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Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan
Author(s): Tun-Jen Cheng
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Source: World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Jul., 1989), pp. 471-499
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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DEMOCRATIZING
THE QUASI-LENINIST REGIME
IN TAIWAN
By TUN-JEN CHENG*
A
FTER nearlyfourdecades of authoritarian
rule by a Leninist
party the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT), democratic
forcesare now gainingground in Taiwan. Since themid-seventies,political space forelectoralcompetitionin Taiwan has graduallyopened up,
the degree of political contesthas intensified,and the scope of political
discoursein the public domain has widened. In themid-eighties,various
authoritarianlegal constructs notablythe thirty-eight-year-old
decree
of martiallaw and theprohibitionof new politicalpartiesand new newspapers were dismantled,and rules fordemocraticpoliticsare being established.Civic organizationsare forming,and theyare articulatingtheir
interests.Entrybarriersto organized politicalcompetitionhave been removed and four new opposition parties have appeared. The archaic
"Long Parliament" that lasted forty-oneyears and enabled the KMT to
dominatepoliticalpower is being phased out. In AlfredStepan's terms,a
civil society that is, the arenas, movements,and organizationsfor expressingand advancing manifold social interests has emerged, while
the arenas and arrangementsforpoliticalcompetitionare being created
under an authoritarianregime.'
Althoughthemovementtowarddemocratizationin Taiwan is beyond
of thistrendis the subjectof many debates.
any doubt,the interpretation
What factorsbest explain itsorigin?Is democracythe likelyoutcome? If
so, how stablewould such a democracybe?
The trendtoward democracyin Taiwan can be construedas a consequence of rapid economic growthand social change in a capitalisteconomy. Almost all socioeconomiccorrelatesof democracythattheoristsof
modernizationhave isolated thatis, high levelsof urbanization,indus*I would like to thankThomas Gold, StephenHaggard, JohnC. Kuan, JamesMorley,Susan Shirk,Hung-mao Tien, and MyronWeiner fortheircommentson thispaper. I also benefitedfroma conversationwith Ellen Comisso and JohnMcMillan. Researchforthispaper
was fundedbytheUniversityof CaliforniaPacificResearchProgram.
I Stepan,Rethinking
MilitaryPolitics(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,i988), 3-4.
472
WORLD POLITICS
trialization,per capita income,literacyrates,and mass communicationare now presentin Taiwan.2 Democratic impulsesare obviouslyconsequences of economic and social transformation
thattheKMT regimeitself
has helped to create. Taiwan is, as Lucian Pye has recentlysuggested,
"possiblythe best workingexample of the theorythateconomic progress
should bring in its wake democraticinclinationsand a healthysurge of
pluralism,which in timewill undercutthefoundationsof theauthoritarian rule common to developingcountries."3
Democratic inclinationsor impulsesalone do not ensureregimetransformation,however.The demand fordemocracydoes not always create
its own supply. Economic developmentmay move a countryto "a zone
but the directionof political change is not preof political transition,"4
ordained. Instead of fosteringdemocracy,economic performancemay
well make an authoritarianregimemore resilient,ifnot more legitimate,
An authoritarianregimemay
or itmay even give riseto authoritarianism.
succeed in co-optingor containingcounter-elites.In the calculus of the
attentivepublic, the opportunitycost of democraticmovementmay be
too high to bear. Minimum concessionsto popular demand fora greater
say in politicsmay well extendthelifeofan existingauthoritarianregime.
In the end, democraticfermentmay serve to consolidateauthoritarianism.
Indeed, one informedobserverforecastin i984 thattheKMT regimein
Taiwan would merely"soften"-that is, reduce the degree and extentof
political control rather than allow democratization to run its full
course.5At least two factorslend supportto thisexpectation.First,as a
Leninistparty,theKMT would seem to constitutea more formidablebarsuch as the
rierto democracythando non-Leninistleadershipstructures,
in
in
authoritarian
like
those
South
bureaucratic
Korea's
military
regimes
and Brazil's recenthistory.With a high organizationalcapacity,a dominant ideology,and, above all, a deep penetrationof society,a Leninist
partyis predisposed to steerthe course of politicalchange. Moreover,a
Leninist partymay be expectedto do its utmostto resistthe painfulprofrom a hegemonic,privileged party
cess of institutionaltransformation
into an ordinarypartyin a competitivepoliticalarena. By contrast,a reSeymourMartinLipset,PoliticalMan, expandeded. (Baltimore:The JohnHopkins UniversityPress, i98i); Phillips Cutright,"National PoliticalDevelopment: Measurementand
Analysis,"AmericanSociologicalReview28 (April i963), 253-64.
3 Pye, Asian Power and Politics(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press,i985), 2334 Samuel P. Huntington,"Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science
Quarterly9 (Summer i984), 201.
5 Edwin A. Winckler,"Institutionalization
and Participationon Taiwan: From Hard to
China Quarterly
99 (Septemberi984), 48i-99.
SoftAuthoritarianism?"
DEMOCRATIZING TAIWAN
473
treatto its niche of national securitypresentsa move of role contraction
forthe rulingmilitaryin a bureaucraticauthoritarianregimefacingecoeven strengthenitshand. Whether
nomic adversity,and can theoretically
a Leninistpartyis more competentthan the militaryto manage political
change depends on itspossessionof power bases and economic resources.
Lacking a national power base and facing the task of distributingeconomic adjustmentcosts,forexample, the Leninist partiesin the SovietaffiliatedPolish regime and in independent,yet decentralized,Yugoslavia find themselvesat presenton the verge of disintegrationand in
need of the militaryfortheirrule.
Second, unlike some other third-worldcountries,Taiwan has little
legacyof democracy.Institutionaldiffusionduringthe colonial era came
froman authoritarian,imperialJapan,ratherthan froma liberal democratic Western power, as was the case in the Philippines,for example.
Unlike Singapore and India, Taiwan was decolonized througha wholesale transferofpower and resourcesfroma defeatedcolonial power to the
KMT regime:thisprocesstook place withoutany politicalstruggle.In addition,unlike most of Latin America,where oligopolisticcompetitionin
the last centuryand populistmobilizationin the interwarand earlypostwar periodsof thiscenturyhad permittedactivelabor unions,outspoken
churches,and politicalparties,postwarTaiwan did not inheritany demThe cost of democracyto be created ratherthan
ocraticinfrastructures.
revivedis thereforeveryhigh when compared with the cost of accepting
a reformedKMT regime.
If theadventof democracyin a societythatenjoyseconomicprosperity
is probable but not inevitable,how can one explain the genesis of democratictransitionand the viabilityof an emergingdemocracyin Taiwan?
Obviously it is necessaryto go beyond the wealth theoryof democracy,
which merelyidentifiesthe arguably "necessary"conditions,as spelled
out above, fora functioningdemocracy.(Some democraticregimeshave
long existedwithoutthese "necessary"conditionsin such less developed
countriesas Costa Rica, India, and Colombia.) This paper will take the
socioeconomic conditions conducive to democratic development as a
given,and focuson the processesby which democraticforcesin the societyemerge,grow,and outmaneuverthe regimein establishinga new institutionalframeworkof political processes.This exerciseis an applicaapproach to democratictransitionthat was
tion of the rule-of-the-game
firstenunciated by Dankwart A. Rustow and has recentlybeen elaboratedbyAdam Przeworski.6In analyzingtheprocessofdemocratization,
6 Rustow,"Transitionto Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," Comparative
Politics2
(April 1970), 337-63; Adam Przeworski,"Some Problemsin the Studyof the Transitionto
474
WORLD POLITICS
this rule-of-the-game
approachfirstidentifies
the agentsof political
then
examines
the
change,
bargaining
situations
facedbykeypoliticalacassesseshowdemocratic
rules
orin coalition,
torsindividually
and finally
are internalized
and upheldbycontending
politicalforces.
This papertakesa fundamental
positionadvancingtheprincipalarinTaiwan: theanalysisofdeofdemocracy
gumentabouttheformation
mocratization
shouldfocuson theoriginanddevelopment
ofpoliticalopposition.One only needs to recounthow an authoritarian
regime
todemocracy;
restricted
and deterred
themovement
afterall,anyregime
witha monopolyon statepowerhas everyincentiveas well as an immensecapacityto preventthe growthof dissentand opposition.7
Althoughan authoritarian
regimeoftensumsup itspurposesin a finiteand
concreteway,itcan easilyredefine
goalsand tasksso as to extenditspoliticallife.Becauseauthoritarian
theirmonopregimesseldomrelinquish
and usuallymake concessions
forthesake of
oly on powervoluntarily
ratherthandemocratic
politicalexpediency
values,theriseandgrowthof
tranpoliticaloppositionshouldbe thefocusofthestudiesofdemocratic
sition.
inTaiwan hasbeenlargelyattribThe successofdemocratic
transition
ofthenew opposition,
as reflected
utedto thepoliticalentrepreneurship
in itsabilityto settheagenda,to use extralegal
methodsin finessing
the
toshiftthebargaining
repressive
legalframework,
arenas,andeventually
a new setofrules.This new political
to forcetherulingeliteto institute
a middle-classmovement,
the consequenceof
oppositionis essentially
itdiffers
fromtheold political
rapideconomicdevelopment;
intrinsically
liberalismthatoriginatedin the May Fourth
oppositionof intellectual
Movement.Manyof itsmembersare social-science
trainedintellectuals
withprofessional
skillsand legal expertise.
Moreover,theyare socially
connectedto smalland mediumbusinesses.
oftheKMT as an authoritarian
We beginwitha conceptualization
regime,managedbya Leninistparty.The riseand fallofan oppositionof
in the earlyyearsillustrates
the extremely
liberalintellectuals
limited
movements.
space thatwas thenallowedfordemocratic
Next,we considerthesocioeconomic
changesthatweakenedthetightcontrolof the
Afterexamining
KMT and bredthenewopposition.
thedemocratic
moveWe
ment,we offeran explanationon whyit achieveda breakthrough.
