Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
Explaining Japanese Politicians’ Behaviors
M. Erika Pollmann1
This article examines the relative importance of international versus domestic considerations in order to predict how Japanese politicians will behave with regards to the
Yasukuni Shrine. Whenever high-ranking politicians visit the shrine, there are substantial costs in Japan’s relationship with South Korea and China. Yet, some Japanese
politicians continue to visit the shrine. To better understand why they visit, this study
not only looks at cases in which politicians were unresponsive to anticipated international costs (and hence visited the Yasukuni Shrine), but also moments when politicians were responsive and changed their behavior accordingly (and thus did not visit
Yasukuni Shrine). This study concludes that domestic political considerations, specifically politicians’ ties to conservative groups that support shrine visits, their attachment
of a positive ideological meaning to a shrine visit, and whether they have the popularity
to withstand a domestic backlash to a shrine visit are the most important factors that
facilitate the occasional visit, while the known diplomatic consequences of visits usually
constrain politicians from visiting.
The Korean peninsula and Chinese mainland have historically played an important
role in calculations of national security for Japanese elites. Yet, in recent years, Japanese
I would like to first and foremost thank Michael J. Green, my thesis adviser, who guided me from
the very beginning. I would also like to thank Jordan Sand for encouraging me to keep pursuing this
venture until publication. I cannot thank Professors Green and Sand enough for their leadership of
the Georgetown-Japan 2020 Initiative, an incredible opportunity to travel to and do research in Japan.
And finally, I would like to thank Kendra Billingslea, my dean and friend, for her support and advice
throughout the process. The original article was written to complete a requirement for Honors in
the International Politics program at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. The views
expressed here and any mistakes are my own.
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politicians seem to ignore the detrimental effects of Yasukuni Shrine visits on Japan’s
relationship with South Korea and China. The Yasukuni Shrine has courted regional
controversy since the late 1980s due to the enshrinement of war criminals convicted
by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. While conservative Japanese politicians wish to
visit to pay their respects to the deceased, South Korean and Chinese observers see
such homage as glorification of Japan’s militarist past, and react with anti-Japanese
rhetoric and cancellation of state-level meetings. This study analyzes the decisions of
Japanese politicians to visit or not visit the Yasukuni Shrine since fall 1998 to assess
whether Japanese politicians give greater weight to (a) Japan’s relationship with South
Korea and China or to (b) their domestic political standing.2 This study advances the
argument that the most significant factor in predicting when politicians are more likely to visit the shrine is the structure of domestic politics—their electoral reliance on
conservative groups that support shrine visits, their ideological commitment to visiting
the shrine, and the overall popularity and strength of the Cabinet. Japanese politicians
generally are responsive to anticipated international condemnation and more frequently choose not to visit the shrine, but when individuals do choose to visit, the decision
is generally unrelated to changes in how Japan perceives its relationship with South
Korea and China.3
This study goes beyond previous analyses because it does not exclusively focus on visits.
To fully explain why politicians behave unresponsively, it is also important to analyze
what factors may have led to their decision to behave responsively (i.e., to not visit).
Also, this study goes further than previous studies by analyzing both the domestic and
international aspects at once, allowing for a fuller examination of the constraints that
Japanese politicians face. This is done by applying Putnam’s two-level game model,
which is a more accurate reflection of the full range of considerations behind this
decision-making process.4 It also considers the effect of China and South Korea on
Fall 1998 was chosen as the cut-off point because that is when Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo
met with South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung and Chinese President Jiang Zemin, and before
those meetings his Chief Cabinet Secretary clearly admitted Japanese recognition of the diplomatic
costs of a Yasukuni Shrine visit.
3
The term “politician” in this study primarily denotes prime ministers; however, this study does include a discussion of Cabinet ministers and Diet members as well, so the term loosely covers Japanese
national-level elected officials.
4
A few previous studies have also considered the issue from both a domestic and international perspective. See Sheila Smith, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2015), 57-100: this chapter focuses on how domestic politics informed
the debate over the Yasukuni Shrine, with special consideration of how Chinese pressure affected the
domestic conversation. Also see Yew Meng Lai, Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan’s Relations
with China: A Neoclassical Realist Interpretation (London: Routledge, 2014), 114-50: Lai’s research
takes a neoclassical approach and systematically examines both international and domestic factors.
He argues that, “a critical examination of the context leading to [Koizumi’s] shrine visits, and the
manner in which they were carefully choreographed and executed, not to mention the diplomatic maneuvering thereafter, suggest that shrewd calculations involving the use of nationalism for domestic
political objectives, and its delicate balancing and trade-off with other factors, were also at play.” Lai
primarily uses U.S. resolve/commitment to Japan and Japan’s diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis China as
his main international independent variables. The main advantage of this study over Lai’s chapter is
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Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
Japanese politicians’ decision-making, and analyzes the behavior of prime ministers
both before and after Koizumi Junichiro.
The first section of this article will provide a historical overview of the “Yasukuni Problem” in Northeast Asia’s regional diplomacy. The second section will discuss how Putnam’s two-level game model can be applied to Yasukuni Shrine visits. The third section
explains the research design of the study, and the fourth section discusses the findings.
The fifth section discusses the broader picture by extending the discussion beyond
prime ministers to consider trends in Cabinet ministers and Diet members’ behavior.
The final section discusses the implications of this study.
A Brief History of the Yasukuni Shrine Controversy in Northeast Asia
The Yasukuni Shrine was built in 1869 during the Meiji era to honor Japanese subjects
who died for the emperor following the Boshin War, which ended the Tokugawa Shogunate. It enshrines almost 2.5 million people, including those who died in the Pacific
War. Thousands of Class-B and Class-C war criminals were discreetly enshrined there
from 1959 until 1970 without causing much international consternation. In 1978,
however, fourteen Class-A war criminals were secretly interred, which became public
knowledge in 1979. Until 1985, when Prime Minister Nakasone bowed to Chinese
pressure and stopped visiting, it had been considered normal for prime ministers to visit the shrine. These visits only became a significant regional issue over the course of the
1980s, when China protested for the first time after Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko’s
1982 visit. South Korea did not react until much later, after Prime Minister Hashimoto
Ryutaro’s 1996 visit.5
The conflict over visits to the Yasukuni Shrine persists to this day because of uncompromising differences in the constitutive principles of what a prime minister’s shrine visit
means. Akihito Tanaka identifies four potential meanings for a shine visit: “mourning
of dead soldiers,” “state intervention in religion,” “justification of aggression,” and “rejection of Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.”6 While Japanese politicians who visit aim to
that it can analyze more recent cases since Lai’s publication, as his chapter focuses on Koizumi’s visits
and Shinzo Abe’s deliberate ambiguity.
5
Even though the origin of this conflict is commonly attributed to the internment of the Class-A war
criminals, Lewentowitcz argues that neither the inclusion of fourteen Class-A war criminals nor the
“official” capacity in which visits were made can fully explain why or when South Korea and China
began reacting, as their reactions were either delayed after or inconsistent for a while following the
revelation of the secret enshrinement and Prime Minister Suzuki’s first “official” visit. Based on his
research, Lewentowicz concludes that Chinese and South Korean reactions have more to do with
the strength and weakness of the Chinese Communist Party in China and democratization and economic development in South Korea than they do with the secret internment. Steven Lewentowicz,
“In Response to Yasukuni: The Curious Approach the Chinese and South Korean Governments Take
Toward an Unresolved Link to the Past,” (Master’s dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013),
67-9, 85-6.
