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Will Latin America again
become
an arena
for great power conflict?
Who 3D
Prints What
in 2033?
For almost two centuries, the Monroe Doctrine has shaped great power interactions with Latin America. Designed to
provide a framework for protecting nascent Latin American republics from European colonial interference, the Monroe
Doctrine grew into a vision of United States (U.S.) leadership, if not hegemony and domination. The Roosevelt Corollary
to the Monroe Doctrine gave the U.S. the self-declared right to intervene in the internal politics of Latin American
countries to maintain their independence from non-American influence.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union made important inroads into the region, causing concern (and overreaction)
among policy-makers in Washington. The Cuban Revolution led to one of the most dangerous nuclear confrontations
the world has yet seen. At no point, however, did the Soviets really threaten U.S. hegemony in the region. Allies of the U.S.
remained in control of all of the major power governments, and the Soviets never offered a very compelling economic
or social alternative for Latin American states.
Today, the growth of China’s economic relations with Latin America has the potential to erode U.S. leadership in the
region. And with some Latin American countries chafing under American hegemony, China could make political and
military inroads as well. Indeed, China’s growing economic and military strength could provide the biggest challenge to
the Monroe Doctrine in two centuries, leading to the question: will the U.S. respond, and if so, how?
In a recent simulation, Wikistrat probed potential Chinese and U.S. strategies for competition in Latin America. Analysts
examined China’s best possible strategies for increasing its regional influence, and the range of potential U.S. responses,
before evaluating the impact of competition on the region. The analysts concluded that China cannot pose a significant
threat to U.S. pre-eminence in Latin America, and that any U.S. over-reaction to Chinese influence could result in
substantial harm to the region.
ABOUT US
Wikistrat is the world’s first crowdsourced consultancy. It leverages a global network of subject-matter experts
via a patent-pending “Collaborative Competition” methodology to provide a variety of analytic services. Scenario
generation, policy planning, risk assessment and red-teaming exercises are conducted by Wikistrat on a realtime, interactive online platform.
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CHINA’S ENTRY POINTS
Military
In the short- and medium- terms, Latin America will remain beyond the reach of the Chinese military. The developing
blue water navy and expeditionary capacity of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy could change this in the long
run, but for now China will play a distinctly second-tier role in Latin American military affairs.
However, China can make inroads into the Latin American arms market. Not all Latin American countries want to buy
American equipment, and some that want to cannot. For example, several regional states (most notably Argentina and
Brazil) desperately need to recapitalize their air forces, yet have little interest in either older American offerings (such
as the F/A-18) or the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Similarly, attempts at export of front-line European fighters (such as the
Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale and Saab Gripen) have run into both fiscal and political obstacles.
Argentina is actively considering the acquisition of the JF-17 fighter-bomber. This could lead to additional sales in the
future, up to and including the Shenyang J-31 stealth fighter. If China remedies reliability issues, it could out-compete
both Russia and the European Union for parts of the military aircraft market in the region. China’s advances in transport
aircraft would also have a big impact.
China’s recent sale of eight diesel-electric submarines to Pakistan also potentially portends an effort to grab part of the
undersea warfare market in Latin America. European exports, primarily from France and Germany, currently dominate
regional submarine flotillas, but Chinese boats conceivably offer a low-cost alternative.
In addition to these big ticket items, China also exports a variety of other military equipment, including missiles, ground
vehicles, small arms and small naval vessels. Besides the straightforward financial benefits, the export of arms opens
the door to broader Chinese military influence in the region, as the PLA and its industrial associates send trainers,
engineers, and advisors to recipient countries.
Economy
China’s greatest opportunities come with economic penetration of the region. Indeed, China has already made
substantial inroads, becoming the largest trading partner of several Latin countries, and stepping up investment in
economies across the region. China has combined its political and economic approaches by providing financing for
several struggling regional countries.
China can continue to increase its influence by facilitating further investment, both in the private sector and in regional
transport infrastructure, as well as more aggressively attempt to establish an alternative financial infrastructure for
Latin America, building on its efforts with the BRICS. Providing an alternative to the Washington Consensus model
offered by the U.S. could play well in both political and economic terms.
