Decoupling motor plans from perceptual decisions to investigate

Articles in PresS. J Neurophysiol (March 12, 2014). doi:10.1152/jn.00308.2013
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Decoupling motor plans from perceptual decisions
to investigate when and whether decisions are embodied
Neuro Forum to Filimon et al. on
The Journal of Neuroscience, Jan 30; 33(5): 2121- 2136.
Stefano Sandrone
1 NATBRAINLAB - Neuroanatomy and Tractography Brain Laboratory, Department
of Forensic and Neurodevelopmental Sciences, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s
College, SE5 8AF London, UK.
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Total number of words (text):
2455.
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Total number of references:
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*Address correspondence to:
Stefano Sandrone
NATBRAINLAB
Institute of Psychiatry
16 De Crepsigny Park
London SE5 8AF
United Kingdom
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Email: [email protected]
Running Title:
Motor plans and perceptual decisions
Keywords:
Decision-making
Motor plans
Perceptual decisions
Embodied cognition
Acknowledgments: Many thanks to Richard Hahnloser, David Bontrager and
Henrietta Howells for their comments on a previous version of the manuscript.
Decision-making is a crucial part of our life: we sense information from the
Copyright © 2014 by the American Physiological Society.
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environment and perform our motor response. However, ‘whether’ and ‘when’
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decisions are embodied still needs to be fully elucidated. Neuroimaging data obtained
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by the disentanglement of perceptual decision from motor preparation revealed an
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increase in connectivity between inferior frontal cortex and sensory regions, and the
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important role played by intraparietal sulcus in motor decisions. The results obtained
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as well as the new research questions prompted by this work are carefully discussed
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herein.
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Every day, from the moment the alarm clock sounds (and we are of two minds
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about getting out of the bed or postponing for a couple of minutes) until night
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when we choose whether to set it again or not, we make a huge number of
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decisions, with a plethora of deeply intermingled cognitive, emotional, motor,
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spatial, and temporal aspects. In a paper recently published in The Journal of
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Neuroscience, Filimon et al. addressed the challenging topic of decision-making
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using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and a well-
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designed experimental strategy (Filimon et al., 2013). They disentangled motor
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preparation from perceptual decision-making to investigate whether the
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sensorimotor system implements perceptual choices.
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Previous research on this topic had been confounded by motor planning due to
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pre-assigned sensorimotor mappings (Shapiro, 2011), leaving the question open
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of whether and when these decisions are embodied in brain circuits. Preceding
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neurophysiological studies on monkeys postulated the existence of a “decisional
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threshold” that can be reached by the accumulation of sensory information, with
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greater firing rates for perceptual decisions based on high sensory evidence, than
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those based on low evidence. However, increased firing patterns in frontal eye
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fields (FEF) and the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) (see for example Kim and
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Shadlen, 1999) are misleading, since they could be correlated to motor plan
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preparation rather than to perceptual decisions or sensory integration. Evidence
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of the fact that prior expectation can modulate the interaction between sensory
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and prefrontal regions in the human brain has already been found (Rahnev et
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al., 2011), but the contribution of effector-specific sensorimotor regions to
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perceptual decisions is not so clear, given that effector-nonspecific areas also
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contribute to eye and hand movement planning. This scenario is further
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complicated by the fact that the human decisional threshold acts in multiple
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ways, e.g. with sustained activity vs. non-sustained activity modalities.
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In the light of that, Filimon et al. avoided a priori assumptions on the decisional
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threshold. From an epistemological point of view, this bottom-up experimental
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approach is probably the best solution when different theoretical frameworks
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are available and none of which can be identified as ultimately correct. They
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analysed the increase in effective connectivity between sensory evidence areas
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and higher-level regions. In the process, they revealed target locations and the
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effector type to the experimental subjects only after the decision stage. After a
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training period, nineteen people undertook a task in which they had to decide
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repeatedly whether greyscale noisy stimuli represented a face or a house,
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individually adjusted for each subject and presenting high or low levels of
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sensory evidence (i.e. with low or high levels of noise). All stimulus images had
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the same spatial frequency, contrast, and luminance. After a variable delay of up
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to 9 seconds, subjects were given a specific motor preparation instruction on how
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to indicate their decision. Starting from a fixation point, they were given an
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additional 1.5 seconds in which to respond either by saccading to the
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remembered target location (up, down, left or right) or by pressing the
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corresponding button on a diamond-shaped response pad (hand trials). Eight
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possible motor plans were thus decoupled from perceptual decisions. During
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each motor preparation period, a star or a square, respectively representing a
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face or a house, appeared as a target at one of the aforementioned locations, and
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subjects responded without receiving any feedback.