6
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo, East Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the
Resurgence of Nationalism (West Port CT: Prager Security International, 2008), 129.
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restrict the meaning of their visit to the “mourning of dead soldiers,” foreign observers
interpret it as “justification of aggression” and “rejection of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.”7 Before the 1980s, the dominant discourse was restricted to a Japanese understanding of what a shrine visit meant—with vocal but limited dissent from the pacifist
left wing—and neither South Korea nor China understood different meanings. This,
however, changed when South Korea and China began challenging the Japanese understanding and offering their own interpretations: shrine visits signaled “a resurgence
of Japanese militarism” through a rejection of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, and
were thereby justifying Japanese aggression during WWII.8
After Hashimoto, Koizumi was the first prime minister to visit the shrine again. He
visited annually between 2001 and 2006. Koizumi’s uncompromising attitude on the
matter led to deterioration in relations between Japan and Japan’s neighbors, demonstrated through formal diplomatic protests and cancelled meetings.9 After Koizumi’s
August 2001 visit, Beijing initially refused a bilateral summit with Koizumi, but he was
still able to make a fence-mending trip to China in October. After the April 2002 visit,
China postponed scheduled defense exchanges and cancelled Koizumi’s state visit to
China (even though they proceeded with Chinese Communist Party leader Zeng Qinghong’s visit to Japan). After Koizumi paid a visit in January 2003, China demanded a
moratorium on shrine visits as a precondition for high-level talks. Despite this, Koizumi was able to meet with President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of an international event
in St. Petersburg in May. The January 2004 visit maintained the freeze in high-level
diplomacy, and also led to the cancellation of a naval exchange. Relations worsened after his October 2005 visit, when Chinese officials began ignoring their Japanese counterparts even at international events, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) summit held in November of that year. China and South Korea also cancelled
the tripartite meetings that had been conducted as part of the ASEAN Plus Three
(APT) framework. Ironically, Koizumi’s most high profile visit perhaps had the most
limited impact; he stepped down just over a month after his August 2006 visit. Instead
of holding his successor responsible for Koizumi’s recklessness, Beijing worked quickly
to improve relations with Japan.10 Prime ministers since then have tried to salvage the
relationship by pledging to not visit or refraining from visiting.
The status quo was maintained until Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the shrine
in December 2013. After each of his visits, there was a negative reaction from South
Korea and China. For example, in response to Abe’s most recent visit on December 26,
“State intervention in religion” is an important issue within Japan domestically; critics argue that
visits by politicians violate Article 20 of the Constitution, which mandates separation of church and
state. It is an issue that has been addressed by Japanese courts as well. However, this is not a focal point
of the international dispute over the shrine.
8
Lewentowicz, “In Response to Yasukuni,” 103.
9
The Yasukuni Shrine issue is perhaps the most important history-related issue in Japan-China relations. It is still a significant issue in the Japan-South Korea relationship, but the issue of “comfort
women,” a euphemism for sex slaves used by the Japanese Imperial Army, is an even bigger flashpoint.
10
Lai, Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan’s Relations with China, 125-30.
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Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
2013, the South Korean government warned of “huge diplomatic repercussions.”11 A
South Korean government official warned, “All exchanges between Japan and South
Korea may be suspended. We cannot predict what will happen.”12 After Abe’s shrine
visit, South Korea’s defense ministry scrapped a memorandum of understanding between deputy defense ministers to promote more working-level exchanges and called
off a series of defense meetings and military exchange programs that had been scheduled with Japan.13 As relations had already come to a standstill due to tensions over
Abe’s views on history, the shrine visit was consequential because it dashed any possibility of reconciliation in the near future.
After Abe’s visit, there was also a strong reaction from China, which was expressed
through several diplomatic channels. Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang issued
the following statement: “We strongly protest and seriously condemn the Japanese
leader’s acts…Japanese leaders are not only showing no moderation but have doubled
their efforts and created a serious incident on historical issues. … The essence of Japanese leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine is to beautify Japan’s history of militaristic
aggression and colonial rule.” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi summoned Japanese Ambassador to China, Masato Kitera, to lodge China’s protest. Wang said after
the meeting, “This is a grave provocation to international justice and also a ruthless
trampling on human conscience.”14 These statements exemplify the difference between
Chinese observers’ and Japanese politicians’ interpretation of a visit. The Chinese Ambassador to Japan, Cheng Yonghua, also lodged a protest with the Japanese Foreign
Minister.15 The high-level rhetoric did not lead to popular protests, but it deepened the
freeze in diplomatic relations.
This issue is unlikely to disappear from Japan’s relations with South Korea and China.
Instead, it seems that it is becoming further entrenched and problematic. Recently,
South Korean and Chinese media have turned their attention to smaller details, such
as the visiting behavior of junior politicians, and whether an offering is sent in lieu of
Reiji Yoshida and Mizuho Aoki, “Abe visits Yasukuni, angering Beijing and Seoul,” Japan Times, December 17, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/26/national/abes-surprise-visit-to-yasukuni-sparks-criticism.
12
“Abe’s Yasukuni visit stirs hornet’s nest in Beijing, Seoul,” The Asahi Shimbun, December 27, 2013,
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201312270076.
13
Kim Eun-jung, “Seoul cancels defense meetings with Tokyo following war shrine row,” Yonhap News
Agency, December 29, 2013, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/12/28/34/0301000000A
EN20131228001800315F.html.
14
“China attacks Japanese PM’s war shrine visit,” Al Jazeera, December 26, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/asia-pacific/2013/12/china-attacks-japanese-pm-war-shrine-visit-201312264250918500.
html.
15
Reiji Yoshida and Mizuho Aoki, “Abe visits Yasukuni, angering Beijing and Seoul,” Japan Times,
December 17, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/26/national/abes-surprise-visit-toyasukuni-sparks-criticism/.
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the prime minister’s attendance in person.16
Applying Putnam’s Two-Level Game Model to Yasukuni Shrine Visits
In his seminal article about the link between domestic politics and foreign policy,
Robert Putnam argues that central decision-makers are striving to achieve a “winset,” which constitute “win[s]” in two different games simultaneously. This “win-set”
is limited by what is politically acceptable to domestic and international audiences.
Putnam explains, “At the national level…politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups [that pursue their interests by pressuring the government
to adopt favorable policies]. At the international level, national governments seek to
maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse
consequences of foreign developments.”17 The challenge for politicians is to make decisions that create an optimal win-set, which may be contradictory between the two
levels. A visit to the shrine could advance the Japanese politician’s goal domestically,
but undercut his goal internationally, while a non-visit could have the opposite effect.
Specifically, a “win” for Japanese politicians in the international arena would be to improve or maintain good relations with South Korea and China. One way to accomplish
this goal is to not visit the shrine. A typical explanation of how international factors
affect Japanese politicians’ calculations is offered by Daiki Shibuichi, who postulates
that prime ministers abstained from shrine visits after Nakasone because Japan was
still in a de facto “alliance” with China against the Soviet Union over this time period
(it was only under Nakasone that shrine visits became an issue; before him, the international arena was nonexistent because neither South Korea nor China were interested
in the Yasukuni Shrine).18 Up until 1982, there was no diplomatic cost associated with
a shrine visit. But after these costs began to increase, the domestic payoff was no longer
enough to offset the international loss, so Nakasone stopped visiting. Both Nakasone
and Hashimoto specifically cited Japan’s “national interests” when they justified their
decision to discontinue visits.19 Due to the international environment Japan faced—
the exigencies of the Cold War—Japan valued good relations with its “quasi” or “de
facto” allies South Korea and China, and this limited the international “win-set” to a
discontinuation of shrine visits.20
Peter Landers and Yoshio Takahashi, “Japanese Minister Visits Controversial Yasukuni Shrine,” The
Wall Street Journal, April 13, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230387360457949
6782325799234; Jeyup S. Kwaak and James T. Areddy, “South Korea, China React to Yasukuni Shrine
Visits,” The Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2014/08/15/
south-korea-china-react-to-yasukuni-visits.
