What are the contents of de se beliefs?
First-Person Propositions
De se belief
Non-de se beliefs
I am burning.
Peter is burning.
He is burning. (pointing at me)
The DGS for Philosophy is burning.
• I can have this de se belief without having any of these non-de se beliefs,
or vice versa.
Peter Hanks
University of Minnesota
[email protected]
April 6, 2012, Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris
• Assumption: different beliefs have different contents.
• The content of the de se belief must be distinct from the content any
non-de se belief.
What is the content of the belief that I am burning?
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Fregean first-person thoughts
Problems for Fregean first-person thoughts
‘I am burning’
• Mysterious, dubious
<first-person sense, sense of ‘burning’>
• Incommunicability: no one else can grasp the thought I express when I
say ‘I am burning’
mode of presentation of
me that only I can grasp
“Now everyone is presented to himself in a special and primitive way, in which he is presented to
no one else.”
- Frege, “Thoughts,” 1918
• General problems for Fregean descriptivism (e.g. rigidity)
‘Peter is burning’
<third-person sense, sense of ‘burning’>
Back to the drawing board ...
mode of presentation of
me that anyone can grasp
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Propositions as types of spoken and mental actions
Peter is burning.
⊢ < Peter, burning>
Peter is burning.
assertion
assertion
Peter is burning.
predication type of
reference act
judgment
In each case the subject:
refers to Peter
expresses the property of burning
predicates burning of Peter
type of
expression act
Tokens include particular judgments and assertions that Peter is burning.
Tokens of the same type:
⊢< Peter, burning>
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Predication
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Fregean picture of judgment and assertion
thoughts/propositions
<Water is H2O>
• Type of action in which a subject applies a property to an object.
<Hesperus is visible in the evening>
<London is pretty>
<Cicero was an orator>
<Mathematics is reducible to logic>
• Not neutral. Commits the subject to the object’s having the property.
<Peter is burning>
• Rejection of Frege’s content-force distinction. Rejection of Fregean picture
of judgment and assertion. No entertainment.
Peter is burning.
entertain
judgment
assertion
• Requires a notion of cancellation, e.g. for conditionals and disjunctions.
subject
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Peter is burning.
My picture
Soames’s picture in What is Meaning?, 2010
Soames identifies propositions with types of events in which subjects
predicate properties of objects, but the kind of predication involved is
neutral and non-committal.
⊢ < Peter, burning>
proposition
token
token
Peter is burning
Peter is burning
judgment
“What is it to entertain a proposition? It is, I suggest, to predicate something of
something else. To entertain the proposition that o is red is to predicate redness
of o.”
- Soames, What is Meaning?, 2010
assertion
subject
• act of reference to Peter
• act of expressing the property of burning
• act of predicating burning of Peter
“Since to entertain the proposition that o is red is simply to predicate redness of
o, and since this predication is included in every attitude with that content,
entertaining the proposition is one component of any propositional attitude we
bear to it. To judge that o is red is to predicate redness of o, while endorsing
that predication.”
- Soames, What is Meaning?, 2010
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Soames’s picture in What is Meaning?
Problems for Frege and Soames
Problems for Frege
⊢* < Peter, burning>
proposition = type of event
• Problem of the unity of the proposition: how do we account for the fact
that propositions have truth-conditions?
Acts of predication are the source of truth-conditions.
neutral predication
Peter is burning
entertainment /
neutral predication
• Conditionals and cancellation
Peter is burning
judgment
Peter is burning
assertion
subject
Problems for Soames
• No entertainment (understood as a neutral kernel in judgment)
• No neutral predication
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∼ = cancellation
Conditionals and cancellation
⊢ < ∼⊢<Russell, right>, ∼⊢<Frege, wrong>, if >
• An utterance of ‘If p then q’ is neither an assertion that p nor an assertion
that q.
• The contents of ‘p’ and ‘q’ do not change when used inside a conditional.
The contents of ‘p’ and
‘q’ must not contain
assertion.
