BARANGAY GOVERNMENT DISASTER PREPAREDNESS:
THE CASE OF TYPHOON SENDONG
AFFECTED ILIGAN COMMUNITIES
Dr. Liwayway S. Viloria
Princess Angelica D. Mamon
Chris G. Escuadra
Chrisjen L. Anaya
Jhona D. Landong
Department of Sociology –College of Arts and Social Sciences
MSU-IIT, Iligan City
Abstract
Utilizing the case study design, this study describes the disaster preparedness of four
typhoon Sendong affected barangays of Iligan City, namely: Hinaplanon, San Roque, Upper
Hinaplanon and Tibanga. The study focuses on the barangay disaster preparedness before the
typhoon, actions taken during the typhoon, and the strategies and activities undertaken in the
aftermath. Group interviews and in-depth interviews were conducted with the 20 barangay
informants and the 6 key informants, respectively. Observation method was used to generate
information on the general profiles of the four affected barangays. The data were analyzed
utilizing content analysis.
The study reveals that most of the barangays are not prepared for the disaster due to lack
of budget, which apparently resulted to negligence and over-confidence; only one barangay was
able to implement its Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (BDRRMP). The
lack of proper information-based systems and the ignorance of the residents have contributed to
their unpreparedness. Delayed response and relief are due to impassable roads, among other
things. In the aftermath, barangay government officials have helped in the distribution of the
relief goods and have coordinated with the city and national governments, the NGOs, and other
private sector groups regarding their barangay long term rehabilitation.
Presently, the four affected barangays are under rehabilitation; and strengthening their
BDRRM Plan and Committee is their priority. Having better braced themselves for future
disaster in the aftermath of Sendong, these barangays succeeded in achieving their goal of “zerocasualties” when typhoon Pablo struck the Mindanao region in December 2012.
Keywords: Barangay Risk Reduction and Management Plan, disaster preparedness, response
and relief, rehabilitation
Introduction
Asia has been the worst catastrophic events affected region. The National Disaster
Coordinating Council (NDCC) has recorded 523 events from 1987 to 2000 with an average
of 37 disasters annually (Office of Civil Defense, 2001). In particular the Philippines, being
located within the Pacific ring of fire, has been classified among the top ten hazardous
countries in the world on account of the numerous natural geo-meteological hazards to which
it is constantly exposed. In November 2, 1995, typhoon Rosing ravaged the Municipality of
Bula, Camarines Sur with devastating flood waters reaching 7-20 feet and left 11 barangays
and the 1 poblacion submerged under water (Luna, 1994). The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo
claimed 2,729 lives after releasing 800 million cubic meters of pyroclastic materials. It has
inundated approximately 500 villages that triggered floods that lasted 30 days to 6 months in
the provinces of Zambales and Tarlac. There has been proof of the vulnerability of cities,
especially the smaller settlements, to extreme weather events. Last November 5, 1991, an
entire city vanished in less than 1 hour after devastating waters along with mud streams
ravaged Ormoc City and claimed approximately 4000 lives and destroying thousands of
houses and left a whole lot of people homeless (Luna, 1994). Iligan City, however had not
been as vulnerable as other provinces or cities, until the onslaught of Typhoon Sendong on
December 17, 2011.
Typhoon Sendong was the 19th tropical cyclone to hit the Philippines in 2011, which
ravaging a number of cities and provinces, Mindanao in particular, with devastating rains and
flash floods unleashed to the unprepared communities. Iligan City was among those hardest
hit, leaving 28 out of 44 barangays in severely damaged, 17,709 families affected of which
2,437 families stayed in evacuation centers, at the time of the study 13,211 houses partially
damaged and about 3,945 houses totally washed out, 652 were confirmed dead and 808 were
reported missing. These forms of devastation on lives and properties apparently indicate to
how unprepared the local government and the residents were. From the various sectors of the
society, questions have raised regarding the LGU preparedness to deal with the immediate
and long-term effects of the devastating natural hazards such as Typhoon Sendong.
Complaints have been heard about the snail pace response of the LGUs to address needs and
problems involving evacuation, relief, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors. There
complains are certainly disturbing in the light of the fact that Iligan City received a 2 nd place
“Kalasag” award in 2010. Given this recognition in disaster preparedness, it leads one to
wonder other ended, the City & Barangay LGUs were proposed for the upcoming typhoon
Sendong or other disasters.
These issues and concerns certainly call for systematic investigation. Available
studies that have given priority attention to certain of such issues include the study of
Colance, Landong and Manda (2012) which has documented the effects of Typhoon Sendong
on people’s livelihood, land resources, water sources, infrastructures and community
facilities in the upland community of Barangay Rogongon, Iligan City. This study, however,
was undertaken in an upland community which was not among the worst hit by Sendong.
And barangay government disaster preparedness was not among its areas of concern.
2|Page
Objectives of the Study
This research intends to investigate the preparedness of Iligan City local government
units, particularly the affected barangays of San Roque, Hinaplanon, Upper Hinaplanon and
Tibanga, to handle the Sendong tragedy as well as future typhoons that might occur. This
research documents the strategies, processes and actions undertaken by these local
government units during, before and after the Sendong disaster. Strategies and activities
undertaken in the aftermath of Sendong are examined to determine barangay government
preparedness for possible future occurrences of natural calamities, particularly typhoon and
flood. More specifically, the study aims to describe the following dimensions of local
governance relative to Sendong Disaster:
1. disaster preparedness of the barangay governments of the four affected barangays
before the Sendong disaster;
2. actions taken by the barangay governments of the four affected barangays during the
disaster; and
3. strategies and activities undertaken by the barangay governments of four affected
barangays in the aftermath of Sendong in preparation for possible future typhoons and
floods.
