PoliticalIdentifyandPartyPolarizationintheAmericanElectorate
DavidC.Kimball
BryceSummary
EricC.Vorst
UniversityofMissouri‐St.Louis
PresentedatTheStateoftheParties:2012andBeyondconference,Akron,OH,November7,
2013.
"Iwanteveryonetreatedfairlyinthiscountry.Wehavenevergonewrongwhenwe've
extendedrightsandresponsibilitiestoeverybody."
–BarackObama,May14,20121
"Thispresidentismovingusawayfromourfounders'vision.Insteadoflimited
government,heisleadingustowardlimitedfreedomandlimitedopportunity."
–MittRomney,April12,20122
Evidenceofideologicalpolarizationamongpartyeliteshasfueledadebateabout
thedegreeofpolarizationamongtheAmericanpublic.Muchofthedebatehasfocusedon
anideologicalorpolicy‐baseddefinitionofpolarization.Forexample,thereisclear
evidenceof“sorting,”anincreasingcorrespondencebetweenavoter’spartyidentification
andideologicalpositiononaleft‐rightspectrum(Levendusky2009).Inaddition,thereis
evidenceshowingthatthepolicypreferencesofaverageDemocratsandRepublicanshave
movedfartherapartonseveralkeyissues,particularlyamongthemostengagedsegment
oftheelectorate(Abramowitz2010;Laymanetal.2010).
However,moreattentionshouldbegiventopsychologicalcomponentsof
polarizationthatemphasizepoliticalidentity.Increasedpartisandisagreementamong
politiciansandactivistshasfosteredamoreattentivepublicandastrongersenseof
politicalidentityamongmasspartisans(Hetherington2011).Oneconsequenceis
increasedpartyloyaltyonElectionDay(Bartels2000).Butheightenedelitepartisanship
alsoencouragesthepublictoviewpoliticsinzero‐sum“usversusthem”terms.Increased
partyconflictattheelitelevelinvitesmassfollowerstointernalizethebroadoutlinesof
thoseconflictsanddenigratetheirpoliticalopponentsmorethaninthepast.Forexample,
AlanAbramowitzwritesthatgrowingpoliticalpolarizationmay“contributetoatendency
todemonizetheopposingpartyanditssupporters”(Abramowitz2013,xv).
WetesttheseargumentswithsurveydatafromtheAmericanNationalElection
Studies.Aspartyeliteshavebecomemoreideologicallypolarized,masspartisanshave
becomemorepolarizedintheirbasicevaluationsofthetwomajorpoliticalparties.In
particular,followersofbothpartiesexpressincreasinglevelsoffearandcontempttoward
theoppositepartyanditspresidentialcandidates,withthe2012electioncycleproducing
recordlevelsofout‐partydemonization.Polarizedratingsofthetwomajorpartieshave
manyroots,includingpartyidentity,ideology,corevalues,group‐basedattitudes,
individualpredispositions,andthegrowthinpartisanmedia.
1Killough2012.
2Metzler2012.
1 PartofouranalysisincludespublicattitudestowardtheTeaParty,thelatestfrontin
thepartisanwarsandagoodexampleofthepsychologicalbasisofmasspolarization.The
strongestpredictorofTeaPartysupportisthedegreetowhichvotersliketheRepublican
PartyanddisliketheDemocrats.Partisanshipalsostructureshowvotersdefinethe
burgeoningTeaPartymovement.Redmeatrhetoricthatdemonizestheoppositionisa
stapleofpoliticalcampaignsanditsustainsoppositionpartieswhentheyarenot
governing.SincePresidentObamahasoccupiedtheWhiteHouse,evaluationsofthe
nation’sdirectionarecloselyassociatedwithcontemptfortheDemocraticPartyandits
president.Thereisadeepeningreservoiroffearandloathingoftheopposingpartythat
canbetappedbypoliticalleaderseagertomobilizethebaseforthenextpoliticalbattle,but
contemptforthepoliticaloppositioninhibitsnegotiationandeffortstofindcommon
groundinAmericanpolitics.
PartyPolarization
ThereisclearevidenceofpartypolarizationattheelitelevelofAmericanpolitics.
Polarizationistypicallydefinedintermsofagrowingideologicalgapbetweenthetwo
majorpoliticalpartiesandincreasedideologicalhomogeneitywithinparties.Forexample,
studiesofCongressfindthatthecenteroftheDemocraticPartyhasmovedtotheleftwhile
Republicanlegislatorshavemovedmoresharplytotheright,particularlyduringthepast
twodecades(Bonicaetal.2013;Theriault2013).Inaddition,studiesofpartyactivistsfind
growingdifferencesbetweenDemocratsandRepublicansoneconomic,racialandcultural
issues(Laymanetal.2010).Finally,recentexaminationfindsaconsiderabledegreeof
partypolarizationinAmericanstatelegislatures(ShorandMcCarty2011).
Thereissomedebateabouttheextentofideologicalpolarizationamongthemass
public.Some,suchasFiorinaandcolleagues(2011)arguethatmostvotershavecentrist
policypreferencesthathavenotchangedmuchintheaggregateinresponsetoelite
polarization.However,severalotherstudiesobservegrowingdifferencesbetween
RepublicansandDemocratsonarangeofissues(e.g.,Abramowitz2010;Laymanetal.
2010).Increasedelitepolarizationmeansthatelectedofficialsmorefrequentlydivide
alongpartylinesonimportantissuesoftheday.Theincreasingfrequencyandintensityof
thesepolicydisagreementsmakethepublicmoreawareofpolicydifferencesbetweenthe
majorpoliticalparties(Hetherington2011).Beingawareofthemajorpolicydifferences
betweenthepartiesmakesiteasierforcitizenstochoosesidesinthepartisanpolitical
wars.
Furthermore,elitepolarizationheightenspartisanidentityandloyaltyamongthe
masspublic.Forexample,Druckmanandcolleagues(2013)findthatexposuretoelite
polarizationincreasestheimpactofpartycuesonpublicopinion,reducestheinfluenceof
2 substantiveinformation,andboostsconfidenceinone’sopinions.Regardlessofthe
substanceofthedisputes,masspartisanshavearootinginterestinseeingtheirpartywin
politicalbattles.Whenelitepartisandisagreementsincreaseinfrequencyandintensity,
masspartisanswillfeelastrongersenseofidentitywiththeirownpoliticalpartyanda
greaterinclinationtodefinetheoppositepartyinnegativeterms.Thus,someexplainparty
polarizationintermsofgroupidentity,separatefromideologicalpreferences.
Socialidentitytheoryarguesthatpeoplederivetheirownsenseofselffromtheir
membershipingroups.Themotivationtoidentifywithanin‐group(towhichtheperson
belongs)thatisdistinctfromaperceivedout‐groupispowerful(Tajfel1978,1982).Asa
result,peoplenaturallytendtoseetheworldintermsofin‐groupsandout‐groups.More
importantly,thetheorypredictsbiasedperceptionsthatexaggerateinter‐groupdifferences
andgeneratepositivefeelingstowardone’sowngroupandnegativefeelingsabout
opposinggroups.PartyidentificationisacentralconceptinthestudyofAmericanvoting
behavior,andwasoriginallyconceivedtoresembleothersocialgroupidentities,like
religion(Campbelletal.1960).Thus,socialidentitytheorymayhelpusunderstand
partisanshipandpartypolarization.
Severalstudiesexaminepartisanshipfromtheperspectiveofsocialidentitytheory.
Mostimportantly,aselitepartypolarizationisconveyedtothepublic,citizensbecome
morecertainabouttheirownpartyidentity(Lavine,Johnston,andSteenbergen2012;
Druckman,Peterson,andSlothuus2013).Similarly,Greene(1999)findsthatstrong
partisansstandoutfromotherpartisansintermsoftheirrobustsocialidentitywitha
politicalparty.Furthermore,socialidentitypredictsvoterloyalty,activism,andideological
extremismevenwhencontrollingforstrengthofpartisanship(Greene2004).More
recently,Iyengar,Sood,andLelkes(2012)applysocialidentitytheorytodocument
increasingaffectivepolarizationinthemasspublicintheUnitedStatesandBritain.For
instance,theyobserverisinglevelsofoppositiontointer‐partymarriageandincreased
partypolarizationintraitratingsofpartysupporters.
