The European Union and North Africa’s
In/Security
Sezgi Karacan
*
Abstract: This study asks ‘what are the implications of the European Union’s securitization of migration on North Africa’. As migration becomes linked with security in the
EU, practices of security and migration policies result in different insecurities for others. While the issue of externalization of the EU’s security policies are analysed
through the Paris School approach to security, its implications for North Africa and
various referents other than states are read through the lens provided by Aberystwyth
School approach to security. It is argued that constructing North Africa as a threat in
terms of migration is only one side of the issue. What is more to the point is that the
EU’s security practices of migration result in the securitization of migration in North
Africa with implications such as insecurity for individuals, societies, states and the region as different referent objects.
Keywords: Securitization of migration, externalization of security, the EU, North Africa
The EU’s security policies and practices in terms of migration reveal how different borders function whether inside, at the territorial boundaries, and outside
the EU. Starting in the 1980s, migration has been linked to security. This resulted in merging of the internal and external security in Europe, hence the externalization of (in)security practices. This has inevitable implications for the
EU’s neighbouring countries. It is argued that security practices of migration in
the EU result in not only constructing North Africa as a threat in terms of migration, but also the securitization of migration in North Africa with implications as experiences of insecurity for individuals, societies, states and the region
as different referent objects.
This study adopts two different theoretical frameworks. To analyse securitization of migration and the interpenetration of internal and external security in
Europe, a Paris School approach is adopted to understand the process. Following this, an Aberystwyth School approach is employed to inquire into the implications of this process of externalization of the EU security practices and securitization of migration for different referent objects. Through adopting these different approaches, it is aimed to problematize why certain issues are framed as
threats as opposed to others while questioning different experiences of insecurity of different referents.
Assistant, Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East, 85.Cad. No: 8 Yücetepe, 06100
Çankaya/Ankara/Turkey.
*
Turkish Public Administration Annual, Vol. 39-40, 2013-2014, p. 67-79.
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Security as a Negative Concept
Criticizing the objectivist approaches to security, the construction of the linkage
between migration and security has been a debated topic in the critical security
studies literature. Arguing that threats are not given and out there to be discovered, critical approaches to security focuses on the ways in which issues were
constructed as threats to security and how migration was securitized through
speech acts or daily practices of security and insecurity. In other words they approach security “as a discourse through which identities and threats are constituted rather than as an objective, material condition” (Buzan and Hansen, 2009:
243). Whereas the Copenhagen School scholars argue for the desecuritization of
the issues that are once securitized, thus carrying them to the realm of political
issues or normal issues at best (Waever, 1995; Buzan et al., 1998), the Paris
School scholars approach security as a technique of government. For the latter
approach it is not just the exceptional moment of a speech act, but the daily
practices of security professionals and the practices rooted in society are as well
processes of (in)securitization resulting in security and insecurity. The two – security and insecurity – are mutually constitutive (Bigo, 2000; 2002; 2003; 2008;
Huysmans, 2000). This means that one’s security is at the same time insecurity
of that very same subject and others (Bigo, 2008: 123).
Security is then a “principle of formation that does things” (by Dillon 1996
cited in Aradau and Munster, 2010: 74) and the Paris School asks what security
does in addition to what security means (Bigo, 2008: 116). For the Paris School
approach there is a competition among groups of security professionals over
representation of issues as threats and the tools to deal with them. Thus security
agenda is set up depending on who gets to make those decisions of who is to be
secured, who and what is to be sacrificed, which issues are threats, and the
means for dealing with those threats (Bigo, 2008: 123).
As it comes from a political sociology tradition, the starting point of the Paris School is not international security but rather ‘internal’ security and its merging with ‘external’ security’ (Bigo, 2008: 126). The initial focus of its analysis
is:
The freedom of movement of persons inside the European Union (EU) and
the destabilization of the notions of national sovereignty and frontiers as locus
of controls, as well as the relation between liberty and security (Bigo, 2008:
127).