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
The principles and concepts that have helped shape the framework of this study are
mainly drawn from the structural functionalist theory, the UN Humanitarian Resolution
461182 of 1991 through the Sphere Project, the Hyogo Framework for Action, the Philippine
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 (R.A. 10121), the National Disaster
Risk Reduction and Management Framework of the Philippines, and the National Disaster
Risk Reduction and Management Plan, 2011 to 2028.
The Structural Functionalism Theory by Talcott Parsons assumes that societies are
made up of differentiated and interrelated structures. It postulates that to ensure survival,
social systems must satisfy the functional requisites or needs of adaptation, goal attainment,
integration and latency. Through the interconnecting structures or social institutions, these
functional needs are satisfied; and that social institutions reorganize and bring the social
systems can be brought back to the ideal state of harmony or equilibrium, all through the
process of reorganization of social institutions (Trevino, 2001). Supplementing the Structural
Functionalist Theory is the Social Contract Theory which assumes that a world in a state of
nature makes people’s lives poor, nasty, brutish and short because of the four features of the
human condition: equality of need, scarcity, the essential equality of human power and
limited altruism. In a state of nature there are no social goods such as farming, industry,
education, housing and technology since social cooperation is needed for these things or
contributing to exist. So, in order to avoid this kind of life there should be guarantees that
people must not harm each other and people must be able to rely on one another to keep their
agreements. And so people have established governments by means of social contract where
3|Page
they give up some of their personal freedom and give the government the authority to enforce
laws and agreements for everyone to follow. Through this they are relatively safe from each
other and can benefit from the other social goods that will result. Based on this theory, it is
part of the government’s responsibilities to guarantee the safety of its people (Rachel, 2008).
In support of the responsibility of the government to ensure people’s safety, the UN
humanitarian Resolution 46/182 of 1991 has declared that, “Each State has the responsibility
first and foremost to take care of the victims of natural disasters and other emergencies
occurring on its territory. Hence, the affected State has the primary role in the initiation,
organization, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its
territory.”
Basically, protection of its people is a mandated role that the state is bound to
perform. In relation to providing humanitarian aid during disaster events, the states are
responsible for “calling” a crisis and inviting international aid; they provide assistance and
protection themselves; they are responsible for monitoring and coordinating external
assistance; and they set the regulatory and legal frameworks governing assistance.
In this light, two international frameworks or protocols provide useful theoretical
foundations for the analysis of LGUs disaster management courses of actions: they are the
UN Humanitarian Charter and the Minimum Standards. The former has been carried out
through the Sphere Project (2004) while the latter has been through the Hyogo Project.
The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards, is a project established by the
United Nations (UN) which aims to improve the quality of disaster response in terms of its
effectiveness and accountability of the humanitarian system to the people who are affected by
disasters through the Sphere Project. Humanitarian actions are based on the following set of
protection principles;
1. All humanitarian agencies should ensure that their actions will not bring harm to
affected people.
2. Activities should particularly benefit those who are most affected and vulnerable.
3. They should be able to contribute in helping affected people from violence and other
human right abuses.
4. They help affected people recover from abuses.(The Sphere Project, 2011; p. 7)
This Charter is concerned with the fundamental requirements on sustaining people's
lives and dignity that are affected by the calamity, the minimum standards cover activities
especially those that meet urgent survival needs of disaster-affected population which
respond to the people’s need for water, sanitation, nutrition, food, shelter, and health care
(Sphere Handbook 2004). It is designed for use during situations including natural disasters,
conflict, slow and rapid onset events, rural and urban environments, and complex political
emergencies in all countries (The Sphere Project, 2011, p. 9).
Moreover, the Humanitarian Charter upholds its fundamental principles: The right to
live, The distinctions between combatants and non-combatans, The principle of nonrefoulement, UN believes that all possible steps should be taken to prevent or alleviate human
suffering arising out of calamity or conflict. This belief is reflected in international
humanitarian law and the principle of humanity. To satisfy the basic right to life of every
individual affected by a disaster, minimum standards were set by the UN for the people to
have access to at least the minimum requirements like water supply, sanitation, food and
4|Page
nutrition, shelter and health care. Government and private sectors are encouraged by the UN
to meet their obligations under international humanitarian rights law, international
humanitarian law, and refugee law.
Furthermore, the Charter aims to improve the quality of disaster response in terms of
its effectiveness and accountability of the humanitarian system, provided to the people who
are affected by disasters. Although conforming to the Sphere does not mean meeting all the
standard indicators since it will depend on different factors, such as access to the affected
areas, lack of cooperation with the authorities or severe insecurities and that some of which
are out of their control. In cases where the standards were not met, humanitarian agencies
should:
1. Describe their reports, the gap between the relevant Sphere indicators and the ones
reached in practice.
2. Explain the reason for these and what needs to be changed.
3. Assess the negative implications for the affected population.
4. Take appropriate mitigating actions to minimize harm caused by these implications.
Hence, this approach is concerned with the fundamental requirements on sustaining
people's lives and dignity that are affected by the calamity. These Minimum Standards are the
requirements regarding people's need for water, sanitation, nutrition, food, shelter, and health
care.