17
Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International
Organization 42 No. 3 (1988): 434.
18
Daiki Shibuichi. “The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan: Why All the
Fuss?” Asian Survey 45, No. 2 (2005): 209.
19
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo, East Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the
Resurgence of Nationalism (West Port CT: Prager Security International, 2008), 128, 133.
20
Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
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Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
However, a politician may see a visit as relatively inconsequential if he either (a) has
confidence that South Korea and China cannot afford to let their relations with Japan
deteriorate, so they will forgive a visit, or (b) believes that relations with South Korea
and China are already so poor that his visit could not possibly worsen relations even
further. In such situations, the politician could interpret a visit as “neutral.” For the
subject under consideration in this article, a “neutral” outcome from a visit is considered
a part of the “win-set” because in the international arena there are no benefits to shrine
visits—it is a matter of the relative size of the cost.
An example of the first type of “neutral” outcome—when Japanese politicians believe
relations will not deteriorate because Japan has diplomatic leverage over China—would
be Koizumi’s 2002 visit. According to Yew Meng Lai, Koizumi may have calculated
that he could visit without overly negative consequences on Japan-China relations
because China was eager to improve relations to resume Japanese official development
aid (ODA) disbursements, which had been delayed since relations deteriorated after
the 2001 visit. Japanese aid, trade, and investment, which are all important to China’s
continued economic growth, emboldened Koizumi to make his second visit because he
interpreted a visit would be “neutral” in the international arena, meaning that it would
not have significant consequences.21 When Japan values relations with South Korea
and/or China more than South Korea/China value relations with Japan, then Japanese
politicians are likely to proceed more cautiously, while if South Korea and/or China
value the relationship more, Japanese politicians are likely act recklessly.
Abe’s 2013 visit is an example of the second type of a “neutral” outcome, when relations
with South Korea and China pre-visit were already so negative that they could not deteriorate further post-visit. Bilateral summits had stalled since Abe’s election, and had
come to a standstill over history and security issues unrelated to the Yasukuni Shrine.
Abe believed that a Yasukuni Shrine visit simply could not have made relations worse,
making this a “neutral” decision for Abe.
This research examines Japanese politicians’ calculations of whether a visit will result in
a “neutral” outcome or a “loss,” and how it is related to Japan’s perception of its changing relationship with South Korea and China.22 If relations with South Korea and/
or China are improving, Japan has more to lose from a visit. Since the relationship is
starting at a better place, a shrine visit would cause the relationship to deteriorate dramatically. A visit during a period of rapprochement is more likely to be seen as a “loss”
than when relations with South Korea and/or China have been deteriorating. If relations with South Korea and/or China are deteriorating, however, a visit is more likely
to be seen as a “neutral” outcome because relations simply do not have as far to fall.
Lai, Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan’s Relations with China, 137.
This measure was chosen because it is impossible to measure whether Japan or South Korea/China value their bilateral relationship more, and because it makes more sense to evaluate the state of
relations in the context of more recent developments rather than based on some arbitrary, absolute
standard of what constitutes a “good” or “bad” state of relations.
21
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A “win” for Japanese politicians in the other game, the domestic arena, is keeping office.
Depending on the coalition that put the prime minister in power, visiting the shrine
could be a key part of fulfilling this goal. If a proposed agreement (moratorium on
visits) threatens the chief negotiator’s coalition, he is unlikely to endorse it (pledge not
to visit).23 Interparty elections matter, of course, but because Japan is a parliamentary
system, so do intraparty elections. Thus, the prime minister and his Cabinet’s overall popularity are important because of the ever-present possibility of dissolution and
snap elections. Domestic interest groups, such as the pro-shrine Japan Association of
Bereaved Families ( JABF), can play an important role in intraparty elections, especially for their natural allies, the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).24 JABF,
known as Izokukai in Japanese, has traditionally been “a major source of votes for the
LDP” in general elections, and from the 1990s onward, “[their] vote could make or
break a run at the leadership of the [LDP] and the prime minister’s office.”25
The most common explanation for why Koizumi continued visiting annually, despite
the consistent and predictable negative reaction from China and South Korea, focuses
on pressure by domestic interest groups, such as JABF. Because of nationalist groups’
close ties to the LDP, “its leaders are vulnerable to demands for official visits to the
Yasukuni Shrine.”26 However, it is important to consider individual prime ministers’
ideological beliefs as an intermediary that “translates” the input from the JABF into
the output of political behavior. JABF pressure alone is not a convincing explanation
for why Koizumi continued to visit, because the number of bereaved family members—and the number of votes they could get—was declining over the course of his
tenure. During this time, the JABF’s influence not only declined numerically, but their
views also became more nuanced and less categorically supportive of shrine visits.27
Furthermore, even in earlier periods when conservative political pressure groups had
been more powerful, they did not have a uniform affect on prime ministers; Japanese
prime ministers in the past either chose not to visit or, like Nakasone and Hashimoto,
reversed their choice to visit in the face of international pressure.28 As the JABF becomes less influential, the potential “win” in the domestic arena from a shrine visit is
also shrinking.
Domestic explanations focus on the role of such interest groups as well as interparty
Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 458.
Lai, Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan’s Relations with China, 118.
25
Sheila Smith, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2015), 70, 72.
26
For Japanese rightists, accepting critics’ negative image of Yasukuni Shrine is “tantamount to admitting that Japanese history of the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries was a mistake,” and,
therefore, they push for prime ministers to visit the shrine as a representative of the state to validate
the sacrifices made by the deceased. Shibuichi, 199-201.
27
Smith, Intimate Rivals, 89, 97-9.
28
Yusuke Shirai, “An Institutional Approach: Japan’s Prime Minsiter Junichiro Koizumi’s
Controversial Visits to the Controversial Yasukuni Shrine,” (Master’s diss., University of Georgia,
2007), 65-7.
23
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Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
competition and interparty factionalism. Yusuki Shirai explains Koizumi’s visits in
the context of the declining power of the Japan Socialist Party ( JSP) and changes in
the balance of power within the ruling LDP’s factions.29 According to Shirai’s institutionalist explanation, Koizumi could continue to visit every year—despite the diplomatic costs—due to the decline of the China-friendly JSP and the weakening of
the “pro-China” Tanaka faction within the LDP.30 Even though international costs
were increasing, domestic costs were also decreasing—because neither the JSP nor the
Tanaka faction had the ability to punish him—so Koizumi could continue his visits.31
Even though the JSP is no longer a relevant factor in Japanese politics, some parties
do openly oppose visits, such as the New Komeito Party, the LDP’s junior coalition
partner, and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the second largest party after the
LDP. Therefore, the impact of domestic pressure groups is still a relevant factor in a
prime minister’s decision-making.
