Wielding the Human Rights Weapon: The United States, Soviet Union, and Private
Citizens, 1975-1989
A dissertation presented to
the faculty of
the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University
In partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Christian Philip Peterson
June 2009
© 2009 Christian Philip Peterson. All Rights Reserved.
2
This Dissertation titled
Wielding the Human Rights Weapon: The United States, Soviet Union, and Private
Citizens, 1975-1989
by
CHRISTIAN PHILIP PETERSON
has been approved for
the Department of History
and the College of Arts and Sciences by
Chester J. Pach, Jr.
Associate Professor of History
Benjamin M. Ogles
Dean, College of Arts and Sciences
3
ABSTRACT
PETERSON, CHRISTIAN PHILIP, Ph.D., June 2009, History
Wielding the Human Rights Weapon: The United States, Soviet Union, and Private
Citizens, 1975-1989 (592 pp.)
Director of Dissertation: Chester J. Pach, Jr.
My dissertation will explore the complexities of the role human rights played in
U.S.-Soviet relations from 1975 to 1989 through the prism of globalization. It will
describe how Western private citizens, Soviet dissenters, and members of Congress
exploited the language of Final Act (Helsinki Accords) to forge a transnational network
committed to globalizing the issue of Soviet human rights violations. This development
challenged bureaucratic discretion in ways that gave the Carter and Reagan
administrations little choice but to challenge Soviet internal behavior in forthright
fashion. Instead of viewing transnational activities as a threat to their expertise, many
officials in each administration made working with and supporting non-governmental
groups an integral element of their approach to undermining the international and internal
legitimacy of the USSR. Utilizing Soviet internal documents available in English, this
dissertation will also explain why many Soviet policymakers feared the human rights
critiques of dissenters and Western private citizens just as much, if not more, than the
statements of U.S. politicians.
Without losing sight of the pivotal role private citizens and Congress played in
tarnishing the international reputation of the Soviet Union, this work will also offer an indepth comparison of the Carter and Reagan administrations’ efforts to promote human
4
rights in USSR. It will argue that a transnational perspective calls into question many of
the standard interpretations of each administration’s efforts to promote human rights in
the Soviet Union. In the case of the USSR, a transnational framework complicates
arguments that focus on the inherent weaknesses of Soviet dissent during the early to mid
1980s. After exploring these topics, this work will outline the limitations of
“constructivist” accounts of how international human rights “norms” shaped Soviet
reform efforts after Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary.
Approved: _____________________________________________________________
Chester J. Pach, Jr.
Associate Professor of History
5
DEDICATION
TO CORI MEGAN MCCARTHY—THE LOVE OF MY LIFE
6
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank the Ohio University History Department and Contemporary
History Institute (CHI) for giving me an excellent graduate education. Dr. Chester Pach
could not have been a better dissertation advisor. Because of his professionalism and
firm commitment to mentoring graduate students, he made this work much better than it
otherwise would have been. In particular, he helped me develop my arguments and see
the numerous shortcomings in my original drafts. Dr. Steven Miner and Dr. John Brobst
expanded my knowledge of Soviet and British history. Dr. Paul Milazzo and Dr. Alonzo
Hamby proved excellent instructors in twentieth-century U.S. political history. Dr.
Patrick Griffin’s seminar on U.S. colonial history stands out as one of the most
informative and interesting classes that I have ever taken. I would also like to thank Dr.
Patricia Weitsman for serving as the outside reader on my committee. The feedback that
gave me will prove valuable when I begin to prepare this dissertation for publication.
I also need to thank the archivists and scholars who helped me carry out the
research necessary to complete this project. The staff at the Jimmy Carter Presidential
Library expressed interest in my dissertation topic during my two visits and helped me
locate a wide variety of documents that had just been declassified. At the National
Security Archive, Svetlana Savranskaya permitted me to examine her personal copies of
transcripts from a series of conferences examining U.S.-Soviet relations from 1977-1981.
The archivists at the National Archive went out of their way to help me locate and
examine the files of the U.S. Helsinki Commission and copies of the CSCE Digest.
7
In conclusion, I would like to thank my graduate peers who made studying at
Ohio University such a memorable experience. I enjoyed discussing a wide variety of
works with Jack Epstein, Sherry Hill, Mark Rice, Tom Bruscino, Ricky Garlitz, Robert
Davis, and Jon Peterson. I also enjoyed hanging out with and discussing history with
Bill Knoblauch, Paul Isherwood, Todd Pfeffer, Steve Heinze, and Mario Cinquepalmi.
No matter where I end up over the long term, I will never forget eating “salmon and
salad” with these individuals on the porch at 34 East Carpenter Street. For me, this
residence will always be a “gorgeous” abode with picture perfect windows.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………...3
Dedication ………………………………………………………………………………...5
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………. 6
Abbreviations…………………………………………………………………………… 10
Chapter 1: Introduction ………………………………………………………………… 13
Chapter 2: The Human Rights Weapon Emerges: Soviet Dissent, Private Citizens, and
the U.S. Congress, 1975-1977..……………………………………………… …46
Chapter 3: Setting the Stage for a Superpower Confrontation: Jimmy Carter, the Soviet
Union, and Human Rights, 1975-1976…………………………………………..88
Chapter 4: The Carter Administration Wields the Human Rights Weapon, January 1977August 1978…………………………………………………………………… 139
Chapter 5: The Soviet Government versus Dissenters: Conflicting Interpretations of the
“Globalization of Human Rights” and Jimmy Carter, January 1977-August
1978…………………………………………………………………………… 195
Chapter 6: A Delicate Balancing Act Topples: The Carter Administration, Human Rights,
and Private Citizens, September 1978-January 1981…………………………. 241
Chapter 7: The Soviet Government versus Dissenters, Part II: Conflicting Interpretations
of the “Globalization of Human Rights” and the Carter Administration,
September 1978-January 1981………………………………………………… 288
9
Chapter 8: The Reagan Administration’s “Conservative” and “Private” Human Rights
Campaign, January 1981-November 1985……………………………………. 334
Chapter 9: The Soviet Government versus Dissenters: Conflicting Views of the
“Globalization” of Human Rights, Peace, and the Reagan Administration, January
1981-September 1986…………………………………………………………. 389
Chapter 10: Holding Mikhail Gorbachev and Soviet Bureaucrats Accountable: U.S.Soviet Relations, Human Rights, and the Final Act, December 1985-January
1989……………………………………………………………………………. 431
Chapter 11: Revolutions from Above and Below: Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet
Bureaucrats, Human Rights, and the Tribulations of Soviet Civil Society…… 475
Chapter 12: Conclusion ……………………………………………………………...... 529
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………....... 549
10
ABBREVIATIONS
Used in text:
AFL-CIO
AI
AFTU
BEA
CIA
CEC
CAPR
CBM
CDE
CCECB
COCOM
CPSU
CSCE
ES
ESACR
Exit Group
HAIG
HRF
IHF
KGB
KOR
ICFTU
ICA
ILO
ISKAN
KP
LDC
MFA
MFN
NATO
NCSJ
NED
NGOs
NSC
NSDD
NTS
PCG
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations
Amnesty International
Association of Free Trade Unions of Workers
Bureau of European Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Conference on East European Churches
United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Confidence-Building Measures
Conference on Security and Disarmament in Europe
Council of Churches of the Evangelical Baptists
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
Soviet Communist Party
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Executive Secretariat
United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights
Initiative Committee to Fight for the Right of Free Exit from the
USSR
Helsinki Agreements Implementation Group
Human Rights Foundation
International Helsinki Federation
Committee of State Security
Committee of Workers Defense
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
International Communication Agency
International Labor Organization
Soviet Institute on the United States and Canada
Klub Perestroika
Less-Developed Country
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Soviet)
Most-Favored Nation
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
National Council on Soviet Jewry
National Endowment for Democracy
Non-Governmental Organizations
National Security Council
National Security Decision Directive
People’s Labor Alliance (France)
Press Club Glasnost
11
PD
PRM
RFE/RL
SALT
SI
SMOT
SOS
UCSJ
UNESCO
UNHRC
UNHRCM
USIA
USNAS
VOA
WCSJ
WCC
WJC
WPA
Presidential Directive
Presidential Review Memorandum
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
Socialist International
Free Interprofessional Association of Workers
Scientists for Sakharov, Orlov, and Shcharansky
Union of Councils for Soviet Jews
U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
United Nations Human Rights Commission
U.N. Human Rights Committee
United States Information Agency
United States National Academy of Sciences
Voice of America
Washington Council on Soviet Jewry
World Congress of Churches
World Jewish Congress
World Psychiatric Association
Used in footnotes and bibliography:
BBC
BEA
BM
CCL
CDSP
CCE
CHRUR
CO
CV
ES
FO
GSB
GSC
GSG
HOSF
HU
JC
JCPL
JT
Memcons
MC
MH
NA
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
Bureau of Ethnic Affairs
Brzezinski Materials
Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania
Current Digest of the Soviet Press
Chronicle of Current Events
Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR
Country
Cyrus Vance
Executive Secretariat
Foreign Affairs
General Secretary Brezhnev
General Secretary Chernenko
General Secretary Gorbachev
Head of State Files
Human Rights
Jimmy Carter
Jimmy Carter Presidential Library
Jessica Tuchman
Memorandums of Conversations
Midge Costanza
Marilyn Haft
National Archive
12
NSA
NSABM
OPL
PPOP
PH
RCSCE
RL
RRPL
SB
SAEA
WHCF
WO
WHORM
USHCF
ZB
National Security Archive
National Security Affairs—Brzezinski Materials
Office of Public Liaison
Public Papers of the President of the United States
Paul B. Henze
Records of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Robert L. Lipshutz Files
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Samizdat Bulletin
Special Assistant for Ethnic Affairs
White House Central Files
William Odom
White House Office of Records Management
United States Helsinki Commission Files
Zbiginew Brzezinski
13
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In his work Power and Protest, Jeremi Suri makes a compelling argument that a
“global disruption” took place in 1968 that challenged the existing political structures of
the U.S., Chinese, and European national governments. Dissatisfied with “Cold War
politics,” private citizens took to the streets and called into question the “legitimacy and
prestige” of the modern nation state. To preserve domestic stability, leaders as diverse as
Mao Zedong and Richard Nixon embraced a “profoundly conservative” type of “politics”
called détente. They “used promises of international peace to deflect attention from
domestic difficulties and to free their resources for repressive measures.” They also
placed a premium on using secrecy “to insulate their activities from domestic attack” and
reinforce “established authorities.” When reflecting on how these developments played
out over the long term, Suri lamented that détente had “protected a state-centered world”
and discredited “political idealism.” Just as troubling, “it further isolated policymakers
from their publics” and “fortified” the boundaries of political authority at the
international and national levels. By excluding so many people from decision making,
the rise of détente “contributed to the pervasive skepticism of our ‘postmodern age’.”1
Suri’s arguments deserve attention for a number of reasons. They help show the
conservative nature of détente and the “democratic deficit” of international institutions.
They also make important contributions to the growing body of literature that describes
the shortcomings of using a “state-centric” approach to explain changes in the
1
Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2003), 5, 213-4, and 262-4.
14
international environment.2 No matter how sophisticated, works that privilege the
behavior of national leaders at the expense of non-state actors fail to capture the
complexities and nuances of how important foreign decisions are made. Despite these
larger accomplishments, Suri’s conclusions have one notable drawback. The same
international impulse against bureaucratic authority and discretion that he described
continued to have an important impact on U.S.-Soviet relations during the 1970s and
1980s.
To illustrate this development, this dissertation will offer a careful comparison of
how the Carter and Reagan administrations utilized the Final Act (Helsinki Accords) as
part of a larger campaign to promote human rights in the Soviet Union. By defending
international ideals, private citizens and Congress succeeded in making each of these
administrations active participants in a transnational network committed to globalizing
the issue of Soviet human rights violations. Instead of viewing these transnational
activities as a threat to their bureaucratic expertise, many officials in each administration
2
See also Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic
Structures, and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 14-5. The
following works also highlight the trappings of relying on “state-centric” approaches to describe how states
behave. See Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and
the End of the Cold War,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 185-214; Risse-Kappen,
Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic
Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1-38, 234-78; Martha Finnemore, National
Interests in International Society (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), 1-33, 128-50;
Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization
52, no. 4 (Fall 1998): 887-917. Daniel C. Thomas has written a number of important works on how
transnational human rights activities and Helsinki “norms” shaped the behavior of the U.S. and Soviet
governments. See Thomas, “The Helsinki Accords and Political Change in Eastern Europe,” in RisseKappen et al., ed., The Power of Human Rights, 205-33; Thomas, The Helsinki Effect (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2001); and Thomas, “Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of
the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 110-41.
15
made working with and encouraging NGOs an integral element of their overall approach
to undermining the international legitimacy of the USSR.
In addition to examining the behavior of the U.S. government, this work will
offer an in-depth analysis of the Soviet government’s view of dissenters and non-official
activities. It will devote considerable attention to how Soviet policymakers responded to
the efforts of Western governments and private citizens to use human rights as a way of
undermining the international prestige of their regime. It will also examine the role
human rights and transnational actors played in shaping Mikhail Gorbachev’s efforts to
reform Soviet-style socialism.
The starting point for understanding the role human rights played in U.S.-Soviet
relations during the 1970s and 1980s must begin with a brief summary of how the Final
Act came into existence and the language of the document. Because World War II ended
without a comprehensive peace settlement, the Soviet government wanted to obtain a
treaty that legitimated the political status quo in Eastern Europe. To accomplish this
goal, it proposed the convening of a general European security conference during the
1950s. Besides inducing Western European governments to accept Moscow’s
domination of Eastern Europe, Soviet leaders hoped to prevent West Germany’s
“integration into” NATO and create “demilitarized” zones designed to remove U.S.
military forces from Western Europe. They also wanted to forge agreements that allowed
Moscow and its allies “to achieve much needed investment and technical assistance from
the West.”3
3
Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 28-30; and William Korey, Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords: Focus
on U.S. Policy (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1983), 8-10 and 12-15. See also Korey, The
16
The United States and Western European governments were skeptical of Soviet
proposals calling for “demilitarized zones.” While never a unified block, they countered
with proposals that called for the freer flow of information between Eastern and Western
Europe. They also asked for more scientific and cultural exchanges, as well as
agreements that outlawed the jamming of foreign broadcasts. Since Soviet leaders had no
intention of taking such far-reaching steps, the idea of convening a security conference
became “overshadowed” by Cold War crises such as the Soviet invasion of Hungary in
1956 and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.4
These setbacks did not prevent Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev from
reviving the idea of a pan-European security conference in 1966. Three years later, a
Warsaw Pact summit in Budapest issued a communiqué that proposed the convening of a
meeting that would reach agreements on the following issues: 1) the inviolability of
European frontiers; 2) the renunciation of the threat of force between European countries;
3) the formation of a “permanent multilateral mechanism for peace and security in
Europe; and 4) the expansion of trade, economic, scientific, technological, and cultural
relations between all European nations.”5 Despite the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
in 1968, many Western European governments found these proposals much more
appealing than they once had. The West German Chancellor Willy Brandt viewed them
Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process, and American Foreign Policy (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1993), 1-19; Ibid., NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “A Curious
Grapevine” (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 229-30; and John J. Maresca, To Helsinki: The
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973-1975 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
1985).
4
Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 30-1.
5
Ibid., 35-6.
17
as a useful way to build enduring links with Eastern Europe; the French government “was
attracted by the opportunity to promote détente in a forum less biased toward” the United
States and Soviet Union. Even more important, “public and parliamentary support for
détente meant that no Western European government could afford to be uninterested in
an apparently reasonable Soviet initiative to reduce East-West tensions.”6
Overcoming the skepticism of the Nixon administration, NATO foreign ministers
agreed to explore “substantive issues for a conference” in 1969. This decision resulted in
a barrage of diplomatic activity over the next three years aimed at finalizing the
negotiating agenda of a “comprehensive” European security conference. While NATO
ministers insisted that the United States and Canada must participate in any such meeting,
the proposals that they issued refrained from mentioning the issue of human rights. This
position suited Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, just
fine, as they preferred to pursue an agenda that stabilized rather than undermined U.S.Soviet relations.7 Unhappy with this attitude, the representatives of the European
Community (EC) insisted that any meeting should address the issue of human rights and
individual liberties. Once the preliminary talks of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) began in November 1972, Warsaw Pact nations were
“faced with a firm EC commitment that its member states would not agree to participate
6
Ibid., 36. See also Korey, Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords, 13.
7
Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 38-47 and 52.
18
in a security conference unless they were satisfied with the place of human rights and
contacts on the agenda.” 8
After more than two years of sometimes acrimonious negotiations, the Soviet
Union and United States had little choice but to reconcile themselves to the position that
any document produced by the CSCE would mention human rights. On 1 August 1975,
the United States, Canada, and thirty-three European nations signed the Final Act. While
not a formal treaty, this agreement pledged each signatory to follow a series of
stipulations contained in three separate sections called “Baskets.” Basket I contained the
ten guiding principles of signatory relations, whereas as Basket II pledged each member
to facilitate cooperation in the fields of economics, science, and the environment. Basket
III called on each signatory to promote the free flow of information, ideas, and people
among the participating states.
Brezhnev signed the Helsinki Accords to legitimize the political status quo in
Eastern Europe and secure economic/technical assistance from Western countries.9
Subsequent events would show that he underestimated the degree to which this document
challenged the internal discretion of signatory governments. For the first time, “human
rights were formally recognized in an international agreement as a fundamental principle
8
9
Ibid., 59.
See Leonid Brezhnev, Peace, Détente, and Soviet-American Relations: A Collection of Public Statements
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), 94-99, 101, 102-112, 119, 131, 133, 137-9; L.I. Brezhnev,
Socialism, Democracy, and Human Rights (Pergamon Press, 1980), 138-9; Thomas, The Helsinki Effect,
94; and CDSP 27, no. 31 (1975): 14-5. See also N.A., From Helsinki to Belgrade: The Soviet Union and
the Implementation of the Final Act of the European Conference, Documents and Material (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1977), 1-81.
19
regulating relations between states.”10 Principle VII called on signatories to “promote
and encourage” private citizens’ “exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural,
and other rights and freedoms.” To further enhance the importance of human rights, it
called on each signatory to act in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and all United Nations covenants on human Rights. Even more striking, this
principle confirmed the right of each individual to “know and act upon his rights”
outlined in the Final Act. In theory, this stipulation gave private citizens the ability to
cite the Helsinki Accords when attacking their governments’ human rights abuses.11
The language of Basket III outlined the importance of reducing the barriers that
divided citizens in Eastern and Western Europe. For example, one provision called on
signatory governments to expand the opportunities private citizens had to meet with and
receive information from their counterparts. Another stipulation asked each nation to
facilitate contacts among “religious faiths, institutions, and organizations” practicing
“within the constitutional framework of participating states.” Along with calling for
more cultural agreements, Basket III urged each participating state to “further the
development of contacts and exchanges among young people.” It also mentioned each
signatory’s need to increase “contacts among governmental institutions and nongovernmental organizations and associations.”12
10
11
Korey, Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords, 15 and 17.
N.A., “Appendix: Extract from the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,”
in Human Rights and American Foreign Policy, ed. Donald P. Kommers and Gilburt D. Loescher (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 145-6. Also see the electronic copy of the Helsinki
Accords located at http://www.hri.org/docs/Helsinki75.html [14 May 2007].
20
Even though the Final Act established no mechanism for punishing specific
violations, the agreement indicated that each nation could not ignore certain provisions or
entire baskets on the grounds that they violated their “sovereign rights.” This agreement
also indicated that each of the principles in Basket I had “primary significance” and could
not be interpreted without reference to each other. This clause reinforced the idea that
progress in the implementation of one basket depended on equivalent progress in the
other two baskets. To put this insight another way, the Final Act linked the advancement
of security, human rights, trade, and human contacts in an interrelated web best defined
as the “Helsinki process.” Because the document called for a wide array of follow-up
conferences, signatories had forums to gauge progress and challenge the implementation
records of their counterparts.13
The signing of the Final Act became an important turning point in the Cold War
because of the behavior of Soviet dissenters. Before exploring this development, we
need to keep in mind that the term “dissent” has no simple definition.14 On one level, it
refers to a wide array of individuals such as democrats, refuseniks (Jews whose
emigration requests had been denied), and nationalists who had expressed disapproval of
the Soviet government’s official policies in some kind of public fashion. In a larger
12
See also Korey, The Promises We Keep, 1-19. Elizabeth Borgwardt explores the pivotal role the United
States played in creating international human rights standards after World War II ended. See Borgwardt, A
New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 2005).
13
14
To view the provisions of the Final Act, see the website in footnote eleven.
See Robert Horvath, The Legacy of Soviet Dissent: Dissidents, Democratization, and Radical
Nationalism in Russia (London: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 81-149. For a nice account of the difficulties
involved in defining Soviet dissent, see Philip Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent, and Reform in Soviet Russia
(London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 75-93; and Gleb Vysotin and Valentin Sereda, ”Workers
Participation,” SB 94 (Feb. 1981): 2-3.
21
sense, it also encompasses private citizens and government officials who engaged in nonsanctioned activities behind closed doors such as discussing non-official poetry and
debating Western European social-democratic ideas.15
Chapter II will argue that the steps that Soviet leaders took to curb dissent during
the 1960s and 1970s only created future problems. Fed up with the arbitrary bureaucratic
discretion that authorities wielded over them, some dissenters rallied around the idea of a
universal glasnost (openness) that linked the respect for basic human rights to
international security.16 Over time, this development played a key role in the creation of
a transnational network based on holding Soviets accountable for their internal behavior
and respect for internationally recognized human rights. As some political scientists and
sociologists have argued, this type of network develops when “domestic groups in a
15
See Geoffrey Hosking, The Awakening of the Soviet Union (London: Heinemann, 1990), 13. Richard
Sakwa agrees with this position, noting that “the absence of effective formal means of conflict resolution
and claims to a monopoly on legitimate intellectual debate created an underground market of ideas. In
other countries many of the groups mentioned above, such as feminists and peace groups, would have
become interest or lobby groups. In the Soviet Union they were forced to become dissident groupings;
dissent was a product of the system itself.” See Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, 2nd ed. (London and
New York: Routledge, 1998), 214. See also Vaclav Havel, “The Power of Powerless,” in John Keane, ed.,
The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central-Eastern Europe (Armonk, NY: M .E.
Sharpe, 1985), 23-96. For other works on Soviet dissent, see Paul Goldberg, The Final Act: The Dramatic,
Revealing Story of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group (William Morrow and Company, Inc, 1988);
Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights
(Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press, 1985); Joshua Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents: Their
Struggle for Human Rights (Boston: Beacon Press, 1980’ Revised edition, 1985).
16
Robert Horvath makes this point in his excellent work that at least in part covers the different ways some
dissenters and Soviet reformers such as Mikhail Gorbachev viewed the concept of glasnost. See Robert
Horvath, The Legacy of Soviet Dissent: Dissidents, Democratization, and Radical Nationalism in Russia
(London: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 50-80. See also Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, The Thaw
Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990, 1993),
108-9, 120-4, 141, 167, 175, 180-3, 203, 208, 260-1, 283, 313-4. This position also comes across in the
writings of Andrei Sakharov and Yuri Orlov. See Orlov, trans. by Thomas P. Whitney, Dangerous
Thoughts: Memoirs of a Russian Life (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991), 163-7, 193209; Sakharov, ed. by Efrem Yankelevich and Alfred Friendly, Jr., Alarm and Hope (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1978), 3-18, 112-128, 139-167; and Ibid., trans. by Guy Daniels, My Country and the World (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), 11-50.
22
repressive state” search out international allies as part of a larger effort to exert pressure
on their own governments. These allies can include a wide array of actors, including
NGOs and international institutions such as the United Nations Human Rights
Commission (UNHRC). They can even consist of philanthropic foundations, sympathetic
publications, and foreign governments.17
The transnational network described above achieved an important victory when
Congress and numerous U.S. NGOs embraced the task of holding Soviet leaders
accountable for their violations of the Final Act. Even though many Americans criticized
the agreement for accepting the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, sympathetic
members of Congress drew on the support of NGOs to create the U.S. Helsinki
Commission in 1976. This joint executive-legislative committee utilized the reports of
private citizens and dissenters to monitor each signatory’s compliance with the Final Act.
Distrustful of bureaucratic discretion and authority in ways similar to dissenters,
members embraced the role of holding the executive branch accountable for its
commitment to promoting human rights in the USSR.18 They also called for more
17
See Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in
International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 12, 9, 18, 23-4, 28, 30, 37. See also
Kathryn Sikkink, “Human Rights, Principle Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America,”
International Organization 47, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 411-441; Volker Schneider, “The Global Capital of
Human Rights Movements: A Case Study of Amnesty International,” in Karsten Ronit and Volker
Schneider, ed., Private Organizations in Global Politics (New York: Routledge, 2000), 146-64; and
Kathryn Sikkink, “The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western
Europe,” in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and
Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 139-72.
18
R. Shep Melnick advances powerful arguments about how American policymakers and private citizens
began to operate in a political environment ever-more distrustful of bureaucratic discretion and authority
during the 1970s. See Melnick, “From Tax and Spend to Mandate and Sue: Liberalism after the Great
Society,” in Jerome Mileur and Sydney Milkus, ed., The Great Society and the High Tide of Liberalism
23
“public” human rights diplomacy and encouraged private citizens all the over world to
monitor and report on signatories’ Final Act compliance record.
The importance of this development cannot be overstated. By cultivating the
support of Western private citizens, journalists, and government officials, dissenters
began the long-term process of “globalizing” the issue of Soviet human rights violations
and holding governments accountable for their behavior. As some constructivist political
scientists argue, they succeeded in creating new international “norms” of behavior
capable of transforming the ways that states behaved. Unlike their neorealist and
neoliberal peers, they hold this position because states are in effect social actors whose
interests cannot be fixed in terms of rationality models, economic capabilities, or military
power. From this angle, dissenters helped unleash “local, transnational, and interstate
processes” that challenged how “state and societal actors” understood their “identifies,
interests,” and policy preferences. Since all states “seek legitimization by domestic and
international audiences,” they played a critical role in creating an international
“normative” environment that questioned the legitimacy of governmental practices that
violated the provisions of the Final Act and international human rights standards.19
Constructivist political scientists have outlined a number of frameworks to
explain how international “norms” and transnational activities shape the ways
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 2005). See also “Human Rights are Riding a Wave of Popularity,”
The New York Times, 28 February 1977, 2.
19
See Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 3, 269. See also Ibid., 7, 14; Sikkink and Finnemore, “International
Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 887-94; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, 17, 22-5; Risse-Kappen, et al., The Power of Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 1-16; and Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), Chapters 1 and 2.
24
policymakers behave.20 They often employ concepts such as “ideational persuasion” and
“rhetorical entrapment” to account for why state actors change their behavior in response
to how transnational actors “frame” certain behaviors as either legitimate or illegitimate.
The former process takes place when policymakers accept the explanatory power of a
new idea and then change their conduct based on a transformed understanding of
legitimate behavior. “Rhetorical entrapment” occurs when policymakers endorse a new
idea for tactical reasons such as deflecting international condemnation of domestic
behavior. Even if they have to enact policies that compromise other important interests,
they eventually feel obligated to behave in ways consistent with the “logic” of that idea
“to avoid the costs of rhetorical inconsistency.” 21
While these concepts have utility in explaining behavior of governments, even the
most sophisticated models cannot escape one obvious point. A state actor’s willingness
to adhere to an international norm depends on just how much he or she identifies with the
requirements of satisfying a specific norm.22 This reality magnifies the importance of
explaining “how norms connect” with individual policymakers.23 More to the point,
credible accounts need to specify how policymakers’ ideological underpinnings and
20
In particular, see Sikkink and Finnemore, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change;” RisseKappen, et al., The Power of Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Thomas,
The Helsinki Effect; and Katzenstein,, ed., The Culture of National Security, Chapters 1 and 2.
21
See Thomas “Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War,” 112.
22
Ibid., 140. See also Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 9013; Risse-Kappen, et al., The Power of Human Rights, 6-16. For accounts that pay more attention to how
domestic structures impact the effects of international human rights norms, see Risse-Kappen, Bringing
Transnational Relations Back In, 14-33; and Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do not Float Freely: Transnational
Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War.”
23
Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” World Politics 50, no. 2
(1998): 325.
25
understanding of domestic developments shape their view of appropriate and legitimate
behavior.24
To accomplish this task, Chapter III will grapple with the complexities of how the
Brezhnev regime and presidential candidate Jimmy Carter responded to the
“globalization” of Soviet human rights violations. The behavior of the Soviet
government cannot be divorced from the existence of the USSR as a multiethnic,
multinational empire and the pervasive influence of orthodox Marxist-Leninist
ideology.25 Without any way to justify their authority other than the ideological
correctness of Marxist-Leninism and the global prestige of the Soviet Communist Party
(CPSU), orthodox policymakers disliked how dissenters and human rights critiques
challenged the inevitable advance of Soviet-style socialism across the globe. In sharp
contrast to the image of the USSR as a powerful totalitarian state, they also worried about
the loyalty of millions of Soviet private citizens, especially members of religious groups
24
In their edited work Ideas and Foreign Policy (1993), Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane highlight
how a policymaker’s ideology influences the choices he or she makes because “it logically excludes other
interpretations of reality or at least suggests that such interpretations are not worthy of sustained
exploration.” See Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions,
and Political Change (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), 12; and John Lenczowski, Soviet
Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy: A Study of Ideology, Power, and Consensus (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1982), 271. See also Frank A. Ninkovich, Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in
the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), introduction, and Frank A.
Ninkovich, “Interests and Discourse in Diplomatic History,” Diplomatic History 13, no. 2 (1989): 135-61.
25
A number of works emphasize the fundamental role ideology plays in explaining Soviet behavior. In his
work a Failed Empire, Vladislav M. Zubok argues that the existence of a “revolutionary-imperial”
paradigm” meant that “Stalin’s and his successors’ foreign policy motivations cannot be separated from
how they thought and who they were.” See Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War
from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 8 and 342. Along
similar lines, Robert D. English illustrates the pivotal role a “hostile-isolationist” ideology plays in
explaining the behavior of the Brezhnev regime. See Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West:
Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 9
and 119-124. See also Zubok, “New Evidence on the End of the Cold War: New Evidence on the “Soviet
Factor” in the Peaceful Revolutions of 1989,” CWIHPB 12-13 (Fall/Winter 2001), 1-2; and Arkady N.
Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 283-5.
26
and those who called for independence or national autonomy in Ukraine, Georgia, and
the Baltic Republics. They feared these individuals because they never forgot that
millions of Soviet citizens had collaborated with Germany and fought against the Soviet
Union during World II.26 Not wanting to leave anything to chance, orthodox officials
imprisoned dissenters and worked to discredit transnational human rights because they
felt as if these activities increased the likelihood that domestic insurrections against
Soviet rule would take place. Since determined foes existed at home and abroad, they
acted on the assumption that the Soviet Union would fall apart unless the CPSU kept a
tight grip on political power and enforced ideological conformity at all levels of society.
Since orthodox policymakers worried about the possibility of domestic
insurrections taking place, they viewed the development of an autonomous civil society
as a direct attack on the foundations of Soviet power. This dissertation will define this
term as a state-sanctioned “independent sphere” of legal activities “where rights are
effectively secured and in which civil associations and interest groups can assert
themselves.” Because “independent groupings” could not compete for political
influence, “civil society in the Soviet context” consisted of “independent groupings” that
defended ideals such as freedom of thought. It also included the “thousand[s] of other
[independent]” activities that called into question orthodox Marxist-Leninist norms of
behavior in public view and behind closed doors. This argument is important. Even
though Soviet orthodox policymakers wanted to forge an obedient population that
accepted the unquestioned authority of the CPSU, they failed to “atomize” their society in
26
For a cogent summary of these developments, see Steven Merritt Miner, Stalin’s Holy War: Religion,
Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003),
333-5.
27
the wake of Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization efforts during the late 1950s and early
1960s. Given this reality, it makes just as much sense to write about the Soviet
government’s totalitarian aspirations as it does to focus on the success it had in
marginalizing the influence of dissenters.27
The importance this study places on orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology and fears
of domestic insurrection does not mean that all Soviet officials were automatons. Toplevel policymakers often engaged in debates when making important foreign policy
decisions.28 As Robert English argues, some “liberal-minded” reformers who
sympathized with Western values managed to retain positions in foreign policy think
tanks and research institutes.29 In spite of their ideological pretensions, orthodox Soviet
officials were not immune to international public opinion. In practice, they proved quite
capable of making pragmatic concessions in hopes of quieting international criticism and
furthering important foreign policy objectives such as increasing trade with United States.
27
See Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, 209; and Hosking, The Awakening of the Soviet Union, 14.
See also Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms, 1985-1990 (New York: Prentice Hall, 1990), 200-1.
28
Furthermore, this argument does not assume that policymakers always worked to the same ends. See
Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change, 31-62; Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the
Soviet Union is Governed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), chapters 8-14. See also
Conference #2 of the Carter-Brezhnev Project, 98; and The Collapse of Détente, 8-10, 107-120; Arbatov,
The System, 194-200.
29
Robert English devotes considerable attention to how Nikita Khrushchev’s “cultural thaw” and deStalinazation produced a “liberal-reformist domestic community” who identified with Western values. See
English, Russia and the Idea of the West, 11-15 and Chapters 2-5. Zubok advances similar arguments,
arguing that “Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization and then Brezhnev’s détente produced the first significant
cracks in the Soviet home front. See Zubok, Failed Empire, 340. See also Zubok, “Unwrapping an
Enigma: Soviet Elites, Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War,” in Silvio Pons and Federico Romero, ed.,
Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, and Periodizations (London and New
York: Franck Cass, 2005), 137-64; Aleksandr Yakovlev, The Fate of Marxism in Russia (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1993), 111; Patrick Flaherty, “Perestroika Radicals: The Origins and Ideology of the
Soviet New Left,” Monthly Review 40, no. 4 (1988): 19-33; and Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina Vanden
Heuvel, Voices of Glasnost (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1989).
28
Far from staying on the defensive, Soviet officials also defended the legitimacy of
imprisoning dissenters and described how their nation’s human rights record outshone
that of the United States.
