The Definition and Implication of “regarded as disabled” for Public
Employers
By Jessie Peed
A paper submitted to the faculty of the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
Master of Public Administration
April, 2010
This paper represents the work of a UNC MPA student. It is not a formal report of the School of
Government, nor the School of Government faculty.
Executive Summary
In September 2008 Congress amended the Americans with Disabilities Act. These amendments directly
addressed the definition of disability. The result of the amendments tilted the balance between
employers and employees in “regarded as disabled” cases toward employees by allowing more cases
to be heard by juries. These changes re-emphasize the need for employers to focus on good
management and human resources policies in order to avoid discriminatory practices and
unnecessary litigation.
Introduction and Background1
In an employment at will system, negative employment action for reasons not protected by statute is
legally acceptable. Employers are free to hire, promote, and fire employees for a variety of reasons
without legal repercussion. The United States Congress has limited this prerogative in employment
decisions based on a variety of protected classes. Examples of these classes include race, national origin,
gender, age, religion, or disability.2
Disability was added to this list as part of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and later the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990. The original purpose of the ADA was “to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities.”3 A key question has emerged with regard to employment decisions based on disability under
the ADA: “which individuals qualify as disabled and are thus entitled to protection?” 4
In the definitions section of the ADA Congress defined disability using a three-pronged approach.
The first two prongs of disability are fairly straightforward - “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities” 5 or “a record of such an impairment.” 6 The
third prong is less clear - “being regarded as having such impairment.”7
Issues surrounding “regarded as disabled” were important elements of 2008 legislation that amended
the ADA.8 When Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act, which is generally understood to redirect
the courts to the original intent of the ADA9, it included language directing its application for the
provision of broad employment protection to individuals with disabilities and those who are “regarded as
disabled”. Under the ADA Amendments Act, an employee seeking coverage under the “regarded as”
prong need only show that the employer views the employee as having an impairment. It is no longer
necessary to show, as it had been previously, the impact of the perceived impairment on a major life
activity. 10 An applicant or employee can now be considered "regarded as" disabled if he or she is subject
to an action prohibited by the ADA based on an impairment that is not transitory and minor. 11 This new
legislation results in some key questions concerning the application of the “regarded as disabled” prong of
the ADA.
This paper examines the impact of the recent ADA amendments concerning “regarded as disabled”
on the legal outcomes of ADA cases. Based on the evaluation of likely legal changes resulting from this
amendment the impact on public sector human resources (HR) practices is explored. First, the
methodology used to explore these questions will be reviewed. Second, the paper examines case law
surrounding the ADA and explores how the 2008 Amendment changes on the issues of “regarded as
disabled” impacts the decision making process of the courts. Third, the changed court decision making
will be examined in reference to how it likely will alter future case outcomes. Finally, the paper outlines
the significance of these changes for public sector employers and makes recommendations for human
resources practices.
Methodology
Given the recent passage of the ADA Amendments Act the impacts of legislative changes have not
yet been reflected in case law. This paper considers the impact of this legislation, as it related to the issue
of “regarded as disabled,” on future ADA litigation and explores potential implications for local
government HR practices. Past court cases are reviewed through the lens of the congressional directives
in theADA Amendments Act. This review allows for an evaluation of how the outcomes of previous
cases might change as the new amendments are applied to situations with similar facts in the future. This
research provides a foundation to understand what the ADA Amendments Act might mean for HR
departments interested in using appropriate practices and avoiding litigation.
A sample of 88 cases from federal appellate and trial courts was reviewed in order to identify
situations in which disputes related to “regarded as disabled” would be addressed similarly or differently
following the ADA amendments of 2008. The sample was selected by identifying all cases that (a) raised
the “regarded as disabled” issue, (b) arose within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit (the federal appellate court whose decisions govern North Carolina and nearby
states), and (c) included actual judicial deliberation on the issue of “regarded as disabled.”
1
This sample of cases were selected by using Shepard’s® Citations Service to identify cases decided
under the ADA (resulting in 5,611 cases), narrowing this pool to cases raising the issue of “regarded as
having such an impairment” (yielding 2,000 cases), further limiting the sample to cases decided within
the geographic region specified (resulting in 196 cases), and finally identifying those 88 cases in which
the issue of “regarded as disabled” was actually considered by the trial or appellate court.12
Systematic case review was conducted on this final sample of cases. Cases were reviewed to collect
the facts of the original cases, the findings by the original courts, and judicial reasoning. Each fact pattern
was then evaluated to determine how changes embodied in the ADA Amendments Act would likely
impact the results were the same facts presented in court following the amendments. The analysis was
informed by the ADA Amendments Act‟s statutory language, legislative intent (evident in committee
reports and the Congressional Record), and insights from secondary sources (law journal articles and
scholastic publications).
The ADA Amendments Act was shaped in important ways by Congress‟s desire to address what it
regarded as mistaken interpretations under the ADA as originally enacted. In Sutton v. United Air Lines
the U.S. Supreme Court held that for an employee to be “regarded as disabled” under the ADA the
employer had to believe that the employee had a physical or mental impairment that substantially limited
one or more major life activity (for employment cases the major life activity in question is often
“working”). In Sutton the Court held that “if a disability can be corrected or mitigated, employers can
conclude that an impairment does not amount to a „substantial limitation‟”. 13 In Sutton the Court futher
held that to be “regarded as disabled” with regard to the major life activity of working, the employer had
to consider the employee to be substantially limited in a broad class of jobs. The reasoning in this case
was expressly rejected by Congress in the ADA Amendments Act with important implications discussed
below14
Examining the Case Law
Individuals seeking relief under the ADA Amendments Act must prove: that 1) they have actual or
perceived disabilities, 2) the disabilities were the cause of the negative employment actions, and 3) the
disabilities resulted in injury. 15 If the party bringing the action (“plaintiff”) fails to provide adequate
evidence to support his or her claim at the outset (“prima facie case”), the defendant may seek “summary
judgment” on the grounds that no reasonable person could conclude from the evidence that an actionable
claim has been stated. If the court agrees, the case may be dismissed without going to a jury. 16 Generally
speaking, such individuals must prove they are disabled, or are “regarded as being disabled,” before the
question of discrimination is evaluated by the court.17
The ADA Amendments Act changed the substantive criteria for cases brought under the “regarded as
disabled” prong of the ADA. Under the original version of the ADA, courts required plaintiffs to show
that:
The employer, or other covered entity,
o Believed the person had a physical or mental impairment, or record of such an impairment, that
substantially limited a major life activity;
o If the major life activity in question was working; believed the plaintiff was unable to perform a
broad class of jobs rather than just the job in question.
Under the ADA Amendments Act, substantive requirements were changed so that an individual bringing
a “regarded as disabled” claim must offer evidence that:
The employer, or other covered entity,
o Believed the person had a physical or mental impairment (even if the impairment did not limit a
major life activity), and
o Regarded the person as unable to perform the job in question (rather than a broad class of jobs)
2
Findings and Recommendations
As might be expected, a review of past case fact-patterns revealed that results would either remain the
same or change in the aftermath of the ADA Amendments Act. 18
In some cases, the projected outcome would not change, primarily because the results of these cases
under the original ADA reflected the extent to which adequate evidence was presented to support the
plaintiff‟s claim. If the plaintiff failed to present evidence of alleged discrimination sufficient for a judge
to require the defendant to present competing evidence, the case under the ADA Amendments Act would
likely also fail. Similarly, if the plaintiff presented strong evidence of discrimination, the ADA
Amendments Act changes would likely have little effect.
Cases Reflecting Insufficiency or Sufficiency of Evidence Likely to Yield the Same Outcome
Review of fact patterns and judicial analysis in the sample of cases suggested that approximately 45
percent turned on the sufficiency of evidence. The results in these cases would likely not change in the
aftermath of the ADA Amendments Act.
Same Outcome: Insufficient Evidence.
Cases may turn out the same because the complainant failed to present enough evidence to survive
summary judgment and progress to trial (this lack of evidence was not enough in previous cases and
would still remain inadequate).Under the ADA Amendments Act the plaintiff remains obliged to present
evidence that the employer believed the employee had an impairment, and that this impairment was the
reason for the adverse employment action. Of the cases in the sample, over 25 percent fell in this
category.19 In many such cases the plaintiff asserted both claims that he or she was disabled and claims
that he or she was “regarded as disabled” but failed to provide adequate evidence to support either claim.
The Scott v. Montgomery County Gov't, case epitomizes this outcome. In this case the employee was
hired as a part-time messenger/clerk and his duties entailed driving. The employee was diagnosed with
sleep apnea and it was determined that he was not able to drive in a safe manner. The fact that the
employee could not reasonably perform the job for which he applied was a reasonable reason for
termination. Employers are not required to hire or continue to employee employees not capable of safely
performing the job in question. 20
Same Outcome: Sufficient Evidence.
Cases may also result in the same outcome because the complainant presented a strong case with
enough evidence to survive summary judgment (proceed to a jury trial) under the more narrow pre-ADA
Amendment Act standards. In such cases employers‟ discriminatory actions or motivations were clear.
Their behavior was a violation of the narrow standards set by the previous courts. Approximately 20
percent of the cases were in this category.21 These cases were typically ones in which the employer
clearly stated why he or she was failing to hire or promote the employee, and this reason was prohibited
by law.
Wilson v. Phoenix Specialty Mfg. Co. is an excellent example of this outcome. In this case the
employee had Parkinson's disease but was still able to perform the essential functions of his job as a
shipping supervisor. After disclosure of his condition the employee was terminated. In this case the
employee was terminated and was able to provided evidence that the employer's president had stated that
the employee qualified for ADA designation; the employer discounted a specialist's medical opinion that
the employee was capable of returning to work; management shunned the employee; and the employer
inaccurately believed that the employee was unable to adequately key information into a computer, write,
count washers, or use information on a computer screen. Based on the evidence, the district court found
the employer‟s reason for termination to be excuses.22
3
Recommendations
Cases that turn on the sufficiency of evidence suggest that HR professionals need to be especially
attentive to maintaining accurate records and documentation of HR decisions. The recommendations that
follow represent HR practices and policies that many organizational already undertakebut become even
more important under the more lenient standards of the ADA Amendments Act.
Keep accurate notes pertaining to job interviews, promotion considerations, and termination
decisions23
When dealing with a potential disability claim, fully investigate the limitations of the employee in
question
o Do not presume to be able to make a medical diagnosis; get a medical opinion
o Do not tell a potential employee that you are not hiring him/her because of his/her disability
Cases Reflecting the Substantive Changes to the Definition are Likely to Yield Different Outcomes
In the ADA Amendments Act Congress clearly established that for “regarded as having a disability”
under the ADA to apply, it is now only required that the employee show that the employer viewed him or
her as having an impairment. It is no longer necessary for the employee to show that he or she was
regarded as having an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.
Of the cases reviewed, almost half of the employees were able to show that they were regarded as
impaired, but not sufficiently impaired to qualify for protection (under the previous requirements). These
cases were originally decided under the general language of Sutton v. United Airlines. In this case the
employer believed that the employee was impaired but not substantially limited in a major life activity.
Different Outcome: Impaired with regard to the job in question.
The majority of cases in which the projected outcome would change involve decisions in which the
major life activity under review was “working.” The employer in these cases regarded the employee as
unable to perform the job in question but not necessarily limited in his or her ability to work in a class or
broad range of jobs as required by the previous ADA case law. Congress directly addressed this
requirement in the ADA Amendments Act.
For an individual to be regarded as disabled under the ADA Amendments Act it is no longer required
that he or she show that he or she was regarded as unable to perform a broad range of jobs (substantially
limited in the major life activity of working). It is now sufficient that the employee show that he or she
was regarded as limited in his or her ability to work at the job for which he or she applied. In other words,
hiring decisions must be made with evaluation specific to the job for which the applicant applied.
Foore v. Richmond is a compelling example of this outcome. In this case a police officer who had
worked for more than 14 years was placed on disability retirement when it discovered that the vision in
his right eye fell below the office‟s requirements. At trial, defendant maintained that plaintiff was not
disabled because his visual impairment did not substantially limit any major life activity. The appellate
court held that the employee did not have a disability within the meaning of the ADA. The record
demonstrated that employee had overcome his impairment, and the only job he had been precluded from
undertaking was the position of police officer. The court held that because the employer believed him to
be capable of performing other duties he was not substantially limited in the major life activity of
working.24 Under the ADA Amendments Act this line of reasoning is no longer valid; the police officer‟s
disability claim must be evaluated in terms of his ability to perform the job for which he applied.
Different Outcome: Regarded as having an impairment with regard to a major life activity
A small sample of the cases in which the projected outcome would change involve decisions relating
to regarded as having an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity generally. 25 These
cases were not specific to the major life activity of working. In these cases the original court followed the
line of reasoning laid out in Sutton v. United Air Lines.