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank can prove a model in this regard. China persisted in the creation of the bank
despite strong opposition from the U.S., which worried that the bank would undercut efforts at forcing developing
economies to reform. The bank has proved relatively popular, earning the support of a variety of prominent Asian and
European countries.
THE U.S. RESPONSE
Washington need not respond aggressively to growing Chinese influence, even if Beijing makes a conscious decision to
target the region. The U.S. can relax for two reasons.
First, the U.S. has the same massive advantages in Latin America that it enjoyed relative to the Soviet Union during the
Cold War, and relative to a variety of European colonial powers during the 19th century. The U.S. can rely on the size of its
market, the power of its military and its longstanding cultural ties with Latin America to weather any effort to expand
Chinese presence.
The U.S. continues to enjoy longstanding ties with most of the militaries of the region. In some cases, the U.S. has
developed extensive operational relationships with Latin American military organizations, often associated with the
War on Drugs. The U.S. thus has ample opportunity to shut out China, as well as militaries that grow to close to the PLA.
The economies of Latin America are hardly colonial in the traditional sense of directly serving the metropol. However,
Latin American producers, businessmen, and commercial officials tend to have much greater experience with the U.S.
market than with the Chinese. The U.S. market has radically different needs than the Chinese (most Latin American
countries are considerably wealthier on a per capita basis than China), and reconfiguring exports would involve significant
transition costs. This is often the case even with respect to commodities; Venezuela, for example, has struggled to shift
its oil exports away from the U.S.
Finally, the U.S. has social advantages. Most Latin American countries have expatriate communities within the U.S., and
in some cases these communities are quite large. They provide an anchor for U.S.-Latin American relations that China
can never replicate.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the U.S. need not view Chinese influence in Latin America in zero-sum terms.
If Chinese cash fuels the development of Latin American infrastructure, American consumers and businesses stand to
win. By and large, U.S.-Chinese competition lacks an ideological component. Though Venezuela has struggled mightily
to broaden its ideological struggle against the U.S., China has thus far not taken the bait. In part, this may arise from
Chinese reluctance to take over patronage of the region’s basket cases. As the Soviet Union discovered, and as even the
U.S. has learned, conducting geopolitical competition in the backyard of an opponent can incur some serious economic
and military costs.
Latin America can potentially benefit from some Chinese attention, with investment, financial assistance and preferential
trade deals resulting from the intensified geopolitical competition. Poverty and isolation in Latin America don’t help the
U.S., even if China takes some important steps towards increasing economic integration in the region.
THE DANGERS OF OVER-REACTION
Given Washington’s very aggressive response to Soviet efforts to make a mark in the region, it is quite possible
the U.S. will take active steps to curtail Chinese influence. It also bears noting that U.S.-Soviet competition did
not play out well for Latin America during the Cold War. The Soviets co-opted the legitimate grievances of
workers, farmers and indigenous peoples into a broader project of weakening U.S. influence, while the U.S.
responded by supporting foul authoritarian governments, often brought to power by military coups.
Undoubtedly, the U.S. should undertake some steps that would improve its position in Latin America.
Accelerating the return of Cuba to the regional fold would help heal the wounds of political conflict over
the past hundred years. Washington can also emphasize the further development of multilateral regional
institutions, and try to bring more countries into such agreements as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The U.S.
military can refocus on the region, increasing cooperation on issues of regional concern above and beyond the
War on Drugs, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
Nevertheless, the U.S. can also cause a lot of harm, not to mention alienation, if it panics about Chinese influence
in Latin America. China cannot displace the U.S., and the U.S. stands to benefit from China’s attention to the
region.
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ATTRIBUTIONS
[Cover] This work, “cover”, is a derivative of “US Grunge Flag” by Nicolas Raymond, under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0); “Chinese flag,
Beijing, China.” by Daderot, released into the public domain; “Political South America” map from the CIA World Factbook website” by CIA, released into the public
domain. “Cover” is licensed under CC By Daniella Mordehai.
June 2013