Democracy," in Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter,eds., Transitions
fromAuthoritarianRule: ComparativePerspective(Baltimore: The JohnHopkins UniversityPress,
I 986).
7 Leonard Schapiro,"Introduction,"
in Schapiro,ed.,PoliticalOpposition
in One-Party
States
(New York: JohnWiley, 1972); RobertA. Dahl, "Introduction,"in Dahl, ed., Regimesand
Oppositions
(New Haven: Yale UniversityPress,1973).
DEMOCRATIZING TAIWAN
475
on theviability
ofa democracy
thatis still
concludewithsomethoughts
in themaking.
QUAsI-LENINIsT
AUTHORITARIANISM
Taiwan felltotheKMTregime,whichhad beenbuilton a
Postcolonial
scale but was soon compressedintoan islandsociety.The
continental
in I927 and entrusted
withthetaskofnational
KMTregime,established
butnotthecommunist
had survivedtheJapaneseinvasion,
construction,
revolution
on mainlandChina.In 1950, theregime,withI.5 millionpeople mostlystateemployeesand militarypersonnel moved to Taiwan,
whichat thattimehad an indigenouspopulationof7 million.Several factorscontributedto theeffectiveconsolidationof theKMT'S politicalpower
in Taiwan.
positionedin thestate
First,theindigenouselitewas neverstrategically
machinery.For a varietyof reasons, the Japanesecolonial government
had recruitedfewerlocal elitesin Taiwan than in Korea.8 Upon Japan's
defeatin I945, a large contingentofKMT expatriatesquicklydisplaced the
formercolonial administrators;in I947, an island-widerevolt(caused by
the mismanagementof a corruptKMT governor)resultedin the decimationof the local elite.9
Second, the defeatof the KMT regimeon themainland motivatedand,
ironically,facilitateda thoroughpolitical reformin I95I by which the
partyapparatus acquired a high degree of organizationalcapacityand a
semblance of corporatiststructure.Upon its arrivalin Taiwan, the KMT
purged factionalleaders within its own ranks (many had already fled
abroad), built a commissar systemin the army,extended its organizational branchesthroughoutall levels of governmentand, followingland
reform,into every social organization in both rural and urban sectors.
Defining"the people" as itssocial base, theKMT organized a youthcorps,
recruitedleading farmers,formedlabor unions in the state sector,and
preventedtheemergenceof independentlabor unions all throughleadershipcontroland exclusiverepresentationof thesesocial groups.i'
Third, because of regime relocation,national electionswere convenientlysuspended. Removed fromtheirmainland constituencies,the national representativeswere exempt fromreelectionforan indefiniteperiod. They served in threeorgans: the National Assembly,whose main
8 Edward I-te Chen, "JapaneseColonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Comparisonof the
Systemsof PoliticalControl,"HarvardJournalofAsiaticStudies30 (1970), 126-58.
9 George H. Kerr,FormosaBetrayed(Boston: Houghton Mifflin,i965).
10Tzu Yu ChungKuo i (Taipei, i96i), i.
476
WORLD POLITICS
functionis to elect a presidenteverysix years; the Legislative Yuan (literallybranch),which enacts legislation;and the Control Yuan, a watchdog organizationthatmonitorstheefficacyand disciplineof government
officials.TightlycontrolledbytheKMT (and well paid), an overwhelming
majorityof the membersof these bodies were inactive.Meanwhile, oppositionpartiesdisintegratedduringtheirretreatto Taiwan and survived
only on the KMT'S subvention.
Fourth,the inheritanceof colonial propertiesand theinflowof foreign
aid- an economic payoffforpoliticalincorporationinto the Westernalliance during the cold war made theKMT regimeresource-richin comparison with any social groupings.In the I950s, the state controlledall
foreignexchange derivedfromaid and state-managedagrarianexport;it
monopolized the banking sector,and state-ownedenterprisesaccounted
forhalf the industrialproduction.Reversingthe prewar relationshipbetween theKMT and business,in which theformeressentiallydepended on
the support(but oftenviolated the interests)of the Shanghai capitalists,
businessin Taiwan came to depend on an autonomousKMT state."
Most scholarshave describedtheKMT regimein Taiwan between I950
and the mid-ig8os as authoritarian.1However, if one used JuanLinz's
definitionof an authoritarianregime as one characterizedby a limited
but not responsiblepluralism,a mentalityratherthan an ideology,and
controlratherthanmobilization,the fitis not exact.Intra-elitepluralism
was punished; social conformityand national unitywere emphasized.
While syncreticand vague, Sun Yat-sen's threeprinciplesof the people,
or san mmn
chi i-namely, nationalism,democracy,and the people's livelihood (a verymoderateformof statecapitalism)-constituted the dominant ideology that precluded the advocacy of any other ideology. The
KMT did not stop at exercisingcontrolover society.It soughtto penetrate
1"Parks M. Coble, Jr.,"The Kuomintang Regime and the Shanghai Capitalists,1927-
China Quarterly77 (March 1979), 1-24; JosephFewsmith,Party,State,and Local Elites
in RepublicanChina (Honolulu: Universityof Hawaii Press,i986); RichardC. Bush, "Industryand Politicsin KuomintangChina: The NationalistRegimeand Lower Yangtze Chinese
Ph.D. diss. (Columbia University,1978); Tun-jen Cheng,
Cotton Mill Owners, 1927-1937,"
"Political Regimesand DevelopmentStrategies:South Korea and Taiwan," in Gary Gereffi
Miracles:Patterns
in LatinAmericaand
and Donald Wyman,eds.Manufactured
ofDevelopment
East Asia (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,forthcoming).
Hung-chao-Tai, "The Kuomintangand Modernizationin Taiwan," in Samuel P. HunPoliticsin ModernSociety(New York: Basic
tingtonand Clement Moore, eds.,Authoritarian
Books, 1970); Na-teh Wu, "Emergenceof the Oppositionwithinan AuthoritarianRegime:
The Case ofTaiwan," mimeo(UniversityofChicago, i980); Winckler(fn.5); JurgenDomes,
in Taiwan: Group Formationwithinthe RulingPartyand the Op"Political Differentiation
positionCircles, 1979-1980," Asian Survey 21 (October i98i), 1023-42; Thomas B. Gold, State
and Societyin theTaiwan Miracle(New York: Sharp, i986); ChalmersJohnson,"PoliticalInstitutionsand Economic Performance:The Government-BusinessRelationshipin Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan," in RobertScalapino et al.,AsianEconomicDevelopment-Present
and Future(Berkeley,CA: Instituteof East Asian Studies,i987).
1929,"
12
DEMOCRATIZING TAIWAN
477
all organizationsin order to preventpolitical competitionand to secure
resourcesforregime-defined
politicalgoals,eventhougheffective
mobilizationwas limitedto thestatesectorand students.
and party-state
theKMT reIn termsof partystructure
relationship,
pargimein thisperiodwas a Leninistone.'3Therewas organizational
allelismbetweenthepartyand thestate:partyorganscontrolled
administrative
unitsat variouslevelsofgovernment
as wellas themilitary
via a
commissarsystem."Oppositionparties"weremarginalizedand transformedinto"friendship
parties"of therulingparty.Partycadreswere
socializedas revolutionary
vanguards.Decisionmakingwithintheparty
centralism.
theexwas achievedbydemocratic
Partycellsalsopenetrated
The KMT was an elitistpartyusingmassoristingsocialorganizations.
ganizationsto mobilizesupportfromlargesegmentsof thepopulation
forthenationaltasksthattheregimeimposedon society.
theKMT fromotherLeninist
Two "structural"
features
distinguished
regimes.First,unlikeLeninistpartieselsewhere,theKMT did not subor themonopolyofposcribeto theprincipleofproletarian
dictatorship
liticalpowerbya communist
party.Instead,theKMT'S ideologyadvocated
calledon theKMT to redemocracyvia tutelage.The I947 Constitution
fromoneofsuperimposition
adjusttheparty-state
and party
relationship
via partymembers.
dictationto one ofindirectinfluence
FromtheviewtheKMT was meanttobe butoneofmanycompointoftheConstitution,
petingdemocratic
partiesand no longertherevolutionary
partytutoring
and society.The I950 partyreform,
thegovernment
however,restored
theKMT'S positionas a "revolutionary-democratic"
party-a charismatic
partywitha nichein politicsbecauseofitsleadershipin thenationalrevoftheparty'straditional
olution.'4Sucha reconfirmation
roleenabledthe
KMT
to shouldertheself-imposed
historical
missionof "retakingmainland China and completing
nationalconstruction."
The politicalhegebutbased
monyof theKMT was thusnotenshrinedin theConstitution,
on severalso-calledtemporary
thatwereattachedto,butacprovisions
in the name of the nationalemertuallysuperseded,the Constitution
withthe communistregimeon
gencyarisingfromthe confrontation
mainlandChina.
Whilesuspending
nationalelections,
theKMT regimedid permitpoliticalparticipation
at thelocallevel.Directelectionsforbothexecutiveand
councilpositionsat the county,township,and villagelevelshave been
13Mark Mancall, "Introduction,"in Mancall, ed., Formosa Today (New York: Praeger,
i963): Yangsan Chou and Andrew J.Nathan, "DemocratizingTransitionin Taiwan," Asian
Survey27 (March i987), 277-99.
14 KennethJowitt,
"An OrganizationalApproachto theStudyofPoliticalCulturein Marxist-LeninistSystems,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview68 (January-March
1974),
89-98.
