Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.7, No. 4, 2013
China’s Emerging Role in the New
Arab World
Mohammad El-Sayed SELIM①
（College of Social Sciences, Kuwait University）
Abstract: The Arab Spring has changed the political landscape in the
Arab world. The spring which began as genuine grass-root movement
designed to create more equitable social projects, was steered by
Western powers and local Islamists in different directions with these
powers heavily intervening to control and/or weaken Arab states.
China has pursued a policy of non-intervention in the domestic affairs
of Arab states, and letting the peoples decide their own future. China
may have miscalculated when it allowed NATO to interfere in Libya.
That intervention had catastrophic consequences for China and Libya.
Consequently, China, in collaboration with Russia decided not to
repeat the same experience in Syria especially since foreign intervention
in this case will be even more catastrophic. China vetoed Security
Council draft resolutions calling for regime change in Syria and
insisted on letting the Syrians decide peacefully their future course of
action. Further, China under the new leadership has suggested for the
first time a four-point program to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. The
①
Dr. Mohammad El-Sayed Selim, Professor of political science, College of Social
Sciences, Kuwait University.
36
China’s Emerging Role in the New Arab World
article argues that the Chinese-Russian approach to the Syrian crisis is
bound to have long-term implications for the future of the Arab world.
As the signs of the positive contributions of that approach are emerging,
China should proceed to reinforce these contributions through a
concerted approach to engage with the new regimes in the Arab world,
strengthen the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, correct the
imbalances of Sino-Arab trade, especially with the countries of the Arab
Spring, focus on investing in these countries in labor-intensive
industries, putting the four-point proposal on the agenda of ArabIsraeli negotiations, and, most importantly, deal with the question of
the Israeli nuclear capabilities and the potential of Israel going to war
against Iran, a scenario which will represent a major setback to the
Chinese achievements in the region.
Key Words: Arab World; Arab Spring; Four-point Proposal; Islamic
Movements; Non-intervention; Multi-polarity; China-Arab States
Cooperation Forum
Introduction
The years of the Four Modernizations, heralded a change in
China’s global strategy from emphasis on revolutionary change
towards a policy based on pragmatism and economism (Selim, 1971:
58-83). This change was felt in the Arab world as China focused on
supporting peace projects, including support for the newly-created
Palestinian Authority, and expanding economic relations. After the
end of global bipolarity, China began to pursue a more proactive
policy in the Middle East, as it did not subscribe to Western projects
for change in that region including the George Bush democracy
37
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.7, No. 4, 2013
promotion projects and the Greater Middle East Initiative (Selim, 1994;
Selim, 2006: 56-66). In fact, China was the only big power which did
not attend the three summits held in 2004 by the big powers to form
the international consortium for democracy promotion in the Middle
East. China contended that change in the Arab world should emanate
from within the region rather than through external pressures.
By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, and after
consolidating its economic rise, China began to project power in areas
far from its territory and close to the Middle East. In this context one
understands the naval facilities which China has built in Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, and Myanmar, and the visits of the Chinese frigate Ma’anshan
and supply vessel Qiandaohu to Abu Dhabi in March 2010. However,
China’s projected power was mostly a soft rather than a hard one.
China expanded the teaching of Chinese language and culture in the
region, established the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum with all
the member states of the League of Arab States, and received around
9,000 students from the region in addition to its traditional policy of
sending Chinese students to perfect the Arabic language in its
homeland. It also endeavored to support the process of state-building
in Palestine and still is the only big power which has an embassy with
the Palestinian Authority.
Chinese policy was further reinforced in the aftermath of the
“Arab Spring” which began at the end of 2010 in the form of mass
revolutions which swept some regimes in the region, especially after it
became clear that Western powers have hijacked the Arab Spring and
began to employ it for their own interests. The Arab protest
movements were mainly home grown. They were not motivated by
38
China’s Emerging Role in the New Arab World
Western powers as was the case of the Ukrainian and Georgian
protests. In fact, these powers tried to secure the ruling Arab regimes.