In this context, what was described as the process of (in) securitization
works through governing the populations through policing, following and tracing them (Fassin, 2011). (In)securitization practices are not limited to state officials, bureaucrats or security professionals but embedded in routines of society
and logics of freedom (Bigo, 2008: 128). As a result, the embeddedness of these
The EU and North Africa’s (In)security
69
practices in everyday life makes them left unquestioned and they become naturalized. In the EU, one issue that is linked with security is migration. Although
migration was not always linked directly to the security of citizens of host countries, starting in the 1980s migration became one of the issues that is highly securitized.
Securitization of Migration in Europe
Until 1970s, there was a demand for migration as guestworker recruitment.
However the migration policies became one of control and transformed from
soliciting to stemming in Europe starting with 1970s. This was due to the oil
crisis in 1970s, the high numbers of asylum seekers in 1980s, increasing concerns over illegal immigration, human smuggling and organized crime being at
the top of the Western states’ migration control agenda in the 1990s, and terrorist attacks in the 2000s (Guiraudon and Joppke, 2005: 2). In the 1970s, immigrants started to be seen as threats to economy, and later starting in the 1980s,
becoming scapegoats for many issues, they started to be seen as threats to economic and public order and represented as societal threats and challenge to national identity as a result of the process of “spillover of the economic project of
the internal market into an internal security project” (Huysmans, 2000: 752).
Moreover, with the demise of the Soviet Union, hence with the decline of the
communist threat, migration was seen as part of a new form of threat, a threat
which was less visible and diffused than the threats of Cold War, but it was
deemed more dangerous (Bigo, 2004: 123).
States are still considered to be the main actors of controlling their borders
and the movement of people across them. However, since the 1980s and 1990s,
there is an increasing role given to individual sponsors, local social services, security agencies and transgovernmental police groups in controlling migration
(Guiraudon, 2005: 31). This process of delegation to third-parties was coupled
with the Europeanization of migration control. Institutionalization of transgovernmental cooperation took place through the creation of the third pillar on Justice and Home Affairs with the Treaty on European Union in 1992 (Guiraudon,
2005: 34). In 1999 with the Amsterdam Treaty, most issues of this area were
carried to the first pillar and the Schengen Convention was incorporated into the
EU system which meant more supranationalization rather than intergovernmental decision making. In 1999 the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force. Illegal
immigration and crime were linked to personal security not least due to the EU
policy initiatives (Koslowski, 2004: 106). This further implicated constructing a
linkage between transfer of sovereignty to the EU as it was seen as the most appropriate way to tackle these issues that were linked with security such as migration (Koslowski, 2005: 100). Integration of policies governing migration to
the EU meant further tighter border controls and restriction of migration
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(Koslowski, 2004). The notion of security was prioritized over freedom and liberty in the post-Maastricht and post-Amsterdam periods due to the Europeanization of migration issues. Since they became part of the Schengen Agreement, Italy, Greece and Spain adopted a more security-oriented view of migration
(Bigo, 2004: 123). Those practices of security related to migration signify another issue related to borders. As migration has become securitized, the practices to control migration in terms of borders become scattered across inside the
EU and outside where the ‘threats’ were conceived to be coming from. This
means that there is no more a clear demarcation between internal and external
security, and the agents of security such as police and military.
Internal and External Security of the EU
Bigo (2000; 2003) argues that the line between internal and external security is
blurred due to the transnationalisation of security since “external security agencies are looking inside the borders in search of an enemy from the outside” analysing “transversal threat [supposedly coming from immigrants]” and “internal
security agencies are looking to find their internal enemies beyond the borders
and speak of networks of crime” supposing a link between immigrants and security issues such as terrorism, organised crime and trafficking (2000: 171).