The Soviet government’s mixture of ideologically driven and pragmatic behavior
raises the question of whether Marxist-Leninist dogma or cold, calculated realism best
explains its international and domestic behavior. Because orthodox Marxist-Leninist
ideals influenced how Soviet policymakers viewed their “domestic legitimacy” and the
appropriateness of other states’ international conduct, these principles played a
fundamental role in how they rationalized their conduct. As one scholar writes,
“ideology used for purposes of rationalization must necessarily become a guide for
action,” which means that “Soviet ideology and Soviet pragmatism are complementary
rather than antagonistic.” Since foreign policymakers can make pragmatic decisions even
as they as follow ideologically driven policies, this study will dispense with the
realist/ideological dichotomy that characterizes many treatments of the Soviet
government’s conduct.30
A mixture of political calculations and deeply held beliefs accounts for why
Jimmy Carter identified himself with the cause of human rights during the later stages of
the 1976 presidential campaign. Well aware of charges that Gerald Ford had not done
30
Lenczowski, Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy, 269. At least in part, these works also explain
how pragmatic concessions do not rule out the existence of ideologically-driven behavior, see Douglas J.
Macdonald, “Formal Ideologies in the Cold War: Toward a Framework for Empirical Analysis,” in
Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, and Theory (New York and London: Routledge,
2000), 180-206; and Nigel Gould-Davies, “Rethinking the Roles of Ideology in International Politics
During the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 90-109. This article is
important because it shows the limitation of the argument that ideologues “must have a master plan . . . be
inflexible . . . and cannot cooperate with adversaries.” He also rejects the position that ideologues must be
“unremittingly aggressive.” See Ibid., 95-6.
29
enough to challenge Soviet internal behavior, the complaints of the U.S. Helsinki
Commission and private citizens led him to abandon his once negative view of the Final
Act. In practice, the lessons he drew from the American civil rights movement, as well
as his religious values and identification with Wilsonian principles, influenced his
thinking. He came to accept the argument that embracing universal human rights
standards would put the United States in the best possible position to fulfill its historic
role as a “beacon” to the rest of the world. Without falling victim to the pitfalls of
excessive idealism, he hoped to use the issue as a way of engaging in effective
ideological competition with the Soviet Union while laying the foundation for a day
when all governments would feel obligated to respect the basic liberties of all private
citizens.
The determination of Soviet leaders to punish dissent and restrict Jewish
emigration raises important questions about how the Carter administration attempted to
promote human rights in the USSR. The existing literature on this subject is diverse. A
number of critics focus on Carter’s naiveté or growing unwillingness to challenge the
Kremlin’s domestic conduct in a forceful manner as his term in office progressed.31
31
The following works call into question Carter’s efforts to promote human rights in the Soviet Union:
Joshua Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy
(Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press), 29, 32, 34, 54, 202, 216; William F. Buckley, “Human Rights and Foreign
Policy: A Proposal,” Foreign Affairs (Spring 1980): 788-90; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,”Human Rights and
the American Tradition,” Foreign Affairs 57, no. 3 (1979): 516-7; Nicolai N. Petro, The Predicament of
Human Rights: The Carter and Reagan Administration Policies, Volume V (New York: University Press of
America, 1983), 13; Burton I. Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter (Lawrence: University of
Kansas Press, 1993), 39-42; Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Doublestandards,” Commentary
(November 1979): 40; Robert O. Freedman, The Soviet Union and the Carter Administration (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Center for Russian and East European Studies, 1987), 57-9; Walter Laquer, “The
World & President Carter,” Commentary 65, no. 2 (1978): 56-63; Gebhard Schweigler, “Carter’s Détente
Policy: Change or Continuity?” World Today 34, no. 3 (1978): 81-9; Stanley Hoffman, “The Hell of Good
Intentions,” Foreign Policy 29 (Winter, 1977-1978), 3-26. Steven F. Hayward, The Real Jimmy Carter:
30
Some of these critics also contend that he failed to carry out a coherent approach to U.S.Soviet relations.32 While admitting that his administration took some steps to promote
human rights in the Soviet Union, a number of works describe how he abandoned his
“world-order” orientation in favor of a more traditional Cold War approach after the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.33 Unlike many critics, some treatments defend
the position that Carter remained committed to challenging Soviet internal behavior
throughout his entire presidency.34 Olav Njolstad and Robert M. Gates insist that Carter
and many of his subordinates used human rights as a way of engaging in vigorous
ideological competition with the Soviet Union and integrated “moral values” into the
framework of Cold War competition.35
How our Worst Ex-President Undermines American Foreign Policy, Coddles Dictators, and Created the
Party of Clinton and Kerry (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc, 2004), 107-113; Kristen Sellars,
The Rise and Rise of Human Rights (London: Sutton Publishing, 2002), 128-9.
32
For example, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American
National Security Policy during the Cold War, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 342-9. See
also Hoffman, “The Hell of Good Intentions;” Daniel P. Moynihan, “The Politics of Human Rights,”
Commentary (August 1977): 19-26; and Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter, 94-7, 164-5.
33
See Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1986); William Stueck, “Placing Jimmy Carter’s Foreign Policy,” in Gary M. Fink and
Hugh Davis Graham, The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post-New Deal Era (Lawrence:
University of Kansas Press, 1998); John Drumbell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation, 2nd ed.
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995), 110-30; David F. Schmitz and Vanessa
Walker, Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War
Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 28, no. 1 (2004):; and Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and
Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Carter (Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution, 1994); Jerel A. Rosati, “Jimmy Carter, a Man Before His Time? The Emergence and Collapse
of the First Post-Cold War Presidency,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 23, no. 3 (1993): 459-76; Ibid., The
Carter Administration’s Quest for a Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 1987).
34
Robert A. Strong, Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana Press, 2000), 95-6, 122; Schmitz and Walker, “Jimmy Carter and the Foreign
Policy of Human Rights,” 130, 143.
35
Njolstad, Peacekeeper and Troublemaker, 294. Gates advances this argument even though he admits
that Carter’s efforts to support dissent “were idealistic and not primarily motivated by the notion of
31
The existing accounts of Carter’s efforts to challenge Soviet behavior suffer from
several notable flaws. More often than not, they do not reveal the complexities of the
role human rights promotion played in his administration’s overall approach to U.S.Soviet relations. Many critical treatments also make the mistake of gauging the executive
branch’s commitment to promoting human rights in the USSR and support dissenters as
function of policymakers’ public rhetoric on the subject.36 Furthermore, all works could
do a much better job of describing how transnational human rights activities both shaped
and became an important element of the administration’s approach to weakening the
international appeal of Soviet-style socialism.
Chapters IV and VI will address these issues by examining the Carter
administration’s efforts to promote human rights in the Soviet Union through the prism of
“reciprocal accommodation.” This framework has a number of advantages. It helps
reveal how Carter calibrated the frequency of public rhetoric about Soviet human rights
violations in response to signs of either “moderation” or “deterioration” in Soviet internal
behavior. It also illustrates how arms control negotiations shaped the executive branch’s
approach to promoting internal reform in the USSR. Many executive branch officials,
including Carter, felt as if signing SALT II would help improve Soviet internal behavior
and forge an international environment more consistent with U.S. values. As a result of
this mindset, they sometimes toned down their public rhetoric about Soviet human rights
violations to create an international climate more conducive to successful negotiations.
undermining the Soviet government.” See Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Inside Story
of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Penguin Books, 90-6 and 175-8.
36
For good examples of this tendency, see Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade, 33-4; Buckley, “Human
Rights and Foreign Policy,” 788-90; and Freedman, The Soviet Union and the Carter Administration.
32
This sort of behavior helps demonstrate that Carter and many of his subordinates
often overestimated the likelihood that Soviet leaders would make their internal behavior
more consistent with the provisions of the Final Act. Nevertheless, it does not illustrate
that his administration became less willing to challenge Soviet internal behavior after the
first few months of 1977. The Carter administration played an important role in making
the issue of human rights a fundamental aspect of Cold War competition.37 Consistent
with the larger goal of “reciprocal accommodation,” executive branch officials
challenged the international legitimacy of Soviet leaders by citing the Final Act in a wide
variety of public and private forums. By the time Carter left office, members of his
National Security Council felt confident enough in the larger trends of the Cold War to
draw up memorandums that called into question the permanence of the USSR and
advocated even more determined efforts to encourage Soviet dissent. Executive branch
officials also acted on the belief that governmental protests alone could not change Soviet
internal behavior. As a result of this mindset, they supported private citizens who worked
toward the goal of “globalizing” the issue of Soviet human rights violations.38
37
This argument shares some commonalities with those of Robert A. Strong and Peter Bourne. See Strong,
Working in the World, 38-41 95-6; and Peter Bourne, Jimmy Carter: A Comprehensive Biography from
Plains to Post-Presidency (New York: Scribner, 1987), 383-92, 397, 453-4, 484-5, It has even more
commonalities with those of Njolstad. In Peacekeeper and Troublemaker, he makes the crucial point that
Carter used “linkages” to show the Soviets how their international and domestic behavior worsened U.S.
relations. See Ibid.,291-2. While I agree with many points that Njolstad makes in his work, he stops his
analysis of Carter’s human rights promotion in 1978. He also does not address the administration’s efforts
to “globalize” Soviet human rights violations by working with private citizens and its efforts on the behalf
of dissenters in U.N forums.
38
Edward Bailey Hodgman addresses this topic in his dissertation, but only utilized a small selection of
documents found in the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. See Ibid., “Détente and the Dissidents: Human
Rights in U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1968-1980 (Ph.D., University of Rochester, 2003).
33
This development raises the issue of how transnational actors shape governmental
policy.39 In practice, the task of gauging the precise influence of non-governmental
pressure on the behavior of elected officials remains difficult. According to the human
rights historian David P. Forsythe, politicians tend to work with groups sympathetic to
their viewpoint. They also utilize the activities of private citizens to serve their own
interests or deflect political pressures.40 Without forgetting that promoting human rights
in the Soviet Union served American interests, Chapters IV and VI will contend that the
U.S. Helsinki Commission and private citizens made executive branch officials more
aware of the political costs involved in ignoring the issue of Moscow’s internal behavior.
They also helped turn the Final Act follow-up conferences in Belgrade and Madrid into
39
Many works have addressed the issue of how private citizens shaped the Carter administration’s human
rights policies. This dissertation will provide more coherence by employing an integrative framework that
grapples with the complexities of the role transnational human rights actors played in U.S.-Soviet relations.
See Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 345-9; Drumbell, The Carter Presidency, viii, Chapter III, V, and
VII; Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 50-3; Korey, The Promises We Keep, Chapter II; Freidbert
Pluger, “Human Rights Unbound: Carter’s Human Rights Policy Reassessed,” Presidential Studies
Quarterly 19 (Fall 1989): 705-716; Sandy Vogelgesang, American Dream Global Nightmare (New York:
W. W. Norton, 1980). See also Thomas, The Helsinki Effect; Risse-Kappen, The Power of Human Rights;
David Forsythe, Human Rights and World Politics (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993); Petrus
Buwalda, They Did not Dwell Alone: Jewish Emigration from the Soviet Union, 1967-1990 (Washington,
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997); Martin Gilbert, Shchransky, Hero of Our Time (London:
Macmillan, 1986); Jeri Laber, The Courage of Strangers: Coming of Age with the Human Rights Movement
(New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 91-165, 273-90; Myrna Shinbaum, “Mobilizing America: The National
Conference on Soviet Jewry,” in Murray Freidman and Albert D. Cherlin, ed., A Second Exodus: The
American Movement to Free the Jews (Hanover, NH: University of New England Press, 1999): 173-80;
Micah Naftalin, “The Activist Movement,” in Ibid., 224-42; and W. Ruby, “The Role of the NonEstablishment,” in Ibid., 220-3; Andrew Harrison, Passover Revisited: Philadelphia’s Efforts to Aid Soviet
Jews, 1963-1998 (Madison, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson Press, 2001), 185-208; David A. Harris, In the
Trenches: Selected Speeches and Writings of an American Jewish Activist, 1979-1999 (Hoboken, NJ:
KTAV Publishing House, 2000); and Max Kampelman, Entering New Worlds: The Memoirs of a Private
Man in Public Life (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), 226-34.
40
Forsythe, Human Rights and World Politics, 117-20. He also makes the important point that “it is
reasonably clear that on many issues in international relations, including those pertaining to human rights,
the state shares decisions with important non-state actors-especially from a political rather than strictly
legal perspective. Ibid., 17-18.
34
visible and legitimate international forums that challenged the Soviet Union’s internal
behavior and refusal to recognize the legitimacy of non-official activities.
Since accounts that privilege the behavior of the U.S. government only give a
partial view of the role human rights played in U.S.-Soviet relations, Chapters V and VII
will examine the growing strength of the transnational network based on monitoring the
Kremlin’s internal behavior. Taking advantage of the ever-shrinking globe, dissenters
and Western private citizens formed an increasing number of transnational links with
each other. This development played an important role in moving Western governmental
and global public opinion in the direction of challenging the totalitarian aspirations of
orthodox Soviet policymakers. After describing how private citizens worked together to
“globalize” Soviet domestic misconduct, these chapters will also analyze the diverse
ways that dissenters and Soviet émigrés viewed Carter’s efforts to promote human rights
in the Soviet Union.
In addition to showing readers that the U.S. government was one player in a
broader global struggle against Soviet human rights violations, Chapters V and VII will
devote considerable attention to the behavior of the Brezhnev regime from 1977- 1981.
Although some critics might argue otherwise, these chapters will show that Carter could
not have done much more to promote human rights in the USSR. Given their intense fear
of domestic ideological subversion and insurrection, orthodox officials like KGB
Chairman Yuri Andropov feared the human rights critiques of transnational actors just as
much, if not more, than those of U.S. politicians. Besides viewing Carter as a committed
35
ideological foe, they also took a wide variety of steps to enhance the international
prestige of Soviet-style socialism.
After exploring the behavior of the Soviet government and transnational human
rights actors, this dissertation will examine the Reagan administration’s efforts to
promote human rights in the USSR. This topic deserves attention because the existing
literature on this subject remains uneven and at times intensely partisan. Numerous
works focus on how Reagan’s “hard-line” policies and/or efforts to promote democracy
across the globe played an important role in forcing the Soviet Union to end the Cold
War on U.S. terms.41 Others focus on how Jeane Kirkpatrick’s writings about the
differences between “totalitarian” and “authoritarian” governments played an important
role in making Reagan’s approach to promoting human rights less hesitant to challenge
communist regimes than Carter’s.42
41
Peter Schweizer and Paul Kengor make very few references to the issues of human rights in their
treatments of how Reagan “won” the Cold War. See Peter Schweitzer, Reagan’s War: The Epic Story of
His Forty-Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism (New York: Doubleday, 2002); Paul
Kengor, The Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism (New York: Harper Collins, 2006).
See also Norman A. Bailey The Strategic Plan that Won the Cold War: National Directive 75. MacLean,
VA, 1999); Peter Schweitzer, ed.., The Fall of the Berlin Wall: Reassessing the Causes and Consequences
of the End of the Cold War (Washington, D.C: Hoover Institution Press, 2000); Edwin Meese, With
Reagan: The Inside Story (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Press, 1992); and Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for
Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books); Whittle Johnson, “Reagan and
America’s Democratic Mission,” in Eric Schmertz et al., ed., President Reagan and the World (Westport,
Conn., 1997), 19-26; Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, “The Origins and Meaning of Reagan’s Cold War,” in
Paul Kengor and Peter Schweizer, ed., The Reagan Presidency: Assessing the Man and his Legacy
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005). For a more nuanced account of the same story, see
Dinesh D’ Souza, Ronald Reagan: How an Extraordinary Man Became an Extraordinary Leader (New
York: The Free Press, 1997); Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
(New York: Random House, 2005); and Jay Winik, On the Brink: The Dramatic, Behind-the-Scenes Saga
of the Reagan Era and the Men and Women who Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
See also Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 355-79.
42
See also Paula J. Dobriansky, “Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy,” The Washington Quarterly
(Spring 1989): 160-7; Petro, The Predicament of Human Rights, 58-9; Andrew Busch, Ronald Reagan and
the Politics of Freedom (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 207. See also Jeane J. Kirkpatrick,
36
While not oblivious to the larger goal of democracy promotion, some treatments
describe how Reagan made human rights an integral part of his “four-sided” negotiating
agenda that linked improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations to changes in the Kremlin’s
internal behavior. A number of these accounts fall within the confines of a growing body
of literature that outlines how Reagan’s pragmatism and flexibility better explain his
approach to promoting human rights in the Soviet Union than works that focus on his
rigid ideology.43 In sharp contrast to Reagan’s image as fierce “Cold Warrior,” some of
these accounts note the strong preference for “quiet” human rights policy he displayed
“Establishing a Viable Human Rights Policy,” World Affairs (Spring 1981): 323-334; Ibid., “Human
Rights and the Foundations of Democracy,” World Affairs 144, no. 3 (1981/1982): 196-203; and Ibid.,
“East/West Relations: Toward a New Definition of Dialogue,” World Affairs 144, no. 1 (1981): 14-30;
Michael Novak and Richard Schifter, “Speeches by the U.S. Delegation before the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights,” World Affairs 143, no. 3 (1980/1981): 226-30, 236-9, 252; and Walter
Laquer and Barry Rubin, ed., The Human Rights Reader, 2nd ed. (New York: New American Library,
1989), 278-81. See also “Human Rights and American Foreign Policy; a Symposium, Commentary 72, no.
5 (1981): 28-9, 40-9 and 60-2.
43
In particular, see Jack F. Matlock, Jr., “U.S. Policy and Human Rights in Relations with the USSR, 19611991,” in Debra Liang-Fenton, ed., Implementing U.S. Human Rights Policy: Agenda, Policies, and
Practices (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004), 245-66; Ibid., Reagan and
Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (New York: Random House, 2004), 101, 105, 144, 152, 156, 161,
166, 169, 175-6, 212, 217, 222, 226, 259, 265, 268, 283-4, 291-5; Ibid., Autopsy on an Empire: The
American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995),
11, 80, 84-6, 96, 148-50, 427, 637; Schmertz et al, President Reagan and the World, 124. See also Lou
Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 298-301, 307,
312, 316, 752-3, 783-4; Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the
Soviet Union, 1983-1991 (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1991), 19-24, 34-47;
Melvyn Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York:
Hill and Wang, 2007), 347-8, 360-4, 381, 383, 401, 418-20. Despite his focus on the Reagan
administration’s “liberal democratic internationalism,” Tony Smith also stresses Reagan’s pragmatic
instincts and behavior. See Smith, “America’s Mission: the United States and the Worldwide Struggle for
Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 268, 272-3. See also
Joshua Green, “Reagan’s Liberal Legacy: What the New Literature on the Gipper Won’t Tell You,”
Washington Monthly (January/February 2003). Available [Online]:
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/0301.green.html [10 December 2006]; and Robert W.
Tucker, “Reagan’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs (1988/1989): 12-3
37
during his first six years in office; a few even question the importance that he placed on
the task of supporting Soviet dissenters.44
Chapters VIII and X will argue that current works on Reagan’s efforts to
transform Soviet internal behavior have several notable drawbacks. With the exception
of some specialized studies, they do not devote enough attention to the crucial roles that
the Final Act and transnational human rights activities played in his administration’s
approach to promoting human rights and democracy in the USSR.45 Much like it had
been for Carter, remaining an active participant in the “Helsinki process” and supporting
transnational human rights activities became Reagan’s best available weapon for
accomplishing the goal of building democratic institutions in the USSR.
Without losing sight of Carter and Reagan’s distinctive policies, these chapters
will also call into question some standard interpretations of their efforts to promote
44
See Cannon, President Reagan, 784; and Tamar Jacoby, “The Reagan Turn Around on Human Rights,”
Foreign Affairs (Summer 1986): 1066-86. See also Caleb Rossiter, Human Rights: The Carter Record, the
Reagan Reaction: Part Two in a Series on Human Rights and the International Financial Institutions
(Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy, 1984), 24. The long-time ambassador to the United
States Anatoly Dobrynin felt that Reagan cared less about supporting Soviet dissenters than Carter. See In
Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Random House,
1995), 515, 582.
45
The best account of the Reagan administration’s relationship with the Final Act remains William Korey’s
The Promises We Keep. Although this work has a number of strengths, it does not grapple with the
complexities of Reagan’s overall approach to promoting human rights in the Soviet Union. Instead, it
almost exclusively focuses on the administration’s relationship with the Helsinki Accords. See Korey, The
Promises We Keep. See also Jeri Laber, The Courage of Strangers: Coming of Age with the Human Rights
Movement (New York: Public Affairs, 2002). For other accounts that at least mention he Final Act, see
Vojtech Mastny,, ed., The Helsinki Process and the Reintegration of Europe, 1986-1991: Analysis and
Documentation (New York: New York University Press, 1992); Stefan Lehne, The Vienna Meeting on the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1986-1989 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 37-9,
119-20, 130; George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Maxwell
Macmillan International, 1993), 122, 170, 277, 572-3, 1099; Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era,
60, 324-5, 395-6, 417-8, 429. Some works have addressed the influence of Congressional and private
citizens without the benefit of having access to administration documents. See Jacoby, “The Reagan Turn
Around on Human Rights,” 1067-1078; Sellars, The Rise and Rise of Human Rights, 136-140, 148;
Rossiter, Human Rights: The Carter Record, the Reagan Reaction, 22-4; A. Glenn Mower, Human Rights
and American Foreign Policy: The Carter and Reagan Experience (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987),
153-7.
38
human rights in the Soviet Union. While Reagan embraced the task of engaging in
vigorous ideological competition with the USSR, he often acted in ways designed to
mollify Soviet sensibilities on human rights issues; he also placed fewer specific
economic penalties on the Kremlin for imprisoning dissenters than Carter had. In many
ways, the actual steps that he took to rebuild U.S.-Soviet relations had important
commonalities with the “Helsinki process” described above. Because of his decision to
sign cooperative and exchange agreements with the USSR throughout his time in office,
Reagan faced the same kind of Congressional and public criticisms about his
commitment to supporting dissenters that Carter had.
However important, the behavior of the Reagan administration does not capture
all the complexities of the role dissenters and human rights played in U.S.-Soviet
relations during the 1980s. To understand this development, we need to remember that
the Soviet government faced a number of important setbacks as the 1970s drew to a
close. In 1978, millions of Catholics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe gained
spiritual nourishment and a profound sense of hope when a Polish cardinal named Karol
Wojtyla became Pope John Paul II. During the next two years, Soviet leaders made the
fateful decision to invade Afghanistan and witnessed visible cracks in their hold on
Eastern Europe. Dissatisfied with their poor economic conditions in Poland and inspired
by the efforts of John Paul II on the behalf of human freedom, the devout Catholic Lech
Walesa played a key role in organizing a federation of independent trade unions known
as “Solidarity.” The repressive measures of the Polish authorities may have forced this
movement go underground until 1989, but they had in reality lost the wider war. Instead
39
of remaining obedient, numerous Poles began to behave “as if they lived in a free
country.’” Rejecting the Marxist-Leninist regime, they participated in periodic strikes
and organized themselves in clandestine cells that published documents critical of
existing life in Poland; they also rallied around the idea of Poland as a Catholic nation.46
Just as the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe began to crack, the Kremlin also saw
signs that an increasing number of private citizens and government officials had become
disillusioned with Marxist-Leninist ideology and life in the USSR. To illustrate the
failure of the Soviet government’s totalitarian aspirations, Chapter IX will expand its
analysis of dissent well beyond the confines of human rights activities and calls for a
universal glasnost. Instead of becoming more obedient, an increasing number of
individuals decided to carve out separate spheres of existence outside the confines of
official ideology where they could pursue their interests without state interference.47 This
development is of crucial importance because it provides a partial corrective to accounts
that stress the inherent weaknesses of Soviet dissent during the 1980s.48 Better educated
and more familiar with life outside the USSR, an increasing number of private citizens
46
For a cogent account of the rise of Solidarity in Poland, see J. M. Roberts, The Penguin History of
Europe (Penguin Books: London, 1997), 637-8.
47
48
Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, 209.
Robert Horvath addresses this topic in his work The Legacy of Soviet Dissent. See Ibid., 1-8, 81-2, and
236-8. See also Robert Sharlet, “Soviet Dissent since Brezhnev,” Current History 85, no. 513 (1986): 3214, 40; Roy Medvedev, “Andropov and the Dissidents: The Internal Atmosphere under the New Soviet
Leadership,” Dissent 31, no. 1 (1984): 97-102; Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 8-9, 18-23; W.D. Connor,, “Differentiation, Integration, and Political Dissent,” in
Rudolf Tokes, ed., Dissent in the USSR (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975), 155.
40
and government officials engaged in non-official activities that by definition showcased
the erosion of the Soviet government’s domestic ideological legitimacy.49
Dissent was also not as weak as it appeared because of the growing strength and
sophistication of the transnational network dedicated to holding the Soviets accountable
for their human rights violations. Dissenters and émigrés not only continued to provide
Western private citizens and governments with information about conditions in the Soviet
Union, but also participated in activities that showed the hypocrisy of the Kremlin’s vocal
support for the Western European peace and American nuclear freeze movements. As
the international prestige of the USSR plummeted, Western European leaders became far
more vocal in their criticisms of Soviet internal and international conduct; they also went
further in defending the legitimacy of transnational human rights activities and the right
of non-Russian nationalities to exercise self-determination.
Chapter XI will focus on the question of why Gorbachev and other “liberalminded” reformers took steps to make Soviet internal practices consistent with
international human rights norms. Some works explain this development as a function of
the ways in which “material weaknesses” and/or the Reagan administration’s policies
forced Soviet policymakers to make concessions on human rights issues.50 In sharp
49
See Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, 209, 214. According to this author: “The civil society. . . .
that had been gathering strength in myriad of covert ways came out into the open under Gorbachev. . . .
This gathering force of individual and group initiative burst the bonds that ‘mere’ democratization placed
on them.” See Ibid. 209. For another excellent account of this development, see “George Urban’s
Conversation with the philosopher Leszek Kolakowski,” Encounter 56, no. 5 (1981): 22-4.
50
The most respected materialist account of Gorbachev’s behavior remains Stephen G. Brooks and William
C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for
Ideas,” International Security 25, no. 3 (2000/2001): 5-53; and Wohlforth, “The End of the Cold War as a
Hard Case for Ideas,” Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 2 (2005): 165-173. On the whole, I find critiques
41
contrast to these accounts, constructivist political scientists such as Robert English and
Daniel C. Thomas stress the pivotal role ideas and the international “normative”
environment play in explaining the transformation in Soviet behavior.51 Since Gorbachev
and other “liberal-minded” reformers held “’Westernizing’” beliefs that placed
importance on making the USSR a legitimate Western nation, they took steps to make
Soviet human rights practices more consistent with international standards and the Final
Act. Other accounts complicate the explanatory power of these arguments by pointing
out how Gorbachev and other “liberal-minded” reformers fell short of respecting
pluralism and taking the steps necessary to create a democratic Soviet state.52
of this approach compelling. As Daniel C. Thomas argues, “the materialist argument is indeterminate with
respect to Gorbachev’s decision to pursue radical political reform in the mid- to late 1980s rather than the
alternative policy of marketization-without-democratization that was pursued in China and that was
advocated, unsuccessfully, by moderate Soviet officials who were concerned about the survival of the
Soviet regime.” See Thomas, “Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold
War,” 115. See also Robert English, “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War’s End: A Reply to
Brooks and Wohlforth,” International Security 26, no. 4 (2002): 91; and Ibid., “The Sociology of New
Thinking: Elites, Identity Change, and the End of the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 2
(2005): 74. See also Ibid. “Ideas and the End of the Cold War: Rethinking Intellectual and Political
Change,” in Silvio Pons and Federico Romero, ed., Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War, 130-2. See
also Zubok, A Failed Empire, 307-8.
51
See Thomas, “Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War, 110-41;
Ibid., The Helsinki Effect; and English, Russia and the Idea of the West; and Ibid., “Ideas and the End of the
Cold War.” While the following works are not oblivious to the contradictions in Gorbachev’s behavior,
they on the whole paint him as a committed reformer. See Brown, The Gorbachev Factor; John Gooding,
“Gorbachev and Democracy,” Soviet Studies 42 (April 1990), 195-231; Stephen F. Cohen, The Failed
Crusade (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000); and Anatoly S. Chernyaev, trans. and ed. by Robert D. English
and Elizabeth Tucker, My Six Years with Gorbachev (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press,
2000).
52
In particular, see Horvath, The Legacy of Soviet Dissent, 41, 43, 45, 51, 53-4, 63, 70, 78-80, 101-111,
115-6, 185-6 and 207-8. Some works focus on how Gorbachev had little understanding of how his policies
would work out in practice or had difficulty moving away from his Leninist roots. See William Odom,
“The Sources of ‘New Thinking’ in Soviet Politics,” in Olav Njolstad, ed., The Last Decade of the Cold
War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation (London and New York: Frank Cass, 2004),
135-158; Ibid., The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Jerry F.
Hough, Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985-1991 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution
Press, 1997); Anthony D’ Agostino, Gorbachev’s Revolution (New York: New York University Press,
1998); John Keep, Last of the Empires: A History of the Soviet Union, 1945-1991 (Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996); Dmitri Volkogonov, ed. and trans. by Harold Shukman Autopsy for an
42
These works deserve attention because they help show how constructivist
accounts do not pay enough attention to the inherent limitations of “liberal-minded”
Soviet reformers and Gorbachev’s enduring hostility to non-official critics. To address
this shortcoming, Chapter XI will pay close attention the contours of ideological change
or inertia in minds of top-level Soviet policymakers and lower-ranking officials. It will
show how the steps that Gorbachev took to create a less bureaucratic society ended up
shaping the general trajectory of his reform campaign.53 The U.S. government and
transnational human right actors exploited the “liberalized” political terrain to challenge
the legitimacy of the General Secretary’s preference for a “directed” glasnost. From this
angle, Soviet private citizens became important democracy builders. With the help of
Western governments and NGOS, they helped convince some Soviet officials to make
their government’s internal behavior more consistent with the provisions of the Final Act
and international human rights standards.
Unlike many constructivist explanations, this chapter will maintain that Soviet
reformers did not just carry out reforms to make their nation a “normal” member of the
Western world.54 Gorbachev and some of his subordinates proved susceptible to
Empire: The Seven Leaders Who Built the Soviet Regime (New York: The Free Press, 1998); Martin
McCauley, Gorbachev: Profiles in Power (London and New York: Longman, 1998); Walter Laquer, The
Long Road to Freedom: Russia and Glasnost (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1989); Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick, The Withering Away of the Totalitarian State . . . and other Surprises (Washington, D.C.,
1990), 36-67 and 70-92.
53
For a cogent account of Gorbachev’s efforts to create a “more participatory society,” see John Gooding
“Gorbachev and Democracy,” Soviet Studies 42, no. 2 (April 1990), 205.
54
See Thomas, “Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War;” and
Ibid., The Helsinki Effect, Chapters 7 and 8, 282. Robert English follows a similar pattern and privileges
Gorbachev and other “liberal-minded” reformers’ goal of becoming a “normal” Western nation; he also
could have done more to outline Gorbachev’s hostility to non-official activities. See English, Russia and
the Idea of the West. For an account that diverges from this pattern, see Robert G. Herman, “Identity,
43
transnational critiques because they hoped to forge a superior synthesis of socialism and
democracy capable of generating universal emulation.55 This attitude accounts for why
these individuals hoped to use the issue of human rights as a way of engaging in vigorous
ideological competition with the United States and other capitalist countries. In contrast
to previous Soviet behavior, some individuals even cited the reports of transnational
human rights actors to buttress the legitimacy of their complaints about U.S. internal
behavior.
The final section of this chapter will grapple with the successes and limitations of
Gorbachev’s reform campaign. In light of Russian and Soviet history, the signing of the
concluding document at the Final Act follow-up conference in Vienna marked an
important step toward creating a law-abiding socialist state that felt obligated to respect
each individual’s basic freedoms. Despite this achievement, the inability and
unwillingness of many Soviet officials to tolerate diversity had a predictable result. As
the authority of the CPSU crumbled, the Soviet government failed to institutionalize the
laws and practices necessary to create a civil society capable of checking governmental
behavior in a stable and predictable manner.
The collapse of the Soviet Union raises an important point that the renowned Cold
War historian John Lewis Gaddis has written about in detail. In his work We Know Now,
Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War,” in
Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security.
55
The arguments of Jacques Levesque had an important impact on my understanding of Gorbachev’s quest
for superior version of socialism. He also makes a strong argument that Gorbachev held a strong
attachment to ideas and in many ways worked to create a “utopian world order.” See Levesque, “The
Messianic Character of Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’: Why and What For,” in Njolstad, ed., The Last
Decade of the Cold War, 172. Vladimir Zubok makes a similar argument. See also Zubok, A Failed
Empire, 309-10; and Hosking, The Awakening of the Soviet Union, 11-12.
44
he reminded readers that “the diversification of power did more to shape the Cold War
than did the balancing of power.”56 The USSR may have had plenty of military strength,
but “[d]eficiencies in other kinds of power—economic, ideological, cultural, [and]
moral” resulted in its downfall. This insight is appropriate. Without any guns or bullets,
private citizens played a fundamental role in “globalizing” the idea that superpower status
could not be divorced from how Soviet leaders respected the basic human rights of their
private citizens. Much like Jimmy Carter predicted, U.S. politicians held values and
operated in a political system that put them in a much stronger position to handle and
exploit this “diversification of power.”57
This argument does not mean that the issue of human rights violations alone
caused the collapse of the USSR; poor economic performance, the weakening appeal of
orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology at all levels of society, and the persistence of
religious observance and nationalist aspirations in places such as Ukraine all played an
important role in the Soviet Union’s demise. Nevertheless, the growing attention that
private citizens and Western governments paid to the issue of human rights mattered a
great deal. They helped the rest of the world see that the USSR was an artificial creation
whose continued existence depended on the willingness of the CPSU to suppress basic
freedoms and prevent individuals from expressing own values and identities. As the final
chapter will explain, this defeat proved every bit as damaging as the economic failures of
56
John Lewis Gaddis, We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997), 283. Gaddis’s doctoral advisee Jeremi Suri makes a similar point in Power and Protest. See Ibid.,
263.