478
WORLD POLITICS
heldregularly
sinceI950. The provincialsenate,originally
composedof
delegates elected by countycouncils,has been turnedinto the provincial
assembly,subjectto periodicdirectelectionssince I959 (althoughthegovernor has always remained appointive).Subnational politicsadhered to
an ingeniouspoliticaldesign,which gave electiveofficialsextremelylimited budget-approvingpower and negligibleregulatorypower. It indicated the KMT regime'scommitmentto the goal of fulldemocracywithout having to announce a timetable."Putting on a democraticface" as
such also justifiedTaiwan's membershipin the Westernpoliticalcamp.
In addition, subnationaldemocracywas a politicalsafetyvalve that dissipated the political energyof disgruntledex-landlords(comparable to
the local councilsthatabsorbedthede-aristocratizedsamurai in Meiji Japan). Finally,because of the dominationof themedia by theKMT, as well
as its organizational and financialresources,local electionswere also a
mechanism for the KMT to co-opt local elites.The subnationalelections
institutedby theKMT regimein Taiwan were competitive,real,and local
interest-based,totallyunlike thoseof a Leninistregime.'5
Second, while not lacking in socialist ideas, the KMT regime was
embedded in a capitalisteconomyin which privateownershipand market exchange were the norm,and stateownershipand exchange by decree were exceptions.The KMT never embraced the ideological goal of a
Leninist state.Its ideologylacked what one scholarhas called a "goal culture" that is, a pronounced commitmentto an explicitprogramof social transformationwith which to attain the sacrosanctgoal of a communist society.'6The principle of people's livelihood,one of the three
pillars of san min chi i, espouses economic equality but does not specify
any preferredmeans to attain it, such as industrialdemocracy,social
ownership, or other redistributivepolicies. As suggested above, it has
been interpretedas legitimizinga moderateformof statecapitalism,and
was used to justify,not the impositionof a ceilingon privateenterprises,
but an ill-definedfloorof state-ownedenterprisesas a safeguardagainst
the private sector. In fact, the imperativesof its own anticommunist
stand, the necessityfor compensatingthe agrarian elite during land reform,as well as the persuasion of United States aid-givingagencies induced theKMT regimeto divestitselfof some state-ownedenterprisesand
to fostera few privateenterprisesas earlyas the I950s.
15 Bruce J.Jacobs,"Paradoxes in thePoliticsof Taiwan: Lessons forComparativePolitics,"
TheJournaloftheAustralianPoliticalScienceAssociationI3 (November 1978), 239-47; Arthur
J.Lerman, Taiwan's Politics:The ProvincialAssemblyman's
World(Washington,DC: UniversityPress of America,1978).
i6 Chalmers Johnson,
"Comparing CommunistNations,"in Johnson,ed., Changein CommunistSystems(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1970).
DEMOCRATIZING TAIWAN
479
Initially,the principal aim of the regime was to recover mainland
China by militarymeans. All major economic infrastructure
projects
were appraised in termsofeconomicbenefitsand theirimpacton military
preparedness.The partyincessantlyconducted surveyson social conditionsand kept social organizationsin a combatmode. In place of national
partypolitics,ad hoc consultationswere conducted with elites fromall
walks of life.All aspectsof local electionswere tightlycontrolledso as to
containthe growthof politicalopposition,which was regardedas a divisive force harmful to the national task of retaking mainland China.
Campaigning, for example, was limited to ten days; qualificationsfor
candidacy were constantlyrevised; election days were proclaimed unexpectedly;no suprapartysupervisorybody was permitted.As a result,
the KMT predominated in local politics.Nonmembers surfaced during
each election,but theywere a sortof "quasi-opposition."'7Such political
actorswere fewand unorganized,primarilytryingto distancethemselves
fromthe KMT ratherthan challengingthe legitimacyof the existingpoliticalregime.
Under the tightpoliticaland social controlof the KMT regime,only a
few liberal intellectuals,under the cover of limited academic freedom,
managed to air theirdissent.During the mainland era, these liberal intellectualshad been part of the political circles that urged the KMT to
make a quick transitionfromtutelageto a constitutionaldemocracy.Regrouped in Taiwan, and in the atmosphereof the KMT'S reform,the liberals found theirpoliticalrole in constructivecriticism.With the support
of several liberal-minded(American-educated)KMT elites and the subvention of the Asia Foundation, these intellectualsinitiateda journal
called Free China Fortnightly(FCF) to promote liberal democracy by
means of politicalcriticismand social education.The FCF group,tolerated
fora decade(I950-i960)
in spiteoftheearlyeclipseofitspoliticalspon-
sors,was the only focal point forpoliticaldissent.In the end, the group
was relentlesslysuppressedwhen it decided to coalesce with the indigenous Taiwanese eliteto forman independentsocial organizationas a first
stepto establishinga new politicalparty.
The rise and decline of the FCF group definedthe boundariesof political toleranceof theKMT regimeas well as thelimitedcapacityoftheearly
politicaldissidentsto expand theireffectiveness.
At most,theKMT regime
would permit a political opposition that was individual-based, fragmented,and locally orientedratherthan collective,coalescing,and nationwide.For itspart,the FCF group as thebackboneof democraticforces
17Juan J.Linz, "OppositionIn and Under an AuthoritarianRegime: The Case of Spain,"
in Dahl (fn.7), '91-
WORLD POLITICS
480
inherent
fromitsearlyoriginsand otherconstraints
suffered
in thefifties
to the
at thattime.It oweditsexistence
in theTaiwanesesocialstructure
wereparamembers
ofa fewstateelites;mostofitsfounding
sponsorship
affiliated
withtheKMTin one wayor another.As
stateelites,previously
base.SecoftheKMTelite,theFCFgrouplackedanygrass-roots
a spinoff
trainedin
ond,thecoremembersofthegroupwereliberalintellectuals
at intelwhoexcelledprimarily
in philosophy,
especially
thehumanities,
lectualdiscourseand socialeducation.It tookthema decadeto seekan
A largeportionof
alliancewithindigenousTaiwanesepoliticalactivists.
buttrainedmostly
all ofthemprofessionals,
thelatterwerelocalnotables,
in medicalscienceand thelike,ratherthanin thelegalor socialscience
disciplinesthatwould have impartedtheskillsof politicalbargaining.
and physicians
weresurvivors
ofthepast;theywere
These intellectuals
whichwasbasicallycomsocialstructure,
notrootedinthecontemporary
capturedbytheKMTbecauseof
(a classpolitically
posedofsmallfarmers
of the KMT).
land reform)and stateemployees(a naturalconstituency
unpreparedfor
Thus, notonlywas thepoliticaloppositionofthefifties
bargainingwiththeregime;societyitselfwas notamenableto
strategic
ofpoliticalopposition.
themobilization
SOCIOECONOMIC
CHANGE
AND POLITICAL
OPPOSITION
The decade thatfollowedthepurgeof theFCFgroupin i960 was a
arrestedpoitsgripon thesociety,
darkage. The KMTregimetightened
who daredto voicetheirviews,appointedretiredmililiticaldissidents
taryleadersto governtheprovinceof Taiwan,and silencedanysortof
was inofpoliticalpower,however,
The consolidation
politicaldiscourse.
whichhad begunearlierbutaccelerated
toeconomicgrowth,
strumental
economicpolicymakstrategy,
in thesixties.The choiceofdevelopment
ing,and thechangesin variousincentiveschemeswereinsulatedfrom
thatare commonin a
thesortsofpoliticaldebatesand societalpressures
At thesametime,thewholesocietywas directedtodemocratic
system.
wardeconomicgrowth.
withwhichto makeTaiFromthesixtieson,economicdevelopment
goal that
wan a modelof socioeconomic
progressbecamean overriding
thelong-term
butnotsupplant,
objectiveofretakingthe
was to support,
of nationalgoals was probablydue to a promainland.The re-setting
That is,following
ofnationalsecurity.
nouncedchangein theparameters
theI958 Taiwan Straitscrisis,itbecameclearthatUnitedStatessupport
the
limitedto thedefenseof Taiwan; therefore
of Taiwan was strictly
meansbecameremote.
mainlandChinabymilitary
ofretaking
possibility
DEMOCRATIZING
TAIWAN
481
AfterCommunist China announced the completionof an atomic installation in i964, the prospectbecame even dimmer.'8
At the same timethatinternationalsecurityconditionsforcedthe KMT
to establishthepriorityofeconomicgrowth,thatverygrowthseemed imperiled. By the late fifties,
Taiwan's domesticmarkethad become nearly
saturatedby import-substituting
industry.Where were futuremarkets
forits goods to be found? The KMT turnedto Chinese-Americaneconomists for advice,'9 and, under subtle pressure by the U.S. aid-giving
agency,undertookeconomicreformsbetweenI958 and i96i, reorienting
the economy toward export markets,freezingthe state sector,and encouragingprivateentrepreneurship.
The storyof Taiwan's achievementof export-ledgrowthhas been told
manytimes.Between i960 and i980, Taiwan's grossnationalproductincreased at an annual rateof 9 percent;itsexportsexpanded at around 20
percenta year; the industrialshare of itsproductionincreasedfrom25 to
45 percent;income became more equitablydistributed(the ratioof earners in thehighestquintileto thosein thelowestdropped from5.5 to 4.i8);
and its inflationrate in the sixtieswas as low as 2 percent.20No one was
leftout of the processof economic development:one was eithermaking
it happen or realizing itsbenefits.