The Humanitarian Charter provides the strategies and their linkages account in trying
disaster impacts. These are; 1.) Ensuring that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local
priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation, a country that was able to
develop a policy with legislative and institutional framework for disaster risk reduction have
greater capacity of managing risks and achieve a widespread consensus for engaging and
complying with disaster risk reduction among all sectors of the society; 2.)Identify, assess
and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning. Having knowledge of the incoming
hazard and the vulnerability of the community is the starting point for reducing disaster and
promoting disaster resilience; 3.) The use of knowledge innovation and education to build a
culture of safety and resilience at all levels. Collection, compilation and dissemination of
relevant knowledge and information on hazards, vulnerabilities and capabilities are needed to
keep the people informed and motivated into becoming a culture that gives importance to
disaster prevention and resilience. With this disasters can be substantially reduced; 4.)
Reduce the underlying risk factors. Factors like social, economic, physical, environment and
land use as well as hazards such as geological events, weather, water climate variability and
change are also considered and given attention by different sectors of development planning
and programs since these factors can also be changed by a disaster; and 5.) Strengthen
disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels. Being well prepared and ready to
act, also equipped with proper knowledge and capabilities, the affected community can
substantially reduce the impacts and losses at the time of the disaster
(http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa).
One of the most important international documents on disaster reduction and capacity
building of affected communities is The United Nations Hyogo (UN) Framework for Action
(HFA). This was formulated in response to the increasing losses and damages to lives,
5|Page
properties, livelihood and environment brought about by the natural hazards like typhoons,
floods, droughts, tsunami, cyclones, earthquakes, wildfires, and other forms of calamities.
The HFA constitutes the UN members’ commitment to take steps to reduce disaster risks
through adoption of a set of guidelines to reduce vulnerabilities to natural hazards. Adopted
in January 2005 in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan, this framework aims to build resilience to disasters
of nations and communities through substantively reducing by 2015 losses in lives and in the
social, economic, and environmental assets of the communities and nations (International
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (www.unisdr.org/hfa).
In the context of sustainable development, the HFA focuses on four priority areas for
action, including principles and techniques to guide vulnerable communities toward
achieving disaster resilience, namely: 1. Make Disaster Risk Reduction a Priority. Ensure that
disaster risk reduction is a national and local priority with a strong institutional basis for
implementation. 2. Know the Risk and Take Action. Identify, assess, and monitor disaster
risk and enhance early warning. On the basis of this knowledge, effective early warning
system should be developed, one that is appropriately adapted to the peculiar situation of the
people at risk. 3. Build Understanding and Awareness. Use knowledge, innovation, and
education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels. Knowledge and
understanding of appropriate vulnerability measures combined with commitment to act is the
key to disaster reduction. 4. Reduce Risk. Cut down underlying risk factors. Communities
and countries can be resilient to disasters by investing in double, well-known ways of
reducing vulnerability and risk. 5. Be prepared and Ready to Act. Strengthen disaster
preparedness for effective response at all levels. Preparedness through conducting risk
assessments, among others, prior to investing in development programs and projects at all
levels of society can make people more resilient to natural hazards.
Consistent with the policy statement and provisions of the Philippine Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management Act of 2010, the Philippine National Risk Reduction and
Management (DRRM) Framework was crafted and approved on June 16, 2011. Its vision for
our country is to achieve sustainable development with “safer, adaptive and disaster-resilient
Filipino Communities …” (The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan,
2011 to 2028). Toward this end, it entails a paradigm shift, from reactive to proactive DRRM
characterized by men and women with increased awareness and understanding of DRRM
towards increasing their disaster/climate change resilience and decreasing their
vulnerabilities. Crucial to achieving this paradigm shift is the empowerment of leaders and
communities and the development of proper mindset and behavior towards reducing and
managing risks and minimizing the impact of disasters. In essence, this means being able to
build back better or build on from experiences, learnings, good practices, research that help
address underlying factors behind people’s vulnerability and thus increases their capacity to
adjust or manage the impacts of hazards and disasters. Success in these efforts indicate that
communities have become disaster-resilient (Ibid.).
Four mutually reinforcing priority areas are designed to achieve the vision of
NDRRMF, namely: a) Disaster Prevention and Mitigation; b) Disaster Preparedness; c)
Disaster Response; and d) Rehabilitation and Recovery. Disaster prevention and mitigation
means avoiding hazards and mitigating their potential effects through minimizing
vulnerabilities and exposure and strengthening capacities of communities. Disaster
preparedness involves establishing and reinforcing capacities of communities to anticipate,
cope and bounce back from the adverse effects of emergency events and disasters. Disaster
response during, immediately after a disaster requires providing life preservation and meeting
the basic subsistence needs of affected population. By disaster rehabilitation and recovery, it
6|Page
focuses on the restoration and improvement of facilities, livelihood and living conditions and
organizational capabilities of affected communities, and reduced disaster risks consistent with
the “building back better” principle. (Ibid.)
Drawing insights from the Hyogo framework and the National Risk Reduction
Management Framework of the Philippines particularly on disaster risk reduction
components, this study focuses on disaster preparedness of Sendong affected barangays. It
documents the LGU-Iligan’s initiatives along the dimensions of local political commitment,
knowledge development, application of risk reduction measures, the vulnerability capability
analysis and how it leads to recovery. In order to document the LGUs political commitment,
this study identifies the officials within the local level and documents the institutional
framework of the government to determine the hierarchy of control, along with policy
developments, legislation and codes on organizational development and community actions.
This is reckoned during the period before the occurrence of Sendong. The study also
documents the education and training activities that were conducted before and after typhoon
Sendong. For the Application of Risk Reduction Measures, the environmental management,
social and economic practices, physical and technical measures, land use and urban planning,
protection of critical facilities and networking and partnerships before typhoon Sendong are
documented and compare these with that after the occurrence of the disaster.