In the domestic arena, whether a shrine visit is a “win” or a “loss” depends on the particular coalition that supports the prime minister. There is a mutual dependency between politicians and their supporters, as politicians are unlikely to solicit the support
of pro-shrine groups unless the politicians themselves attach a positive meaning to a
shrine visit, and pro-shrine groups are unlikely to offer their support unless the politician was inclined to be sympathetic to their views. This research uses politicians’ stated
preferences regarding the shrine visits as a proxy measure for how likely they are to be
supported by and rely on pro-shrine visit groups.
This research also considers the overall strength of the politician, because there is domestic opposition to shrine visits within Japan. Public opinion is the greatest check
on a politician’s potential visit. As the Japanese public becomes more socialized to
the international costs of shrine visits, they grow increasingly opposed to such visits;
therefore, this research measures the strength of the prime minister and his Cabinet to
ascertain whether the prime minister is in a strong enough position to withstand the
anticipated domestic backlash.
Table 1. lays out the different ways that Japanese politicians could calculate whether
visiting the shrine would constitute a “win” (or “neutral”), or a “loss” in the two different arenas. Yasukuni Shrine visits are a clear way to apply Putnam’s two-level game
metaphor, where different prime ministers try to achieve a “win-set” of maintaining
office and achieving good relations with neighbors, because “No matter how much
[supporters of shrine visits] may want this to be a domestic matter, it will have foreign
Shirai, “An Institutional Approach,” 16.
Shirai, “An Institutional Approach,” 31, 36-7.
31
Another potential domestic benefit to visiting the shrine is issue linkage. See Phil Deans, “Diminishing Returns? Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in the Context of East Asian
Nationalisms,” East Asia 24 No. 3 (2007): appealing to the ultra-right base through shrine visits helped
bolster Koizumi’s position within the LDP so that he could push through his economic and postal
reform program over the objections of members of his own party.
29
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policy and security consequences for Japan.”32
Table 1. Modeling the Wins and Losses from the International and Domestic Perspectives
How Japanese politicians perceive the domestic political environment
How Japanese
politicians
perceive Japan’s
relationship
with South
Korea and
China
Ideologically value shrine visits (allied with pro-shrine visit
groups) and domestically popular
enough to withstand backlash
from a visit >> visit is a domestic
“win”
Ideologically do not value shrine
visits (not allied with pro-shrine
visit groups) and domestically popular enough to withstand
backlash from a visit >> visit is
domestically “neutral” OR
Ideologically do not value shrine
visits (not allied with pro-shrine
visit groups) and not domestically popular enough to withstand
backlash from a visit >> visit is a
domestic “loss” OR
Ideologically value shrine visits (allied with pro-shrine visit groups) but not domestically
popular enough to withstand
backlash from a visit >> visit is a
domestic “loss”
Japan’s relationship with China
and/or South
Korea is improving >> Visit
is internationally
a “loss”
Outcome: ?
Outcome: No Visit
Japan’s relationship with China
and/or South
Korea is deteriorating >> Visit
is internationally a “neutral”
outcome
Outcome: Visit
Outcome: No Visit
Sheila Smith, “Abe’s Yasukuni Visit: The Consequences?” Council for Foreign Relations: Asia Unbound, December 30, 2013, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2013/12/30/abes-yasukuni-visit-the-consequences.
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Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
This article is primarily interested in examining two propositions from Putnam’s work.
First, if a choice must be made because an action would have contradictory consequences in the two different arenas (as is the case in the upper left quadrant), Putnam
expects the chief negotiator to “give primacy to his domestic calculus … not least because his own incumbency often depends on his standing [in the domestic arena].”33
This study will test his prediction by directly comparing how well international versus
domestic factors correlate with expected behavior by Japanese politicians. Second, this
article explores the chief negotiator’s proclivity to act as a “veto player.” A central decision-maker can act as a “veto player” when they put their parochial interests first and
contravene the negotiator-approved international agreement. Central decision-makers
are more likely to “veto” an “agreement” when their interests (i.e., winning support
from Japanese conservatives) diverge from the interests of those they represent (i.e.,
the security of all Japanese citizens).34 In this case, the hypothetical “agreement” would
be an informal moratorium on shrine visits, and the prime minister would “veto” it by
visiting.
Research Design and Hypotheses
Scope of the Study: Why Yasukuni?
The population of cases relevant to my research question is the range of actions that
Japanese politicians could take that worsens relations with South Korea and China,
but have domestic benefits. This study will focus on the particular range of such actions that (1) pit a politician’s personal domestic interest against his/her state’s national
security interest, but (2) have little to no material cost to execute and little to no immediate material benefit, and (3) are laden with emotional import in that particular relational context. This study chooses to focus on symbolic provocative behaviors, because
more concrete behaviors have substantial costs and benefits that must also be taken
into account. For example, lifting the arms export ban or reinterpreting the Japanese
Constitution to allow for collective self-defense are actions that, depending on the
interpretation of Japan’s intention behind theses actions in South Korea and China,
could worsen Japan’s relationships with these two countries. However, by strengthening
Japan’s defense industry and increasing Japan’s deterrence capability, such actions carry
substantial benefits to Japan. In such cases, the material benefits of the action may
outweigh the costs to the relationship with South Korea and China.
Of the population of potential symbolic gestures, this article analyzes Yasukuni Shrine
visits for three reasons. The first is that Yasukuni Shrine visits are actions, while comments that unnerve South Korean and Chinese sensibilities about Japan’s colonial and
imperial history (e.g., comfort women or the Nanjing Massacre) are “just” words. Actions indicate that a conscious choice had been made, and even after reflecting on
the costs, the actor decided to proceed. Second, focusing on shrine visits eliminates
33
34
Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 457.
Ibid., 460.
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incidents of provocation engineered by non-elected actors. For example, controversies
over the content of textbooks are the outcomes of complex bureaucratic decision-making procedures that politicians do not fully control. Ministers are political appointees,
but bureaucrats do not face the same pressure as elected officials to appeal to an electorate. Therefore, they do not fit into the structure of Putnam’s two-level metaphor;
bureaucrats care about Japan’s security, but they are not accountable to the public, so
they are not constrained by the domestic calculus. The third reason for the selection
of shrine visits is the clarity and consistency of measurement, and the relative ease
with which non-events can be measured. It is hard to anticipate when a disparaging
remark about Japan’s imperial history could have been made but was not.35 However,
with shrine visits, it is easy to observe when a politician could have visited but did not.
There are very specific days during the calendar year when visits are more likely, and a
non-visit on one of those days can be interpreted as a political decision.
Scope of the Study: Why 1998?
This study is limited to relevant cases from fall 1998 to the present.36 Chief Cabinet
Secretary Nonaka Hiromu’s statement in the prelude to Kim Dae-Jung and Jiang Zemin’s state visits to Japan in October and November, respectively, clearly set the standard that Japanese politicians have a responsibility to give South Korean and Chinese
feelings “consideration” when deciding whether to visit the Yasukuni Shrine or not.
At a pivotal press conference on August 5, Nonaka said, “Without having achieved
sufficient understanding from neighboring countries, it is best to refrain from visiting
because that is the best way for a member of the government to prevent unnecessary
misunderstanding or irritation.”37 Thus, fall 1998 marks the beginning of the period
of interest—instead of the end of the Cold War—because this statement by Nonaka clearly acknowledged Japanese politicians’ recognition that shrine visits have the
potential to disrupt Japan’s relationship with South Korea and China. It took a few
repetitions after 1982 for Japanese politicians to adapt to South Korea and China’s new
priorities, but after the fall of 1998, no Japanese politicians could feign ignorance about
the potential international consequences of a visit.38
It is possible to anticipate the approval of new textbooks and teaching guidelines or the publication
of the annual White Paper and Diplomatic Bluebook, but, as bureaucratic outputs, once a change has
been made in a previous cycle or year, it takes on a life of its own through path dependency.