Rapid growth,however,had liberalizingsocial consequences thatthe
KMT had not fullyanticipated.With the economytakingoff,Taiwan displayedthefeaturescommon to all growingcapitalistsocieties:theliteracy
rate increased; mass communicationintensified;per capita income rose;
and a differentiated
urban sector includinglabor,a professionalmiddle
class, and a business entrepreneurialclass-came into being. The business class was remarkableforits independence.Althoughindividual enterpriseswere small and unorganized,theywere beyond the capture of
the party-state.To preventthe formationof big capital, the KMT had
avoided organizingbusinessesor pickingout "nationalchampions."As a
result,small and medium enterprisesdominated industrialproduction
and exports.As major employersand foreignexchange earners,these
small and medium businesseswere quite independentof the KMT.2'
The emergingbifurcationof the politicaland socioeconomicelite was
i8
20.
MervinGurtov,"Taiwan: Looking to theMainland,"AsianSurvey8 (Januaryi968), i6-
19Samuel P. S. Ho, "Economics,Economic Bureaucracy,and Taiwan's Economic Development,"PacificAffairs
6o (Summer i987), 226-47.
Computed fromTaiwan Statistics
Dada Book (Taipei: Council forEconomic Developmentand Planning),variousissues.
Tun-jen Cheng, "Politicsof IndustrialTransformation,"
Ph.D. diss. (Universityof California,Berkeley,i987), chap. 3.
20
482
WORLD POLITICS
divisionbethesub-ethnic
intensified
bythefactthatitlargelymirrored
As nationalpoliticswas
and Taiwanesepopulations.22
tweenmainlander
theindigenousTaiwanesepursued
reservedformainlanders,
primarily
economicadvancementforsocial upwardmobility.Thus, while ecotheycameto be heldlargelybytheTainomicresourceswerediffused,
wanese.
at thesametimethattheKMT'S instituThese changeswereoccurring
and
tionalcapacityformobilizationand control,once so overpowering
welldeveloped,was rapidlyeroding.In somesense,thiswas becausethe
theidea ofa military
counterattack
to
KMT regimeno longerentertained
But
in
the
syslargepart, dynamiccapitalist
returnto mainlandChina.
temhad simplyoutgrowntheregime'spoliticalcapacity.In theinstituoftheKMT cadresystemis a notionalgap thatemerged,thedeficiency
to reorganizethe cadre system
table example.Despite variousefforts
it
is
still
largelybasedon administralines,
alongoccupational-functional
aresimcivicandeconomicassociations
tiveregions.The ever-expanding
ply beyondthe capacityof the KMT to monitor,much less to control.
internationMoreover,thereis a limittowhichtheregimecan penetrate
suchas theJuniorChambersofCommerce,
allyorientedorganizations,
theLions Clubs,and theRotaryClubs.
thatdemocratic
ideas beganto growat thesame
It is not surprising
time.In thismaturing,
open,capitalisteconomy,producersand sellers
came moreand moreto internalizea marketculturethathonorsconrespectsconsumerstastes,and
tracts,dependson impersonalrelations,
It becameeasy,forexobservestherulesof thegame forcompetition.
is a kindofpoliticalmarket
ample,to acceptthenotionthatdemocracy
Viewed
respondtopublicopinion.23
inwhichgovernment
and politicians
from the demand side, if consumersdeterminea firm'ssuccess in the
market place, why should not voters'preferencesdeterminethe acceptabilityof public officialsor public policy? Viewed fromthe supply side,
if businessmencan compete,why are politicalentrepreneursstilldenied
entryto the electoralmarketat the nationallevel?
In the early-industrializingcountriesof Western Europe, the democratic impulse originated in the industrialbourgeoisie,particularlythe
One reason is
textileand othernondurableconsumer-goodsindustries.24
Alan Cole, "The PoliticalRoles ofTaiwanese Entrepreneurs,AsianSurvey8 (September
i968), 645-5423Shirley Kuo, "Wo kuo chingchi fa chan tui min chu hua ti yinghsiang" [The Impact of
Economic Developmenton Democratizationin Taiwan], Chungyangjihpao, August5, 1986,
p. I.
JamesR. Kurth,"IndustrialChange and PoliticalChange: A European Perspective,"in
in Latin America(Princeton:PrincetonUniverDavid Collier,ed., The New Authoritarianism
sityPress,I 979), 3 I8-62.
24
DEMOCRATIZING TAIWAN
483
sectordid notneedstateassistance
in capitalacthattheconsumer-goods
it was notas capital-intensive
cumulationand mobilization:
as theprowere
ducer-goods
sector,and consumergoodsfromearlyindustrializers
in the international
market.Nor did thissector
relatively
competitive
needthestate'sassistanceto demobilizesocialistworkers.Yet,foraccess
tothedomesticmarketand tolabor,itneededtoeliminateinternaltrade
as wellas thelocalguildsthatimmobilized
theworkforce.The
barriers
therefore
Westernindustrial
innabourgeoisie
pushedforrepresentation
statepowerand to ensurea laissez-faire
tionalpoliticalarenasto restrict
economy.
hasbeendifferent.
In Taiwan theexperience
The bourgeoisie
was not
a
the
latter
been
hinderedby landownerclass,
eliminatedbythe
having
In addition,thestatein Taiwan actedon bestatethroughland reform.
ofthebourgeoisie as, for
halfof,butnotat thebehestof,theinterests
Moreexample,in variousstate-initiated
policiesforexportpromotion.
was treatedpaternalistically;
over,laborin smalland mediumenterprises
action.Hence,
itwas neither
organizednorwas itpreparedforcollective
coercivepowerto maintainintherewas no need forthegovernment's
dustrialpeace.
The main activistsforpoliticalchangein Taiwan were the newly
emergingmiddle-class
intellectuals
whohad comeofage duringtheperiodofrapideconomicgrowth.This newelite,consisting
predominantly
demandeda liberaldemocracy,
ofTaiwanesefromthecountryside,
as the
UnliketheFCF leaders,who werescholars
FCF grouphad in thefifties.
leadersofthenew
mostlytrainedin philosophy,
education,and history,
weretrainedinthesocialsciences notablyinpodemocratic
movement
liticalscience,law, and sociology.Like theFCF leaders,however,these
new advocatesof democracy
are,in ReinhardBendix'sterms,educated
toideasand institutions
elitesreacting
ofa reference
societyand readyto
at
them
home.25
Western
democratic
idealsas well
apply
They adopted
institutional
as democratic
and
procedures,
design,politicaltechniques,
This new democratic
legalframeworks.
leadershipwas betterequipped
withorganizational
skillsand morelikelytotakepoliticalactionthanthe
FCF grouphad been.Whilethelatter
ideasand educated,the
propagated
former
putideasintopracticeand mobilized.
of these
Althoughwe have no empiricalstudyof thecareerpatterns
new Taiwaneseelites,thereis strongreasonto assumethatthemiddlewho fueledthedemocratic
movement
wereconnected
classintellectuals
toleadersofsmalland mediumbusinesses
viavarioussocialtiesbasedon
Such businesses,
school,regional,and workplaceaffiliations.
especially
25Bendix, Kingsor People (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,I978),
I2-I3,
292.
484
WORLD POLITICS
thosein theexportsector,
offered
politicalfundsand a fall-back
careerto
leadersofthepoliticalopposition.
In manycases,thelatterevenhad successfulbusinesscareersin theexportsector.The socialscienceschoolsof
majoruniversities
supplygraduatesbothtothirty
thousandexporthouses
and to thepoliticalopposition.
Leadersof thedemocratic
movementbecameoppositionists
between
I972 (theyeartheKMT introduced
politicalreform
undernewleadership)
and I977 (theyearmembersofthepoliticalopposition
coalescedto take
collectiveactionand scoredan electoralvictory).
The movementof the
politicaloppositionactuallystarted
as a politicalreform
movement
at the
oftheseventies;
theresponseofthenewKMT leadershipwas a
beginning
slow processofpoliticalco-optation
and a modicumofpoliticalliberalizationin theformof allowingsomelatitudeof politicaldiscourse.The
largenumberof politicalactivists
and thelimitedscopeof politicalreformled in theendtotheformation
ofa counterelite
thatchallengedthe
foundations
oftheKMT regime.
The politicalreformmovementwas initiallytriggered
by Taiwan's
forcedseveranceof itsformaltieswithmanyWesterncountries
and its
in theUnitedNationsto CommunistChina. This
loss of membership
diplomaticsetbackhad a dramaticimpacton thewholesocietyand led
the well-educated
youngelite,in Almondand Powell'swords,to "acoftheroleofpoliticsin theirlivesand new goals
quirenew conceptions
forwhichtheymaystrive."26
Whiletheinitialreactionto thedeterioratwas patriotic,
ing externalenvironment
soonturned
youngintellectuals
theirattention
to domesticsocietyand politics,
whichtheybelievedthey
couldand shouldinfluence.
Betweeni969 and I972, theyconductedseveral socialsurveys,
notablyon theplightof theruralsector.They also
oftheregime,especiallyconcerning
questionedthestructural
deficiency
theissueof thecompetence
and legitimacy
of thethreebranchesof the
NationalCongressthathad notfacedreelection
sinceI946, and had not
made room fornew membersfromTaiwan. There was what Reinhard
Bendix would call an intellectualmobilization.
In I973, the KMT regime responded to this intellectualfermentwith
several policy changes. In the socioeconomicarena, agriculturalpolicy
was drasticallyaltered; the rural sectorchanged fromone thathad been
heavilysqueezed intoone thathas been heavilysubsidized and protected
ever since. In the politicaldomain, young people highlyeducated, and
mostlyTaiwanese- were recruitedforpartyand governmentpositions;
26 Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative
Politics:A DevelopmentalApproach(Boston: Little,Brown, i966), 65.
DEMOCRATIZING TAIWAN
485
supplementaryelectionswere institutedto replenishthe aging national
representatives.27
These reformscoincided with the dynamicsof leadershipsuccession.