4
Congress addressed this reasoning in the ADA Amendments Act by extending “regarded as”
protections to all individuals whether or not the perceived impairment limits or is perceived to limit a
major life activity. The only limitation placed on this definition by Congress is that this definition shall
not apply to impairments that are transitory and minor. “A transitory impairment is an impairment with an
actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.”26 If the transitory impairment lasts more than six months,
it may be considered a covered condition under the ADA. The ability to correct or mitigate an
impairment no longer disqualifies an employee from ADA protections.
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams provides the premier example of this outcome. 27 In this case the
employee performed on an engine fabrication assembly line. She developed pain in her hands, wrists, and
arms; and was diagnosed with impairments including carpal tunnel syndrome. The Court found that to be
substantially limited in performing manual tasks under the ADA, an individual was required to have an
impairment that prevented or severely restricted the individual from doing activities that were of central
importance to most people's daily lives and the impairment's impacts were required to be permanent or
long-term.28 Under the ADA Amendments Act this line of reasoning is no longer valid; the impairment is
not required to be permanent, it is only required to last longer than six months. If the employee‟s
impairment is correctable it should be assessed based on its active, pre-correction state.
Recommendations
Simply put, Congress‟ intent with the ADA Amendments Act was to extend the ADA protections to
include more individuals. As such, HR personnel must be aware that actions that were previously
acceptable may no longer be so. It is no longer sufficient for employers to assume that a job applicant can
work somewhere in order to avoid a “regarded as disabled” claim.
Hiring decisions should be made based on the specific job in question in order to evaluate for the best
candidate. The courts have reinforced this practice by clarifying that in ADA claims it must be
demonstrated that evaluation was specific to the job for which the applicant applied, making it critical that
the employer fully understand the requirements of each job opening. It is now even more important that
employers:
Understand essential job functions and write a clear job description tailored to each job opening 29
Conduct a valid and reliable job analysis
Clearly state job requirements in job description
Establish appropriate selection criteria reasonably related to the requirements of the job 30
Include task based assessments in the job application process; this will allow more effective
evaluation of a potential employee‟s ability to perform the job in question.
Conclusion
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 was meant to change the behavior of the Courts and to tilt the
balance between employers and employees in “regarded as disabled” cases toward employees by allowing
more cases to be heard by juries.
The practices listed above should help to protect employers from verdicts against them in disability
discrimination suits, but the broader recommendations can be more simply understood: be both careful
and thoughtful.
Mark Bradbury noted “If in fact, it is more desirable to avoid litigious behavior than to emerge
victorious in court, public human resource managers are well advised to adopt a strategy that reduces the
likelihood of obesity-related discrimination.”31 This concept can be applied more broadly to all disability
related discrimination; employers are advised to practice thoughtful management techniques. This is
especially true when it comes to dealing with potential discriminatory actions. Make sure employment
decisions are based on valid employment techniques and standards
5
1
For more information on the history of the ADA and its treatment by the Courts prior to the ADA Amendments
Act of 2008 see Appendix A.
2
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub. L. 88-352), Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (Pub.
L. 90-202).
3
42 U.S.C. § 12102(b)(1) (1990).
4
Sarah J. Parrot, The ADA and Reasonable Accommodation of Employees “regarded as disabled”: Statutory Fact
or Bizarre Fiction? Ohio State Law Journal. Vol 67: 1495. p1497. 2006.
5
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2000).
6
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B) (2000).
7
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) (2000).
8
For the exact language of the ADA Amendments Act refer to Appendix B.
9
More information about the original intent of the ADA is available in Appendix A.
10
Pub. L. No. 110-325, Sec. 4(a)(3)(A), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555.
11
“Notice Concerning The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Amendments Act of 2008.” Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Website. http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/adaaa_notice.cfm
12
The database is available in table form as Appendix C, attached to this paper.
13
“The Definition of Disability After Sutton v. United Airlines.” Neighborhood Legal Services, Inc. 2000.
http://www.nls.org/conf2000/brineast.htm
14
Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1999). In Sutton, twin sisters, each suffered from severe myopia,
which was correctable with appropriate lenses. They both applied for positions as pilots. The airline refused to hire
them based on an airline policy requiring a certain level acuity. The Court affirmed the decision below because a
"disability" under the ADA had to be determined with regard to corrective measures. Therefore the sisters did not
have an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. This reasoning was specifically rejected by
Congress.
15
Colker, Ruth. The Law of Disability Discrimination: Teachers’ Manual. Sixth Addition. Lexis Nexis. 2007.
16
Prima Facie Case for Discrimination: Plaintiff must offer evidence that they are a member of a protected class
(race, sex, age, disability, etc.), that they applied for and were rejected from the job in question, that they were
qualified for the job, and that the job remained open or someone else was hired for the position. If these standards
are not met the case will be dismissed as a matter of law and not heard by a jury, “summary judgment for the
employer”. Once a prima facie case for discrimination has been made the employer must articulate a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the employment discrimination to avoid “summary judgment for the plaintiff”, there
is no requirement that the employer offer evidence to support this claim at the pre-trail phase.
17
“The threshold issue in any ADA case is whether an individual alleging discrimination is an individual with a
disability” CRS Report for Congress. The Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act. Order Code RS22901.
September 12, 2008. p.1
18
Approximately 95% of cases fell into this three category system. Not all cases were predictable based on the ADA
Amendments Act.
19
28% of cases fell in this category.
20
Scott v. Montgomery County Gov't, 164 F. Supp. 2d 502 (D. Md. 2001). The employee was hired as a part-time
messenger/clerk and his duties entailed driving. The employee was diagnosed with sleep apnea and it was
determined that he was not able to drive in a safe manner. The employer was not under an obligation to
accommodate the employee by assigning him to permanent light duty and a part-time schedule would not reduce the
risk that the employee would experience somnolence while driving since it was unpredictable and unaffected by
how much sleep he had the previous night. The employer's policy of restricting priority reconsideration for positions
at or below current grade level was reasonable and the accommodations provided by the employer were reasonable
and met the good faith standard of the claim of reasonable accommodation.
21
21.6% of cases fell in this category.
22
Wilson v. Phoenix Specialty Mfg. Co., 513 F.3d 378 (2008). In this case the employer manufactured washers that
were used in aircraft manufacturing. Despite his Parkinson's symptoms, the employee was able to perform the
essential functions of his job as a shipping supervisor. After disclosure of his condition the employee was
terminated. The employee provided evidence that (1) the employer's president stated that the employee qualified for
ADA designation; (2) the employer discounted a specialist's medical opinion that the employee was capable of
returning to work; (3) management shunned the employee; and (4) the employer inaccurately believed that the
employee was unable to adequately key information into a computer, write, count washers, or use information on a
computer screen. In response the employer claimed that the employee was terminated as part of a company wide
6
work force reduction. The district court found this reason was pretextual based on evidence that the only other
worker affected by a purported workforce reduction was transferred to another job and that another worker who was
promoted to a newly-created position of shipping foreman performed the same duties as the employee bringing the
suit.
23
“Discipline and Discharge: Steps to Avoid Wrongful Termination.” HR Answers' Advantage Newsletter. March
2006. http://www.hranswers.com/services/newsletters/advantage/Mar2006.pdf
24
Foore v. Richmond, 6 Fed. Appx. 148 (4th Cir. 2001). In this case a police officer who had worked for more than
14 years was placed him on disability retirement when it discovered that the vision in his right eye fell below the
office‟s requirements. At trial, defendant maintained that plaintiff was not disabled because his visual impairment
did not substantially limit any major life activity. The appellate court held that plaintiff did not have a disability
within the meaning of the ADA. The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that plaintiff's visual impairment did
not substantially limit any major activity--either seeing or working. Rather, the record demonstrated that plaintiff
had overcome his impairment, and the only job he had been precluded from undertaking was the position of police
officer for defendant. The court held: district court erred when it refused to grant defendant's motion for judgment as
a matter of law.
25
13.6% of cases fell in this category.
26
Pub. L. No. 110-325, Sec. 4(a)(3)(B), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555.
27
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 199 (U.S. 2002). The Court noted: It is insufficient for
individuals attempting to prove disability status under this test to merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of
an impairment. Instead, the ADA requires them to offer evidence that the extent of the limitation caused by their
impairment in terms of their own experience is substantial. That the Act defines "disability" "with respect to an
individual," makes clear that Congress intended the existence of a disability to be determined in such a case-by-case
manner. An individualized assessment of the effect of an impairment is particularly necessary when the impairment
is one such as carpal tunnel syndrome, in which symptoms vary widely from person to person.
28
Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1999).
29
Postol, Lawrence P.; Kadue, David D. An Employer's Guide to the Americans with Disabilities Act: From Job
Qualifications to Reasonable Accommodations .24 J. Marshall L. Rev. 702 (1990-1991).
30
“The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) defines a qualified applicant as one who can perform the essential
functions of the job. Essential functions are the primary job duties intrinsic to the position; they do not include
marginal or peripheral tasks that are not critical to the performance of the primary job functions.” Pynes, Joan E.
Human Resources Management for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: 2nd Edition. San Francisco, CA. 2004. p.
153.
31
Mark D. Bradbury. “The Legal and Managerial Challenge of Obesity as a Disability.” Review of Public Personnel
Administration, Vol. 27, No. 1, 79-90, 87 (2007)
7
APPENDIX A: A Brief historical overview of ADA
The original purpose of the ADA was “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”1 When the ADA passed it was
understood by Congress to be an expansion of The Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 2 The ADA definition
for disability was drawn directly from the language of the previous Act. 3 The courts had interpreted
this definition very broadly to cover a wide range of physical and mental impairments and Congress
intended this broad definition to be extended under the new law. 4
According to U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) “The Americans with
Disabilities Act [gave] civil rights protections to individuals with disabilities similar to those provided
to individuals on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, age, and religion.” 5 Among the
protections offered by the ADA is a prohibition of discrimination against individuals with disabilities
in regard to employment decisions, including “job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.”6
The EEOC notes “the inclusion of persons regarded as having a substantially limiting impairment [in
the ADA] reflects Congressional intent to protect all persons who are subjected to discrimination
based on disability, even if they do not in fact have a disability.” 7 This perspective was adopted by the
courts in early readings of the Rehabilitation Act 8 and was intended by Congress to be extended under
the ADA.
The subsequent court cases that arose under the ADA saw a dramatically different interpretation of the
same language. When addressing the “regarded as disabled” prong of the ADA the Courts routinely
took a very narrow approach. The Court‟s finding in Sutton v. United Air Lines typified this approach
to the ADA; here the Court held that to be regarded as disabled under the ADA the employer had to
believe that the employee had a physical or mental impairment that substantially limited one or more
major life activity. 9 As in Sutton, this most often arose where the major life activity in question was
working. In such cases the Court required that the employee show that the employer believed he or
she was regarded as unable to perform a broad class of jobs – it was insufficient to show that employer
believed he/she was unable to perform the job in question. 10 This created a very high bar for
employees seeking coverage under the regarded as disabled prong of the ADA.
In the ADA Amendments Act Congress provided a guide for Courts and employers to use when
interpreting the ADA in the future: “The purposes of this Act are… to reject the Supreme Court‟s
reasoning in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) with regard to coverage under the
third prong of the definition of disability and to reinstate the reasoning of the Supreme Court in School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) which set forth a broad view of the third prong
of the definition of handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”11
In School Board of Nassau County the Court addressed the regarded as disabled prong of disability
holding that the basic purpose of the Act was to “ensure that handicapped individuals are not denied
jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others… society's
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical
limitations that flow from actual impairment.” 12 In this case the Court noted that it may be the
perception of other that creates a limitation on a major life activity.
The ADA Amendments Act is generally understood to redirect the courts to the original intent of the
ADA, to provide broad employment protection to individuals with disabilities or those who are
regarded as disabled. Under the ADA Amendments Act, an employee seeking coverage under the
8
“regarded as” prong need only show that the employer views the employee as having an impairment, it
is no longer necessary to show the impact of the perceived impairment on a major life activity. 13
1
42 U.S.C. § 12102(b)(1) (1990).
“As evident from the ADA's legislative history, Congress' decision to adopt [The Rehabilitation Act‟s]
definition of disability was a deliberate decision to cover the same wide group of individuals who had been
covered under that existing law.” ADA Hearing of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
Statement of Chai Feldblum Professor, Federal Legislation Clinic, Georgetown University Law Center. July 15,
2008.
3
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, P.L. 101-336. The Act took effect July 26, 1992.
4
“Congress' decision to adopt Section 504's definition of disability was a deliberate decision to cover the same
wide group of individuals who had been covered under that existing law. Congress expected that the definition
of "disability" would be interpreted as broadly under the ADA as it had been interpreted under the previous
disability rights law for over fifteen years.” ADA Hearing of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions. Statement of Chai Feldblum Professor, Federal Legislation Clinic, Georgetown University Law
Center. July 15, 2008.