36
This research ends with December 2014 because the last Cabinet Office polls were conducted during
that time.
37
“小渕首相、野中官房長官は靖国参拝見送 (PM Obuchi and CCS Nonaka will forego Yasukuni
Shrine worship),” The Asahi Shimbun, May 8, 1999. Author’s translation.
38
1998 also represents a generational change in Japan’s political leadership. See Daiki Shibuchi, “The
Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan,” 11: On one hand, younger generations
may be more willing to visit because while Nakasone’s generation are “often deeply concerned about
Asian affairs” due to their wartime experiences, Koizumi’s generation’s “worldview … tends to encompass only Western countries.” On the other hand, younger generations may feel less attached to
the shrine because they are no longer of an age to personally know or remember the war dead. Either
way, the cut-off controls for such generational differences in penitent attitudes towards South Korea
and China.
33
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Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
Types of Events: The Dependent Variable
There are fifty-two discrete events over the time period of this study, which can be
divided into three types: seven visits, thirty-six non-visits, and nine offerings. Offerings
are a proxy for either a visit or a non-visit depending on the prime minister’s preferences (discussed in more detail later). Visits usually have a negative effect on Japan’s
relationship with South Korea and China, and they are most likely during significant
days for shrine celebrations. These days include the Spring Festival, usually on April
21, 22, or 23, the Fall Festival, usually on October 17, 18, or 19, and Victory-Japan
(VJ) Day on August 15. The Spring and Fall Festivals are the most important days for
the performance of religious duties. VJ Day is particularly sensitive for South Korea
and China because it commemorates Japan’s defeat in WWII and Korea’s liberation
from Japan. Visits have occurred on other days as well for various reasons; for example,
a politician may attempt to mitigate controversy or commemorate a special event in
his personal history by visiting. A non-visit is coded as a signal of diplomatic intent to
improve or maintain relations when it falls on one of the three potential dates discussed
above. Visits are gestures that signal unresponsiveness to anticipated international condemnation. Non-visits are responsive gestures.39
Offerings on potential visit dates represent a compromise between a visit and a non-visit, reflecting the balancing act between satisfying the demands of domestic supporters
with the maintenance of good relations with South Korea and China. Whether an offering was made because the politician was responsive or unresponsive to international
condemnation depends on the prime minister’s inclination towards a visit. If the prime
minister had expressed a desire to visit, an offering is coded as a non-visit, because
potential international backlash changed the politician’s calculus. If the prime minister did not express the desire to visit, but sends an offering, it is coded as a visit because consideration of domestic politics—the need to solicit support from conservative
groups—led him to make a token gesture. The two prime ministers who sent offerings
are Shinzo Abe and Aso Taro; it is known that these two politicians generally support
shrine visits, yet their actions were responsive to international pressure. Therefore, these
nine instances are coded as non-visits.
International and Domestic Outlook: The Hypotheses and Independent Variables
This research tests whether the correlation between changes in the value of the independent variables and the value of the dependent variable provide greater support for
internationally-oriented or domestically-oriented hypotheses. The four hypotheses are
as follows:
Additionally, four prime ministers went further and pledged that they would not visit while prime
minister: Fukuda on September 16, 2007, Hatoyama on August 12, 2009, Kan on June 15, 2010, and
Noda on September 2, 2011. Koizumi Junichiro, on the other hand, pledged on April 15, 2001 that he
would visit every year.
39
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H1a: When Japan perceives its relationship with South Korea is improving, Japanese politicians are more likely to respond to an anticipated negative reaction from South Korea (not visit).
H1b: When Japan perceives its relationship with China is improving,
Japanese politicians are more likely to respond to an anticipated negative reaction from China (not visit).
H2a: When the prime minister does not personally support a shrine
visit—he does not rely on the support of pro-shrine groups—he is
more likely to respond to an anticipated negative reaction from China
and South Korea (not visit).
H2b: When the prime minister and his Cabinet have low approval
ratings—he is likely to be negatively affected by a domestic backlash—he is more likely to respond to an anticipated negative reaction
from China and South Korea (not visit).
In the first hypothesis, when relations are on an upward trajectory, Japan has more
to lose from provocative gestures. Meanwhile, if relations are already declining, then
Japan does not have as much to lose, so politicians are more willing to suffer South Korean and Chinese condemnation. Japan’s perception of South Korea and China will be
measured by the Cabinet Office’s annual opinion polls, which are conducted in the fall,
as the percentage of respondents who believe that relations with South Korea or China
are “good” or “very good.” If the percentage of those who believe relations are “good”
or “very good” increases, that is coded as Japan perceiving its relationship with said
state as improving. If the percentage decreases, the relationship is seen as deteriorating.
A minimum criterion of two percent change will be imposed to ensure the change is
meaningful. These opinion poll numbers are compiled in Table 2.
There are two issues with this measure that must be acknowledged. First, this measure
does not capture small changes over the course of the year. Politicians may react more
strongly to recent changes rather than year-on-year changes. Additionally, the timing
of events may have a disproportionate impact on this measure. Incidents that occur
in September or October may have greater impact than in other times of the year.40
The second problem is variable endogeneity; it is impossible to ascertain if relations
deteriorated during the course of the year because of shrine visits, or if deteriorating
relations enabled politicians to visit the shrine after deciding a visit would be a “win/
neutral” instead of a “loss.”
For example, even if relations deteriorate dramatically in the spring over textbook controversies,
that will not be captured in public opinion polls from fall-to-fall. Furthermore, the trawler crash
between Japan and China in September 2010 could have a disproportionate impact on the dramatic
change between 2009 to 2010 simply because it occurred in September, right before the poll was conducted in October—indeed, the percentage of those who perceived relations with China to be “good”
or “very good” dropped from 38.5 percent to 8.3 percent.
40
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Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
Table 2. Public Opinion of Japan’s Relationships with South Korea and China
H1a: Japan-South Korea
Relations
H1b: Japan-China
Relations
Good/Very Good
Good/Very Good
Obuchi
40.3
45.6
11/19-29, 1998
Obuchi
42.8
41.5
9/30-10/10, 1999
Obuchi
52.1
44.6
10/19-29, 2000
Mori
51.4
42.5
10/11-21, 2001
Koizumi
42
41.3
10/10-20, 2002
Koizumi
58.3
47.2
10/23-11/2, 2003
Koizumi
59.8
46.9
10/7-17, 2004
Koizumi
55.5
28.1
10/6-16, 2005
Koizumi
39.6
19.7
10/5-15, 2006
Abe
34.4
21.7
10/4-14, 2007
Fukuda
49.9
26.4
10/9-19, 2008
Aso
49.5
23.7
10/15-25, 2009
Hatoyama
66.5
38.5
10/21-31, 2010
Kan
59.9
8.3
9/29-10/16, 2011
Noda
58.5
18.8
9/27-10/7, 2012
Noda
18.4
4.8
9/26-10/6, 2013
Abe
21.1
6.8
10/16-26, 2014
Abe
12.2
5.3
Cabinet Office
Survey Dates41
Prime
Minister
9/25-10/5, 1997
Source: Japan’s Cabinet Office.