Indeed, theywould not have been possiblewithoutChiang Ching-kuo's
ascension to the premiership.He dismissedmany of the old KMT leaders
of the Chiang Kai-shek generationand institutedsupplementaryelectionsas a part of politicalreform.The latterwas a necessarystep to alleviate the seriousproblemof gerontocracyin the threenational representative bodies. Members were aging or dying fasterthan theycould be
replaced by the KMT regime,eitherby enlistingalternatesor by using secret,undemocraticmethods (such as nominationsfrommainlander associationsof various provinces).At the same time,the new agricultural
policyseemed to have consolidatedthe KMT'S power base in ruralareas.
These initialpoliticalreformshad actuallybeen designed more to coopt the oppositionthan to expand participation.They were used to consolidate the KMT'S leadershipand positionin society,especiallyin the rural sector.They had the unintentionaleffect,however,of expanding the
pool of the new politicalelite fromwhich the oppositionwas drawn.
Because of political co-optation,openings at the national level were
quite limitedforthepoliticalcompetition;notall ambitiousleaders could
be or wanted to be routedthroughtheKMT. Because of the piecemeal approach of supplementaryelectionsfor the threenational representative
organs,thereremainedan evidentcontrastbetween"hereditary"politics
at the centrallevel and democraticpoliticsat the local level-a situation
thatgrew less acceptableas timewenton.28The resultingdisappointment
with these political reformsled to the exodus of many of the new elite
fromthe KMT; theycollectivelyshiftedtheirattentionto the I977 local
electionsand, togetherwith a few dissidentlegislators,formeda solid
group of politicalopposition.
The decade between I977 and i986 witnessedan accelerated democraticmovementin Taiwan. The centralthrustof the democraticforces
was toward building a legitimateoppositionparty.Progresswas by no
means linear. It can be divided into two phases: the first,I977-I979,
was
one of violence-proneconfrontation
betweentheoppositionand theKMT;
the second, i980-i986, was one of intensivebargainingbetween the two
sides.The firstphase was a dramaticcycleofboom and bust forthedem27 Mab Huang, Intellectual
Ferment
for PoliticalReformsin Taiwan, 197i-73 (Ann Arbor:
CenterforChinese Studies,Universityof Michigan,1976).
28 JohnF. Copper withGeorge P. Chen, Taiwan's Elections:
PoliticalDevelopmentand Democratization
in the Republicof China (Occasional Papers/Reprint
Series in Contemporary
Asian Studies,Universityof Maryland,i986).
486
WORLD POLITICS
ocraticmovementthatcame close to self-destruction.
In thesecond phase,
the revived movement experienced some setbacks,but its gains were
steadyand cumulative.
Unquestionably,the announcementof local electionsin I977 stimulated an expansion in the democratic movement. The elections were
marredby a riotin a poll stationof Tao Yuan county,an eventthatbegan
to tip the balance toward the conservativegroup withinthe KMT. Members of the political opposition campaigned as a group and won onequarter of the magistrateposts and 30 percentof the seats in Taiwan's
ProvincialAssembly.The oppositiondelegationwas large enough to stall
the Assembly,but insufficient
to pass any resolutions-a situationthat
was frustrating
on various occasions.The sweetelectoralvictoryand the
sour provincial politicsthat followed caused the majorityof opposition
leaders to radicalize the democraticmovementby taking to the streets
and mobilizingthemasses. These more radical leaders instantlyemerged
as themainstreamfactionof thedemocraticmovement.They were called
the Formosa Magazine Group, or FMG, afterthe titleof theirprincipal
journal. Their hope was to build up a social forcestrongenough to make
theirdemocraticdemands credibleand to deterthegovernmentfromresortingto political suppression.Their initial efforts,however, only resulted in furtheringthe rise of the conservativefactionwithinthe KMT,
which advocated suppressionand intimidationby rapid deploymentof
the police force.
The suspensionof a planned national electionin late I978, when Taiwan was shockedbyPresidentJimmyCarter'swithdrawalof recognition
fromitsgovernment,had the unintentionaleffectof spurringthe FMG to
escalate itseffortsto mobilize support.The decisionto defertheelection,
taken unilaterallyby the government,was interpretedby the opposition
as indicatingan indefinitepostponement.The FMG, throughthe islandwide branch offices of its publication, immediately intensified its
campaign for democracy and human rights.Mass rallies and political
agitationin theautumnof I979 continuouslypushed thelimitsofpolitical
toleranceand oftenverged on violence.In December I979, theseactions
backfired when a violent confrontationwith the police occurred at
Kaoshiung and the regimequickly jailed mostof the leaders of the radical opposition.
THE
DEMOCRATIC
BREAKTHROUGH
With moderates in control of the opposition movement after the
Kaoshiung incident,the KMT regimesoughtto "normalize" the political
DEMOCRATIZING TAIWAN
487
elections.
In addition,itaddedmore"supplemenprocessbyreinstituting
in thethreenationalrepresentatarypositions"forelectoralcompetition
to
tiveorgans,enactedelectorallaws reducethescopeofadministrative
discretion
overcampaignactivities,
reiterated
itscommitment
to democracy,and beganto groomsomeliberalcadresforthetaskofcontinuing
Democratization
as conceivedbytheKMT
dialoguewiththeopposition.
was clearlyan incremental
process.It meanta gradualinfusionof new
bloodamongtheagingnationalrepresentatives-by
meansof a highly
circumscribed
electionin whichtheoppositionwas deniedtherightto
organizea partyor partiesofitsown.Indeed,theKMT regimecontinued
to preventtheexpansionof theoppositionas before,butit now applied
ofpoliticalrestriction
moresubtly.
thetechniques
of themoderatewing,thedemocratic
Underthestewardship
movementrecovered,
winning25 percentofthepopularvoteand I5 percent
and gainingmomenseatsin thei980 nationalelection,
ofthecontested
tumin twolocalelectionsthatensued.The opposition
presented
itselfas
crediblepoliticalforce.It emphasizednonviolence,
butusedexa unified,
For example,itsleadertra-legaldevicesto coordinate
campaignefforts.
a processthatrecommended
candidatesand supshipinstitutionalized
was especiallyimportant
portedtheircampaigns.Electoralcoordination
multibecausetheelectoralsystemTaiwan has adopted-a single-vote,
memberdistrictsystem-tendsto intensify
competition
amongcandidatesof the same party.Oppositioncandidatesalso drafteda common
platformthatessentiallydemandedpoliticalliberalization(annulling
martial-law
freedomto speak,publish,associate,and
decrees;restoring
oftheentiremembership
ofthethreenationalrepresenrally);reelection
tativeorgans;directelectionof thepresident,
theprovincialgovernors,
in thatorder.This commonplatform
and others,
provideda clearbenchmarkfortheopposition.
The progressthattheopposition
made in domesticelectionswas furtheredbythediscovery
ofoverseasresources
thatit couldtap.On their
i982 tripto theUnitedStates,fourprominent
moderateopposition
leaders,invitedbytheStateDepartment
as a teamto visittheU.S. Congress,
to overseasTaiwaneseorganizations,
wereintroduced
severalof whom
werealreadyactivein thelawfullobbying
business.This tripbroadened
thehorizonof oppositionmembersand transformed
thesocialtiesbetweenthemand overseasTaiwaneseintoa politicalnexus.The oppositionthereby
made a quantumjump in itsown foreignrelations.
Previouslythe FMG had onlymaintainedloose contactswithprivatehuman
such as AmnestyInternational,
whichhave little
rightsorganizations,
the government.
Now the oppositionhad
bargainingpower vis-ai-vis
488
WORLD POLITICS
foundan arena in the United States(as a securityprovider)through
whichtheKMT regime(as a security
influconsumer)
mightbe indirectly
enced.
While the oppositionremainedunifiedimmediately
afterthe i980
to splitup itsleadershipbeelections,
legislative
politicssoonthreatened
tweenthemoderateseniorleadersand themoreradicaljuniorleaders.
The jailingof FMG leadersallowedmoderatesto becomewhatAngela
has called"primeleaders,"creditedwiththe
Berger,in anothercontext,
rebirthof the opposition.29Moreover,the jailing of FMG leaders provided
opportunitiesin the lower ranks of the leadership foryoung opposition
memberswho had witnessed,but not taken partin, the previousradicalized opposition movement. Seeking recognitionoutside the Legislative
Yuan, these young "lesser leaders" (Berger's term) were predisposed to
repudiate the KMT regime in toto ratherthan to bargain with it within
the existing system.They did not appreciate the concessions that the
moderate leaders had extractedfromthe KMT partywhip in the Legislative Yuan;30theyalso heated up the foreignpolicyissues-especially the
issue of Taiwan's sovereigntyand destiny,whichhad been on thepolitical
agenda of theoppositionsince i982. Here, the"lesser,"more radical leaders blatantly espoused the goal of Taiwan's independence while the
"prime" moderate oppositionleaders toyedwith the "German formula"
of using a basic law to postponethe issue of unificationindefinitely.
This internaldisunityin the oppositionmovementhelps to explain its
poor performancein the i983 national election,in which both the movement and the moderateswithinit were weakened. To reintegratethe beleaguered opposition,itsembattledmoderateleadersthereuponproposed
to establisha formalorganizationcalled theAssociationforPublic Policy
(APP). They hoped that thisorganizationwould functionduring and between elections,enabling the oppositionto coordinateelectoralstrategies,
minimize factionalism,and harmonizevariouspolicystands.It was to fill
the knowledge gap of the oppositionin many policy issue areas, such as
foreignpolicy,labor, and environmentalprotection,so as to enable the
opposition to engage in a unifiedlegislativedebate and to appeal to its
potentialconstituencies.The branchesof the APP were also seen as an infrastructure
fora politicaloppositionpartyin the future.In short,the APP
was proposed as a proxyforand a prelude to forminga new party.