5
http://www.ada.gov/qandaeng.htm
6
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
7
EEOC 902.8 Regarded as Having a Substantially Limiting Impairment
8
“By amending the definition of ''handicapped individual'' to include not only those who are actually physically
impaired, but also those who are regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are substantially limited in a major
life activity, Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are
as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.” School Board of Nassau
County v. Arline. 480 U.S. 273. (1987).
9
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999)
10
Id.
11
P.L. 110-325 ADA Amendments Act of 2008 September 25, 2008
12
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 318-319 (1987)
13
ADA Amendments Act, P.L. 110-325(2008), 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2009).
2
9
APPENDIX B: ADA Amendments Act of 2008, PUBLIC LAW 110–325
An Act.
To restore the intent and protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "ADA Amendments Act of 2008".
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that-(1) in enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Congress intended that the Act
"provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities" and provide broad coverage;
(2) in enacting the ADA, Congress recognized that physical and mental disabilities in no way diminish
a person's right to fully participate in all aspects of society, but that people with physical or mental
disabilities are frequently precluded from doing so because of prejudice, antiquated attitudes, or the
failure to remove societal and institutional barriers;
(3) while Congress expected that the definition of disability under the ADA would be interpreted
consistently with how courts had applied the definition of a handicapped individual under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that expectation has not been fulfilled;
(4) the holdings of the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its
companion cases have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA,
thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect;
(5) the holding of the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534
U.S. 184 (2002) further narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA;
(6) as a result of these Supreme Court cases, lower courts have incorrectly found in individual cases
that people with a range of substantially limiting impairments are not people with disabilities;
(7) in particular, the Supreme Court, in the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), interpreted the term "substantially limits" to require a greater degree of
limitation than was intended by Congress; and
(8) Congress finds that the current Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ADA regulations
defining the term "substantially limits" as "significantly restricted" are inconsistent with congressional
intent, by expressing too high a standard.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are--
10
(1) to carry out the ADA's objectives of providing "a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination" and "clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination" by reinstating a broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA;
(2) to reject the requirement enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity is to be determined with reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures;
(3) to reject the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999)
with regard to coverage under the third prong of the definition of disability and to reinstate the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)
which set forth a broad view of the third prong of the definition of handicap under the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973;
(4) to reject the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), that the terms "substantially" and "major" in the
definition of disability under the ADA "need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard
for qualifying as disabled," and that to be substantially limited in performing a major life activity
under the ADA "an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the
individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives";
(5) to convey congressional intent that the standard created by the Supreme Court in the case of
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) for "substantially
limits", and applied by lower courts in numerous decisions, has created an inappropriately high level
of limitation necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA, to convey that it is the intent of Congress
that the primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered
under the ADA have complied with their obligations, and to convey that the question of whether an
individual's impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis; and
(6) to express Congress' expectation that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will revise
that portion of its current regulations that defines the term "substantially limits" as "significantly
restricted" to be consistent with this Act, including the amendments made by this Act.
SEC. 3. CODIFIED FINDINGS.
Section 2(a) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12101) is amended-(1) by amending paragraph (1) to read as follows:
"(1) physical or mental disabilities in no way diminish a person's right to fully participate in all aspects
of society, yet many people with physical or mental disabilities have been precluded from doing so
because of discrimination; others who have a record of a disability or are regarded as having a
disability also have been subjected to discrimination;";
(2) by striking paragraph (7); and
(3) by redesignating paragraphs (8) and (9) as paragraphs (7) and (8), respectively.
SEC. 4. DISABILITY DEFINED AND RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.
11
(a) Definition of Disability.--Section 3 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
12102) is amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 3. DEFINITION OF DISABILITY. "As used in this Act:
"(1) Disability.--The term `disability' means, with respect to an individual-"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such
individual;
"(B) a record of such an impairment; or
"(C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph (3)).
"(2) Major life activities.-"(A) In general.--For purposes of paragraph (1), major life activities include, but are not limited to,
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing,
lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and
working.
"(B) Major bodily functions.--For purposes of paragraph (1), a major life activity also includes the
operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune system,
normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine,
and reproductive functions.
"(3) Regarded as having such an impairment.--For purposes of paragraph (1)(C):
"(A) An individual meets the requirement of `being regarded as having such an impairment' if the
individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this Act because
of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is
perceived to limit a major life activity.
"(B) Paragraph (1)(C) shall not apply to impairments that are transitory and minor. A transitory
impairment is an impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.
"(4) Rules of construction regarding the definition of disability.--The definition of `disability' in
paragraph (1) shall be construed in accordance with the following:
"(A) The definition of disability in this Act shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of
individuals under this Act, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act.
"(B) The term `substantially limits' shall be interpreted consistently with the findings and purposes of
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.
"(C) An impairment that substantially limits one major life activity need not limit other major life
activities in order to be considered a disability.
12
"(D) An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a
major life activity when active.
"(E)(i) The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be
made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures such as-"(I) medication, medical supplies, equipment, or appliances, low-vision devices (which do not include
ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses), prosthetics including limbs and devices, hearing aids and
cochlear implants or other implantable hearing devices, mobility devices, or oxygen therapy
equipment and supplies;
"(II) use of assistive technology;
"(III) reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids or services; or
"(IV) learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications.
"(ii) The ameliorative effects of the mitigating measures of ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses shall
be considered in determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.
"(iii) As used in this subparagraph-"(I) the term `ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses' means lenses that are intended to fully correct
visual acuity or eliminate refractive error; and
"(II) the term `low-vision devices' means devices that magnify, enhance, or otherwise augment a
visual image.".
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.)
is further amended by adding after section 3 the following:
"SEC. 4. ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS. "As used in this Act:
"(1) Auxiliary aids and services.--The term `auxiliary aids and services' includes-"(A) qualified interpreters or other effective methods of making aurally delivered materials available
to individuals with hearing impairments;
"(B) qualified readers, taped texts, or other effective methods of making visually delivered materials
available to individuals with visual impairments;
"(C) acquisition or modification of equipment or devices; and
"(D) other similar services and actions.
"(2) State.--The term `State' means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands of the United States, the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.".
13
(c) Amendment to the Table of Contents.--The table of contents contained in section 1(b) of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 is amended by striking the item relating to section 3 and
inserting the following items:
"Sec. 3. Definition of disability.
"Sec. 4. Additional definitions.".
SEC. 5. DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY.
(a) On the Basis of Disability.--Section 102 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
12112) is amended-(1) in subsection (a), by striking "with a disability because of the disability of such individual" and
inserting "on the basis of disability"; and
(2) in subsection (b) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking "discriminate" and inserting
"discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability".
(b) Qualification Standards and Tests Related to Uncorrected Vision.--Section 103 of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12113) is amended by redesignating subsections (c) and (d)
as subsections (d) and (e), respectively, and inserting after subsection (b) the following new
subsection:
"(c) Qualification Standards and Tests Related to Uncorrected Vision.--Notwithstanding section
3(4)(E)(ii), a covered entity shall not use qualification standards, employment tests, or other selection
criteria based on an individual's uncorrected vision unless the standard, test, or other selection criteria,
as used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity.".
(c) Conforming Amendments.-(1) Section 101(8) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12111(8)) is amended-(A) in the paragraph heading, by striking "with a disability"; and
(B) by striking "with a disability" after "individual" both places it appears.
(2) Section 104(a) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12114(a)) is amended by
striking "the term `qualified individual with a disability' shall" and inserting "a qualified individual
with a disability shall".
SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.
(a) Title V of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12201 et seq.) is amended-(1) by adding at the end of section 501 the following:
14
"(e) Benefits Under State Worker's Compensation Laws.--Nothing in this Act alters the standards for
determining eligibility for benefits under State worker's compensation laws or under State and Federal
disability benefit programs.
"(f) Fundamental Alteration.--Nothing in this Act alters the provision of section 302(b)(2)(A)(ii),
specifying that reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures shall be required, unless
an entity can demonstrate that making such modifications in policies, practices, or procedures,
including academic requirements in postsecondary education, would fundamentally alter the nature of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations involved.
"(g) Claims of No Disability.--Nothing in this Act shall provide the basis for a claim by an individual
without a disability that the individual was subject to discrimination because of the individual's lack of
disability.
"(h) Reasonable Accommodations and Modifications.--A covered entity under title I, a public entity
under title II, and any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation under title III, need not provide a reasonable accommodation or a reasonable
modification to policies, practices, or procedures to an individual who meets the definition of
disability in section 3(1) solely under subparagraph (C) of such section.";
(2) by redesignating section 506 through 514 as sections 507 through 515, respectively, and adding
after section 505 the following:
"SEC. 506. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION REGARDING REGULATORY AUTHORITY. "The
authority to issue regulations granted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the
Attorney General, and the Secretary of Transportation under this Act includes the authority to issue
regulations implementing the definitions of disability in section 3 (including rules of construction) and
the definitions in section 4, consistent with the ADA Amendments Act of 2008."; and
(3) in section 511 (as redesignated by paragraph (2)) (42 U.S.C. 12211), in subsection (c), by striking
"511(b)(3)" and inserting "512(b)(3)".
(b) The table of contents contained in section 1(b) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 is
amended by redesignating the items relating to sections 506 through 514 as the items relating to
sections 507 through 515, respectively, and by inserting after the item relating to section 505 the
following new item:
"Sec. 506. Rule of construction regarding regulatory authority.".
SEC. 7. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
Section 7 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 705) is amended-(1) in paragraph (9)(B), by striking "a physical" and all that follows through "major life activities", and
inserting "the meaning given it in section 3 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
12102)"; and
(2) in paragraph (20)(B), by striking "any person who" and all that follows through the period at the
end, and inserting "any person who has a disability as defined in section 3 of the Americans with
15
Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12102).". SEC. 8. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Act and the
amendments made by this Act shall become effective on January 1, 2009.
16
APPENDIX C: Case Review Summary
Table 1A: Case Review Summary
Same Outcome: Insufficient Evidence
Case Name
Facts
Original Reasoning
Projected
Reasoning
Original
Finding
Correa v.
Roadway
Express, 2003
U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 184
(M.D.N.C.
Jan. 2, 2003)
The applicant attended a meeting with the human resources manager,
completed an application, and received a call from the company requesting
that he get a physical abilities test. The applicant argued that the two failed
tests were not administered at the proper speed. The applicant passed the
third test after the directions were given in Spanish. The company offered
the applicant a lower paying position. After passing the test, the company
offered an interview, however the applicant declined because he was afraid
to have an interview in English. The company withdrew his application.
The court found that the applicant could not
establish his prima facie case as to any of his
claims under the ADA, the ADEA, and Title
VII. The failure to complete the interview
process rendered the applicant not qualified for
the position.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Crow v.
McElroy Coal
Co., 290 F.
Supp. 2d 693
(N.D. W. Va.
2003)
Plaintiff alleged he was discriminated against because of his disability. SAs
for the ADA claim, plaintiff argued that because his doctor released him to
work in a letter dated June 1, 1994, he was an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability. Plaintiff was terminated from his employment
on February 13, 2001. On that date, a doctor stated to the superintendent
that he had not cleared plaintiff to work in an underground coal mine. As
plaintiff failed to obtain a release to work from his doctor, plaintiff had not
shown that he could perform the essential functions of the job with or
without reasonable accommodation. In addition, plaintiff failed to state a
claim for "failure to accommodate." He did not request accommodation at
the time of his termination, nor did he request accommodation in a timely
manner after receiving the doctor's letter.
The court held that plaintiff had not shown he
was a qualified individual with a disability at
the time of termination.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Csicsmann v.
Sallada, 211
Fed. Appx.
163 (4th Cir.
Va. 2006)
In this case the employee included a “regarded as disabled” claim along
with an actual disability claim and an FMLA claim. The employee took a
two month FMLA leave for hip surgery. When he returned his job had
been eliminated and he was placed on a new project with equivalent salary
and benefits and similar responsibilities. Shortly after his return he
requested accommodations or disability leave because of pain in his hip.
These requests were denied. He was subsequently downsized when the
corporation underwent structural changes.
The court granted summary judgment for the
employer in this case based on the fact that the
employee failed to show that he was “regarded
as disabled” and never argued that he was
actually disabled.
Same
No Summary
Judgment
17
Edmonson v.
Potter, 118
Fed. Appx.
726 (4th Cir.
Md. 2004)
Eeoc v. Sara
Lee Corp., 237
F.3d 349 (4th
Cir. S.C. 2001)
Ennis v. Nat'l
Ass'n of Bus.
& Educ.
