m b e r subsequent paragraphs
accordingly.
2. Add new paragraph 9-3.4.2 as follows:
9-3.4.2 For gas fired lances, improper gas supply (metering)
wessure shall initiate tripping of the lance Ileader ~md individual
ance safety shutoff valves [See Figure A-7-5.1.1 (a).]
COMMITTEE STATEMENT: 1. Editori~d.
2. Item 2 v~as added to be consistent widl section 9-3.3.2 and
ix A.
R OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27
VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:
AFFIRMATIVE: 20
N( )T RETURNED: 7 Conrod, Gendreau, Goldbach, Knotts,
Lafontaine, Melvin, Wietzke
(Log #4)
8504-5 - (9-3.3.5 Note): Accept in Principle
SUBMITTER: R.S. Rand, Bailey Controls Co.
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8504-36
RECOMMENDATION: Add file following sentences to 9-3.3.5 Note
to read:
"Some fuel supply systems for wann-up burners ,are configured with
sensors and interlock logic for controlling fuel flow on a per burner
basis. Others ,are configured with sensors and interlock logic for
controlling fuel flow to burners as a group. Care must be taken to
ensure interlocks are designed for use wifll tile fuel supply piping
arrangement used."
SUBSTANTIATION: This standard permits both h e a d e r e d and
individual fuel controlled burners. [,See Figure A-7-5.1.1 (f) and
(h) ]. This standard should clearly identify die differences and how
monitoring logic should fimction.
COMMITI'EE ACTION: Accept in Principle.
Revise ,and move file note following sentences to %3.3 to read:
"Caution: Some fuel supply systems for warm-up burners are
configured with sensors and interlock logic for monitoring and
tripping burners on a per burner basis. Odiers are configured with
sensors and interlocks for monitoring and tripping warm-up burners
as a group. Care must be taken to ensure interlocks are designed for
use with die fuel supply piping arrangement used."
[
(Log #2)
8504- 3 - (9-3.3.3, 9-3.3.4): Accept in Part
SUBMITTER: R.S. Rand, Bailey Controls Co.
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8504-36
RECOMMENDATION: 1. In %3.3.3 clarify, by replacing: "igniter
fuel header, safety shutoffvalves, and individual igniters" with
"igniter header and individual igniter safety shutoffvalves."
2. In 9-3.3.4 replace: "warm-up burner fuel header safety shutoff
valves, and individual warm-up burners" with "burner header :rod
individual warm-up burner safety shutoffvalves, igniter header and
individual igniter safety shutoffvalves and deenergize sparks."
27
NFPA 8504 -- A96 ROC
2. In 9-3.4.1 add a reference to 6-2.2.5 [bed temperature setpoint
for normal l,'mce firing, warm-up burner operation NOT required.]
3. In 9-34.2 add an additional sentence to read:
"LarJce fiiel pressure shall be monitored to insure each kmce is
being operated widtin its capacity as designated by dae lmace
nlanufacturer."
SUBSTANTIATION: The fimctional requirements for lances
should identify that in bed firing is used. The operating and initial
fuel feeding bed temperature setpoints should be identified.
Because lances are in bed fired, it is not necessary to monitor low
lmace pressure from a loss of flame standpoint. Header pressure
could be monitored to insure the lance is being fired within its
capahilities.
COMMITFEE ACTION: Accept in Principle in Part.
1. In 9-3.4 Lances, after the words "...fired in the lance" add the
following: "[See 6-1.5. l(f) and 6-2.1.20)6 and 6-2.1.2(j)4] ."
2. In 9-3.4.1 add the following:
(See 6-2.2.5).
3. In Figure 9-3.4, Bed Temperature Low block, chmage "6-2.2.5" to
"9-3.4.1"
4. Revise 9-3.4.2 to read as follows:
"Improper lance fiiel pressure shall be interlocked to ensure each
lance is being operated within its capacity as designated by die lance
m:mufacturer and shall initiate a trip of the individual lance s,'ffety
shutoff valves.
Lance fuel presstire shall be monitored to insure each lance is
being operated within its capacity as designated by the lance
m:mufactu re r."