57
Leszek Kolakowski makes this position clear in “George Urban’s Conversation with the philosopher
Leszek Kolakowski,” 26
45
Soviet-style socialism. The noted philosopher Leszek Kolakowski addressed this issue in
1983 when argued:
In the last analysis the main source of Soviet strength is Western incomprehension
of those great and growing internal tensions which threaten the fabric of the
Soviet system. If Soviet leaders suspected for one moment that the Western
world knew what they [author’s italics] know about their system, their worries
about the staying power of the Soviet empire would increase immeasurably.58
Unlike Kolakowski, this work will argue that Soviet policymakers did comprehend and
worry about the determination of the Western world to point out the level of internal
repression necessary to hold the USSR together. When Gorbachev attempted to
restructure the Soviet Union in ways designed to meet the human rights standards of
Western society, he unleashed developments that resulted in the destruction of Vladimir
Lenin’s Marxist-Leninist experiment.
58
Ibid.
46
CHAPTER 2: THE HUMAN RIGHTS WEAPON EMERGES: SOVIET DISSENT,
PRIVATE CITZENS, AND THE U.S. CONGRESS, 1975-1977
In January 1977, a dissident publication that reached foreign audiences described
how the Soviet government had lost the ability to shield its domestic conduct from
international scrutiny. No amount of repression, the document predicted, would allow
the authorities to “conceal the truth about their violations” of internationally recognized
human rights and “the Final Act.” Because damaging information could now flow across
state borders in a matter of seconds, Soviet leaders “can never be certain that facts on the
unending suppression of elementary liberties in the USSR will not become public.”59
This chapter will explain why dissenters felt confident making this prediction. It
will do so by describing how they played a crucial role in the creation of a transnational
advocacy network based on monitoring Soviet internal behavior. During the 1960s, a
wide array of dissenters rallied around the concept of universally recognized human
rights to protect themselves from a government bent on eradicating activities that
authorities deemed non-official. With a strong desire to make their society more humane,
some formed a wide array of non-official groups designed to monitor Soviet compliance
with the Final Act and existing Soviet laws.
The activities of these groups impressed many Western observers. Already
unhappy with the U.S. executive branch’s lack of interest in human rights, several
members of Congress accepted the arguments of NGOs and created the U.S. Helsinki
Commission. This organization not only monitored the executive branch’s efforts to
59
CHRUR 25 (January-March 1977): 48-9.
47
bring about Soviet and Eastern European compliance with the Final Act, but also
encouraged private citizens to hold governments accountable for their behavior. While
many in the U.S. State Department resisted this development, some members of the Ford
administration recognized that they would have to carry out at least some “public” human
rights diplomacy to satisfy the concerns of their Congressional and public critics. By
obtaining this concession, private citizens and Congress made important progress toward
accomplishing the larger goal of making human rights a contentious and visible issue in
U.S.-Soviet relations.
The Final Act, Soviet Dissent, and the Rise of Citizen Monitoring
Nikita Khrushchev’s speech at the Twentieth Party Congress about Joseph
Stalin’s crimes and de-Stalinization policies had important domestic repercussions. His
words led some survivors of the Gulag and other private citizens to make tentative
demands for more artistic and intellectual freedoms. Even before orthodox officials like
Leonid Brezhnev removed Khrushchev from power, they had become wary of the
excesses associated with the “cultural thaw” of the 1950s. In particular, they disliked
how a growing number of private citizens discussed topics such as politics and literature
in ways that conflicted with official ideology. 60
Convinced that Khrushchev’s policies had weakened the ideological resolve of
the population, the Brezhnev regime decided to curb the expression of opinions that did
60
Horvath, The Legacy of Soviet Dissent, 77-9. See also Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, The
Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990,
1993), 117-46; and Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and
Human Rights (Middletown, Conn., 1985), 274-79, 323-5; and Abraham Brumberg, ed., In the Quest for
Justice: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union Today (Praeger Publications: New York, 1970),
Introduction; and Joshua Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggle for Human Rights. 2nd edition
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 1-96.
48
conform to views sanctioned by the Communist Party. During the mid 1960s, Soviet
authorities arrested and convicted Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel for publishing nonofficial works abroad under pen names. They based this punishment on language found
in Article 70 of the criminal code, which forbade anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda
that weakened the Soviet state. When two hundred Soviet citizens gathered in Pushkin
Square to protest these authors’ arrests and demand a public trial, the authorities detained
everyone involved and arrested several participants. The Kremlin also amended the
criminal code to ban public protests and any form of communication that government
officials viewed as slanderous.61
In response to these efforts to curtail independent thought, dissidents wrote protest
letters to government officials stressing how arbitrary bureaucratic decisions such as
carrying out closed trials and sending sane individuals to psychiatric wards violated legal
norms. As part of this process, some offered to engage in dialogue with Soviet officials
on the best ways the government could follow the provisions of their nation’s constitution
and domestic laws. Many dissidents also carried out public protests and produced
samizdat, a term that refers to the self-publication and distribution of non-official
publications. To curtail this practice, the Soviet government arrested and tried four
dissidents in 1967 and 1968 for the illegal creation and distribution of samizdat. This
“trial of four” played an important role in bringing about the creation of the Chronicle of
61
Horvath, The Legacy of Soviet Dissent, 77-9.
49
Current Events, a bi-monthly samizdat publication that documented Soviet human rights
violations, restrictions on emigration, and suppression of religious activity.62
As Peter Reddaway and other scholars have noted, the Chronicle played an
important role in helping the diverse dissident movement find unity in the common cause
of human rights. Instead of ignoring each other as they had throughout much of the
1960s, dissidents as diverse as Crimean Tatars, Ukrainian nationalists, Baptists, and
human rights activists such as Andrei Sakharov began working together and
communicating with each other.63 Cognizant that their political differences could weaken
their movements’ overall strength, dissidents began to emphasize Soviet authorities’ need
to follow the international human rights agreements they had signed. For example, Jews
became visible demanding the right to emigrate afforded individuals in the U.N.
Declaration of Human Rights. The growing importance dissidents attached to human
rights became even more apparent when a group of them formed the Initiative Group to
Defend Human Rights in 1969. Its first publication, which appeared in The Chronicle,
asked the United Nations to examine the Kremlin’s violations of Soviet citizens’
internationally recognized human rights.64
62
Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia, 79, 85-6; Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, 15-6;
Paul Goldberg, The Final Act: The Dramatic, Revealing Story of the Moscow Watch Group (New York:
William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1988), 28; Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents, 98, 100-5.
63
Peter Reddaway, ed., Uncensored Russia: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union (American Heritage
Press, 1972).
64
See Peter Reddaway, “Dissent in the Soviet Union,” Dissent (Spring 1976): 138. For a good account of
this debate’s history, see Richard N. Dean, “Contacts with the West: The Dissidents’ View of Western
Support for the Human Rights Movement in the Soviet Union,” Universal Human Rights 2 (January/March
1980): 48, n. 2.
50
The Kremlin’s attempts to curb dissent during the late 1960s and 1970s through
arrests, imprisonment, and commitment of individuals to psychiatric institutions had
mixed success. Soviet officials pressured some dissidents to renounce their activities on
national television and managed to shut down production of The Chronicle from October
1972 to mid-1973. On the other hand, a group of dissidents for the first time claimed
responsibility for disseminating the publication before an audience of foreign journalists.
Just as important, new groups such as the Moscow Human Rights Committee and
Council of Relatives of Imprisoned Baptists emerged and published articles in The
Chronicle calling for the rule of law in Soviet society. In 1974, Valentin Turchin and ten
other dissidents set up a Moscow branch of Amnesty International (AI), although the
organization’s International Secretariat hesitated to recognize the branch. Worried about
upsetting recent improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations, the Secretariat forbade members
of the Moscow branch from attending Amnesty’s annual meetings.
While these groups on the whole stressed the need to engage in dialogue with
government officials about possible reforms, many became impatient with the Kremlin’s
continued repression and harassment of individuals who expressed non-official opinions.
As a result of their growing impatience, some dissidents asked Western governments and
non-governmental organizations to show more support for their efforts aimed at making
Soviet officials respect their own laws and the international human rights agreements
they had signed. Consistent with this campaign, the recently exiled Alexander
Solzhenitsyn used his profits from the Nobel Prize to create a fund in his own name that
51
gave assistance to individuals and their family members who suffered from Soviet
governmental repression.65
During the early 1970s, the ways in which dissenters cultivated Western public
opinion grew in sophistication. They held press conferences and television interviews,
distributed samizdat material to foreign journalists, and made some appeals to the United
Nations that elaborated how Soviet officials had violated internationally recognized
human rights. They also called on Western government leaders, participants in
international conferences, and private organizations such as AI to voice greater support
for their efforts.66 In many ways, dissenters had begun the process of drawing Western
governments and private citizens into an international “dialogue whose premises and
perimeters [sic] were laid down by the domestic critics of the Soviet regime.”67
Although dissidents stressed Soviet legality and the importance of internationally
recognized human rights, they never viewed their protests as tantamount to creating an
organized political opposition to the Communist party. Instead, they went out of their
way to define their activities as moral, non-political endeavors designed to bring about
the creation of a law-abiding Soviet state. They eschewed underground revolutionary
65
Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent, and Reform in Soviet Russia, 87; Abraham Brumberg, “Dissent in
Russia,” Foreign Affairs 52, no. 4 (1974): 782, 785; and Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents, 131-4. See also
Hodgman, “Détente and the Dissidents,” 331-2.
66
Howard L. Biddulph, “Protest Strategies of the Soviet Intellectual Opposition,” in Dissent in the USSR:
Politics, Ideology, and People, ed. Rudolph L. Tokes (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975),
111-2. Also found in Dean, “Contacts with the West,” 50-1. Note: Dean erroneously attributed this
material to Tokes. Frederick Barghoorn has a good account of the growing links between Soviet dissidents
and Western journalists and human rights activists in his work Détente and the Democratic Movement in
the USSR (New York: Macmillan Press, 1976), 103-6. See also Emma Gilligan, Defending Human Rights
in Russia: Sergei Kovalyov, Dissident and Human Rights Commissioner, 1969-2003 (New York:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 10-29; and Chalidze, The Soviet Human Rights Movement .
67
Quote taken from Dean, “Contacts with the West,” 51.
52
violence, sent signed petitions to Soviet government officials, and emphasized the
necessity of governments’ acting within the boundaries of international and domestic
law.68 For many dissidents, a close connection existed between human rights and the
idea of glasnost. As Robert Horvath has shown, many dissidents during the 1960s and
1970s reached the conclusion that the Soviet government would never curb their human
rights abuses and illegal imprisonments unless they generated the maximum amount of
domestic and international publicity about Soviet misconduct as they could muster.
Based on this assumption, they defended the position that glasnost guaranteed each
individual’s inherent rights to express his or her opinion and receive information from
anywhere in the world. This attitude accounts for why dissidents attached so much
importance to receiving foreign broadcasts about conditions in the Soviet Union.69
No dissident better articulated the close connection between human rights,
glasnost, and international security than Andrei Sakharov. In his 1975 lecture accepting
the Nobel Peace prize, which his wife read for him after Soviet authorities refused to
grant his travel request, Sakharov argued that “[d]etente can only be assured if from the
very outset it goes hand in hand with continuous openness on the part of all countries, an
aroused sense of public opinion, the free exchange of information, and an absolute
respect in all countries for political and civil rights.”70 In an essay written at the request
68
Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent, and Reform in Soviet Russia, 76, 81-3, 89-93; Horvath, The Legacy of
Soviet Dissent, 84-95; Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents, 151-2. See also Valery Chalidze, “Human Rights: A
Policy of Honor,” CHRUR 25 (Jan./Feb., 1977): 59-62.
69
Horvath, The Legacy of Soviet Dissent, 54-69. See also Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation,
124.
53
of the Norwegian Nobel Committee in March 1977, Sakharov continued to stress this
theme:
The most serious defect of a “closed society” [Soviet Union] is the total lack of
democratic control over the upper echelons of the party and government in their
conduct of domestic affairs and foreign policy. . . . The “closed nature” of our
society is intrinsically related to the question of civil and political rights. The
human rights issue, is not simply a moral one, but also a paramount, practical
ingredient of international trust and security.71
The dissenter Yuri Orlov shared Sakharov’s views about the close connection
between human rights, glasnost, and international security. This attitude explains why
each of them came to view the Final Act as a weapon that dissidents could wield against
the Soviet state. Since “appeals to the [Soviet] public” held out little chance of changing
the Kremlin’s disrespect for individual human rights, Orlov decided that “we [dissidents]
had to create our own committee and send expert documents to signatory governments
about the USSR’s violations of the political agreement it had signed.” When the full
scope of Soviet Union’s contempt for human rights became apparent, he reasoned,
Western nations would have little choice but “to demand that the Soviets cease
repressions against their citizens.”72
Many of Orlov’s fellow dissidents disagreed with his long-term plan of using the
Final Act as a means of engaging in dialogue with government officials about the best
ways of reforming Soviet society. Despite these misgivings, some accepted his
70
Andrei Sakharov, Alarm and Hope, ed. by Efrem Yankelevich and Alfred Friendly, Jr. (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 10.
71
72
Ibid., 102.
Yuri Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts: Memoirs of a Soviet Dissident, trans. Thomas P. Whitney (New York,
William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991), 189-91. See also Hodgman, “Détente and the
Dissidents,”330-53 and 377-83.
54
arguments about how monitoring Soviet compliance could bring about increased Western
support for their efforts. They also accepted his reasoning about “how the issues of
humanitarianism and freedom of information” have a direct relationship with the problem
of international security. After discussing his plan with some of his closet friends, Orlov
announced the formation of an eleven-member committee called “The Public Group to
Support Compliance with the Helsinki Accords in the USSR (Moscow Watch Group)” at
a press conference on 12 May 1976. He told reporters that the Moscow Watch Group
would monitor and struggle for Soviet observance of Basket III and Principle VII, the
humanitarian articles of the Helsinki Accords. So its members could obtain as much
information about conditions inside the Soviet Union as possible, the Watch Group urged
private citizens to send it written complaints about Soviet human rights violations and
illegal conduct.73
Once members of Moscow Watch Group received these complaints, they would
check their authenticity and then forward them to “all heads of signatory states.” The
Watch Group hoped that these states would use this information to document Soviet
violations at the 1977 follow-up conference scheduled to take place in Belgrade.74 Along
with trying to disseminate as much accurate information as possible, the Moscow Watch
Group called on citizens in other signatory states to create organizations that monitored
their government’s compliance with the Final Act. It also called for the creation of two
73
Joshua Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggles for Human Rights, 2nd edition (Boston: Beacon
Press), 320; Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts, 189-92; Goldberg, The Final Act, 11-58; and Alexeyeva, The
Thaw Generation, 274-94. For a good account of some dissidents’ initial skepticism at Orlov’s proposal,
see Peter Grigorenko, Memoirs, trans. by Thomas P. Whitney (New York: W. W. Norton and Company,
1982), 433-6.
74
Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents, 338-9.
55
international commissions to monitor each signatory’s compliance with the Helsinki
Accords and the conditions of Soviet prisons.75
In some important ways, the course of action that Orlov advocated followed the
general trajectory of dissent that this chapter has already outlined in some important
ways. Since he understood that dissidents championed different causes and often
disagreed over tactics, the Moscow Watch Group never advocated a specific political
program. Instead, this group stressed the necessity of monitoring Soviet compliance with
the Final Act and convincing the Kremlin to abide by the international human rights
agreements it had signed. Its emphasis on the collection and distribution of accurate
information across the globe concerning Soviet human rights violations highlighted many
dissidents’ belief in the close connection between glasnost, human rights, international
security, and Soviet internal reform. In a fashion similar to earlier dissidents, Orlov also
recognized that the Moscow Watch Group needed the strong support of Western
governments and citizens if it had any chance of convincing the Kremlin to reform. In
many ways, this group’s determination to disseminate well-researched reports and
accurate information rather than appeals to the United Nations illustrated dissidents’
growing sophistication and willingness to call on Western governments to challenge
Soviet human rights abuses.76
75
Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, 337. See also Catherine Fitzpatrick, The Moscow Helsinki
Monitors: Their Vision, Their Achievement, The Price They Paid, May 12, 1976-May 12, 1986 (New York:
U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, 1986), 15-2. See also “The Public Group to Promote Observance of the
Helsinki Accords in the USSR,” CHRUR 20-21 (April/June 1976): 5-6.
76
Dean, “Contacts with the West,” 52.
56
While Orlov’s vision may have incorporated some familiar dissident strategies,
the formation of the Moscow Watch Group became an important turning point in the
history of dissent. During the next two years, numerous dissidents followed this group’s
example and formed similar public monitoring groups in the Soviet republics of Ukraine,
Armenia, Lithuania, and Georgia. Some groups also emerged with more specific
mandates such as the Christian Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Religious
Believers and Working Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political
Purposes. 77 The Moscow Watch Group’s decision to monitor the Kremlin’s compliance
with an international agreement it had signed represented an unprecedented challenge to
the Soviet officials’ “monopoly on political space.” This strategy also played a role in
further uniting the “disparate opposition” behind the banner of human rights. The
importance many dissidents attached to internationally recognized human rights only
increased when the United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Social,
Cultural, and Economic Rights, which all Warsaw Pact countries had ratified, entered
into force in early 1976. Instead of holding their annual Pushkin square rallies on the
Soviet Constitution Day (December 5), Soviet dissidents began to hold them on the
International Day of Human Rights (December 10) in 1977.78
Besides helping Soviet dissidents unite behind a common cause, the activities of
Soviet Helsinki monitors inspired private citizens in other countries to monitor their own
governments’ compliance record. In September 1976, Polish intellectuals formed the
77
Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents, 312; and “The Dissidents v. Moscow,” Newsweek, 21 February 1978, 23-
4.
78
Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of
Communism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Horvath, The Legacy of Soviet Dissent, 94.
57
precursor to Solidarity known as the Committee of Workers Defense (KOR), which
emphasized workers’ right to form independent trade unions and the Polish government
obligation to follow the Final Act. A few months later, the Polish Helsinki Committee
came into existence. In a fashion similar to the citizen monitoring groups in the Soviet
Union, this non-governmental human rights organization sent documents to the West
concerning Polish violations of the Final Act and harsh treatment of Solidarity. The
efforts of these groups received a boost when members of the Catholic Church in Poland
and later Pope John Paul II called on the Polish government to implement the Final Act.79
During the European Youth and Student Assembly that took place from 18-24
June 1976, a British delegation read a statement from the underground Polish Youth
Committee for the Implementation of the Helsinki Agreement that called on “similar
committees” in Europe and the United States to monitor their governments’ compliance
with the Helsinki Accords. On 1 January 1977, 242 Czechoslovakian citizens signed
Charter 77, which emphasized how private citizens had the right and obligation to
challenge their governments’ violations of universally recognized human rights in the
U.N. Human Rights Covenants and the Final Act. Following the example of citizen
monitoring groups in the Soviet Union, the signers of this document rejected the notion
of forming a political opposition and emphasized the need to promote “the general public
interest” like other “citizen initiatives in the “West and East.”80
79
William Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “A Curious Grapevine” (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 233-4. For a more in-depth discussion, see Thomas, The Helsinki Effect,
167-74.
80
Korey, NGOS and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 234. An electronic copy of Charter 77
can be found at “Charter 77 Manifesto.” Available [Online]:
58
The growth of Final Act public monitoring groups coincided with other
developments that raised private citizens’ awareness of the Helsinki Accords. During the
November 1975 World Congress of Churches (WCC) held in Nairobi, Kenya, a Swiss
delegate proposed a resolution entitled “Disarmament, the Helsinki Agreement, and
Religious Liberty” that called on the Soviet Union “to implement effectively principle
no. 7” of the Final Act. In response to this proposed resolution, the WCC central
committee asked European churches to send it a report on how the Final Act protected
religious liberty. Keston College and three religious institutes in England, Switzerland,
and the Netherlands fulfilled this request and sent the central committee “extensive, welldocumented evidence” of how the Soviets violated the Final Act’s provisions related to
religious freedom. The report that the European institutes sent even noted that “the
unmistakable conclusion to be drawn [from the analysis of Soviet legislation] is that the
fundamental laws of the USSR must be drastically changed before one can speak of
freedom of conscience . . . [and] before Christians and other believers will be raised from
second to first class citizens.81
After a group of affiliated Orthodox and Protestant churches attended the
Conference on East European Churches (CEC) from 27-31 October 1975, numerous
congregations in East Germany and other Eastern European countries discussed and
analyzed the provisions of the Helsinki Accords. These discussions help explain why a
large percentage of the 100,000 East Germans who requested visas to visit West
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/19/documents/charter.77/ [14 May 2007]. See also
Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 174-83.
81
Dante Fascell, “The Helsinki Accord: A Case Study,” Annals, AAPSS 442 (March 1979): 73; and
CHRUR 22 (July-September 1976): 23-4.
59
Germany from August 1975-August 1976 cited the provisions of the Final Act when
making their request. One week after the European Youth and Student Assembly took
place, the meeting of the twenty-nine Communist and Workers’ parties in East Berlin, at
the insistence of the Spanish and Italian delegations, called on each signatory to
implement the provisions of the Helsinki Accords. Just like they had done with the Final
Act, Soviet and Eastern governments published the meeting’s concluding document in
their official domestic publications.82
The formation of citizen monitoring groups such as and Ukrainian Watch Group
and activities of institutions like the CEC helped increase private citizens’ awareness
about the obligations governments accepted when they signed the Helsinki Accords.83
On the most basic level, this development grew out of changes in how global society
functioned that only accelerated during the 1970s. As Dante Fascell (D-FL) argues in his
essay “The Helsinki Accord,” the growing interdependence of nations in areas such as
energy and food production, along with technological advances in the fields of
communications and transportation, had “created an enormous increase in transnational
ties among nations.” As part of this process, “structures within a society, whether
cultural, business, education, professional, or scientific” had to some extent become
involved in international relationships. “These nongovernmental groups and
individuals,” Fascell writes, “now play an important role in world affairs . . . [and] are
82
Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 101-2; 107-9
83
Fascell, “The Helsinki Accord,” 70.
60
demanding a say in the traditional agreements, exchanges, and relationships among world
government leaders.”84
Fascell’s arguments in many ways resemble recent works that emphasize how the
idea of human rights became “globalized” in the 1970s because of the creation of
transnational advocacy networks. A transnational human rights network begins when
“domestic groups in a repressive state bypass their state and directly search out
international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from the outside.” These
international allies can include a wide array of actors, including but not limited to
churches, unions, domestic non-governmental groups with similar goals, and nongovernmental organizations from other countries. They can also include international
human rights organizations, international non-governmental organizations such as the
U.N. Human Rights Commission, philanthropic foundations, sympathetic publications,
and Western governments.85 As Thomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn
Sikkink point out in their edited work The Power of Human Rights, a transnational
human rights network comes together when relevant actors become “bound together by
84
85
Ibid.
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International
Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 12, 9, 18, 23-4, 28, 30, 37. See also Kathryn Sikkink,
“Human Rights, Principle Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America,” International Organization
47 (Summer 1993): 411-441; Volker Schneider, “The Global Capital of Human Rights Movements: A Case
Study of Amnesty International,” in Karsten Ronit and Volker Schneider, ed., Private Organizations in
Global Politics (New York: Routledge, 2000), 146-64; Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn
Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), 1-38, 234-78; Daniel C. Thomas, “The Helsinki Accords and Political Change in
Eastern Europe,” in Ibid., 205-233; and Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In:
Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995); and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United
States and Western Europe,” in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy:
Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 139-72.
61
shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services.”
Kenneth Cmiel makes a similar argument in his article “The Emergence of Human Rights
Politics in the United States,” when he writes that “by the middle of the seventies, the
information revolution on human rights was in full swing and the network of activists
increasingly agile. Communication circuits that had not existed ten years before were
confidently pushing politically charged information across the globe.”86
No matter how important, the formation of a transnational advocacy network
based on monitoring Soviet and Eastern European compliance with the Final Act did not
just depend on the proliferation of citizen monitoring groups and the activities of
institutions such as the WCC. It also came together because of the exchange of
information between Eastern private citizens and Western government employees. While
many Western embassy employees refused to work with dissidents, some passed their
messages along to broadcasting organizations such as the BBC and Radio Liberty/Radio
Free Europe. These institutions then transmitted many of these messages and reports to
the ever-growing audiences in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. For example, in
1966 “only 2.4 to 4.2. percent of college-educated Muscovites regularly listened to
Western Russian-language” radio programming. By 1976, that percentage had risen to
between forty and fifty percent. During the 1980s, Radio Liberty surveys estimated that
about seven million Soviet citizens listened to its programming each day. According to a
1979 Polish survey, fifty percent of the adult population listened to Radio Free Europe, a
86
Risse, Ropp, Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights, 18; and Kenneth Cmiel, “The Emergence of Human
Rights Politics in the United States,” The Journal of American History 86, no. 3 (December 1999).
Available [Online]: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/cmiel.htm [16 July 2007].
62
percentage that would only climb during the 1980s. As many dissidents have argued,
Western broadcasting played a crucial role making Eastern European and Soviet citizens’
more aware of their messages and how governments worked to repress non-official group
activity.87
Western journalists stationed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe may have
paid little attention to the formation of the Moscow Watch Group, but they helped relay
dissident messages to sympathetic Western embassy officials. When these journalists
started to receive more and more Helsinki-oriented appeals from Eastern European and
Soviet citizens, they devoted more attention to the struggle for human rights in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. In places such as Berlin and Moscow, they “began to write
about the Helsinki-related demands of workers, writers, religious believers,” individuals
seeking to emigrate from the Soviet Union, and human rights activists. As William
Korey points out in his work The Promises We Keep, “accounts in the Western media . . .
served as powerful means for stirring the consciousness in the United States” about
conditions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.88
During the 1970s, Soviet citizens began to read more dissident literature about life
in the Soviet Union published in the West (tamizdat) than they had in the previous
decade. According to Boris Rabbot, a high-ranking Soviet government official whom the
Kremlin allowed to emigrate, unpublished Soviet sociological studies illustrated that “one
87
Boris Rabbot, “Détente: The Struggle within the Kremlin; The Debate over Debate; An Ex-Insider’s
Revelations,” Washington Post, 10 July 1977, B1; and Korey, A Curious Grapevine, 234-5. See also
Chalidze, The Soviet Human Rights Movement, 23.
88
William Korey, The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process, and American Foreign
Policy (New York: St. Martins Press, 1993), 52.
63
copy of the dissident writer Vladimir Maximov’s book, ‘Seven Days of Creation,’ may
be read by 500 to 700 people . . . to the point of total disintegration.”89 Just as important,
various American and Western European publishers made samizdat publications such as
The Chronicle of Current Events (Amnesty International), A Chronicle of Human Rights
in the USSR (Khronika Press), and A Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania
(Lithuanian Roman Catholic Priests' League of America) accessible to the Western
audiences and Soviet émigré communities. These publications contained documents
about conditions in the Soviet Union that Helsinki monitoring groups managed to send
abroad. Some of these documents included accounts of dissident trials, dissident opinion
pieces about Soviet internal behavior, and dissident pleas to Western audiences for public
support. The Khronika Press published a plethora of short pamphlets in English and
Russian describing conditions in the Soviet Union such as Human Rights Conventions
Ratified By the USSR and Vladimir Bukovsky---Soviet Dissenter.90
Eastern European and Soviet private citizens also managed to raise the
international community’s understanding of the Helsinki Accords and Soviet human
rights abuses because they received support from and gave information to Western
private citizens and non-governmental human rights organizations. In particular, they
gave information to U.S. ethnic lobbies such as the International League for Human
Rights, the Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee, and the Czechoslovakian
89
90
Rabbot, “Détente.”
Frances X. Clines, New York Times, 10 December 1977, 23. During the mid-1970s, Edward Kline’s
Khronika Press in New York City published 1,100 English and 500 Russian editions of CHRUR each
month.
64
National Council of America. Of course, these linkages had begun to form before the
Helsinki Accords came into existence. For example, the International League for Human
Rights recognized the Moscow Human Rights Committee as an affiliate in 1971. This
organization also gave its annual human rights award to Sakharov in 1973. As indicated
earlier, AI recognized a Moscow Branch in 1974. Furthermore, groups such as the Union
of Councils for Soviet Jews (UCSJ) and the National Council on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ)
championed the cause of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union within the halls of the
U.S. government.91
Because of the growth of Soviet and Western scientific contacts that grew out of
the 1973 U.S.-Soviet exchange agreement, many Western scientists chose to defend their
Soviet counterparts who faced repression for voicing non-official opinions. The
President of the USNAS Philip Handler wrote a letter to the Head of the Soviet Academy
of Science in 1973 arguing that governmental attempts to silence Sakharov jeopardized
Soviet-American scientific cooperation. In response to the arrest of the dissident
biologist Sergei Kovalyov on 27 December 1974, the Federation of American Scientists
created a “Committee in Defense of Sergei Kovalyov.” This group sent Anatoly
Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, a letter with the signatures of 92
biologists (all members of the U.S. National Academy of Scientists) urging the Soviet
government to give Kovalyov either clemency or amnesty. With advice from Handler,
91
Frederick C. Barghoorn, Détente and the Democratic Movement in the USSR (New York: The Free
Press, 1976), 32; Cmeil, “The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States”; Lesya Verba and
Bohdan Yasen, ed., The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine: Documents of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group,
1976-1980 (Baltimore: Smoloskyp Publishers, 1980), 21-22; Richard Lourie, Sakharov: A Biography
(Hanover: University Press of New England, 2002), 254-55; and CHRUR 23-4 (October-December 1976):
9-10. The International League for Human Rights also made Sakharov an honorary vice-president in 1976.
See Sakharov, Alarm and Hope, 33-4.
65
the USNAS created a human rights committee in 1976 that defended the rights of all
scientists to receive information and attend scientific conferences anywhere in the
world.92
The Final Act only increased private citizens’ willingness to endorse courses of
action designed to monitor how the Soviet government treated their citizens on a
consistent basis. After receiving numerous appeals from Soviet scientists, especially
from those who were Jewish, the 113th Annual Meeting of the USNAS that took place in
1976 asked scientists to support “An Affirmation of Freedom of Inquiry and Expression.”
The guidelines issued to the Academy’s foreign secretary insisted that the organization
“keep a closer watch over violations of scientists’ rights around the world and that the
Academy will intercede in defense of individual scientists privately or, on occasion,
publicly, when such an action appears appropriate and useful.” Along similar lines, the
Royal College of Psychiatrists (Great Britain) passed a resolution urging the 1977
Congress of World Psychiatric Association to “condemn the systematic misuse of
psychiatry for political purposes in the USSR.” The Royal College also “decided to seek
permission for a delegation of psychiatrists to visit the Soviet Union in order to examine
some of the dissenters who have been certified as insane.”93
92
Lourie, Sakharov, 255; and Emma Gilligan, Defending Human Rights in Russia, 43; Marguerite Garling,
ed., The Human Rights Handbook: A Guide to British and American International Human Rights
Organizations (New York: Facts on File, 1979), 228. For a good analysis of how the scientific community
supported dissenters, see Laurie S. Wiseburg and Harry M. Scoble, “Monitoring Human Rights Violations:
The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations,” in Kommers and Loescher, ed., Human Rights and
American Foreign Policy, 185.
93
CHRUR 20-1 (April/June 1976): 50.
66
Armed with information about human rights abuses in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe, private citizens attempted to make Western Final Act signatory
governments part of their transnational human rights network. As part of this campaign,
they began inundating American and Western European foreign ministries “with massive
documentation of” Soviet and Eastern European human rights abuses in 1976.94 Daniel
C. Thomas makes an astute observation when he writes that “American and NATO
policy on the CSCE [Helsinki Process] began to reflect the priority on human rights
favored by dissidents in the East and their supporters in West.” In sharp contrast to
previous communiqués that stressed the need for “mutual understanding” and the
importance of Helsinki-inspired cooperation among states, the North Atlantic Council’s
communiqué of May 1976 insisted on “the full implementation of all parts of the Helsinki
Final Act by all signatories, so that its benefits may be felt not only in relations between
states but also in the lives of individuals.”95
The issue of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union became a visible issue in
the U.S. Congress well before the Helsinki Final Act went into force. Nevertheless, the
efforts of human rights organizations such as Freedom House and U.S. ethnic lobbies on
the behalf of Soviet dissents and their Eastern European counterparts “made the West
aware of the value of the Helsinki Accords.” As the next section of this chapter will
illustrate, Congress responded to public pressure by creating a U.S. governmental
commission designed to receive and publish information from private citizens across the
94
Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 130-1.
95
Ibid.
67
globe concerning Soviet and Eastern European compliance with the Helsinki Accords.
Many members concluded that this commission could not carry out its mandate of
monitoring how Final Act signatories implemented the agreement and respected
internationally recognized human rights without receiving advice and information from
private citizens.
The growing interest members of Congress displayed for monitoring signatories’
compliance with the Final Act also flowed from their increasing identification with the
issue of human rights. During the 1970s, private citizens belonging to groups as diverse
as the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights and the National Council of
Churches began forging an influential U.S. domestic human rights lobby in the mid1970s. While these groups advocated a dizzying array of positions, they stoked
Congressional members’ interest in the issue of human rights through their testimony in
hearings and “background information for U.S. [human rights] legislation and U.N.
deliberations.” They also made the issue of human rights difficult for members of
Congress to ignore because of the vast quantity of credible “detailed information” they
gave U.S. policymakers documenting “just how badly many of Washington’s client states
are abusing their own citizens.”96
In the case of the Final Act, one could speak of an American “Helsinki Lobby”
in 1980 consisting of over one hundred ethnic, religious, and human rights groups that
put consistent pressure on the U.S. government to bring about Soviet and Eastern
96
Vogelesang, American Dream, Global Nightmare, 142-47; and Cmiel, “The Emergence of Human
Rights Politics and the United States.”