The barangay LGUs’ disaster preparedness is viewed as a measure of their
functionality and effectiveness in strengthening the adaptive capacity and resilience of their
communities to disaster occurrences as contemplated under the structural-functionalist theory
and the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act. It is likewise assumed as a
fulfillment of their mandated role in protecting their communities’ safety and security from
whatever hazards.
The succeeding figure diagrammatically shows the strategic concerns of the Hyogo
Framework for the disaster risk reduction which the United Nations has adopted in the
context of sustainable development.
Pre-Sendong Disaster Preparedness
of the affected Barangay
Governments
Actions taken by the four affected
barangay governments during
Sendong disaster
Strategies and Activities of four
affected barangay governments after
Typhoon Sendong
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the conceptual framework of the study
7|Page
Scope and Limitation of the Study
The study tackles the disaster preparedness of the four affected barangays when
typhoon Sendong hit Iligan City. It also includes the actions carried out during the occurrence
of the disaster, and the strategies and activities undertaken by the barangay governments with
the help of the different government agencies, non-government organizations and private
sectors in the aftermath. The study is limited to the twenty (20) informants from the four
affected barangays and six (6) key informants from the different city government offices that
were chosen through purposive sampling method.
The researchers used the qualitative case study method as the research design. The
data were obtained through individual interviews using interview guide and secondary
sources from libraries and barangay and city offices files. Observation method was also
utilized to generate information on the locale of the study. Content analysis technique was
used in analyzing data.
Given its qualitative design, the findings of this study are valid only to the four
affected barangays. These cannot be applied, therefore, to other Sendong affected barangays
nor to other LGUs affected by other typhoons locally and abroad.
Significance of the Study
Being a qualitative one, this study describes the disaster preparedness, actions during
and after, and the strategies and activities of the barangay governments of four affected
barangay of Iligan City. In this way, this study is rendered capable of contributing to the
efficiency of qualitative method studies on disaster preparedness and other disaster-related
issues. In a similar fashion, this study is valuable as it has potentials for reinforcing Parson’s
Structural Functionalist theory.
To the local government units involved in this study, the findings of this study can
provide empirical inputs for reviewing and reformulating, whenever necessary, disaster
management related policies or decisions, projects and activities towards making their
barangays resilient to disasters.
Methodology
Qualitative case study method is employed in this study as its research design. With
the aid of an interview guide in-depth interviews are done to extract information about the
disaster preparedness of the four affected barangays of Typhoon Sendong in Iligan City.
Involved in this study were a total of 26 informant who were purposively chosen using the
homogenous sampling method, at 5 informants for each of the four barangays and 6
personnel from the City Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office (CDRRMO), City
Planning and Development Office (CPDO), Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG)-Iligan, City Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Philippine Coast
Guard-Iligan (PCG) and Bureau of Fire and Protection-Iligan (BFP).
8|Page
Research Setting
The study covers four affected barangays of Iligan City, Philippines – one of the two
cities (the other being Cagayan de Oro City) that were greatly affected by typhoon Sendong.
The four affected barangays are Upper Hinaplanon, Hinaplanon, San Roque, and Tibanga.
Iligan City is the 2nd largest city in Northern Mindanao following Malaybalay City. It
is a lone legislative district separated from the 1stCongressional District of Lanao del Norte. It
is known as the city of Majestic Waterfalls with 23 discovered waterfalls in and around the
city. The city is composed of 44 barangays spanning a total land area of 813.37 km2., with a
population of 318,040 as of the 2007 population census.
Iligan City's topography is characterized by a narrow coastal alluvial plain fronting
Iligan Bay at the foot slopes of undulating hills and mountains. Several river valleys are
found in the city with relatively steep slopes. At the mouth of Agus River, very steep slopes
separate the coast line and the highland areas. Over 12% of the city's land area has elevations
of less than 100 meters above mean sea level (amsl), 21% are within 100 to 300 meters amsl,
while the remaining areas of more than 65% are with elevations of 300 meters amsl and
above (http://www.iligan.us/iliganexecutive_summaryinsert.htm).
Before typhoon Sendong hit Iligan City, the city was classified to have a third type of
climate wherein the seasons are not very definite. Rain is more or less evenly distributed
throughout the year. Because of its tropical location the city does not experience cold
weather. Neither does it experience strong weather disturbances due to its geographical
location (being outside the typhoon belt) and also because of the mountains that are
surrounding the city (http://www.iligan.gov.ph/index.php? Itemid=521&id=458&option).
Iligan is an industrialized city with an income of PhP 1,929,603,147, as of 2008 which
is 87% higher than its income in the previous year. The increase in income was brought about
by the new investments in the city such the construction of a bigger Gaisano Citi Super Mall
and the opening of the National Power Corporation’s Nature Park which boasts tourist
attractions such as a zip line, ostriches, pythons, a bat park and butterfly garden, a lagoon,
waterfalls, a viewing deck and wall climbing. As of 2008, Iligan City had a total of 24 newlyregistered business organizations with a paid-up capital of Php 20,127,000. Paid-up capital
increased by 257% compared to that of previous year which registered at Php 7,803,500. In
addition, there were a total of 6,053 business establishments in Iligan City. Eighty-two
percent of these establishments are micro enterprises. The biggest three industry groups in
Iligan are Wholesale &Retail Trade (62%), Real Estate Business (13%) and Hotels and
Restaurants (6%) (http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ru10/profile/iligan/1_overview.html)
9|Page
Figure
2.