COMMITTEE STATEMENT: 1. Rejected second item of
submitter's Comment, because the material is covered elsewhere in
the text (6-2.2.5).
2. Other changes are editorial.
NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27
VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:
AFFIRMATIVE: 20
NOT RETURNED: 7 Conrod, Gendreau, Goldbach, Knotts,
Lafontaine, Melvin, Wietzke
COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Note is more appropriate as a caution
statement, arid better placed following Section 9-3.
NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27
VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:
AFFIRMATIVE: 20
NOT RETI IRNED: 7 C,onrgd, Gendreau, (;oldbach, Knotts,
Lafontaine, Melvin, Wietzke
(Log #7)
8504- 6 - (Figure 9-3.4): Accept in Principle
SUBMITTER: R.S. Rand, Bailey Controls Co.
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8504-38
RECOMMENDATION: Revise Figure 9-3.4 Lance Safety Subsystem:
Interchange the bed tempe~tture input blocks.
SUBSTANTIATION: The tractional requirements for in bed firing
identifies two setpoints. [6-2.10)6 arid 0)4] for initial fuel feeding
widt warm-up bt, rnei~ in operation and (6-2.2.5) for nornlal
operation. Figure 9-3.4 has these setpoints interchanged, i.e., in the
present figure, the lances are tripped below the operational limit b u t
firing is permitted below the setpoint for initial feeding if die warmup burners are operating.
COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.
1. Accept the submitter's proposed cllan~e.
2. In Figure 9-3.4, "Bed temperature low' block, change "6-2.2.5"
to "9-3.4.1"
3. In Figure 9-3.4, "Lance bed temperature permit inadequate"
block, change "See 6-2.1.2(i)6 and 6-2.1.2(04" to "See 9-3.4"
4. In Figure 9-3.4, "Lance filel supply pressure unsatisfactory", add
tile following: "(See 9-3.4.2)".
5. In Figure 9-3.4, "Loss of atomizing media", add die following:
"(See 9-3.4.3)".
6. In Figure %3.4, "Warm-up burners not proven" block add the
following: "(See 9-3.4)".
7. In Figure %3.4, "Bed not fluidized" block, add file following:
"(See 9-3.4.4)".
COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Changes to Figure %3.4 were to
ruMBovidebetter cross reference to appropriate sections.
ER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27
VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:
AFFIRMATIVE: 20
N()T RETURNED: 7 Conrod, Gendreau, Goldbach, Knotts,
Lafontaine, Melvin, Wietzke
(Log #6)
8504-9-(9-3.4.2 Note): Reject
SUBMITTERa R.S. Rand, Bailey Controls Co.
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8504-38
RECOMMENDATION: Delete the Note for %3.4.2.
SUBSTANTIATION: Because l~mces are in bed fired, it is not
necessary to monitor low lance pressure from a loss offlaine
standpoint. Header pressure could be monitored to insure the
lance is being fired within its capabilities.
COMMITrEE ACTION: Reject.
COMMITrEE STATEMENT: The note is correct as written. It states
that if lances have individual fuel flow capability, monitoring of
header pressure does provide a measurement of individual lance
ressure.
~UMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27
VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:
AFFIRMATIVE: 20
NOT RETURNED: 7 C,onrod, Gendrean, Goldbach, galotts, "
Lafontaine, Melvin, Wietzke
(Log #17)
8504- 7 - (Figure %3.4): Accept in Principle
SUBMITTER: -[)avid Kraft, Babcock & Wilcox, C,o.
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8504-38
RECOMMENDATION: Revise text:
"Bed temperature low 6-2.2.5 needs to recognize a bed start-up
condition by increasing a c6ndition to dais permissive.
[~rn~ain t t l e l
io b e d p r o v e n
SUBSTANTIATION: The "Bed temperature low (6-2.25)"
permissive (for lance safety shutoff valves open) prevents inerting
the lances on cold and lint start-ups. For example, if the bed
temperature is 1105°F [6-2.1.2(j)6] would ,allow start-up of lances,
but bed temp low would prevent lance start-up.
COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.
COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Submitter's intent is satisfied by
Committee Action on C o m m e n t 8504-6 (Log #7).
NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27
VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:
AFFIRMATIVE: 20
N()T RETURNED: 7 Conrod, Gendreau, Goldbach, Knotts,
Lafontaine, Melvin, Wietzke
(Log #8)
8504- 10 - (9-3.4.4, %3.4.5, %3.4.6): Accept
SUBMITTER: R.S. Rand, Bailey Controls Co.
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8504-38
RECOMMENDATION: 1. In 9~o3.4.4 clarify, by replacing: "a lance
trip" with "a trip of the lance header ,and individual lance safety
shutoff valves."
2. In 9-3.4.5 clarify, by replacing: %3.4.5 with "A master fuel trip
shall initiate the tripping of all lance header and all individual lance
safety shutoff valves."
3. In 9-3.4.6 clarify, by replacing: %3.4.6 with "The master fuel trip
relay shall directly trip all lance header and all individual Imlce safety
shutoff valves."
SUBSTANTIATION: 1. %3.4.4 should specifically identify the
safety shutoff valves to be tripped.
2. "An interlock from the m,xster filel trip device" is incorrect
ternlinology. The trip logic for tile lance should trip the header mid
the individual s~d'ety shutoffvalves when a MFT is required [Figure %
3.1(b)].
3. 9-3.4.6 needs clarification and should be consistent with wording
of similar requirements for waJ'm-up burners mad solid fuel.
Note: Table for Figures A-7-5.1.1 and A-8-5.1.1 should ch~mge
"Main" to "Burner Header" safety shut-off valve for item A.
( Log #5)
8504- 8 - (9-3.4, 9-3.4.1, 9-3.4.2): Accept in Principle in Part
SUBMITTER: R.S. Rand, Bailey Controls Co.
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8504-38
RECOMMENDATION: 1. In %3.4 Lances, add a reference to 61.5(0 and 6-2.1.2(i)6 and (j)4 [bed temperature setpoint for initial
lance firing, warm-up burner operation required.]
2. In 9-3.4 Lances, add an additional sentence to read:
"I_;mce firing d e p e n d s on the hot bed material for ignition and
stable combustion of die filel."
28
NFPA 8504 -- A96 ROC
COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.
1. In 9-3.4.4 clarify, by replacing: "a lance trip" with "a trip of the
lance header and individuM lance safety shutoff valves."
2. In 9-3.4.5 clarify, by replacing: 9-3.4.5 with "A master fllel trip
shall trip all lance lleader and individual lance s~ffety shutoff valves."
3. In q-3.4.6 clarify, by replacing: 9-3.4.6 with "The master fuel trip
relay shall directly trip all hmce header and individual lance safety
shutoff ~dves."
COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Changes are editoriM only, complete
text shown above for clarity.
NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27
VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:
AFFIRMATIVE: 20
N( )T RETI IRNED: 7 Conrod, (Z;eudreau, ( ;oldbaeh, Knotts,
Lafontaine, Melvin, Wietzke
(Log #16)
8504- 14 - (Figure 9-3.5): Accept in Principle
SUBMITTER: [)avid Kraft, Babcock & Wilcox, Co.
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8504-41
RECOMMENDATION: Revise text:
"Bed temperature low 6-2.2.5 needs to recognize a bed start-up
condition by increasinl,g ,.a condition to the permissive.
V r n a i n fuel to b e d p r o v e n ]
SUBSTANTIATION: The bed temperature low (6-2.2.5) permissive
prevents starting solid filel input on cold ~uad hot start-ups. This
permissive needs to recognize start-up conditions (i.e., lower ignition
temperatures versus higber trip temps for automatic control.
COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.
COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Submitter's intent is satisfied by
Committee Action on C o m m e n t 8504-11 (Log #10).
NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27
VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:
AFFIRMATIVE: 20
NOT RETI IRNE.D: 7 Conrod, (;endreau, Goldbach, Knotts,
L~ffontaine, Melvin, Wietzke
(Log #10)
8504- 11 - (Figure 9-3.5): Accept
SUBMITTER: R.S. ILand, Bailey Gontrols Co.