However, once the protest movements began, the US shifted its policy
towards containing these movements and employing them to secure
its interests. This took the form of striking alliances with the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt through which the Americans would secure
their control of power and the Brotherhood would make sure that
American interests in the Arab world would be maintained. This has
resulted in a domestic political course designed to facilitate the
Brotherhood’s road to power, which created deep divisions in Egypt
which are still plaguing the country so far. In the case of Libya, the US
intervened militarily to destroy the infrastructure of the state and kill
its leader, which resulted in a wave of violence and the fragmentation
of the state. Also, Americans intervened in the Yemeni case to secure
the rule of President Ali Saleh, who was a close ally of the US in its
“global war on terror.” This has resulted in a prolonged turmoil in
Yemen which has almost wrecked the country. The Syrian reform
movements were also turned violent by acquiescing with the supply
of arms to the “revolutionaries” by some regional players (Liu, Y.,
2012: 107-115).
In all these cases, the US allied itself with the moderate Islamists.
However, moderate Islamists brought with them the extremists as
well, as can be seen in Egypt and Tunisia today. US support for the
Islamists has been accounted for on two grounds, (i) the US wanted to
create a Sunni Islamist block against Shiite Iran as a part of the cold
war against Iran; and (ii) the US wanted to secure its interests in the
Arab world, including the security of Israel by persuading the
39
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.7, No. 4, 2013
Islamists to perform that role as a price for their control of power
(Harb, 2012: July 26).
American support for the Islamists was not without a price. That
price for them was to pursue foreign policies which conform to
American interests. In fact, the new Islamist governments are more
loyal to the US than the previous regimes. This was not what the
revolutionary youth were hoping for when they began their protests.
In fact, Prof. Liu Zhongmin, the director of the Middle East Studies
Institute at Shanghai International Studies University commented on
this development in a commentary published in Arabic in the People’s
Daily newspaper on February 17, 2012 with a revealing title “what a
failure for the efforts of the Arab nation if its destiny was tied to the
West”. He said, “If the political changes resulted in powers which are
allied to the West, bringing its destiny to foreign hands, then what a
failure for the efforts of the Arab nation as its renaissance will be a
mirage.” (Liu, Z., 2012: February 17). Such assessment was quite
accurate as the foreign policy pursued by the Islamist governments
was pro-American.
The objective of this article is to review China’s reaction to these
Arab developments, to assess its contribution to political integrity of
Arab countries, and to point out to some main issues which China
could consider in the future in its quest to create a multi-polar world
and maintain the sovereign status of countries of the Arab world, and
to reinforce Sino-Arab relations.
40
China’s Emerging Role in the New Arab World
I. China and the Arab Spring
Like all other powers, China was surprised by the Arab Spring,
which was viewed as disturbances or at best “changes” (He, B., 2011:
December 9-10), and a development unlikely to bring about
democracy to the Arabs, a prediction which turned out later on to be
accurate (Rauhala, E., 2011: January 31).① But China quickly assessed
its impact on its interests in two directions, domestic and external. At
the domestic level, China was concerned with the impact of the Arab
Spring, which turned out to be an Islamic Spring, on Chinese Muslims,
as the new Islamist governments could provide some support to the
separatist movements in Xinjiang. At the external level, the main
concern was directed towards Chinese investments and trade with the
countries of the Arab Spring.
China pursued a policy of non-intervention in the affairs of the
Arab Spring countries leaving the ultimate outcomes to be decided by
the peoples of the region. On January 18, 2012, Wen Jiabao, the then
Prime Minister of China, said during his visit to the United Arab
Emirates that “Arab countries should be left to decide by themselves
their own political destiny, and the people’s will must be taken into
account in this process.” He went on to assure that “the affairs of the
region must be decided by its countries and peoples and their
aspirations for change must be respected. We believe that the
difficulties facing Arab counties will be temporary. We support the
countries of the region in choosing an independent path for
①
On January 30, 2011, the Global Times wrote in its editorial called “Color
Revolutions Will Not Bring About Real Democracy,” that it is questionable
whether the democratic system really works…Democracy is still far away from
Tunisia and Egypt.”
41
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.7, No. 4, 2013
development which suits their own national circumstances.” (South
China Morning Post, 2012: January 19). This statement reflected China’s
overall policy towards the Arab Spring and the issue of foreign
intervention. However, the course of action differed from one case to
the other.