The contents of ‘p’ and ‘q’ contain
assertion, but the element of assertion
is cance"ed or overridden when ‘p’ and ‘q’
are used inside a conditional.
Frege
If Russell is right then Frege is wrong.
⊢ < ∼⊢<Russell, right>, ∼⊢<Frege, wrong>, or >
Russell is right or Frege is wrong.
⊢ < ⊢<Russell, right>, ⊢<Frege, wrong>, and >
Russell is right and Frege is wrong.
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Cancellation: ∼ ⊢
⊢ < Peter, burning>
Analogy with stage acting
Which type of reference act?
Peter is burning.
• Object-dependent reference type
actor
• The actor performs an act of predication in a context in which conventions about
stage-acting cancel or override the usual commitments and consequences of predication.
• Something similar happens when you utter the antecedent and consequent of a
conditional.
The type of reference act in which someone refers to Peter using
any name or referential device. Any act of reference to Peter falls
under this reference type.
• Name-dependent reference type
⊢ < ∼⊢<Russell, right>, ∼⊢<Frege, wrong>, if>
If Russell is right then Frege is wrong.
• In uttering the antecedent I predicate right-ness of Russell, but the consequences of this
act of predication are cancelled by the fact that my utterance is inside a conditional.
• A feature of the meaning of ‘if ’ creates a context in which the consequences of
The type of reference act in which someone refers to Peter using
the name “Peter”. Only acts of reference to Peter using the name
“Peter” fall under this reference type.
Peter ≠ object-dependent reference type
≠ name-dependent reference type
Peter = semantic reference type
predication are cancelled.
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Example
Semantic reference types
Suppose Joe is a childhood friend of Barack Obama who knew Obama only as
“Barry”. Joe does not realize that his friend Barry grew up to become the
president of the United States.
Peter = semantic reference type
Define a relation R on token acts of reference:
x, y = token acts of reference
nx, ny = names used in x, y respectively
Barry is president.
xRy iffdef anyone who is semantically competent with nx and ny will realize,
under relevantly ideal conditions, that x and y have the same
referent.
Michelle
Obama is president.
Me
• Joe is competent with the names “Barry” and “Obama” but does not realize that
these two token acts of reference co-refer.
• Intuitively, x and y bear R iff semantic competence with the names used in those tokens
is sufficient on its own for knowing that x and y co-refer.
• These two acts of reference do not bear R and so fall under different semantic
reference types.
• For a token act of reference x, the semantic reference type of x is the type of reference
act of being an act of reference that bears R to x.
• The semantic content of a name n is the semantic reference type of token acts of
reference using n. Neither a Millian nor a Fregean account of the semantic contents of
names.
Barry ≠ Obama
• Same for most co-referential names, “Cicero” / “Tully”, “Hesperus” / “Phosphorus”,
“Mark Twain” / “Sam Clemens”, etc.
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Context sensitive semantic reference types
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Perry’s Enterprise example
Perry, “Frege on Demonstratives,” 1977
x, y
token acts of reference
dx, dy
referential terms (names, indexicals or demonstratives) used in x and y
cx, cy
Kaplanian contexts of interpretation for x and y
<agent, time, location, world, sequences of demonstrata>
USS Enterprise
xR*y iffdef anyone who is semantically competent with dx and dy, and can
identify the applicable parameters in cx and cy, will realize, under
relevantly ideal conditions, that x and y co-refer.
That is the Enterprise.
Applicable parameters:
“I”
agent
“now” time
etc.
That is the Enterprise.
Perry
• The semantic reference type of a token act of reference x is the type of reference act of
being an act of reference that bears R* to x.
• The semantic content of an indexical relative to a context c is the semantic reference
type of the use of that indexical in c.
• Perry’s friend is competent with the demonstrative “that” and can identify the
applicable parameter in both cases. But Perry’s friend fails to realize that Perry’s token
acts of reference co-refer.