Radio, Inc., 53
F.3d 55 (4th
Cir. Va. 1995)
The employee claimed that she was disabled by carpel tunnel syndrome,
that the Postal Service had not accommodated her disability, and that she
was subjected to a hostile work environment. The Postal Service
immediately changed the employee's work assignment after she presented
medical documentation relating to her carpel tunnel syndrome; it also
approved 13 requested schedule changes to accommodate her disability.
The district court granted summary judgment to
the Postmaster and dismissed the employee's
claims. The court found the employee had
failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination because she did not show that
she suffered an adverse employment action
arising from her disability.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Employee suffered from a seizure disorder, which did not affect her ability
to drive or take care of herself or her child. However, employee's seizure
disorder did, at times, affect her ability to remember and most seriously
affected her ability to sleep. Defendant employer had a seniority policy and
employee was notified that another employee with 20-years more seniority
would be assuming her shift. Defendant offered several options, and
employee chose a severance package. Employee then filed a charge under
the ADA.
The Court held that the ADA did not require
defendant employer to deviate from its
nondiscriminatory seniority policy in order to
accommodate the employee. To have held that
the employee could have violated the seniority
rights of the other employee in order to uphold
her own rights under the ADA would have
been error.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
The district court had rendered an order that granted summary judgment for
appellee employer on appellant employee's complaint that was filed under
the ADA. Appellant claimed that she was suspended and terminated
because of her known association with her disabled son. There was
undisputed evidence that appellee was not satisfied with appellant's job
performance.
The court held that appellant had not
established a prima facie case of
discrimination. First, appellant was not a
member of the protected class. Second,
appellant had not presented evidence that she
was performing her job at a level that met
appellee's legitimate expectations. Finally,
appellant had not established that the discharge
occurred under circumstances that would have
permitted an inference of discrimination on the
basis of an impermissible factor. There was
nothing in the record that linked appellant's
discharge to her son's HIV positive status. The
court affirmed the summary judgment for
appellee.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
18
Felix v. Sun
Microsystems,
Inc., 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
7508 (D. Md.
Apr. 12, 2004)
Johnson v.
Becton
Dickinson
Labware, 2001
U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24978
(M.D.N.C.
Sept. 20, 2001)
The husband claimed discrimination under the ADA because his occasional
episodes of "binge drinking" were not of sufficient frequency, intensity, and
duration to substantially limit any of his major life activities to qualify him
as disabled under the statute. Finally, the district court likewise held that
the wife failed to state a prima facie case of retaliation because, inter alia,
her generalized complaints of harassment to various members of her former
employer's human relations department did not specifically reference either
the ADA or FMLA, and thus did not qualify as protected opposition
directed at her former employer's unlawful conduct.
The employee, who was a diabetic, asserted that the employer failed to
provide her a reasonable accommodation and subjected her to a hostile
work environment. The employee's duties included the operation of certain
machines used in the manufacture of laboratory dishware. She began to
experience low-blood sugar episodes related to her diabetes and was placed
on insulin injections. She experienced two additional low-blood sugar
episodes while working on the dishware machine. Her doctor informed her
that she was not to work on the dishware machine alone. The employer told
the employee it did not have an available job to meet her needs, and it
placed her on leave. Several months later, the employee returned to work
and was assigned to same machine she had worked on before going on
leave. She suffered another low-blood sugar episode and resigned.
19
The court noted that the mere fact that the
employee was a diabetic did not establish that
she was disabled. The employee failed to
forecast any evidence that her impairment
substantially limited her ability to work and
thus failed to show that she suffered from a
disability as defined by the ADA. Therefore,
the employee's claims failed.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Jones v.
Family Health
Ctrs., Inc., 323
F. Supp. 2d
681 (D.S.C.
2003)
Jurosko v.
Leviton Mfg.
Co., 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
6905
(W.D.N.C.
Apr. 10, 2002)
Lane v. WalMart Stores,
Inc., 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
13935 (D. Md.
Aug. 28, 2000)
After the former employee tendered her resignation, she stated that she was
still subjected to continued harassment. The former employee brought the
action against the former employer, and the record included a Report and
Recommendation of a United States Magistrate Judge. The former
employee filed timely objections to the Report. The former employee
argued that the former employer violated the ADA by failing to
accommodate her disabilities. The court found that based upon the medical
information that the former employer had provided regarding the former
employee's condition, it was reasonable to excuse her from all travel, rather
than from certain sites, that involved excessive travel. Accordingly, the
former employer had made reasonable accommodations for the former
employee's condition, in compliance with the ADA. The former employee
also alleged gender discrimination in violation of Title VII, and the
magistrate judge concluded that the claim had been abandoned as the
former employee did not address it in her opposition memorandum. The
former employee claimed that she did not intend to abandon the claim, but
conceded to having done so. Therefore, the claim had been waived.
The court found that based upon the medical
information that the former employer had
provided regarding the former employee's
condition, it was reasonable to excuse her from
all travel, rather than from certain sites, that
involved excessive travel. Accordingly, the
former employer had made reasonable
accommodations for the former employee's
condition, in compliance with the ADA. The
former employee also alleged gender
discrimination in violation of Title VII, and the
magistrate judge concluded that the claim had
been abandoned as the former employee did
not address it in her opposition memorandum.
The former employee claimed that she did not
intend to abandon the claim, but conceded to
having done so. Therefore, the claim had been
waived.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
The employee allegedly suffered from attention deficit/hyperactivity
disorder and depression, which the employer assumed for motion purposes
were mental impairments under the ADA. After she received a warning
from the employer, the employee filed a complaint with the EEOC. Less
than two weeks later, the employee left work early, admittedly without
permission. This incident led to her dismissal and a second EEOC
complaint for retaliatory discharge.
The court held that the employee did not show
that the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her was
pretextual. She did not deny that her
termination was for leaving early, and
conceded that her behavior warranted dismissal
under company rules.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Plaintiff had a learning disability. Plaintiff was hired as a sales associate at
defendant's store. Defendant needed to reduce its workforce. The following
criteria was used in selecting employees for termination: 1) length of
employment with defendant; 2) whether the employee had any "coachings"
in their file; and 3) whether the employee was available and willing to work
nights. Plaintiff was terminated, along with twenty other employees.
Plaintiff sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming
she was discriminated against because of her learning disability.
The court granted defendant's motion. The
court found inter alia (1) the ADA did not
apply since plaintiff failed to show any
significant impact her learning disability had on
her ability to perform her job during her
employment; and (2) plaintiff could not offer
sufficient evidence that her disability was a
motivating factor in her dismissal.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
20
Defendant brought suit under the ADA for wrongful termination. Although
asthma and allergies qualified as a disability, defendants were entitled to
summary judgment because plaintiff failed to establish that her condition
substantially limited her ability to work. Moreover, plaintiff failed to
establish that defendants considered her condition a disability. Defendants
were entitled to summary judgment on the breach of contract claim because
plaintiff was an at-will employee and she had signed an acknowledgement
card that disclaimed contractual liability.Given that Plaintiff exceeded the
employer's attendance benchmark,
The Court found that Mr. Morgan discharged
Plaintiff due to her excessive absenteeism
rather than some erroneous stereotype that her
asthma and allergies substantially limited her
ability to work.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
The employee suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome and arthritis-related
pain in her hands and from back pain. After a medical leave, the employee
underwent a functional capacity examination (FCE), which did not address
the condition of the employee's hands. The employee returned to work
without restrictions on her hands, but continued to experience pain. The
employer requested a second FCE focusing on the employee's hands and
back. The exam revealed that the employee was precluded from performing
most of the tasks included in her job description of building cabinets. The
employee's own doctor concurred with the results of the second FCE.
Based on the second FCE, the employer terminated the employee. T
he court found that requesting the second FCE
did not violate the ADA. It was reasonable for
the employer to question whether the employee
was capable of performing her job. The second
FCE, though not limited to the employee's
hands, did not go beyond evaluating the
employee's ability to perform job-related
functions. The employee was not a qualified
individual with a disability under the ADA, as
the request for the second FCE did not mean
that the employer regarded her as disabled.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Palov v. IKON
Office
Solutions, Inc.,
2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
158 (D. Md.
Jan. 4, 2001)
There was no dispute that plaintiff applied for a vacant position or that he
possessed the qualifications required for the job. The issue was whether
plaintiff's rejection gave rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.
IKON has pinpointed Palov's negative employment references as the sole
reason it revoked his employment offer. Palov did not provide any evidence
to refute this explanation nor was he able to establish that IKON regarded
him as impaired or disabled.
The court held that IKON's motion for
summary judgment on Palov's ADA claim will
be granted because he is unable to establish that
he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Parr v. District
19 Community
Servs. Bd.,
1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS
4220 (4th Cir.
Va. Mar. 16,
1999)
Plaintiff employee was discharged for failing to properly keep medical
charts on her patients. Plaintiff sued, claiming she was disabled as a result
of a learning disability. Plaintiff had volunteered information concerning
her learning disability when questioned about her work performance and
defendant merely sought verification of her self-claimed disability. There
was no evidence that her supervisors actually believed she was disabled, as
opposed to simply ineffective, because of her failing to properly maintain
her charts.
The court granted defendant employer's motion
for summary judgment, holding that plaintiff
failed to sufficiently show that she had a
disability within the meaning of the Americans
with Disabilities Act or that defendant regarded
her as disabled.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Mayers v.
Wash.
Adventist
Hosp., 131 F.
Supp. 2d 743
(D. Md. 2001)
Nelson v.
Thomasville
Furniture
Indus., 2002
U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5683
(M.D.N.C.
Jan. 17, 2002)
21
Petty v.
Freightliner
Corp., 122 F.
Supp. 2d 666
(W.D.N.C.
2000)
Plaintiff claimed there were job openings to which he could have been
reassigned as a "reasonable accommodation." Defendant correctly engaged
plaintiff in an "interactive process" to determine the appropriate
accommodation under the circumstances. As part of a union settlement
agreement, defendant had reassigned plaintiff to a position whose
requirements he could meet. . The motion for reconsideration was denied.
The district court held that defendant's
testimony or belief was not dispositive of
whether plaintiff was disabled for purposes of
the ADA, and, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, as the nonmoving
party, plaintiff had provided no testimony or
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could
conclude there were open positions, the
requirements of which plaintiff could fulfill,
and to which defendant had an obligation to
reassign him.
Richardson v.
First Citizens
Bank & Trust
Co., 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS
11654 (4th
Cir. N.C. June
3, 1998)
Employee's claims that her employer violated the ADEA and ADA were
dismissed by the district court because it held she had not timely filed her
charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The
employee could not establish a prima facie case under the ADA because
she had no direct evidence of discrimination on the basis of her medical
conditions and she did not meet the first element of McDonnell Douglas as
none of her diagnosed medical conditions substantially limited her ability
to perform her job during the time she began having performance problems.
the court did not reach the issue of timeliness
but held that employee had failed to establish a
prima facie case for her claims under the
ADEA or ADA.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Employee was an asymptomatic individual infected with human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV). He failed to comply with a memorandum
that outlined the requirements of his position. Supervisor cautioned him
about his unprofessional conduct. Appellant told another employee that he
was infected with HIV. Appellant was fired for failing to meet his sales
goals.
The court held that employee failed to establish
that he was performing his job to the
employer's satisfaction before he was
terminated.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Runnebaum v.
NationsBank
of Maryland,
N.A., 123 F.3d
156 (4th Cir.
Md. 1997)
22
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Saunders v.
Balt. County,
163 F. Supp.
2d 564 (D.
Md. 2001)
Scott v.
Montgomery
County Gov't,
164 F. Supp.
2d 502 (D.
Md. 2001)
Shin v. Univ.
of Md. Med.
Sys. Corp.,
2010 U.S.
App. LEXIS
5177 (4th Cir.
Md. Mar. 11,
2010)
The employee did not demonstrate either that he was actually disabled
under the ADA, or that his employer, regarded him as disabled, therefore
the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Even assuming that he had a physical impairment that remained partially
uncorrected and thus disabling, he failed to allege that his impairment
substantially limited his pursuit of a major life activity. Even if the
employee suffered from a physical impairment that was not fully corrected,
however, his claim still fell short because he did not allege any facts
indicating that he was substantially limited in a major life activity as a
result of his asthma. Because he failed to demonstrate that he was
substantially limited in a major life activity, he was not considered disabled
under the ADA. He also failed to allege any facts suggesting that his
employer perceived him as disabled or harbored misperceptions about his
asthma.
The court granted summary judgment for the
employer in this case based on the fact that the
employee failed to show that he was “regarded
as disabled” and never argued that he was
actually disabled.
Same
No Summary
Judgment
The employee was hired as a part-time messenger/clerk and his duties
entailed driving. The employee was diagnosed with sleep apnea and it was
determined that he was not able to drive in a safe manner. The employer
was not under an obligation to accommodate the employee by assigning
him to permanent light duty and a part-time schedule would not reduce the
risk that the employee would experience somnolence while driving since it
was unpredictable and unaffected by how much sleep he had the previous
night. The employer's policy of restricting priority reconsideration for
positions at or below current grade level was reasonable and the
accommodations provided by the employer were reasonable and met the
good faith standard of the claim of reasonable accommodation.