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The first finding of the experiment was that the subjects recognised faces and
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houses with high levels of accuracy, and even more so for increased sensory
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evidence, as witnessed by behavioural analysis and cerebral activations for
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presented stimuli. Faces activated face dominant regions in occipital and ventral
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temporal cortices significantly more than did houses, which in turn mainly
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activated the parahippocampal gyrus, thus confirming previous reports
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(Kanwisher and Yovel, 2006). However, the variability among subjects on
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cerebral shape and size and individual differences in ear canals as well as in
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lateral ventricles produced different field distortion in ventral temporal cortex in
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each subject. Therefore, registration of individual run to a standard space was
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imprecise, and could to some extent smear out the activations in the fusiform and
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parahippocampal gyri. Because of that, regions of interest were selected at the
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single-subject level. Regardless of the sensory evidence level, all stimuli led to
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widespread BOLD activations that involved, inter alia, the prefrontal cortex,
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FEF, the orbitofrontal region, intraparietal and parietal areas, the precuneus,
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the cingulate cortex, and subcortical structures. These activations probably
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reflected other mental processes and factors involved in this paradigm, such as
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attention, memory, difficulties and other inter-individual differences.
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The second finding was that psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis
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allowed the authors to identify the specific decision-making network and thus
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satisfied a requirement for increased effective connectivity with faces and house
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areas during the perceptual decisions. The combination of a PPI analysis with
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the comparison of the total amount of BOLD activation for High- versus Low-
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evidence conditions could be viewed as the fMRI equivalent of the postulated
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sensory evidence comparator process and the accumulation to threshold (see also
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Gold and Shadlen, 2007). The authors hypothesised and empirically confirmed
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that, during the phase of sensory evidence integration, perceptual decision-
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making regions should systematically display higher connectivity with the
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absolute difference between time series from face- and house-dominant sensory
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regions over the perceptual decision period than during the rest of the trial,
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when motor planning is underway.
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However, even with this approach, the aforementioned factors could still account
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for an increase in connectivity. The authors accordingly set three further
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stringent criteria: (i) that perceptual areas involved in sensory integration should
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also be modulated by the amount of sensory evidence available during the
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perceptual decision; (ii) that said areas should show greater activation during the
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decision stage than the post-decision stage, and (iii) that they should be activated
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above baseline. At the face/house decision stage, the effective connectivity
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increased substantially in several regions, but the inferior frontal sulcus (IFS)
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was the only region to meet the established criteria for sensory integration. The
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IFS responded to the sensory evidence independently of effector-specific motor
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preparation and reached a perceptual decision in the absence of a motor plan,
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without the need for the decision to be embodied. Motor plans cannot be formed
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in putative LIP. Although sensory evidence modulation over the perceptual
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decision in the parietal PPI areas was predictable (and possibly too weak to be
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detected with fMRI techniques), such modulation was recorded in prefrontal but
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not in parietal cortices, whose neurons enshrined a finer representation of very
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specific stimuli (Quiroga, 2012). A re-analysis of the data on the basis of this
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specific point confirmed previous reports, therefore revealing a greater motor
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preparatory activity for oculomotor decisions with a greater putative LIP
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High>Low modulation (Tosoni et al., 2008). This motor IPS region, interestingly
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also not overlapping with the PPI areas when a less stringent liberal threshold
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was applied, was indeed involved in motor and eye movement decisions between
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possible targets to be reached with a saccade, probably through its connectivity
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with middle temporal regions. The final observation of this study was that of
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higher IFS activation for low- than for high-evidence decisions. In contrast, LIP
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displayed a High>Low pattern during motor decisions, which suggested for the
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first time that different regions and types of decisions have different neural
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signatures.
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These results are striking, and some interesting and stimulating issues can be
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raised. We are still far from having ultimately mapped the LIP areas in monkeys
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and the equivalent ones in humans, and future investigations will have to fill this
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conceptual
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(cytoarchitectonic) and functional (connectivity) perspectives. Also, modifying
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the paradigm so as to increase the number of the training trials would have
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made this study even more analogous to those performed in monkeys, allowing
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more meaningful comparison. Given that the experimental paradigm requires a
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saccadic movement, the authors correctly decided to use an eye-tracker inside
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the fMRI. This tool is very useful when used to quantify the movements of the
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subjects before the final decision, to measure the point of gaze and the motion of
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an eye related to the head and to analyse whether specific eye movements are
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linked to specific (i.e. correct vs incorrect) decisional outcomes.
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Thanks to the study by Filimon and colleagues, we have learnt that abstract
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decisions in the absence of sensorimotor mappings are not embodied, but that
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sensorimotor networks do contribute to motor decisions. Interestingly, some
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variants of the experimental strategy used by Filimon et al. could be really useful
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to gain further insights. The first of them could rely on the exploitation of visual
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lexical choice. Only tangentially discussed by the authors, a psycholinguistic
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version of their paradigm would enable modulation of the ambiguity inherent to
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the material presented, and it would facilitate a focus on the perceptual decision
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that involves the dichotomy between abstract and concrete (more embodied)
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stimuli. With these modifications, in fact, it would be possible to assess the
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contrast between eye-, hand- and also mouth-movements (Cappa and
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Pulvermüller, 2012). Also, the use of multi-modal and cross-sensorial responses
gap
by
properly
addressing
it
from
both
structural
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(e.g. audio-visual object responses) could expand the range of perceptual
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decisions here considered.