This implies “the blurring of the line between police and military activities”
(Bigo, 2004: 137) and ‘policiarization of the military’ (Bigo, 2003: 111). This
interpenetration signifies three important points. Firstly, an obscured line between who needs to be controlled emerges as the immigrant becomes a figure of
‘enemy within’ or ‘outsider inside’ (Bigo, 2003: 112). Secondly, there is always
a tension between cosmopolitanism and institutional racism or closed nationalism. Since the national borders are no longer barriers, the limits of citizenship
and identity are blurred (Bigo, 2003: 112-113). Finally, limits of security or
what is security is also blurred. Surveillance technology, privatization of security, and ‘individualization of securitiness’ contribute to this uncertainty of
‘where security is beginning and where security is finishing’ (Bigo, 2003: 113).
Since the internal security is externalized and the external security is internalized, sovereign borders are no longer barriers to agencies of security. Acknowledging that it is not possible to control movement of people by reference to
identity, Bigo argues “[F]reedom is limited by a new security device: the monitoring of minorities and of diasporas. Identity fences replace territorial fences”
(2003: 115). In the context of the externalization of EU’s security practices, Del
Sarto (2009: 18) wrote:
While EU member states continue to belong to different concentric border
regimes, EU policies towards the ‘southern Mediterranean’ not only aim at expanding the Union’s governance to its neighbourhood. They also envisage the
export of the EU’s variable border geometry to its periphery, which also entails
The EU and North Africa’s (In)security
71
a disassociation of the classical functions of borders from each other across the
Euro-Mediterranean area.
These border practices show that the borders in the traditional sense – as territorial limits of the sovereign – is not adequate to understand today’s borders.
Although those traditional borders are still highly relevant, there are other bordering practices that take place far away from the territorial walls. Critical border studies suggest alternative conceptualizations of borders in terms of what
they are and where they are. One example is the shift from a geopolitical conceptualization to a concept of biopolitical border (Peoples and VaughanWilliams, 2010: 146-7). Technologies such as surveillance and the border
mechanisms such as FRONTEX are some examples that challenge the traditional geographical thinking on borders. In the context of the EU, the externalization of security practices necessitates such an approach to borders:
Indeed, as a result of EU policies-whether in the framework of the Barcelona
Process or the ENP-the European Union increasingly emerges as an entity with
fuzzy borders, whereby ‘the neighbours’ in its southern (and eastern) periphery
act as a buffer area, or EU borderlands. (Del Sarto, 2009: 18)
European migration policies and security practices are examples of different
border practices that take place inside or outside the EU, and not just the borders of the member states. Those policies highlight different agents that do bordering and practice security. Moreover, EU’s security practices in terms of migration and externalization of security have further implications in other parts of
the world.
European Security Practices in the Mediterranean
In terms of migration control the policies can be examined under two categories: direct (visibility at the border and law enforcement) and remote control
(Guiraudon and Joppke, 2004). Border control and law enforcement are related
with raising fences, mobilizing security forces at the border and restricting asylum seeking conditions. Guiraudon and Joppke (2004: 12) argue that through
these policies, the new immigration countries in southern Europe showed their
commitments to be ‘good citizens’ of Europe and commitments to the European
security agenda. The second category, remote control, means externalizing controls beyond national borders. It includes controlling migration before the immigrants reach the destination country, i.e. control in the countries of origin and
transit, and delegating control to the third parties (Guiraudon and Joppke, 2004:
13). The aim is to encourage those third countries obtain effective institutions of
migration control and make them accept the undocumented immigrants back
(‘dampening’ to transit countries), thus creating a buffer zone and discouraging
migration (Guiraudon and Joppke, 2004: 13-14). In the EU, besides the com-
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mon policy among members, this policy is also adopted especially with regard
to the southern border, to the countries of North Africa. Guiding principles for
signing bilateral agreements on a country-to-country basis between EU members and the sending or transit countries were adopted in 1995 (EUROPA
2012). One example is the readmission agreement signed between Spain and
Morocco in 1992.
