April 5, 2011
Various Rating Actions Taken On Irish Banks
Following Financial Measures Programme And
Bank Restructuring Plan
Primary Credit Analyst:
Nigel Greenwood, London (44) 20-7176-7211; [email protected]
Secondary Contacts:
Giles Edwards, London (44) 20-7176-7014; [email protected]
Sean Cotten, Stockholm (46) 8-440-5928; [email protected]
OVERVIEW
• On March 31, 2011, the Central Bank of Ireland presented the results of
its Financial Measures Programme in conjunction with the Irish
government's announcement of a two-pillar approach to the rebuilding of
the Irish banking sector.
• On April 1, 2011, we lowered our long-term ratings on the Republic of
Ireland to 'BBB+' from 'A-'. We also removed the ratings from CreditWatch
negative. The outlook on Ireland is stable.
• Despite the planned capital injections and the announcement of their
roles as the key pillars in the Irish bank restructuring plan, the
ratings on Allied Irish Banks PLC (AIB) and Bank of Ireland (BOI) remain
on CreditWatch with negative implications.
• The planned disposal of the life operations of Irish Life & Permanent PLC
(IL&P) has led to a one-notch downgrade to reflect the fact that we no
longer factor support from the life operations into our rating opinion of
IL&P's banking operations.
• The ratings on AIB, BOI, and IL&P remain on CreditWatch while we consider
the stand-alone credit profile (SACP) and notches of extraordinary
government support in light of the Financial Measures Programme.
• We are also lowering the ratings on Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd. (Anglo)
by one notch, reflecting our view that its importance to the Irish
government has reduced. The outlook on Anglo is negative.
• The weakened creditworthiness we see in the Irish sovereign has also led
to a review of the ratings on the foreign-owned, domestically active
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banks.
• We are lowering the ratings on Barclays Bank Ireland PLC (BBI) and Ulster
Bank Ireland Ltd. (UBIL), and its U.K. parent Ulster Bank Ltd. (UBL), by
one notch. The outlook on BBI is stable, mirroring that of the Irish
sovereign.
• The ratings on AIB, BOI, IL&P, UBIL and UBL, and KBC Bank Ireland (KBCI)
remain on CreditWatch with negative implications, indicating the
potential for further rating actions as we consider their SACPs in light
of the significant restructuring that lies ahead for the Irish banking
system.
LONDON (Standard & Poor's) April 5, 2011--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services
said today that it took various rating actions on the four domestically owned
Irish banks and three foreign-owned banks operating in Ireland which it rates.
This follows our review of the results of the Irish government's Financial
Measures Programme ("the Programme"), comprising a Prudential Capital
Assessment (PCAR) and a Prudential Liquidity Assessment (PLAR), as well as the
announced restructuring of the Irish banking sector and our revised ratings on
the Republic of Ireland (BBB+/Stable/A-2). The rating actions on the four
domestically owned Irish banks and three foreign-owned banks are as follows:
• The 'BB/B' counterparty credit ratings on Allied Irish Banks PLC (AIB)
remain on CreditWatch with negative implications, as do the 'BB-/B'
ratings on AIB's wholly owned U.K. subsidiary, AIB Group (UK) PLC (AIB
UK). We continue to factor a two-notch uplift for Irish government
support into the counterparty credit ratings on AIB above its 'b+' SACP.
• The 'BB+/B' ratings of Bank of Ireland (BOI) remain on CreditWatch with
negative implications. We continue to factor a two-notch uplift for Irish
government support into the counterparty credit ratings on BOI above its
'bb-' SACP.
• As a result of the planned restructuring of Irish Life & Permanent PLC
(IL&P), which will lead to the disposal of its life operations, we have
lowered the ratings to 'BB+/B' from 'BBB-/A-3'. This reflects our view
that there will likely be no material support by Irish Life Assurance PLC
(ILA; BBB-/Watch Dev/--) of IL&P. The IL&P ratings remain on CreditWatch
with negative implications. We continue to factor a two-notch uplift for
Irish government support into the counterparty credit ratings on IL&P
above its revised 'bb-' SACP. In addition, we have lowered IL&P's lower
Tier 2 subordinated debt rating to 'CCC' from 'B' given the government's
stated intention to include subordinated debtors in the recapitalization
of Irish banks.