Regional
Map
showing
Iligan
City
http://www.iligan.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=
February 24, 2012.)
(retrieved
from
449&Itemid=516 on
Figure 3.Map showing location of barangays that were flooded due to typhoon Sendong (Retrieved from
https://www.sheltercluster.org/Asia/Philippines/TropicalStormSendong2011/Documents/Iligan_Map%20of%2
0flooded%20areas%20(Barangays).jpg on February 15, 2013)
Note: The four affected barangays covered in the study are those encircled, namely: barangay San Roque, barangay
Hinaplanon, barangay Upper Hinaplanon and barangay Tibanga.
10 | P a g e
Review of Related Literature
Whether human-induced or natural hazards-induced, disasters can happen anytime,
anywhere especially to vulnerable people and environments. In order to minimize, if not
totally avoid losses and injuries to lives and damages to properties caused by hazards and
disasters across countries and communities, the United Nations formulated the Hyogo
Framework for Action (HFA) to which the Philippines was one of the 168 signatory
countries.
In line with the HFA, the formulation and implementation of laws and policies in
building up disaster preparedness through actions have been given priority by the Philippine
national governments with the enactment of the RA 10121 or the “Philippine Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management (DRRM) Act of 2010” that guides and strengthens the disaster
risk reduction and management capacity of the country, LGU’s, communities, institutions and
various other groups.
As mandated by the RA 10121, local governments units and communities have
integrated disaster risk reduction and management into their plans and activities.
One case is Quezon Province, due to the damages left by typhoon Winnie in 2004 the
province had developed their disaster preparedness plan implementing early warning system,
radio communication technology and the use of indigenous knowledge system (IKS), such as
in identifying early signs to the weather patterns; behaviour of animals and migration of
birds. Forming, training and developing of contingency plans strengthen the risk management
of the communities in the province. This helps them for future preparation.
In Marikina City, the LGU has improved its drainage system; canals, creeks and other
waterways were being unclogged. Factories situated near the riverbanks were also removed
unless these factories could to build their own waste and wastewater management facilities.
Resettlement projects as well are located to higher and safer grounds. The city has installed
water level gauge and sirens to warn people. Numerous offices had coordinated for the city’s
disaster preparedness program towards center’s proceedings, communication and information
monitoring of water level, available evacuation center, medical assistance, food and relief
goods distribution, evacuation transport, logistic requirements, rescue operations, security
and public order, accurate information dissemination, conducts maintenance services.
In Bula, Camarines Sur, they have employed Different kinds of preparedness
mechanism. One of which is reconstruction of people’s houses. They also added up tools and
equipments to be used during a disaster. The municipality’s barangay council purchased
boats for the rescue, evacuation and transportation in preparation of flood. The Department of
Local Government in the area have trained barangay tanod enable for them to gain
knowledge to rescue operations. Also there were Disaster Management Committees trained
by an NGO in to such different phases of disaster management.
In Labo Camarines Norte, they organized an emergency response team which is
known as BERTs – OCOu (Barangay Emergency Response Teams-Organized Community
Operations Units). The organized group helps assist the BDCC in warning and evacuating
11 | P a g e
people in affected communities and in hazard mapping and contingency planning. Thus, this
supports the municipality to become aware of disaster preparedness and mitigation.
In Paranaque City, the Barangay BF Homes have developed their Disaster
Preparedness Plan. They have formed teams that were given responsibilities and tasks as
based to their capabilities. The Calamity and Disaster Preparedness Plan guidelines of the
Barangay is composed of pre, during and post-disaster phases. Hence, these would help them
avoid panic and unnecessary actions during disasters.
In Brgy.Maasin, Quezon, and the island province of Palawan the communities have
mobilized their members to solve their problems including them isolation from the town
center, lack of health care services and environmental degradation through BDAT (Barangay
Disaster Action Team). The members of BDAT used posters and comics as public awareness
on disaster preparedness. The community provided the labor for the various projects and Red
Cross supplied the materials needed. Technical help in engineering design was given by the
municipal government. Hanging bridge was used during floods for access to the village
center and schooling for children.
Furthermore, the Philippine government has improved knowledge and capacity in
handling disasters through the institutionalization of the Gawad Kalasag that stands for
KAlamidad at Sakuna LAbanan SAriling Galing ang Kaligtasan. The yearly award (national
and regional) is given to the municipality, province or city which has developed the best
contingency plan and disaster preparedness or disaster risk reduction management program.
Iligan City was one of the cities nationwide which received such award Gawad Kalasag
award.
The studies and articles presented have helped shape the present study. As
experienced in various parts of the Philippines disaster preparedness is a key for the
communities to better cope with disastrous calamities through their plans and strategies most
especially through their implemented actions. In this way they became disaster-resilient
communities. Locally, the studies of Enriquez, Gallardo and Villa in Hinaplanon (2012) and
of Colance, Landong and Manda in Rogongon (2012) respondents from Hinaplanon and
Rogongon revealed that respondents were unprepared when typhoon Sendong came. The
actions taken by their barangay officials were limited to the coordination of different
organizations. It somehow shows that their studies were taken mainly from the perspective of
the residents in a single barangay. Hence, the government role and perspective were less
attended. Iligan being a Gawad Kalasag awardee before the occurrence of Typhoon Sendong,
was expected to have armed itself for disaster. Ironically however, it appeared that it was
caught flat- footed when Sendong struck, leaving a large number of casualties and damages
to properties. This disaster has raised a serious question regarding the city’s disaster
preparedness. This study is an attempt to address this particular gap in disaster discourse.