[Figure1abouthere]
Thereisadditionalevidenceofincreasingdenigrationoftheoppositeparty,
particularlyinthelastdecade.Figure1showsthepercentageofpartisanswhoreport
feelingangryorafraidabouttheoppositeparty’spresidentialcandidate.Thedataarefrom
surveysconductedbytheAmericanNationalElectionStudies,andquestionsthataskifthe
presidentialcandidateofaparticularpartyevermadetherespondentfeelangry,orafraid.3
3The2012waveoftheANESsurveysisunusualinthatitincludedtwointerviewmodes.Onesampleof
respondentswasinterviewedface‐to‐face,thetraditionalmodeforANESsurveys,andtheothersample
completedthesurveyontheInternet.SeveralindicatorsshowtheInternetsampletobemorepolarizedthan
theface‐to‐facesample.Foranydepictionofchronologicaltrends,asinFigure1,weonlyusetheface‐to‐face
sampleofthe2012survey.
3 Whileoppositepartypresidentialcandidatestendtoinspiremoreangerthanfear,both
indicatorsincreaseovertime.Comparedtopreviousdecades,bothindicatorsalsoreach
newhighsin2012,withalmosthalfofpartisansprofessingfearandalmosttwo‐thirdsof
partisansexpressingangerinreactiontothepresidentialcandidatefromtheopposite
party.
[Figure2abouthere]
ThemostcompellingevidencefromIyengar,Sood,andLelkes(2012)depicts
growingmasspolarizationinthefeelingthermometerratingsofthetwomajorpartiesover
thepastthirtyyears.Thethermometerquestionsaskrespondentstorategroupsor
politicalfiguresonascalefrom0to100,withhighervaluesindicatingwarmerfeelingsand
lowerscoresindicatingmoreanimositytowardtheobject.Weupdatetheirevidenceto
includethe2012waveoftheANESsurveys(seeFigures2and3).Asthefiguresindicate,
duringthepastthirtyyearsRepublicansandDemocratshaveconsistentlyratedtheirown
partypositively,atapproximately70degrees.Onaverage,Democratstendtoratetheir
ownpartyacouplepointshigherthanRepublicansratetheGOP.
[Figure3abouthere]
However,thefiguresshowthatratingsoftheoppositepartyhavedeclinedover
time,witharelativelysteepdropoccurringduringthelasttenyears.Meanratingsofthe
oppositepartywerecloseto50degreesin1980buthavedroppedalmostto30degreesin
2012.Onaverage,DemocratstendtoratetheGOPapointortwolowerthanRepublicans
ratetheDemocraticParty.Onceagain,the2012cycleproducedrecordlowthermometer
ratingsoftheoppositeparty,forbothRepublicansandDemocrats.Tosummarizethetwo
trends,thegapinaffectionforone’sownpartyandtheoppositeparty,termedaffective
partisanshipor“netpartisanaffect”(Iyengar,Sood,andLelkes2012),hasincreasedfrom
roughly25degreesin1980toalmost37degreesin2012.
Whyisthispolarizationinaffectiveratingsofthetwomajorpartieshappening?
Thereissomedebateaboutthisquestionaswell.Abramowitz(2013)arguesthatideology
isattherootofmasspolarization.Ideologicaldisagreementsbetweenthetwopartieshave
comedefineagrowingportionofthepolicyagenda,andDemocratsandRepublicanshave
movedfartherapartontheideologicalspectrum.Thus,affectivepolarizationmaybeaby‐
productofideologicalpolarization.Asithappens,theratherdramaticincreaseinnet
partisanaffectamongthemasspublicoverthepastdecadecoincideswithsharper
ideologicalpolarizationinCongressduringthesameperiod.
Iyengarandcolleagues(2012)arguethatexposuretopoliticalcampaigns,and
negativeadsinparticular,explainsmasspolarization.Politicalcampaignstendtofocus
heavilyoninter‐partydifferences,which,accordingtosocialidentitytheory,should
4 strengthenpartisanidentityamongvoters.Inaddition,negativecampaignadvertisingis
devotedtodemonizingtheopposingpartyanditscandidates,whichshouldencourage
partisanstoviewtheiropponentsinaharsherlight.Furthermore,negativecampaigningin
presidentialelectionshasincreasedovertime(West2013),whichalsocorrespondswith
thegrowingpolarizationinratingsofthetwoparties.
Webelievethatneitheroftheseperspectivesfullyexplainspolarizedattitudes
towardthepoliticalparties.Inadditiontoideology,thereareotherpoliticalattitudes
associatedwithpartypolarizationintheUnitedStates.Inadditiontonegativecampaigns,
thereareothersourcesofpartisanrhetoricthatcontributetoaffectivepolarizationin
Americanpolitics.TherearepluralisticrootsofpoliticalattitudesintheUnitedStates
(Kinder1983;ClawsonandOxley2013),andpartypolarizationisnodifferent.Corevalues
thatarecommonreferencepointsinpoliticaldebates,group‐relatedsymbolsandattitudes,
thegrowthofpartisanmedia,andindividualpredispositionshelpexplainpolarizedratings
ofthetwopoliticalparties.Inthenextsectionweexplainthesehowtheseconceptsrelate
topartypolarizationandtheninthefollowingsectionweprovidesomeevidencefromthe
2012ANESsurveytosupportourhypotheses.
SourceofMassPolarization
AsshownbyAbramowitz(2010,2013),thestrengthenedlinkbetweenpartisanand
ideologicalidentificationisanimportantsourceofpolarizationintheUnitedStates.
However,eventhoughmanypoliticaldebatesinAmericanpoliticscanbeboileddownto
ideology,elitediscoursedoesnotframepoliticsentirelyintermsofliberal‐conservative
conflicts.Infact,politicalpartiesandcandidatesfrequentlyavoidusingtermssuchas
“liberal”or“conservative”intheircampaignrhetoric.Thismakessensebecausefew
Americansuseideologicaltermstodiscusspolitics,andmanydonotunderstandpoliticsin
termsofleft‐rightideologicalconcepts(Converse1964;Lewis‐Becketal.2008;Goren
2013).AsignificantportionofAmericansareunabletoplacethemselves,orthemajor
parties,ontheideologicalspectrum.Thosethatdotendtoassume,sometimesincorrectly,
thattheirfavoredcandidateshavethesamepolicyandideologicalpositionsasthemselves.
Thetendencytoprojectone’sownattitudesontofavoredpoliticalfiguresismost
pronouncedamongpeoplewithstrongpartyattachments(Lavine,Johnston,and
Steenbergen2012).Thus,therearesomelimitsontheabilityofideologytoexplain
partisanconflictandpolarization.Corevalues,group‐basedattitudes,individual
predispositions,andtheriseofpartisanmediaalsoaccountforthestateofparty
polarizationintheUnitedStatestoday.
5 CoreValues
Toappealtoasmanyvotersaspossible,politicalcampaignsfrequentlyframepolicy
disputesintermsofcorevaluesorprinciplesthatcanbeappliedtoissuesinaparticular
policydomain.Corevaluesaregeneralbeliefsabouthowtheworldshouldwork,and
valuesguideaperson’sunderstandingofrightandwrong.Totheextentthatpartisan
politicaldebatesareframedintermsofclashingvalues,thenpartisansareencouragedto
viewthoseconflictsintermsofrightversuswrongandgoodversusevil.Ifdifferentparties
representcompetingvalues,ordifferentpolesonthesamevaluedimension,thencore
valuesmaystructureaffectivepolarizationintheUnitedStates.
Corevaluesarewidelyheldandusedbyvoters.Virtuallyallcitizens,regardlessof
theirlevelofeducationorinvolvementinpolitics,adheretoalimitednumberofcore
valuesandareabletobasetheirownvotingdecisionsandpolicypreferencesonthose
values(Feldman1988;Goren2013).Sincefirmlyheldvaluesmayconflictwithoneanother
onsignificantpublicpolicydebates,valuesarelikelytostructurepartisanconflict.Asa
result,valueconflictmaybeanimportantsourceofattitudepolarizationinAmerican
politics.Weexaminethreecorevaluesthathavebecomecommonsourcesofpartisan
conflictinAmericanpolitics:egalitarianism,limitedgovernment,andmoral
traditionalism.4
Egalitarianismemphasizesequalopportunityandfairtreatmentforeveryone,
regardlessoftheirindividualattributes.Highadherencetoegalitarianismisassociated
withmoreliberalviewsinseveralpolicydomains,particularlysocialwelfareissues.Low
adherencetoegalitarianismisassociatedwithmoreconservativepolicypositions
(Feldman1988).Thus,egalitarianismcorrelateswithDemocraticpartisanship.Limited
governmentdealswiththedegreetowhichthenationalgovernmentshouldinterveneto
provideaneconomicsafetynetforitscitizens.Thosewhobelievethatpeoplearelargely
responsiblefortheirownwell‐beingfavorlimitedgovernment.Highadherencetolimited
governmentisassociatedwithmoreconservativeviewsoneconomicpoliciesand
correlateswithRepublicanpartisanshipandvotingbehavior(Goren2013).Overall,
egalitarianismandlimitedgovernmenthelpstructureapersistentpartycleavageinthe
UnitedStatessincetheNewDeal.