• We have lowered the long-term counterparty credit rating on Anglo Irish
Bank Corp. (Anglo), which we consider a government-related entity (GRE)
under our criteria, by one notch to 'CCC+' from 'B-'. This reflects our
view of Anglo's reduced importance to the Irish government. We have also
removed the ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications. The
outlook is negative.
• Today's rating actions do not affect the ratings on debt issues of AIB,
BOI, IL&P, and Anglo as these issues are guaranteed by the Republic of
Ireland.
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• We have lowered the counterparty credit ratings on Barclays Bank Ireland
PLC (BBI) to 'A-/A-2' from 'A/A-1' to reflect the weakened
creditworthiness of the Irish sovereign, and removed the BBI ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications. We have maintained our view of
BBI's 'core' status to its parent. The outlook is stable.
• We have lowered the long-term ratings on Ulster Bank Ltd. (UBL) and core
Irish subsidiary, Ulster Bank Ireland Ltd. (UBIL) to 'BBB+' from 'A-'. As
a result of the weakened creditworthiness of the Irish sovereign, group
support above UBL and UBIL's 'bb+' SACP is now capped at three notches.
The UBL and UBIL ratings remain on CreditWatch with negative
implications.
• The 'BBB+/A-2' ratings on KBC Bank Ireland PLC (KBCI), which incorporate
two notches of group support above KBCI's 'bbb-' SACP, remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications.
In our opinion, the Programme and bank restructuring announcement represent a
credible first step by the Irish government toward the eventual rebuilding of
investor confidence in the deeply troubled Irish banking system. Moreover, the
level of detail and transparency presented in the Programme appears to us to
compare well with that presented by peer European banking systems to date.
Nevertheless, we believe that it will likely be many years before the Irish
banking system starts to approach the creditworthiness of peer European
systems. Our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) on Ireland
remains in Group 6, which is the lowest of any developed country globally,
with the exception of Greece, which we lowered to Group 7 on March 31, 2011.
The Programme comprises the PCAR and the PLAR and was applied to AIB, BOI,
IL&P, and EBS Building Society (not rated). The PCAR takes into account
independently estimated loan losses over the three-year period 2011-2013 under
base (€20.0 billion) and adverse scenarios (€27.7 billion), estimated from a
bottom-up analysis of loan books. In addition, the PCAR takes into account a
top-down stress test that models the impact on banks' balance sheets and
income statements. Additional capital buffers are applied to take account of
lifetime loan losses and other contingencies.
The PLAR outlines plans to reduce the banks' loan-to-deposit ratio to 122.5%
by end-2013. Under the Programme, banks will segment their businesses into
'core' and 'non-core' portfolios, and all assets will reportedly remain within
the existing legal entity. The main aim of the Programme is to deleverage loan
portfolios by €72.6 billion by 2013. Deleveraging will give rise to losses on
exit which will create a need for further capital. This assumption is included
in the PCAR. In total, the gross additional capital requirement for the four
banks is €24.0 billion. This amount is intended to enable the banks to remain
above a minimum 10.5% core Tier 1 ratio under the base scenario and above 6.0%
under the adverse scenario, plus an additional protective buffer.
This capital injection, if none is garnered from private sources or other
capital actions, would be on top of the €46.3 billion that the government has
already injected into these banks (and Anglo and Irish Nationwide Building
Society (INBS)).
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The Irish government has determined that AIB and BOI will be the two core
pillars of its banking system, together with the remaining foreign-owned
banks. Both AIB and BOI will reportedly become significantly more domestically
focused with limited nonretail and commercial banking activities. The
government will facilitate AIB's take-over of EBS, which was previously being
bid for by a U.S. private equity firm and IL&P. We note that the U.K.
subsidiaries of both AIB and BOI will remain part of their respective core
businesses, albeit that their U.K. business as a whole will be reduced in size
and scope. In contrast, IL&P will reportedly be required to sell its life
insurance subsidiary, ILA, and we understand that the Irish government does
not view IL&P as a pillar of the banking system. Separately, Anglo and INBS
(whose deposit books were sold to AIB and IL&P, respectively, in February
2011) will reportedly be merged and wound down over several years.