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8504-41
RECOMMENDATION: Interchange bed temperature input blocks
1 arm 3. Delete (6-2.2.5) from bed teinperature permit input Mock.
Delete bed temperature input block 7.
SUBSTANTIATION: The fimctional requirements fl)r in bed firing
identifies two setpoints. [6-2.1 0)6 and 0)4] for initkd filel feeding
wifl~ warm-n I>.burners in operation and (6-2.2.5) for normal
operation, l, igure 9-3.5 has these set:points interchanged, i.e., in the
present figure, the solid fuel is tripped below file operational limit
but firing is permitted below file setpoint for initial feeding if the
warm-up burners are operating.
The bed temperature input block at die bottom ofd~e diagrmn is
not required and should be deleted.
COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.
*
NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27
VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:
AFFIRMATIVE: 20
N()T RETURNED: 7 Conrod, Gendreau, Goldbach, Kmotts,
Lffontaine, Melvin, Wietzke
(Log #9)
8504- 15 - 9-3.5, 9.3.5.1): Accept in Part
SUBMITTER: R.S. Rand, Bailey Controls Co.
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8504-41
RECOMMENDATION: 1. In 9-3.5 Solid Fuel, add a reference to 61.5(0 and 6-2.1.2(i)6 mid 0)4 [bed temperature setpoint for initial
solid fuel feeding, warm-up burner operation required.]
2. In 9-3.5 Solid Fuel, add an addition',d sentence to read:
"Solid fuel firing d e p e n d s on tile hot bed material for ignition ,and
stable combustion of file fuel."
3. In 9-3.5.1 add a reference to 6-2.2.5 [bed temperature setpoint
for normal solid fuel firing, warm-up burner operation NOT
required.]
SUBSTANTIATION: Tile fimctional requirements for solid filel
firing should identify fl~at in bed firing is used. The operating mad
initi:d fiml feeding bed temperature setpoints sbould be identified.
COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Part.
1. In 9-3.5 Solid Fuel, ~ffter the word "...fired" add the following:
"[See 6-1.5.1 (f) and 6-2.1.2(0 6 and 6-2.1.2(j)4] ."
2. Reject Item 2 of Gommeut.
3. In 9-3.5.1 add the following at file end of the paragraph: "(See 62.2.5) ."
4. In Figure 9-3.5, "Bed temperature low" block, change "6-2.2.5"
to "9-3.5. I"
5. In Figure 9-3.5, "Solid fuel bed t e m p e r a t u r e p e n n i t iuadequate"
block, change "See 6-2.1.20)4, 6-2.1.2(06 and 6-2.2.5" to "See 9-3.5"
6. In Figure 9-3.5, "Solid feed system c o m p o n e n t malfunction"
block, add the following "(See 9-3.5.2)"
7. In Figure 9-3.5, "Warm-up burners not proven" block Add file
following: "(See 9-3.5)".
8. In Figure 9-3.5, "Bed not fluMized" block, Add the following:
"(See 9-3.5.4)".
COMMITTEE STATEMENT: 1. Change to Item 1 was editoriM for
clarification.
2. Item 2 of C o m m e n t is rejected because the submitter's intent is
addressed elsewhere in tile standard.
3. Changes to Figure 9-3.5 were to provide better cross reference to
riate sections.
R OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27
VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:
AFFIRMATIVE: 20
NOT RETURNED: 7 Conrod, Gendreau, Goldbach, Knotts,
Lafontaine, Melvin, Wietzke
(Log #14)
8504- 12 - (Figure 9.3.5): Accept in Principle
SUBMITTER: David K~Mt, Babcock & Wilcox, Co.
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8504-41
RECOMMENDATION: Remove "bed temperature below the
ope~tting limit" (Bottom box).
SUBSTANTIATION: Already covered by file top box "bed
temperature low" (See 6-2.2.5).
COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.
COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Submitter's intent is satisfied by
Committee Action on C o m m e n t 8504-11 (Log #10).
NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27
VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:
AFFIRMATIVE: 20
NOT RETURNED: 7 Conrod, Gendreau, Goldbach, IZmotts,
L~ffontaine, Melvin, Wietzke
(Log #15)
8504- 13 - (Figure 9-3.5): Accept in Principle
SUBMITTER: David Kraft, Babcock & Wilcox, Co.