The APP was formallyestablishedin i984 and had some success.It abBerger,Oppositionin a Dominant-Party
System(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,
143? C. L. Chiou, "Politics of Alienationand Polarization:Taiwan's Tangwai in the i98os,"
Bulletinof ConcernedAsianScholarsi8 (July-September
i986), i6-28.
29
I969),
DEMOCRATIZING TAIWAN
489
an agendafordemocratic
sorbedmany"lesser"leadersand formulated
APP
reform.
On foreignpolicy,the
successfully
highlighted
theprinciple
as a compromise
betweenadvocacyofTaiwan'sinofself-determination
dependenceand advocacyof thestatusquo. Althoughtheprincipleof
was utterlyunacceptableto both the KMT and the
self-determination
whowerebothadamanton theunification
ofmaincommunist
regimes,
The
land Chinaand Taiwan,itnevertheless
begantogainin popularity.
fewlocal chaptersoftheAPP thatwereformedprovedto be an effective
base forthepoliticalopposition.Meanwhile,partycomorganizational
forpartyconstitumitteesin theAPP's localchaptersand thecommittee
office
commenced
studies
on
the
tionin theAPP's main
politicalpartysystem.
and expansionoftheAPP rancountertotheKMT'S stratThe formation
Whilethreatening
to disband
egyto splintertheoppositionmovement.
theregimeavoidedtakinganypunitiveaction;
theAPP and itsbranches,
instead,it urgedbargainingand dialoguevia a thirdsmallindependent
retired
memberoftheCongroupofliberalprofessors
plusa voluntarily
resultedin a staletrolYuan. However,severalroundsof negotiations
mate: the KMT would admitthe APP to two localitiesonly-a minor
couldnotaccept.
thatdelegatesoftheopposition
concession
to demanddemocracyand
Whileusingnearlyeverysocialgathering
forTaiwan's futo declare"theinalienablerightofself-determination"
For itspart,the
ture,theoppositionavoidedviolentactionin thestreets.
befuddledbyvariousspeculations
aboutthe
KMT
regimewas internally
politicalsuccessionin the post-ChiangChing-kuoera and externally
ofthesecurity
troubledbytheallegedwrongdoing
apparatus-an impliIn mid-i986,to decationin thekillingof severalChinese-Americans.
flectpublic attentionfromthe issues of self-determination,
political
of
the
international
and thetarnished
succession,
image
regime,theKMT'S
blue-ribbon
chairmannamed a twelve-person
studygroupwithinthe
oftheNapartyto examinesixcrucialpoliticalissues:therestructuring
martiallaw,civicorganizations,
tionalCongress,local autonomy,
social
and theKMT'S internalreform.3'
reform,
In lateSeptemberi986, duringthe KMT'S seriousstudyofdemocratiannouncedtheestablishment
of
zation,leadersofthepoliticalopposition
a new politicalparty,theDemocraticProgressive
Party(DPP). The leadershipof theKMT, in a conditionof highuncertainty
regardingtherea
in
gime'sreactionto theDPP, staged coup mid-October
byproclaiming
ofpoliticalassotheendofthemartiallaw decreeand oftheprohibition
3 Chou and Nathan (fn. I3).
490
WORLD POLITICS
ciations,includingparties.In December i986, the DPP and the KMT competed as the two principalpartiesin the national election,and the KMT
acted as an ordinarypartyin an emergingtwo-partysystem.The regime
carried out the above decisions in i987 and, in spite of strongresistance
fromthe old generationof national delegates,moved to rejuvenatethe
membershipof the threenationalrepresentative
organsby means of regular elections.
of events,it is evidentthatthe political
From the above reconstruction
opposition has succeeded in turningitselffroma targetof suppression
into an accepted competitorin politics.How can we explain this breakthrough? It seems that,for KMT elites,the concessionsvindicated their
longtimecommitmentto the idea of democracy;foroppositionelites,the
KMT'S concessionswere inevitable,necessary,and proofof thecompelling
power of democraticforces.These two contrastingviews are overstated:
the democraticbreakthroughshould be construedas the resultof a series
of calculated moves by both the rulersand the opposition.Only through
analyzing the structureof the bargainingsituationcan one understand
the logic of thesemoves thatshaped the course of democratictransition.
The emergenceof a politicaloppositionin I977 createda situationof
strategicinteractionbetween the KMT party-stateand its challengers.
Each move of one side was conditionedby one of the other's.The two
sides were locked into a continuousprocessof bargainingwhereincommunication was possible and actions were observable.In this situation,
both sides,oftenas rationalactors,made decisionsbased on given informationand theavailable optionsforresultsthattheyregardedas themost
desirableex ante. The oppositionhoped to achieve a quick transitionto
fulldemocracy(a total reelectionforall politicalofficesin a faircompetitionamong parties),while the regimewanted to have a gradual and extended processof democratization.
Neitherthe regimenor the oppositionwas a unitaryactor.On the side
of the politicalopposition,as we have seen, therewere both radical and
moderategroups: the formerwere more disposed to risk-takingand even
violence while the latterwere more risk-averseand willing to negotiate.
On the side of the KMT, there were conservativeas well as reformist
groups; the formerwere more troubledby possiblenegativeeffectsof the
democratictransitionwhile the latterwere more concernedwith the increasingcostsof freezingthe statusquo. These twindichotomiescomplicated the bargainingsituation,but not by as much as theymight have:
the shiftingbalance betweenhardlinersand softlinersin the KMT tended
to correspondwiththe alterationof moderateand radical elementsin the
opposition.
DEMOCRATIZING TAIWAN
491
Otherstudiesshow thatagenda settingand bargainingarenasalso
shaped the structureof bargainingand its outcome.32The partythathas
the power to set the agenda can preventissues thatare unfavorableto itselffromreachingthe bargainingtable,or it can sequence the agenda in
a way thatwill maximize itsgains and minimizeitslosses. Differentbargaining arenas impose differentconstraintson each side. A partyis expected to shiftthe bargainingto arenas where it has a comparativeadvantage.
The oppositionpresenteditsdemands in the followingorder: individual libertyfrom martial-law constraints,political freedomto associate
and to dissent,complete reelectionof the members of the legislative
branch of the centralgovernment,and directelectionsforthe chiefexecutive positions.Essentially,the decontrolsof civic societywould precede thecontestforpoliticalpower. The sequence seemed logical because
a meaningfulpoliticalcontestis premisedon theexerciseof civil and politicalrights.33
It was not in the KMT'S interestto impose a timetableforchange, especially one set by the opposition; and, because it had controlover the
stateapparatus,the legislativearena, and the media, the KMT could veto
the democratizationagenda proposed by the opposition.The KMT, in its
own democratizationagenda, actually reversedthe logical sequence of
democratictransition.Until i986, it kept increasingthe scope of supplementaryelectionswhile disallowing,in the name of national security,all
oppositionpartiesand public debateson politicalliberalization.Settinga
purely electoral agenda enabled the KMT to minimize the opposition's
gain in the extended process of democratictransition.Moreover,a very
tightelection law constrainedcampaign activity,and preelectioncrackdowns crippledcriticalpublications.
There were fourbargainingspheres:the streets,the LegislativeYuan,
the third-party
mediated dialogue, and overseasarenas (notablythe U.S.
Congress).In the streets,the oppositioncould take actionat any timeand
in a place of its own choosingso as to address issues and views thatwere
excluded from the KMT-controlledmedia. But this was also an arena
wheremob rule was possible,where theoppositionwas vulnerableunder
martiallaw, and where it would unavoidablybe perceivedas radical.
The second arena, the legislature,was dominatedby theKMT. The opposition'selectoralstrengthcould not be fullytranslatedinto parliamentarypower since onlyaround 30 percentof the parliamentaryseats were
open to competition.Thus, althoughtheoppositiongenerallyreceived30
32
JohnW. Kingdon,Agendas,Alternatives,
and PublicPolicies(Boston: Little,Brown,i984).
and Schmitter(fn.6); Stepan (fn. i), 6.
33 O'Donnell
492
WORLD POLITICS
percentofthevotes,itwononly20 percentofthecontested
seats(due,in
ofitselectoralbase);itsrepresentation
intheLegpart,tomaldistribution
islativeYuan amountedto onlyaround6 percent.The KMT'S manipulationofregulations,
suchas raisingthequorumforsubmitting
a bill,furthercurtailedthelegislative
poweroftheopposition.
As T. J.Pempelhas
in a dominantpartysystem,
argued,fora politicalopposition
thereis an
inherentdilemma:boycottand obstruction
bringno credit,whilecompromiseforsmallgainsinvolvestheriskofbeingaccusedofcollusion.34
This arena could be an important
one,however.There have been few
in thelegislature,
membersoftheopposition
buttheywereable to use it
as a vantagepointformonitoring
policymakingand forinvestigating
and controversial
issuesas thebudgetand themanagement
suchsensitive
of foreignexchangereserves.Moreover,membership
in thelegislature
permitstheoppositionto gain somecontroloveragendasettingvia emand interpellation.
barrassment
The definingfeatureof thethirdarena,themediateddialogueinstituted in i987, was an explicitprocessof give-and-take.This arena could
be a potentialtrapforthepoliticalopposition
becauseoftwoasymmetric
First,a compromise
reachedat thebargaining
tableis,bydefconditions.
solution.The likelihoodofbeingdiscredited
inition,a second-best
byinwas low fortheKMT softliners,
ternalcriticsforsucha compromise
but
Softliners
the
highforthemoderatewingoftheopposition.
mightjustify
deal as a minimalnecessaryconcession,but the moderateopposition
in contending
thattheyhad extractedthemaximighthave difficulty
mumpossiblegain.Second,theKMT had an institutional
but
hierarchy,
was oftenfluidand poorlycoordinated.
thestructure
oftheopposition
In
betweentheconseraddition,theKMT'S supremeleadercould arbitrate
vativeand reformist
groupswithintheparty,buttheleadershipof the
was stillbeingformed.
