Jessica Jasso
Section II. : Eisenhower’s Coalition
From Section I, we used the Eisenhower administration to discuss the first part of Trubowitz’s
theory in explaining foreign policy: geopolitical slack.1 In this section, we move to the second
part which analyses the coalition’s preference for guns or butter.2
When Eisenhower came to power, neither the Republicans nor the Democrats had absolute
control of Congress.3 This changed two years later when the Democrats got control over
Congress and kept it throughout the Eisenhower presidency.4 This helps explain why Eisenhower
was keen on building good relations with them, and sometimes even go against his party’s
wishes just to please those of the Democrats.5
The Republicans wanted to cut back spending by eliminating all the New Deal and Fair Deal
programs, and by reducing military spending as well.6 However, Eisenhower couldn’t do that
because the Democrats wanted almost the opposite. Democrats not only wanted to keep the
existing social programs but they wanted to expand them, which would raise spending.7
Therefore, Eisenhower had to somehow balance the budget but still keep funding the existing
social programs. His answer came in the form of foreign policy. Eisenhower knew that he
couldn’t eliminate all the social programs just like the Republicans wanted because Congress
was ruled by Democrats for 6 out of the 8 years he was in power.8 Hence, anything that
Eisenhower wanted to pass needed to be supported by Democrats, and eliminating their social
programs was not going to get him their support. Yet, he had to cut spending somehow and this
is where he decided to opt for a cheaper foreign defense policy: nuclear deterrence. Nuclear
weapons would not only cut back military spending but also increase the cost of waging war or
provoking the US; which was a win for Eisenhower because he managed to cut spending and still
impose a huge threat to the Soviets. This then explains Eisenhower’s usage of nuclear threats to
deal with Korea and the two Strait Crisis. Therefore, the fiscal constraints during Eisenhower’s
presidency help explain his foreign policy of deterrence.
Additionally, Eisenhower used foreign policy to not only keep the support of his coalition but
to also bring the Democrats aboard. During his presidency, especially in the early years,
1
Peter, Trubowitz. "Grand Strategy's Microfoundations." Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American
Statecraft. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2011). Print.
2
ibid
Michael, Birkner. "More to Induce Than Demand”: Eisenhower and Congress. Congress and the Presidency, 40
(2013): 165-94. Doi: 10.1080107343469.2013.788404.
4
ibid
5
ibid
6
Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. “Dwight D. Eisenhower: Domestic
Affairs.” Accessed September 27, 2015.
http://millercenter.org-/president/biography/eisenhower-domestic-affairs.
7
ibid
8
Michael, Birkner. "More to Induce Than Demand”: Eisenhower and Congress. Congress and the Presidency, 40
(2013): 165-94. Doi: 10.1080107343469.2013.788404.
3
Eisenhower faced challenges from his coalition. Some of the Republicans wanted to limit his
executive power to make treaties while others wanted to remove the US from the United Nations.
For instance, in 1952, the Republican Old Guard lead by Bricker had proposed the Bricker
Amendment that would essentially limit the president’s ability to make treaties.9 After intense
negotiations, Eisenhower was able to stop the amendment. Then in 1953, a few Republicans
wanted to pass an amendment that was directed at the United Nations, which stated that the US
was to cut all contributions to the UN if it accepted China as a member.10 Eisenhower was
against such amendment because he believed that the UN made it easier for countries to discuss
global issues and settle disputes.11 Not to mention that it reduced the costs of dealing with global
issues alone. Once again he negotiated with the Republicans and stopped them from pursuing the
issue any further. To overcome these internal divisions that threaten Eisenhower’s coalition, he
used a foreign policy that united the Republicans and undermined their internal divisions. This
policy was, taking an aggressive approach to stopping the spread of communism because to
Republicans halting communism was a key interest.12 In addition, while the Republicans had a
solid cold war policy, the Democrats didn’t, and this allowed Eisenhower to also use foreign
policy as a way to bring the Democrats on board.13 Eisenhower would meet with Democrats,
especially Senator Lyndon B. Johnson and House Leader Sam Rayburn, to discuss national
security and make them feel part of his quest to stop communism.14 Eisenhower figured that
since Democrats did not seem to have a clear objective in regards to cold war, then it would be
easy to sway them towards a more aggressive policy. This would not only keep the Republicans
happy, but get Eisenhower Democratic support. However, the Democrats agreed to support
Eisenhower in foreign affairs as long as he did not cut any of the New Deal/Fair Deal
programs.15 This proved to be a challenge to Eisenhower because the Republicans wanted to
eliminate all New/Fair Deal social programs.16 Republicans believed that free market forces
should guide the economy and not the government.17 On the other hand, not only did the
Democrats wanted to keep the existing programs but they also wanted to increase spending on
them; which as mentioned earlier was a problem for Eisenhower because he was trying to
maintain a balance budget.18 In the end, Eisenhower did give in to some of the demands such as
increasing the number of houses built for the low-income housing project, extending social
security, increasing educational funds, and raising the minimum wage.19 This then allowed
Eisenhower to not only go after guns but also butter. Conclusively, the reason why Eisenhower
pursued communism in Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia so determinedly was because it
9
ibid
ibid
11
ibid
12
ibid
13
Sean, Trende. "The Underrated Eisenhower Coalition." Sabato's Crystal Ball. November 20,