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Crucial insights could be also gained by modifying the experimental design with
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the introduction of new factors as regressors. For example, the modulation of the
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response movement can be achieved by means of pointing or bimanual responses
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(Madlon-Kay et al., 2013) rather than of the less demanding button pressing.
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Conversely, exclusion of the high- and low-response targets could reduce the
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combinations of motor plans, and thus simplify the task.
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Designing a well-controlled experiment where scientists can properly manipulate
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individual variables is a fundamental methodological issue, and Filimon and
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colleagues have elegantly done this. At the same time, however, we live in a
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dynamic and lively world where static stimuli are extremely rare. Therefore, one
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of the next challenging steps could be the use of a visual motion discrimination
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task instead of recognition, which could further reduce the gap between the
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experimental setting and our daily decision-making process. Moreover,
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displaying coloured stimuli, in spite of a slight difficulty in individual
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adjustment, would make the task even more ecological.
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There are many different kinds of decisions, and to obtain a complete picture we
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need to insert processes that are pivotal in our everyday decision-making, such
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as punishment and reward. In the original paradigm used by Filimon and
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colleagues, subjects responded without receiving any positive or negative
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feedback. On one hand, the punishment level for incorrect responses could have
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been parametrically manipulated across blocks of trials (as in Blank et al., 2013).
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On the other hand, a tiny modification in the paradigm (i.e. visual signal on the
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screen or auditory pleasant stimulus when the correct answer is given) can allow
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the researchers to gain insights from the influence of positive rewards on the
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decisional outcome. These results provide a mechanism of how prior
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expectations may affect perceptual decision making, namely by changing neural
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activity in, and sensory drive to, prefrontal areas.
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Given the neural differences between young adults and elder people in decisional
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processing (Crone and Ridderinkhof, 2011) and the relatively low age of the
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experimental subjects tested by Filimon and colleagues (24.9 years, and a rather
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dispersed range of 20 to 32 years), these results need to be replicated in an older,
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bigger, and more clustered representative population sample. It would also be
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productive to extend this study to adolescents, and thus to intercept motor plans
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and perceptual decision throughout their evolutive trajectories (Koolschijn et al.,
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2011).
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Considering the social nature of decision-making, the introduction of a trial-by-
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trial feedback to the experimental subjects could also be used to model real or
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fictitious social interactions by making the subject consider the presence of a
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potential competitor who plays the same paradigm, but with decisional outcomes
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that should be independent for every subject. This further modification coupled
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with the experimental timing used by Filimon et al. would also be useful to
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monitor the performance of the subjects, and it will result in an increase in
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response accuracy, mirroring an increase in their motivation aimed at making
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the right decision trial by trial, and intercepting the social side of decisional
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processes.
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In real life, we are supposed to make decisions quickly and, quite often, in a
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stressful social environment, different from the non-stressful experimental
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timing context used by Filimon et al. Therefore, in order to further complete this
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scenario, future research on decision-making will also have to take advantage of
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the recent findings from the emerging research field of psychoneuroimmunology
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(see Eisenberger, 2012). In this case, to further study the link between social
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relationships and physical health while performing decision-making tasks, the
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level of pro inflammatory cytokines IL-6 and the soluble receptor for tumor
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necrosis factor-α (sTNFαRII) that are usually increased in competitive social
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interactions (Chiang et al., 2012) can be assessed. Finally, this level of analysis
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should be coupled with a more specific investigation of the oscillatory activity in
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the motor cortex at different frequency ranges during the decision-making
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process, in order to further exploit the dynamics of perceptual choice, and also
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those relating to expectation, a crucial component in our daily decisions (de
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Lange et al., 2013).
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The accomplishment of a very detailed neurophysiological understanding of the
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decision-making process is possible only with a stimulating convergence of
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several levels of studies, with multiple experimental strategies linked to an
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interplay between studies on monkeys and on humans as well as a tight coupling
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of hypothesis-driven and bottom-up approaches. With the aim of depicting new
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theories of decision- making, future research will not only have to record
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neurophysiological correlates of decision-making and the interactions between
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cerebral areas, but also the modulations underpinning neural circuitry and
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oscillatory activity with magnetoencephalography (MEG) and transcranial
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stimulation tools (i.e. TMS), putting hypotheses on functional brain architecture
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models, including the brain deep nuclei (Ding and Gold, 2013), to the test.
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In conclusion, real life decisions mix perceptual, social, and reward-based
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decision processes. Remarkable works such as this by Filimon and colleagues,
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through carefully studying specific elements of the bigger picture, are
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incrementally extending the boundaries of our knowledge in this area. To
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properly intercept the complexity of this topic, we need to multiply the
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perspectives from which we can study decision-making, before integrating all the
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newly acquired pieces of evidence into novel theories on this subject. Intriguing
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research avenues stand in front of us: it is time for neuroscientists to make
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challenging decisions on decision-making.
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