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8504-41
RECOMMENDATION: Revise text:
"Solid fllel bed temperature permit inadequate (See 6-2.1.20)4, 62.1.2(i)6 ~ ) . "
SUBSTANTIATION: 6-2.2.5 is a separate permit covered by the top
box "bed temperaulre low" 6-2.2.5.
COMMITrEEACTION: Accept in Principle.
COMMITI'EE STATEMENT: Submitter's intent is satisfied by
Committee Action on G o m m e n t 8504-1 l (Log #10).
NUMBER OF COMMITI'EE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27
VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:
AFFIRMATIVE: 20
N()T RETURNED: 7 (;onrod, Gendreau, Goldbacb, Knotts,
Laffmtaine, Melvin, Wietzke
(Log #t 1)
8504- 16 - (9-3.5.2): Accept
SUBMITTER: R.S. RarJd, Bailey Controls Co.
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8504-4t
RECOMMENDATION: In 9-3.5.2 clarify, by replacing: "following a
c o m p o n e n t malfunction" with "following a solidfllel system
c o m p o n e n t malfimcfion."
SUBST/kNTIATION: Clarify by specifying fll~tt feed train
c o m p o n e n t maifmlction require tripping of upstream components.
I COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept
Accept the submitter's comment, and editorially cllaxige "...~L~to
initiate die tripping of..." to "...to trip...".
29
NFPA 8 5 0 4 - A96 ROC
(Log #13)
8504- 18- (Figure A-8-5.1.1 (c), (d), (g), (h), (i)): Accept
SI.~MITTER: R.S. Ramd, B,'dley Controls Co.
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: N / A
RECOMMENDATION: T h e lines to remaining igniters should tee
off after the igniter header safety shutoff valve [E] on Figures A-85.1.1 (c), (d), (g), and (11).
The line should not pass t h r o u g h tile flow meter [M] on Figure A8-5.1.1 (i).
•
SUI~TANTIATION: The igniter header safety shutoff valve ~hould
shutoff all igniter fuel.
The line fllrough die flow meter on Figure A-8-5.l.l (i) is a Wpo.
COMMITI'EE ACTION: Accept.
NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27
VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:
AFFIRMATIVE: 20
NOT RETURNED: 7 C,onrod, Gendreau, Goldbach, I~alotts,
Lafont~dne, Melvin, Wietzke
COMMITrEE STATEMENT: Editorial change for clarification.
NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27
VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:
AFFIRMATIVE: 20
NOT RETURNED: 7 Conrod, Gendreau, Goldbach, Knotts,
LafontMue, Melvin, Wietzke
(Log #12)
8504- 17- (%3.5.3): Accept
SUBMITTER: R.S. Rand, Bailey Controls Co.
COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 8504-41
RECOMMENDATION: In %3..~.3 clarify, by replacing %3.5.3 with
"A mzL~ter tirol trip shall initiate file tripping of tile solid tirol feed
system."
Add a new paragraph to read:
"The master tirol trip relay shall directly trip the solid fiiel feed
system."
SUBSTANTIATION: "An interlock from file master filel trip
device" is incorrect terminology. The trip logic ibr solid fuel should
trip die solid filel feed system when a M v r is required [Figure
%3.1 (b).]
A newp~tragraph is required to specify fllat file M'FT relay trips file
fuel feedsystem. This paragraph should be consistent widl wording
of similar requirements for warm-up burners and lances.
A duel tripping pafll (via solid tirol logic mad MFT relay) is required
to eliminate die MET relay a single point of failure.
I COMMITI'EE ACTION: Accept.
|. Accept the submitter's comment, mid editorially change
"...initiate the tripping of..." to "...trip...".
2. New paragraph becomes 9-3.5.4. R e n u m b e r subsequent
aragraphs accordingly.
OMMITrEE STATEMENT: Editorial for clarification.
NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27
VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:
AFFIRMATIVE: 20
NOT RETURNED: 17 Conrod, Gendreau, Goldbach, KnollS,
Lafontaine, Melvin, Wietzke
30