In terms of EU’s southern border, the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) is
considered to be the first comprehensive policy adopted towards the southern
Mediterranean starting in 1972 (Bilgin et al., 2011). However, the relations continued on bilateral basis during the 1980s and 1990s. In this period the funds
given to Mediterranean countries were tripled by the EC. The EC followed a
policy advocating political dialogue in the region by supporting Arab-Maghreb
Union, the ‘5+5’ dialogue between member states and Maghreb countries, and
assembling a Mediterranean Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCM)
first of which took place in 1992. The aim of the CSCM was cooperation on
several issues one of which was security. This process is considered to be one of
the factors paving way for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Bilgin et al.,
2011: 11) which was established in 1995. The objective of the EMP or Barcelona Process emphasizing common area of peace, stability and prosperity can be
summarized as follows:
This declaration is the founding act of a comprehensive partnership between
the European Union (EU) and twelve countries in the southern Mediterranean.
This partnership aims to turn the Mediterranean into a common area of peace,
stability and prosperity through the reinforcement of political dialogue, security,
and economic, financial, social and cultural cooperation. (EUROPA 2011)
Security (the Political and Security Partnership) was prioritized among the
two other aspects of the partnership, namely the Economic Partnership, and the
Social and Cultural Partnership. The security concerns included immigration
coming from the South and instability in the South. The multilateral approach
left its place to more bilateral cooperation (Bilgin et al., 2011: 12). In addition
to terrorist attacks in 2000s and the ‘war on terror’, the process of enlargement,
which meant bringing closer the EU to an unstable region – the North Africa –
and constituting the largest development and economic gap in the world
(Fuentes, 2008: 274), also influenced security practices of EU vis-à-vis Mediterranean (Bilgin et al., 2011: 13). Immigration was linked with national security
more than ever as it was associated with terrorism. According to Collyer (2006:
256) whereas in Europe and North America migration came to be associated
with terrorism following the attacks in the USA and bombings in Madrid and
London, in other parts of the world where there were also terrorist attacks –
such as Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Indonesia –
migration was not associated as an explanation for terrorism and the attacks did
The EU and North Africa’s (In)security
73
not result in increased border controls. This difference is related with associating migration with terrorism in Europe and North America whereas in other
parts only Islamic radical migrants were associated with terrorism rather than
migration as a whole. Collyer (2006: 257) also points to the externalization of
EU’s migration policies and techniques to the North Africa mainly for the purposes of securing EU internally. In 2003, A Secure Europe in a Better World:
European Security Strategy was issued. The issues such as immigration, terrorism and environment were on the agenda and cross-border cooperation to deal
with those issues was emphasized (Bilgin et al., 2011: 13). In 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy was adopted in the context of increasing sense of insecurity, the ‘war on terror’, following the goals of the EU outlined in the ESS
document and a frustration with the weaknesses of the EMP. This externalization of security practices of the EU was an attempt of securing itself through
transforming the neighbour countries without any membership during or after
the process (Bilgin et al., 2011: 14).
The transformation from the EMP to the ENP meant a less inclusive identity
discourse (Bilgin et al., 2011: 16). Whereas through the ENP a common security perspective was emphasized and the security-building model of the EU was
attempted to be exported to the southern Mediterranean states, through the ENP
bilateralism was preferred, ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinction became prevalent and the
southern Mediterranean countries were deemed responsible for the ‘threats’
(Bilgin et al., 2011: 16). The externalization of European security practices continued with “training of the military and police forces of southern Mediterranean countries, the training of immigration officers, and the transfer of surveillance and control technology” (Bilgin et al., 2011: 16). In other words, through
capacity building and exporting highly technologized and militarized means, the
EU externalized its immigration control policies (Bilgin et al., 2011: 17). Therefore, what the EU is focused on has been border controls and restriction neglecting human rights and the social and political context of immigration. This, it is
argued, reduces immigration control to risk analysis (Bilgin et al., 2011: 15-17)
and the ‘political’ decision of what is a threat and who is to be secured is depoliticized by this way (Mueller 2004). One institution built for these measures
of externalization of the EU security practices is FRONTEX established in
2004. Its main objective is to have an integrated border security for Europe. The
operations of FRONTEX are good examples of the externalization of the EU’s
security practices since they take place in far away territories than the member
states’. In this way, North Africa becomes ‘buffer zone around the European
Union’ or ‘EU borderlands’ (Del Sarto, 2009). Another example of externalization of EU security practices is the ‘safe third country’ concept. It refers to extraterritorial processing of asylum seekers. Thus, it implies a restriction on the
rights to seek asylum in the destination country since a person who is in move is
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sent to a ‘safe third country’ (Guiraudon, 2000; Kneebone, 2008). Readmission
Agreements also mean externalization of security practices of the EU countries,
based on bilateral level between countries rather than the EU and non-EU states.