The court upheld summary judgment because
the employee could not perform the essential
functions of his job. While the employee
qualified as a disable person under the ADA he
could not demonstrate that a reasonable
accommodation would permit him to continue
as a messenger/clerk since one of the essential
functions of his job was driving.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Doctor appeals a decision of the district court granting summary judgment
to the hospital. The district court granted summary judgment to Appellees
on Dr. Shin's claims. His supervisor suggested Dr. Shin be placed on
medication and seek the aid of a rehabilitation specialist. After a thorough
evaluation Dr Shin was diagnosed with "significant impairment in visualspatial reasoning and visual memory." After additional accommodations
were made Dr. Shin was terminated.
The court upheld summary judgment because
Dr. Shin could not perform the essential
functions of his job with or without reasonable
accommodation.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
23
Tangires v.
Johns Hopkins
Hosp., 79 F.
Supp. 2d 587
(D. Md. 2000)
Plaintiff, who suffered from asthma, sued defendant employer under the
ADA contending that defendant violated the ADA by denying her requests
for reasonable accommodation and terminating her employment because of
her disability. Defendant moved for summary judgment as to all claims and
the court granted defendant's motion.
The court concluded that plaintiff's asthma was
treatable and that during her employment she
intentionally refused the recommended
medication. Since plaintiff had not availed
herself of proper medical treatment, the court
concluded that she was not a "qualified
individual with a disability" who was protected
by the provisions of the ADA.
Thompson v.
Catenary Coal
Co., 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
20304 (S.D.
W. Va. Feb.
26, 2003)
Although the employer had additional openings after the applicant was
placed on the waiting list, he was not hired. The employer claimed that
better qualified individuals were hired instead. Under the ADA, the
applicant failed to establish that he was disabled; he reported during his
examination that the illness had had no effect on his work history. Although
the applicant claimed that he was restricted from strenuous lifting, he did
not show that such a restriction was substantial in comparison to the
abilities of the general population. Although it appeared that under the
WVHRA the applicant's diabetes would render him presumptively
disabled, he still was required to show that he was limited in one or more
major life activities.
The court held that applicant did not show that
the employer regarded him as disabled, given
that other individuals who had diabetes were
hired.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Tozzi v.
Advanced
Medical
Management
Inc., 12 Am.
Disabilities
Cas. (BNA)
296 (D. Md.
May 24, 2001)
The employee could not maintain her claim that she was actually disabled
at the time her employer fired her, based on her inability to cook, clean or
socialize after working an eight hour day, or commute home from work,
because any limitations she did experience were, according to her own
affidavit, temporary. Her mere allegations regarding the psychological
effects of her cancer and surgeries were not sufficient to establish a mental
impairment under the ADA. The employee also argued that she had a
record of impairment, h
The court held the employee also could not
maintain that she was disabled based on an
alleged mental impairment. The court found
that mere hospitalization did not create a record
of impairment. The employee could not show
that the condition for which she was
hospitalized, breast cancer, substantially
limited her ability to engage in one or more
major life activities because her condition was
temporary.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Williams v.
Avnet, Inc.,
910 F. Supp.
1124
(E.D.N.C.
1995)
Plaintiff suffered severe injuries in an automobile accident unrelated to her
job. Defendant had a policy of granting employees disabled by nonoccupational injuries a medical leave of absence of up to six months,
providing such employees are able to return to work without restrictions.
After months of not working plaintiff was allowed by her doctor to return
to work with restrictions at which time she was fired.
Court held that if a handicapped employee
could not do his job, he could be fired, and the
employer was not required to assign him to
alternative employment
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
24
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Same Outcome: Sufficient Evidence
Case Name
Atkins v. USF
Dugan, Inc.,
106 F. Supp.
2d 799
(M.D.N.C.
1999)
Baucom v.
Potter, 225 F.
Supp. 2d 585
(D. Md. 2002)
Campbell v.
Prince
George's
County, Md.,
11 Am.
Disabilities
Cas. (BNA)
907 (D. Md.
Jan. 4, 2001)
Facts
Original Reasoning
Projected
Reasoning
Original
Finding
Defendant moved to dismiss age and discrimination claims brought by
plaintiff, its former employee.
The court held that plaintiff's medical
conditions, including coronary heart disease,
hypertension, and diabetes, did not qualify
plaintiff as "disabled" under the ADA because
the conditions were temporary, as evinced by
plaintiff's request to return to work. Because
defendant subjectively treated plaintiff as
having a permanent disability, however, the
ADA claim survived dismissal.
Same
No Summary
Judgment
Plaintiff is an individual who has suffered for most of his adult life from
alcoholism, depression, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. He claims the
United States Postal Service, terminated his employment on account of
these disabilities. T
The court held that it was clear that he was
terminated on account of his disability. The
employer's "arbitration award" argument did
not apply because the adverse employment
action was not taken pursuant to a binding
arbitration award. Finally, the employer could
not maintain that it was unaware of his need for
an accommodation.
Same
No Summary
Judgment
Plaintiff was hired by defendant to work in its drug analysis laboratory as a
forensic chemist. She was promoted, while also receiving an "outstanding"
job performance evaluation. Plaintiff observed alleged health, safety, and
other violations in the laboratory that plaintiff believed would endanger the
health and safety of herself and other employees. She began reporting her
concerns to the police department and other laboratory employees. Over
time, a number of matters occurred which plaintiff alleged were
discriminatory. Eventually, she was terminated as a result of an
investigation into testing standards used at the drug laboratory. In its
opinion, the court addressed only those issues which remained after
plaintiff's concessions.
The court found that plaintiff had established a
prima facie case of disability discrimination or
retaliation. In the instant case, Defendants
mistakenly believe that Plaintiff's actual,
nonlimiting impairment substantially limits
Plaintiff's major life activity of working.
Same
No Summary
Judgment
25
Cline v. WalMart Stores,
144 F.3d 294
(4th Cir. Va.
1998)
EEOC v.
BrowningFerris, Inc.,
2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS
18273 (4th
Cir. Md. July
28, 2000)
EEOC v.
BrowningFerris, Inc.,
262 F. Supp.
2d 577 (D.
Md. 2002)
The employee required surgery for a brain tumor and requested leave under
the FMLA. Upon his return to work, the employee was demoted. The
employee was subsequently terminated for allegedly clocking in prior to
starting time and "stealing" time from the company. The employee alleged
that his demotion was motivated by handicap discrimination and that his
termination was in retaliation for asserting his rights under the FMLA and
the ADA. The employee's supervisor commented to several individuals
that the employee would not be able to perform his duties as a night
maintenance supervisor after his surgery. The employee was permanently
discharged, but another employee terminated at the same time for the
alleged same reason was rehired; the employee's file contained no record of
his termination or a policy violation. The employee was impermissibly
demoted after his return from FMLA leave.
The court held that there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to have found that the
employee's termination was in retaliation for
asserting his rights under FMLA and the ADA,
but that the jury awards for compensatory and
punitive damages were excessive.
Same
No Summary
Judgment
Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
appealed the dismissal of an action it filed on behalf of employee, a former
garbage truck driver suffering from Crohn's Disease, against her former
employer under the ADA. The court of appeals vacated and remanded the
district court's judgment. The court found that the plaintiff's allegation that
she was terminated based upon her employer's perception that she was
disabled because she was unable to "work around waste," was sufficient to
meet notice pleading requirements. The court reasoned that "working
around waste" could conceivably cover a broad range of jobs, including
positions wholly separate from the waste removal industry and therefore
might constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of
working.
The court held that the dismissal of the
complaint was premature and remanded to the
district court for further proceedings.
Same
No Summary
Judgment
Employer conceded that it decided to fire an employee due to her Crohn's
Disease but denied that it did so in violation of the ADA. The Court found
the employee presented evidence sufficient to establish circumstances that
raised a reasonable inference of discrimination.
The court found that sufficient evidence was
presented from which a reasonable jury could
find that her Crohn's Disease rendered her
disabled, in that she was substantially limited in
the major life activities of moving her bowels
and eating.
Same
No Summary
Judgment
26
EEOC v.
Dollar Gen.
Corp., 252 F.
Supp. 2d 277
(M.D.N.C.
2003)
EEOC v.
Town &
Country
Toyota, Inc., 7
Fed. Appx.
226 (4th Cir.
N.C. 2001)
Farmer v.
Harper, 1998
U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23522
(E.D. Va. May
20, 1998)
Fletcher v.
Tidewater
Builders Ass'n,
216 F.R.D.
584 (E.D. Va.
2003)
The EEOC filed suit against the employer on behalf of its former employee,
a woman who was moderately mentally retarded. The employer had hired
the employee to perform some clerk duties in its retail store; the employee
was assisted on the job by a job coach who was not paid by the employer.
After the employee was fired, the EEOC filed suit alleging that it had
violated the ADA. On the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the
court held that there were genuine issues of material fact concerning
whether the employee's job coach was a temporary training accommodation
such that she might have been able to perform her job functions on her own
and if the job coach was temporary, whether the job coach had performed
the employee's job duties for her. Therefore, a genuine issue of material
fact existed regarding whether the employee was a qualified individual with
a disability under the ADA, and therefore the parties were not entitled to
summary judgment.
The court held that a genuine issue of material
fact existed regarding whether the employee
was a qualified individual with a disability
under the ADA, and therefore the parties were
not entitled to summary judgment.
Same
No Summary
Judgment
Employer's supervisor made several comments demonstrating that he
regarded employee as disabled. Employee was subsequently terminated.
The court found that there was sufficient
evidence in the record to conclude that the
employer regarded the employee as
substantially impaired in the major life activity
of walking.
Same
No Summary
Judgment
A jail deputy was terminated because of a knee injury.
The court held that the deputy was disabled
within the meaning of the ADA, and his
supervisors viewed his knee problem as a
disabling condition.
Same
No Summary
Judgment
The employer alleged that the employee failed to state a prima facie case of
disability discrimination. However, the employee stated sufficient facts to
sustain a claim under the ADA. The employee stated that the side effects of
the medication she took to control her disease substantially limited a major
life activity including, but not limited to, work.
The court held that the employee stated that the
employer terminated her in violation of the
ADA because of her disability. Whether the
employee was actually disabled did not need to
be determined at that point in the litigation.
Also, the employee properly alleged a claim of
retaliation and a claim under the FMLA against
the employer for which relief could have been
granted.
Same
No Summary
Judgment
27
Green v. CSX
Hotels, Inc.,
650 F. Supp.
2d 512 (S.D.
W. Va. 2009)
The employee presented evidence sufficient that he was prevented from
returning to work based on the employer's discrimination. Employer failed
to offer the employee a different position, especially after she repeatedly
sought one, and the employer required that the employee submit to at least
one improper functional capacity evaluation, at the very least. The
employer argued that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether it regarded the employee as disabled and that the magistrate judge
ignored the employer's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
terminating the employee.
The court found it was possibile that a
reasonable jury could find that the employer
regarded the employee as disabled
Same
No Summary
Judgment
Lamb v. John
Umstead
Hosp., 19 F.
Supp. 2d 498
(E.D.N.C.
1998)
A former employee of a state-run hospital filed an action under the ADA
alleging that she had been discriminated against after the hospital
discharged her from her position as a social worker. The court further held
that although the employee failed to plead her ADA claims with sufficient
specificity under the federal rules.
The court found that the employee had
presented a prima facie claim of discrimination
against the hospital. As such, the court denied
the hospital's motion to dismiss the employee's
claims, and granted the employee leave to
amend her complaint.
Same
No Summary
Judgment
Malone v.
Greenville
County, 2008
U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 86520
(D.S.C. Aug.
11, 2008)
The plaintiff applied for employment with the Sheriff of Greenville County.
The plaintiff did not participate in either a physical fitness test or
psychological evaluation; he claimed he could not take the polygraph test
because he is diabetic. This claim was not put at issue by the motions for
summary judgment, notwithstanding the fact that the parties have certainly
discussed the facts surrounding the decision not to polygraph the plaintiff in
substantial detail.
Court denied employer's motion for summary
judgment because the plaintiff has produced
evidence that the defendant perceived the
plaintiff's diabetic condition as one susceptible
to disabling seizures was sufficient to be heard
by a jury
Same
No Summary
Judgment
Raytheon Co.
v. Hernandez,
540 U.S. 44
(U.S. 2003)
Former employee sued petitioner employer, alleging that the employer
refused to rehire the employee, after his discharge based on a positive drug
test. employer contended that the employee was not rehired based on the
employer's policy not to rehire employees who left the company for
violating workplace conduct rules.
The Court held that if the employer did indeed
apply a neutral, generally applicable no-rehire
policy in rejecting the employee's application,
the employer's decision not to rehire the
employee could, in no way, be said to have
been motivated by respondent's disability.