In the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, there was no initial foreign
intervention and the protests quickly subsided with the departure of
Ben-Ali and Mubarak. But, the Libyan case dragged on, with the
rebels using violence with arms supplied by foreign powers, some of
them Arab. In this context, China abstained during the vote on
resolution
1973
issued
on
March
17,
2011
authorizing
the
establishment of a no- fly zone over Libya. China’s abstention paved
the road for passing the resolution which was used by NATO to
destroy the Libyan infrastructure and contribute to the assassination
of Qaddafi. This was executed despite the Chinese declared policy of
the peaceful resolution of the conflict. It seems that China interpreted
the resolution literally and did not expect Western powers to go that
far in expanding its scope, or that China had received assurances that
the resolution will be implemented strictly to enforce a no-fly zone.
When it became clear that NATO had gone far beyond its mandate
and widened the scope of the no fly zone to the level of military
intervention in Libya, including the assassination of Qaddafi, China
continued to call for the peaceful resolution of the crisis. It also
regretted on March 22, 2011 NATO’s military strikes in Libya and
warned that it had not approved the use of military force against
Libya. The spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry said,
42
China’s Emerging Role in the New Arab World
“The initial purpose of relevant UNSC resolution is to guarantee
the safety of civilians in Libya. We have noted the reports about
civilian casualties caused by military strikes against Libya by some
countries, and we are highly concerned. We oppose the abuse of force
which leads to heavier civilian casualties and a bigger humanitarian
disaster.” (FMPRC, 2011: March 23).
China, as represented by the spokesman of its Foreign Ministry
on May 31, 2011, called for an immediate cease fire, and the peaceful
resolution of the crisis, and respecting the choices of the Libyan people
with no reference to the military intervention in Libya (Embassy of
China in Egypt, 2011: June 1). As it became clear that the rebels were
winning, China moved to protect its investments in Libya and at the
same time make a final appeal for a peaceful resolution. On July 6,
2011, and as the battles were raging between Qaddafi forces and the
rebels around Misrata, Chen Xiaodong, director general of the West
Asian and North African Affairs Department of the Chinese Foreign
Ministry, met Ali Al-Sawi, the deputy head of the Libyan National
Transition Council. Chen pleaded for a quick political solution to the
crisis through substantial talks between the parties (Xinhua News, 2011:
July 7). As it became clear that the rebels were winning, China pleaded
to the new government in Libya to protect its investments in that
country and to continue economic cooperation with China (Martina,
M. & Buckley, C., 2011: August 23).
China seems to have learned the lesson and applied it in dealing
with the Syrian crisis. Accordingly, when the Security Council tried to
repeat the same scenario in Syria, not by establishing a fly zone, but by
calling for the removal of the Syrian regime, which would mean the
43
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.7, No. 4, 2013
same outcome,
China and Russia voted
against
resolutions
condemning the Syrian government or calling for the removal of that
government. On October 4, 2011, China and Russia voted against a
draft resolution condemning the Syrian government for using violence
against the anti-regime rebels. The resolution got nine votes in the
Security Council with the abstentions of four countries (India, Brazil,
South Africa, and Lebanon). On February 4, 2012 China and Russia
voted for the second time against a draft resolution calling for regime
change in Syria on grounds that the draft was a violation of Syria’s
sovereignty. This was despite the fact that the draft resolution was
backed by the League of Arab States. The Chinese People’s Daily
accounted for the Chinese veto as follows:
The Syrian people have their independent democratic rights in
supporting any government, which has an obligation to maintain the
stability of the country and protect the safety of the people. The only
way to this end is national reconciliation…It is China’s principle to
promote a peaceful settlement of the Syria crisis and help the Middle
East move forward stability. This gives full concern about the
fundamental interests of the Syrian people, and embodies China's high
degree of responsibility for world peace as a permanent member of
the UN Security Council (Zhong, S., 2012: February 8).
These were rare occasions since the end of the Cold War in which
China and Russia have used their veto power in the Security Council.①
①
In commenting on the Chinese and Russian vetoes, US delegate to the UN
Susan Rice said that the US was outraged that the Council had failed to address
serious human rights violations. American columnist John Metzler wrote a report
on October 10, 2011 entitled, “Russia-China double vote at the UN allows Syria to
get away with murder,” in which he also referred to the outrage of Rice.
44
China’s Emerging Role in the New Arab World
China, in collaboration with Russia also voted on March 1, 2012
against a resolution passed by the UN Human Rights Council which
condemned the Syrian authorities. Further, in order to show
commitment to the enforcement of this policy, China sent warships to
the Mediterranean in July-August 2012. This was the first time it sent
such warships as the first time as warships were sent to Libya to
evacuate Chinese nationals. During the July-August Chinese maritime
deployment in the Mediterranean, joint manoeuvres with Russian
warships were conducted in the Mediterranean close to the Syrian
shores which proves our previous thesis on the Chinese-Russian
strategic understanding.