• Perry’s token acts of reference do not bear R*, and so fall under different semantic
reference types.
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Perry’s Enterprise example
Perry’s messy shopper example
Perry, “Frege on Demonstratives,” 1977
Perry, “The Problem of the Essential Indexical,” 1979
He is making a mess.
USS Enterprise
a
b
That is the Enterprise.
I am not making a mess.
That is the Enterprise.
• Perry fails to realize that his two token acts of reference co-refer.
Perry
• These tokens do not bear R*, and so fall under different semantic reference types.
⊢ <<Thata, Enterprise>, identity>
⊢ <<Thatb, Enterprise>, identity>
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first-person proposition
Non-repeatability
Typically, a context sensitive semantic reference type will have at most a single token.
c
⊢<Ic, making-a-mess>
I am making a mess.
⊢<Ie, making-a-mess>
≠
⊢<If, making-a-mess>
e
d
f
I am making a mess.
I am making a mess.
⊢<Hed, making-a-mess>
He is making a mess.
.....................................
Perry is making a mess.
⊢<Perry, making-a-mess>
Exceptions:
• Multiple uses of an indexical in a single utterance, e.g. “I think I am making a mess”
• Multiple uses of an indexical in the premises and conclusion of an argument.
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Communicability
Grasping vs. entertaining
⊢<Ic, burning>
judgeable/assertable by
others
graspable by hearers
Fregean first-person
thoughts
NO
NO
my first-person
propositions
NO
YES
c
I am burning.
me
hearer
• Because of non-repeatability, no one (including me) can assert or judge another token of
this proposition. In that sense, this first-person proposition is inaccessible to others.
• NB: grasping ≠ entertainment
• Entertainment is something subjects are supposed to do prior to, or in the course of,
making a judgment. I am skeptical about entertainment.
• However, there is no barrier in principle to a hearer recognizing that I have performed a
token of this type. First-person propositions are communicable in this sense. Hearers can
grasp first-person propositions in the sense that they can recognize that speakers have
performed tokens of these types.
• Grasping is something hearers do in understanding a speaker’s utterance. On my view,
this is a matter of classifying utterances under types.
• The Fregean picture runs entertainment and grasping together - treats both as neutral
cognitive contact with a proposition.
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Hume-Heimson
De se reference
Perry, “Frege on Demonstratives,” 1977
What is it to make de se reference to yourself? What kind of reference act is that?
⊢ <<I, Hume>, identity>
super-type
What is I?
de se reference type
First attempt
⊢ <<Ig, Hume>, identity>
⊢ <<Ih, Hume>, identity>
g
h
I am Hume.
I am Hume.
Hume
Heimson
Intuitively, Hume and Heimson said the same thing.
Cf. Lewis, “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se,” 1979.
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An act of self-reference is de se iff in performing that act the subject cannot fail
to know that she refers to herself in that act
of reference
Problems: too reflective, regress
Second attempt
An act of self-reference is de se iff in performing that act the subject must lack
the (false) belief that she does not refer to
herself in that act of reference
NB: must hold fixed the fact that the subject is competent with the term she
uses in her act of reference
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Definition of first-person propositions
Back to the problem of de se belief
I = de se reference type
= the type of reference act in which a subject refers to herself without the possibility
falsely believing that she did not refer to herself
• What is the content of the belief I express when I say “I am burning”?
I
super-type
• The content of this belief must be distinct from the content of the beliefs I express by
saying “α is burning”, where “α” is any term or description, other than “I”, that
designates me.
c
⊢<Ic, burning>
I am burning.
⊢<Ie, making-a-mess>
d
⊢<If, making-a-mess>
me
He is burning.
⊢<Hed, burning>
Peter is burning.
⊢<Peter, burning>
Definition:
A first-person proposition is any proposition containing a de se semantic
reference type, i.e. a semantic reference type that is a sub-type of I.
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First-person propositions:
• well-defined, not mysterious
• communicable
• not descriptivist, no problems about rigidity
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