Same
No Summary
Judgment
After the employee had returned to work following treatment for cancer,
the employer terminated her. Sixteen months later, she brought a suit
against the employer for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), The employer's motion for summary judgment on the ADA claim
was denied as the employee had put forth evidence that she had a disability,
that the employer viewed her as disabled, that she was qualified for the job
from which she was terminated.
The court an issue of material facts existed as
to whether she resigned or was terminated.
Same
No Summary
Judgment
Shea v.
Village Green
Care Ctr.,
1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
16470
(E.D.N.C.
Aug. 28, 1998)
28
The employee contended that the employer regarded him as a suffering a
major disability in the major life activity of walking. Employee offered
evidence that among other things, the employee testified that on 15
occasions the admitted decision maker told him that he walked "too slow"
to do his job. The employee's ADEA claim also survived summary
judgment, as the employer failed to carry its burden of proving that it
would have terminated the employee even absent the age-based motive.
The court denied summary judgment on the
employee's ADA claim because there was an
issue of material fact as to whether his
termination was motivated at least in part by
false perception
Same
No Summary
Judgment
Vanderpool v.
Inco Alloys
Int'l, Inc., 1999
U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12363
(S.D. W. Va.
June 3, 1999)
Plaintiff was employed by defendant employer as a laboratory assistant and
welder. Plaintiff suffered a mental health crisis, which eventually led to his
termination. Plaintiff initially missed three days of work due to his health
problems, staying in touch with his supervisors by phone, but not attending
work. Finally, plaintiff was advised by a psychiatrist to take two weeks off
work. Upon calling his supervisor and informing him of his need for twoweek sick leave, plaintiff was fired from his job. Plaintiff claimed that he
was fired due to his mental health crisis, in violation of state and federal
laws. Defendant claimed that plaintiff was already on probation for his
continued attendance problems and that the decision to terminate plaintiff
was unrelated to his health problems.
The court held that there were genuine issues of
factual dispute and that summary judgment in
favor of either party was not appropriate.
Summary judgment for defendant denied and
partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff
also denied.
Same
No Summary
Judgment
Wilson v.
Phoenix
Specialty Mfg.
Co., 513 F.3d
378 (4th Cir.
S.C. 2008)
Despite his Parkinson's symptoms, the employee was able to perform the
essential functions of his job as a shipping supervisor. Employer that
inaccurately believed that he was unable to adequately key information into
computer, write, count washers, or use information on computer screen,
violated ADA because employee was terminated based on fact that
employer regarded the employee as being disabled within meaning of the
ADA
The court found that the employer's proffered
reasons for terminating the employee were
pretextual
Same
No Summary
Judgment
The employee, a substance abuse counselor at an outpatient treatment
facility, was informed, after a medical leave of absence, that he would not
be returned to his former position. The employee refused to take a lesser
position and was deemed to have resigned.
The court denied summary judgment and found
that there was a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the employee was performing his
job functions at a level which met the
employers' expectations, a necessary element to
show a case of prima facie disability
discrimination under the ADA.
Same
No Summary
Judgment
Taylor v.
Ameristeel
Corp., 2004
U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28894
(W.D.N.C.
Mar. 2, 2004)
Young v.
Carolina
Healthcare
Sys., 1998
U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13553
(W.D.N.C.
Aug. 12, 1998)
29
Different Outcome: Impaired with regard to the job in question
Case Name
Bailey v.
CharlotteMecklenburg
Bd. of Educ.,
2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
21275
(W.D.N.C.
Nov. 1, 2000)
Bateman v.
American
Airlines, Inc.,
614 F. Supp.
2d 660 (E.D.
Va. 2009)
BILLINGS v.
TAYLOR
ROYALL
INC., 10 Am.
Disabilities
Cas. (BNA)
849 (D. Md.
Apr. 11, 2000)
Facts
Original Reasoning
Projected Reasoning
Original
Finding
The employee suffered a knee injury which resulted in limitations in
standing, sitting, lifting, and climbing, which the employee managed by
using a cane and taking pain medication. The employee alleged that her
impairment limited her ability to function as a teacher and counselor in the
employer's school, and that she was harassed because of her limitations.
The court held that the employee failed
to establish a prima facie case of
disability discrimination, since the
evidence did not indicate that the
employee was disabled within the
meaning of the ADA.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
The employee worked 18 years as a purser flight service manager until he
sustained an injury at work. The employer prohibited his return to work
until several work restrictions were lifted. While on an involuntary medical
leave of absence, the employee filed an EEOC charge alleging race and
disability discrimination and a failure to accommodate. He was terminated
four days after returning to work.
The Court held that the ADA wrongful
discharge claim failed because the
employee's temporary impairment did
not render him disabled under the
ADA, and the employer did not regard
him as disabled. The failure to
accommodate claim failed since the
employee was not disabled, and even if
he was regarded as disabled, this would
not entitle him to a reasonable
accommodation.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
The court granted defendants' motion
for summary judgment. Plaintiff was
not "disabled" under the ADA; he was
not significantly restricted in his ability
to work as an actor.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Plaintiff suffered a serious injury to his neck while working. As a result,
plaintiff was severely limited in activities requiring physical exertion.
Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging claims of disability
discrimination and retaliation under the ADA.
30
Bradley v.
Arlington
County, 189
Fed. Appx.
164 (4th Cir.
Va. 2006)
Dean v. Philip
Morris USA
Inc., 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
13035
(M.D.N.C.
July 29, 2003)
Foore v.
Richmond, 6
Fed. Appx.
148 (4th Cir.
Va. 2001)
Plaintiff contended that, while his mental impairments (obsessivecompulsive disorder and depression) did not themselves limit any major
life activity, the county regarded him as substantially limited in his ability
to work. However, plaintiff failed to proffer sufficient evidence that the
county viewed him as unable to perform a broad range of jobs or a class of
jobs. The evidence only established that it may have regarded him as
unable to undertake the duties of an FF/EMT. The county's ultimate
determination on plaintiff's ability to perform as an FF/EMT necessarily
depended upon the unique duties of that job, and the court could not
conjecture how county officials might have evaluated his fitness for another
public safety job.
The Court held that an employee was
not disabled under the ADA because
employer viewed him as unable to
perform a single, particular job
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Plaintiff contends that her reassignment to the Rework area is evidence that
Defendant regarded her as disabled. This assignment certainly indicates
that Defendant felt that the restrictions recommended by Plaintiff's surgeon
would prevent her from working in some areas of the plant, notably,
Cut/Filler/Storage and Blending.
The court held that it is an unsupported
leap, however, to assume from this that
Defendant regarded her as restricted in
her ability to perform a broad range of
jobs. Because Defendant attempted to,
and did in fact, place Plaintiff in a job
within the broad category of
manufacturing jobs, it is clear that
Defendant did not regard Plaintiff as
unable to perform that broad category
of jobs. Therefore, the reassignment of
Plaintiff to Rework is insufficient to
support her claim that she was regarded
as disabled under the ADA.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Plaintiff served as a police officer for defendant for more than 14 years.
Defendant placed him on disability retirement when it discovered that the
vision in his right eye fell below the requirements for a police officer.
Defendant reevaluated plaintiff's eligibility to be an officer 10 years later,
but it again determined that his impaired vision disqualified him. At trial,
defendant maintained that plaintiff was not disabled because his visual
impairment did not substantially limit any major life activity.
The appellate court held that plaintiff
did not have a disability within the
meaning of the ADA. The evidence
adduced at trial demonstrated that
plaintiff's visual impairment did not
substantially limit any major activity-either seeing or working. Rather, the
record demonstrated that plaintiff had
overcome his impairment, and the only
job he had been precluded from
undertaking was the position of police
officer for defendant.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
31
Fryer v.
Engelhard
Corp., 1997
U.S. App.
LEXIS 15172
(4th Cir. S.C.
1997)
Hoots v. Sara
Lee Corp.,
1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
9711
(M.D.N.C.
1999)
Hooven-Lewis
v. Caldera, 249
F.3d 259 (4th
Cir. Md. 2001)
Jennings v.
Greenville
Utils. Comm'n,
1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
6125
(E.D.N.C.
Mar. 2, 1998)
Fryer alleges that he has established a prima facie case because he has
submitted evidence that Engelhard discriminated against him on the basis
of a perceived disability, i.e. his sensitivity to platinum. It is undisputed that
Fryer suffers from platinosis and that the defendant has been aware of
Fryer's sensitivity since 1974. In support of his claim, Fryer submits
evidence that the Human Resources Manager allegedly stated that
"anybody who was diagnosed as platinosis would be barred from the
plant." He also points out that he was voluntarily tested as part of a
platinum sensitivity study, and several months after testing more sensitive
than any other employee, he was terminated.
The court ruled that even if the
employee had demonstrated a
perceived impairment within the
meaning of the ADA, the employee had
not demonstrated that such impairment
was perceived to substantially limit one
or more of his major life activities in
that the inability to perform a single
particular job did not constitute a
substantial limitation of the individual's
ability to work.
Plaintiff employee brought a discrimination action against defendant
employer, alleging wrongful discharge and violations of the ADA because
she could not walk or stand for continuous periods of time. Defendant
removed plaintiff from active payroll after recommending her for a job, but
refusing to offer her the job after her request to use a stool.
The court held that the mere fact that
Sara Lee was aware of Hoots's
impairment "'is insufficient to
demonstrate either that the employer
regarded the employee as disabled . . .
or that that perception caused the
adverse employment action.'"
Plaintiff alleged that the Army (1) discriminated against her because of her
hand tremor, (2) subjected her to placement in improper job positions and
terminated her in retaliation for her Equal Employment Opportunity
activity, and (3) terminated her for informing on superiors who failed to
report errors in laboratory data.
Plaintiff's claim of discrimination failed
because her hand tremor did not
substantially limit a major life activity
and the Army did not regard plaintiff as
one limited in any major life activities.
The employee alleged that he was allowed to return to his job after back
surgery but required assistance when lifting 20 pounds or more, and that,
notwithstanding his request for accommodations, the employer required
him to resign.
32
The Court held that an employee was
not disabled under the ADA because
his inability to perform a single,
particular job did not constitute a
substantial limitation.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Jones v. Balt.
County, 2001
U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7064
(D. Md. May
18, 2001)
Jones v.
Westinghouse
Elec. Corp.,
1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
5750 (D. Md.
Mar. 26, 1999)
Plaintiff worked for defendant Baltimore County as a storekeeper. Plaintiff
was under a medical restriction not to lift items of over 30 pounds because
he had medical problems caused by diabetes and heart disease. Plaintiff
suffered congestive heart failure on the job. After this incident plaintiff was
advised that defendant county had decided that he would have to take a
leave of absence, retire, or resign. Plaintiff declined the opportunity to
apply for another job and eventually signed his application for disability
retirement. T
The court found that plaintiff presented
insufficient evidence to prove that he
was disabled within the meaning of the
ADA. The record clearly establishes
that he is able to perform - and was
regarded by Baltimore County as being
able to perform - a broad range of
clerical jobs. He was invited to apply
for several such jobs by the County
and, although he chose not to apply for
them, he has found employment of a
similar nature in the private sector.
Jones's claim of disability focuses
solely upon a single job that the County
concluded he could not satisfactorily
perform.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
At the time of plaintiff's lay-off, he was 56 years old. Defendant filed a
motion for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's discharge claim
arose in the context of a reduction in force. It stated that plaintiff was
chosen for lay-off because his skill level was below that of his coworkers
and because it would have been too disruptive to place plaintiff in another
professional slot. Jones's only argument is that Burns (and Burns's
supervisor) was aware of Jones's heart condition and Burns used his
evaluation of Evans's performance during Jones's absence to differentiate
between the two employees. Jones asserts that Burns thus used Jones's
absence against him in violation of the ADA. A decision maker's mere
awareness of an alleged impairment, however, does not suffice to prove
that the employer considered the employee to be disabled and that the
perceived disability motivated the discharge.
The court granted defendant's summary
judgment on plaintiff's ADA claim and
held that plaintiff failed to establish he
was disabled and failed to prove that
defendant perceived him as having an
impairment that would substantially
limit his ability to perform a wide class
of jobs.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
33
Marshall v.
Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc.,
2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
8880 (W.D.
Va. 2001)
McKenzie v.
Target Stores,
1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
10687 (D.S.C.
1998)
Employee alleged that employer discriminated against him because of his
alleged dyslexia and that employer fabricated a criminal charge of petit
larceny against him. Employee did not provide qualified expert testimony
to establish that he had dyslexia. The court found that employee's evidence
did not prove that he was dyslexic, but rather that he simply told people that
he was dyslexic.