Moraltraditionalismfocuseson“thedegreetowhichconservativeororthodox
moralstandardsshouldguidethepublicandprivatelifeofthenation”(Goren2013,5).
Moraltraditionalistsopposechangingnormsregardingfamilystructureandbelievethat
governmentshouldpromotetraditionalfamilyvalues.Incontrast,moralprogressivesare
4ThesearenotmeanttobeanexhaustivelistofcorevaluesinAmericanpolitics.Additionalvaluesare
coveredbyGoren(2013)andClawsonandOxley(2013).Rather,egalitarianism,limitedgovernment,and
moraltraditionalismhavestructuredpartyconflictintheUnitedStatesforanextendedperiod.
6 moretolerantofdifferentlifestylesandresistgovernmenteffortstoenforcetraditional
notionsofmorality(Hunter1991).Moraltraditionalismundergirdsseveralpolicydebates
intheUnitedStates,includingabortionandgayrights,andmoraltraditionalismhasbeena
sourceofpartisanconflictsincethe1960s(Goren2013;ClawsonandOxley2013).
Corevaluesaredistinctfromleft‐rightideologyassourcesofpartisanconflict.While
eachofthevaluesdescribedabovecanbemappedontotheliberal‐conservativespectrum,
noneofthemareperfectlycorrelatedwithideology.Moreimportantly,peoplewhomay
notcomprehendtheliberal‐conservativeframeworkofideologicalconflictcanapplycore
valuestovotingandpolicydecisions.Andsincecorevaluesformthebasisforbeliefsabout
rightandwrong,valuesarecrucialfornurturingnegativeviewsofthepoliticalopposition.
Itisnosurprisethatpartisanrhetoricfrequentlytapsintocorevalues.Thequotationsfrom
PresidentObamaandGovernorRomneyatthebeginningofthispaperoffertwoexamples
ofvaluereferencesduringthe2012presidentialcampaign.Obama’sstatement,madein
connectionwithhisannouncedsupportforlegalizinggaymarriage,containsegalitarian
themes.Romney’sstatement,madeattheannualconventionfortheNationalRifle
Association,emphasizeslimitedgovernment.Insum,valueconflictshouldhelpexplain
polarizedratingsofthetwoparties.Thosewithmoreextremebeliefsoneachvalue
dimensionshouldproducemorepolarizedratingsofthetwomajorparties.
Groupattitudes
Wealsobelievethatattitudestowardsocialgroupscontributetopolarizedratings
ofthetwopoliticalparties.Attitudestowardgroupsareanimportantsourceofpolicy
preferencesintheUnitedStates.Partisanrhetoricisfrequentlyframedintermsdesigned
toappealtopublicstereotypesofprominentgroupsinsociety.Inaddition,sometheories
ofpartisanshiparerootedinpublicperceptionsofsocialgroupscommonlyassociatedwith
eachpoliticalparty(Jacoby1988;Green,Palmquist,andSchickler2002).Asisthecasewith
corevalues,peoplewhodonotfollowpoliticsverycloselycanstillformbeliefsabout
groupsinsocietyandrelyonthosebeliefstoevaluatethepoliticalparties.Wefocuson
attitudestowardtwogroupsthatreflectimportantpartisandifferencesinmodernpolitics:
AfricanAmericansandwomen.
WhilemanyscholarshaveobservedadeclineinovertracismintheUnitedStates,
DonaldKinderandLynnSanders(1996)arguethatanewtypeofracialprejudice,termed
“racialresentment”,hasemergedinthewakeofthecivilrightsmovement.Racial
resentmentcentersonabeliefthatalackofworkethicaccountsforinequalitybetween
blackandwhiteAmericans.SinceAfricanAmericansidentifyheavilywiththeDemocratic
Party,racialattitudeshavelikelypartisanconsequences.Racialresentmenthasnot
diminishedoverthelasttwodecadesanditisassociatedwithpolicypreferencesonissues
7 suchasaffirmativeactionandthedeathpenalty(KinderandSanders1996;Clawsonand
Oxley2013).Inaddition,racialresentmentisassociatedwithRepublicanpartisanshipand
votingbehavior(ValentinoandSears2005).Finally,thepartisanimpactofracial
resentmentmaybestrongernowthatthefirstAfricanAmericanpresidentinthenation’s
historyoccupiestheWhiteHouse(TeslerandSears2010;KinderandDale‐Riddle2012).
Elitepoliticalrhetoricandmediacoverageofpoliticscanarouseracialresentmentinsubtle
ways.Forexample,whenNewtGingrichreferredtoBarackObamaas“thefoodstamp
president”duringthe2012presidentialcampaign(Weiner2012),theremarkmayhave
tappedintoracialresentment.Sincetherearesubstantialdifferencesbetweenblackand
whitevotersintheirsupportforthetwomajorparties,weexpectracialresentmenttobe
associatedwithpolarizedratingsoftheparties.
WealsoexamineattitudesinvolvingthestatusofwomeninAmericansociety.
Modernsexismrevolvesaroundreactionstochanginggenderrolesandbeliefsaboutthe
degreethatdiscriminationagainstwomenstillpersists(GlickandFiske2011).Thereisa
consistentgendergapinvotingandpartyidentification,withwomenmoresupportiveof
theDemocraticPartyandmenfavoringtheRepublicanParty(ClawsonandOxley2013).
Furthermore,thereispersistentpartisanconflictoverissuesspecifictowomen,suchas
abortion,contraception,equalpay,andworkplacerights.Forexample,theDemocratic
PartyrecentlycampaignedonanallegedGOP“waronwomen,”highlightingsomeofthese
issues.The“waronwomen”rhetoriclikelystirsbeliefsaboutmodernsexismwhenvoters
evaluatethetwoparties.Thus,attitudesabouttheroleofwomenarelikelytobeasource
ofpolarizedratingsofthetwomajorparties.
PartisanMedia
Thusfarwehavediscussedattitudesthatareexpectedtobeprimedbypartisan
rhetoric.Itisalsoimportanttoconsiderthesourcesofpartisanrhetoricinelitediscourse.
Inadditiontonegativecampaigns,therecentgrowthofpartisanmediaoncabletelevision,
talkradio,andtheInternetisanotherlikelysourceofpolarizationinAmericanpolitics.
Partisanmediaprogramsandwebsitestendtofeaturehyperboliclanguageandfear
mongeringthathighlightsthelatestoutrageperpetratedbythepoliticalopposition(Berry
andSobieraj2013).Thus,partisanmediaseemstobeaneffectivemechanismfornurturing
negativeattitudestowardtheoppositeparty.
Thereisevidencethatconsumersofpartisanmediabecomemorepolarizedbythe
experience.Inaseriesofcontrolledexperiments,Levendusky(2013a)findsthatexposure
tolike‐mindedmediaproducesmovescitizenstoadoptmoreextremepolicypositions.In
addition,exposuretopartisanmediaisassociatedwithmorenegativeratingsofthe
oppositepartyandreducedsupportforbipartisanship(Levendusky2013b).Mutz(2007)
8 arguesthattwofeaturesoftelevisedpoliticaldiscourse,incivilityandclose‐upcamera
shotsofspeakers,causeviewerstotreatopposingpointsofviewaslesslegitimate.Intwo
experiments,shefindsthatexposuretoteleviseddebatescausedviewerstorateopposing
candidateslessfavorably,producingmorepolarizedratingsoftheirpreferredand
opposingcandidates.Incivilityandclose‐upcameraanglesaremorecommonfeaturesof
partisantelevisionmediathanmainstreamtelevisionnetworks.Thus,weexpectthat
consumersofpartisanmediawillexhibitmorepolarizedratingsofthetwomajorpolitical
parties.
Predispositions
Finally,wehypothesizethatsomeindividualshavepredispositionsthatfostermore
negativeviewsofthepoliticalopposition.Onesuchtraitisthe“needtoevaluate,”which
reflectsaperson’scapacityforbeingjudgmental.Inotherwords,theneedtoevaluate
indicatesthedegreeandfrequencywithwhichsomeoneratesobjectsasgoodorbad.
Thosewhoarehighintheneedtoevaluatetendtoholdmoreintenseopinions(Jarvisand
Petty1996).Whenitcomestopartisanpolitics,weexpectthattheneedtoevaluateis
associatedwithmorenegativeopinionsoftheoppositionandmorepolarizedratingsofthe
twomajorparties.