In our view, positive factors for the ratings on the four domestically owned
Irish banks and three foreign-owned banks include:
• Our opinion that the assumptions underlying the stress testing of
capitalization are robust and have contributed to a stable outlook on the
Irish sovereign ratings.
• The very large planned capital injections, which demonstrate the Irish
government's continued support of certain banks and that this support is
trending from potential to actual support.
• The announced deleveraging and restructuring, which in our view appear to
be both practical and plausible measures, given what we view to be the
limited palatable options available to the Irish government.
• The fact that there is now a plan of action, which we believe reduces
uncertainty and allows bank management to plan ahead accordingly.
Nevertheless, we believe that significant credit weaknesses and uncertainties
remain:
• We continue to view Ireland's BICRA as very weak.
• Even under the Programme's base scenario, the PCAR starkly highlights the
weak asset quality across all the loan portfolios of the Irish banks. The
elevated loan losses modeled under the PCAR will negatively impact bank
profitability for the next three years at least, in our view.
• Furthermore, while the assumptions appear robust, in our opinion this is
merely the latest of several capital assessments over the past 12 months
and may yet prove to be insufficient if economic circumstances turn out
to be more severe than those modeled.
• The PLAR allows for a sizable systemwide haircut on asset disposals by
2013. Depending on market conditions, in particular those outside of
Ireland, it is possible that this may prove to be too low an assumption,
even if we think that these transactions are possible to consummate.
• Even if the banks delever as planned, we consider that the banks may
remain reliant on Irish central bank funding sources.
• We believe that implementation risk could follow the bank restructuring.
• The exact future role for the banking operations of IL&P has not been
fully clarified, in our opinion.
• The two-pillar approach to the system may lead to unintended competition
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concerns for the authorities in the medium term, in our view.
• Details on the timing of the capital injections and the exact nature of
those capital instruments have not yet been announced. We understand,
however, that the banks' management must soon submit their capital plans
to the regulator.
• We also note that no medium-term arrangements for the provision of Irish
central bank liquidity facilities have been announced.
• Finally, while the political will to impose burden sharing on senior
unguaranteed bondholders has reportedly diminished, the sheer scale of
the planned changes means, in our view, that this risk has not completely
dissipated.
CREDITWATCH STATUS
We are maintaining the CreditWatch negative on AIB, BOI, and IL&P. The
CreditWatch negative indicates our view of the difficulties associated with
the ambitious restructuring plan, the need for additional details about the
timing and nature of the capital injections, and the impact of the aggressive
deleveraging plans on each bank's SACP. We have maintained the CreditWatch on
UBL, UBIL, and KBCI because we are of the view that the tougher Irish
regulatory requirements and significant changes elsewhere in the Irish banking
system may weigh on their SACPs. We expect to resolve the CreditWatch on all
five banks within three months. We expect that the counterparty credit ratings
may be affirmed or lowered by one or two notches.
DOMESTICALLY OWNED BANKS
We view the liquidity of AIB, BOI, and IL&P as very weak. Even though in our
view the PCAR/PLAR result provides clarity as to how much the Irish central
bank believes is the sovereign's maximum contingent liability, we believe the
Irish banking system has a long way to go to recover.
The Irish government has now reportedly allocated about €19 billion
(reportedly a net figure after taking account of burden sharing by
subordinated bondholders) of the €35 billion originally earmarked for the
banking sector as part of the EU-IMF restructuring agreement. The willingness
and ability of Ireland to provide further extraordinary support to its banking
system in the future may therefore have been somewhat reduced. Nonetheless,
our view of the potential for future extraordinary government support is
reflected in a two-notch uplift above the respective SACP on AIB, BOI, and
IL&P, which incorporates support received to date or that is pending and
clearly identified. These include:
• Injections of equity and hybrid capital under previous recapitalization
efforts;
• National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) tranches already transferred or
due to be completed shortly;
• Ongoing funding and liquidity support by the ECB and Central Bank of
Ireland; and
• Capital injections announced on March 31, 2011, because they are
quantified and the government is committed (and able) to provide these
injections
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Allied Irish Banks PLC
We consider AIB to be a highly systemically important institution. This view
is further supported by the Irish government's view of AIB as a pillar in the
future of Irish banking. The ratings remain on CreditWatch while we consider
the SACP and notches of extraordinary government support in light of the PCAR
result and deleveraging challenges.