For example, Spain and Italy has one with Morocco since 2004. Other examples
are Spain and Italy with Algeria and Italy with Tunisia (Baldwin-Edwards,
2006: 318-9).
As argued above, these security practices have further implications for other
referents than the EU, member states or citizens. In order to analyze the implications of Europe’s securitization of migration on different security referents in
the North Africa, it is necessary to reflect on a broader and deeper understanding of security.
Security as a Derivative Concept
Looking at the Paris School literature, it is possible to argue that the studies are
mostly on the ‘Western’ context. This is not surprising thinking that the starting
point of analysis of the scholars under the umbrella of Paris School was internal
security and its merging with external security in Europe, thus it helps analyzing
the process of externalization. However looking at the implications of the externalization of EU’s security practices towards a non-Western context it is essential to engage in questions concerning the means and ends of security, or the
referent objects of security, and to question why some issues that are experienced as insecurities by certain referents has become part of security agenda
while other issues has been left outside the security agenda. For example, Williams (2007) questions why issues such as violence, health, and environmental
crisis have been on the lower ends of the security agenda compared to migration
for the EU.
For the Aberystwyth School (Booth, 1991; 1999; Bilgin, 1999; 2002; 2008),
since security is a derivative concept, the answer given to “what is security” is
one of political and philosophical standpoint. The state-centric and statist approaches to security are criticized. Scholars approaching security from this point
of view argue for a decentralization of the state both in theory and practice.
State is contested both as the agent of security and the referent object of security. Therefore arguing that state should be means of security and not the ends,
they emphasize that state is not the only means and other agencies should also
be studied, and given voice in theory/practice. In this vein, first a deepening of
the understanding of security is necessary. This means taking others as security
referents and not just the state. The next step is broadening which implies realizing the insecurities that are brought to those referent objects other than the state.
Security for Aberystwyth School is a derivative concept and the answers to
‘what is security’, ‘whose security’ and ‘what are the tools to achieve security’
are political ones. Rather than being a negative concept, security is a positive
The EU and North Africa’s (In)security
75
concept for Aberystwyth School and it means emancipation of individuals. In
terms of migration Aberystwyth School looks at different referent objects such
as the immigrants themselves and the insecurities they face as a result of migration. It is argued that through reconceptualising security alternative practices
can be improved that will decrease insecurities.
In terms of EU’s securitization of migration and its security practices in the
Mediterranean, one can find various insecurities for different referents in North
Africa. For example, in their report “European Security Practices vis-à-vis the
Mediterranean: Implications in Value Terms”, Bilgin, Lecha and Bilgiç (2011)
discuss several implications of European security practices for different referents in such as individuals, society, state and the region.
The adoption of EU’s migration policies and techniques signifies a shift in
the attitudes towards migration and migrants in the North Africa. In that sense
South’s security agenda came close to that of Europe. Although it can be argued
that, in North Africa, immigrants were seen as a solution to the economic problems or gains in terms of economy, with expansion of the EU’s policies, the attitudes shifted to more racist ones. Immigrants became to be seen as threat to
society and state as well (Collyer 2006). Externalization of EU security practices for the purposes of internal/external security of Europe had diversified implications for different security referents.