Asecondpredispositionrelevanttopartisanpolarizationisauthoritarianism,a
worldview“concernedwiththeappropriatebalancebetweengroupauthorityand
uniformity,onetheonehand,andindividualautonomyanddiversity,ontheother”
(Stenner2005,14).Authoritariansvalueconformityandorderandtendtoviewwithworld
inblackandwhiteterms.Attheotherextreme,libertariansvaluediversityandappreciate
nuance.Authoritarianismisassociatedwithpublicpreferencesonissuessuchasgayrights,
militaryinterventionabroad,andthebalancebetweencivillibertiesandtheneedto
preventterroristattacks(HetheringtonandWeiler2009).
Giventheassociationbetweenpoliticalattitudesandauthoritarianism,itwould
appearthatauthoritarianismisrelatedtopartyidentification.Wehaveasomewhat
differentpointofview.HetheringtonandWeiler(2009)arguethatauthoritarianism
structurespartisanship,withthosehighontheauthoritarianismspectrumgravitating
towardtheRepublicanPartyandvoterslowinauthoritarianismfavoringtheDemocratic
Party.Whiletheyfindevidencetosupportthelinkbetweenauthoritarianismand
partisanship,thatisnottheentirestory.HetheringtonandWeiler(2009)alsofindan
asymmetrywhenexaminingauthoritarianismandfeelingthermometerratingsofthetwo
parties.Inaddition,theyfindaconsiderablevariationontheauthoritarianismdimension
withinbothparties.Inexaminingpartisanpolarization,itisimportanttokeepinmindthat
authoritariansmakestrongerdistinctionsbetweenin‐groupsandout‐groups(Stenner
9 2005).Thus,wehypothesizethatauthoritarians,regardlessofthepartywithwhichthey
identify,holdmorenegativeopinionsoftheirpoliticalopponentsandmorepolarized
ratingsofthetwomajorparties.Tosummarize,webelievethatthereareseveralrootsof
partisanpolarizationinthemasspublic.Inthenextsectionwetestourhypotheseswith
publicopiniondatafromthe2012election.
PredictorsofNetPartisanAffect
Weexaminethepredictorsofpolarizedpartyevaluationsusingdatafromthe
AmericanNationalElectionStudies2012TimeSeriessurvey(ANES201).Thesample
includes2,054face‐to‐faceintervieweesand3,860whocompletedthesurveyonthe
Internet.Ourmeasureofpolarizedpartisanattitudesisthethermometerratingforone’s
ownpartyminusthethermometerratingfortheoppositionparty,dubbed“netpartisan
affect”byIyengar,Sood,andLelkes(2012).
Beforegettingtomeasuresofourconceptsdescribedabove,weincludeseveral
controlvariablestoaccountforalternativeexplanationsofpolarization.First,wecontrol
forstrengthofpartyidentification.AsFigure4indicates,strongpartisansproduce
significantlymorepolarizedratingsofthetwopartiesthanothers,andthedifference
betweenstrongpartisansversusweakandleaningpartisanshasgrownbyaboutfive
degreesoverthepast30years.5Thedifferencesbetweenweakandleaningpartisansare
notnearlyaspronounced.Forstrongpartisans,thedifferenceinpartythermometer
ratingsincreasedfromroughly39degreesin1978toover56degreesin2012.Netpartisan
affecthasrisenforotherpartisansaswell,butnotquiteassteeplyasforstrongpartisans.
Inanycase,wecontrolforstrengthofpartisanshipbyincludingseparatedummyvariables
forstrongandweakpartisansintheanalysesbelow.
[Figure4abouthere]
Ideologyisanothercommonpredictorofpartypolarization,asmoreextreme
ideologicalpositionsareassociatedwithmorepolarizedratingsoftheparties.Wecontrol
forideologybyusingtheitemthatasksrespondentstoplacethemselvesonaseven‐point
scalefromextremelyliberalatoneendtoextremelyconservativeattheotherend.A
follow‐upquestionaskedmoderatesandthosewhocouldnotplacethemselvesonthescale
tochooseonesideoftheideologicalspectrumortheother.Weusedthefollow‐upitemto
placemanyofthoseuncertainideologuesasslightlyliberalorslightlyconservative,
5ForallanalysesinthispaperwetreatIndependentswholeantowardapartyaspartisans.
10 minimizingtheamountofmissingdata.Highervaluesonthescaleindicatemore
conservativerespondents.
ItisnotclearwhytheInternetsampleismorepolarizedthantheface‐to‐face
sampleinthe2012ANESdata.PerhapsthelowerresponseratefortheInternetmode
producesamorepoliticallyextremesampleofrespondents.PerhapstheInternetmodeof
thesurveyfosterstheexpressionofmoreextremeattitudes.Weincludeadummyvariable
fortheInternetmodeofsurveyresponseasanothercontrolvariable.Netpartisanaffectis
approximatelysixdegreeslarger,onaverage,fortheInternetrespondentsthanforthe
face‐to‐facerespondents.Wealsocontrolforresidentsofbattlegroundstates,totestthe
hypothesisthatexposuretothepresidentialcampaignproducesmorepolarization.On
average,netpartisanaffectwasjustonetotwodegreeshigherinbattlegroundstatesin
2012.
Finally,wetreatthetwopredispositions,needtoevaluateandauthoritarianism,as
controlvariablesbeforeestimatingtheimpactofcorevalues,group‐basedattitudesand
exposuretopartisanmedia.Wemeasureneedtoevaluatebyaveragingresponsestotwo
questionsabouthowfrequentlytheyformopinionsaboutthings.6Highervaluesindicatea
strongerneedtoevaluate.Wemeasureauthoritarianismbasedonfourforced‐choice
questionsthataskaboutpreferredtraitsinchildren(independencevs.respectforelders;
curiosityvs.goodmanners;obediencevs.self‐reliance;andbeingconsideratevs.well‐
behaved).Responsestothefourquestionsareaveragedtogethertocreatethe
authoritarianismscale.7Highervaluesindicateamoreauthoritarianworldview.
Theassociationsbetweenthecontrolvariablesandnetpartisanaffectarepresented
inTable1separatelyforDemocratsandRepublicans.Weuseordinaryleastsquares
regressiontoestimatetheimpactofeachvariableonnetpartisanaffect.Foreachvariable
weusethemodelestimatestocalculatehowmuchthegapinpartythermometerratings
changes,onaverage,whenmovingfromthe10thpercentiletothe90thpercentileoneach
independentvariable.Weusethisapproachbecausesomeindependentvariableshave
highlyskeweddistributions.Notsurprisingly,strengthofpartisanshipisapotentpredictor
ofnetpartisanaffect.Holdingtheothercontrolvariablesconstant,strongpartisansrate
thetwopartiesroughly25degreesfartherapartthandoleaningpartisans.Weakpartisans
producepartythermometerratingsonlyafewdegreesmorepolarizedthanleaning
partisans.Ideologyalsoinfluencesnetpartisanaffectintheexpecteddirection.Moving
fromlowtohighconservatismamongRepublicansincreasesthegapbetweenpartyfeeling
thermometerratingsbyalmost12degrees.Movinginamoreconservativedirectionamong
Democratsreducesthegapinpartyratingsbyasimilaramount.
6Thequestionsaskedwhethertherespondenthasopinionsaboutmanythingsandiftherespondenthas
moreopinionsthantheaverageperson.Thereliabilitycoefficient(Cronbach’sα)fortheseitemsis.66.
7Thereliabilitycoefficient(Cronbach’sα)fortheitemsintheauthoritarianismscaleis.60.
11 [Table1abouthere]
Wealsofindfairlyconsistentassociationsbetweenthetwopredispositionsandnet
partisanaffect.Movingfromlowtohighvaluesontheneedtoevaluatescaleincreasesthe
gapbetweenpartyratingsbyroughly5degrees,formembersofbothparties.Similarly,
movingfromlowtohighvaluesonauthoritarianismpolarizespartythermometerratings
byroughly8degrees.SincebothmeasuresyieldsimilarestimatedeffectsforRepublicans
andDemocrats,thissuggeststhatthepredispositionscontributetopartypolarizationin
fairlyuniformways.