Bank of Ireland
Along with AIB, BOI is viewed by the Irish government as a pillar in the
future of the Irish banking sector and in our view remains a highly
systemically important institution. The ratings remain on CreditWatch as we
consider the SACP and notches of extraordinary government support in light of
the PCAR result and deleveraging challenges.
Irish Life & Permanent PLC
The rating actions on IL&P reflect our review of its SACP in light of the
announcement that its life company will be sold. Unlike the case of AIB and
BOI, the government has not explicitly defined IL&P as a key pillar of the
Irish banking market. Nevertheless, we still view IL&P to be highly
systemically important. We have maintained two notches of extraordinary
government support into the ratings on IL&P. We have also lowered the dated
subordinated debt ratings on IL&P to 'CCC' because the Irish government has
clearly included burden sharing on subordinated debt in its recapitalization
plans. Based on the experience that we have observed at Anglo, AIB, and BOI,
we see a "clear and present risk" that subordinated bondholders of IL&P are
likely to suffer loss. IL&P's ratings remain on CreditWatch negative as we
assess the impact of the restructuring, deleveraging, and PCAR results on the
future of IL&P's banking entity.
Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd.
The rating actions on Anglo reflect our opinion that, despite a "strong" link
to the government, this GRE is now of "limited importance" in accordance with
our GRE criteria and that there is only a "moderate" likelihood of
extraordinary support. Accordingly, we have lowered Anglo's counterparty
credit rating to 'CCC+', one notch above its 'ccc' SACP. We take the GRE
approach for the ratings on Anglo, in contrast to those of the other
domestically owned Irish banks for whom we apply our systemic importance
criteria. This is because we expect Anglo to be wound down over a period of
years and remain in government ownership throughout that period. We have
removed Anglo's ratings from CreditWatch and assigned a negative outlook, as
the government has stated that there is no immediate need for additional
capital for either Anglo or INBS, but that a further assessment will be
available in May.
FOREIGN-OWNED, DOMESTICALLY ACTIVE BANKS
We have also analyzed the implications of the weakened creditworthiness of the
Irish sovereign on the three foreign-owned, domestically active Irish banks
that we rate: BBI, KBCI, and UBIL. While not supported by the Irish
government, we rate these banks higher than their domestically owned peers due
to our views on the likelihood of parental support and our view of their
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modestly stronger SACPs. In particular, BBI, KBCI, and UBIL have not seen the
sort of stress experienced by their domestic peers, particularly regarding
access to funding. However, under our ratings methodology, we only maintain
ratings on financial institutions above that of the sovereign in exceptional
circumstances (see "Corporate, Counterparty, And LRG Credit Ratings That
Exceed The Sovereign Rating," published Nov. 5, 2010). We typically do this
only where we conclude that the operating and financial characteristics of an
entity provide a high probability that it can meet its debt obligations even
when the sovereign cannot.
Barclays Bank Ireland PLC
We lowered the long-term ratings on BBI to 'A-' from 'A' and the outlook is
stable in line with the sovereign. Unlike its peers, BBI's outlook is stable
because we see no reason to change our view of its 'core' group status. Given
the exceptional circumstances we see, we have not lowered the BBI ratings to
be in line with the 'BBB+' sovereign credit rating, instead allowing a
one-notch differential. This is because:
• We believe that BBI or its parent should be able to find sufficient
foreign or local currency funding to repay its liabilities and all
deposits;
• In our view, BBI would be very easily supported by its parent due to its
small relative size and the fact that the parent is highly rated, not
being a government-supported institution itself; and
• BBI's core status reflects our view that substantial support would be
forthcoming from the parent.
Ulster Bank Ireland Ltd., Ulster Bank Ltd.