In terms of individuals as the referent objects of security, the insecurities due
to the act of migration faced by the immigrants are focused. (In)security practices of the EU and its externalization to the North Africa mean higher restriction and increased and militarized border controls with highly developed
technologies. However these practices do not decrease the overall number of
immigrants and results in the increasing in the number of illegal migrants who
seek for alternative routes which are dangerous and they generally contact with
human smugglers. These result in increased number of deaths, being exposed to
violence especially by human smugglers and violation of fundamental rights.
Moreover, the conditions for seeking asylum are restricted by the EU which increases the risk that the asylum seekers being sent to places where they can be
persecuted (Bilgin et al., 2011: 21-27; Brachet, 2011; Kneebone, 2008).
One of the implications for societies as security referents are considered to
be securitization of migration as a societal threat which result in the rise of xenophobia and racism, an increasing us and them division between the peoples of
Africa as the North African people assume the role of being the guardian of
EU’s southern border and policemen for the EU and construct sub-Saharan peoples as threats to security (Bilgin et al., 2011: 28). However this securitization
of sub-Saharan people reflects the very Eurocentric approach (BaldwinEdwards, 2006) of migration being internalized by the peoples of North Africa.
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In terms of states as security referents, this process result in adopting high
technologies for migration control and militarization of borders and other migration control practices. In this way, North African states assumed the role of
being the gatekeeper of EU’s southern border. The securitization of migration
meant linking migration with Islamist activism and terrorism. The militarized
and technologized controls alienated both civil society and other peoples of different countries especially that of sub-Saharan from the regimes. In this sense,
security brought insecurity with it (Bilgin et al., 2011: 27-30).
Looking at North Africa as a security referent, the underdevelopment of the
region is what is at stake. The Eurocentric approach to migration is internalized
in the North Africa and migration is securitized, and the EU controls the migratory flows within the continent from South to North without really knowing
whether those immigrants were going to Europe in the first place. In fact, it is
argued that in North African countries, mobility of people has been seen as beneficial in socio-economic terms. Some reasons for this were seasonal employment, labour shortages and remittances. Actually the long history of migratory
movements and people’s mobility have been a mode of livelihood for the peoples of Africa. Thus not all migration from south to north in the continent of Africa are for the purposes of transiting to Europe, in other words not all migration
is intercontinental or trans-Mediterranean but trans-Saharan although represented the other way (Keenan, 2006; Brachet, 2011). Moreover, in spite of preventing migration within the continent, the EU welcomes skilled labour. This hinders the prospects for development in terms of economic factors in the region.
Thus, the EU attempts to secure itself at the expanse of the development of
North Africa (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006).
EU’s security practices and its externalization to the North Africa display a
contradiction between what the EU deems itself promoting and the consequences of its practices. The EU does not engage in the implementation process of the
practices that was externalized to the North African states. Acknowledging the
impossibility of creating a ‘fortress’ around itself (Bigo, 2004), the EU uses the
neighbouring states as immigrant ‘dampening’ sites and buffer zones between
itself and the countries of origin (Del Sarto, 2009) without taking responsibility
of such externalization, on the contrary delegating responsibility to the third
countries (Bilgin et al., 2011).
Conclusion
The security practices of the EU are externalized to the North African states as
the line between internal and external security of Europe is blurred. The result is
securitization of North Africa, constructing it as a threat in terms of high number of immigrants which were linked with terrorism, organized crime, and threat
to social cohesion, economic cohesion and national identity. In an attempt to
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77
show its commitment for the European security agenda and due to economic
concerns such as economic cooperation with Europe, North African states internalized the Eurocentric approach of migration and securitized migration towards sub-Saharan people and this resulted in misinterpretation of all trans-subSaharan migration as trans-Mediterranean migration. This securitization of migration in North Africa had further implications for individuals, societies, states
and the region which are overlooked by the EU as a security actor.
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