Turningtoourotherhypothesizedpredictorsofpartypolarization,theANESdata
alsoprovidebatteriesofquestionsthatweusetomeasureadherencetocorevalues.We
measureegalitarianismusingsixitemsthataskrespondentsthedegreetowhichthey
agreeordisagreewithstatementsaboutequalrights,equalopportunity,fairtreatment,
andrelatedtopics.Weaveragedresponsestothesixquestionstocreatetheegalitarianism
scale.8Highervaluesindicateastrongerbeliefinequality.TheANESsurveycontainsfour
questionstomeasurebeliefsaboutlimitedgovernment.Theitemsaskaboutpreferences
forfreemarkets,preferencesformoreorlessgovernment,whygovernmenthasgotten
bigger,andtheamountofpreferredregulationofbusiness.Weaveragedresponsestothe
fourquestionstocreatethelimitedgovernmentscale.9Highervaluesindicateastronger
preferenceforlimitedgovernment.Finally,wemeasuremoraltraditionalismusingfour
questionsthataskrespondentsthedegreetowhichtheyagreeordisagreewithstatements
aboutnewerlifestyles,changingmoralbehavior,traditionalfamilyvalues,andtolerance
fordifferentmoralstandards.Responseswereaveragedtogethertocreateamoral
traditionalismscale.10Highervaluesindicateastrongerpreferencefortraditionalmoral
values.
Wemeasuregroup‐basedattitudesinasimilarmanner.Racialresentmentis
measuredbasedonfourquestionsthataskrespondentsthedegreetowhichtheyagreeor
disagreewithstatementsaboutthestatusofblacksinsociety(ClawsonandOxley2013,
196).Responsestothesefouritemsareaveragedtogethertocreatethescale(Cronbach’sα
=.80).Highervaluesindicatehigherlevelsofracialresentment.TheANESsurveycontains
sixquestionstomeasurebeliefsaboutmodernsexism.Theitemsaskabouthowserious
sexdiscriminationis,mediacoverageofsexdiscrimination,whetherwomendemanding
equalityseekspecialfavors,discriminationinhiringandpromotion,whethercomplaining
aboutsexdiscriminationcreatesmoreproblems,andwhetherwomenhaveasmany
8Theegalitarianitemsformareliablescale(Cronbach’sα=.78).
9Thelimitedgovernmentitemsformareliablescale(Cronbach’sα=.77).
10Thereliabilitycoefficient(Cronbach’sα)fortheitemsinthemoraltraditionalismscaleis.77.
12 opportunitiesasmen.Weaveragedresponsestothesixquestionstocreateamodern
sexismscale.11Highervaluesindicategreaterconcernaboutthepersistenceofmodern
sexism.
Finally,wemeasureexposuretobothflavorsofpartisanmediaaswellasageneral
measureofmainstreamnewsmediaexposure.TheANESsurveyincludedalongseriesof
questionsaskingwhichTVandradioprogramstheyregularlyconsumeandwhichweb
sitestheyregularlyvisit.Weselectednineteensources,fromRushLimbaughtoHannityto
theDrudgeReport,asexamplesofconservativemedia.Weaveragedtogetherresponses
indicatingthenumberofthosemediasourcesthatpeoplefrequentedregularly.12Higher
valuesindicategreaterexposuretoconservativemedia.Weapplythesamemeasurement
methodtonineteenliberalmediasources,includingHuffingtonPost,MSNBC,National
PublicRadio,andtheNewYorkTimes.13Highervaluesindicategreaterexposuretoliberal
media.PartisanmediaexposureisconfinedtoafairlysmallsliceoftheAmerican
electorate.Basedonthesemeasures,themedianrespondentisnotaregularconsumerof
anyliberalmediaoranyconservativemedia.Wealsoconstructedascaleofgeneral
attentiontomainstreamnewsbasedonhowmanydaysaweekrespondentsfollowthe
newsonTV,radio,theInternet,andinnewspapers.14Highervaluesindicatemorefrequent
generalnewsexposure.Themedianrespondentfollowsthenewsthreedaysaweek
throughthosesources.
[Table2abouthere]
InTable2wereportthebivariateassociationsbetweennetpartisanaffectandthe
remainingpredictors,whilecontrollingforthevariablesdepictedinTable1.Weusethe
samemethodusedinTable1andreportassociationsseparatelyforDemocratsand
Republicans.Allthreecorevaluespolarizeevaluationsofthepoliticalpartiesinthe
expecteddirection.MovingfromlowtohighvaluesonegalitarianismamongDemocrats
increasestheexpectedgapinpartyratingsbyalmost16degrees.AmongRepublicans,
strongbeliefinlimitedgovernmentandmoraltraditionalism(toalesserdegree)generate
morepolarizedevaluationsofthetwomajorparties.Corevaluescanalsohelpusexplain
thegrowthinpartypolarizationduringthelastfewdecades.Thecorrelationbetween
moraltraditionalismandtheseven‐pointpartyidentificationscalehasgrownfrom.09in
1986to.37in2012.Similarly,thecorrelationbetweenegalitarianismandpartisanshiphas
grownstronger(from‐.33in1984to‐.45in2012).Theresultsalsorevealthemoderating
impactofcross‐pressuredpartyidentifiers.Partymemberswhoadheretovaluesthat
conflictwiththebasepositionoftheirparty(egalitarianismforRepublicans,limited
11Thereliabilitycoefficient(Cronbach’sα)fortheitemsinthemodernsexismscaleis.66.
12Theconservativemediaitemsformareliablescale(Cronbach’sα=.86).
13
Theliberalmediaitemsformareliablescale(Cronbach’sα=.77).
14Thereliabilitycoefficient(Cronbach’sα)fortheitemsinthegeneralnewsexposurescaleis.43.
13 governmentandmoraltraditionalisminthecaseofDemocrats)arelesspolarizedintheir
ratingsofthetwoparties.
Wealsofindevidenceofourhypothesizedeffectsofgroup‐basedattitudesonparty
polarization.MovingfromlowtohighvaluesinracialresentmentamongRepublicans
increasesthegapinpartythermometerratingsby10degrees.ForDemocrats,higherlevels
ofracialresentmentmutesaffectivepartypolarization.Racialresentmentalsohelps
accountforthegrowthinaffectivepolarizationsincethe1980s,asthecorrelationbetween
partyidentificationandracialresentmenthasincreasedfrom.15in1986to.38in2012.
Turningtogenderattitudes,increasingconcernaboutmodernsexismamongDemocrats
producesmorepolarizedratingsofthetwomajorparties,buthasamoremutedimpacton
Republicans.
Comparedtotheattitudesandpredispositionsexaminedhere,theoverallimpactof
mediaexposureonpartypolarizationisratherweak.Thisisdueinparttothefactthat
exposuretopartisanmedia,aswehavedefinedit,isverynarrow.Forexample,themedian
Republicanisnotaregularconsumerofanyofthe19conservativenewssourceswe
examined.Similarly,themedianDemocratdoesnotfrequentanyliberalsourceseither.
Nevertheless,wedofindthatRepublicanexposuretoconservativemediaisassociated
withan8degreeincreaseinthegapbetweenpartythermometerratings.Exposureto
liberalmediahasaweakerimpactonpartypolarization.Thereismorewidespreadpublic
exposuretogeneralsourcesofnewsintheUnitedStates,butattentiontogeneralnews
sourcesdoesnotappeartodomuchinthewayofaffectivepolarization.Overall,whilethe
partisanmediahavegrownsubstantiallyoverthepastseveralyears,theymaynot
contributemuchtomasspolarizationbecauseoftheelectorate’slimitedexposureto
partisanmedia.
Thusfar,wehaveprovidedsomeevidenceofthepluralisticrootsofparty
polarizationintheUnitedStates.Partyidentity,ideology,corevalues,groupattitudes,
predispositions,and,toalesserdegree,mediaexposure,allappeartocontributeto
polarizedevaluationsofthemajorparties.Thisbegsthequestionofwhetherpolarized
viewsofthepartiesmattersinAmericanpolitics.Wethinkincreaseddenigrationofthe
oppositepartyhasseveralimportantconsequences.Inthenextsections,weexaminetwo
areaswherenetpartisanaffectcontributestoourunderstandingofpublicopinion:
attitudestowardtheTeaParty,andevaluationsofthecountry’sdirection.
TheTeaPartyandOut‐PartyDenigration
InarelativelyshortperiodoftimetheTeaPartyhasbecomeanimportantforcein
Americanpolitics,puttingitsstampondebatesaboutgovernmentspendingandthe
14 nationaldebtandinfluencingRepublicanprimaryelectionsaroundthecountry.TheTea
PartyhasalsoemergedasamajorsourceofoppositiontoPresidentObamaandthe
DemocraticPartyagendainnationalgovernment(SkocpolandWilliamson2013).We
examinepublicsupportfortheTeaPartyusingdatafromthefirstwaveoftheANES
EvaluationsofGovernmentandSocietySurvey(EGSS1),conductedviaInternetinOctober
of2010.ThiswasoneoftheearliestnationalsurveystoincludequestionsabouttheTea
Party.
WeestimateasimplestatisticalmodelofsupportfortheTeaParty,whichis
measuredonascalefrom1(opposeagreatdeal)to7(supportagreatdeal).Previous
researchfindsthatsupportfortheTeaPartyislargelyconfinedtowhites(Skocpoland
Williamson2013),sowelimitoranalysistonon‐Hispanicwhiterespondentstothesurvey.
