The U-2 Incident in Perspective
Surprise vs. Survival
John F. Looshrsck, Editor
H
ALF a dozen years ago we asked a man, whose
judgment on both military and scientific matters
we very much respect, the following question:
If you had $2 billion additional to spend on national
security, over and above funds presently. available, how
would you most profitably spend the money?'
The answer came without hesitation:
-On intelligence. The more we know about the forces
we are trying to deter, the cheaper and more effective
is our deterrence.
Recalled today, the above dialogue does much to
put the U-2 affair into proper perspective.
Warningagainst surprise attack is the key to the entire deterrent posture of the free world, since it is the
key to survival of the retaliatory force. Any one who
doubts this should read carefully the special report
beginning on page 43. Tlw report is based on a careful
analysis of Soviet pronouncements and policy documents. Experts in Soviet military and political doctrine
have read it and support its conclusions. The thesis of
surprise attack runs through it like a Red thread from
beginning to end. It is clear that the ringing down of
the Iron Curtain involved far more than the paranoiac
reflex of a totalitarian regime. It was an integral part
of a calculated plan to attain military, political, and
technological superiority, aided by free world conIi1Si011, delusion, and misilifonnation.
The Air Force Association has long recognized Red
secrecy as a par-unmint threat to the peace and security
of the free world. As far back as 1953, the AFA Statement of Policy called upon the United States to propose, under the aegis of the United Nations, a declaration of "'Freedom of the Air Spaces."
In 1954. AFA's Statement of Policy pointed out that
"we cannot accept the possibility of our annihilation by
surprise attack, Free-world security demands a vastly
improved intellieence system to provide adequate
warning of impending Soviet attack, to give defense
planners a more factual idea of the form and magnitude of the military threat against which we should
build our defenses. In 1955, President Einnhower presented his famous
"Open-Skies- proposal, which provided for mutual
overflights by the US and USSR, with a free exchanee
of reconnaissance phonier-Jobs. Russia rejected the plan.
of course, because the Soviets had much to lose and
little that they could not gain by other means from our
Open society.
In that year, the Air Force Association again addressed itself to the problem of surprise in a Statement
of Policy which said:
-- History shows that Communists have no compunction against striking first and without warning.... We
6.•.R
FORCZ
Soviet Russia that we are willing to take
risks for world peace; that a free interchange of information and people among all nations is essential to
world security; that the world air spaces must be free
to tlu. people of all nations."
All such attempts at piercing the Iron Curtain to the
degree necessary to protect the world against the threat
of surprise attack have met with failure. But it should
surprise no one that other and less open means have
been pursued. Indeed, one salutary effect of the U.
incident might well be the realization by the American
peopl e that this nation has been and Inuit IONIA Mille to
be caigaged in such activities. As a people Americans
are prime to view the power struggle in which we are
so deeply involved as a simple TV western kind of
conflict, with the good ma and the bad guys plainly
identified and with virtue inevitably triumphant, regardless of what underhanded tactics the villain may
pursue. This wasn't really true in Dodge City, and it
certainly isn't true in the world of today.
Another lesson we can learn from the U-2 is that we
must spare neither time, energy, nor money in devising
warning and reconnaissance systems that are free from
the taint of clandestinity, As Publisher James H. Strapbel pointed out in SPACE DIGEST last March:
-The far side of the earth—not the far sidle of the
moon—represents the immediate and appalling threat
to peace and freedom. _ Our earth-bound and airhound methods for detecting surprise attack must be
continued and improved—but at best these are Lady
expedients, We continue to live under the gun. Only in
spate --with our new line of sight—can we employ an
electronic alarm system to effectively warn against MITprise attack. . [And] with all the world aliata , l
Ini .
against imgresNive action, the need for huge tlai.14F-1.1
attack forces would deteriorate, and voluntary ri I
tam of armaments would be encouraged."
Use of such electronic spaeeborne systems as Mil las,
Samos, and their more sophisticated successors would
involve no violation of national air space, and their
development must be pursued with every resource at
our disposal.
The collapse of the summit confereuce, which oc
curred as this was being written, must not be allowed
to obscure the basic need for warning against surprise
attack, which continues to exist regardless of Soviet
intransigence or American vacillation, Th e h at that
the US and the USSR have painted themselves into
opposite corners serves to dramatize the fundamental
philosophical conflict that continues to divide the
[Mist COFIVill{32
world. In assessing its impact, let us not forget that
it is tension and conflict which produce U-2s, not the
reverse.—Enn
Magathne•
lurtio
1960