The KMT negotiator
opposition
as an agentserved
fortheoppositionhad multiple
onlyone principal,but the negotiator
and was oftenuncertain
abouthisbargaining
principles
position.
totheTaiwanesecommunities
The fourth
arenaowed itsexistence
in
theUnitedStatesand to Taiwan's dependenceon theU.S. forweapon
ofitssecurity.
supply,marketaccess,and theimpliedunderwriting
OverseasTaiwanesehad attempted
tolinktheissueofhumanrightsforpolitical prisonersto the island'squalification
fora preferential
tariff.AlthoughWashingtonhad never imposedany economicsanctionson
remains.Moreover,thelobbying
efforts
of overTaiwan, thepossibility
seasTaiwanesedo maketheissueofdemocratic
moreconspictransition
34 T. J.Pempel, "The Dilemma of Parliamentary
Oppositionin Japan,"Polity8 (Fall
63-79.
1975),
DEMOCRATIZING TAIWAN
493
uous to some influentialAmerican congressmen.In addition, several of
the overseas Taiwanese organizationsespoused revolutionand armed
struggleforTaiwan's liberation.The existenceof Taiwanese revolutionaries overseas had the effectof making the domestic opposition seem
more rational and moderate,and thus more acceptable to the KMT. In
short,the oppositionhad the upper hand in the fourthbargainingarena.
In view of this structureof bargainingbetween the KMT regime and
the politicalopposition,it is clear why the FMG had failedin the seventies.
The I977 election riot resulted in the ascent of the conservativewing
withinthe KMT, while the Assembly'spoliticsradicalized the majorityof
leaders in thepoliticalopposition.Locked in a situationof strategicinteraction,the radical oppositionand conservativeKMT cadres did not communicate: the formerdid not heed the warningsof the latter,while the
latterdid not consultwith the formerabout the suspensionof elections.
The result was that the FMG miscalculated and adopted an irrational
strategyof seekingan instantbreakthroughto democracy.The FMG's second mistakewas to concentrateitseffortsin onlyone bargainingarenathestreets-where martiallaw made itmostvulnerableto suppressionby
thegovernment.
The subsequentsuccess of the moderate wing of the politicalopposition can be explained by its adoption of a differentstrategy.In i983, it
theagenda. It did so byenteringthe
began to forcetheKMT to restructure
debate on Taiwan's future-an issue that concerns everyone in Taiwan-and calling foreitherself-determination
or a "German solution,"
therebyforcingthe KMT to address the issue of democratizationimmediately.Indeed, once it had been placed on theagenda, theKMT softliners
quicklysaw thepotentialof using democratizationto call attentionto the
wideninggap between Taiwan and mainland China, to hurtthe latter's
political image, and to blunt its diplomatic offensivefor reunification.
ifnotan incentive,to make
These side effectsgave theKMT a justification,
concessionsto the opposition.
The DPP leaders also changed arenas, deemphasizing the bargaining
tableand insteadworkingin a coordinatedfashionin thethreeotherarenas: the LegislativeYuan, the streets,and overseas.By playingthe game
in theLegislativeYuan, theyobtainedinformationand secureda hand in
rewritingthe rules. They used streetdemonstrationsto amplifytheir
voices,but did not resortto violence-the youngerand more restivesupportersbeing restrainedby remindersof the debacle of the FMG. Thus,
despite some strainedrelationsbetween prime and lesser leaders, mass
movement in the streetsand opposition in the Legislative Yuan were
skillfullycoordinated.
494
WORLD POLITICS
The overseasarena was also involved.Ever since itsformationin i982
forthe purpose of lobbying,theFormosan AssociationforPublic Affairs
(FAPA)
has set its agenda in accordance with thatof the APP, and later the
DPP.35 The attemptedreturnof exiled dissidentsto Taiwan was timed to
highlightthe cause of the democraticmovement.Indeed, the DPP's assertionthatthe formationof thepartyhad long been planned is highlycredible in view of the immediateattentionpaid to it by severalleading U.S.
senatorswho were contactedby the FAPA when the DPPwas born.36The
KMT
regime,accused of violatinghuman rightsin U.S. territories,was
susceptibleto political moves on Capitol Hill. One way for the KMT to
shore up its relationswithWashingtonwas to move Taiwan's politicstoward democratization.
Skillfulas the moderate oppositionwas, its success in securingthe legitimizationof opposition partiesand a commitmentto an. accelerated
transitionto democracymust also be attributedto the shrewdnessof the
in managing the change with the least cost to itself.It did this in
KMT
threeways.
First,it secured,at least fora time,itscardinalpolicies.The formation
of civic and politicalorganizationsand the exerciseof politicalfreedom
was accepted,but only withinthe legal bounds of threerestrictiveprinciples-namely, no use of violence, no advocacy of communism,and,
most importantly,no advocacy of separatism(Taiwan independence).
These safeguardsallowed the regimeto exclude what Otto Kirchheimer
has called "opposition in principle."37By not suppressingthe DPP even
though it had been illegallyformed,and by making a wholesale concession to the DPP's demands fordemocratization,the KMT regimeplaced itselfin a strongbargainingpositionto demand the DPP's compliance with
the threeprinciples.The DPP reciprocatedby not includingin its charter
the principleof self-determination,
which the KMT stronglyopposed for
fearit would eventuallylead to Taiwan's independence.
Second, in spiteof competitiveelections,theKMT moved to secure-at
least fora time-its dominationof thelegislature.It did thispartlybynot
agreeingto open the entirelegislatureto popular electionsall at once, but
insistingthat the members elected in I946 retaintheirprivilegedpositions until theirdeaths. This pleased the conservativesand helped to secure continuedKMT dominance. Even afterthe entirerepresentationhas
35Asian-American
Times,November9, i987, p. I.
36 Min chichouk'an,Junei i, i987, p. i; Ching Yu, "Chu tangshihyu chi hua ti hsingtung"
[Establishinga new partywas a deliberateand plannedaction],Shihpao chouk'an,October4,
i986, p. ii.
Kirchheimer,"The Waning of Oppositionin ParliamentaryRegimes,"Social Research
(Summer 1957), 027-56.
37
24
DEMOCRATIZING
TAIWAN
495
been democratically
elected,the KMT'S positionseemslikelyto remain
strongbecauseof its abilityto influencetheelectoraland partyrules.
Withtheexceptionof thethreeprinciples
mentioned
above,therevised
fornew politicalparties.
electionlaw of i983 has verylow entrybarriers
ofnewpartiesfromtheconstitThis has actuallyled to a mushrooming
uenciesthattheDPP had hopedto takeover.The law also providesfor
multimember
a systembiasedagainsta mediumsingle-vote,
districts,
size partylike theDPP whichhas to competewiththeleadingpartyin
This systemworksbestfortheleadingpartywhichcan
mostdistricts.
inmostor all
nominate
optimalcandidatesand allocatevotesaccordingly
theirvotesin a few
and forsmallpartieswhichcan concentrate
districts,
withtheability
districts.38
Combiningtheseruleson politicalcompetition
to reward constituencies,the KMT is incubatingin Taiwan a systemin
likethatofJapan,ratherthana two-party
whichone partyis dominant,
likethatoftheUnitedStates.
system,
until
Third,it managedto hold offthedemocratizing
breakthrough
tensionshad been relieved.Ever
manyof thesubethnicand intraparty
surfacedin theearlyI970s, theKMT has
sincethedemocraticferment
been tryingto indigenize the party.By the mid-ig8os, 45 percentof the
membersand 75 percentofthecadresin
CentralStandingCommittee's
theKMTwerenativeTaiwanese.And eversincethepoliticalopposition
forcein thelate I970s, theKMT has begunto debecamea formidable
mocratize
itself,
instituting
an opennominating
system
and a nonbinding
the KMT
primarysystem.By delayingthe processof democratization,
havecomanagedto separatethisissuefromothersthatmightotherwise
alescedto producea violentrevolutionary
upheaval.
FROM
QUASI-DEMOCRACY
To FULL
DEMOCRACY?
crossedan important
thresholdof
AlthoughTaiwan has definitely
democratic
transition,
thequestionremainswhethertheincipientdemocraticinstitutions
will growand endure.RobertDahl has arguedthat
once a repressive
regimemovesaway fromthepremiseof totalcontrol
thereis no naturalstoppingpoint
and beginsto allow someopposition,
untilitreachesfull-scale
orelsereimposes
totalconpoliticalcompetition
trol.39
of democratization
Historyhas all too oftenseen the stymieing
as inWeimarGermany,
Taisho
trendsand thelapseofnewdemocracies,
38 Arend Lijphartet al., "The Limited Vote and theSingle Nontransferable
Vote: Lessons
fromthe Japaneseand Spanish Examples," in BernardGrofmanand Arend Lijphart,eds.,
ElectoralLaws and TheirPoliticalConsequences(New York: AgathonPress,i986), 154-69.
39 Dahl (fn.7).
496
WORLD POLITICS
Japan,and, in the i96os, the southerncone of Latin America. There are,
however,a number of pointsthatsuggestthatTaiwan may be on an irreversiblecourse of democratization.
First, the KMT itselfhas internalized some democratic values. In a
speech on ConstitutionDay i984, Chiang Ching-kuo,the late chairman
of the KMT, recognized-for the firsttime in the KMT'S history-the exIn thesame speech,
istenceof a "pluralist"societywithdiverseinterests.40
Chiang Ching-kuo affirmedthe legitimacyof people's holding different
pointsof view. Afterthe birthof the DPP, Lee Huan, secretarygeneral of
the KMT, announced that the KMT, as an ordinaryparty,would compete
with other parties peacefullyand on an equal footing.And the KMT'S
trainingprogram ceased to socialize partycadres as revolutionaryvanguards.4'Such a normativeperspectiveof itsrole in an emergingdemocof the KMT duringthe
racyis a drasticdeparturefromthe self-perception
partywhichalone
past seven decades, when it saw itselfas a revolutionary
representedthe national interest.