SomearguethatTeaPartysupportismotivatedbyideologicaloppositiontothepoliciesof
theDemocraticPartyunderPresidentObama(Abramowitz2013;Summary2013).Wetry
tomimicthesestudiesincreatingapolicyconservatismscalebasedonseveralbinary
choicequestionsthataskaboutoppositiontoprominentlegislativeitemsearlyinthe
Obamapresidency.Wecreatedascalefromsevenoftheselegislativeitems,includingthe
stimulusbill,thechildren’shealthinsuranceprogram(SCHIP),capandtradelegislation,
theAffordableCareAct,regulationofthefinancialindustry,endingthemilitary’s“don’t
ask,don’ttell”policy,andfederalfundingofstemcellresearch.Ourmeasureindicatesthe
proportionofthoselegislativeitemsthattherespondentopposed.15Highervaluesindicate
moreconservativepolicypreferences,sothepolicymeasureshouldbepositively
associatedwithsupportfortheTeaParty.
SomestudiesfindthatsupportfortheTeaPartyismotivatedbyracialresentment
andareactiontotheelectionofthefirstAfricanAmericanpresidentinthenation’shistory
(ParkerandBarreto2013;Abramowitz2013;Summary2013).Wecreatearacial
resentmentscaleusingthesamefoursurveyquestionsdescribedabove(Cronbach’sα=
.83).Highervaluesindicatehigherlevelsofracialresentment,soracialresentmentshould
bepositivecorrelatedwithsupportfortheTeaParty.
WehypothesizethatsupportfortheTeaPartyin2010alsorepresentsastrong
partisanreactiontothefirstinstanceofunifiedDemocraticPartycontrolofCongressand
theWhiteHousesince1994.TheTeaPartyisanoutletforGOPangerandunhappinessat
findingthemselvesintheloyalopposition.Thus,netpartisanaffect(thedegreetowhich
onelikestheGOPanddislikestheDemocrats)shouldbeagoodpredictorofsupportforthe
TeaParty.TheEGSS1surveydidnotincludepartyfeelingthermometerquestionstoallow
ustomeasurenetpartisanaffectinthesamewayaswiththe2012ANESdata.However,
thereisanacceptablesubstitute:fourquestionsthataskhowmuchrespondentslikedor
15Thepolicyconservatismitemsformareliablescale(Cronbach’sα=.80).
15 dislikedtheDemocraticParty,BarackObama,theRepublicanParty,andSarahPalinona
scalefrom1(likeagreatdeal)to7(dislikeagreatdeal).Wereversethescaleforthe
RepublicanandPalinitemsandaveragethefourresponsestocreateanetpartisanaffect
scale.16HighervaluesindicategreaterpositiveaffectfortheGOP,sothescaleshouldbe
positivelyassociatedwithTeaPartysupport.
[Table3abouthere]
Wefindthatwhencontrollingforpolicypreferencesandracialresentment,support
fortheTeaPartyisstillstronglyassociatedwiththedegreetowhichonedislikes
DemocratsandlikesRepublicans(seeTable3).Movingfromthe10thpercentiletothe90th
percentileonnetpartyaffectincreasesexpectedsupportfortheTeaPartyby2.7points,
almosthalfoftherangeonthesupportscale.Bycomparison,policyconservatismand
racialresentmenthavesmallereffectsonTeaPartysupport(.9pointsand.6points,
respectively).Overall,theseresultssuggestthattheTeaPartycanbeunderstoodasa
vehicleforthosewhodisliketheDemocraticPartythemost.Itislikelythatincreasing
partypolarizationhelpedmaketheTeaPartypossible.Adeepeningreservoirofhostilityto
theDemocraticPartyamongRepublicansprovidesfertilegroundforTeaPartyappeals.
WithgrowingcontemptfortheGOPevidentamongDemocrats,perhapsasimilar
movementontheLeftisnotfarbehind.
TofurtherexamineattitudestowardtheTeaPartywecodedresponsestoanopen‐
endedquestionaskingwhattheTeaPartystandsfor,alsofromthefirstwaveoftheEGSS
survey.17Thedatafileincludedthefulltextoftheresponseprovidedbyeachperson.We
codedresponsesintoeightdifferentcategories,basedonconceptsdevelopedbyBrewer
(2009)andtheAmericanNationalElectionStudiescodingforquestionsaboutwhatpeople
likeanddislikeaboutthetwomajorpoliticalparties.ThesecategoriesincludedEconomic
Policy,Non‐economicPolicy,Philosophy,GovernmentManagement,GeneralImage,People,
ForeignPolicy,andNone(orDon’tKnow).Eachrespondentwascodedintoatleastoneof
theseeightcategories.WiththeexceptionoftheNonecategory,thecategoriesarenot
mutuallyexclusive.Thus,asubstantiveresponsecouldbecodedintomultiplecategories.18
Thecriterionfortheplacementoftheresponsesintoeachcategoryisasfollows.
TheEconomicPolicycategoryincludedresponsesthatreferencedtheeconomy.For
instance,referencestotaxes,spending,aswellasfiscalandmonetarypolicy.19Non‐
EconomicPolicyresponsesconsistedofthosethatwerenon‐economicinnature,orthat
16Thereliabilitycoefficient(Cronbach’sα)forthenetpartisanaffectscaleis.86.
17Thequestionasks“WhatdoestheTeaPartystandfor?”
18Forinstance,considerthefollowingresponse:“ReductionofTaxes.SocialConservatives.”Thisresponse
wascodedasbothPhilosophyforitsreferencetosocialconservatismandasEconomicforthereferenceto
taxes.
19Forinstance,theopen‐endedresponse“lowertaxes”wascodedasanEconomicPolicyresponse.
16 referenceddomesticpoliciesspecifically,suchaswelfare,education,andguncontrol.20The
Philosophycategoryincludedideologicalphrases,suchas“conservative,”aswellas
associatedvaluesincludinglessgovernment,traditionalvalues,andstates’rights.21The
GovernmentManagementcategoryincludedresponsesthatreferencedhowthe
governmentwasrunorhowitoperated.Thisincludedresponsespertainingtowasteful
governmentspending,governmentincompetence,andcorruption.22TheGeneralImage
categoryincludednegativeorpositiveresponseswithoutideologicalorissuecontent,such
aswhetherrespondentslikedordislikedtheTeaPartyaswellasspecificreferencesto
partylabels.Forinstance,affectiveresponsessuchastheTeaPartystandsfor“craziness”
or“Theystandforthepeople”werecodedasGeneralImage.ThePeoplecategoryincluded
responsesthatreferencedaparticularindividual.Forexample,theseincluderesponses
mentioningSarahPalinorotherpoliticiansassociatedwiththeTeaParty.23TheForeign
PolicycategorycoveredspecificresponsesrelatedtoforeignaffairssuchasthewarsinIraq
andAfghanistanormoregeneralresponsessuchasthosereferringtoisolationism.24The
None(orDon’tKnow)categorypertainedtoresponsesthatwereleftblankorwhere
responsesstatedthattheydidnotknowtheanswertothequestion.
Thefirstsetofresultsaggregatesallresponsesbycategoryandillustratesthe
frequencywithwhichrespondentsidentifiedtheTeaPartyasbeingassociatedwitheachof
theeightcategoriesdescribedabove.Thehighestpercentageofrespondents(44%)
identifiedtheTeaPartyusingageneralimage,while29%describedtheTeaPartyinterms
ofgeneralphilosophy,and23%mentionedaneconomicpolicy.Farfewerrespondents
identifiedtheTeaPartywithanon‐economicpolicy(3%),governmentmanagement(2%),
apersonorpeople(1%),orforeignpolicy(0.2%).Morethanone‐in‐threerespondents
(35%)eitherdidnotknowwhattheTeaPartystandsforordidnotanswerthequestion.
Theseresultsareinterestinginthat,roughlyoneyearintotheTeaParty’sexistence,
respondentsusedageneralimagetodefinetheTeaPartymorefrequentlythanthey
referredtophilosophyasadefiningfeature.Further,respondentsusedageneralimageto
definetheTeaPartyroughlytwiceasoftenastheyusedaneconomicpolicytodothesame.
Thesecondsetofresultsdividesthehighest‐frequencyresponsecategoriesof
generalimage,philosophy,andeconomicpolicybypartyidentificationandorientation
towardtheTeaParty.TheheightofeachbarinFigure5indicateswhatpercentmentioned
20Forinstance,theopen‐endedresponse“anti‐publiceducation”wascodedasNon‐economicPolicy
response.