Gradually, China developed a comprehensive policy towards the
Syrian crisis which included the six main elements, (i) Cessation of all
forms of violence by all parties, and all parties should express their
demands by peaceful means (ii) the Syrian government and
opposition must begin a political dialogue under the auspices of the
UN and Arab League envoy to reach a road map a for political change
in Syria to be implemented in a certain time frame, (iii) supporting the
role of the UN in relief operations on the basis of respect of national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria, (iv) all international
actors should respect Syrian national sovereignty and territorial
integrity and respect the right of the Syrian people to choose its
political regime. China does not approve any blockade or threats to
impose blockades, (v) China supports the nomination of a UN and
Arab League envoy to settle the Syrian crisis; and (iv) all members of
http://eg.china-embassy.org/ara/lxjzh/t827281.htm. The same Rice and Metzler
were quite in favor of the human rights violations which the USA committed in
Iraq and Afghanistan in which tens of thousands of civilians were killed.
45
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.7, No. 4, 2013
the Security Council should abide by the UN charter.① To implement
that policy China refrained from supplying all the parties of the Syrian
crisis with arms, as it has done during the Libyan crisis (China Daily,
2011: September 2).② It also established contacts with the opposition
forces in Syria who were more willing to negotiate with the regime,
mainly the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change (NCB).
A delegation from the NBC led by Hassan Mana visited China in
February 2012. It held talks with Zhai Jun, the Chinese Deputy Foreign
Minister, and during the meeting he called upon the Syrian
Government to earnestly fulfill its promises and begin an all-inclusive
reform process and resolve disputes via talks and consultations (Global
Times, 2012: February 11-12). He met members of the NBC in
Damascus and Beijing (Cui, H., 2012: February 10; Al-Ahram, 2012: July
8).③
One cannot account for China’s policy towards the Syrian crisis
with reference to its economic interests alone; as such interests in Syria
were much less than they were in Libya. China pursued that policy on
three main grounds, (i) China realized that the fall of Bashar Al-Assad
would embolden Israel and Western powers to attack Iran which
would result in a major regional war which could threaten the flow of
oil to China, if Iran closed the Hormuz Straits. The fall of Iran, in
①
Statement of the Chinese Foreign Ministry on March 4, 2012 and reiterated by
the Chinese Ambassador to Doha presented at the Conference of the Doha
Institute for Policy Research and Studies, Doha, December 16, 2013.
②
There were charges that China had supplied Qaddafi with arms, but China
denied that charge arguing that it had ordered all Chinese companies to observe
Security Council Resolution 1970.
③
Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, threatened China and Russia that they
will pay for their support of Assad to remain on power. The Chinese Foreign
Ministry Spokesman replied that the Clinton statement was unacceptable.
46
China’s Emerging Role in the New Arab World
China’s perception, would bring NATO even closer to China’s borders,
(ii) By blocking Western intervention in Syria, China aspires to achieve
two major objectives, establishing the sanctity of the Westphalian
principles of state sovereignty and “non-intervention in others’
domestic affairs”, and breaking American hegemony in the Middle
East, thereby helping to transform the global system into a truly
multipolar one, in which the global decision will be the outcome of
compromise between all nations; and (iii) In pursuing its policy
towards the Syrian crisis, China had to take into consideration the
American pivoting towards Asia and its role in mobilizing the
Southeast Asian nations against China’s vital interests in the South
China Sea. China was trying to counter the American strategy in the
other side of Asia, that is West Asia, and at the same time prop-up the
Russian strategy in the Syrian crisis hoping that Russia will
reciprocate in the Asia-Pacific. Also, support to Russia was vital for
China’s economic interests as it imports almost 13 million tons of
crude oil from that country annually and it is expected that Russia will
export 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China by 2015 through
the natural gas pipeline; and (iv) China also learned the lesson of the
Libyan crisis. The main conclusion that China drew from that crisis
was that NATO was not trustworthy as it reneged on its promises to
China to restrict its intervention in Libya to establishing a no-fly zone.