That thisconversionis genuine is attestedto by a numberof facts.Initsdemocraticprocedures.Changes
ternally,the KMT is institutionalizing
in
the
rules
been
made
have
governingthe selectionof candidates who
run forpublic officeon the KMT ticket,of delegatesto the partycongress,
and even of the partyleadership.Nomination is no longer a top-down
process,but proceeds fromthe bottomup, beginningwith open registration, a kind of nonbindingprimaryreflectingthe preferencesof rankand-filemembers,and the selectionof candidatesby a nominatingcommitteelargelybased on the resultsof the primary.Around two-thirdsof
thedelegatesto theThirteenthPartyCongressin Junei988 were selected
througha competitiveelectoralprocess.This congresselected,fromthe
floor,theCentralCommitteemembersfroma long listof candidateswho
had eitherbeen recommendedby theparty'sOrganizationCommitteeor
nominated from the floor. The membershipof the Central Standing
Committeehas, however,not yetbeen opened to competitiveelection.
Externally,theKMT is disengagingfromtheadministrationof the state
and has increasinglybecome an electoralinstitutionpreoccupiedwithperiodic political contestsratherthan a Leninist organization devoted to
matchingideological goals with statepolicy.The separationof the party
fromthe stateis the task thatremainsthe biggestchallenge to a Leninist
party.The personnel flow fromthe KMT to the state and the financial
pipeline fromthe statetreasuryto the KMT have been made clear,thanks
to the DPP's use of investigativepower in the LegislativeYuan. Respond4?Chungyangjih pao, December 25, i984, p. 3.
41Ibid., August4, i987, p. 2.
DEMOCRATIZING TAIWAN
497
ing to the DPP's and, to some extent,the media's criticisms,the KMT has
begun to pursue a policy of self-reliancein its personneland financial
management.KMT cadres are being professionalized;thatis, theyare better paid, provided with pensions,task-orientedratherthan merelyloyalty-driven,and specialized in electoralstrategy.Through itsCentral Investment Company, the KMT has become an active equity holder in
industryand a key playerin the financialmarket.In addition to transformingitselfinto an entityseparate fromthe stateapparatus,it is also
withdrawingfromthe largelystate-runeducational system,in response
to the students'and, to some extent,the faculties'demands forcampus
autonomy.It stillretainssome influencein the judiciary,especiallyover
political libel suits. However, a supraparty supervisorybody-now
mostlycomposed of liberal scholars instead of the judiciary-monitors
and judges the fairnessof the electoralprocess.
A second reason why the democratizationprocessprobablycannot be
stopped is that so-called veto groups, those with the potentialand tenwithdemocratization,are no longerinfluential.Within
dencyto interfere
or conservativewing has lost its clout. The rethe KMT, the ultra-rightist
formistwing is now in firmcontrolof the partyorganizationand supportsall theyoungKMT officeholdersin thethreenationalrepresentative
organs; theyformcoalitionsamong themselvesratherthan with the old
privilegedmemberswho were electedin I946.
The military,a frequentveto group in many third-worldpolities,has
been politicallyneutralized since the introductionof the commissarsystem in I950. Even if the partywere to withdrawfromthe military,the
propensityfor militaryinterventionin Taiwan politics would remain
low. Militarypaternalismbased on personal and regional ties was completelyeliminatedafterthe reorganizationand centralizationof the early
I950s. A rotationsystemof militarycommand is firmly
established.The
militaryelite is well compensated,and the militaryas an institutionhas
carved out many profitableniches in the domesticeconomy,such as in
constructionand in state-ownedenterprises.Political control and economic payoffscan be expectedto continueto dissuade the militaryfrom
enteringpolitics.
The thirdargumentforthe continueddevelopmentof democracyin
Taiwan has to do with the linkage betweensocial cleavages and political
forces.Taiwan's political forcesare no longer solely structuredby the
sub-ethniccleavage. Crosscuttingsocial cleavages now complicaterather
than radicalize the politicalcontest.
The sub-ethniccleavage between Taiwanese and mainlanders,as reflectedin the politicalplatformand elite compositionof the opposition,
498
WORLD POLITICS
movewithinwhichthedemocratic
providedthebasicsocialframework
for
the
demand
and
mentunfolded.The principleofself-determination
of
itemsin variousplatforms
priority
rightswereinvariably
democratic
thegap betweenthetwogroups.
thepoliticalopposition.Each reflected
bymany
butentertained
wasendorsedbyveryfewmainlanders,
The first
was a middle-class
Taiwanese.The second,thedemandfordemocracy,
couldbe
cleavage.Democratization
thesub-ethnic
issuethattranscended
ofpoliticalpowerbetween
as a redistribution
and had been interpreted
and theTaiwanese.Althoughmanyliberal,intellectual
themainlanders
mainlandershad supportedtheoppositionforthepurposeofcreatinga
to balancetheKMT, at mostonlya dozenwerefoundin the
counterforce
and nonein therankand file.Thus,
oftheopposition,
leadershipstratum
Taiwanese,
werenotexclusively
of democracy
althoughthe supporters
itselfas a Taiwanesepoliticalforceand itwas so
presented
theopposition
perceived.
cleavagelostits
theissueofsub-ethnic
proceeded,
As democratization
For one thing,
thoughnotitssalience,in politicaldynamics.
hegemony,
indigenized.An overwhelming
theKMT leadershipbecameincreasingly
ofnew leadmajorityofKMT candidatesforpublicoffice-thereservoir
Commitin
Central
balance
the
The
Standing
ers-are now Taiwanese.
teeoftheKMT is also tippingin favoroftheTaiwanese.Sincethedemocraticbreakthroughin i986, othersocioeconomicfactorshave begun to
labor-capital
the horizontalpatternsof politics,particularly
strengthen
ofa
ofmartiallaw and thepromulgation
Withthedismantling
relations.
have
labor
unions
civicorganizations,
laborlaw and of laws governing
In viewofthesize oftheworkingpopulation(sixmilbeenlegitimized.
it is likelythatissuesinof thetotalpopulation),
lion,aboutone-third
rights
welfare,wages,and organizational
volvingworkingconditions,
of
labor
issues
The
attention.
to
command
significance
begin
political
will
polity.
ofclasscleavagetoTaiwan'sdemocratizing
indicatestherelevance
replace,subThis is nottosaythatclasshasreplaced,orwillinevitably
cleavagein Taiwan'ssociety.
as themostfundamental
ethnicdifferences
sectorand workbetweentheself-employed
For one thing,theboundary
todrawand easytocross.
is difficult
ersin smalland mediumenterprises
oftenbecome
in smallenterprises,
Some workers,especiallyapprentices
oftheworkersare employedin
Onlyone-sixth
ownersof smallshops.42
wheretheymightbe moreaccessibleto politicalactivlargeenterprises
incomeand even
numberof lower-middle
ists.Moreover,a substantial
low-incomepeople perceivethemselvesas a vaguelydefinedmiddle
Hill Gates, "Dependency and the Part-Time Proletariatin Taiwan," ModernChina 5
(July1979), 38I-408.
42
DEMOCRATIZING TAIWAN
499
class-not a surprisingphenomenonin societieswithhigh social mobility
and a low degree ofincome inequalitysuch as Taiwan and Japan.43
Other
issues have become equally salient.A notable example is the conflictbetween the polluting industriesand local residents,which involves the
need to balance two competinggoals, economic developmentand environmentalprotection.This issue has become high on the politicalagenda
because ultimatelythe public has to decide on the trade-offbetween the
costsof developmentand the costsof environmentalprotection.The social cleavage in this issue area is based on localitiesand regions,not on
class.
Facing multiple social cleavages and diverse interests,both the KMT
and the DPP, as theirpartyconstitutionsreveal,are attemptingto become
catch-allparties.The KMT has definedits social base as the "people"; for
theDPP, it is the"masses."44Several empiricalstudiesofelectoralbehavior
show no clearcutprofilesof theirsupporters,45
suggestingthatboth parties are still"discovering"theirconstituencies.Meanwhile, new parties,
addressingsingle-issueareas, are being formedon behalf of clearlydefinedsocial groups. The emergenceof the Worker's Partyin late i987 is
a notable example thatmay indicatethe surfacingof single-issueparties
that will representconsumer,professional,and environmentalgroups;
but,as of now, thereis no clearcutbond betweenpoliticalforcesand social interests.
The ultimatetestof democracyis theacceptanceofelectoralresultsfor
a change in power. In the foreseeablefuture,it is unlikelythatthistestof
democracywill have to be applied, since the DPP is not in a winning position.It has neverbeen able to break the 30-percentbarrierand its electoral base is not wide, while the KMT has the resourcesand the institutional framework to maintain itself nationwide. Still, it would be
extremelycostlyto reversethe trendtoward democracy.
43Yung Wei, "Hsiang tuan chi ho hsieh min chu ti tau lu mai chin" [Make headway to
unity,harmony,and democracy],Chungyangjihpao, October7, 1982, p. 3.
44 The Secretariat,
The PartyConstitution
of theKMT (Taipei, i988); the Secretariat,The
PartyConstitution
oftheDPP (Taipei, i987).
45Fu Hu and Ying-longYu, "Hsuan min ti tou pieh chu hsiang:chiehk'ou yu lei hsingti
fen hsi" [Votingorientationof the electorates:A structuraland typologicalanalysis],paper
presentedto theChinese PoliticalScience Association,Taipei, September9, I983.