The court further found that employee
was not disabled. Employee's evidence
was not sufficient to support a verdict
for him because he could not establish
that he had a history or record of
impairment. Employee claimed that he
was disabled because he was regarded
as having a mental impairment that
substantially limited one or more of his
major life activities. However,
employee could not establish that
employer regarded him as incapable of
working generally, or that his alleged
dyslexia restricted his ability to work in
comparison to the average person in the
general population.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
The employee suffered from cerebral palsy. The employer hired her as a
cashier, and for 30 days she satisfactorily met all productivity standards.
However, the employee's productivity began to suffer. She accepted a
check made out to the wrong store and incorrectly validated another check
twice. She was moved to the position of switchboard operator, where she
continued to make errors. The employee was terminated. She filed an
action alleging violations of the ADA. The employer filed a motion for
summary judgment, which was referred to a magistrate who recommended
that it be granted. T
The court held that the employee was
not disabled under the ADA, because
despite her cerebral palsy she was not
hindered in her ability to hold a wide
range of jobs and was not substantially
limited in the major life activity of
working. She had demonstrated over
the first month of employment that she
was capable of performing the job of
cashier. The employer had no reason to
believe that her subsequent
performance deficiencies were caused
by her cerebral palsy and could not be
charged with awareness of any need for
an accommodation.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
34
Overstreet v.
Calvert
County Health
Dep't, 187 F.
Supp. 2d 567
(D. Md. 2002)
Parker v.
Montgomery
County Sch.,
1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
22210 (D. Md.
1999)
Parkinson v.
Anne Arundel
Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 214 F.
Supp. 2d 511
(D. Md. 2002)
The counselor, a recovering marijuana addict, worked as a contractual
addictions counselor for the county mental health department in its drug
abuse treatment program. The program eventually came under the control
of the state agency. The counselor admitted to having a couple of drinks
after work. Her supervisor decided to fire her because he believed that she
was in recovery and should not be drinking. The supervisor had never
witnessed the counselor as being intoxicated. The counselor was reinstated
after a grievance hearing. Upon returning to work, her case load dropped,
her co-workers ostracized her, and the relationships with her supervisors
seriously deteriorated. The counselor resigned and filed an Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission charge alleging constructive
discharge.
The court held that the counselor failed
to establish constructive discharge
because the attempted discharge by the
supervisor was fully cured by her
reinstatement and the fact that her coworkers ostracized her did not create an
intolerable working condition.
Furthermore, neither the supervisor's
remark nor the revocation of the fulltime job offer created intolerable
working conditions.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Plaintiff employee filed an employment discrimination action against
defendant employer. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, or in the
alternative, for summary judgment. The court denied defendant's motion to
dismiss, but granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The court held that defendant was
entitled to summary judgment. The
court held that plaintiff could not show
that he had a disability under the ADA
or the Rehabilitation Act because he
did not have an impairment that
substantially limited his major life
activities, he had no record of such
impairment, and defendant did not
regard plaintiff as having such an
impairment. The court held the fact that
MCPS has retained Parker in various
computer related positions since
removing him from DSD shows that it
does not regard him as being
substantially limited in his ability to
work generally
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
The court held that the technician failed
to show that the medical center
regarded him as disabled pursuant to
ADA
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
The inability to handle on-call assignments could have substantially limited
the major life activity of working, the technician failed to show that his oncall hours had been reduced or that any decrease was due to the medical
center's perception that the technician was substantially limited in a major
life activity.
35
Rishel v.
Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co.,
297 F. Supp.
2d 854
(M.D.N.C.
2003)
Sanders v.
FMAS Corp.,
180 F. Supp.
2d 698 (D.
Md. 2001)
Serrano v.
County of
Arlington, 986
F. Supp. 992
(E.D. Va.
1997)
Sutton v.
United Air
Lines, 527
U.S. 471 (U.S.
1999)
The court held that the employee's
evidence was insufficient that the
employer regarded him as disabled, that
is, being unable to perform a broad
class of jobs.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Even assuming that the employee was
disabled for purposes of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, she failed to
show that at the time of her discharge
she was performing at a level that met
the employer's legitimate expectations
given evidence that she failed to meet
an accuracy level required of all
employees and failed to attend a
required remedial training class to
improve her performance.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Applicant for county firefighter position had a history of back injuries, was
deemed unsuited for work as a firefighter but not unsuited for a wide range
of other jobs.
A prima facie case under the ADA was
not made, applicant was not regarded
as disabled
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Πs, twin sisters, each suffered from severe myopia, which was correctable
with appropriate lenses. They applied for positions as pilots with the airline.
They contended that the airline's refusal to hire them as pilots because of
their uncorrected visual acuity was based upon their disability and was
impermissible discrimination under the ADA.
The court held that they did not make
allegations sufficient to support a claim
that they were regarded by the airline
as having an impairment that
substantially limited a major life
activity, as the individuals alleged only
that the airline regarded them as unable
to satisfy the requirements of a
particular job.
This case was expressly
rejected by Congress in
the ADAAA as having
an undesireable
outcome.
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
The employee was terminated at age 56 from his job working in the
employer's (an insurer) special investigation unit. His duties had included
investigating claims that the employer believed to be suspicious. He
suffered injuries to his back and hand that made it more difficult for him to
perform his job duties. The employer learned that he had purchased stolen
property from another employee. The employee was informed that he was
not bondable and therefore he was being terminated.
The employee failed to show that she was a qualified individual with a
disability because she failed to produce sufficient evidence that her asthma,
which was controlled by medication, substantially impaired her major life
activity of working.
36
Taliaferro v.
Associates
Corp. of N.
Am., 112 F.
Supp. 2d 483
(D.S.C. 1999)
Taylor v. Fed.
Express Corp.,
429 F.3d 461
(4th Cir. Md.
2005)
Terry v. City
of Greensboro,
2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
869 (M.D.N.C.
2003)
Thomas v.
Northern
Telecom, Inc.,
157 F. Supp.
2d 627
(M.D.N.C.
2000)
Plaintiff was employed by defendant, who was engaged in the business of
consumer lending through a network of branch offices. Plaintiff's
immediate supervisor received an anonymous letters from employees,
complaining about plaintiff's management style and techniques. A
subsequent evaluation also reflected plaintiff's need to improve people
skills. Further problems arose, leading to a demotion and plaintiff's
eventual termination. Plaintiff sued and the court granted summary
judgment in defendants' favor.
The employee was a courier. He injured himself at work and began to
suffer from back pain. He received treatment, but he had difficulty bending,
standing for prolonged periods, and lifting more than 30 pounds. The
employe provided him with a temporary light-duty job, then placed him on
disability leave. When the employer concluded that the employee was not
entitled to further benefits, it gave him the option of returning to work as a
courier or taking a leave of absence. After the employee declined a parttime courier position and after his leave of absence expired, he was
terminated. Employer offered evidence that the employee could perform a
range of activities and that he qualified for more than 1,400 different types
of jobs and more than 130,000 actual jobs in his area.
The employee, a police officer, dislocated his shoulder and resigned his
position after recovering from his injury. The employer subsequently
extended an offer to the employee for a police officer position, conditioned
on a medical examination related to his prior injury. Taking the exam
delayed the employee's return to work by three months, and he was
returned to work as a telephone response technician. The employee alleged
that the employer regarded him as a disabled individual, pursuant to the
ADA, until the date on which he was allowed to return to work. . That the
employee was eventually placed in the position of telephone response
technician was insufficient on its own to show that he was substantially
limited in his ability to work.
Plaintiff worked intermittently on Defendant's assembly line from 1991
until January 1998, when she was terminated. In 1995, Plaintiff injured
both of her shoulders while at work. After corrective surgery, Plaintiff
returned to work in January 1997. Upon returning to work, Plaintiff's
physician instructed her to go to physical therapy any time she experienced
shoulder pain. Defendant's work site has a physical therapy center. The
physician also recommended that Plaintiff be assigned to an assembly line
position requiring minimal physical exertion. Despite the physician's
37
The court held that plaintiff failed to
establish both that he was a qualified
individual and that he suffered from a
disability at the time of his discharge;
thus, his claim of discrimination under
the ADA failed.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
The court held that though the
employee's impairment precluded him
from a substantial number of jobs, the
employee was not regarded as disabled
under the ADA because the employers
believed he could perform other jobs.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
The court held the employee was not
barred from working for the employer
generally. Because the telephone
response technician job was one within
the police department, the employee
was not precluded from a broad range
of jobs.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
The court held that it need not accept
unsupported legal conclusions and
found in favor of the employer
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
instructions, Plaintiff was allowed to attend physical therapy only after
receiving permission from her supervisor. Plaintiff alleges that several
white employees were permitted to attend physical therapy without having
to get supervisor permission and that they were allowed to stay at physical
therapy as long as necessary. In addition, Plaintiff was originally assigned
to a job on the assembly line requiring repetitive lifting and twisting
movements. She received a new assignment to a less physically demanding
job only after complaining to her supervisor.Plaintiff's complaint asserts
that she is "an individual whom Nortel has regarded as disabled.".
However, Plaintiff offers no factual support for this conclusion.
Tuten v.
Clariant Corp.,
1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS
4135 (4th Cir.
S.C. 1999)
Plaintiff employee filed suit against defendant employer alleging violation
of the ADA. Plaintiff had a medical condition which prevented him from
performing his job. Defendant moved plaintiff to a different position but
terminated plaintiff when it determined there was no permanent position
available.
38
The court noted the ADA would have
protected plaintiff if defendant took an
adverse employment action because it
perceived plaintiff to be restricted in his
ability to perform. However, because
there was no evidence plaintiff was
restricted to perform a class of jobs,
plaintiff failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish an action covered
by the ADA.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Washington v.
George G.
Sharp, Inc.,
124 F. Supp.
2d 948 (E.D.
Va. 2000)
Williams v.
Federal
Express Corp.,
1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
20327
(W.D.N.C.
1999)
Plaintiff employee brought an action against defendant employer alleging
violation of the ADA. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment,
claiming that plaintiff failed to establish that, while employed, she was
disabled within the meaning of that term under the ADA, that plaintiff's
ADA claim was time barred, and that defendant did not discriminate
against plaintiff in violation of the ADA because the accommodations
plaintiff requested either were unrelated to her disability or were
unreasonable.
The court granted summary judgment
for defendant, holding that plaintiff was
not disabled under the ADA due to her
back injury, that plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that she was unable to
work in a broad class of jobs, and that
plaintiff failed to establish that she
lacked notice of the defendant's
discriminatory intent to trigger the
continuing violation doctrine. Plaintiff
asserts that the annotation Ms. Strumfa
made on Plaintiff's interview form
concerning her thirty-pound lifting
restriction constitutes a record of
impairment. Plaintiff also argues that
because Sharp knew of the limitation
on the quantity of weight she was
capable of lifting and viewed the
limitation negatively, Sharp regarded
her as disabled. Both arguments fail to
establish that Ms. Washington is
disabled under the ADA. For the
reasons discussed above, Plaintiff's
lifting restriction related to her back
injury is not a disability because it does
not substantially limit her in the major
life activity of working.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
In this case, Plaintiff asserts that he was relieved of his duty as a Courier
based on his alleged disability, and was then demoted and subjected to
different and harsher ters of employment due to his alleged disability. In
support if his claim that FedEx regarded him as disabled, Plaintiff points to
the fact that he was removed from his position as Courier. However, this
does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether FedEx
regarded Plaintiff as being disabled.
Defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment, which the court granted. The
evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff
was removed from his position because
his lifting restrictions were below those
required for the Courier position. In no
way does this suggest that FedEx
regarded Plaintiff as being substantially
limited in his ability to perform a class
of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
39
Wyland v.
Boddie-Noell
Enters., 1998
U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8137
(W.D. Va.
1998)
The employee alleged that he was terminated due to the employer's
perception that he was disabled. The employer had concerns about driving,
productivity, and memory as a result of the employee's medications. The
employer informed the employee that he would not be promoted to the
group leader position while under his medication. The employee was also
required to undergo periodic drug screening. This evidence was sufficient
to show that the employer regarded the employee as impaired.
The court held that the employee failed
to establish that the perceived
impairment substantially limited the
major life activity of working because
he failed to show that the employer
considered him significantly restricted
in a broad class of jobs. The employer's
was concerned that the employee could
not safely perform the driving function
of the group leader position. There was
no evidence that the employer
questioned the employee's ability to
perform any other position. The court
held that driving was not a major life
activity under the ADA. Also the
employee's failure to appear for a drug
test was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his
termination, and there was no evidence
of pretext.
Under the new
ADAAA it is no longer
necessary to show that
the employee is
substantially limited in
his ability to work in a
class or broad range of
jobs
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Different Outcome: Regarded as having an impairment
Case Name
Dunford v.
Food Lion
Inc., 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
11597 (W.D.