China’s strong opposition to foreign intervention in Syria was not
strictly observed in the case of Bahrain, where the GCC states sent a
military force to restore law and order and suppress the Shiite
rebellion. China ignored GCC intervention as it was viewed as a
regional intervention not directly connected with great power
competition, and it was enforced under a collective security treaty
47
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.7, No. 4, 2013
signed by the GCC states in December 2000. The objective of the
intervention was to maintain the status quo rather than to change it
(Farahat, M., 2012: 15-17).
II. China’s Future Policy toward the New Arab World
Whether the rise of the Islamists is a long term cycle or not,
China’s interests in the Arab world will not be drastically reduced as a
result of this factor, but mainly due to other factors which are, (i) the
outcomes of the Syrian crisis; and (ii) the Taiwanese approaches to
Arab governments, including the new Islamist ones. The main factor
that would seriously impinge upon China’s future relations with the
Arab world is the outcome of the Syrian crisis. If that crisis ended up
through a negotiated peaceful settlement, this would enhance China’s
position in the Arab world and would represent a serious blow to the
Western project in the Middle East and would also block the rise of the
Islamists, especially the extremist elements of them who are leading
the fight in Syria. In this case, China would have to move quickly to
help in the national reconstruction and rehabilitation of Syria.
However, if that crisis ended up in the West and Al-Qaida’s advantage,
one could expect a long cycle of ambivalence in Arab-Chinese
relations, especially with the new regime in Syria. China’s interests
would be jeopardized as a result of the long-term effects of the victory
of the extremists. That is why the battle over Syria will be quite
decisive for the future relations between China and the Arab world.
Chinese Taiwan also has been coaxing the Arab Spring countries
to engage into technological cooperation, an area which it argued was
its main specialization and which was lacking in Arab-Chinese
48
China’s Emerging Role in the New Arab World
cooperation. An Egyptian columnist visited Chinese Taiwan and
reported that Taiwan authorities was interested in expanding relations
with the Arab Spring countries. (Gab-Allah, K., 2013: July 13). In
another article on Mursi’s visit to China he ridiculed the visit as
fruitless with the balance of trade between China and Egypt was
overwhelmingly in favour of the former and advocated establishing
contacts with Chinese Taiwan.
China has to re-orient its Arab policy with a view of securing its
interests given these two main factors and the changes in the global
and regional strategic environment which we have outlined earlier.
China has major interests with the Arab countries the most important
of which is that it imports from them 54% of its total crude oil imports,
which is vital to China’s economic growth. Arab governments too,
Islamist or not, have vested interests in continuing relations with
China. The GCC oil exporting states have an interest in forming oil
partnerships with China as the West is fast reducing its oil imports
from them due to the new discoveries in the field of energy. Arab
countries also have been showing an increasing trend of “Looking
East” with special emphasis on China (An, H., 114-133). This explains
why Arab oil-exporting countries were keen to maintain economic
relations with China despite political differences over the Syrian crisis.
This was also reflected in the visit of Mohammad Mursi, the first
Islamist President of Egypt after the January 25, 2011 Uprising, to
China in 2012. In fact, this was his first visit to a non-Arab country
since his election. Although he was backed by the US, he found it
important to deepen relations with China at least to keep his options
with the Americans open (Bianchi, R.). The fact that his Islamist
49
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.7, No. 4, 2013
Egyptian government presented that visit as a huge victory for Mursi
shows that the “Chinese Option” is quite important for them.①
In dealing with the new Arab world, China has already
developed a policy which will impact on the Arab world for the years
to come. The reference is to its policy towards the Syrian crisis which
is bound to save the Arab Orient from foreign intervention and
political chaos. Despite the claims of some Arabs, especially from the
Gulf Cooperation Council, that China has betrayed the “Syrian
revolution,” China has blocked the extremists’ road to Damascus
thereby saving the integrity of the Syrian state, and the entire region
for that matter. China should persist in that policy in collaboration
with Russia as a prelude to the creation of a multipolar world. Further,
on May 6, 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a four-point
proposal for the settlement of the Palestinian question during his talks
with visiting Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas. The four points
suggested were as follows:
First, the right direction to follow should be an independent
Palestinian State and peaceful co-existence of Palestine and Israel. To
establish an independent state enjoying full sovereignty on the basis of
the 1967 borders and with East Jerusalem as its capital is an inalienable
right of the Palestinian people and the key to the settlement of the
Palestinian question. At the same time, Israel’s right to exist and its
legitimate security concerns should also be fully respected. Second,
negotiation should be taken as the only way to peace between
①
Mamdouh Al-Wali, the chairman of the board of directors of Al-Ahram and an
Islamist himself wrote an article entitled “Chinese cooperation and the
rearrangement of home from inside” Al-Ahram, September 1, 2012, in which he
hailed the visit.