68
European compliance with the Final Act.97 As this dissertation will illustrate in the
forthcoming chapters, this American “Helsinki Lobby” provided U.S. policymakers with
detailed, credible information about Soviet and Eastern European violations of the Final
Act and internationally recognized human rights. These groups also continued to forge
more and more transnational links with private citizens across the globe during the late
1970s and 1980s, a development that only further “globalized” the issue of Soviet and
Eastern European human rights violations.
The U.S. Government, the Final Act, and the Impact of Citizen Monitoring
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S. executive branch shied away from
challenging the Soviet Union’s repression of dissent.98 Richard Nixon and his National
Security Advisor/Secretary of State Henry Kissinger advocated a realipolitik version of
détente that placed almost no emphasis on encouraging the Soviet Union to show a
greater respect for human rights.99 Instead of working to change Soviet internal behavior,
Kissinger called on the United States to provide the Soviet Union with economic benefits
if it improved its international conduct. He hoped that the prospect of losing access to
American technology would convince the Soviet Union to stop supporting national
liberation struggles in less developed countries and preserve international stability. If the
97
Vojtech Mastny, ed., Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security: Analysis and Documentation
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), 197.
98
See Patricia Weiss Fagen, “The United States and International Human Rights, 1946-1977,” Universal
Human Rights 2, no. 3 (1980): 19-33.
99
William C. Green, “Human Rights and Détente,” Ukrainian Quarterly 36, no. 2 (1980): 138. For a good
comparison of Jimmy Carter’s and Henry Kissinger’s approaches to the promotion of human rights, see
David P. Forsythe, “America’s Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality,” Universal Human
Rights 2, no. 3 (1980): 35-53.
69
subject of human rights were to be raised at all with the Soviets, Kissinger thought that
such discussions should only take place in closed negotiating sessions (i.e., quiet
diplomacy).100
Besides having little interest in raising the issue of Soviet human rights violations,
the Nixon administration also felt little need to challenge the internal behavior of rightwing authoritarian allies in nations such as Chile. Numerous members of Congress,
especially those who first entered office in the early 1970s opposed to the Vietnam War,
grew tired of the executive branch’s approach to foreign affairs and started to call
attention to realipolitik’s lack of morality. This dissatisfaction only intensified as
senators and representatives began associating the disastrous consequences of the
Vietnam conflict and hypocrisy of CIA covert activity with the executive branch’s almost
unquestioned control of U.S. foreign policy. To challenge executive dominance,
Congress passed the War Powers Resolution over Nixon’s veto. Not satisfied with this
victory, many Congressional members called on Kissinger to restore the “Wilsonian
tradition” of U.S. foreign policy that emphasized human rights rather than balance of
power considerations. The strength of this sentiment became apparent when
Congressman Don Fraser (D-MN), with the help of his staff member John Salzburg, held
100
Samuel P. Huntington, “Renewed Hostility,” in the Making of America’s Soviet Policy, ed. Joseph Nye,
Jr. (New Haven: Yale University Press), 268, 270-1; and Sandy Vogelesang, American Dream, Global
Nightmare: The Dilemma of U.S. Human Rights Policy (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1980),
102. For an excellent of account of Kissinger’s hostility toward the task of promoting human rights, Jeremi
Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 2007), 242-6.
70
a series of fifteen hearings concerning the proper role of human rights in U.S. foreign
policy in 1973.101
The summary report from these hearings condemned Kissinger’s conduct of
foreign policy for all but ignoring human rights and insisted that “consideration for
human rights in foreign policy is both morally imperative and practically necessary.”
After Fraser’s hearing took place, Congress strove to reassert its role in determining U.S.
foreign policy, paying particular attention to adjusting “the distorted perspective” of
human rights “within the executive branch.” The 1973 Foreign Assistance Act urged the
President to withhold military or economic assistance from any country that imprisoned
its citizens for political purposes. Fraser also sent numerous letters to the State
Department declaring the importance Congress now attached to human rights
considerations when deciding foreign aid requests. 102
Armed with information about human rights violations in countries allied with the
United States provided by groups such as AI, Congress next added Section 502B to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. This measure called on the executive branch to “reduce
or terminate security assistance to any government which engages in a consistent pattern
of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” In response to the U.S.
State Department’s determination to ignore human rights legislation, Congress in effect
enacted a series laws over the next two years--sometimes over Gerald Ford’s veto--
101
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., “Human Rights and the American Tradition,” Foreign Affairs 57, no. 3 (1979):
512; and Vogelesang, American Dream, Global Nightmare, 121, 125-7.
102
Vogelesang, American Dream, Global Nightmare, 128-33. See also David P. Forsythe, “Congress and
Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Fate of General Legislation,” Human Rights Quarterly 9 (1987):
382-404.
71
barring U.S. foreign aid to countries that violated internationally recognized human rights
“unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such [a] country.” These
laws eventually required the U.S. State Department to issue human rights reports on
every country that belonged to the United Nations. In amendments to the Foreign
Assistance Act made in 1976, Congress justified these laws on the grounds that the
United States should “promote and encourage increased respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms throughout the world without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion.” In blunt language, Congress also insisted that “a principal goal of the
foreign policy of the United States shall be to promote the increased observance of
internationally recognized human rights by all countries.103
The growing Congressional interest in human rights impacted Soviet-American
relations. In 1974, Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Reform
Bill and the Stevenson Amendment to Export-Import Bank Bill. Against the wishes of
both the executive branch and Soviet government, these measures placed an assortment
of economic restrictions and penalties on the Kremlin for attempting to curb Jewish
emigration from the Soviet Union. As expected, Kissinger argued that these measures
only torpedoed his efforts to gain the release of Soviet Jews though “quiet” diplomatic
efforts. The Soviets rejected them as interference in their “internal affairs” and cancelled
earlier-negotiated trade agreements with the United States.104
103
For a solid review of this legislation, see Robert F. Drinan, The Cry of the Oppressed: The History and
Hope of the Human Rights Revolution (Cambridge, Mass: Harper & Row, 1987), 70-80.
104
Samuel Huntington, “Renewed Hostility,” 279.
72
The intense lobbying of Jewish non-governmental organizations such as NCSJ and
Sakharov’s letter to Congress in support of the Jackson-Vanik amendment help explain
why these measures became law. This development should not obscure the reality that
the U.S. government’s efforts to promote human rights in the Soviet Union remained
limited during the early to mid 1970s. As one-time Congressman and human rights
activist Robert Drinan argues in his work Cry of the Oppressed, the congressional interest
in human rights that accelerated in the mid 1970s primarily reflected this institution’s
shame “at seeing the United States linked to repressive regimes in nations such as [South]
Korea, the Philippines, Chile, and Argentina.105
While Congress wanted to make human rights an integral component of U.S. foreign
policy, its members in no way showed enthusiasm for the Final Act negotiations that
began in 1973. The executive branch also did not enter these negotiations with
enthusiasm. In fact, Kissinger expressed his disapproval of the Helsinki Process in
private on more than occasion during the negotiating period. For example, he told
William F. Buckley that “the Conference [Final Act negotiations] wasn’t our idea. It
isn’t something I am proud of . . . . Heads of government shouldn’t meet for something
that isn’t that important.”106 State Department officials must have followed Kissinger’s
instructions “to stay ½ step behind the Europeans” because Brezhnev expressed his
displeasure with U.S. officials’ torpor during Final Act negotiations. In a private
105
Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 123. See also Thomas M. Frank and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by
Congress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 83-97. See also Drinan, Cry of the Oppressed, 76.
106
See Korey, The Promises We Keep, 15-8; and “Henry Kissinger Telecon with William F. Buckley,” 21
July 1975. Available [Online]: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB135/19750721.pdf>
[14 May 2007]. See also Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 55-88.
73
conversation with Kissinger, Brezhnev argued that “[w]e feel the United States is far too
passive. At the conference, [it] sits in silence. France takes one position. THE FRG
[Federal Republic of Germany] has its position. We think the United States should take a
resolute position.”107
This criticism has merit because European nations on the whole played a much more
active role than the United States in convincing the Soviet government to accept Basket
III and Principle VII. Worried about the possibility of Congress’ removing American
troops from Western Europe, the Nixon administration viewed Final Act negotiations “as
the prince to be paid for the MBFR [Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions]
negotiations” that Kissinger “saw as essential for safeguarding the U.S. military presence
in Europe.”108 In practice, Ford believed that the Final Act’s human rights provisions
could help reduce East/West tensions over the long term. Nevertheless, he remained
committed to “quiet diplomacy” and refused to meet with the exiled Soviet writer
Solzhenitsyn two weeks before the Final Act came into existence.109
107
See William Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts: Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New
York: New Press, 1998), 334.
108
109
Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts, 16-7. See also Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 73-85.
John J. Maresca, To Helsinki, 154-60. For Ford’s strong endorsement of the Helsinki Accord’s human
rights provisions, see Judith F. Buncher, ed., Human Rights & American Diplomacy, 1975-1977 (New
York: Facts on File, 1977), 9. See also Douglas Brinkley, Gerald R. Ford (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 2007 ), 110-2; and Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford
(Harper & Row, Publishers and the Reader’s Digest Association, Inc., 1979), 298-301. During a
conference about the Carter presidency that took place in 1994, the former Soviet ambassador to the United
States Anatoly Dobrynin stated that Henry Kissinger made the following statement to the Soviet foreign
minister Andrei Gromyko when discussing the Final Act: “Why are we quibbling over these forms of
words? No matter what goes into the Final Act, I don’t believe that the Soviet Union will ever do anything
it doesn’t want to do.” See Conference #2 of the Carter-Brezhnev Project: A Conference of U.S. and
Russian Policymakers and Scholars held at Musgrove Plantation, St. Simon’s, Georgia, National Security
Archive, Washington, D.C. A transcript of this conference is in the possession of NSA archivist Svetlana
Savranskaya.
74
Even though Ford emphasized the Final Act’s human rights provisions when
justifying why his administration signed the agreement, the State Department showed
little inclination to challenge Soviet human rights practices in public. Instead, it
continued the executive branch’s practice of presenting the Soviet foreign ministry with a
list of families who wanted to immigrate to the United States for the purpose of family
reunification.110 The Ford Administration and Soviet Union also agreed to resolve
differences over the implementation of the Helsinki Accords at “the responsible
diplomatic level.” In practice, the deputy chief mission at the U.S. embassy in Moscow
and the deputy chief of the USA Department in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
met twice at the U.S. embassy in Moscow to discuss practices that each nation considered
a Final Act violation. If any of the issues raised in these exchanges proved intractable,
subsequent meetings at the level of “foreign ministers or heads of government” would
attempt to resolve them.111
Despite his commitment to “quiet diplomacy,” Ford agreed to the exchange of
Bukovsky for the Chilean Communist Luis Corvalan in December 1976. U.S. State
Department officials may have gone out of their way to distance the United States from
the exchange, but Bukovsky himself in no uncertain terms endorsed the measure. “My
release in exchange for the release of Luis Corvalan,” he noted, “seems to me to be
unprecedented.” “For the first time the Soviet government plainly acknowledged the
110
111
CHRUR 22 (July-September 1976): 36.
Jack F. Matlock, “U.S. Policy on Human Rights in Relations with the USSR, 1961-91,” in Implementing
Human Rights Policy: Agendas, Policies, and Practices, ed. Debra Liang-Fenton, ed., (Washington DC:
United States Institute of Peace, 2004), 253-4.
75
existence in the USSR of political prisoners.” Soviet exile Valery Chalidze and the
American publisher Edward Kline issued a joint statement that referred to the exchange
as a confirmation that the Soviet regime “is waging a pseudo-war on its own citizens who
have dared to criticize the government.”112
The Ford administration’s continuing emphasis on holding the Soviets accountable
for their implementation of the Final Act through “quiet diplomacy” only explains part of
the reason why the U.S. government hesitated to undertake a public campaign to promote
human rights in the Soviet Union. Instead of recognizing the importance of the Final
Act’s human rights provisions and calls for increased “human contacts,” many U.S.
politicians viewed the measure as a sellout to the Soviet Union. Senator Henry Jackson
(D-WA) argued that the agreement nullified the U.S. government’s commitment to the
right of self-determination for citizens in the Baltic republics and Eastern Europe.113
Throughout his 1976 Presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter condemned Kissinger-style
détente as “amoral” and excoriated the Final Act as tantamount to accepting “the Russian
takeover of Eastern Europe.” In a series of interviews with Playboy over a three-month
span of the campaign that appeared in November 1976, he asserted that “I never saw any
reason we should be involved in the Helsinki meetings at all” because “we got very little,
if anything, in return.”114
112
CHRUR 23-4 (October-December 1976): 8-9.
113
Buncher, Human Rights & American Diplomacy, 9.
114
The Presidential Campaign of 1976, Volume I, Part Two (Washington, DC: United States Government
Printing Office, 1978), 836, 953. See also Buncher, Human Rights & American Diplomacy, 79.
76
Republican presidential-hopeful Ronald Reagan also voiced his strong
disapproval of Kissinger-style détente and referred to Ford’s signing of the Helsinki
Accords “as having put an American ‘stamp of approval on Russia’s enslavement of the
captive nations [of Eastern Europe].’”115 During the drafting of the 1976 Republic Party
Platform, Reagan’s supporters played a pivotal role in passing a foreign policy plank
entitled “Morality and Foreign Policy.” Along with praising Solzhenitsyn’s admonitions
about the inherent evils of communism, this plank insisted that future negotiated
agreements, “such as the one signed in Helsinki, must not take from those who do not
have freedom the hope of one day gaining it.”116 Almost one month after Carter defeated
Ford in the 1976 election, Reagan informed his radio listeners that “thousands of Soviet
citizens are in concentration camps for trying to obtain an exit visa.” Since the Kremlin
refused to let these individuals exercise their universal right to emigrate, he argued that
“the Helsinki Pact should be used for wrapping garbage . . . like yesterdays
newspaper.”117
Many dissidents shared Reagan and Carter’s suspicions that the U.S. government
cared more about preserving Kissinger-style détente than helping them promote Soviet
internal reform. When trying to figure out why Western nations acted in such a manner,
Andre Amalrik, who wrote the provocative work Will the Soviet Union Survive Until
1984, argued that the West found it easier to support emigration than deal with the
115
Bunchner, Human Rights & American Diplomacy, 33.
116
For an electronic copy of the Republican Party’s 1976 Platform, see “Republican Party Platform of
1976,” 18 August 1976. Available [Online]:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=R1976 [14 May 2007].
117
Kiron K. Skinner et al. ed, Reagan, In His Own Hand (New York: The Free Press, 2001), 144.
77
confrontation required of any campaign designed to challenge Soviet human rights
practices. This type of attitude remained commonplace among many dissidents even
after Ford signed the Final Act.118 When discussing his reasoning behind creating the
Moscow Watch Group, Orlov insisted that “Western governments had not doubted that
the Soviet Union would fail [emphasis in original] to discharge its obligations in the area
of human rights, but they went along with this as unavoidable evil.” The purpose of our
group, he continued, “was, first and foremost, to change this ‘Munich approach’ of the
West.”119
Even though many dissidents remained wary of the West’s willingness to promote
human rights in the Soviet Union and U.S. politicians continued to criticize the Final Act,
events had already taken place that would transform the U.S. government’s attitude
toward the utility of the agreement. Two weeks after Ford signed the Final Act, a
Congressional delegation traveled to Moscow to meet with Soviet government officials.
During this visit, Representative Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ) held meetings with numerous
dissidents, including Orlov and Turchin (not yet exiled). These individuals impressed
upon her that close “cooperation between the West and the Soviet human-rights
movement on the basis of the humanitarian articles of the Helsinki Final Act” could help
promote Soviet internal reform. Heartbroken by the stories she heard about the Soviet
government’s harsh treatment of individuals who wanted to emigrate or practice their
118
119
Andrei Amalrik, Notes of a Revolutionary, trans. Guy Daniels (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1982), 304.
Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts, 194. See also Valery Chalidze, “The Humanitarian Provisions of the
Helsinki Final Act,” CHRUR 25 (Jan./Feb., 1977): 91-3
78
religion without state interference, Fenwick raised the issue of Soviet compliance with
the Final Act during her delegation’s meeting with Brezhnev.120
The arguments of dissenters about the importance of the Helsinki Accords and
determination to meet with the Congressional delegation despite KGB surveillance
impressed Fenwick. She returned to the United States convinced that the Ford
administration had not done enough to monitor Soviet compliance with the Helsinki
Accords. In September 1975, she introduced a bill proposing that Congress establish a
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (U.S. Helsinki Commission)
designed to monitor Soviet compliance with the Final Act. Twelve days later, Clifford
Case (R-NJ) followed Fenwick’s example and introduced the same legislation in the
Senate. Because these pieces of legislation called for the creation of a commission with
both legislative and executive representatives, the Ford administration worked against it,
insisting that the commission gave Congress more power in determining American
foreign policy than the Constitution allowed. While the administration’s constitutional
arguments remain debatable, most agree that the State Department opposed the
commission because Kissinger believed that the proposed legislation would complicate
his handling of Soviet-American relations.121
When defending the creation of a Helsinki commission, Fenwick emphasized how
much importance dissidents attached to the Final Act and the U.S. government’s need to
120
See Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, 283. See also Goldberg, The Final Act, 59-64;
Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents, 214.
121
Madeline K. Albright and Alfred Friendly, Jr, “Helsinki and Human Rights,” in The President, The
Congress, and Foreign Policy, ed. Edward S. Muskie (Lanham, MD: The Atlantic Council of the United
States, 1986), 297-302; and Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 126. See also William Korey, The Promises We
Keep), 21-35
79
monitor the Soviet Union’s human rights record. During a Congressional hearing on 4
May 1976, she explained how Soviet private citizens had told congressional delegates
that “the West must not forget about the third basket of the Helsinki which addresses
itself to human rights.122 “Since members of Congress are perhaps more aware of the
individual cases and group assessments developed by associations in this country, she
continued, “Congressional participation will help agencies like the State Department to
speak more forcefully for human rights in dealing with communist countries.”123
Ford administration officials rejected this line of argument and tried to defend
their “quiet” diplomatic efforts to further Soviet compliance with the Final Act. In
response to Fenwick’s testimony, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional
Relations Robert J. McCloskey argued that “[t]he commission . . . would not appear
equipped to add significantly to the action being taken or the information being compiled;
nor would it appear to be able to exercise a more effective monitoring role than existing
committees or subcommittees of Congress.” “[I]ts extraordinary composition,” he
insisted, “would not seem to provide an appropriate or effective means for coordinating
or guiding our efforts.”124
Because of the constitutional issues an executive-legislative commission raised,
the Ford administration’s campaign against Fenwick’s legislation appeared to have some
chance of success until something astonishing happened. Hearing of increased dissident
122
Mastny, ed., Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, 114-5.
123
Ibid., 115-6.
124
Ibid., 117.
80
activity in Eastern Europe, many of the ethnic lobbies that had once denounced the
Helsinki Accords, including the Joint Baltic American Committee and the PolishAmerican Congress, voiced strong support for Fenwick’s legislation, viewing it as means
of pressuring the Soviet Union and Eastern European nations to comply with the Helsinki
Accords. Groups as diverse as the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, the
National Council on Soviet Jewry, Freedom House, Human Rights Research (Inc.), and
the Federation of American Scientists also endorsed the creation of a commission.125
During debates about the formation of a commission, Amalrik wrote an editorial
in the New York Times criticizing “the U.S. government’s tendency to favor good
relations with the Kremlin over frank discussion of human rights conditions and
compliance with Helsinki norms.” Dissidents and human rights activists from all over
the world echoed Amalrik’s sentiments and urged Congress and the Ford administration
to monitor Soviet and Eastern European implementation of the Final Act. Facing intense
public pressure and charges from both Republicans and Democrats that it had no interest
in human rights, the Ford Administration dropped its campaign to stop Fenwick’s
legislation. On 3 June 1976, Congress created the U.S. Helsinki Commission.126
While the Ford administration all but refused to cooperate with the Helsinki
Commission, this institution came to play a pivotal role in keeping human rights an
important issue in Soviet-American relations. With the words of dissidents fresh in their
125
See U.S. House of Representatives, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Part II, 94th
Congress, 4 May 1976, 89-118. See also Korey, NGOS and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
235-7; Ibid., “Human Rights NGOS: The Power of Persuasion,” Ethics & International Affairs 13 (1999):
163; and Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 126-7.
126
Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 127-8.
81
minds, commission members called for more “public diplomacy” and encouraged private
citizens to monitor Final Act signatories’ compliance record.127 The Commission’s
emphasis on public participation explains why it became an important forum for
members of non-governmental organizations and exiled dissidents to articulate their goals
and gauge U.S. efforts to promote human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
This body also published documents it received from private citizens in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union. This practice in effect made the Commission an important
clearinghouse for private citizens’ reports about conditions in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe.
Along with serving as clearinghouse, the Commission’s staff worked with nongovernmental groups to create reports that documented how well various signatory
nations had implemented the Helsinki Accords. Staff members also drew on the reports
of private citizens when offering recommendations to the executive branch on how to
improve signatories’ compliance with the Final Act. After consulting with nongovernmental groups, staff members worked with State Department officials to create the
U.S. negotiating positions at the Final Act follow-up conferences. As these practices
would suggest, “the knowledge and resources of nongovernmental bodies” became “an
integral part” of monitoring and encouraging governments’ compliance with the Final
Act.128
127
See U.S. House of Representatives, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Part II, 89-118.
128
Fascell, “The Helsinki Accord,” 27.
82
Much like Fenwick envisioned when she proposed the legislation, the
Commission became an important forum for executive and legislative consultations on
the Helsinki Accords.129 On a routine basis, executive branch officials gave testimony
before the Commission, often answering members’ questions about the administration’s
efforts to promote human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As required in
the legislation creating the commission, the State Department also had to publish
semiannual reports documenting Final Act signatories’ compliance records and the steps
the administration had taken to improve that compliance record. For all intents and
purposes, the commission monitored the executive branch’s commitment to the Final
Act.
As the description above indicates, the Commission became an instrumental part
of the transnational human rights network based on furthering Soviet and Eastern
European compliance with the Helsinki Accords and other internationally recognized
human rights. Its very existence helps illustrate the development of a diverse
international impulse against governmental bureaucratic discretion and authority. For
example, during the 1976 presidential campaign, Carter on more than once occasion
complained about Kissinger’s secret, unpredictable diplomacy and stressed the need for
the American public to “be involved as deeply as possible” in the formulation of U.S.
foreign policy positions and decisions.130 The 1976 Republican platform rejected the
129
Albright and Friendly, Jr., “Helsinki and Human Rights,” 288. See also Korey, Human Rights and the
Helsinki Accord, 31.
130
The Presidential Campaign of 1976, Volume I, Part Two, 710, 736, 1013, and 1113. See also The
Presidential Campaign of 1976, Volume One, Part One (Washington D.C: United States Government
Printing Office, 1978), 67-8, 81, 110-1, 447
83
practice of concluding secret agreements without the participation of the American
public.131
In a fashion similar to how Fenwick emphasized the legislative branch’s closer
association “with individual cases and group assessments developed by associations in
this country,” Representative Larry McDonald (D-GA) voiced his distrust of the State
Department’s willingness to speak for the rights of individuals:
The Department of State . . . asserts that it can and is sufficiently able to monitor
the Helsinki agreement for compliance and take the necessary corrective steps. I
suggest that is wrong. By its very nature, the prevailing attitude at the
Department of State is not to ruffle anyone’s feathers. This is particularly true in
the case of the Soviet Union, because, as they themselves say, ongoing
negotiations are always more important than the individual rights of any
person.132
In his Congressional testimony near the end of 1976, the U.S. Helsinki Commission’s
Deputy Chief of Staff Alfred Friendly, Jr., argued that “only if American public opinion
presses the American government to seek real progress on the human rights promises of
the Final Act can we expect American officials even to raise such questions at the
diplomatic level.” “Helsinki has made those questions legitimate subjects for diplomatic
discourse,” he continued, “but it will take an informed and energetic effort by interested
private groups in the West to get those questions asked and asked until satisfactory
answers are forthcoming.”133
131
See “Republican Party Platform of 1976.”
132
See Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Part II, 19. To view other representatives’
non- similar sentiments toward non-governmental groups, see Ibid., 13-4, 26-7, 41, 57, 61.
133
CHRUR 23-4 (October/December 1976): 18.
84
Soviet dissidents and their counterparts in Eastern Europe may have faced
different circumstances than Western politicians and representatives of non-governmental
organizations, but also chose to criticize their governments’ bureaucratic and arbitrary
definitions of human rights. Since many dissidents emphasized the importance of
glasnost, few should be surprised that the founding document of the Ukrainian Watch
Group argued that “we . . . fully understand that the bureaucratic interpretation of Human
Rights does not exhaust the interpretation that is embodied in the international legal
agreements signed by the government of the USSR. “We accept these documents in their
full scope, the document continued, without bureaucratic distortions or arbitrary
limitations by officials or state agencies.” Charter 77 insisted that Czechoslovakian
citizens could not exercise their civic rights because secret “political directives from the
machinery of the ruling party . . . and powerful individuals” dictated that “national
institutions and organizations” curtail and punish any independent political thought or
nonconformist conduct.134
The dissenter Valery Chalidze wrote a samizdat article that expressed similar
sentiments about the Soviet judicial system. “Politically-motivated arbitrary practices,”
he lamented, provide authorities the bureaucratic discretion needed to punish
nonconformists (i.e., dissenters and prisoners) and conceal “everything shameful or
harmful.” Because “legislators take account of the need for such arbitrary actions in
134
Verba and Bohdan Yasen, The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine, 21-22. The Ukrainian Watch
Group issued a manifesto on its first anniversary that in part read: “There is only one culprit: the
bureaucratic structure of society created by Stalin, whose inertia has not been overcome yet. This unique
underground cybernetic machine, a bureaucratic superbrain, a social computer that has usurped the
privileges ands rights of rule by the people and has camouflaged itself with the idea of such rule.” See
Ibid., 126. See also See “Charter 77 Manifesto.”
85
drafting laws,” he writes, Soviet law consists of vague definitions, “abundant loopholes,”
and statutes that “contain conflicting provisions.” Even more troubling, “legislative
functions are delegated to executive organs . . . and numerous legislative acts are never
published.” When discussing why Western governments hesitated to challenge Soviet
and Eastern European human rights violations, Chalidze voiced concerns similar to those
of Alfred Friendly, Jr, arguing that “governments are not obligated to see to it that other
states fulfill their international commitments.” “For this reason,” he continued,
“whenever the issue of human rights has been an issue, I have always counted on social
forces, and have only regarded government activity as a potential secondary factor when
roused to action by public opinion in Western countries.”135
The development of a transnational human rights network based on monitoring
governmental violations of the Final Act with strong links to Congress proved of
immense importance. In the coming years, the executive branch would have greater
difficulty addressing the issue of human rights violations behind closed doors and not
endorsing the efforts of Soviet dissenters and their Eastern European counterparts in
public. The Ford administration’s conduct illustrates these new realities. Unlike his
earlier behavior, Kissinger began “urging the Chilean military dictatorship to mend its
ways” and agreed to hold meetings with members of AI.136
A State Department official even wrote a letter to a representative of AI noting
that “the contacts that you and others from organizations like Amnesty have made with
135
See Chalidze, “The Humanitarian Provisions of the Helsinki Final Act,” 92. See also Andre Amalrik,
Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 22.
136
Cmiel, “The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States.”
86
the Department of State serve to direct our attention to the human element in our foreign
policy.” “All of us, the letter continued,” have been impressed with the growth of
attention to the issue of human rights in the Congress and among the American people.”
In reference to the recent Congressional legislation concerning human rights, the letter
also noted that “the Department has made institutional changes to attempt to make certain
that human rights factors are included in the formulation of foreign policy.” 137 Unlike
his earlier refusal to meet with Solzhenitsyn, Ford received a “Ukrainian cardinal who
had been expelled from the Soviet Union ‘whom even the Pope had forbade’” from
participating in further political activity.138
Besides shaping the behavior of U.S. politicians, the globalization of human rights
issues also spelled trouble for the Soviet government. In January 1977, a dissident
document that reached foreign audiences predicted how the Politburo would respond to
the proliferation of international critiques concerning Soviet domestic misconduct.
Because Soviet leaders feared the ways in which foreign and domestic critics called into
question their right to rule, they would “carry out a ruthless suppression of civil liberties
and fundamental human rights in the USSR.” They would also have no choice but “to
discourage world public opinion from responding to [dissident] appeals for support
issued in the USSR.” Such a development,” the document concluded, should not come as
a surprise to anyone because “West European Communist parties’” calls for
137
Letter from Charles W. Robinson to Wendy Turnbull, 11 June 1976, Human Rights/Amnesty
International Collection, Box 1, Folder 1976, National Security Archive (NSA), Washington DC.
138
“Memorandum of Conversation: W. Averell Harriman and Leonid Brezhnev, 20 September 1976, IV202, Global Competition and Deterioration of U.S. Soviet Relations: A Conference of Russian and U.S.
Policymakers and Scholars, held at Harbor Beach Resort, Fort Lauderdale, FL 23-6 March 1995, NSA.
87
implementing all of the Final Act’s provisions had only increased “the authorities’ fear of
the bourgeoning human rights movement in the USSR.” 139
Even in the short term, these words proved quite accurate. The “globalization” of
human rights issues forced the Soviet government to take a number of steps to defend the
internal cohesion of its multinational, multiethnic empire and the international reputation
of Soviet- style socialism. Congressional and public pressure also shaped the behavior of
Jimmy Carter during the 1976 presidential campaign. Influenced by the reports of
private citizens and the U.S. Helsinki Commission, he identified his candidacy with the
cause of human rights and changed his once negative view of the Final Act. As the next
chapter will explain, the Kremlin and Carter behaved in ways that made the issue of
human rights an important element of Cold War competition.
139
CHRUR 25 (January-March 1977): 48-9.
88
CHAPTER 3: SETTING THE STAGE FOR A SUPERPOWER CONFRONTATION:
JIMMY CARTER, THE SOVIET UNION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 1975-1976
In his memoir Keeping Faith, Jimmy Carter recounts how he stressed the proper
role human rights should play in U.S. foreign policy when he announced his intention to
run for president on 12 December 1974. After asking the audience what happened to
Americans’ “great dreams” about their nation’s future, he insisted that the United States
should “set a standard within the community of nations of courage, compassion, integrity,
and dedication to basic human rights and freedoms.”140 He may have mentioned human
rights on a few occasions after he made this speech, but never went out of his way to
identify his candidacy with this issue before the Democratic convention that took place
from 12-15 July 1976. Besides criticizing the Helsinki Accords, Carter showed little
enthusiasm for the Jackson-Vanik amendment. During the National Democratic Issues
Conference held near the end of 1975, he voiced his preference for increasing the rate of
Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union through “quiet diplomacy” and called the
Jackson-Vanik amendment “a mistake in our foreign policy.”141
As Carter crisscrossed the United States drumming up support for his presidential
campaign, the Soviet Central Committee received a report from a KGB official about the
behavior of Andrei Sakharov. This document denounced the publication of his work My
140
For the full text of Carter’s speech announcing his intention to run for the presidency see [Online]:
http://www.4president.org/speeches/carter1976announcement.htm [14 June 2007].
141
Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade, 2-3; The Presidential Campaign of 1976, Part One, Volume I, 83-4,
116, 160, 202, 247, 270, 547, 693, 836, 953. See also Njolstad, Peacekeeper and Troublemaker, 227-9.
For a clear analysis of when Carter mentioned human rights before the Democratic Convention, see Ibid.,
note 13.
89
Country and the World in English and “several Western European languages.” It also
excoriated Sakharov for allowing his writings to appear in foreign publications such as
Time and the Western radio stations “’Voice of America,’ Die Deutsche Welle,’ and
‘Radio d’Italia.” Based on this evidence, the report concluded that this dissenter’s
behavior “shows a further evolution toward an anti-Sovietism and direct complicity with
the forces of international reaction.”142
This internal Soviet report and Carter’s behavior raise important questions about
how they responded to the globalization of human rights issues. Why did Soviet
policymakers worry so much about the activities of a small number of dissenters and
view human rights critiques as tantamount to “international reaction”? What steps did
they take to defend the international reputation of Soviet-style socialism and curb
transnational human rights critiques? Why did Carter chose to identify his candidacy
with the cause of human rights after the Democratic convention of 1976? How did he
conceive of the Final Act, Soviet-American relations, and the task of human rights
promotion before he entered office? By addressing these questions, this chapter will
explain why the behavior of Carter and the Kremlin ended up making the treatment of
dissenters and human rights contentious issues in U.S-Soviet relations for the remainder
of the Cold War.
The 1976 U.S. Presidential Campaign: Jimmy Carter and Universal Human Rights
During the early stages of his presidential campaign, Carter crafted a message
designed to appeal to the American public’s growing disillusionment with the
142
“Chebrikov to the Central Committee; the appearance of Sakharov’s collection of essays My Country
and the World.” Available [Online]:
http://www.yale.edu/annals/sakharov/documents_frames/Sakharov_100.htm [12 July 2007].
90
performance of the U.S. government at home and abroad. According to William Stueck,
Carter attacked from the “right and left.” To head off disasters such as Vietnam or illegal
CIA interventions in other nations’ internal affairs, he stressed the need to make foreign
policy reflect American citizens’ inherent morality and U.S. ideals such selfdetermination and freedom of expression.143 In a firm rejection of secret agreements and
arbitrary bureaucratic decisions, he also voiced his intention to open up regulatory
agencies to public scrutiny and “let the American people be involved as deeply as
possible” in the creation of U.S. foreign policy. Sensing many Americans’ growing
uneasiness with Kissinger-style détente , Carter criticized the Ford administration’s lack
of morality and noted how the Soviets had taken advantage of détente at the expense of
U.S. interests.144
While some have argued that his campaign representatives appeared uninterested
in the issue of human rights at the Democratic convention, Carter accepted their advice
that embracing human rights held out the possibility of reconciling the left and right-wing
factions of the Democratic Party. As his advisers recognized, liberal Democrats could
use human rights to criticize right-wing dictatorships, whereas their conservative
143
William Stueck, “Placing Jimmy Carter’s Foreign Policy,” in Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham,
ed., The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post-New Deal Era (Lawrence: University of Kansas
Press, 1998), 245. See Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 28; and The Presidential Campaign of 1976,
Part One, Volume I, 79-80
144
For example, see The Presidential Campaign of 1976, Part One, Volume I, 110-1. See also Jimmy
Carter, Why Not the Best? (New York: Broadman Press, 1975, 1977; Fayetteville: University of Arkansas
Press, 1996), 123-8. Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, 27-33; Tony Smith, America’s Mission,
240; and Dan Caldwell, “U.S. Domestic Politics and the Demise of Detente,” in Odd Arne Westad, ed., The
Fall of Détente: Soviet-American Relations during the Carter Years (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press,
1997), 105-6.