Va. 2001)
Facts
Original Reasoning
The former employee claimed that the corporation violated the ADA by
failing to make reasonable accommodations for her and by constructively
discharging her. She also sought damages under Virginia law for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The former employee worked as
a cake decorator and stated that she was unable to clean due to her allergic
reaction to cleaning agents. The corporation argued that her alleged
impairments did not substantially limit her ability to breathe.
The court recommended that the former
employee did not suffer from an impairment
that substantially limited a major life activity.
The former employee's condition was
temporary and not chronic because her
condition only occurred when she was exposed
to certain chemicals. She was not disabled as
required by the ADA. The court further
recommended that the facts did not state a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
40
Projected
Reasoning
Under the new
ADAAA it is
no longer
necessary to
show that the
employee is
regarded as
substantially &
permanently
limited in a
major life
activity, only
regarded as
disabled
Original
Finding
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Ellinger v.
Frazier, 2000
U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2638
(D. Md. 2000)
Plaintiff employee sued defendant commissioner of police under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming he was denied promotion
based on defendant's perception that plaintiff suffered from a disability.
Plaintiff claimed a herniated disc in his back was a disability. Defendant
moved for summary judgment.
Fitch v.
Solipsys
Corp., 94 F.
Supp. 2d 670
(D. Md. 2000)
Defendants moved for summary judgment on claims by plaintiff for
disability discrimination in violation of the ADA. He contends that
although the three principals of Solipsys, Warren Citrin, David Buscher and
Robert Thurber, knew that he had a heart condition and a lifting restriction
when they hired him. He proffered evidence, which that employer's sons
each referred to him once as a "cripple."
Halperin v.
Abacus Tech.
Corp., 128
F.3d 191 (4th
Cir. Md. 1997)
Appellant sustained a back injury that restricted him from work for several
months. Upon appellant's return to work, his employer terminated him.
Appellant then filed suit alleging claims of employment discrimination
under the ADA and ADEA. The district court granted summary judgment
for appellee former employer. On review, appellant argued that summary
judgment was inappropriate because he established a prima facie case of
discrimination under both the ADA and the ADEA and because his former
employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating his
employment were pretextual.
41
The court held to prove disability, plaintiff
must show he was regarded as having an
impairment that substantially limited a major
life activity. The court held no reasonable jury
could find defendant thought plaintiff's back
condition was an impairment that substantially
limited a major life activity. Plaintiff had
worked on regular active full-time status for
several years after the back injury occurred.
Temporary placement on limited duty was
insufficient to support plaintiff's claims.
Therefore, the court held that it could not be
inferred that defendant perceived plaintiff as
disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The
court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment.
The court found that plaintiff failed to present a
prima facie case of disability discrimination.
Two incidents of name-calling were not
sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute
discriminatory harassment and it was not
reasonable for plaintiff to believe that the
remarks constituted Title VII violations. Even
had plaintiff established a prima facie case for
discrimination, plaintiff's evidence was
insufficient to rebut defendant's
nondiscriminatory, non-retaliatory reason for
terminating him - that he was difficult and had
an uncooperative attitude.
The court held that appellant was not a
qualified individual with a disability under the
ADA because he failed to show that his back
injury was significant.
Under the new
ADAAA it is
no longer
necessary to
show that the
employee is
substantially
limited in a
major life
activity
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Under the new
ADAAA this
evidence may
be deemed
sufficient that
he was regarded
as having a
disability.
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Hodgson v.
Shenandoah's
Pride Dairy,
2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
8007 (W.D.
Va. 2002)
When the employee had further problems associated with his asthma and
could not pass a physical to obtain an alternative driving job, the employer
informed the employee that no other work was available and that he was
being placed on medical leave. When the employee exhausted his leave, he
was terminated. The district found that while the asthma certainly had an
impact on the employee's life, as evidenced by his reduced lung capacity, it
did not impose a substantial limitation on his breathing.
The facts, taken in a light favorable to the
employee, demonstrated that he could perform
daily tasks despite the impact on his breathing.
Thus, the employee did not demonstrate that he
was significantly restricted in his breathing, as
was required under that criterion of the ADA.
Further, the evidence clearly showed that the
employer considered the employee's condition
to be temporary and that the employee's
termination was not attributed to a serious
health condition but to the absence of any
information on the employee's current health
when his medical leave expired. Consequently,
the employee fell far short of presenting a case
for being regarded as disabled by the employer.
McNeil v.
Scotland
County, 213 F.
Supp. 2d 559
(M.D.N.C.
2002)
Despite the employee's less-than-satisfactory work record, the employer
placed her in a position to gain experience to be a caseworker. The
employee continued to experience problems with her work, and she was not
promoted to a caseworker position even though she applied several times.
The court determined that the employer was
entitled to summary judgment on the claim
under the ADA. The ADA claim failed because
the employee's temporary condition was not a
disability and the employer was not required to
provide an indefinite leave of absence.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Peeples v.
Coastal Office
Prods., 203 F.
Supp. 2d 432
(D. Md. 2002)
The employee became depressed after he was promoted. The employee
stopped going to work, only telling his employer that he was ill and that he
would discuss returning to work after a follow-up appointment with his
physician. Eventually, the employee's physician told the employer that the
employee was being treated for depression and was unable to work.
The court determined that the employer was
entitled to summary judgment. The employee
was not "regarded as" disabled by the employer
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
42
Under the new
ADAAA it is
no longer
necessary to
show that the
employee is
regarded as
substantially
and
permanently
limited in a
major life
activity, only
regarded as
disabled
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Pollard v.
High's of Balt.,
Inc., 281 F.3d
462 (4th Cir.
Md. 2002)
The employee argued that the employer violated her ADA rights by failing
to accommodate her disability and by constructively discharging her. As
to the ADA claims, the employee argued that she was substantially limited
in the major activity of working. The instant court found, however, that the
employee's back injury was not substantially limiting. The employee's ninemonth absence from work was insufficient to demonstrate that she had a
permanent or long-term impairment that significantly restricted a major life
activity. Further, the fact that she took a job with a car dealership when she
left the employer reinforced the conclusion that she was not substantially
limited in the major life activity of working. Also, Congress did not intend
for ADA protections to extend to individuals with temporary impairments.
Court found employee's impairment, recovery
from back surgery, was temporary and not
covered by the ADA.
Qualls v. Giant
Food, Inc., 187
F. Supp. 2d
530 (D. Md.
2002)
The court concluded that the produce clerk was limited to complaints
concerning his back injury and the discrimination that resulted from that
injury. Moreover, the produce clerk failed to show that any other employee
who had been placed on light duty was similarly situated to him.
The ADA claim failed because the produce
clerk failed to establish that his back injury
substantially limited a major life activity or was
permanent.
43
Under the new
ADAAA it is
no longer
necessary to
show that the
employee is
regarded as
substantially
and
permanently
limited in a
major life
activity, only
regarded as
disabled
Under the new
ADAAA it is
no longer
necessary to
show that the
employee is
regarded as
substantially
and
permanently
limited in a
major life
activity, only
regarded as
disabled
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Rohan v.
Networks
Presentations
LLC, 375 F.3d
266 (4th Cir.
Md. 2004)
Rose v. Home
Depot U.S.A.,
Inc., 186 F.
Supp. 2d 595
(D. Md. 2002)
The employee, an actress and singer, suffered from posttraumatic stress
disorder and severe depression, and had increasing episodes while with a
touring theatre company. She was terminated as she was unable to perform
certain aspects of the job.
The court held that she was not "disabled"
under the ADA because she did not suffer an
impairment that substantially limited her in one
or more major life activities, and no evidence
suggested that the employer regarded her as
such.
Under the new
ADAAA it is
no longer
necessary to
show that the
employee is
substantially
limited in a
major life
activity
The employee claimed that his vasomotor rhinitis substantially limited his
major life activities of breathing, sleeping, and working. The employer
disagreed. It was clear from the record that the employee did not follow the
proper protocol in determining whether he had vasomotor rhinitis. Thus, as
a matter of law, he did not receive a proper treatment plan for his
impairment. The employee's failure to take the proper measures to gain a
proper diagnosis necessary to a proper treatment plan was the legal
equivalent of a refusal to avail himself of proper treatment.
The court held that the employee did not
present proper proof he had a disability as
defined by the ADA, and the employer was
entitled to summary judgment in its favor. But,
even assuming the employee was rightly
diagnosed with vasomotor rhinitis as the sole
cause of his ailments, and taking into account
mitigating measures, he could not establish that
he was severely restricted in the major life
activities of breathing, sleeping, or working.
Under the new
ADAAA it is
no longer
necessary to
show that the
employee is
substantially
limited in a
major life
activity
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Outlier Cases: Do not fit into classification system
Case Name
Facts
Original Reasoning
Projected
Reasoning
Original
Finding
Burkett v.
United States
Postal Serv.,
175 F.R.D.
220 (N.D. W.
Va. 1997)
The applicant worked as a data conversion operator for a private contractor
that provided mail bar coding services for the employer. When the
employer elected to bring its bar coding operations in-house, the applicant
applied for a position. A physician who performed a risk assessment of the
applicant and other applicants concluded that they were medically
unqualified for employment. In her action, the applicant proposed a class
consisting of her and all applicants for employment with the employer at its
center who were denied employment on medical grounds. The court found
that class disposition of the applicant's action was inappropriate because the
court could not address the issue of whether the employer violated the
Rehabilitation Act without first determining that each member of the class
was a disabled individual entitled to the Act's protection.
Because members of the proposed class had
different medical conditions and contended that
they were perceived as disabled, the resolution
of the action required a judicial investigation
into each member's individual claims. Thus,
there could be no finding of commonality
among class members.
Same
No Summary
Judgment
44
Haulbrook v.
Michelin N.
Am., Inc., 252
F.3d 696 (4th
Cir. S.C. 2001)
Nance v.
Potter, 225 F.
Supp. 2d 638
(M.D.N.C.
2002)
Plaintiff worked as a chemical engineer for defendants in and outside of the
United States. While overseas, he began to experience breathing difficulties
and was sent home for treatment while on medical leave. Plaintiff was
successfully treated and required to return to work. Plaintiff hired counsel
to represent him in negotiations with defendants for accommodations
necessitated by his medical condition. Defendants terminated plaintiff after
numerous failed attempts to contact plaintiff and to have him appear for an
evaluation of his condition and continuing employment. Plaintiff sued
under the ADA.
Plaintiff began working for the United States Postal Service ("USPS") as a
letter carrier in Shreveport, Louisiana, in 1982. During his employment in
Shreveport, Plaintiff was involved in an accident while driving his postal
vehicle. The USPS determined that Plaintiff was at fault in the accident and
reassigned Plaintiff to a lower-paying position in 1985. On July 3, 1996,
Plaintiff underwent back surgery to repair his ruptured disk. After his back
surgery, Plaintiff did not return to work until October 1996. Upon his
return, Plaintiff was placed on limited duty and was responsible for
handling loose and damaged mail. In 1997, Plaintiff's doctor recommended
that Plaintiff be on light duty through the end of the year and refrain from
repetitive lifting, lifting over twenty pounds, and intermittent standing.
Plaintiff's doctor also noted that it would be preferable for Plaintiff to work
on a non-concrete floor surface and to engage solely in office-type work for
that time period. After a review of Plaintiff's file and the evaluation from
Plaintiff's supervisor, USPS officials from the Norfolk facility advised
Plaintiff that his transfer request was denied because Plaintiff was unable
physically to assume the full duties of the mail handler position.The
employer claimed that Americans with Disabilities Act, claim was barred.
The court initially held that the employee failed to show any extreme and
outrageous conduct by the employer or that he suffered any severe
emotional distress.
45
Court found that plaintiff had a duty to respond
and cooperate with his employers' good faith
efforts to evaluate his potentially disabling
condition.
The court held that the employee's ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims were barred by res
judicata because, in a prior action involving the
same parties and claims, the employee was
determined to be not disabled.
Same
Summary
Judgment for
Employer
Settle v. S.W.
Rodgers Co.,
998 F. Supp.
657 (E.D. Va.
1998)
Plaintiff, a former employee of defendant employer, suffered a torn rotator
cuff while on the job. He was placed on limited duty by his treating
physician, but was required to perform all his normal job duties by the
employer. The employer subsequently fired the employee. The employee
filed suit in a three-count complaint alleging retaliatory discharge and
discrimination under the ADA and the FMLA. The employer filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the employee was not disabled under
the ADA, that employee's claims under the FMLA were untimely, that the
employee's claims of retaliatory discharge were precluded by a prior
finding by the Virginia Workers Compensation Commission, and that the
employee was barred from claiming punitive damages and mental distress
damages under the FMLA.
46
The court granted the motion in part, and
denied it in part. The court found that the
employee had not made a sufficient showing of
disability under the ADA, but granted the
employee leave to amend the complaint.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my committee: Willow Jacobson, Robert Joyce. Judith Wegner, and Mark
Bradbury. Without their support, this capstone would not have been possible.
47