50
China’s Emerging Role in the New Arab World
Palestine and Israel. The two sides should follow the trend of the times,
pursue peace talks, show mutual understanding and accommodation,
and meet each other half way. The immediate priority is to take
credible steps to stop settlement activities, end violence against
innocent civilians, lift the blockade of the Gaza Strip and properly
handle the issue of Palestinian prisoners in order to create the
necessary
conditions
for
the
resumption
of
peace
talks.
Comprehensive internal reconciliation on the part of Palestine will
help restart and advance the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks. Third,
principles such as “land for peace” should be firmly upheld. The
parties concerned ought to build on the existing achievements that
include the principle of “land for peace”, the relevant UN resolutions
and the Arab Peace Initiative to advance the Middle East peace
process across the board; and, fourth, the international community
should provide important guarantees for progress in the peace process.
Relevant parties of the international community should have a greater
sense of responsibility and urgency, take an objective and fair position,
make vigorous efforts to encourage talks for peace, and increase
assistance to Palestine in such fields as human resources training and
economic development.
The next step is for China to capitalize on the present momentum
and push towards the actual implementation of this policy statement.
Western powers, dominating the Quartet, are now planning to end the
conflict along the present lines of division, especially turning Israel
into a “Jewish state”, which means deporting the Palestinians with
Israeli citizenship, and keeping the Israeli colonies in the West Bank
divided into apartheid-like cantons. China could join the Quartet and
51
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.7, No. 4, 2013
work with Russia inside that institution so as to bring some balance to
its work by injecting the new Chinese proposals.
China should contribute to the stabilization of the region through
a pro-active policy to constrain Israel from launching a war against
Iran. One should not forget that Israel is a self-declared nuclear power
itself, and peace cannot be achieved with only one country possessing
nuclear weapons in the region. As Western powers are endeavoring to
de-nuclearize North Korea, the same approach should be applied to
Israel. One cannot claim that Israel is outside the Non-proliferation
Treaty, as North Korea also is also outside that Treaty. China should
put the question of the Israeli nuclear arsenal on the table as peace
cannot be maintained with one party possessing nuclear weapons.
In the meantime, the following main issues must be considered
and incorporated in China’s new strategy towards the new Arab
world. First, it should engage with Islamic governments and moderate
Islamic movements in the Arab world with a view of persuading them
to respect present treaty commitments, the principle of peaceful
settlement of disputes not only internationally but also at the domestic
level, and observing international human rights standards in dealing
with the opposition. In doing so, China will have to abandon the
tradition of dealing only with the ruling elites and adopt a new
paradigm of dealing with all political forces in Arab countries,
Islamists and civil, as it had done in Syria. The Syrian lesson is quite
informative in this respect. China talked to the government and the
moderate elements of the opposition at the same tome. Second, China
should restructure its trade relations with the Arab non-oil exporting
countries in the direction of a more balanced trade. The balance of
52
China’s Emerging Role in the New Arab World
trade between Egypt and China in 2012 was $ 9 billion with Chinese
exports almost $ 7.5 billion. China’s reputation in the Arab world has
been increasingly tarnished as a result of the inflow of Chinese goods
to Arab markets and its negative impact on Arab industries. One
Chinese analyst has acknowledged this factor arguing that “there has
been increasing worry and suspicion about China’s economic presence
among the general (Arab) public, which has become social bedrock for
the “China threat theory” across the region.” He concluded that
“China should give priority and take practical measures to address
them as soon as possible.” (An, H., 132). Third, China should also give
more priority to labor-intensive investments and technological
cooperation rather than mere exchange of goods. China’s total
investments in Egypt are almost $ 400 million out of $ 53 billion of
external Chinese investments (Al-Ahram, 2013: August 31). By focusing
on these areas, new jobs will be created and China will be in a better
position to influence the Islamist governments; and, finally, special
attention must be given to the re-invigoration of the China-Arab States
Cooperation Forum for Cooperation established in 2004, by
implementing its resolutions; it was noticed that few of these
resolutions have actually been implemented. This should include
establishing a foundation to supervise areas of cultural and
educational cooperation, and turning the Forum into a viable forum
for political consultations between China and the Arab countries.