12 | P a g e
Findings of the Study
Disaster Preparedness of the Four Affected Barangays
Before the onslaught of Typhoon Sendong all the barangay governments of the four
affected barangays received their own copies of the City Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Plan from the City Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office. Officials
of the four barangay government units were aware of the CDRRM plan of the City which has
won the second place in a national competition of the Oplan Gawad Kalasag 2010.
Unfortunately, however most of the barangay governments were unable to fully formulate
their respective BDRRM plans; they were not able to revise the City DRRM plan to fit in
with the realities in own barangays. Although some may have crafted their BDRRM plans,
they failed to implement these either because of lack of financial support or inability to see
the need for a BDRRM plan. Some were still in the process of formulating their BDRRM
plan when the disaster occurred. This was the case of Hinaplanon that was about to conduct
its trainings when the disaster ravaged the barangay.
Only Barangay Tibanga was able to implement its BDRRM plan, although it still
lacked equipment and focused on fire and storm surges. Both the barangay and City
governments were not able to formulate their respective land use and urban development
plans, one of the factors which were attributed for the vulnerability of the victims during the
typhoon. Looking at the overall disaster preparedness of the four affected barangays before
the occurrence of typhoon Sendong, it may be opined that Barangay Tibanga was better
prepared from typhoon Sendong. It formulated and implemented its Barangay Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management Plan. It conducted disaster trainings, although limited to
barangay officials and a few selected people. These are among its disaster preparedness
activities which the rest of the four barangays were unable to fully accomplish. Along with
the Barangay Hinaplanon, Tibanga, also has emergency response teams for rescue, and these
are composed of their own barangay leaders. Barangay San Roque, on the other hand, relics
on the City Government for rescue while Barangay Upper Hinaplanondoes not have any
emergency response team. Before the occurrence of the disaster only Barangay Tibanga
received information on the possible scenarios from the city government. In the same way, it
was the only barangay that had an information-based system, that is, house to house
information drive. Most of the barangays did not have any information-based system, either
because they failed to create one or they were not able to implement whatever plans they
created.
Actions Taken by the Barangay Governments during Typhoon Sendong
During the occurrence of the disaster, majority of the barangays were unable to follow
their respective BDRRM plans, only Barangay Tibanga did. Since most of the barangay
government officials were also victims of the disaster, they were only able to help out their
own families and managed to save other victims whom they can actually help out in their
conditions. The officials of Barangay Tibanga were able to mobilize their rescue teams which
were assigned before the occurrence of the disaster. Most of the barangay officials were able
to help out in the distribution of the relief goods and also some rescue operations; they were
also the ones that guided the people in the evacuation centers. There was also a delayed
mobilization of the rescue teams during the disaster; most were unable to reach the area since
13 | P a g e
the roads were impassable and by that time the rescue teams were unable to fully help out the
victims; and so the only means and best way of survival was through the victim’s initiatives
to save themselves and to rescue other victims to safety.
Most of the relief operations were focused on each purok and evacuation areas. The
problems encountered during the relief operations were the irritability of the victims along
with the complaints of unequal distribution of the goods since most relief goods were delayed
and not enough for the victims. Also the delay of the relief distribution because of the
impassable roads added up to their irritability. The barangay governments assessed their
plans as useless since these plans were not used during the disaster; however, there was one
barangay that was able to use its BDRRM plan effectively. Also, the city government
officials admitted that they had made a mistake in their plan during Sendong, because they
expected the Tubod river to swell up thus most of their men were stationed there, but
unexpectedly it was the Mandulog river that overflowed because of the logs that clogged up
on the Mandulog bridge causing the water to rise and flooded the nearby barangays. Bayug
Island was then washed out after the bridge had collapsed.
Strategies and Activities by the Barangay Governments after Typhoon Sendong
After the disaster, the barangays were focused on rehabilitation. They provided their
barangays with constant water supply and medical missions; relocated the victims and had
them organized for them to be able to slowly recover on their own; and had started drafting
new ordinances and policies for the environmental protection and rehabilitation of their
barangays such as waste management programs, riprapping of the riverbanks along with
canal dredging of their barangays. They will also be conducting seminars and training for
their officials which will then be echoed to their constituents in the barangays. The barangays
have also started to prepare for any other disaster that might occur while some leaders were
confident to say that they were prepared to face another similar kind of disaster. Most of them
were admittedly unable to assess their own strengths and weaknesses while some only
focused on fire and storm surges. For the overall assessment of the barangays of their
BDRRM plans, they do have the plan but they were unable to implement and use it during the
disaster; some said that the plan was unable to handle the magnitude of the disaster.
Nevertheless, there was a barangay (Tibanga) that was able to make use of its plans
efficiently.
Conclusion
Based on the findings, most of the barangay governments were not prepared for
Typhoon Sendong. Although one barangay was able to create and implement its BDRRM
plan, most were unable to secure a copy of the City Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Plan and incorporate it into their barangay level. They were also unable to
implement and use their plans during the disaster.Due to unpreparedness for typhoon
Sendong which could be attributed to low budget of the barangays, they were unable to
conduct seminars and training along with the provision of proper equipment would allow
enable them to create and implement their own BDRRMC plans. Most of the barangay
14 | P a g e
governments did not receive any information about the typhoon from the city government;
and finally they did not have any information-based system to disseminate any information to
their constituents.