91
counterparts could employ the same issue to rebuke the Soviet Union.145 After careful
negotiation, Carter agreed to a Democratic platform that called on the United States to
“reaffirm the fundamental American commitment to human rights across the globe” and
“work for a release of all political prisoners in all countries.” He also issued a press
release on 14 July that called on the Soviet Union and other countries to “abide by the
human rights commitment they made at the Helsinki Accords.”146
Following the advice of his campaign team, Carter devoted more attention to the
issue of human rights as a way of criticizing Ford’s amorality and approach to SovietAmerican relations after the Democratic convention ended. An anonymous campaign
adviser summed this strategy up well when he told the New Yorker reporter Elizabeth
Drew that “[human rights] was a beautiful campaign issue . . . [because] there was a real
degree of public opinion hostile to the administration.”147 Given the sheer volume of
letters Carter received from private citizens and NGOs about the plight of individual
dissidents, the campaign team must have also advised him to voice his support for
individuals who faced governmental oppression inside the Soviet Union. In particular,
his team urged him to pay close attention to the policy preferences of Jewish groups
worried about the Kremlin’s refusal to allow numerous Jews to exercise their right of
emigrating from the Soviet Union.148
145
Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 134; and Drumbell, The Carter Presidency, 117-8. See also and Njolstad,
Peacekeeper and Troublemaker, 228-9; and Joshua Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade, 2-4.
146
For an electronic copy of the Democratic platform, see “Democratic Party Platform of 1976,” 12 July
1976. Available [Online]: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=29606 [14 May 2007]. See
also Moynihan, “The Politics of Human Rights,” 22.
147
See Elizabeth Drew, “A Reporter At Large: Human Rights,” The New Yorker (18 July 1977): 38.
92
After receiving this advice, Carter chose not to answer an open letter that
Sakharov addressed to him and Ford about the importance of holding the Soviet
government accountable for its repression of dissent. Instead, he addressed the topics of
human rights and dissidents in the speech he delivered to the Jewish organization B’nai
B’rith on 8 September.149 Drawing on materials about the plight of Vladimir Slepak that
his campaign team had received from the refusenik’s mother living in Israel, Carter told
the audience that “the fate” of dissidents such as Vladimir Bukovsky and Slepak “will be
very much on my mind as I negotiate with the Soviet Union.” He also indicated that “if
any nation, whatever its political system, deprives its people of basic human rights, that
fact will help shape our people’s attitude toward that nation’s government.” “Despite our
deep desire for successful negotiation on strategic arms, he asserted, “we cannot pass
over in silence the deprivation of human rights in the Soviet Union.”150
148
To see a wide assortment of the letters Jimmy Carter received about the plight of individual dissidents
and the importance of human rights, see the following collections: 1976 Presidential Campaign—Stuart E.
Eizenstat, Box 23, Folder: Jewish Affairs, 10/76, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (JCPL), Atlanta,
Georgia; Ibid., Box 20, Folder: B’nai B’irth Speech, Washington, D.C., 9/8/76, JCPL; Robert L. Lipshutz
Files (RL), Box 46, Folder: Soviet Jewry, 4/78-4/79, JCPL; 1976 Presidential Campaign—Sam Bleicher,
Box 36, Folder: Human Rights, JCPL; 1976 Presidential Campaign—Harriet Zimmerman, Box 312,
Folder: Telegrams, JCPL. For a glimpse of how much importance the administration attached to obtaining
the Jewish vote see, Letter from Richard Holbrook to Stuart E. Eizenstat, 14 October 1976, 1976
Presidential Campaign—Stuart E. Eizenstat, Box 23, Folder: Jewish Affairs, 10/76, JCPL.
149
Richard Holbrooke raised the possibility of Carter’s answering this letter to make President Ford look
weak and amoral, but Carter never carried out such a course of action. See Holbrooke to Eizenstat, 14
October 1976.
150
The Presidential Campaign of 1976, Volume I, Part Two, 711-2. National Director of Jewish
Community Affairs Harriet Zimmerman issued a press release in mid-September that pointed how: “A
major part of Gov. Carter’s background material on Vladimir Slepak came to us in a letter and enclosure
from Mr. Slepak’s mother in Israel. See Press Release, 1976 Presidential Campaign—Stuart Eizenstat, Box
20, Folder: B’nai B’irth Speech, Washington D.C., 9/8/76. See also Edward Bailey Hodgman, “Détente
and the Dissidents: Human Rights in U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1968-1980 (Ph.D., University of Rochester,
2003), 247-8.
93
One week after delivering this speech, Carter sent telegrams to Stuart Wurtman
and Irene Manekofsky, the president and vice-president of the Union of Council for
Soviet Jews (UCSJ). In his note to the former, he explained that “the list of persons who
have been oppressed by the Soviet Union is long, and includes both Christians and Jews.”
He also wrote that “the Soviet Union should abide by the human rights commitment it
made when it signed the Helsinki Accord[s] and the United States should voice its
support for that commitment.” In his note to the latter, Carter observed that while “our
power is not unlimited,” it can in “many instances . . . make a crucial difference to
thousands of men and women who are victims of oppression around the world.”151 When
his campaign staff received letters indicating that Soviet officials would not allow Jews to
hold a memorial for the 35th anniversary of the Nazi massacre of Jews at Babi Yar
(Ukraine), he sent letters to the President of the Jewish Community Relations Council in
Philadelphia and the Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. In terse language,
Carter expressed his hope that “Soviet citizens of the Jewish faith be permitted to
memorialize their dead at Babi Yar on the 35th anniversary of the Nazi massacre.”152
The large number of letters addressed to Carter criticizing his negative stance
toward the Jackson-Vanik amendment must have played a role in modifying his attitude
toward this legislation during the campaign. In sharp contrast to his earlier statements, he
told UCJS President Stuart Wurtman on 16 September that his administration would
151
Telegram from Jimmy Carter to Irene Manekofsky, 14 September 1976, 1976 Presidential Campaign—
Harriet Zimmerman, Box 312, Folder: Telegrams, JCPL; and Telegram from Jimmy Carter to Stuart
Wurtman, 16 September 1976, Ibid.
152
Mailogram from Jimmy Carter to Mrs. Esther Polin and Leonid Brezhnev, 1976 Presidential
Campaign—Harriet Zimmerman, Box 312, Folder: Telegrams, JCPL.
94
show “the resolve of both the Executive Branch and the Congress on this basic matter
[emigration] on human rights.” Around the same time, Carter sent a telegram to the
Union of Council for Soviet Jews indicating that he “would do everything I possibly
could as President to encourage the Soviet Union to liberalize its emigration policies for
Jewish citizens who want to move.” He even went so far as to suggest that he “would not
hesitate to use trade pressures to effectuate that purpose.”153 On 29 September, Carter
voiced his support for Jackson-Vanik amendment in public. Instead of seeing this
measure as an ineffective interference in Soviet internal affairs, he now viewed it as a
“human rights measure,” even telling Jackson that he would “effectively implement it” if
elected.154 As these examples suggest, Carter’s public and private actions during his
campaign suggest that he tailored his message about the Final Act, human rights, and
Jackson-Vanik amendment to enhance his candidacy.
These considerations explain why the presidential-hopeful changed his attitude
toward the Final Act. After the staff director of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, R.
Spencer Oliver, contacted the Carter campaign and told officials about the specifics of the
Final Act and the degree of the measure’s public support, Carter decided to emphasize a
view of the agreement more in line with his July 14 press release. During his second
televised debate with Gerald Ford on 6 October, he criticized the President for denying
Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and not insisting on full Soviet compliance with the
153
Carter to Wurtman, 16 September 1976; and Telegram from Jimmy Carter to Union of Councils for
Soviet Jews, 14 September 1976, 1976 Presidential Campaign—Harriet Zimmerman, Box 312, Folder:
Telegrams.
154
Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), 630.
95
Final Act’s Basket III and Principle VII.155 Shortly after Carter won the election, he
moved to show his concern about Soviet human rights abuses by sending a telegram
Vladimir Slepak that expressed his “deep personal interest in the treatment that you and
your colleagues receive.” He also sent a telegram to NCSJ President Eugene Gold
indicating that once in office he “would ask the Soviet Union publicly to comply with the
human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords.” On 22 December 1976, his Secretary
of State-designate Cyrus Vance met with the exiled dissident Andrei Amalrik, who once
again urged the United States to do more “to encourage democratization in the Soviet
Union.”156
Political calculations, as well as pressure from the U.S. Helsinki Commission and
private citizens, impacted the ways in which Carter articulated his commitment to human
rights during the 1976 presidential campaign. Nevertheless, these considerations should
not obscure other important reasons why he voiced his support for the issue and Soviet
dissenters before he became President. Along with unifying the Democratic Party, the
issue “gave his general call for a decent foreign policy some much-needed focus and
substance.”157 Carter also hoped that Republicans who had become disillusioned with
détente would find the prospect of promoting human rights in the Soviet Union
appealing. With conservative support, his administration could then work to forge a
155
Albright and Friendly, Jr., “Helsinki and Human Rights,” 303-4. See also Thomas, The Helsinki Effect,
134; and “Soviets Reproved Over Dissident; Soviet Treatment of Top Dissident Criticized by U.S.”,
Washington Post, 28 January 1977, A1.
156
Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 629. For copies of the telegram Jimmy Carter sent Vladimir
Slepak and Eugene Gold, see RL, Box 46, Folder: Soviet Jewry, 4/78-4/79.
157
Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade, 6.
96
public and congressional foreign policy consensus that emphasized human rights instead
of realpolitik or the rigid and fearful anticommunism that produced the Vietnam
debacle.158
The issue of human rights also appealed to Carter because of his beliefs in the
lessons of U.S. civil rights movement and Wilsonian impulses. According to his reading
of history, the United States had an important role to play in making the international
order more just and amenable to American values. In his speech accepting the
Democratic nomination, Carter noted that the American Revolution made his nation “a
pioneer in shaping more decent and just relations among people and among societies.”
Two hundred years later, he remarked, the legacy of the American Revolution
necessitated that U.S. politicians “carry out a sustained architectural effort to shape an
international framework of peace within which our own ideals gradually can become a
global reality.” This mindset helps explain why Carter had little trouble insisting that
“our country is a beacon of light that ought to provide a concept of what freedom is”
during the 1976 presidential campaign.159
Carter employed the word “ought” because he recognized that the United States
had not always lived up to its ideals in both the recent and distant past. For example, he
reminded Americans that their country had practiced slavery, tolerated “Jim Crow”
segregation in the South, and committed many missteps in Vietnam. He also spoke about
158
Nicolai N. Petro, The Predicament of Human Rights (New York: University Press of America 1983), 13;
and John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency, 118. See also Vogelgesang, American Dream, Global
Nightmare, 110.
159
Carter, Why Not the Best, 164; For example, see “The Second Carter-Ford Debate,” 6 October 1976.
Available [Online]: http://www.debates.org/pages/trans76b.html [14 May 2007]; and The Presidential
Campaign of 1976, Part One, Volume Two,
97
negative developments such as Watergate and the immorality of supporting white
minority governments in Africa. Inspired by the U.S. civil right movement’s
transformation of the South, Carter linked the issues of domestic reform and moral
renewal to a larger universal struggle for human rights.160 This attitude became clear
when told the Democratic convention that no 20th century President had done more to
advance the cause of human rights than Lyndon Johnson. When a Playboy reporter asked
why he had neglected to mention Vietnam when making this comment, Carter stood firm.
After responding that Vietnam had destroyed Johnson’s political career, he remarked that
“there’s hasn’t been another President in history---with the possible exception of
Abraham Lincoln—who did more to advance the cause of human rights.”161
These words illustrate the close connection Carter saw between carrying out
domestic reforms and a wider universal struggle for human rights. As one scholar writes,
he believed that reestablishing a “sense of moral authority at home” would allow him to
“present America as a model abroad with more credibility.” The ways in which Carter
linked a domestic renewal to a wider universal struggle for human rights account for his
determination to explain why the United States needed to embrace universal human rights
standards. From his perspective, working toward adherence to and adopting these
standards would put the United States in a much better moral position to fulfill its role as
a “beacon” to the rest of the world.162
160
The Presidential Campaign of 1976, Volume I, Part One, 425; and Ibid., Volume I, Part Two , 710-1,
993-8.
161
Ibid., 950. See also Carter, Why Not the Best, 161.
98
The lessons of the U.S. civil rights movement only reinforced his belief that the
demonstration and defense of moral principles could help transform the international
environment and serve American interests. Much like the defense of moral principles
played a pivotal role in the “political and social transformation of the Southland,” he
reasoned, a universal defense of human rights could both raise the international
community’s awareness about the issue and force leaders from nations as diverse as the
Soviet Union and Argentina to think about how they treated their citizens before acting.
Over the long term, all governments, including the Soviet Union and the United States,
would have to acknowledge that “human rights had become the historic tendency in our
time” just like American politicians accepted the necessity of ending racial discrimination
in the South. From Carter’s point of view, this sort of peaceful change would not only
enhance U.S. efforts to make the structure of the international system more amenable to
American values, but also reflect “human progress.”163
Carter’s religious values and respect for how U.S. civil rights activists
transformed the moral environment of the United States through their selfless activism
162
Gebhard Schweigler, “Carter’s Détente Policy: Change or Continuity?” World Today 34, no. 3 (1978):
84-5.
163
Members of the Carter administration such as Marshall Shulman and Zbigniew Brzezinski have
emphasized how Jimmy Carter’s understanding of the American civil rights movement shaped his view of
human rights. See Conference #2 of the Carter-Brezhnev Project: A Conference of U.S. and Russian
Policymakers and Scholars held at the Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons Island Georgia, 90, 202-3. The
quotes can be found in Ibid. 202-3; and Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York:
Bantam Books, 1982), 142. See also “Interview with Jimmy Carter,” CNN Cold War Series. Available
[Online]: http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/19/interviews/carter/ [10 July 2007]; The
Collapse of Détente: From March 1977 Moscow Meetings to the December 1979 Invasion of
Afghanistan—The Launch of the Carter-Brezhnev Project: A Conference of U.S. and Russian Policymakers
and Scholars held at the “Playhouse” on the Rockefeller Estate, Pocantico Hills, New York, National
Security Archive, Washington, D.C., 19; Frank A. Ruechel, “Politics and Morality Revisited: Jimmy
Carter and Reinhold Niebuhr,” Atlantic History 37, no. 4 (1994): 26; Tony Smith, America’s Mission, 645; and Presidential Campaign of 1976, Volume I, Part One, 261.
99
predisposed him to sympathize with the plight of individuals facing governmental
oppression. Because “every child is a child of God . . . entitled to stature and respect,” he
believed, the U.S. government had a moral duty to voice its support for those who faced
repression for their defense of human rights. In both domestic and foreign affairs, the
United States needed leaders who would not ignore the plight of “the powerless . . . weak
. . . disenfranchised . . . and . . . other victims of oppression.”164 From this vantage point,
Carter’s deep affinity for human rights flowed from his belief that the United States
government should use its power and influence to “alleviate human suffering around the
world,” which accounts for why he reminded his audiences during the campaign that
human rights abuses took place in countries such as Chile and Argentina, not just the
Soviet Union.165
When discussing why Carter decided to champion human rights before he became
president, his National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, argued that the
President’s deep belief in the issue flowed from his inherent “idealism” and
understanding of the U.S. civil rights movement. While Carter’s inherent idealism helps
explain his emphasis on the necessity of embracing universal human rights standards, we
need keep in mind that Carter in no way viewed himself as advocating a simple idealistic
position. His descriptions of an “imperfect world” and admonitions that Americans could
not remake the world in their own image indicate that accepted the American theologian
164
The Presidential Campaign of 1976, Volume I, Part Two, 714, 994-5. See also Jimmy Carter: American
Experience, Public Broadcasting Corporation, Washington D.C, 180 minutes, 2002, DVD.
165
Ibid., 712, 996. See also The Presidential Campaign of 1976, Volume I, Part One, 445. See also Natan
Sharansky, with Ron Dermer, The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny
(New York: Public Affairs, 2004), XX; and “Interview with Jimmy Carter.”
100
and philosopher’s Reinhold Niebuhr’s admonitions about “the inevitable tension between
idealism and realism” in “political life.”166 In his own way, Carter wanted to articulate a
human rights vision that attempted to reconcile Wilsonian morality with constraints of
realism. In his campaign speech at Notre Dame University in the fall of 1976, he
commented:
I think all of us realize that the question of human rights throughout the world is a
very difficult one. It requires a balancing of tough realism on the one hand, and
idealism on the other. Of our understanding of the world as it is, and the world as
it ought to be. The question I think is whether in recent years we haven’t been too
pragmatic, too cynical. And as a consequence have ignored those moral values
that have always distinguished the United States of America from other
countries.167
Long after he left the presidency, Carter referred to his vision of reconciling
idealism with the constraints of realism as “idealpolitik.” He found this word appropriate
because he believed that “moral principles were the best foundation for the exertion of
American power and influence.” Carrying out a foreign policy that emphasized
fundamental American values and the importance of international law would not only
help transform the international environment, he concluded, but also serve legitimate
American interests. Such a stance would reduce the international appeal of communism
and remove “the reasons for revolutions that often erupt among those who suffer from
persecution.” Along similar lines, Carter believed that “a human rights effort would also
166
See Conference #2 of the Carter-Brezhnev Project, 47, 202; The Presidential Campaign of 1976, Part
One, Volume Two, 710, 994-5; and Ruechel, “Politics and Morality Revisited,” 27.
167
The Presidential Campaign of 1976, Part One, Volume Two, 710.
101
help strengthen our influence” among developing nations “that were still in the process of
forming their own governments and choosing their future friends and trading partners.”168
The use of the term “idealpolitick” may have reflected Carter’s understanding of
Niebuhr’s writings, but articulating such a position has potential pitfalls in the real world
of politics. As we will see in the following chapters,” the affinity he showed for
emphasizing human rights ideals without always admitting “the compromises and
contradictions necessary to translate them into deeds” opened him up to charges of
abandoning those ideals and “moral hypocrisy.” When voicing his commitment to
human rights and support for the Final Act during the 1976 presidential election, it also
remains unclear just how much Carter had grappled with Stanley Hoffman’s admonition
that any U.S. human rights policy pursued with rigor reduces the targeted state’s chances
of working with American leaders to solve “world order issues.” This observation has
special relevance because of ways in which Carter outlined his preferred approach to
Soviet-American relations and détente before he became President.169
Presidential Candidate Jimmy Carter: “World Order Problems,” Détente, and the
Soviet Union
As a number of authors have argued, while the positions that Carter outlined
during the 1976 shared some commonalities with those of Ford and Nixon
administrations, he wanted to transform how the United States approached global
168
See “Interview with Jimmy Carter;” and Carter, Keeping Faith, 142-3. See also Drew, “A Reporter at
Large,” 38; and Brzezinski’s comments in Conference #2 of the Carter-Brezhnev Project, 47, 202.
169
See Ruechel, “Politics and Morality Revisited,” 27; and Stanley Hoffman, “The Hell of Good
Intentions,” Foreign Policy 29 (Winter 1977): 8.
102
affairs.170 In contrast to Kissinger’s penchant for “unilateral dealings with the Soviet
Union,” he stressed the importance of coordinating American foreign policy with other
democratic nations. He also wanted the U.S. government to make a bolder effort to help
solve the problems less-developed nations faced such as poverty, political instability, and
a lack of educational opportunities. As part of this vision, he wanted the United States to
curb foreign arms sales to dictatorships and reduce its military presence abroad. Just as
important, he railed against the U.S. government’s meddling in other nations’ “internal
affairs” and the shortcomings of relying on military power to increase the influence of the
United States abroad. In his address to the Council of Foreign Relations on 15 March
1976, he denounced an American foreign policy “that has consisted almost entirely of
maneuver and manipulation, based on the assumption that the world is a jungle of
competing national antagonisms where military supremacy and economic muscle are the
only things that work and where rival powers are balanced against each other to keep the
peace.”171
Because the world had become more interdependent and pluralistic since World
War II, Carter insisted that the United States had to embrace “world order politics”
designed to create a more “just and stable international order.” He articulated this vision
because he believed that lasting solutions to global problems such as the spread of
nuclear weapons, pollution, international terrorism, and the growing income gap between
170
For a good account of the connections between the Carter administration’s approach to foreign policy
and its predecessors, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 344. The quotation comes from
Stueck, “Placing Jimmy Carter’s Foreign Policy,” 245.
171
The Presidential Campaign of 1976, Volume I, Part One, 46, 50, 58, 66-70,79, 81, 88, 110-3, 186-7,
247, 268, 270-5, 376, 423-4, 447-8, 460, 543, 546, 685; Ibid., Volume, Part Two, 776, 873, 994
103
nations in the North and South depended on the collective efforts of all countries. This
mindset explains why Carter spoke of the U.S. government’s need to place more
importance on working through international institutions such as the United Nations. He
also advanced his “world order politics” vision because he felt that the United States and
Soviet Union no longer had the power and resources necessary to dominate the
international system as they had the during decades after World War II ended.172
Since global problems required international solutions, Carter argued that the
United States needed to work “with the countries of the communist world.” In the case
of the Soviet Union, he spoke about how Soviet and American leaders needed to work
together to promote “peace in the Near East,” reduce nuclear weapons, and remove the
“menace that North Korea presents to South Korea.” The two countries could also
engage in common efforts to solve “world problems” such as “agricultural development
and the population crisis.” While he did not rule out difficulties in obtaining such
cooperation, Carter believed that “the great problem we Americans confront is to
demonstrate to the Soviet Union that our good will is a great as our strength . . . until our
two nations can achieve new attitudes and new trust.” He made this assertion because of
his belief that American policies “should treat people of other nations as individuals, with
the same dignity and respect as we demand of ourselves.” After all, Carter observed that
individuals in different countries “work hard, they have families whom they love, and
172
The Presidential Campaign of 1976, Volume I, Part One, 68-70, 115-6, 118, 187, 189-90, 247, 249;
Ibid., Volume I, Part Two, 815-9,
104
they have hopes and dreams. . . . Their basic personal motives are the same as ours.”173
He also believed that Brezhnev had a genuine interest in peace and disarmament.174
The rhetoric Carter employed about how Soviet and American leaders could
cooperate on certain issues clashed with some of his other statements about the USSR.
He supported the objective of détente on the grounds that such a policy “can be an
instrument for long-term peaceful change within the Communist system . . . and the rest
of the world.”175 On the other hand, he rebuked the Soviets for not living up to the
Helsinki Accords (even when he had a negative view of the agreement), their harsh
treatment of Jews and Christians, and their manipulation of détente as a cover to aid
national liberation struggles and expand their international influence. To rectify this
development, he pledged to become a tough negotiator with the Soviet Union so his
administration could forge a more “reciprocal détente” that gave the United States an
equal advantage for every Soviet benefit. A more even-handed approach to détente, he
indicated, would require “the Soviets, as well as the United States, [to] refrain from
irresponsible intervention in other countries.”176
Because Carter prided himself on reconciling idealism and realism, he referred to
his vision of détente as a mixture of “cooperation and competition” that contained “new
173
The Presidential Campaign of 1976, Volume I, Part One, 115-8, 272, 112, 249, 272-74, 373-4, 460,
515, 543; 547; Ibid., Volume I, Part Two, 817-9, 1021.
174
“Memorandum of conversation between Averell Harriman and President-Elect Carter at Plains, Georgia,
29 November 1976,” in Global Competition and Deterioration of U.S. Soviet Relations, IV-240, V-264.
175
176
The Presidential Campaign of 1976, Volume I, Part One, 116-7.
The Presidential Campaign of 1976, Volume I, Part One, 83, 110, 115-6, 202, 246-47, 270, 547, 691-4;
and Ibid. Volume I, Part Two, 711, 742, 836, 874, 953, 970, 996, 1004, 1009, 1021, 1043.
105
kinds of contacts in some areas along with continued hostility in others.” For example,
he spoke about the need “to develop touristic, academic, and cultural exchanges” among
the Soviet, Eastern European, and American peoples.” Yet, sometimes in the same
breadth, he insisted that the Soviets must follow the human rights provisions of the Final
Act and cease their jamming of international broadcasting. To complicate matters
further, Carter often spoke about the vital importance the U.S. government must attach to
arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. On more than one occasion he
emphasized that “our core dealings with the Soviet Union must be the mutual reduction
in [nuclear] arms.”177
The vision Carter articulated during the 1976 presidential campaign left many
questions unanswered. Would an expression of American goodwill convince Soviet
leaders to cooperate with the U.S. government to solve “world order problems” if Carter
wanted them to meet his conditions for a more “reciprocal détente” and abide by the
human rights provisions of the Final Act? How would Carter balance his deep belief in
articulating American ideals and showing support for those who faced government
oppression against his stated goal of forging closer relations between the American and
Soviet peoples and quest to reduce nuclear weapons? Would not his desire to create an
international order more amenable to American values and human rights by definition
breed confrontation with the Soviet Union?
The next chapter will provide answers to these questions, but some of his
campaign statements provide important insights into how would handle the issues of
177
The Presidential Campaign of 1976, Volume I, Part One, 46, 112, 116, 202, 246-8, 272, 547-8, 694,
704; and Ibid., Volume I, Part Two, 704, 711-4, 742, 856, 955, 1005.
106
Soviet human rights violations when he became President. He may have believed that
the Soviets should follow universal human rights standards, but refused to move SovietAmerican relations backward in time. “While détente must be more reciprocal, Carter
argued, “I reject the strident and bellicose voices of those who would have this country
return to the days of the cold war with the Soviet Union.”178 He also hinted that the
United States should refrain from lashing out at other countries’ when they violated
American principles or behaved in a manner that threatened global peace. In a speech
delivered to the New York Liberal Party, he remarked that:
A strong nation, like a strong person, can afford to be gentle, firm, thoughtful and
restrained. It can afford to extend a helping hand to others. It’s a weak nation,
like a weak person, that must behave with bluster and boasting and rashness and
other signs of insecurity. Ours is a strong nation, and it must remain strong.179
This statement deserves attention because the Soviet government’s treatment of
dissenters and disregard for the provisions of the Helsinki Accords would test the
patience of Carter administration officials and private citizens during the next four years.
The Soviet Government, Dissent, and the Helsinki Accords, 1975-1976
The Brezhnev regime’s reaction to the “globalization” of Soviet human rights
violations cannot be divorced from the importance it placed on eradicating dissent and
discrediting anti-Soviet/communist propaganda. Because many Soviet officials based
their legitimacy on the correctness of orthodox Marxist-Leninism, they viewed political
pluralism with disdain and saw no reason to tolerate the development of an autonomous
civil society. Instead, they held fast to the position that private citizens only gained the
178
The Presidential Campaign of 1976, Volume I, Part One, 247
179
Ibid., 1008.
107
ability to exercise basic political and economic rights in an effective manner when a
communist party representing their interests abolished private property and liquidated the
bourgeois class.180 On the 106th anniversary of Lenin’s birth (23 April 1976), Andropov
differentiated between Soviet-style socialism and what passed for democracy in capitalist
countries: “There is no democracy in general. There is either bourgeois democracy or
socialist democracy.”181 This viewpoint helps account for why official Soviet authors
often referred to the criticisms of dissenters as “slanderous provocations.” From their
perspective, private citizens possessed no inherent right to criticize their government’s
conduct because the Soviet Communist Party had already created a system that ensured
the exercise and protection of all their rights. At least in part, this attitude helps explain
why the Soviet Union decided to sign numerous U.N. human rights conventions during
the 1960s and 1970s.182
The Kremlin also found the existence of dissent troubling because such a
development defied its orthodox Marxist-Leninist conceptions of what made “Soviet
180
Mark Hawkesworth, “Ideological Immunity: The Soviet Response to Human Rights Criticism,”
Universal Human Rights 2 (January/March 1980): 70-3. See also Nikolai N. Yakovlev and Nikolai V.
Sivachev, trans. by Olga Adler Titelbaum Russia and the United States: U.S. Soviet Relations from a Soviet
Point of View (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 266-7.
181
CDSP 28, no. 16 (19 May 1976): 7. In a speech delivered at the 1973 World Peace Conference in
Moscow, Brezhnev told the audience that “we have no serious reason to shun any serious discussion of
human rights.” “Our revolution, the victory of socialism in this country,” he remarked, “have not only
proclaimed but have secured in reality the rights of working people whatever his nationality . . . in a way
that capitalism has been unable to do in any country of the world.” See Brezhnev, Socialism, Democracy,
and Human Rights, 82.
182
Although the Kremlin would not have singed these agreements if they had contained strong enforcement
mechanisms, many would have endorsed the claim that “the historic gains made under socialism have
directly influenced the formulation of international principles and norms in the realm of human rights.”
See K. Chernenko, Soviet Democracy: Principles and Practice (Moscow: Novosti Publishing House,
1977), 26; and Hawkesworth, “Ideological Immunity,” 82-3. See also CDSP 28, no. 7 (17 March 1976): 16.
108
socialist democracy” such a just and humane system. Even though the Politburo defined
the nation’s policies, official publications often pointed out how the general population’s
mass participation in public affairs and official public mass organizations “objectively
proved” the strength and vitality of Soviet democracy. In theory at least, active citizen
participation not only illustrated the monolithic and homogeneous nature of Soviet
society, but also showed how citizens exercised their wide array of rights such as
freedom of expression in a responsible manner. Furthermore, public participation
showed that a majority of citizens wanted to take part in a common effort to improve the
functioning of Soviet-style socialism. This sort of attitude explains why many official
Soviet publications also spoke about how an engaged public proved the existence of the
“new Soviet man.” The report of the 25th Congress of the CPSU defined this individual as
“a man who has been building the future unsparing of his energy and making every
sacrifice.” This “new man” also maintained a “consistent internationalist outlook” while
combining “ideological conviction, vital energy, culture, and knowledge.”183
Those who chose not to participate could also exercise their human rights as long
as they accepted the Soviet government’s “absolutism in the realm of ideas” and kept
their opinions to themselves. As one observer has written, “individuals who fail to
develop this complex of socially useful properties simply fail to qualify for the status of
‘person’ whose rights the [Soviet] socialist state guarantees and protects.” From this
angle, the discretion of Soviet bureaucrats governed the ways in which private citizens
183
For example, see Chernenko, Soviet Democracy, 49-56; 63-4, 81; CDSP 18, no. 7 (17 March 1976): 3;
Samuel Zivs, Human Rights: Continuing the Discussion (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980), 11, 20-24,
45, 83, 143-50; CDSP 28, no. 16 (19 May 1975): 7; and Brezhnev, Socialism, Democracy, and Human
Rights, 133-4.
109
could exercise their basic human rights. They had an obligation to behave in a manner
that bureaucrats defined as consistent with the task of building of socialism in the Soviet
Union.184
The Brezhnev regime’s insistence on domestic ideological conformity operated in
tandem with the orthodox belief that the rest of the world should follow and emulate the
example of Soviet-style socialism. After all, the Soviet Union was the first nation “to
accomplish a socialist revolution” and forge a strong socialist state under the guidance of
a communist party that expressed “the will and interests of all working people.”185 As a
result of this position, orthodox Soviet officials expected Soviet “fraternal”
socialist/communist parties to endorse and defend the legitimacy of Soviet-style
socialism.186 They also believed that these “fraternal” parties should follow the
guidelines and positions set in Moscow when struggling for the creation of socialism in
their own countries.187 Since the Brezhnev regime in effect rejected the legitimacy of
“moral and political pluralism,” many officials concluded that Western Communists had
become infected with “’Eurocommunist heresy’” during the 1970s. They saw no reason
why these parties should criticize Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Accords or
184
Hawkesworth, “Ideological Immunity,” 72; CHRUR 23-4 (October-December 1975): 19; Zivs, Human
Rights, 17-9; N.A., “Human Rights in the Soviet Union—Putting the Record Straight,” New Times 1
(January 1976): 19; CDSP 28, no. 44 (1 December 1976), 4; and Peter Reddaway, “Soviet Policies on
Dissent and Emigration: The Radical Change of Course Since 1979,” no. 192 (28 August 1984), 2-4.
185
See Chernenko, Soviet Democracy, 85.
186
Lenczowski, Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy, 102-3, 129-30, 272-4; McCauley, Gorbachev,
1-3. See also CDSP 28, no. 3 (18 February 1976): 4-5.
187
During the Brezhnev era, the Soviet Union never repudiated the position that the CPSU was the leader
of the global communist movement. See Vasili Mitrokhin and Christopher Andrew, The Sword and the
Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 294,
280-6, 297-304.
110
“advocate a parliamentary road to socialism within a multi-party system” rather than
imitate the Soviet model.188
Since orthodox Soviet officials believed that the advance of Soviet-style socialism
represented the wave of the future, they viewed the struggle between the forces of
socialism and capitalism as the most important factor in international relations. Of
course, they paid close attention to relations with the United States and weighed the
international balance of power in both the military and economic spheres. At the same
time, the Brezhnev regime on the whole acted on the belief that “the development of
different forms of mass communication” such as radio, film, television, and satellites
made the attitude of private citizens “a vital factor in contemporary politics.” This
viewpoint grew out of the orthodox Marxist-Leninist position that “the increased role of
the masses in the formulation of foreign policy” represented “the key factor in the growth
of the world socialist system.”189
Because the attitude of private citizens mattered, the Brezhnev regime had a duty
to show the rest of the world how capitalists and imperialists employed baseless
propaganda to distort the global masses’ attitude toward Soviet-style socialism.190 For
example, the official work Contemporary Anti-Communism (1976) decried how
bourgeois political parties, subversive ideological “centers,” and the Western mass media
188
Lenczowski, Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy, 274; and Hawkesworth, Ideological Immunity,
75-6. See also CDSP 28, no. 26 (28 July 1976): 5-6; Ibid., no. 8 (24 March 1976): 4-9; Ibid., 18, no. 29 (18
August 1976): 9-10; and Mitrokhin and Andrew, The Sword and the Shield, 286.