2014. Accessed 2015.
14
Michael, Birkner. "More to Induce Than Demand”: Eisenhower and Congress. Congress and the Presidency, 40
(2013): 165-94. Doi: 10.1080107343469.2013.788404.
15
Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. “Dwight D. Eisenhower: Domestic
Affairs.” Accessed September 27, 2015.
http://millercenter.org/president/biography/eisenhower-domestic-affairs.
16
ibid
17
ibid
18
ibid
19
ibid
10
was the only issue big enough to undermine the internal divisions of his coalition and bring in
the Democratic support.20 Hence, instead of using foreign policy as a wedge issue, he managed
to use it as a way to unite both parties under one “flag.”
Furthermore, foreign policy can be said to have been used by Eisenhower as a way to
distribute benefits to his coalition. This is most clear in the case of Guatemala. President Arbenz
of Guatemala began a set of land reforms that basically distributed lands owned by the United
Fruit Company to landless peasants. 21 This infuriated the United Fruit Company, who then
urged Eisenhower to do something about it. Eisenhower first cut military aid to Guatemala,
which then led Arbenz to buy weapons from communism Czechoslovakia.22 Upon hearing this,
Eisenhower send the CIA to carry out a coup against Arbenz, which removed him from power
and replaced him with Castillo.23 Castillo was anti-communist and anti-reformist, so once in
power he restored the lands to the United Fruit Company. 24 Thus, foreign policy was used by
Eisenhower to distribute benefits to his supporters, in this case by defending their interests
abroad.
However, Eisenhower did not use foreign policy to gain electoral benefits because it was
obvious that he was going to win the election of 56. He was running against Stevenson, who ran
on a more passive foreign policy platform, and given the nature of cold war during this time, it
was unlikely that he was going to win.25
Overall, the preference of Eisenhower’s coalition for guns and low spending placed fiscal
constraints on Eisenhower that led him to adopt a cheaper defense policy. Additionally, the
internal divisions within his coalition also urged Eisenhower to use foreign policy to unite the
Republican Party by using the communist threat to undermine their internal divisions, and to get
the Democrats’ support. He also used it to distribute benefits but not to gain electoral advantages.
References
Birkner, Michael. "More to Induce Than Demand" : Eisenhower and Congress." Congress and
the Presidency 40 (2013): 165-94. doi:10.1080107343469.2013.788404.
Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. “Dwight D. Eisenhower: Domestic
Affairs.” Accessed September 27, 2015.
http://millercenter.org/president/biography/eisenhower-domestic-affairs.
20
Michael, Birkner. "More to Induce Than Demand”: Eisenhower and Congress. Congress and the Presidency, 40
(2013): 165-94. Doi: 10.1080107343469.2013.788404.
21
22
Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. “Dwight D. Eisenhower: Foreign
Affairs.” Accessed September 19, 2015.
http://millercenter.org-/president/biography/eisenhower-foreign-affairs.
ibid
Ibid
24
ibid
25
Michael, Birkner. "More to Induce Than Demand”: Eisenhower and Congress. Congress and the Presidency, 40
(2013): 165-94. Doi: 10.1080107343469.2013.788404.
23
Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. “Dwight D. Eisenhower: Foreign
Affairs.” Accessed September 19, 2015.
http://millercenter.org-/president/biography/eisenhower-foreign-affairs.
Trende, Sean. "The Underrated Eisenhower Coalition." Sabato's Crystal Ball. November 20,
2014. Accessed 2015.
Trubowitz, Peter. "Grand Strategy's Microfoundations." Politics and Strategy: Partisan
Ambition and American Statecraft. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2011. Print.