Conclusion
By adopting a viable and effective strategy towards the Syrian
crisis, China has been able to facilitate the shift of the global system
towards multi-polarity, restore the legitimacy of state sovereignty,
53
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.7, No. 4, 2013
save the Arab Orient from further turmoil and political fragmentation,
and to check the rising forces of extremism This should be the
beginning of a deep thinking in China about its future relations with
the Arab countries. China will have to capitalize on its positive image
among the Arab masses, and its achievements in the Syrian crisis, a
role which we strongly believe will have long-term ramifications for
the future of the Arabs. Among the areas of potential consideration is
enhancing Chinese investments and technology transfers in the Arab
spring countries, balancing Arab-Chinese trade, and giving more
attention to the Arab-Israeli and Iranian questions with a view of a
speedy and peaceful compromises. This is essential in order to secure
China’s long-term interests in the region and also to check Chinese
Taiwan’s increasing approaches to the new regimes in the Arab world.
References
Al-Ahram (2012: July 8).
Al-Ahram (2013: August 31).
An, H. (2012). Middle East countries show an increasing trend of “Looking East”.
In Qu Xing, ed., International Situation and China’s Foreign Affairs (2012), Beijing:
World Affais Press.
Bianchi, R. Mursi in Beijing: Implications for America’s relations with China and the
Islamic world, retrieved October 4, 2013 from http://www.mei.nus.edu.sg/
publications/mei-insights/morsy-in-beijing-implications-for-america%e2%80%
99s-relations-with-china-and-the-islamic-world.
China’s senior diplomat visits Libyan opposition base (2011: July 7). Xinhua News.
Cui, H. (2012: February 10). China talks with Syria opposition on crisis. China
Daily.
54
China’s Emerging Role in the New Arab World
Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Arab Republic of Egypt. Foreign
Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Regular Press Conference on June 1, 2011,
retrieved October 1, 2013 from http://eg.china-embassy.org/ara/lxjzh/t827281.
htm.
Farahat, M. (2012: December 15-17). The Chinese and Russian behavior towards the
Arab Spring wave: A reading beyond the economic interests, paper submitted to the
Annual Conference of Centers for Political and Strategic Studies in the Arab
World held by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies.
FMPRC. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu’s regular press conference on March 22,
2011, retrieved October 1, 2013 from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/
s2510/2511/t809578.shtml.
Gab-Allah, K. (2013: July 13). Taiwan is approaching “New Egypt”. Al-Ahram.
Global Times (2012: February 11-12).
Harb, O. (2012: July 26). The USA and the Ikwan, Al-Ahram.
He, B. (2011: December 9-10). China’s response to the Arab Spring, paper submitted
at the international workshop held by the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies,
College of Arts and Social Sciences, the Australian National University on the
theme of “Democratizing Neighborhood: Implications of the Arab Spring for
Middle East and Asia,” Canberra.
Liu, Y. (2012). Political turmoil in the West Asia and North Africa and its causal
factors. In the CIIS Blue Book on International Situation and China’s Foreign Policy,
Beijing, Current Affairs Press.
Liu, Z. (2012: February 17).http://arabic.peopledaily.com.cn/31662/7732232.html.
Martina, I & Buckley, C. (2011: August 23). China urges Libya to protect
investments. Reuters.
Rauhala, E. (2011: January 31). What uprising? China censors news from Egypt.
Time.
Selim, M. (1971: July). The People’s Republic of China and the Palestine Question,
Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya, Vol.7, No. 25.
55
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.7, No. 4, 2013
Selim, M. (1994). China in the post bipolar system. In Mustafa Al-Hamarneh, ed.,
The Arabs in the Global Strategies, Amman: Center for Strategic Studies of the
Jordanian University.
Selim, M. (2006). The impact of the rise of China on global and Asian balances. In
El-Sayed Amin Shalaby, ed., China in the Twenty First Century, Cairo: Egyptian
Council for Foreign Relations.
South China Morning Post (2012: January 19).
Zhong, S. (2012: February 8). Why China vetoes UN draft resolution for Syrian
issue. People’s Daily.
56