189
Lenczowski, Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy, 24-5 and 32-6. See also Zivs, Human Rights,
145.
190
Zivs, Human Rights., 102-3.
111
all participated in a common campaign of “psychological warfare.” These forces
concocted stratagems such as citing Soviet human rights violations to “distort the actual
state of affairs in Soviet society” and “belittle the real achievements of the Soviet people
following the Great October Socialist Revolution.” They also used slanderous statements
to legitimize the erroneous idea that any socialist government’s application of MarxistLeninist principles automatically resulted in a Stalinist reign of terror.191
The prevalent belief in the existence of a “monolithic” bourgeois ideology meant
that orthodox Soviet policymakers tended to view the activities of groups as diverse as
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Western journalists, human rights NGOs, and
Western international broadcasting institutions in much the same light. From their
perspective, they all shared the Zionist and imperialist goals of undermining the Soviet
Union’s legitimacy in the eyes of its general population and private citizens all over the
world. As part of this vision, official publications often referred to dissidents as
“immature people who succumb to the influence of this [imperialist and Zionist]
propaganda,” which explains why they often attributed the existence of dissent to the
machinations of foreign intelligence services.192
The widespread belief that ideological subversion fueled dissent meant that many
Soviet leaders viewed détente as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, Brezhnev
favored the continuation of détente because such a policy increased his nation’s
191
O. Reinhold and F. Ryzzhenko, Contemporary Anti-Communism (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976),
15-6, 33, 311-28. See also Zivs, Human Rights, 97, 173, 179; CDSP 18, no. 7 (17 March 1976): 1-2; Ibid.,
18, no. 9, 1-2. Brezhnev also made illusions to “psychological warfare.” See Brezhnev, Socialism,
Democracy, and Human Rights, 82-3.
192
CDSP 18, no. 7 (17 March 1976): 5.
112
opportunities to participate in beneficial exchanges with capitalist countries. In
particular, he liked Kissinger-style détente because such a policy had much in common
with the official position that Soviet domestic conduct lay outside the appropriate bounds
of diplomatic discourse.193 Strengthening détente also meshed well with the Soviet
leadership’s understanding of “peaceful coexistence.” In short, this doctrine posited that
the Soviet Union could negotiate mutually advantageous agreements with capitalist
countries without abandoning the inevitable ideological and class struggles.194
Even though the Brezhnev regime defended the position that “peaceful
coexistence” put the Soviet Union in the best possible position to strengthen the
international prestige of socialism, orthodox officials worried about how the freer flow of
information might contaminate the minds of Soviet citizens. For example, a passage
from the official publication Contemporary Anticommunism argued that Western
propagandists who emphasized human rights sought “to take advantage of détente and
make changes in the internal order of the socialist countries an indispensable condition
for the easing of tensions.” “The perseverance of the architects of this campaign, it
continued, “is due to their striving to use the expansion of economic, scientific,
technological, cultural and political relations between socialist and capitalist states to find
193
See Westad, ed., The Collapse of Détente, 8-10, 130; Conference #2 of the Carter-Brezhnev Project,
2.Brezhenv, Peace, Détente, and Soviet-American Relations, 131-4. See also Barghoorn, Détente and the
Democratic Movement in the USSR, 119-123; and Reinhold and Ryzhenko, Contemporary
Anticommunism, 333-4.
194
CDSP 28, no. 16 (19 May 1976): 8-9. See also Yakovlev and Sivachev, Russia and the United States,
264-5, 260-1.
113
channels for invigorating bourgeois survivals [sic] in the peoples’ minds and destroying
the unity of . . . socialist communities.”195
Since the strengthening of détente and adherence to the principle of “peaceful
coexistence” increased the risk of ideological subversion, the Soviet government decided
to launch “a vast new political indoctrination drive” in mid 1974. This campaign had
“the purpose of intensifying and broadening propaganda” designed to educate Soviet
citizens about the inevitable conflict between the forces of socialism and capitalism.
Many Soviet officials echoed this theme in either their writings or speeches during the
next two years. For example, one author noted that the government’s “concern for
molding a socialist way of life and for the upbringing of the new [Soviet] man obliges us
to intensify our ideological-political work and to reach the heart and mind of every
person.”196
The tenets of orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology go a long way in explaining the
importance the Brezhnev regime placed on ideological conformity and discrediting
foreign anti-Soviet/communist propaganda. Yet, they do not paint a full picture of why
the Kremlin placed so much importance on eradicating dissent. No matter how much
they praised their nation’s “monolithic unity,” many Soviet policymakers worried about
the internal cohesion of their multinational, multiethnic empire because they questioned
the loyalty of numerous citizens in republics such as Ukraine and Georgia. This
195
Reinhold and Ryzhenko, Contemporary Anticommunism, 28-30. See also CDSP 18, no. 9 (31 March
1976): 1-2.
196
CDSP 28, no. 9 (31 March 1976): 13. N.A., From Helsinki to Belgrade, 108-9; CDSP 28, no. 16 (19
May 1976): 8-9. See also Barghoorn, Détente and the Democratic Movement in the USSR, 123, 148-50;
and Brezhnev, Socialism, Democracy, and Human Rights, 121-6.
114
viewpoint grew out of the bitter reality that millions of Soviet citizens collaborated and
fought with invading Nazi armies during World War II; it also grew out of memories of
how the Soviet government only managed to crush Ukrainian insurrections in the early
1950s. Just as they had in the past, many Soviet officials continued to act on the position
that émigré communities across the globe worked day and night to reverse the historic
gains of the October revolution.197
The memory of Soviet citizens’ collaboration with invading Nazi armies during
World War II and subsequent domestic insurrections predisposed many leading officials
to link dissent to conspiracies, terrorism, and fascism. For example, Soviet publications
sometimes referred to samizdat publications as little more than World War II “Nazi
propaganda” that reflected the thinking of “Dr. Joseph Goebbels.” One official
publication translated into English went so far as to equate Sakharov’s writings about the
benefits of creating a world government to subversive “authoritarianism and fascism.”198
In an interview with a French newspaper near the end of 1976, the Chairperson of the
Soviet Association of Jurists Samuil Zivs called Sakharov a “fascist” and referred to
dissidents as “the successors of Nazis” because they associated themselves “with
organizations which during the war [World War II] fought against the USSR and Soviet
197
In reference to foreign enemies who wanted to destroy the Soviet state, Brezhnev called Sakharov’s
1973 letter to Congress in support of the Jackson-Vanik amendment “a Trotskyist deed.” See Michael
Scammell, trans. with help of Catherine Fitzpatrick, The Solzhenitsyn Files: Secret Soviet Documents
Reveal One Man’s Fight Against the Monolith (Chicago: edition q, inc., 1995), 312-3. In his work Human
Rights, Samuel Zivs remarked, “At the Great Congress of ‘Ukrainian Nationalist Organizations,’ the
Banderavites call was: Beware of ‘various deceitful conferences on peace, security, disarmament, détente!”
See Zivs, Human Rights, 132.
198
This work also called Solzhenitsyn a “dedicated successor to the ideologues of fascism.” See Nikolai
Yakovlev, CIA Target—The USSR (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980), 234-5.
115
society.” “If a fascist says that détente is a crime against humanity, and Sakharov says
the same thing,” he remarked, “that is meaningful.”199
The Brezhnev regime also showed little hesitation in linking Jewish emigration
and Zionism with Nazism or fascism. As a Soviet émigré pointed out in 1976, official
publications and public meetings attacked “everything in any way connected with Israel
and Judaism.” Quoting a sample of these publications, he indicated that the main Soviet
argument ran as follows: “Zionism is fascism and is demonstrated by the fact that the
Zionists have always been the chief allies of the Nazis, from the burning of the Reichstag
to the present time. Consequently, Israel is a fascist state and everyone who wants to go
there is a renegade traitor.”200
Before moving ahead, we need to keep in mind that Andropov played a pivotal
role in shaping how Brezhnev regime responded to and viewed dissenters. As a number
of works have pointed out, Andropov’s stint as the Soviet ambassador to Hungary during
the 1956 uprising against Soviet rule “made a deep impression on him.” “As an orthodox
Marxist,” he believed that the uprising took place because of imperialist machinations
and concluded that the Soviet government had to take stern measures to eradicate nonconformist thought at both home and abroad.201 Once he became Chairman in 1967,
Andropov viewed himself a modern “Chekist of the Lenin School” and grasped “that the
199
CHRUR 23-4 (October-December 1976): 20, 22. See also Zivs, Human Rights, 132-5.
200
CHRUR 19 (January/March 1976): 50-1; and Arbatov, The System, 237.
201
Volkogonov, Autopsy for an Empire, 334. See also Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, trans. by
Guy Daniels, Yuri Andropov: A Secret Passage into the Kremlin (New York: Collier Macmillan Publishers,
1983), especially 122-47; Zhores Medvedev, Andropov (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1983),
71-87; and Joshua Rubenstein and Alexander Gribanov, ed., The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2005, 20-33; and Arbatov, The System, 254-86.
116
main threat to the [Soviet] system came not only from stagnation, but also from a rise in
the rebellious state of mind of a growing number of people.” He sent the Politburo and
Central Committee hundreds of memorandums concerning both foreign and domestic
anti-Soviet activities. He also created KGB directorates with the specific purposes of
curbing dissident activities and Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. Andropov
even introduced “modern” and “professional methods” designed to improve his agency’s
ability to engage in espionage and produce counter-intelligence, as well as monitor
individual and public opinion. Just as he wanted, the KGB served “as the guardian of
ideas” and carried out “’preventive work’” designed to preserve Soviet citizens’
ideological reliability.202
While Andropov had to gain the Politburo’s approval before undertaking major
actions such as expelling dissidents from the Soviet Union, the KGB retained a great deal
of autonomy to combat dissent and international criticism of the Soviet Union’s domestic
practices.203 Well aware that trials could give dissenters a platform to outline their beliefs
and garner international sympathy, he approved of using psychiatry as a way of
discrediting their views of the Soviet government. Working with the KGB, the Soviet
psychiatry establishment concocted diagnoses such as “’sluggish schizophrenia’” or
“’creeping schizophrenia’” to explain why dissenters wanted to reform Soviet society.
Consistent with this position, a local KGB official sent a memorandum to the Central
Committee complaining about how he had to deal with mentally ill individuals who
202
Volkogonov, Autopsy for an Empire, 343.
203
Ibid., 341.
117
wanted to form new political parties and distribute “’plans for new laws and
programs.’”204
The pervasive influence of orthodox Marxist-Leninist thought and perceptions of
domestic threats shaped leading Soviet officials’ view of dissent and international
criticism of their nation’s domestic practices. Yet, they were not immune from pragmatic
behavior when pursuing specific foreign objectives. Brezhnev allowed Jewish
emigration from the Soviet Union to reach new highs during the early 1970s as part of his
effort to increase Soviet-American trade and head off passage of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment. International condemnation also resulted in the release of a number of
dissenters who had spent time in psychiatric institutions. The Soviet government may
have lamented Western European Communist parties’ “Eurocommunist” positions, but
officials still sent these parties large amounts of money to fund their political activities.
The KGB also continued to train “selected” Italian Communists in “underground
operations” such as “the fabrication of false documents.”205
Since Soviet policymakers worried about international public opinion, they made
every effort to distance their internal behavior from the mass arrests and arbitrary
“crimes” that took place during the Stalin era. Instead of arresting and doing away with
political opponents in a “Stalinist fashion,” official publications explained how the Soviet
government now adhered to the principles of “socialist legality.”206 Because authorities
204
Anne Applebaum, Gulag: A History (New York: Random House, 2003), 548.
205
Ibid, 550; and Mitrokhin and Andrew, The Sword and the Shield, 286, 298. See also Arbatov, The
System, 248.
206
Zivs, Human Rights, 79-80, 81-88. See also N.A., “Human Rights in the Soviet Union,” 29.
118
now respected the “rule of law,” they treated law-breaking dissenters in a “humane”
fashion. In theory at least, they warned dissidents to cease their unlawful activities before
arresting them, worked to educate Soviet citizens about the requirements of the law, and
tried lawbreakers in neutral judicial bodies. According to one official Soviet publication,
these sorts of practices not only made the Soviet legal practices consist with international
standards, but in some ways surpassed them.207
Brezhnev’s pragmatic instincts and desire to retain the appearance of upholding
“socialist legality” explain why he hesitated for almost eight years before deciding to
revoke Solzhenitsyn’s citizenship and expel him from the country in mid 1974. When
the KGB asked the Politburo for the permission to take the same course of action after
Solzhenitsyn received the 1970 Nobel Prize for Literature, Brezhnev expressed
reservations about carrying out such a drastic move.208 He ended up siding with his
Interior Minister Nikolai Shchelokov, who argued that the “Solzhenitsyn problem” was
created by literary administrators who should have known better . . . In this case what
needs to be done is not to execute our enemies publicly but smother them with
embraces.209
While ideological considerations or fears of domestic subversion did not always
dictate Soviet behavior, we should not forget that Brezhnev’s chose not to deport
Solzhenitsyn at the same time that the Soviet arrest rate for dissident activities reached
207
N.A., “Human Rights in the Soviet Union,” 29.
208
Mitrokhin and Andrew, The Sword and the Shield, 312-3. See also Scammell, The Solzhenitsyn Files.
209
Ibid.
119
the highest levels between the years 1957 and 1979. His hesitations also did not prevent
the authorities from waging a systematic campaign to eradicate samizdat publications.
During the early 1970s, the Brezhnev regime carried out show trials in which dissident
“defendants incriminated themselves in the best Stalinist tradition.”210 The Soviet
government’s mixture of ideologically-driven and pragmatic behavior once again reveals
the shortcomings of debating whether Marxist-Leninist dogma or cold, calculated realism
best explains Soviet international and domestic behavior.
This pattern of behavior guided Soviet conduct after Brezhnev signed the Final
Act on 1 August 1975. When defending Soviet participation in the Helsinki process, he
referred to the agreement as “the culmination of everything positive that has been done
thus far on our continent to bring about the change from the ‘cold war’ to détente and the
genuine implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence.”211 He advanced this
argument even though other members of the Politburo had warned him about how
Western countries might use the provisions of Basket III and Principle VII to interfere in
Soviet “internal affairs.” Instead of heeding these warnings, Brezhnev supported Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko’s arguments that the Kremlin would remain in control of
“what did and did not constitute interference in our domestic affairs.” Perhaps influenced
by Kissinger’s private assurances that the U.S. government would stay out of Soviet
210
Ibid., 313. See also Barghoorn, Détente and the Democratic Movement in the USSR, 140-1.
211
Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 94; and CDSP 27. no. 31 (27 August 1975): 14-5.
120
“internal affairs,” the Foreign Minister reassured his critics that “’We are masters of our
own house.’”212
This confident prediction could not prevent transnational human rights activities
from putting the USSR on the defensive. Only two weeks after the Final Act came into
existence, Brezhnev felt the need to clarify the true meaning of the agreement. He told
visiting members of the U.S. Congress that the agreement’s provisions about the
“inviolability of frontiers and non-interference in internal affairs were ‘points of a
binding nature, whereas “those contained in Basket III were subject to further
agreements.”213 During his private Final Act negotiations with the U.S. attaché Jack
Matlock in November 1975 concerning American and Soviet compliance with the
Helsinki Accords, Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Kornienko minimized the importance
of Basket III and Principle VII. He told the American representative that the “Soviet side
starts from the assumption that the political substance” of the agreement “is defined
primarily by the principles of relations between member states.”214 Around the same
time, the head of ISKAN, Georgi Arbatov, published an article in the New York Times
212
Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (New
York: Random House, 1995), 346. During a conference on U..S-Soviet relations that took place in 1994,
Anatoly Dobrynin commented, “Gromyko always detested having to discuss anything related to Basket III.
But he had been conditioned—and this, I think, is an important factor—he had been conditioned by Henry
Kissinger to treat the whole thing as something of no practical importance.” See Conference #2 of the
Carter-Brezhnev Project: A Conference of U.S. and Russian Policymakers and Scholars held at the
Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons Island Georgia, 63.
213
214
Mastny, ed., Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, 84.
“Memorandum of Georgy Kornienko Conversation with U.S. Attaché Jack Matlock,” 12 November
1975. Available [Online]: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB191/11-121975%20Kornienko.pdf [15 July 2007].
121
lambasting U.S. citizens who criticized the Soviet Union’s Final Act compliance
record.215
The Soviet signing of the Final Act in no way changed Andropov’s attitude
toward dissenters. On 29 December 1975, he informed the Central Committee that over
the past four years his organization had warned 63,108 individuals to cease their “antiSoviet” activities and disrupted the subversive plots of almost two thousand “anti-Soviet”
groups. “Our information shows the aspiration of special services and ideological centers
of the opponent” to create “an anti-Soviet underground publishing organ designed to
serve as an organizational center.” Well aware of the large number of citizens who
collaborated with Nazis during World War II and the domestic insurrections that lasted
into the 1950s, Andropov wrote that foreign subversive organizations counted on the
loyalty of elements such as “Vlasov’s troops” and “participants in the bandit armed
underground in the Ukraine,” Baltic republics, Belorussia, “several regions of Central
Asia, and [the] Northern Caucasus.”216
Six months later, Andropov sent the Central Committee another memorandum
that provided even more statistics about the characteristics of anti-Soviet activities. He
indicated that over the course of 1975 “10,206 anti-Soviet, ideologically harmful and
slanderous anonymous documents were prepared and distributed by 1,629 authors [6,476
pamphlets, 3,255 letters and 475 petitions].” He also wrote that the KGB had identified
215
216
Georgi A. Arbatov, “Reciprocity After Helsinki,” New York Times, 8 October 1975, 41.
“Yuri Andropov Report to the CC CPSU,” 29 December 1975. Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB191/1975-12-29%20Andropov.pdf [19 January 2007].
See also “Excerpt from Anatoly S. Chernayev's Diary,” 3 January 1976. Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB191/01-03-76%20Chernyaev.pdf [19 January 2007].
122
“1,277 authors, who distributed 6,602 anti-Soviet, politically harmful and slanderous
documents [3,210 pamphlets, 3,045 letters, [and] 347 petitions]. “Among those detained
were 37 authors,” he wrote, “who prepared hostile documents with terrorist threats
directed at the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet
government.”217
Since Andropov saw no difference between the activities of “’legal’” dissent
linked to AI and nationalists “who . . . never miss a chance to inflict harm on Soviet
society,” he recommended that the Communist party keep imprisoning dissidents. Such
arrests might upset some of our “détente partners,” he reasoned, but the Soviet
government could not take any chances because “there are hundreds of thousands of
people in the Soviet Union, who are either acting or are ready to act against the Soviet
regime.” The Kremlin also had to remain firm because “under certain circumstances,”
some of these individuals “will embark on an open struggle, or even an armed assault.”
Given these realities, Andropov surmised, “it seems to us [KGB] that one cannot make . .
. concessions on this issue, because they [will] inevitably lead to additional demands
unacceptable to us.”218
The considerable attention Andropov paid to dissident acts only underscores his
fear that these private citizens would succeed in “globalizing” the issue of Soviet human
rights violations. In particular, he warned the Central Committee that western radio
217
“Memo from Andropov to CC of CPSU, ‘On the Results of Search for Authors of Anti-Soviet
Anonymous Documents in 1975,’” 13 March 1976. Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB191/KGB%2003-13-1976.pdf [26 January 2007].
218
Ibid. He also noted that Crimean Tatars and Jewish nationalists had either sent letters to or asked to meet
with the leaders of these Western communist parties during their stay in Moscow for the “25th Congress of
the CPSU [Soviet Communist Party].”
123
stations had broadcast the French and Italian communist parties’ statements about Soviet
non-compliance with the Final Act into the Soviet Union. These messages have not only
become known “to a wide circle of Soviet citizens,” he indicated, but had also led “to an
increase in the activity of hostile elements like Sakharov, [Roy] Medvedev, and some
others.” He advised the Central Committee to tell our “French and Italian comrades “that
the struggle with so-called ‘dissidents’ is not an abstract question of democratization for
us, but vitally important for ensuring the security of the Soviet state.” In his estimation,
Western communist parties could not grasp that “anti-Soviet expressions could still exist
to a lesser or greater extent, even after events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.”219
Much as Andropov reacted when Solzhenitsyn won the 1970 Nobel Prize in
Literature, he became enraged when Sakharov won the same prize for peace five years
later. In a series of memorandums concerning this development, Soviet émigrés and
Western non-governmental organizations such as AI and the Organizing Committee for
Sakharov Hearings had sent this dissenter congratulatory letters. In addition to quoting
foreign journalists’ positive statements about this development, Andropov also quoted
Sakharov’s statement that “[i]t is now very important to increase the pressure of world
public opinion to defend human rights in the Soviet Union.” In obvious disgust, he
concluded that the Nobel Committee decided to give Sakharov the peace prize “in order
to support his anti-Soviet activities and . . . consolidate hostile-minded elements within
this country.”220
219
“Yuri Andropov Report to the CC CPSU,” 29 December 1975.
220
Rubenstein and Gribanov, ed., ed., The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov, 190-1.
124
With the support of Politburo members Dmitri Ustinov and Roman Rudenko,
Andropov sent the Central Committee a recommendation near the end of 1975 that called
for the exile of Sakharov and his wife Elena Bonner to the town Sverdlovsk-44. In
defense of this measure, the document explained how the “the Procurator’s office and
state security organs . . . have taken every possible measure--through the party, Soviet,
and public organizations . . . to bring Sakharov to his senses and avert his political
downfall.” The document also lambasted Sakharov’s role in creating “the so-called
‘International Hearings on Human Rights Violations in the USSR.’” “[T]he organizers of
the ‘Hearings’ exploited [Sakharov’s work] to confirm ‘the fact of persecution” of
national minorities in the USSR, the ‘trampling’ of political and religious freedoms, and
the ‘repression’ of citizens for their political convictions.”221
The authors favored the exiling of Sakharov and Bonner to a city closed to
foreigners for predictable reasons. Such a move would terminate their association with
“citizens of capitalist countries” that “result in the disclosure of secret information that
can cause serious harm to the country’s defenses.” They also endorsed internal exile
because “court proceedings may evoke a negative [international] reaction.” Even though
“the administrative resettlement of Sakharov and his wife will evoke an anti-Soviet
campaign in the West,” the document noted, such a move “will entail smaller political
costs than permitting Sakharov to act with impunity in the future or putting him on trial
for criminal activities.”222
221
Ibid., 200-4.
222
Ibid., 201-2.
125
While Brezhnev never acted on this proposal, Andropov once again denounced
the efforts of foreign governments to globalize the issue of Soviet human rights violations
in a Central Committee memorandum dated 30 March 1976. From his perspective, the
KGB had “always accounted for the fact that the special services of the imperialist
countries and the PRC [China] were trying as much as they can to use détente, and the
expanding international ties to step up their political, economic, and technological
intelligence [activities] against the Soviet Union.” These governments, he insisted, want
to “carry out hostile ideological subversive actions aimed at undermining the
international prestige of the USSR . . . [and] Soviet society.” In reference to dissident
attempts to draw international attention to their activities, he assured the Central
Committee that “attempts to unite anti-Soviet elements organizationally under the banner
of defense of ‘human rights’ in the USSR were frustrated.” He also indicated that their
efforts “to abuse the general principles of the Final Act . . . for hostile purposes were
compromised.”223
The creation of the Moscow Watch Group and the U.S. Helsinki Commission
gave Andropov little choice but to reexamine the domestic impact of the Final Act. On
15 November 1976, he wrote a memorandum that analyzed dissent’s evolution from the
creation of Initiative Group to Defend Human Rights in 1969 to the recent activities of
the Watch Group. He viewed this organization as yet another attempt to create an
“’internal opposition’” to the Soviet regime. After naming all the individuals in the
Watch Group, he noted how its members wanted to “create an international commission”
223
“KGB Annual Report for 1975,” 30 March 1976. Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB191/03-30-1976.pdf [27 July 2007].
126
designed to investigate Final Act violations. He also outlined how “the anti-social
elements” wanted private citizens “to establish similar informal control groups . . . [that]
could be united in an international committee in their countries.” Once again paying
close attention to Soviet citizens’ contacts with foreigners, he wrote that Yuri Orlov went
to the U.S. embassy in Moscow and asked a State Department officer to give the Watch
Group “official recognition.” He also warned the Central Committee that Orlov had
encouraged Americans to “use the information passed to them by the ‘group’ at the level
of governments and heads of states, including at the forthcoming Belgrade
conference.”224
The reports that Andropov sent to the Central Committee elucidate how the Soviet
government went about curbing dissent and weakening the influence of foreign antiSoviet propaganda. Consistent with the Brezhnev regime’s emphasis on strengthening
Soviet citizens’ ideological convictions and upholding “socialist legality,” he and his
subordinates emphasized how the KGB carried out “preventive-prophylactic” work
before it made arrests, which consisted of warning individuals about the illegality of their
activities and hinted at the possibility of arrest if such behavior did not cease. On 13
March 1976, Andropov bragged that about “20 thousand persons, who committed
politically harmful actions that did not contain a criminal intent, were subjected to
prophylactic work” during the following year.225 To cite a more specific example, on the
224
“KGB Memorandum to CC CPSU about the Hostile Actions of the So-Called Group for Assistance of
Implementation of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR,” 15 November 1976. Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB191/11-15-1976.pdf [28 June 2007].
225
“KGB Annual Report for 1975.”
127
same day that Orlov announced the formation of the Moscow Watch Group, KGB
officials threw him into a car and warned him that “nobody has the right to question the
Soviet government’s sincerity in signing and implementing the Helsinki Final Act.” The
authorities may have released him, but TASS issued a dispatch describing Orlov’s
conduct as illegal behavior designed to please foreigners who opposed the relaxation of
“international tensions” and “enemies of the Soviet Union.”226
In an attempt to prevent embarrassing reports about Soviet human rights from
reaching foreign audiences, the KGB disconnected the international phone lines of many
dissenters and confiscated a large number of letters they tried to send abroad. Soviet
authorities also censored the incoming mail of many dissidents and conducted searches of
their homes for illegal non-official publications. Furthermore, the Soviet government
carried out a “vitriolic” campaign against RFE/RL and managed to bar reporters from this
organization from attending the 1976 Winter Olympics in Montreal. In response to the
Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments, the KGB stepped up its efforts to harass and
intimidate Jews who had asked for emigration visas.227 Soviet newspapers also contained
articles written by Jews who had returned to the Soviet Union because of their
disillusionment with life in either Israel or the United States.228
226
Goldberg, The Final Act, 53.
227
CHRUR 22 (July-September 1976): 26-30. In particular, Soviet authorities continued to break up the
scientific seminars of refusenik scientists and refused to let these individuals to attend conferences in
Western countries. See Colin Shindler, Exit Visa: Détente, Human Rights, and the Jewish Emigration
Movement in the USSR (London: Bachman and Turner, 1978), 119-40, 142-3.
228
Shindler, Exit Visa,162-3; and CDSP 28, no. 6 (10 March 1976): 12. See also Nora Levin, The Jews in
the Soviet Union since 1917: Paradox of Survival, Volume II (New York: New York University Press,
1988), 691-729; CDSP 28, no. 47 (22 December 1976): 11-12; Ibid. 28, no. 45 (8 December 1976): 18.
128
The KGB also carried out operations beyond Soviet borders designed to discredit
the arguments of dissenters and the idea that the Soviet government violated human
rights.229 According to Christopher Andrews and Vasili Mitrokhin’s work The Sword
and Shield, Andropov approved a document entitled “Complex Operation Measures to
Expose the Political Background to Award the Nobel Peace Prize to Sakharov” on 22
November 1975. While not an exhaustive list, First Chief Directorate of the KGB
(foreign intelligence) received instructions to give “the Danish, Swedish, and Finnish
press” materials “hinting at his links with reactionary organizations financed by the CIA
and other Western special services.” These instructions also encouraged agents to have
Chilean émigrés produce and disseminate a telegram from the reactionary dictator
Augusto Pinochet congratulating Sakharov for winning the Nobel Prize. They even
called on agents to “inspire public statements by public personalities in the Arab
countries” that explained Sakharov’s award as a function of Zionists’ “decisive influence
on the Nobel Committee” and appreciation of his public statements in support of Jewish
“emigration from the Soviet Union.”230 Given the scope of these proposals, few should
be surprised that Andropov called Sakharov “Public Enemy Number One” during a
meeting of the KGB Collegium in 1976.231
Soviet newspapers also published articles emphasizing how Jewish culture thrived in the Soviet Union.
See Ibid. 28, no. 51 (19 January 1977): 7-8.
229
Mitrokhin and Andrew, The Sword and the Shield, 319, 558. By 1977, thirty-nine active operations of
the KGB were targeted against Sakharov. See Ibid., 549.
230
Mitrokhin and Andrew, The Sword and the Shield, 322-4. For a list of similar proposals, see Rubenstein
and Gribanov, ed., The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov, 190.
231
Ibid., 325.
129
Unhappy with the decision of the WCC to look into the issue of religious freedom
in the Soviet Union, the KGB carried out a campaign to smear the reputation of the West
Indian Methodist Dr. Philip Potter, who served as the group’s chairman. The report that
he authored on Final Act signatories’ respect for religious liberty failed to denounce the
Soviet Union in harsh terms. Not preoccupied with small details, the KGB flooded his
residence with angry letters “from Russian Orthodox clergy, Baptists and other Soviet
Christians, protesting . . . his alleged hostility towards them.” It even attempted “to
orchestrate public criticism of Potter by ‘prominent religious figures’ in Britain, Syria
and Lebanon.” Around the same time, Soviet officials published an English-language
book entitled Religion Under Socialism and produced a TV documentary in English
called Freedom of Religion in the USSR that defended their nation’s respect for religious
observers.232
To challenge the messages dissidents had begun to transmit across the globe in
the mid 1970s, the Soviet government announced the creation of the Rodina
(Motherland) Society in February 1976. This organization aimed at helping other official
groups such as the Soviet Society for Cultural Ties with Compatriots Abroad, the
newspaper Golos Rodiny (Voice of the Homeland), and the magazine Otchizna
(Motherland) shape the opinions of foreign citizens who traced their roots back to current
Soviet republics. As an Isvestia article reported, the Rodina Society strove to strengthen
“ties with primarily progressive émigrés from our country and give them an accurate and
clear account of the achievements of the Soviet people in developing their economy,
232
Ibid., 492-3.
130
culture, and science and in improving of the working people. Taken together with the
importance the Brezhnev regime attached to non-governmental organizations who
supported the official Soviet line, the Rodina Society stands out as a Soviet effort to
challenge transnational actors’ globalizing of the issue of Soviet human rights violations.
Perhaps as expected, the foreign intelligence arm of the KGB created a “Rodina
intelligence section” designed to use the Russian Orthodox Church’s foreign contacts for
agent recruitment purposes.233
Not satisfied with discrediting reports about Soviet violations both at home and
abroad, Soviet officials also attacked the human rights record of the United States
government. As they had done for some time, official publication criticized American
politician for their long-standing discrimination against Native Americans, African
Americans, and their consistent support for brutal right-wing dictatorships. Some
mentioned the illegality of how the FBI harassed Martin Luther King, Jr. during the civil
rights movement and conducted surveillance on millions of American citizens.234 The
foreign intelligence arm of the KGB in Copenhagen, Denmark prepared a booklet entitled
“America’s Two Hundred Years” aimed at discrediting the U.S. two-hundred year
anniversary in the eyes of Western Europeans. Distributed by “the fictitious Danish
organization ‘The European Bicentennial Committee,’” the booklet contained “lavishly
illustrated” drawings and photographs associating the United States with “the crimes of
233
234
CDSP 28, no. 1 (4 February 1976): 16; and Mitrokhin and Andrew, The Sword and the Shield, 498.
For example, see Peter Osnos, “Soviets Strike Back on Civil Rights Criticism,” New York Times, 25
November 1975, A12; and Christopher S. Wren, “Soviet Offers U.S. Rights Challenge,” New York Times,
4 September 1976, 16.
131
the white regimes in South Africa.” It also contained the letter of a “courageous young
Afro-American named General G. Baker” who opposed the American draft during the
Vietnam War on the grounds that U.S army only really cared about fighting against nonwhites interested in freeing themselves from capitalist domination.235
Beyond trying to weaken the international appeal of the United States, official
publications also focused on the Kremlin’s excellent Final Act compliance record. On
the whole, they emphasized how the Soviet government now allowed “multiple entry and
exit visas for accredited journalists” and had reduced the price of exit visas effective 1
January 1976. These publications also explained how the Soviets promoted extensive
cultural and scientific exchanges with other countries and agreed to the reunification of
many divided families.236 Some articles even praised the high level of religious freedom
that existed in Soviet Union.237
The Brezhnev regime also explained how many U.S. policies and laws failed to
live up to the ideals outlined in the Final Act. Authors often criticized the U.S.
government’s policy of denying entry visas to representatives of Soviet trade union
delegations and decision not to publish the entire text of the Helsinki Accords in
235
Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB
Foreign Operations, 1975-1985 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), 91-2.
236
Peter Osnos, “Moscow Moves to Put West on Defensive Over Helsinki,” Washington Post, 24 October
1976, 9; Christopher S. Wren, “Soviet Denounces Critics in the West,” New York Times, 2 October 1975, 7;
Ibid., “So Far, the Helsinki Accords Have Not Opened Soviet Doors,” New York Times, 22 February 1976,
E3; David Fouquet, “Kremlin Carrying Out Some Helsinki Pledges,” Washington Post, 14 January 1976,
A9; David K. Shipler, “Helsinki Accord and the Soviet Union: Effects on Human Rights Seem Mixed,”
New York Times, 1 August 1976, 3; Leonard H. Marks, “The Unfilled promises of Helsinki,” Washington
Post, 1 August 1976, 33; CDSP 28, no. 43 (24 November 1976): 27; Ibid., 28, no. 30 (25 August 1976): 1011; ibid., 28, no. 40 (3 November 1976): 3; ibid., 28, no. 26 (28 July 1976): 4-5.