Note: Bolded numbers represent changes ≥2.0%.
However, despite these weaknesses, these public opinion polls remain the best measure
of the evolution of public opinion. Because they were collected over the entire period
of time under consideration, they provide a consistent and coherent picture of public
opinion. These issues do not undermine the essential arguments of the research because
When surveys coincided with the Fall Festival, the trend from the year before was used to generate
a prediction.
41
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they still capture how the Japanese perceive their relationship with South Korea and
China, which shapes politicians’ calculus about the costs of their actions.
The second hypothesis evaluates how domestic politics shape Japanese politicians’ responsiveness to anticipated South Korean and Chinese condemnation. Domestic politics are measured by (1) the prime minister’s expressed preference for shrine visits
before becoming prime minister—based on statements and visits made before his premiership—as a proxy for support by conservative groups, and (2) opinion polls measuring “support” ratings for the prime minister and his Cabinet conducted by Nippon
Housou Kyoukai (NHK).
The prime minister’s expressed preference for shrine visits will be used as a proxy measure for the strength of pro-shrine interest groups’ influence. Pro-shrine groups are
more likely to support prime ministers who have a strong personal inclination or motivation to visit. If the prime minister was ideologically opposed to shrine visits, he
would not seek—or gain—those groups’ support. The conventional wisdom is that a
visit to the shrine helps the politician win the support of conservatives domestically;
however, if the prime minster does not have ties to groups that promote shrine visits,
he is not reliant on them and has no need to appease them.42 Furthermore, if the public
opposes shrine visits, then a visit could weaken his power, particularly when the support gained from the interest group does not outweigh the loss of political power from
widespread domestic condemnation.
Shrine visits encapsulate a complicated nexus of issues as discussed in the historical
overview of the “Yasukuni Problem.” A prime minister could be disinclined to visit
because they disagree with the meaning attached to a politicians’ visit to the shrine
before they even consider the impact of such a visit on relations with South Korea and
China. It is important to consider what the prime minister himself believes, because, as
Putnam indicates, the chief negotiator is not always acting as an “honest broker”—his
personal views matter as well.43
The ten prime ministers’ expressed preferences are a dichotomous variable. The first
category includes those prime ministers who did not express an inclination to visit in
the past. Some have clearly expressed a disinclination to visit. Some do not specify why
they do not want to visit, for example Fukuda Yasuo, but usually it is because they are
morally opposed to the enshrinement of the fourteen Class-A war criminals, which
was explicitly expressed by Hatoyama and Kan. The second category includes those
prime ministers who expressed a preference to visit by making strongly positive statements about the meaning of a shrine visit. They are categorized in Table 3.
Because JABF is aligned with the LDP, this matters more to the LDP than it does to the DPJ, and
more in the context of intraparty elections for LDP presidencies than interparty national elections.
43
Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 458.
42
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Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
Table 3. Prime Ministers’ Preferences
Category
Cases (Prime Ministers)
1. No preference to visit
Fukuda Yasuo, Hatoyama Yukio, Kan Naoto
2.Preference to visit, based on past behavior
and statements
Obuchi Keizo, Mori Yoshiro, Koizumi Junichiro, Abe Shinzo (2006-07), Aso Taro, Noda
Yoshihiko, Abe Shinzo (2012-present)
Though this paper does not explicitly consider the prime ministers’ party affiliation, it is
important to note here the difference between the LDP, which generally supports visits, and the DPJ, which generally opposes visits. Though there is a difference between
parties, this research uses individual’s personal beliefs instead of party affiliation. The
decision to visit or not is a personal choice as well as a political matter. Furthermore,
there are instances of LDP prime ministers who oppose visits (e.g., Fukuda) and DPJ
prime ministers who support visits (e.g., Noda), which shows that party affiliation is
not entirely predictive of behavior in this situation.
In addition to the prime minister’s relationship with pro-shrine visit groups and party
affiliation, another important domestic factor to consider is the prime minister’s standing with the general public. Japan is a parliamentary democracy. Generally, the Japanese public wants good relations with South Korea and China. As the public becomes
socialized to the costs of shrine visits, they are more likely to oppose it. As Lai analyzes,
citizens were made more aware of how shrine visits influence Japan’s relationship with
China and South Korea during Koizumi’s tenure: “The average Japanese started questioning the wisdom of continuing such visits, in light of the searing images of massive
Chinese, anti-Japanese demonstrations, and widespread international criticisms that
cost Japan dearly, in diplomatic terms.”44
This point is made clear by examining how support for shrine visits, as measured by
public opinion surveys, dropped over time. Leading up to the 2001 visit, there was
broad public support for Koizumi’s visit according to various public opinion polls, including Nippon Broadcasting System (August 3, 76 percent support), TV Asahi (August
4, 59 percent support), and Fuji Television Network (August 10, 49 percent support).45
Prior to his 2003 visit, Mainichi found that 47 percent supported Koizumi’s visit and
43 percent opposed it, but after the visit, 44 percent supported it and 48 percent opposed it. By the time Abe took office in 2006, a Mainichi poll found that 48 percent
opposed a visit and only 39 percent supported it.
If a prime minister is predisposed to visit the shrine, then he is more likely to visit
when he is experiencing high levels of public support. The stronger the prime minister
is domestically, the more he can withstand domestic backlash after a visit. However,
44
45
Lai, Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan’s Relations with China, 129.
Ibid., 134-5.
Winter 2016 [139]
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a visit-inclined prime minister could visit even when he is domestically weak to use
the issue to rally support from a smaller but more energized core. If he is already
extremely unpopular, rallying this core could be worth the further loss in general support. In 2002, Koizumi might have been trying to rally the traditionalists to support
his economic reform agenda, and in 2004, to garner support for his position on the
Self-Defense Forces dispatch that would be debated in the upcoming Diet session.46
Another consideration is that a shrine visit can burnish the prime minister’s credentials
with the general public by proving that he can “stand up” to China. This final variable
was not considered for prime ministers who did not want to visit the shrine. It would
be unlikely for a visit-disinclined prime minister to base his decision on such a variable
because of his domestic standing; visit-disinclined prime ministers do not have the
institutional ties to translate support from pro-shrine visit groups into positive support
that can compensate for a loss of support from the general public.
Whether the prime minister was domestically strong or weak was determined by the
percentage of those who supported the Cabinet according to NHK’s monthly opinion
poll. Political strength is calibrated to the individual prime minister by calculating the
average “support” that they experienced over the entirety of the premiership. If, in the
month before the event, his support rate was higher than his average “support” rate, he
was domestically strong, but if his “support” rate was lower than his average, he was
domestically weak. Table 4 shows the average “support” rate for each visit-inclined
prime minister and his “support” rate a month before each of the events. Popularity is
calibrated because each prime minister has a different base level of popularity; what
might be considered very “good” numbers for one prime minister could be considered very “bad” numbers for another. For example, Koizumi is unequivocally the most
popular contemporary prime minister—so his benchmark for when he is domestically
“strong” is very different from the benchmark of his much less popular predecessor,
Mori Yoshiro.