Only one barangay was able to create its response team and conducted house to house
information drive as its information system. This shows how important the role of the state is
for any given community. Protection of the people and ensuring their safety and survival
have always been the role of every state and thusbarangay governments especially those of
the affected barangays should be more focused on implementing policies and rules to ensure
the safety of their constituents since it will be able to greatly ensure the safety and
survivability of their constituents whenever and whatever disaster may arise. If only the
barangay governments were able to properly formulate and implement their BDRRM plan
then they would have not suffered the casualties they had experienced.
On the whole, the findings of the study provide some validity to the assumptions of
Parsons’ functional requisites and further supported the UN Humanitarian Resolution 46/182
of 1991 through the Sphere Project and the Hyogo Framework. Resilience to hazardous
events or disasters is thus a function of preparedness, response and rehabilitation and social
recovery commitment of the local government units and the affected individuals groups and
human organizations. Since majority of the barangays were unable to follow their BDRRM
plans as required under the Philippine DRRM Act of 2010, the National DRRM Framework
of the Philippines and the National DRRM Plan, 2011-2018 during the disaster, have suffered
greatly from the havoc caused by the disaster. Another reason is that the barangay officers
were also victims, which explains why they were also unable to help out their constituents.
The only way for them to survive is by their own initiatives wherein they tried to help out as
much victims as they can while struggling to save their own lives and families. They were
able to mobilize their response team but unfortunately they were quite delayed because of the
conditions of the roads thus making them unable to help. However, barangay was able to
follow their plan by disseminating information and pre-evacuation of the people before the
disaster. The officials who were also victims helped out as much as they can when the flood
had subsided; they assisted in the relief operations; guided the survivors to the nearest
evacuation centers; and provided them with their basic needs.
Humanitarian aid has been very helpful to the victims after the disaster. The barangay
governments were focused on rehabilitation of the people of their barangays. Since the focus
of all humanitarian aids is to alleviate the suffering of victims of disaster, the LGUs and
NGOs have provided them with basic necessities needed for survival and rehabilitation and
particularly water, foods, shelter, medicine, clothing in the evacuation centers and temporary
settlements. They also focused on the improvement and implementation of their BDRRM
plans along with formulation of new ordinances and policies to be implemented for the
betterment and greater disaster resilience of their barangays. After evaluation, they found that
their BDRRM plans before Sendong was useless because they were unable to make use of it
during an immediately after the disaster. At the moment they are in the process if using and
implementing, whatever is feasible; and revised whatever needs to be changed to make it
better functional and adequate.
In relation to Typhoon Pablo, all the four barangay governments were certain that
they have properly designed and implemented their BDRRMC plans. They have been into
15 | P a g e
seminars and trainings that were conducted by the city government and they were able to
completely use their plans. They have followed their SOPs and protocols and had no trouble
with the cooperation of the people because they were already resilient and prepared for the
situation. Finally, this study found out that the barangay governments along with the city
government are already prepared for any typhoon or disaster that may occur based upon what
they have learned from their experience which has made them better prepared to face
disasters such as Typhoon Pablo wherein Iligan did not suffer any casualty.
Recommendations
Given the highlights of the findings and the limitations of the study, recommendations
are advanced for future studies, for policy action and for practical uses. Further studies may
address the following: (1) a comparative study may be done the disaster preparedness of
barangay government units for typhoon Sendong and typhoon Pablo in the same locale of the
study; (2) comparative study between the disaster preparedness of LGUs of Iligan City for
typhoon Sendong and that of the disaster preparedness of Compostela Valley for typhoon
Pablo; and (3) a study could also be done to evaluate the disaster preparedness plans of Iligan
City and its barangay government units.
For policy action, the following are recommended: (1) A city ordinance has to be
passed requiring the formulation and strict implementation of: (a) Barangay Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management Plan of every barangay in Iligan City, (b) Comprehensive LandUse Plan that integrates the Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan, and (c)
Barangay Development Plan that is aligned with the Comprehensive Land-Use Plan and
Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan; (2) The same City government
ordinance must require each barangay to provide the necessary budgetary allocation for the
formulation and implementation of the above-mentioned plans; and (3) Barangay LGUs
should strictly implement the laws regarding environmental protection by formulating
barangay ordinances on: (a) R.A. 9003 or the Solid Waste and Management Act, (b)
Regulation of quarrying in the river consistent with the Philippine Mining Act, and (c)
Penalizing illegal cutting of trees in accordance with Presidential Decrees 330 and 953.
In utilizing the findings of this study, it is suggested that: (1.) the city government
should strictly monitor the formulation and implementation of its barangay-based disaster
risk reduction and management plans other things that concerns a barangay’s preparedness
when facing any kind of disaster; (2) the city government should conduct activities for raising
public awareness on geo-hazard maps channeling through the barangay government; and (3)
the barangays should establish barangay-based disaster information system and initiate
disasters seminars and trainings for the residents.
16 | P a g e
Bibliography
Books and Journals
Anasarias, Kaloy (2003). The Psychosocial Impact of Internal Displacement: Case Studies
from Complex Emergency Situation on Mindanao. Philippine Sociological Review,
Volume 51
Baxter, Pamela and Jack, Susan, 2008, "Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design
and Implementation for Novice Researchers". The Qualitative Report, Volume 13
Number 4. McMaster University, West Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
Bent Flyvbjerg, 2011, "Case Study," in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds., The
Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, 4th Edition (Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage,
2011), Chapter 17, pp.301-316.