The rating action on UBIL and UBL follows the weakened creditworthiness of the
Irish sovereign. This is because:
• We consider UBIL to be core to U.K.-incorporated UBL, being about 70% of
the consolidated assets, and highly integrated. We therefore believe that
a deterioration of UBIL would weaken UBL, and a downgrade of UBIL would
most certainly lead to a downgrade of UBL; and
• While some of the factors cited with regard to BBI apply in this case, we
do not see a convincing case to rate UBL above the Irish sovereign, not
least because UBL is strategically important to a parent that is itself
government-supported.
The ratings on UBIL and UBL remain on CreditWatch negative pending a further
review and analysis of the SACPs in light of the high stress factors applied
to the domestic banks in the PCAR analysis and the significant changes
elsewhere in the Irish banking system.
KBC Bank Ireland PLC
While some of the factors cited with regard to BBI apply to KBCI, we do not
see a convincing case to rate KBCI above the Irish sovereign, not least
because we view KBCI as strategically important as opposed to core to a parent
that is itself government-supported. We continue to provide two notches of
parental support, which are not constrained by the sovereign credit rating of
'BBB+', compared with KBCI's SACP of 'bbb-'.
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The ratings on KBCI remain on CreditWatch negative pending a review and
analysis of its SACP in light of the high stress factors applied to the
domestic banks in the PCAR analysis and the significant changes elsewhere in
the Irish banking system.
RELATED CRITERIA AND RESEARCH
• Ireland's Ratings Lowered To 'BBB+/A-2' And Removed From CreditWatch;
Stable Outlook Reflects Credibility Of Stress Test, April 1, 2011
• Irish Life Assurance PLC CreditWatch Implications Revised To Developing
On News Of Separation From Parent Bank, April 5, 2011
• How Systemic Importance Plays A Significant Role In Bank Ratings, July 3,
2007
• Group Methodology, April 22, 2009
• Bank Rating Analysis Methodology Profile, March 18, 2004
• Stand-Alone Credit Profiles: One Component Of A Rating, Oct. 1, 2010
• Methodology For Rating Bank Nondeferrable Subordinated Debt (Lower Tier 2
Regulatory Capital), Aug. 4, 2009
• Rating Government-Related Entities: Methodology And Assumptions, Dec. 9,
2010
• Mortgage Lending Business Supports Some European Banking Systems, Yet
Could Impede Others, Sept. 2, 2010
RATINGS LIST
Downgraded; CreditWatch Action; Ratings Affirmed
To
Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating
CCC+/Negative/C
B-/Watch Neg/C
Allied Irish Banks PLC
Counterparty Credit Rating
BB/Watch Neg/B
BB/Watch Neg/B
AIB Group (UK) PLC
Counterparty Credit Rating
BB-/Watch Neg/B
BB-/Watch Neg/B
Irish Life & Permanent PLC
Counterparty Credit Rating
BB+/Watch Neg/B
BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3
Bank of Ireland
Counterparty Credit Rating
BB+/Watch Neg/B
BB+/Watch Neg/B
KBC Bank Ireland PLC
Counterparty Credit Rating
BBB+/Watch Neg/A-2
BBB+/Watch Neg/A-2
Barclays Bank Ireland PLC
Counterparty Credit Rating
A-/Stable/A-2
A/Watch Neg/A-1
From
Ulster Bank Ireland Ltd.
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Ulster Bank Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating
BBB+/Watch Neg/A-2
A-/Watch Neg/A-2
NB: This list does not include all ratings affected.
Additional Contact:
Financial Institutions Ratings Europe; [email protected]
Complete ratings information is available to subscribers of RatingsDirect on
the Global Credit Portal at www.globalcreditportal.com. All ratings affected
by this rating action can be found on Standard & Poor's public Web site at
www.standardandpoors.com. Use the Ratings search box located in the left
column. Alternatively, call one of the following Standard & Poor's numbers:
Client Support Europe (44) 20-7176-7176; London Press Office (44)
20-7176-3605; Paris (33) 1-4420-6708; Frankfurt (49) 69-33-999-225; Stockholm
(46) 8-440-5914; or Moscow (7) 495-783-4011.
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