Other Potential Hypotheses
There are several other potential variables that this article did not consider but could
be explored in future research. For instance, changes in how Japan perceives its relationship with the United States and North Korea could influence shrine visits. Japan’s
relationship with the United States is important to consider because the United States
wants Japan to cooperate more closely with South Korea, preferably as quasi-allies,
so antagonizing South Korea too often has the potential to strain relations between
Japan and the United States. Maintaining the U.S.-Japan relationship is still Japan’s
most important foreign policy goal. The threat of North Korea could also influence
how much value Japan places on its relationship with South Korea and China; if North
Korea is believed to be more of a threat, then Japan could place greater priority on
improving coordination with South Korea and China. A more estranged United States
46
47
Lai, Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan’s Relations with China, 138, 143.
For Abe, the cut-off was October 2014, the last month under consideration.
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Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
Table 4. The Domestic Popularity of Visit-Inclined Prime Ministers
Obuchi:
“Support” Average 38%
Mori:
“Support” Average 22%
Koizumi:
“Support” Average 55%
Abe:
“Support” Average 45%
Aso:
“Support” Average 29%
Noda:
“Support” Average 33%
Month
“Support” Rating
Strength
August 1998
23%
Weak
March 1999
34%
Weak
July 1999
44%
Strong
September 1999
48%
Strong
March 2000
/
/
July 2000
28%
Strong
September 2000
28%
Strong
March 2001
9%
Weak
July 2001
77%
Strong
September 2001
74%
Strong
March 2002
51%
Weak
July 2002
42%
Weak
September 2002
55%
Strong
December 2002
61%
Strong
March 2003
45%
Weak
July 2003
55%
Strong
September 2003
61%
Strong
December 2003
46%
Weak
March 2004
54%
Weak
July 2004
43%
Weak
September 2004
43%
Weak
March 2005
46%
Weak
July 2005
46%
Weak
September 2005
58%
Strong
April 2006
51%
Weak
August 2006
46%
Weak
September 2006
/
/
March 2007
44%
Weak
July 2007
38%
Weak
September 2008
48%
Strong
March 2009
18%
Weak
July 2009
21%
Weak
September 2011
60%
Strong
March 2012
33%
Strong
July 2012
27%
Weak
September 2012
31%
Weak
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Abe:
“Support” Average 57%
March 2013
66%
Strong
July 2013
57%
Strong
September 2013
59%
Strong
November 2013
60%
Strong
March 2014
51%
Weak
July 2014
47%
Weak
September 2014
58%
Strong
or more dangerous North Korea could increase Japanese politicians’ responsiveness
to anticipated downturns in their relationship with their South Korean and Chinese
counterparts.
A few other factors to consider include how supportive Japanese politicians believed
U.S. officials would be of their visits (potentially based on U.S. officials’ past reactions
to visits by Japanese politicians), how clearly South Korean and Chinese policymakers
communicated their potential reaction in the face of a visit, and how strongly South
Korean and Chinese policymakers exerted pressure to prevent a visit. Greater foreign
pressure could reinforce politicians resolve to visit in order to prove their conservative
credentials by “standing up” to Chinese “interference” in domestic affairs.48 These hypotheses were not tested in this essay because it is very difficult to measure estrangement from the United States, fear of North Korea, U.S. support for shrine visits, and
South Korean and Chinese pressure against shrine visits.
Findings
The success rate for each hypothesis was measured as the number of times a prediction
was correct divided by the number of times a prediction could have been made based
on the data available. Domestic strength (for only those prime ministers inclined to
visit) had the highest success rate, at 56.1 percent. Relations with South Korea had a
50 percent success rate, relations with China a 42.5 percent success rate, and personal
inclination of the prime minister—as a proxy for support by pro-shrine visit groups—
was calculated to be successful in 30.8 percent of the cases. These findings are summarized in Table 5 and Table 6. Prime ministers who had expressed a strong desire to visit
were emboldened to do so when they were in a strong domestic position. Relations
with South Korea and China performed at about the same rate, at close to 50 percent;
the status of relations with China and South Korea had an unpredictable effect on the
prime minister’s actions.
Individual preference of the prime minister performed poorly, but there is insight to
be gained by disaggregating the results between visit-inclined and visit-disinclined
prime ministers. For visit-disinclined politicians, the success rate is 100 percent;
therefore, every prime minister who expressed a distaste for visiting did not visit.
48
Smith, Intimate Rivals, 81.
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Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
For only visit-inclined politicians, the success rate is as low as 16.3 percent. This finding
means that even prime ministers who want to visit usually do not. Prime ministers generally do not act as irresponsible “veto” players who annul the informal agreements that
prevent visits. Despite all the hype about Yasukuni Shrine visits, visits tend to be the
exception, not the rule.
Table 5. Results for International Variables
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Table 6. Results for Domestic Variables
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Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
In addition to analyzing the decisions of prime ministers, this study also collected the
number of Cabinet ministers and Diet members who visited Yasukuni Shrine on every
visitable moment since the 1998 Fall Festival to the 2014 Fall Festival, as shown in
Table 7.
The number of Cabinet ministers who visit the Shrine is dependent on the type of
visitable moment: significantly more Cabinet ministers visit on VJ Day than on the
Spring or Fall Festival, regardless of the prime minister. Year-on-year changes strongly
reflect the preference of the presiding prime minister. This finding is logical because
These numbers only include visits on the exact days. Furthermore, “Diet members” includes only
those who visited as part of the “Let’s Everyone Worship” delegation in person. It does not include
retired politicians, politicians who chose to visit as individuals, or politicians who sent an aide in their
stead.
49
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Table 7. Visits by Cabinet Ministers and Diet Members, 1998-201450
The data was collected from Asahi and Yomiuri newspapers and is compiled in the table above.
Blank spaces indicate cases for which data could not be found. In any case of discrepancy between the
numbers reported by Asahi and Yomiuri, the number reported by Asahi is given on the right of the
slash and the number reported by Yomiuri is given on the left of the slash.
50
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the prime minister appoints his Cabinet ministers, so he is likely to choose political and
ideological allies. This overview reveals that the number of visits by Cabinet ministers
is not particularly responsive to changes in the international environment. Instead, it
reflects the prime minister’s own opinion toward shrine visits.51 Eight or nine Cabinet
ministers visited on VJ Day under both Obuchi Keizo and Mori’s premiership; considering the conservative tendencies of both prime ministers and the relatively low-profile nature of shrine visits before Koizumi, this finding is unsurprising. While neither
Obuchi nor Mori visited, South Korea and China did not vehemently react to Cabinet
ministers’ visits. However, Koizumi’s visits politicized the issue of Cabinet ministers’
visits. Interestingly, the number of Cabinet ministers who visited the Shrine on VJ Day
under Koizumi decreased to four or five per year, eventually tapering to two, despite the
fact that Koizumi visited while Obuchi and Mori did not. This may reflect new costs to
Cabinet ministers’ visits as well as Cabinet ministers’ socialization to these costs.
It would appear that the norm of non-visits by Cabinet ministers became institutionalized through a series of LDP and DPJ prime ministers who chose not to visit, yet
that trend reversed itself following Abe’s re-election. Since the 2013 Spring Festival,
one to three Cabinet ministers have visited during every single visitable moment. These
visits by Abe’s Cabinet ministers are likely to continue. Cabinet visits will be a continued source of low-level conflict with South Korea and China. Because these ministers
know they have Abe’s endorsement for visits, they will continue to visit despite the
international response.