Capili, Arnel (2003). How should Disaster be Managed? The Government’s view on
Community-Based Disaster Management.Philippine Sociological Review, Volume 51
Crittenden, Kathleen S. et al. (2003) “Socioeconomic Influences on Livelihood Recovery of
Filipino Families Experiencing Recurrent Lahars” Philippine Sociological Review,
Vol. 51
Delica-Willison, Zenaida (2006). “Community-Based Disaster Risk Management: Gaining
Ground in Hazard-Prone Communities in Asia” South South Cooperation
Dulce, Celso (2003). “Mobilizing the Support of Less Vulnerable Sectors for Disaster
Resilient Communities”. Philippine Sociological Review, Vol. 51
Duque, Priscilla P. (2005) “Disaster Management and Critical Issues on Disaster Risk
Reduction in the Philippines”. International Workshop on Emergency Response and
Rescue (October31-November1, 2005)
Fao Corporate Document Repository (2011). "Semi-structured Interview" Developed by
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome
Huq, Saleemul (2007). “Editorial: Reducing risks to cities from disasters and climate change”
Vol. 19
Langley, Pat (1988) "Learning Object Models From Visual Observation and Background
Knowledge" Institute for the Study of Learning and Expertise. 2451 High Street, Palo
Alto, CA 94301 USA
Luna, Emmanuel (2003). “Endogenous system of response to river flooding as a disaster
subculture: a case study of Bula, Camarines Sur” Philippine Sociological Review,
Vol. 51
Notre Dame University-Socio Economic Research Center (NDU-SERC) (1998). "Situational
Analysis on Child Prostitution in Iligan City" with the Department of Labor and
Employment Region XII and funded by the UNICEF
Patton, M. (1990)."Purposeful Sampling". Qualitative evaluation and research methods
(pp.169-186). Beverly Hills, CA.
Stemler, Steve (2001). “An overview of content analysis”.Practical Assessment, Research &
Evaluation, 7(17)
17 | P a g e
Trochim, B. (1999) "Field Research". Research Methods (Field Research and Types of
Observation)
Yusuf, A. A. & Francisco, H. (2009). Climate Vulnerability Mapping for Southeast Asia.
Singapore: Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia
Undergraduate Theses
Colance, Landong & Manda (2012). The Effects of Tropical Storm Sendong in the Upland
Community of Rogongon, Iligan City. Sociology Department, MSU-IIT Iligan
Institute of Technology
Enriquez, Gallardo & Villa (2012). Levels of Sendong Awareness, Preparedness and
Response among Selected Residents of Barangay Hinaplanon in Iligan
City.Sociology Department, MSU-IIT Iligan Institute of Technology
Lamoste, Patoy & Solon (2012). Living and Health Conditions among Selected Residents on
Sendong’s worst-hit Puroks in Iligan City.Sociology Department, MSU-IIT Iligan
Institute of Technology
Online Sources
Cawis, Redjie Melvic (2011). “Search on for Gawad Kalasag Award”
http://www.baguiocity.com/news_article/search-kawad-kalasag-award
De La Salle Manila Webliography (2011) “Community Based Disaster Management in the
Philippines: Making a Difference in People's Lives”. DRR Portal
http://www.dlsu.edu.ph/library/webliography/subject/disaster_management.asp
Gabule, Lorry V. (2008). Iligan disaster council vies for another “Gawad Kalasag” award
http://archives.pia.gov.ph/?m=12&sec=reader&rp=7&fi=p090428.htm&no=62&date
=04/28/2009
Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and
Communities to Disasters
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/1217_HFAbrochureEnglish.pdf
Lagsa, Bobby and Rosauro, Ryan D. (2011). Local Governments overwhelmed by “Sendong
Disaster”
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/117621/local-governments-overwhelmed-by%E2%80%98sendong%E2%80%99-disaster
National Disaster Coordinating Council (2008).Memorandum Circular. 1-12.
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/10875_gawadkalasagguidelines20081.pdf
National Economic and Development Authority, United Nations Development Program, and
European Commission Humanitarian Aid (2008). “Mainstreaming Disaster Risk
Reduction in Subnational Development and Land-use/Physical Planning in the
Philippines”.
VJ
Graphic
Atrs,
Inc.,
Philippines
http://www.neda.gov.ph/references/Guidelines/DRR/Guidelines%20on%20Mainstrea
ming%20DRR%20in%20Subnational%20Development%20Land%20Use%20Plannin
g.pdf
18 | P a g e
Presse, Agence F. (2011). “Sendong” death toll passes 900 as cities prepare burials.
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/114249/%E2%80%98sendong%E2%80%99-death-tollpasses-900-as-cities-prepare-burials
Stremple, Rosalie and Martone, Michael F. (March 2000) “Disasters Come in All Sizes”
Infopro 2(1).http://www.arma.org/pdf/articles/DisasterAllSizes.pdf
Suson, Divina (2011). Cebu News: Iligan City DRRMC, Second Place sa Gawad Kalasag
National
Level.
PIA
Press
Release.http://archives.pia.gov.ph/?m=7&r=R10&id=58346&y=2011&mo=12
Tigno, Cezar (2008) “Country Water Action: Philippines Flood –Ready Marikina City” Asian
Development Bank. http://www.adb.org/water/Actions/PHI/Flood-Ready-MarikinaCity.asp
UN-ISDR
(2009).Disaster
Risk
Reduction
in
the
United
Nations.
http://www.unisdr.org/files/9866_DisasterRiskReductionintheUnitedNat.pdf
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ru10/profile/iligan/6_economy.html
http://www.iligan.us/iliganexecutive_summaryinsert.htm
http://www.pinas.net/sayt
19 | P a g e