21Forinstance,theopen‐endedresponse“reducinggovernmentpower”wascodedintothePhilosophy
category.
22Forinstance,theopen‐endedresponse“theyareagainstwastefulspending”wascodedintothe
GovernmentManagementcategory.
23Forinstance,theopen‐endedresponse“ItstandsforSarahPalin”wascodedintothePeoplecategory.
24Forinstance,theopen‐endedresponse“Strongmilitary”wascodedintotheForeignPolicycategory.
17 phrasesfromthatcategoryindescribingtheTeaParty.Thecolorofthebarindicateswhat
shareofthoseresponsescamefromTeaPartysupportersversusnon‐supporters.For
example,thebarattheleftedgeofthefigureindicatesthat43%ofDemocratsdescribed
theTeaPartyingeneralimageterms,butonly7%ofthoseDemocraticrespondents
professedsupportfortheTeaParty.Thus,thevastmajorityofgeneralimageresponses
fromDemocratsdescribedtheTeaPartyinnegativeterms.Themostimmediateconclusion
thatcanbedrawnfromtheseresultsisthatfewDemocratsandIndependentsidentified
themselvesasTeaPartysupporters.WhenDemocratsandIndependentsoffereda
descriptionoftheTeaParty,mostoftentheyreferredtothegeneralimageoftheTeaParty
andusuallyinnegativeterms.Bycomparison,roughlyhalfofGOPidentifierssupportthe
TeaParty,andRepublicanstendtodescribetheTeaPartyinmoresubstantiveterms.
[Figure5abouthere]
ItisalsonoteworthythatIndependentswereleastlikelytoofferanydescriptionof
theTeaPartywhileRepublicansweremostlikelytoofferasubstantiveresponse.Perhaps
themostintriguingfindingcomesfromthedifferentwaysinwhichRepublicans,
Democrats,andIndependentsdefinetheTeaParty,regardlessofwhethertheysupportor
opposeit.RepublicansaremorelikelythanDemocratsandIndependentstoreferto
economicpoliciesorgovernmentphilosophythemesindescribingtheTeaParty.While
partyidentificationisonlyamoderatepredictorofwhetherornotarespondentwillusea
generalimagetodefinetheTeaParty,partyidentificationismuchmorehighlycorrelated
withresponsesinvokingeconomicorphilosophicalconceptsasperceiveddefining
features.Specifically,approximately50%ofRepublicansusedageneralimagetodefine
theTeaParty,whileapproximately43%ofDemocratsand30%ofIndependentsdidthe
same.However,RepublicansweremorelikelytodefinetheTeaPartyineconomicterms
(32%)thanwereDemocrats(20%)orIndependents(14%).Republicanswereevenmore
likelytodefinetheTeaPartyinphilosophicalterms(41%)thanwereDemocrats(24%)or
Independents(14%).Inaddition,mostoftheeconomicorphilosophymentionsonthe
RepublicansidecamefromTeaPartysupporters.Overall,justayearintotheTeaParty’s
existencewefindopinionsoftheTeaPartyareheavilybifurcatedbypartisanship.
NetPartyAffectandthePoliticsofNegativeEmotions
Finally,webelievethatpartypolarizationalsosharpenstheemotionalnatureof
politicalconflict.Heightenedcontemptfortheoppositepartycreatesgreaterfearand
loathingwhenreckoningwithoccasionswhentheoppositepartycontrolsthelegislative
andexecutivebranchesofthegovernment.Weexplorethisideabyexaminingsome
questionsfromthe2010EGSS1surveythataskedaboutthedirectionofthecountry.For
18 example,oneiterationofthequestionasked“Generallyspeaking,howdoyoufeelabout
thewaythingsaregoinginthecountrythesedays?Howangry?”Respondentsansweredon
ascalefrom1(extremely)to5(notatall).Thesamerootwasusedtoqueryfournegative
emotions:angry,afraid,worried,andoutraged.Thereisalotofvariationonallfouritems,
withslightlymorerespondentsplacingthemselvesonthenegativesideofthescalerather
thanthepositiveside.Wereversedthedirectionofthescalesothathigherscoresindicate
morenegativeemotions,andweaveragedresponsestoallfouritemstocreateanegative
emotionsindex(α=.89).Wethenestimatearegressionmodeltoexplainvariationin
emotionsaboutthenation’sdirection.
Withthenationstillemergingfromarecessionin2010,weexpectthateconomic
needsandconcernshelpstructurefeelingsaboutthewaythingsaregoinginthecountry.
ThenationalunemploymentrateinOctober2010wasstillhigh(9.5percent).Thus,our
regressionmodelincludesoneindependentvariableindicatingwhethertherespondentis
unemployed.Weexpectthatnegativeemotionsshouldbemorepronouncedforthosewho
areunemployed.Thesurveyalsoincludestwoquestionsaboutongoingeconomicanxieties.
Theitemsaskhowworriedtherespondentisabout(1)one’sfinancialsituationand(2)
payingforhealthcareduringthenext12months.Respondentsansweredonascalefrom1
(extremelyworried)to5(notatallworried).Wereversedthedirectionofthescalesothat
higherscoresindicatehigheranxietylevels,andweaveragedresponsestobothitemsto
createaneconomicperilindex(α=.75).Thereisalotvariationineconomicperil,with
morereportedanxietyaboutone’soverallfinancialsituationthanaboutpayingforhealth
care.Weexpectmoreeconomicanxietytobeassociatedwithmorenegativeemotions
aboutthedirectionofthecountry.
Wealsoexpectthatnegativeemotionsaboutthecountryreflectpoliticalattitudes.
Thosewithmoreconservativepolicypreferencesmayhavebeenupsetin2010aboutthe
contentofthemainlegislativeinitiativespursuedinthefirsttwoyearsoftheObama
administration.Thus,weexpectapositiverelationshipbetweenthepolicyconservatism
indexdescribedaboveandnegativeemotions.Wealsoexaminewhetherpassionsamong
AmericanvotersreflectracialdivisionsinsocietyinresponsetotheelectionofPresident
Obamaandongoingchangesinthenation’sdemographicsembodiedbythatelection.Thus,
whitesmayexpressmorenegativeemotionsthannon‐whiterespondents,andpeoplewith
higherlevelsofracialresentmentmayexpressmorenegativeemotions.
Finally,partypolarizationmaycontributetonegativefeelingsaboutthedirectionof
thecountry.GiventhatDemocratsheldtheWhiteHouseandmajoritiesintheHouseand
Senatein2010,Democraticpartisanslikelyhadmorepositivefeelingsaboutthenation’s
directionthanRepublicans.Morespecifically,weexpectthatthosewhodislikedthe
Democratsthemosttestifiedtothemostnegativeemotionsaboutthedirectionofthe
19 country.WemeasurecontemptforDemocratsbyaveragingresponsestothetwoquestions
thatassesshowmuchrespondentsdisliketheDemocraticPartyandPresidentObama.
ThemodelestimatesarereportedinTable4.Wefindthatwhencontrollingfor
policypreferences,financialpressures,andracialdivisions,negativeemotionsaboutthe
nation’sdirectionarestronglyassociatedwiththedegreetowhichonedislikesthe
DemocraticParty.Movingfromthe10thpercentiletothe90thpercentileincontemptfor
Democratsisassociatedwithaonepointincreaseinnegativefeelingsaboutthedirection
ofthecountry(thefullrangeoftheemotionsindexisfourpoints).Angerandconcern
aboutwhatisgoingoninthecountryisshapedbyhowmuchonedislikesthegoverning
party.Growingdisdainforone’spoliticalopponentsmeansthatpoliticiansandactivists
nowhaveadeeperwelloffearandloathingamongfellowpartysupporterstotapwhen
theyfindthemselvesintheloyalopposition.
[Table4abouthere]
Otherpoliticalattitudesareassociatedwithfeelingsaboutthecourseofthenation.
Increasedoppositiontothemainlegislativeagendaof2009‐2010tendstoproducemore
negativeemotions.Furthermore,wefindsomeevidenceofracialdivisionsinfeelingsabout
thedirectionofthecountry.Whiterespondentsandthosewithhigherlevelsofracial
resentmentreportmorenegativefeelings,althoughthoseeffectsaremoremodest.Finally,
whileunemploymentdoesnotseemtoproducemorenegativefeelings,thereisastrong
associationbetweenconcernsabouteconomicperilsandnegativeemotions.Fearand
loathingaboutthewaythingsaregoinginthenationreflectseconomic,partisan,policyand
racialattitudes.However,partypolarizationandcontemptfortheoppositepartyarean
importantsourceofthosenegativefeelings.