237
CDSP 28, no. 5 (3 March 1976): 1-4. See also Ibid., 28, no. 7 (17 March 1976): 4-5; and ibid. 28, no.
23 (7 July 1976): 1.
132
American newspapers; they also complained about how Soviet and Eastern bloc countries
viewed and read far more Western literature and movies than vice versa. Furthermore,
Soviet publications emphasized how the Soviet Union had signed more international
human rights covenants and complained about the U.S. Helsinki Commission had no
right to judge Soviet domestic conduct. In a clear violation of the “spirit” of the Final
Act, the Brezhnev regime also accused Western countries, in particular the United States,
of attempting to inundate the Soviet public with “fascist and revenge-seeking works” that
exalted “racism and chauvinism, the cult of violence and pornography.”238
The Soviet government carried out measures across the globe to curb dissent and
discredit the very idea of Soviet human rights violations after the Helsinki Accords came
into existence. Yet, evidence suggests that concerns about international opinion
influenced the Brezhnev regime’s conduct from July 1975 until the end of 1976. The
Chronicle of Current Events “lists no arrest of a well-known dissident” from April 1975
to February 1977.239 The KGB may have continued to arrest and/or confine less wellknown dissidents in psychiatric hospitals during this time period, but the documented
dissident arrest rate began to decline in 1975. In fact, these arrest rates would not come
close to the levels of the early 1970s until 1979. Reflecting Brezhnev’s pragmatism,
238
CDSP 28, no. 26 (28 July 1976): 4; Ibid., 28, no. 21 (23 June 1976): 16; Peter Osnos, “Soviets Strike
Back on Civil Rights Criticism,” Washington Post, 25 November 1975, A12; Ibid., “Soviets Hit Back at
West,” Washington Post, 19 February 1976, 14; Christopher Wren, “Soviets Offer U.S. Rights Challenge,”
New York Times, 4 September 1975, 16; N.A., “Soviets Rebut Party Critics,” Washington Post, 21
February 1976, A10; N.A, “Soviets Rebuffs Criticisms of Human Rights Stand,” 21 February 1976, New
York Times, 51; David K. Shipler, “Soviet Official Affirms Ideological Curbs on Import of Western
Publications,” New York Times, 28 September 1975, 23.
239
Edward Kline, “The Helsinki Process: A Balance Sheet,” in Allan Wynn, ed., The Fifth International
Sakharov Hearing: Proceedings (London: Andre Deutsch, 1986), 183.
133
Soviet authorities also began permitting more dissenters such as Andre Amalrik to
emigrate from the Soviet Union and once again allowed Jewish emigration levels to
increase after a step curtailment in 1975.240 During his private conversations with Jimmy
Carter’s unofficial representative Averell Harriman on 8 December 1976, Brezhnev
called many Jews who wanted to leave the Soviet Union “arrogant troublemakers.” Yet,
in the same breath, he insisted that further Jewish “emigration could be facilitated
through more trade.”241
Even more telling, the practice of using the Soviet criminal code to take away
children from religious parents began to decline in 1975, although “[c]ourt decisions
made prior to 1 August 1975 on deprivation of parental rights” remained legally binding.
When Sakharov threatened to “abjure the titles of three times Hero of Socialist labor,
“Laureate of Lenin,” and other “State Prizes” unless his wife received permission to go
abroad for medical treatment on the same day that nations planned to sign the Final Act,
Andropov hesitated. He believed that Bonner had only made this a request at the behest
of foreign intelligence services. After internal deliberations, he voiced his approval of
the Central Committee’s decision to grant her permission on the grounds that such a
move allowed the USSR to “abort the hostile action arranged by Sakharov.”242
240
See also Reddaway, “Soviet Policies on Dissent and Emigration,” 7-12.
241
“Memorandum of Conversation: W. Averell Harriman and Leonid Brezhnev,” 8 December 1976,
Global Competition and Deterioration of U.S. Soviet Relations, IV-261.
242
CHRUR 22 (July-September 1976): 46-7; and “Andropov to the Central Committee; Sakharov's
reaction to permission for Bonner to go to Italy,” 21 July 1975. Available [Online]:
http://www.yale.edu/annals/sakharov/documents_frames/Sakharov_099.htm [19 July 2006].
134
Although concerns about international public opinion influenced the Brezhnev
regime’s conduct, we have every reason to believe that many Soviet officials viewed their
government’s efforts to curb dissent and preserve its global prestige as proper and
effective measures. Behind closed doors, Andropov bragged about how the number of
Soviet citizens sentenced under Article 70 (anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda) from
1967 to 1974 almost equaled the number of individuals sentenced under the same
provision in 1959, a year of supposed “liberalization.”243 He also described how the
number of authors who produced illegal literature in 1975 declined twenty-four percent in
comparison to the previous year. When comparing the same two years, he wrote that
“the number of individuals distributing anti-Soviet anonymous documents containing
terrorist threats directed at party leaders and the Soviet government was reduced twofold
[41.4%] [48 instances in 1975 versus 82 in 1974].”244 He attributed these numbers to the
“further strengthening of the moral and political unity of Soviet society, the Soviet
people’s dedication to the cause of socialism, and the decisive disruption of anti-Soviet
actions by hostile elements.” He also applauded how “measures” such as “stripping
certain persons of their Soviet citizenship and exiling them abroad . . . have proven to be
effective. . . . and [have] helped improve the situation.”245
243
“KGB Memorandum to the CC CPSU, ‘About Some Results of the Preventive-Prophylactic Work of the
State Security Organs,’”31 October 1975. Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB191/KGB%2010-31-1975.pdf [24 July 2007].
244
“Memo from Andropov to CC of CPSU, ‘On the Results of Search for Authors of Anti-Soviet
Anonymous Documents in 1975,’” 13 March 1976.
245
“KGB Memorandum to the CC CPSU, ‘About Some Results of the Preventive-Prophylactic Work of the
State Security Organs,’" 31 October 1975.
135
This analysis deserves attention because official publications and messages
tailored for Western audiences often advanced similar arguments. In a 1976 interview
published in Moscow and printed in English, a Soviet legal official pointed out that
“since the war [World War II] the annual number of convictions in this country has
declined by half.” He also defended the prosecution of a dissenter on the grounds that
“he was prosecuted for homosexualism, which under our laws is a punishable offense.”246
During his interview with a French journalist, Zivs reiterated the predictable line that the
Soviet government cracked down on non-official demonstrations because “Soviet public
opinion strongly supported” such a policy. When he received a question about the
putting the Ukrainian dissenter Leonid Plyushch in a psychiatric institution, Zivs insisted
on the legality of the practice, pointing out that “[t]he diagnosis in question was
conceived not by Soviet psychiatrists but by a famous Austrian psychiatrist at the turn of
the century.” “And as a matter of fact,” he remarked, “it is insane to want to reform
everything: the family, traffic, everything you can think of. It is a sure sign of
madness.”247
After trading the dissenter Vladimir Bukovsky for a Chilean communist political
prisoner in 1976, Soviet newspapers chose not to acknowledge this exchange. Instead,
they ignored this dissenter’s support for non-violent political protest and focused on his
close connections to the fascist émigré organization NTS and “other Western subversive
centers.” When he was not in prison, one article observes, Bukovsky wanted “’to choose
246
N.A.,“Human Rights in the Soviet Union,” 14, 18.
247
CHRUR 23-4 (October-December 1976): 22-3.
136
people who are ready to fight Communists, teach them how to shoot, divide them up into
groups of five and combine them in assault detachments.” Consistent with this sort of
analysis, another official publication later emphasized how “[i]t is only a small step from
participation in Operation human rights to terrorism.”248
Because orthodox Soviet bureaucrats worried about the international prestige of
Soviet-style socialism, the Kremlin paid close attention to the rhetoric of Carter and Ford
during the 1976 U.S. presidential campaign. During his private conversations with
Harriman, Brezhnev complained about how Carter “belittled Soviet-American relations”
and argued that “only the Soviet Union benefited from détente.” He also criticized
Carter’s calls for “interference” in Soviet internal affairs and his strange mixture of hardline rhetoric and calls for more extensive cooperation.249 Brezhnev even told Harriman to
tell Carter that Soviet leaders did not share his understanding of the Helsinki Accords.
Soviet officials must have read the statement that Carter had issued during the
Democratic Convention outlining the need for all signatories to follow the provisions of
the Final Act. An article in Pravda dated 18 July of the same year accused the
248
CDSP 28, no. 52 (26 January 1977): 3; Yakovlev, CIA Target, 209. See also CDSP 18, no. 44 (1
December 1976): 1-4. The USSR took particular interest in the activities of NTS (People’s Labor
Alliance), a émigré organization based in Paris. An official Soviet publication not only remarked how
members of this group “were among the jailers in the Nazi mass extermination camps,” but also blamed the
NTS-CIA alliance for various dissenters’ close identification with Nazi ideology. See Yakovlev, CIA
Target, 162, 140-229. See also Goldberg, The Final Act, 166; Sukharev, “Human Rights in the Soviet
Union,” 19.
249
W. Averell Harriman to Mr. Tony Lake, “Brezhnev Comments on US-USSR relations, Carter
administration,” 2 December 1976, Global Competition and Deterioration of U.S. Soviet Relations, IV-257;
and Memorandum, W. Averell Harriman to Alex. R. Selith,” Ibid., IV-259.
137
presidential-hopeful of “attempting to please the extreme right wing of reaction and the
Zionists.”250
The overall thrust of Brezhnev’s private and public remarks in 1976 and early
1977 indicate that he had no intention of testing “Carter right away” and preferred the
continuation of Kissinger-style détente with the United States.251 At the same time, the
Soviet authorities appear to have toyed with the idea of undertaking a “new offensive
against those persons who collect news and inform world public opinion about human
rights violations in the USSR.”252 If true, the fact that Moscow contemplated such a
course of action goes a long way in explaining why human rights became a visible and
contentious issue in U.S.-Soviet relations during the next four years. Even if Carter
chose not to press Soviet leaders on the subject of Final Act violations before assuming
office, he had voiced his intention to support dissenters and make human rights an
important aspect of U.S. foreign policy.253 Given the importance they placed on
250
CDSP 28, no. 29 (18 August 1976): 17. An article dated 9 October 1976 pointed out that “Jimmy
Carter, who is trying for tactical reasons to get away from his reputation as a liberal, “’sounded almost like
Reagan’” on a number of occasions.” See CDSP 28, no. 41 (10 November 1976): 1.
251
W. Averell Harriman to Mr. Tony Lake, “Brezhnev Comments on US-USSR relations, Carter
administration,” IV-257; Brezhnev, Peace, Détente, and Soviet-American Relations, 147-54; and CHRUR
25 (January March 1977): 47.
252
According to an article in the CCE, an official Soviet spokesman who attended “a closed, high-level
briefing for editors” on how the government would now handle dissent explained that “firmness be shown
and the dissidents silenced. It has been decided to imprison the 50 most active dissidents (probably mainly
Helsinki monitors) and deal severely with their associates. It is time to show strength and not pay attention
to the West. . . . The Soviet Union showed its good will by signing the Helsinki Agreement.” This quote is
taken from Reddaway, “Soviet Policies on Dissent and Emigration,” 9.
253
See “Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin’s Conversation with Averell Harriman, December 1, 1976,” in The
Path to Disagreement: U.S.-Soviet Communications Leading to Vance’s March 1977 Trip to Moscow, Cold
War International History Project. Available [Online]: http://cwihp.si.edu [6 February 2004]. See also
Global Competition and Deterioration of U.S. Soviet Relations, (IV) 188-265.
138
preserving the internal and ideological cohesion of their multinational, multiethnic
empire, Soviet leaders could only have sensed trouble ahead when Carter sent a letter of
support to Vladimir Slepak on 22 December 1976. They also must have winced when his
Secretary of State-designate Cyrus Vance held a private meeting with the exiled dissenter
Andrei Amalrik, who once again urged the United States to do more “to encourage
democratization in the Soviet Union.”254
254
Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 629.
139
CHAPTER 4: THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WIELDS THE HUMAN RIGHTS
WEAPON, JANUARY 1977-AUGUST1978
The support that Carter showed for dissenters after winning the 1976 election
could not help but raise questions about the role human rights would play in U.S.-Soviet
relations once he entered office. Even though his subordinates had not devoted
significant attention to this issue during the transition period, he appeared to give an
answer during his inaugural address. Drawing on his close identification with the
concept of “idealpolitik,” he told the audience how “our commitment to human rights
must be absolute, our laws fair, our natural beauty preserved; the powerful must not
persecute the weak, and human dignity must be enhanced.”255 A few hours later, the
USIA reinforced this message. It transmitted a short speech across the globe in which
Carter assured other nations of his commitment to “human rights, self determination, and
nonintervention.”256
These words proved as unfortunate as they were unnecessary. By choosing not to
admit the compromises necessary to further the cause of ideals, Carter ended up inviting
accusations of weakness when he compromised on human rights issues to accomplish
other important foreign objectives. They also obscured the reality that he had never made
an “absolute” commitment to promoting human rights in the Soviet Union at any point
255
“Inaugural Address.” Available [Online] http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=6575 [20
November 2007]. For an account of how members of the Carter administration did not pay particular
attention to human rights issues before the inauguration, see Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade, 7. See
also Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin’s Conversation with Averell Harriman, December 1, 1976,” in The Path to
Disagreement: U.S.-Soviet Communications Leading to Vance’s March 1977 Trip to Moscow, Cold War
International History Project. Available [Online]: http://cwihp.si.edu [6 February 2004]
256
Schmitz and Walker, “Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights,” 119.
140
during his presidential campaign. When Carter assumed power, he actually made human
rights promotion an important element of an approach to U.S.-Soviet relations best
defined as “reciprocal accommodation.”
The main goal of this strategy involved creating an international environment in
which Soviet leaders would have little choice but to accept the need to respect the basic
human freedoms of their citizens and work with the United States to solve important
global problems. This policy meant that the Carter administration made a conscious
effort to balance the competing objectives of highlighting Soviet human rights violations
within the framework of a universal campaign, acknowledging the plight of dissenters,
and forging cooperative links with the Kremlin. Since the Brezhnev regime could not
ignore the growing international appeal of human rights forever, Carter and other
officials often chose to use to careful, calibrated public and private acts to show
American displeasure with Soviet domestic abuses. From their perspective, such a
strategy provided a way for the U.S. government to show its displeasure with Soviet
internal behavior without foreclosing the possibility of a “reciprocal accommodation”
taking place over the long term.
Analyzing the steps that the Carter administration took to promote human rights
in the Soviet Union through the prism of “reciprocal accommodation” has a number of
advantages. It provides a useful way to critique Carter’s conduct without falling victim
to the familiar argument that he became less willing to challenge Soviet internal behavior
after his first few months in office. It also reveals the shortcomings of gauging the
administration’s commitment to promoting human rights in the Soviet Union as a
141
function of Carter’s public rhetoric on the subject. Furthermore, this approach provides a
useful way of showing how transnational human rights activities influenced and became
an important part of the administration’s efforts to challenge Soviet internal behavior.
While political calculations were never absent, Carter and other officials came to
appreciate how NGOs and the U.S. Helsinki Commission provided up-to-date
information about the internal conditions of individual countries. Others liked how
private citizens challenged the bureaucratic discretion of State Department members who
preferred to keep the issue of human rights behind closed doors. Just as important, many
officials encouraged and supported non-governmental human rights activities because
they believed that private citizens had a crucial role to play in creating an international
environment that challenged the legitimacy of systematic human rights violators like the
Soviet Union.
“Reciprocal Accommodation” and the Carter Administration’s Efforts to Promote
Human Rights in the Soviet Union
After he entered office, Carter picked an upper-echelon foreign policy team
whose collective views reflected his preference for carrying out a universal human rights
campaign and forging a more “reciprocal” détente with the Soviet Union. While
important commonalities existed among these individuals, each of them tended to
privilege certain courses of action over others. Unhappy with the conservative nature of
Kissinger-style détente, Brzezinski and members of the National Security Council
identified with how the issue of human rights gave the United States an effective way of
engaging in peaceful ideological competition with communist countries. In contrast to
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Carter, he also worried more about the spread of
142
communism in less developed countries and the negative global consequences of
projecting a weak American image vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.257
Dissatisfied with the “reflexive” anti-communism of U.S. leaders, State
Department officials such as Assistant Secretary for Human Rights Patricia Derian placed
greater importance on disassociating the United States from authoritarian allies than
engaging in ideological competition with communist countries. They also stressed the
need of the United States to sign international human right covenants and begin the
process of making American domestic laws more consistent with international standards.
While Vance would have preferred to promote human rights in the Soviet Union through
“quiet diplomacy,” Derian went out of her way to advance the argument that individuals
facing government repression in communist and non-communist countries deserved the
vocal support of the U.S. government. She found such a policy appropriate because
“human rights violations do not really have much to do with the form of government or . .
. political philosophy.”258
257
See Zbigniew Brzezinski, “America in a Hostile World,” Foreign Policy 23 (Summer 1976): 65-96; and
G.R. Urban, ed., Détente (New York: Universe Books, 1976), 270-80. This idea also comes through in the
interviews Brzezinski gave during his first two years as National Security Advisor. See “Face the Nation
as Broadcast over the CBS Television Network,” 30 October 1977 6-12, National Security Affairs—
Brzezinski Materials (NSABM), Box 2, Folder: Brzezinski Interviews: 10/77-4/78, JCPL; “CTV Reports,”
10-17, Ibid; “United States Information Agency Television Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, 7-15, Ibid;
“Summer Semester,” 7-13, Ibid.; and “Meet the Press,” 13-15, Ibid. During his stint as National Security
Advisor, Brzezinski appointed staffers such as William Odom, Paul Henze, and Samuel Huntington who
shared his view that promoting human rights could serve “as an important instrument for promoting
internal change within the Soviet Union and its East European satellites.” See Njolstad, Peacemaker and
Troublemaker, 244; and Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade, 15.
258
Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York, Simon and
Schuster, 1983), 46. Because Vance favored reinforcing Soviet leaders’ sense of equality with the United
States, he appointed Marshall Shulman as Chief Advisor to the State Department on Soviet affairs. See The
Collapse of Détente: From March 1977 Moscow Meetings to the December 1979 Invasion of
Afghanistan—The Launch of The Carter-Brezhnev Project: A Conference of U.S and Russian
Policymakers and Scholars Held at the “Playhouse” on the Rockefeller Estate, Pocantico Hills, New York,
22-24 October 1992, NSA, 46. For Derian’s quote see Paula J. Dobriansky, “Human Rights and U.S.
143
Whatever differences the members of Carter’s foreign policy team may have had
with each other, they found common ground in the “reciprocal accommodation” approach
to U.S.-Soviet relations. The best description of this strategy comes from an internal
memorandum that Brzezinski sent to Carter on 28 December 1978. According to this
document, whose contents Carter analyzed, the administration’s “reciprocal
accommodation policy” consisted of four main pillars: “ 1) containment; 2) resistance to
indirect expansion; 3) ideological competition; 4) and the creation of a framework within
which [Brzezinski’s italics] the Soviet Union can accommodate with us, or face the
prospect of isolating itself globally.”259
The ways in which Brzezinski linked the third and fourth pillars go a long way in
explaining how human rights fit into the administration’s overall approach to U.S.-Soviet
relations. By tapping “the global yearning for human rights,” he told Carter, you have
forged a policy that “provides an effective response to Soviet ideology” and “increases
the moral appeal of the United States.” As a result of the “diversification of power” that
had taken place since World War II, the promotion of human rights put pressure on
Foreign Policy,” The Washington Quarterly (Spring 1989): 160. See Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade,
11-16; and Victor S. Kaufman, “The Bureau of Human Rights during the Carter Administration,” The
Historian 61, no. 1 (1998): 50-66.
259
See also Memo, Zbiginew Brzezinski (ZB) to Jimmy Carter (JC), “Weekly Report #83,” 28 December
1978, 1-2, Brzezinski Materials (BM), Box 42, Folder: Weekly Reports, 82-90, JCPL. Some scholars have
accused Jimmy Carter of assembling a foreign policy team with a “’McGovernite’ or ‘left-liberal’
worldview . . . whose human rights passions were focused on the depredations of rightist regimes.” The
charge of a “left-liberal” bias has significant merit, in particular among lower-ranking officials in the State
Department’s Human Rights Bureau. Yet, as this chapter will help show, the growing importance that the
American public attached to human rights and the lobbying efforts of transnational human rights actors
made it difficult for administration officials to downplay or ignore the issue of Soviet human rights
violations whatever their policy preferences might have been. See Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade, 14.
See also Vladislav Zubok, “An Offered Hand Rejected? The Carter Administration and the Vance Mission
to Moscow in March 1977,” in Alexej Ugrinsky, ed., Jimmy Carter: Foreign Policy and Post-Presidential
Years (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994), 357-368
144
Soviet leaders to change their domestic behavior in recognition of international realities.
This situation gave the U.S. government the luxury of using a mixture of carrots and
sticks to challenge Soviet internal repression without relinquishing the goal of forging
more cooperative links with Moscow.260
The collective appeal of this vision meant that the administration’s efforts to
promote human rights in the Soviet Union within the confines of a universal human rights
campaign consisted of three distinct, but often overlapping strands of behavior. The first
consisted of the most visible manifestations of the government’s efforts to engage in
peaceful ideological competition such as strengthening the ability of U.S. radios to reach
audiences in Eastern Europe. It also included behind-the-scene debates between Soviet
and American officials concerning the topic of human rights violations. The second grew
out of the close link that Carter and other officials saw between the task of promoting
human rights across the globe and domestic reform. To make the United States a more
credible and legitimate human rights model, Carter signed several international human
rights covenants and made some attempts to change U.S. laws that conflicted with either
international standards and/or the Final Act. The final strand involved the ways in which
transnational human rights actors both worked with and became an important element in
the Carter administration’s approach to challenging the international legitimacy of Soviet
internal behavior.
Promoting Human Rights in the Soviet Union: Ideological Competition,
International Law, Domestic Reform, and the Final Act
260
Memo, ZB to JC, “Weekly Report #83,” 4.
145
Carter’s preference for a universal human rights campaign and “reciprocal
accommodation” surfaced early in his presidency. On 26 January, he approved
Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM)-17, which called on the State Department to
chair a study that grappled with the question of how American foreign policy “could
reflect a higher and more effective level of concern for fundamental human rights in all
nations.” The first private letter he sent to Brezhnev on the same day explained his goal
of improving “relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of reciprocity, mutual respect
and advantage.” “The most important first step” in this process, he wrote, “must be the
urgent achievement of an agreement on the second stage strategic weapons limitation
[SALT II].”261 After outlining other areas where the Soviet Union and the United States
could work together to promote peace, he reminded Brezhnev that:
[W]e cannot be indifferent to the fate of freedom and individual human rights.
We represent different social systems, and our countries differ from each other in
their history and experience. A competition of ideals is inevitable between our
societies. Yet this must not interfere with common efforts towards formation of a
more peaceful, just and humane world.262
Events soon tested Carter’s commitment to these positions. On 21 January, he
received a letter from Andrei Sakharov that also appeared in The New York Times urging
him “to defend those who suffer because of their unviolent [sic] struggle.” A short time
261
“Carter’s Letter to Brezhnev,” January 26, 1977 in The Path to Disagreement: U.S.-Soviet
Communications Leading to Vance’s March 1977 Trip to Moscow, Cold War International History Project.
Available [Online]: http://cwihp.si.edu [6 February 2004]. In February 1977, Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance issued a memorandum for all his assistant secretaries insisting that “the Department of State must
help implement” the President’s goal of making human rights an integral part of U.S. foreign policy.” See
“Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 17,” 3. Available [Online]:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/prm/prm17.pdf [18 August 2007]; “Memorandum for All Assistant
Secretaries of State,” N.D., NSABM, Box 28, Folder: 2-4/77, JCPL; and “Guidelines for US Foreign Policy
for Human Rights,” Ibid.
262
“Carter’s Letter to Brezhnev,” 26 January 1977.
146
later, Soviet authorities expelled an American correspondent from Moscow and arrested
the Helsinki Monitors Alexander Ginsburg and Yuri Orlov. They next proceeded to
arrest Anatoly Shcharansky, a well-known defender of Jewish emigration rights, and
several members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group on 15 March. The Kremlin justified
most of these arrests on the grounds that monitoring Soviet compliance with the Final Act
violated Article 70 of Russian criminal code (anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda). It
chose to connect Shcharansky to the CIA and charged him with espionage under Article
64.263
The administration’s response to Sakharov’s letter only produced confusion.
Without consulting either Carter or Vance, State Department officials issued a statement
warning the Soviet authorities that “any attempt to intimidate Mr. Sakharov will not
silence legitimate criticism in the Soviet Union.” When asked about this statement on 30
January, Carter responded that any comment on the Soviet treatment of Sakharov “should
have been said by myself or Secretary Vance.”264 He may have confirmed that the State
Department’s words represented his views, but many observers thought he had vacillated
on supporting dissenters, including Sakharov.265 Because Carter had criticized the Ford
administration for not meeting with Alexander Solzhenitsyn, he had little choice but to
send this dissenter a reply. After careful deliberation, Carter sent a personal letter to
263
Fitzpatrick, The Moscow Helsinki Monitors, 22; Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents, 246-7; and Goldberg,
The Final Act, 258-66. See also Hawkesworth, “Ideological Immunity.”
264
265
Andrei Sakharov, Memoirs (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 465.
Ibid., 465; and Strong, Working in the World, 75. See also Hodgman, “Détente and the Dissidents,”
256-60.
147
Sakharov that referred to “human rights” as “a central concern of my administration” and
reiterated his determination to win the release of political prisoners all over the world266
The confusion surrounding the administration’s response to the Sakharov letter
should not obscure Carter’s determination to assert the U.S. right to challenge Soviet
internal behavior. During his first few weeks in office, Carter read telegrams from the
U.S. embassy in Moscow explaining how Soviet leaders equated dissent with ideological
subversion. In spite of these warnings, Carter told Dobrynin in a private meeting on 1
February that the United States would not “back down on” its human rights campaign. A
few days later, Vance presented the Soviet ambassador with a list of divided families and
private citizens who had not yet received permission to emigrate. 267 During these
discussions, Vance warned him that the U.S. government “would have to speak out
publicly to condemn Soviet behavior” if Ginsburg were not released. He also indicated
that the United States would force “a member of the TAS [sic] Washington staff” to leave
the country within a week unless the Soviet government reversed its decision to expel an
American journalist for meeting with dissidents. When the Soviet government failed to
266
“Letter to Andre Sakharov, by Carter.” Available [Online]:
http://america.eb.com/america/article?eu=413245 [10 January 2004]. See also “A Letter to a Friend,”
Time, 28 February 1977, 30-1. See also Department of State Telegrams to Moscow Embassy and Moscow
Telegrams to Department of State, Subject: Sakharov Letter, BM, Box 78, Folder: 3/77, JCPL.
267
For example, see Telegram, Moscow Embassy to State Department,” February 1977, BM, Box 78,
Folder: 3/77, JCPL; Ibid., June 77, Ibid., Folder: 6/77, Ibid.; Ibid., March 1977, Ibid., Folder: 3/77; Ibid.,
May 1977, Ibid., Folder: 4-5/1977. In one dispatch, U.S. Ambassador Al Toon reported that Soviets
considered Carter’s rhetorical support of dissenters as tantamount to their support of the “Weathermen in
the USA.” Telegram, Moscow Embassy to President,” February 1977, BM, Box 78, Folder: 3/77, JCPL.
See also “US Government Initiatives on behalf of Human Rights in the USSR, 1.
148
heed Vance’s warnings, Carter voiced his concern about Ginsburg during a press
conference on 10 February and later expelled a Soviet journalist from Washington.268
The Soviet émigré Vladimir Bukovsky also forced Carter to confront the issue of
Soviet human rights violations. During an appearance on the television show 60 Minutes,
he reiterated his strong desire to speak with the President about internal conditions in the
USSR. After this event took place, officials engaged in a spirited internal debate about
the appropriateness of holding such a meeting. Worried about offending Soviet
sensibilities, Press Secretary Jody Powell suggested that Vice President Mondale rather
than Carter meet with Bukovsky. Powell even suggested that the President tell the
Soviets in private that his human rights campaign only aimed at building “domestic
political support for initiatives in arms control and for détente in general.” Carter refused
to mollify Soviet sensibilities by adopting such a cynical position. Instead, he and
Mondale held a private meeting with Bukovsky without offering the Soviets any
explanation other than the U.S. government’s general concern for human rights and
sympathy for individuals whose governments had mistreated them.269
Carter used public forums to defend this sort of behavior. In response to a
reporter’s question about his personal reply to Sakharov, he insisted that the United States
268
Telegram, State Department to Moscow Embassy, February 1977, BM, Box 78, Folder: 3/77, JCPL; and
JC to Cyrus Vance (CV), 7 February 1977, White House Central Files (WHCF), HU-Box 1, Folder:
1/20/77-1/20-81; and Public Papers of the President of the United States (PPOP), 1977, Volume I
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977), 99-100.
269
It appears that Carter agreed Brzezinski’s reaction to the Powell memorandum: “In my view, this
smacks of cynicism and weakness.” See Memo, Jody Powell to JC, 21 February 1977, BM, Box 78,
Folder: 3/77. Brzezinski later received a memorandum outlining the positions Bukovsky outlined for
Assistant Secretary James Lowenstein on 8 February. “Vladimir Bukovsky’s Meeting with the Vice
President Mondale,” 25 February 1977, WHCF, C0-165, Folder: 3/1/77-3/15/77, JCPL. For an excellent
treatment of this episode, see Njolstad, Peacemaker and Troublemaker, 232.
149
had “a responsibility and legal right to express our disapproval of violations of human
rights” because “[w]e are a signatory of the Helsinki agreement,” whose third basket
“ensures that some of the human rights shall be preserved.” One month later, he told a
reporter that “there is an ideological struggle that has been in progress for decades
between the Communist nations on the one hand and the democratic nations on the
other.” “Mr. Brezhnev and his predecessors,” he continued, “have never refrained from
expressing their point of view when they disagreed with some aspect of social or political
life in the free world.” Given such behavior, Carter argued that his administration had “a
right to speak out openly when we have a concern about human rights wherever those
abuses occur.”270
Along with defending his statements about Soviet human rights abuses, Carter
took steps to strengthen the ability of the United States to engage in peaceful ideological
competition with the Soviet Union. In March, he announced that Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America needed sixteen additional 250-kilowatt
transmitters for broadcasts to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Discounting the
objections of the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, he defended the modernization of
U.S. radios on the grounds that Western broadcasts had become “a vital part of the lives
of the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.”271
270
“President’s News Conference,” 23 February 1977. Available [Online]:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=6887&st=&st1= [16 August 2006]; and “President’s
News Conference,” 24 March 1977. Available [Online]:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7229&st=&st1= [18 August 2006].
271
“Memorandum for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski,” 29 July 1977, BM, Box 9, Folder: 2-12/77; Memo, Paul
B. Henze (PH) to William Hyland, “RFE/RL Transmitter Modernization—Instructions to Ambassador
Stoessel,” Ibid. See also The Department of State Bulletin, 25 April 1977, 423. The Board of International
150
Even more telling than his support for U.S. international broadcasting, Carter
approved several of Brzezinski’s proposals for covert propaganda actions inside the
Soviet Union, as well as Western and Eastern Europe. These activities included: (1) the
clandestine distribution of Soviet dissident literature inside the Soviet Union; (2) an
enhanced book publishing program involving subsidies of East European-oriented
journals with distribution in cultural centers in Eastern Europe; (3) a minorities program
aimed at infiltrating written materials focused on the culture and conditions of diverse
ethnic regions of the USSR; and (4) support to groups in Western Europe promoting
Soviet observance of human rights and democracy “through press articles and other
means.”272
The measures that Carter approved were not put into effect as planned. The State
Department prevented the implementation of the minorities program and bureaucratic
infighting “whittled down” the other proposals. Despite these setbacks, the
administration significantly increased “the quantity of dissident and Western information
Broadcasting, which oversaw the operations of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Voice of America
argued that U.S. broadcasting to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union showed America’s commitment to
“the Helsinki provisions” calling for “freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds.” It also
noted that this type of broadcasting helped promote “democratic ideas.” See Board of International
Broadcasting, Fourth Annual Report, 1978 (Washington, D.C., 1978), 40 and 43. Although some have
argued that Carter only saw Western broadcasts to the Soviet Union as a way to promote Soviet-American
dialogue, he never objected to Radio Liberty’s consistent broadcasting of samizdat literature. See Gene
Sosin, Sparks of Liberty: An Insider’s Memoir of Radio Liberty (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State
University, 1999), 173, 187-9, 191; and Michael Nelson, War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western
Broadcasting in the Cold War (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 138, 141, 146, 163. James
L. Tyson argued that the Carter administration curbed potentially subversive radio broadcasting. He does
not appear to have examined the actual content of Radio Liberty’s broadcasts or dissidents’ strong support
for such broadcasting. See James L. Tyson, U.S. International Broadcasting and National Security (New
York: Ramapo Press, 1983), 68.
272
Gates, From the Shadows, 91-4.
151
and literature smuggled into Eastern Europe and the USSR.”273 On 18 December 1978,
National Security Council staffer Paul B. Henze informed Brzezinski that the
administration-approved efforts of the CIA “to publish and send more indigenouslanguage material into the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe” had proven successful.
When explaining the success of these programs, Henze outlined the important role
private citizens played, noting that they now produced more publications that the CIA
could distribute in their countries than they had ten to fifteen years earlier.274
Before moving ahead, we need to keep in mind that Carter’s preference for a
“reciprocal accommodation” and desire to carry out a universal human rights campaign
shaped how he described his efforts to promote human rights in the Soviet Union. On
several occasions, he tried to reassure Brezhnev that his support of dissenters sprang from
his strong commitment to carrying out a universal human rights campaign rather than
desire to single out the Soviet Union.275 In his second private letter to the General
Secretary, he reiterated his determination to hold the Soviet Government accountable for
its internal behavior, but then added: “We do not wish to create problems with the Soviet
Union, but it will be necessary for our Administration from time to time to publicly
express the sincere and deep feelings which our people and I feel.276
273
Ibid.