Diet members’ visits show similar patterns to those of Cabinet ministers, except for a
significant difference between visits on VJ Day and the Spring or Fall Festivals. For
Diet members, the Festivals appear to be more important than VJ Day. Diet members
show a similar pattern to Cabinet ministers in that their numbers initially increase under Koizumi, then decrease towards the very end of his tenure, and then increase again
after Abe’s re-election. While Diet members might be unresponsive to changes in the
Under Koizumi, of the seventeen individual Cabinet ministers who visited the shrine during at least
one VJ Day period (not just VJ Day, but also including those who visited a few days before VJ Day),
only four of them stopped visiting before they were replaced in a Cabinet reshuffle. Of course, more
Cabinet ministers may have shown a change in behavior if they had kept their ministerial position,
but it is telling that the fluctuation in number of Cabinet ministers depends on administrative reshuffling.
51
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international environment, they appear to respond to immediate criticism from South
Korea and China. While Koizumi was prime minister, the largest delegation of Diet
members (101 members) coincided with his fifth visit during the 2005 Fall Festival,
but on his sixth visit on VJ Day 2006, only fifty-six Diet members accompanied him.
Yet, even sustained international criticism can be overcome by favorable domestic conditions. Even though Abe never visited during a visitable moment, many Diet members
were emboldened to visit during his second tenure, and the number of Diet members
who visited regularly reached triple digits. In comparison, before Abe’s re-election, the
only time the number of Diet members reached triple digits was the Spring Festival
under Obuchi and Mori’s premierships, and Koizumi’s Fall Festival visit.
No clear pattern emerges for either Cabinet ministers or Diet members. The lack of
correlation may be a result of the anonymity of the position of a Diet member. A visit
by one additional Diet member is not nearly as significant as the prime minister or
Cabinet minister’s visit. The difference between eighty-nine or ninety Diet members
visiting the shrine is insignificant—the headline in South Korea and China will be
equally sensational. For Cabinet ministers and Diet members, shrine visits are solely a
function of domestic politics. When the country leans conservative, shrine-supporting
Diet members are more likely to be elected and select a prime minister who is more
conservative and will, in turn, appoint Cabinet ministers who share his ideology.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the status quo decision for Japanese politicians regarding Yasukuni
Shrine visits is to be responsive to anticipated South Korean and Chinese condemnation—and therefore not visit the shrine. Even those prime ministers with a strong
preference to visit, such as Obuchi, Mori, Aso, and Noda, refrain from visiting once
they attain the position of prime minister. However, this baseline can be overcome by
leaders, such as Koizumi and Abe, who have a strong will to visit, are voluntarily “captured” by pro-shrine groups, and are sufficiently popular to withstand domestic backlash. A prime minister who is determined to visit is unlikely to be deterred by changes
in the perception of Japan’s relationship with South Korea and China. Yet, Japanese
politicians prioritize a “win” in the international arena; the international costs of a visit
are rarely perceived to be worth the domestic benefits, so politicians choose to not visit.
Even though they are more responsive to domestic than international factors, a “win”
in the domestic arena is not worth the negative international consequences of a visit.
To answer two questions posed in Putnam’s work, according to these results, domestic
politics do matter more than international politics, and central decision-makers do not
act as profligate veto players. The changes in perception of Japan’s relationship with
South Korea and China have little effect on politicians’ decisions. However, visit-inclined politicians are more likely to visit when they are in a strong domestic position
than when they are not—so they are responsive to changes in domestic politics. This
supports Putnam’s impression that domestic politics matter more than international politics. Second, even though Yasukuni Shrine visits are an easy way for central
decision-makers to act as “veto players” because they can easily circumvent all other
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Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
political and bureaucratic actors, they often do not. Theoretically, this research shows
that even if central decision-makers have the opportunity to act as “veto players,” that
does not necessarily mean that they will. Because politicians prefer a “win” over a “neutral” outcome or a “loss” in the international arena, they are likely to continue to exercise restraint regarding decisions to visit the Yasukuni Shrine. Furthermore, these
findings are cause for optimism for the future of Northeast Asian politics; they offer
hope that future politicians will also uphold the norm of non-visits.
The findings of this study are important, because these findings show that politicians
generally recognize the international costs of their actions. As a conservative prime
minister who believes in the importance of paying tribute to the war dead at Yasukuni
Shrine, Abe is unlikely to ever declare that he will not visit; however, he has also exercised more restraint than was predicted by his critics. What is Abe’s successor likely to
do after Abe steps down in September 2018? Though it is too early to make definite
predictions, two contenders for the premiership are likely to offer Japanese voters a
clear choice. On one hand, Inada Tomomi, Abe’s protégé, visited the shrine on VJ Day
2015.52 On the other hand, Shigeru Ishiba, Abe’s rival, is more restrained; he is sometimes described as “more palatable” to South Korea and China because he would not
visit the shrine.53
Whether Japanese politicians visit the Yasukuni Shrine or not is an important issue in
Northeast Asia’s regional diplomacy. Especially today, “Geostrategic change has turned
revisionist sentiment in Japan into a strategic risk.”54 It is difficult to imagine Japan’s
relationship with South Korea and China improving unless Japanese politicians show
more consideration for neighboring countries’ concerns over how Japan remembers its
imperial past. Shrine visits stifle communication between these three countries, making subsequent escalation of disputes and miscalculation during crises more likely. Yasukuni Shrine visits matter because they negatively impact the maintenance of peace
and stability in the region, contributing to Japan’s regional political isolation. Japanese
leaders can try to compensate by increasing their engagement with other countries
around the world—think of Abe’s recent emphasis on “global diplomacy”—but since
Japan is inescapably rooted in East Asia, it must squarely confront its relationships
with South Korea and China, if only for the sake of its own security.
Yasukuni Shrine visits matter to the United States because Japan’s political isolation in
the region does not serve U.S. interests. Japan can only be an effective U.S. ally in the
region if the nation can communicate and collaborate with South Korea and China.
Additionally, the United States could suffer reputational costs if it stands by in silent
acquiescence to what victims of WWII see as a rewriting of history. The United States
“Abe sends offering to Yasukuni Shrine; three Cabinet ministers visit,” The Asahi Shimbun, August
15, 2015, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201508150042.
53
Julian Ryall, “Shigeru Ishiba set to decline cabinet post and may challenge Shinzo Abe,” South China
Morning Post, August 25, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1580620/shigeru-ishiba-setdecline-cabinet-post-and-may-challenge-shinzo-abe.
54
Smith, Intimate Rivals, 100.
52
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recognizes this danger; the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo issued a rare rebuke following Abe’s
visit in December 2013. Furthermore, the United States does not—and should not—
seek to play a “referee” role in disputes over history between its ally and the world’s
most rapidly growing economy, or, even worse, between its two allies.
The conflict over Yasukuni Shrine visits reflects a broader trend in the region: using
WWII remembrance as a political tool. It is also reflective of the geopolitical shift;
as South Korea and China’s economies develop, their leaders are demanding greater
recognition of their peoples’ suffering. As the historical aggressor, this is a fight that Japan would do best to not participate in. Since the legitimacy of the governing elites in
both South Korea and China are partially based on protesting revisionist narratives of
Japan’s war responsibility, these two countries are unlikely to cease opposition to shrine
visits. The only way forward is for Japanese politicians, like Nakasone and Hashimoto,
to recognize that the international costs have become too high and that no domestic
benefit outweighs those costs.
M. Erika Pollmann received her Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown
University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. She conducted research on Japan’s
politics and diplomacy for Honors in the major, the Ellsworth Bunker Fellowship with the
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, and the Georgetown-Japan 2020 Initiative. She writes for
The Tokyo Report section of The Diplomat.
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