Conclusion
Therearegrowingdifferencesinfeelingstowardthetwomajorpoliticalpartiesin
theUnitedStates.Contemptfortheoppositepartyhasincreasedsubstantially,particularly
duringthepasttenyears.Theincreaseinnegativefeelingsfortheoppositionpartyis
partlyaresponsetoelitepolarization.Elitepolarizationstrengthenspartyidentityamong
thepublic,fuelsbiasedpoliticalreasoninganddistrustofthepoliticalopposition.Polarized
ratingsofthepartieshavemanyothersources,includingideology,corevalues,group‐
basedattitudes,individualpredispositions,andexposuretopartisanmedia.Thus,in
craftingrhetoricthatencouragesrevulsionfortheoppositepartybothpoliticalpartiescan
appealtoadiversepaletteofpublicattitudes.
20 Partypolarizationandincreasinglynegativeassessmentsofone’spolitical
opponentshaveimportantconsequencesforAmericanpolitics.Partypolarizationhas
helpedcreatedemotionalspacefortheTeaPartytoemerge.SupportfortheTeaPartyis
stronglyrelatedtohowmuchonelikestheRepublicanPartyanddislikestheDemocratic
Party.Twentyyearsago,whentherewasconsiderablylesscontemptforDemocratsamong
GOPsupporters,theremaynothavebeenmuchofamarketfortheTeaParty.Ifthat
contemptcontinuestogrow,thentheTeaPartyshouldcontinuetothrive.Sincewe
observesimilarlevelsofcontemptfortheGOPamongDemocrats,thereseemstobean
opportunityforamorecoordinatedmovementliketheTeaPartytoformontheLeft.
Increasednegativitytowardpoliticalopponentsamongthemasspublicisa
promisingdevelopmentforthoseeagertomobilizethebaseofeitherparty.Appealsthat
emphasizethreatsandfeararemoreeffectiveatmotivatingmasspoliticalactivitythana
positiveagenda(Miller2013).Politicianscanappealtofeelingsofcontempt,angerandfear
todrawmorecitizensintothepoliticalarena.However,havingrepeatedlystokedthose
negativefeelingsamongpartysupporters,itcanbedifficultforpoliticianstoridethattiger
whengoverningrequiresnegotiationandcompromise.Ifpartisansdonotviewtheother
sideaslegitimate,thentheyarelesslikelytosupportcompromisewiththeopposition.This
dynamicseemstohavecontributedtothegovernmentshutdowninOctoberof2013.A
majorityofeachparty’ssupportersfounditunacceptablefortheirpartyleaderstomake
concessionstotheotherside(Motel2013).OntheRepublicanside,TeaPartysupporters
(thosewhotendtodislikeDemocratsthemost)weremorelikelytowanttheirpolitical
leaderstostandfirmandnotcompromise(Summary2013).Itappearsthatmanynational
politiciansrespondedtothosedesires,prolongingtheshutdowncrisis.Giventhe
increasingdisdainforpoliticalopponents,anothersimilarcrisismayoccuragainsoon.
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25 Figure1
EmotionstowardOtherParty’sPresidentialCandidatesbyDecade
70
60
Percent
Angry
50
Afraid
40
30
1980s
1990s
2000s
2012
Decade
Source:ANES2010,2013
26 Figure2
MeanPartyRatingsbyDemocrats,1978‐2012
Mean Thermometer Rating
80
70
Democratic Party
60
50
Republican Party
40
30
1980
1990
2000
2010
Year
Figure3
MeanPartyRatingsbyRepublicans,1978‐2012
Mean Thermometer Rating
80
70
Republican Party
60
50
Democratic Party
40
30
1980
1990
2000
2010
Year
Source:ANES2010,2013
27 Figure4
NetPartisanAffectbyStrengthofPartisanship,1978‐2012
60
Net Partisan Affect
50
Strong Partisans
40
30
Weak Partisans
20
Leaning Partisans
10
1980
1990
2000
2010
Year
Source:ANES2010;ANES2013
28 Figure5
WhattheTeaPartyStandsfor,byPartyIdentificationandTeaPartySupport
60
Percent
40
20
0
D
I
Image
R
D
I
R
D
Economic
R
Philosophy
Non-supporters
Source:ANESEGSS1
I
D
I
R
None
Tea Supporters
29 Table1
AssociationsbetweenControlVariablesandNetPartisanAffect,2012
IndependentVariable
Republicans
Democrats
Strongpartisan
24.6
26.6
[21.7,27.5]
[24.0,29.3]
Weakpartisan
2.2
3.7
[‐0.7,5.1]
[0.9,6.4]
Ideology
11.7
‐11.7
[9.3,14.1]
[‐14.2,‐9.2]
Needtoevaluate
4.5
5.9
[1.4,7.7]
[3.1,8.8]
Authoritarianism
8.3
7.5
[5.2,11.4]
[4.1,10.9]
N
1840
2813
Estimatesarecreatedusingordinaryleastsquaresregression.Cellentriesindicate
theexpectedchangeinnetpartisanaffectwhenmovingfromthe10thpercentileto
the90thpercentileontheindependentvariable.95%confidenceintervalsarein
parentheses.Additionalcontrolvariables,surveymodeandbattlegroundstates,are
notshown.Dataareweightedbythepost‐stratifiedweightforthefullsample.
Source:ANES2013
30 Table2
AssociationsbetweenPredictorsandNetPartisanAffect,2012
IndependentVariable Republicans Democrats
Egalitarianism
‐7.4
15.7
[‐10.5,‐4.3]
[12.9,18.4]
Limitedgovernment
10.2
‐11.8
[7.1,13.2]
[‐14.1,‐9.5]
Moraltraditionalism
4.7
‐11.7
[1.6,7.7]
[‐14.4,‐9.0]
Racialresentment
10.0
‐7.9
[7.1,12.9]
[‐11.0,‐4.9]
Modernsexism
‐3.0
9.4
[‐6.0,‐0.2]
[6.7,12.1]
Conservativemedia
8.1
‐2.4
[5.4,10.9]
[‐3.6,‐1.2]
Liberalmedia
‐4.4
1.6
[‐6.4,‐2.3]
[‐0.6,3.8]
Generalnews
2.4
‐3.5
[‐0.6,5.4]
[‐6.4,‐0.6]
N(min)
1840
2813
Estimatesarecreatedusingordinaryleastsquaresregression.Cellentriesindicate
theexpectedchangeinnetpartisanaffectwhenmovingfromthe10thpercentileto
the90thpercentileontheindependentvariable.95%confidenceintervalsarein
parentheses.Additionalcontrolvariables,strengthofpartisanship,ideology,needto
evaluate,authoritarianism,surveymodeandbattlegroundstates,arenotshown.
Dataareweightedbythepost‐stratifiedweightforthefullsample.
Source:ANES2013
31 Table3
PredictingSupportfortheTeaPartyamongNon‐HispanicWhites,2010
Impact
IndependentVariable
[95%CI]
NetPartisanAffect
2.7
[2.4,3.0]
PolicyConservatism
0.9
[0.6,1.2]
RacialResentment
0.6
[0.3,0.8]
904
N
.55
R2
ThedependentvariableissupportfortheTeaPartyonascalefrom1(opposea
greatdeal)to7(supportagreatdeal).Estimatesarecreatedusingordinaryleast
squaresregression.CellentriesindicatetheexpectedchangeinsupportfortheTea
Partywhenmovingfromthe10thpercentiletothe90thpercentileonthe
independentvariable.95%confidenceintervalsareinbrackets.Dataareweighted
bythepost‐stratificationweight.
Source:ANES2010‐2012EvaluationsofGovernmentandSocietyStudy,October
2010Survey
32 Table4
PredictingFearandLoathingabouttheDirectionoftheCountry,2010
Impact
IndependentVariable
[95%CI]
DislikeforDemocrats
1.0
[0.8,1.2]
EconomicPeril
0.9
[0.7,1.0]
Unemployed
0.02
[‐0.1,0.1]
PolicyConservatism
0.2
[0.03,0.4]
RacialResentment
0.2
[0.05,0.35]
Non‐HispanicWhite
0.2
[0.04,0.3]
1161
N
.32
R2
Thedependentvariableisascalemeasuringnegativeemotionsabouttheway
thingsaregoinginthecountryfrom1(notatall)to5(extremely).Estimatesare
createdusingordinaryleastsquaresregression.Cellentriesindicatetheexpected
changeinnegativeemotionswhenmovingfromthe10thpercentiletothe90th
percentileontheindependentvariable.95%confidenceintervalsareinbrackets.
Dataareweightedbythepost‐stratificationweight.
Source:ANES2010‐2012EvaluationsofGovernmentandSocietyStudy,October
2010Survey
33