274
Memorandum from PH to ZB, “CIA Report on Results of Stepped-Up Publishing and Distribution
Effort to USSR & Eastern Europe,” 18 December 1978, National Security Affairs (Horn/Special), Box 3,
Folder: 12/78, JCPL.
275
276
For example, see PPOP, 1977, Volume I, 503.
“Carter’s Letter to Brezhnev,” 14 February 1977 in The Path to Disagreement: U.S.-Soviet
Communications Leading to Vance’s March 1977 Trip to Moscow, Cold War International History Project.
152
On the eve of Bukovsky’s visit to the White House, Brzezinski warned Carter not
to lose sight of his overall approach to U.S.-Soviet relations. The preoccupation of the
international and domestic media, he lamented, inevitably raises the “question of whether
you are right or wrong in commenting directly on the issue of Soviet” human rights
violations. The visibility of this concern only complicates our efforts “stimulate a serious
discussion on the central and concrete issues in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.” To steer
his approach to Soviet relations in the right direction, Brzezinksi urged the President to
deliver “a broadly gauged statement to the effect” that the U.S. government’s human
rights policy “is based on principle and that our concerns are applicable to all nations”
and did not just consist of “anti-Soviet tactics.”277
These words resonated with Carter. During a speech he delivered to the United
Nations on 17 March, he reiterated the U.S. commitment to carrying out a universal
human rights campaign and forging a more cooperative international framework.278
Following the advice of the NSC staffer Jessica Tuchman, Carter attempted to strengthen
the legitimacy of the U.S. human rights criticisms. Confident that American behavior
could both withstand and benefit from more international scrutiny, he pledged to seek the
Available [Online]: http://cwihp.si.edu [6 February 2004]. Vance confirmed Carter’s position on more than
one occasion. See “Vance: We Will Speak Out,” U.S. News and World Report,” 14 March 1977, 18-9; and
The Department of State Bulletin, 25 April 1977, 391.
277
Memo, ZB to JC, “Weekly National Security Report,” 19 February 1977, 1-2, BM, Box 41, Folder:
Weekly Reports, 1-15, JCPL
278
“United Nations—Address before the General Assembly.” Available [Online]:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7183&st=&st1= [5 August 2006]. Deputy Secretary
Anthony Lake’s six-month review of the Carter administration’s human rights policy stressed the
importance of strengthening international human rights institutions. See Memo, Anthony Lake to CV,
“The Human Rights Policy: An Interim Assessment,” N.D., 20, WHCF, Box: HU-1, Folder: 1/20/771/20/81, JCPL. See also Hodgman, “Détente and the Dissidents,” 260-4.
153
ratification of four international human rights covenants, including Civil and Political
Rights (CAPR) and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ESACR). Carter also
expressed his regret that world had “allowed its [United Nations'] human rights
machinery to either be “ignored” or “politicized.” To rectify this development, he called
on the U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) “to meet more often” and urged all
nations to extend the body their “fullest cooperation.” He also called for the United
Nations Human Rights Division to move from Geneva to New York so “the attention of
the press corps can stimulate us to deal honestly with this sensitive issue.”279
Some of the ways that Carter and other officials defended the goal of
strengthening international human rights institutions stand out as quite naïve in
retrospect. For example, Tuchman endorsed the goal of creating a U.N. Human Rights
Commissioner on the grounds that such a move might one day create an “apolitical
forum” capable of responding to a diverse “array of human sufferings.” Another
document described how working through multilateral institutions mitigated the chances
that the United States would “come into direct confrontation with the” country accused of
domestic misconduct.280
279
“United Nations—Address before the General Assembly.” See also Memo, Jessica Tuchman (JT) to
ZB, “Human Rights Proposal,” 18 February 1977, 1-2, NSABM, Box 28, Folder: 2-4/77, JCPL. Carter
remained committed to the concept of strengthening international human rights institutions and making the
United States a more credible human rights model even though he appreciated the possibility that such a
strategy could open up his nation to charges of human rights abuses in international forums. See Memo,
Leslie Denend to ZB, “UN Human Rights Commission Citing of the U.S.,” 1 September 1978,” WHCF,
Box HU-3, Folder: 9/1/78-12/31/78, JCPL.
280
Memo, JT to ZB, “Human Rights Proposal,” 18 February 1977. See also Presidential Review
Memorandum/NSC 28, 7 July 1977, 68-70. Available [Online]:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/prm/prm28.pdf [18 August 2007]. This document also explained how the
“clearly defined human rights responsibilities of multilateral organizations” gave the United States
legitimate documents to cite when raising the subject of human rights with other countries. See also
Hodgman, “Détente and Dissidents,” 260-4.
154
Despite these shortcomings, officials took steps to combat the unwillingness of
U.N. institutions to challenge the domestic practices of communist countries. On 11
February, a U.S. representative raised the issue of Orlov’s arrest in the General
Assembly. Over the course of the next month, both he and Carter asked the UNHRC to
“request information from the Soviets on the arrest and detention of dissidents.” On 7
March 1978, members of the executive branch asked the commission to take a closer
look at the problem of Soviet human rights violations. While such behavior may appear
innocuous, Soviet internal documents show that orthodox policymakers viewed such
developments with alarm. In a directive to the Soviet delegation attending the thirtyfourth session of UNHRC, the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko stressed the
importance of clarifying “the illegality and the bankruptcy” of any actions contributing to
the notion that “the UN carries the central responsibility for securing human rights in all
States.”281
Carter also took other steps designed to make the United States a more credible
human rights model. To improve the U.S. Final Act compliance record, he removed “all
restrictions on travel abroad by American citizens” and relaxed visa restrictions that
281
Memorandum for ZB, “US Government Initiatives on behalf of Human Rights in the USSR,” 17 April
1980, 2-4, Staff Office, BEA, Box 4, Folder: HRD and BOR, 2/80-12/80, JCPL. To combat the
“globalization” of Soviet human rights violations mentioned in the previous chapter, the Foreign Minister
also instructed the delegation to “stress” that the problem of human rights “is the responsibility of
governments, which have taken on themselves the corresponding international obligations, and pertains to
the sphere of their internal competency.” See “Resolution of the CC CPSU: Concerning Participation in
the 34th session of the UN Human Rights Commission,” 19 January 1978,” V, 108-9 in Global Competition
and Deterioration of U.S. Soviet Relations, NSA.
155
excluded foreign groups because of their political beliefs282 On 30 March, Carter told the
National Women’s Political Caucus that “our failure to pass the equal rights amendment
hurts us as we try to set a standard of commitment to human rights throughout the
world.” “I hope,” he continued, “that we can correct that defect by next year at the
latest.”283 Well-aware of Soviet complaints, he supported Attorney General Griffin Bell's
decision to carry out an investigation of the Wilmington 10 case, a controversial court
decision in North Carolina that involved civil rights issues “stemming from
desegregation-related violence.”284
The steps Carter took to illustrate the universal nature of the American human
rights campaign failed to impress Soviet leaders. Brezhnev lambasted the President’s
penchant for interfering in Soviet Union internal affairs and rejected “Washington's
claims to teach others how to live.” In a private letter, Brezhnev warned Carter that
“[w]e do not recommend taxing our patience in any area of international politics,
including the sphere of Soviet-American relations. There is no dealing with the Soviet
282
Third Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 4. See also Carter, Keeping Faith, 144-5. In
practice, Carter proved sensitive to Soviet charges about the ways in which the United States practices
violated the Helsinki Accords. As he asked Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on February 7 1977: “To what
degree are we not complying with Basket III?” See “Handwritten Note from President to Cyrus Vance,
dated 2/7/77 re Dissidents,” in Memo, Rick Hutchenson to ZB, “Dissidents, Vietnam, and CIA
Operations,” 7 February 1977,” WHCF, Box HU-1, Folder: 1/20/77-1/20/81. See also Hodgman, Détente
and the Dissidents,” 256.
283
During this meeting, he also discussed how the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin complained to him about
how Americans criticized the Soviet Union human rights practices even though “'you still haven't ratified
the equal rights amendment.” See PPOP, 1977, Volume 1, 545
284
“See U.S. Probe of Case of ‘Wilmington 10’ Gives Activist Hope,” 14 February 1977, Washington
Post, A3. See also Third Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 4; PPOP, 1977, Vol. I ,1105; Ibid., 1977, Volume II, 2123; and Ibid., 1978,
Volume I, 323, 537, 695, and 1098.
156
Union that way.” Some Soviet press reports explained that Carter’s conduct endangered
the prospects of signing an arms control agreement. Others insisted that he had initiated
psychological warfare against the Soviet Union.285
The Kremlin’s displeasure with the Carter administration’s human rights
campaign boiled over when Vance presented the administration’s SALT proposals in
Moscow near the end of March. Before the meeting took place, the Secretary of State
went out of his way to emphasize that he did not plan to raise the issue of human rights or
discuss individual dissenters. These words fell on deaf ears in Moscow. Brezhnev chose
to denounce Carter’s human rights campaign for endangering the continuation of détente.
Because Vance’s new SALT proposal emphasized weapons reductions rather than
limiting the growth rate of nuclear arsenals, the Soviets dismissed it and refused to make
a counteroffer.286
The harsh Soviet reaction to U.S. government’s human rights campaign and the
failure of Vance’s arms control negotiations in Moscow worried administration officials,
including the President himself.287 While some scholars argue that Carter moderated his
285
Dobrynin, In Confidence, 390-1. “USSR International Affairs,” N.D., 2, Office of Public Liaison (OPL),
Box 53, Folder: Human Rights, Soviet Jewry, 2/77-5/77, JCPL. See also John M. Howell, “The Carter
Human Rights Policy as Applied to The Soviet Union,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 13, no. 2 (1983):
286-295; and “Labor Leaders Hear Russian's Rights Appeal,” Washington Post, 26 February 1977, A8.
286
287
“Testing Carter,” 27; “The SALT Standoff, Time, 11 April 1977, 11.
PPOP, 1977, Volume II, 1206; and Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 155. See also “Interview With the
Question-and-Answer Session With a Group of Publishers, Editors, and Broadcasters.” Available [Online]:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7726&st=adverse&st1=reaction [10 July 2006]. When
thanking an author who wrote a favorable editorial about the administration’s strong defense of human
rights in early March, Carter expressed his surprise “at the timidity of some leaders,” but also indicated that
he had to be “cautious . . . about [the] possible adverse effect on those who already suffer.” See Letter,
Carter to T.J. White, 8 March 1977, WHCF, C0-165, Folder: 3/1/77-3/15/77, JCPL. Shortly thereafter, he
failed to answer a second letter Sakharov sent him and later declined to meet with Avital Shcharansky
157
efforts to promote human rights in the Soviet Union after Vance returned from Moscow,
the overall thrust of his administration’s behavior paints a more complicated picture.
From one angle, the harsh Soviet reaction made officials even more determined to
highlight the universal and even-handed nature of their human rights campaign. Echoing
arguments commonplace in the Human Rights Bureau, Brzezinski urged Carter to make
the American definition of human rights more consistent with international standards. As
he put it, this “broad concept” has “universal appeal” because of the ways in which it
addressed political, economic, and social problems. A more flexible definition would
help prevent the U.S. government from becoming involved in “every major civil rights
issue” or having to take “an overtly anti-Soviet position.” It would also “give us the
freedom to point out the most glaring abuses” without taking away “the necessary margin
of flexibility in dealing with most governments.”288 These words proved influential.
Two weeks after Carter analyzed this memorandum, Vance confirmed the U.S. embrace
of international human rights standards during a speech he delivered at the University of
Georgia.289
during her visit to the United States. See “The Carter Administration’s Morality Play,” Time, 7 March
1977, 11; and Vogelesang, American Dream, Global Nightmare.
288
Memo, ZB to JC, “Weekly National Security Report #9,” 16 April 1977, 1-2, BM, Box 41, Folder:
Weekly Reports, 1-15. See also Njolstad, Peacemaker and Troublemaker, 238-40. In his memoirs, Carter
himself admitted that the administration at first defined human rights “too narrowly.” See Carter, Keeping
Faith, 144.
289
On 1 April 1977, Vance delivered his speech about the U.S. commitment to human rights that affirmed
Brzezinski’s larger arguments and made the U.S. definition the same as international standards. “Cyrus
Vance, Law Day Speech on Humane Purposes of Foreign Policy,” in Walter Laquer and Barry Rubin, ed.
The Human Rights Reader (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979), 299-304. Olav Njolstad takes the
same position in his work Peacemaker and Troublemaker, 239-241.
158
The redefinition of U.S. human rights standards does not mean that Carter
abandoned his efforts to promote human rights in the Soviet Union. In the immediate
aftermath of Vance’s failed negotiations in Moscow, the president explained that the
“Soviets' reaction against me personally on the human rights issue is a misplaced aim. I
have no hatred for the Soviet people, and I believe that the pressure of world opinion
might be making itself felt on them and perhaps I am kind of a scapegoat for that adverse
reaction on their part.” On 2 June, Carter used a public address to reject charges that
Shcharansky had ever worked for the CIA. A few weeks later, he defended his universal
human rights campaign. If this policy “touches the Soviet Union and they interpret it as
intrusion, so be it.” “I don't believe,” he continued, “that there is a single leader of a
nation on Earth today who doesn't have within his or her consciousness a concern about
human rights--how do we appear to our own people, how do we appear to observers from
other nations?”290 Behind closed doors, he wrote to Brzezinski on 8 July that “I see no
need to change” how this administration has gone about promoting human rights across
the globe.291
This comment has special relevance because one day earlier Carter had approved
PRM-28, an internal study which contained the first official guidelines on how the
executive branch should address the issue of Soviet human rights violations. Instead of
deferring to Soviet objections, the document reiterated the importance of monitoring the
290
“The President’s News Conference.” Available [Online]:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7670&st=&st1= [17 June 2006].
291
Ibid.; “European Broadcast Journalists Question-and-Answer Session.” Available [Online]:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7432&st=struggle&st1=Soviet [10 August 2006];
“European Newspaper Journalists - Question-and-Answer Session.” Available [Online]:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7435&st=intend&st1=back+down [10 April 2007].
Memo, ZB to JC, “Weekly Report #20,” 8 July 1977, BM, Box 41, Folder: Weekly Reports, 16-31, JCPL.
159
Final Act compliance records of all signatories. It also favored the further strengthening
of U.S. radios on the grounds that such a program gave the U.S. government an excellent
way of elaborating “our human rights concerns directly to “audiences abroad” and
“foreign leaders.” The document endorsed these types of policies because the promotion
of human rights “supports the growth in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe of
democratic forces which may in time contribute to the development of more open
societies.” It also assists in the philosophical debate with the” USSR “as to the type of
society worth developing.” 292 This point of view remained consistent. One month after
Carter approved PRM-28, he signed Presidential Directive (PD)-18, which confirmed the
importance of competing “politically with the Soviet Union by pursuing the basic
American commitment to human rights and national independence.”293
The importance that Carter and other officials placed on pursuing peaceful
ideological competition with the Soviet Union led them in the direction of supporting
transnational human rights activities. Instead of seeing NGOs as a threat to the
bureaucratic discretion of executive branch officials, PRM-28 praised the ways in which
these groups raised “international . . . and national awareness” about “human rights
concerns.” Because larger political concerns were always present, the document
recommended that the State Department Bureau of Public Affairs play a significant role
292
PRM-28, 58-60. Reflecting President Carter’s preference for careful, calibrated responses to Soviet
human rights violations, the document urged administration officials to “remain firm but non-polemical” in
their criticisms. It also warned about the dangers of too much public diplomacy. “We need not take a
public stance on every human rights violation [in the Soviet Union], but we should not hesitate to speak out
on important cases when circumstances warrant, e.g., the Shcharansky case.” Ibid., 72-4, 34.
293
Ibid, 18. See also and PD/NSC-18, 24 August 1977. Available [Online]:
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/pddirectives/pd18.pdf [12 January 2006]. The larger goal
of “reciprocal accommodation” definitely shaped the language of PRM-28. In particular, see Ibid., 18-9.
160
“in fostering domestic support for our human rights policy” while “facilitating interaction
with efforts abroad.” To accomplish this task, it called for a wide variety of measures,
including “increased cooperation with private organizations throughout the United States
concerned with human rights” and “public appearances by senior administration officials
that stress human rights.” It also suggested that the administration disseminate “material
on our human rights policy to opinion leaders and groups throughout the United
States.”294
These words were not just window dressing. A wide array of officials, including
Carter, took a number of steps to encourage non-governmental human rights activities.
Employing language that must have enraged Soviet leaders, Deputy Secretary of State
Warren Christopher told an audience in August that “the human rights initiative. . . . has a
resonance in the homes and hearts of people around the world . . . . because of the power
of ideas we are espousing.” “With the understanding and support of our citizens [and]
leading private organizations,” he maintained, “this new policy will achieve historic
results.” Carter sent personal letters to representatives of NGOs. On 2 February 1977, he
thanked the President of the Christian Peace Conference for his kind words and prayers.
One month later, he congratulated Jerome Shestack, President of the International League
of Human Rights, for giving various upper-echelon administration officials the
recommendations of a conference entitled “Implementing a Human Rights Commitment
in the United States Foreign Policy.”295
294
PRM -28, 10, 63. This document also called on the State Department to take a wide array of measures
to stimulate public interest in human rights issues. See Ibid., 59-62.
161
When Amnesty International won the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1977, Carter
sent the organization a telegram that read: “Through this high recognition, the Nobel
committee has indeed honored those whose work symbolizes the universal quest for
world peace and justice.” A short time later, he sent a short note to the Chairman of
Global Affairs for the National Council of Catholic Laity. “I warmly commend your
plans,” he wrote, “to promote educational programs” that will increase “public
awareness” about the appalling level of governmental human rights violations still taking
place in the world.296
On 22 November 1977, Mondale spoke at a B'nai B'rith awards ceremony in
recognition of what the dissenters Sakharov and Shcharansky had accomplished for the
cause of human rights. He urged the attendees to work for the cause of human rights
across the globe because the issue had now become “the moral agenda of our time.
“Those who seek to deny individual rights,” he continued, “must answer for their actions
in the court of world opinion.” One month later, Public Liaison officer Joyce Starr
delivered a similar speech to the Washington Council on Soviet Jewry (WCSJ). Because
documents such as the Final Act had given human rights an "international status,” she
commented, the executive branch supported the efforts of transnational actors to hold
295
Department of State Bulletin, 29 August 1977, 273; Telegram, JC to Christian Peace Conference, 10
February 1977, WHCF, CO 165, Folder: 1/20/77-2/28/77-JCPL; and Letter, JC to Jerome Shestack, 9
March 1977, WHCF, Box: HU-1, Folder: 3/1/77-3/31/77, JCPL.
296
Telegram, JC to AI, October 1977, Human Rights/Amnesty International Collection, Box 1, Folder
1977, NSA; and Letter, JC to Mr. Ford Niehaus, 14 October 1977, OPL, Box 54, Folder: Human Rights,
Interreligious Task Force—10/77, JCPL. In a move that combined the impulse of “globalizing” the issue
of human rights and political motivations, Carter followed Press Secretary Powell’s suggestion that he send
private letters of encouragement to individuals who had written favorable editorials about his human rights
policy. See Memo, Jody Powell to JC, “Thank You Notes for favorable editorials,” 23 February 1977,
WHCF, Box HU-1, Folder: 1/20/77-2/28/77, JCPL; Letter, JC to Charles Buxton, 28 February 1977, Ibid.,
JCPL; and Letter, JC to Jim Wells, 21 April 1977, Ibid., JCPL.
162
governments accountable for their behavior. “[W]e encourage members of Congress and
the people to write to Soviet leaders about specific cases” so that they will “not be
surprised at the political consequences which may arise” as a result of U.S. public’s
concern with the cause of “Soviet Jewry.”297
Carter confirmed the importance of encouraging and supporting transnational
human rights activities in March 1978. After reviewing several drafts, he added language
to PD-30 that called on officials to work with “private groups” such as “Amnesty
International” to raise international awareness about human rights issues. The
administration’s emphasis on stimulating non-governmental activities received a boost
when the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) adopted a
new procedure “permitting individuals to file complaints of human rights violations in
areas” of the organization’s “jurisdiction.” A short time later, the UNHRC adopted the
same policy as UNESCO and agreed to “hear complaints from individuals and nongovernmental organizations” about human rights abuses.298
Besides supporting transnational human rights activities, the administration also
held the Soviets accountable for their internal behavior at the Final Act follow-up
297
“Text of Vice-President Walter Mondale’s Address to The National Commission Luncheon of the AntiDefamation League of B’nai B’rith at the Hyatt Regency Hotel,” November 1977, OPL, Box 75, Folder:
HRR, 3/77-11/77; and Memo, Marilyn Haft (MH) to Midge Costanza (MC), “Soviet Jewry: Speech to the
Jewish Community Council, 12:00 Noon, December 12 1977,” 15 December 1977, OPL, Box 55, Folder:
3/77-12/77, JCPL.
298
President Carter’s comments on the rough draft of PD-30 can be found at:
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/pddirectives/pd30.pdf [28 August 2007]. See also PPOP,
1977, Volume 1, 1050; Memo, Lincoln Broomfield to ZB, “Classified Annex,” 16 January 1981, 36-7, BM,
Box 34, Folder: NSC Accomplishments, Human Rights, JCPL; Lincoln Broomfield, “From Ideology to
Program Policy: Tracking the Carter Human Rights Policy,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 2
(Autumn 1982): 11-2; and Schneider, “A New Administration’s New Policy,” 12-14. See also Department
of State Bulletin, 29 August 1977, 831-2. See also State Department Bulletin, 23 May 1977, 506-7; and
PRM-28, 10. See also Hodgman, “Détente and the Dissidents,” 313-16.
163
meeting in Belgrade.299 Determined to put the United States in the best possible position
to engage in peaceful ideological competition with Moscow, Carter signed CAPR and
ESACR just before the main session of this meeting began. During the plenary sessions,
U.S. delegates went out of their way to buttress the credibility of American complaints
about other signatories’ compliance records. Lead U.S. delegate Arthur Goldberg
described how “President Carter . . . [has] said explicitly that we have to do better at
home.” “In spite of the blemishes on our record,” he pointed out, “the point to be made is
that the governmental institutions of the United States are working to eliminate injustices
rather than to deny them.”300 Well aware of Soviet complaints about U.S. internal
behavior, another delegate explained how Carter’s vocal support of ratifying the Equal
Rights Amendment showed the administration’s commitment to furthering U.S.
compliance with Principle VII and international human rights standards.301
After defending the credibility of American criticisms, the U.S. delegation
attacked suggestions that nations could seal themselves off from the “globalization” of
299
Evidence suggests that Carter viewed the Belgrade conference as an excellent way of comparing
American and Soviet human rights practices. See “The President’s News Conference.” Available [Online]:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7670&st=&st1= [17 June 2006]. See also PPOP,
1977, Volume II, 994.
300
Department of State Telegram, “Belgrade CSCE—Ambassador Goldberg’s Statement on Human
Rights,” 1 November, OPL, Box 75, Folder: Ottawa Conference, 12/77, JCPL. For Ambassador
Goldberg’s opening speech at Belgrade, see Department of State Bulletin, 14 November 1977, 674-80. See
also State Department Special Report, “The Belgrade Followup Meeting to the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.”
301
To buttress this line of argument, U.S. delegates also emphasized how the United States had
“liberalized” visa restrictions and made it easier for Americans to travel abroad. They also reported that
Carter had signed and intended to seek ratification of several U.N. human rights covenants. See “Basket I
Statement by R. Spencer Oliver,” 12 December 1977, 1, Box 37, Folder: Robert Spencer Oliver, Belgrade,
Main Meeting, 10/77, Records of the Commission on the Security and Cooperation in Europe (RCSCE),
U.S. Helsinki Commission Files (USHCF), National Archives (NA), Washington, D.C.
164
human rights issues. Time and time again, they explained how the provisions of the
Helsinki Accords and other international human rights documents gave signatories’ no
right to cite “internal affairs” to dodge questions about how they treated their citizens.
During one of the plenary sessions, Goldberg indicated that every political system “can
be held accountable by other nations of the international community for conforming to . .
. certain minimum international standards of justice in the field of human rights as well as
social and economic problems.” In response to a Soviet delegate’s argument that
examining the implementation of human rights would only “undermine the bridges of
understanding . . . built over the last decade between the participating states,” Goldberg
replied that those bridges are only as strong as their foundations. “It is the primary role of
this conference,” he concluded, “to strengthen the foundations so that détente can have a
strong, enduring and noble edifice” whose “practical benefits” private citizens can see in
their “daily lives.”302
These words could not prevent the Warsaw Pact nations from blocking the
signing the concluding document that made specific references to the problem of human
rights violations. However unfortunate, this shortcoming needs to be put in perspective.
In an international forum, U.S. delegates succeeded in defending the right of private
citizens to hold signatories accountable for their internal behavior. Deifying diplomatic
conventions against naming specific names, Goldberg described how the Soviet
government’s imprisonment of Orlov, Ginsburg, and Shcharansky proved its inability to
302
Department of State Telegram, “Belgrade CSCE—Ambassador Goldberg’s Statement on Human
Rights”; and Department of State Telegram, “Ambassador Goldberg’s Statement in Plenary November 9
Summing Up Belgrade Meeting After Six Weeks and Implementation of Human Rights Commitments,”
November 1977, OPL, Box 75, Folder: Ottawa Conference, 12/77, JCPL.
165
tolerate non-governmental activities sanctioned by the Final Act. His subordinates
behaved in a similar manner. They even took time to cite the names of Ukrainian
Helsinki monitors who had been imprisoned for exercising their basic human rights.303
Many critics have overlooked the Belgrade conference because of the
administration’s preference for using careful, calibrated public and private acts to show
American displeasure with Soviet internal behavior. After the Kremlin began arresting
fewer prominent dissenters in the summer of 1977 in preparation for the Belgrade
conference, Carter responded by making fewer specific references to Soviet human rights
violations than he had in the past. When this trend continued and Jewish emigration
levels rose, he chose to defend his commitment in public by making periodic references
to Belgrade. He also described how the United States had once again become a “beacon
of light to the rest of the world” and had helped raise international awareness about
human rights violations. Facing charges both at home and abroad that the U.S. human
rights campaign had become less active, Brzezinski advised the President in October
1977 that he “might have to speak out again publicly on the issue [of human rights] to
disabuse the Soviets and . . . head off domestic charges that you are backing off human
rights.” Instead of heeding this advice, Carter told him not to worry because Soviet
303
Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 146; and Department of State Telegram, “Belgrade CSCE—Ambassador
Goldberg’s Statement on Human Rights.” The wealth of information the U.S. delegation had about
conditions in the Soviet Union and individual dissenters comes across in the USHCF. See Untitled Hand
written notes, Box 37, Folder: Belgrade, Human Rights, RCSCE, USHCF, NA. See also Department of
State Telegram, “Ambassador Goldberg’s Statement in Plenary November 9 Summing Up Belgrade
Meeting After Six Weeks and Implementation of Human Rights Commitments,” November 1977; and
Department of State Telegram, “Belgrade CSCE—US Basket Three Presentation to Closed Plenary
October 13, 1977,” OPL, Box 75, Folder: Ottawa Conference, 12/77, JCPL.
166
attacks on the U.S. delegation in Belgrade “are helping” the image of the United States as
an even-handed human rights defender.304
Around the same time, Carter also attempted to convince Soviet leaders not to let
human rights issues stand in the way of taking concrete steps to improve U.S.-Soviet
relations. At a private meeting on 9 September 1977, he told the Soviet Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko about all the ways the United States and Soviet Union could work
together to help solve important global problems. When he raised the issue of
Shcharansky’s arrest, Gromyko became angry and argued that “such questions have an
infinitesimal significance” and “can only harm the climate of our relations.”305
In response to these harsh words, Carter pointed out that “[t]here were no words
of criticism as such toward the Soviet Union or Brezhnev personally” in contrast to
negative portrayals of himself in the Soviet press, which he hoped would subside. He
then uttered an amazing volley of statements, beginning with his hope that
Soviet-American relations will constantly improve. I would suffer a complete
political fiasco as President if this does not happen. In other words, I would have
betrayed . . . [the] confidence my own people. . . . The goal of constant
improvement of relations with the Soviet Union is a matter of first priority for me.
There is no more important problem for me.306
304
“’I Don’t Intend to Lose,” 2 May 1977, Newsweek; and Memo, ZB to JC, “Weekly Report #33,” 21
October 1977, 3, BM, Box 41, Folder: Weekly Reports, 31-41, JCPL. During this time period, Carter
preferred to speak about his general commitment to promoting human rights throughout the world. For
example, he would say things like: “2 years ago . . . the subject of human rights would be a rarity among
heads of state, but now, even the most abusive governments, there is a concern ‘what does the rest of the
world think about me, what will happen if I persecute this group or bring a legal charge against this
person.” See PPOP, 1978, Vol. I, 237.
305
“Record of a Conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Carter, 23 September 1977”
in U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Turn Toward Confrontation, 1977-1980—New Russian and East German
Documents, Cold War International History Project. Available [Online]: http://cwihp.si.edu [6 February
2004]
306
Ibid. Carter had already expressed such sentiments as early as 4 March. See “Carter’s Letter to
Brezhnev,” 14 February 1977 in The Path to Disagreement: U.S.-Soviet Communications Leading to
167
At the same time, “[w]e do not believe that that the Shcharansky affair lacks significance.
I did not blow it up. It concerns broad segments of the American public.” In reference to
Gromyko’s concerns about American human rights practices, he remarked that “the
concern you expressed about human rights in our country, as well as our public concern
over this question in the Soviet Union, could lead to a broadening of human rights in both
countries.” In the future, “I hope that both sides will exert necessary restraint and that
you will not allow openly expressed concern over these issues in the USA to spoil our
relations.”307
These statements are revealing. They help illustrate how Carter’s ideological
underpinnings and commitment to forging a “reciprocal accommodation” shaped U.S.
efforts to promote human rights in the USSR. At least in part, Carter preferred a
calibrated strategy because he identified with the inherent strengths of democratic
governments and the universal appeal of human rights. He saw no reason why the United
States should give up on the larger task of forging cooperative links with the Brezhnev
regime in vital areas such as arms control. In retrospect, Carter also appears to have
shared Vance’s and Marshall Shulman’s (State Department Adviser on Soviet Affairs)
view of Soviet leaders as essentially pragmatic policymakers capable of adapting
themselves to larger changes in the international environment. Based on this assumption,
he held fast to the position that expressions of goodwill tempered with realistic
Vance’s March 1977 Trip to Moscow, Cold War International History Project. Available [Online]:
http://cwihp.si.edu [6 February 2004].
307
“Record of a Conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Carter,” 23 September 1977.
168
bargaining could convince Soviet leaders to change their internal behavior over time and
sign agreements consistent with U.S. interests.
Besides retaining a faith in the efficacy of realistic negotiations, Carter shared
Vance’s and Shulman’s fear that any sharp deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations would
only make the Kremlin more prone to crack down on dissident activities. He made this
position clear on 21 July 1977. “The experience of our own country this last century,” he
told the American public, “has proven that an atmosphere of peaceful cooperation is far
more conducive to an increased respect for human rights than an atmosphere of
belligerence or warlike confrontation.”308 Carter’s firm belief in the lessons of the U.S.
civil rights movement and the transformative power of promoting ideals (idealpolitik)
also predisposed him to follow a calibrated strategy. In the same speech in which he
dismissed Americans’ “inordinate fear of communism,” he remarked: “I fully understand
the limits of moral suasion, “[b]ut I also believe it is a mistake to undervalue the power of
words and of the ideas that words embody.” Because the leaders of “totalitarian” regimes
understand that “words are action,” they persecute “dissidents” for the words they use
and the ideals they espouse.309
The collective appeal of the positions outlined above help account for why many
officials expected Soviet leaders to moderate their international and domestic behavior
308
“Charleston, South Carolina Remarks at the 31st Annual Meeting of the Southern Legislative
Conference.” Available [Online]: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7852&st=&st1=
[13 July 2006].
309
“University of Notre Dame--Address at Commencement Exercises at the University.” Available
[Online]: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7552&st=Notre&st1=Dame [10 August
2007]. It appears that Brzezinski, not the State Department, wrote the phrase “inordinate fear of
communism”. See “Discussant: David L. Aron,” in Ugrinsky, ed. Jimmy Carter, 369.
169
over the long term. On 26 February 1977, Brzezinski informed the President that the
Soviets “have stopped short of linking human rights to security issues” and look forward
to discussing arms control proposals with Vance next month in Moscow. Soviet wariness
to engage in confrontation on this issue,” he assured the President, “is probably
reinforced by their concern over the possible contagion of the issue in Eastern Europe.”
No matter which way you look the problem of human rights violations, the Soviets “have
an incentive to be firm but not to allow the [human rights] situation to escalate.”310
Even after the harsh Soviet reaction to the Carter administration’s human rights
campaign and Vance’s SALT proposal, Brzezinski remained optimistic about the future
trajectory of U.S.-Soviet relations. On 24 June 1977, he told the President that “the
Soviets have applied varying tactics to neutralize” dissent, “but it continues.” Because
the problem of Soviet human rights violations had now become a global issue, “the U.S. .
. . has the power to greatly aggravate the Soviet dilemma.” This situation points to “an
eventual turn in Soviet policy back toward something resembling détente.” Even if such
a change does not take place over the short term, “we still have most of the high cards
[necessary] . . . to shape Soviet policy” in ways favorable to U.S. interests. Expressing
his general agreement with Brzezinski’s arguments, Carter wrote “good” on the first page
of the report.311
310
Memo, ZB to JC, “Weekly National Security Report #2,” 26 February 1977, 1-2, BM, Box 41, Folder:
Weekly Reports, 1-15, JCPL.
311
Memo, ZB to JC, “Weekly National Security Report #18,” 24 June 1977, 3-4, BM, Box 41, Folder:
Weekly Reports, 16-30, JCPL. Cyrus Vance also believed in the eventual moderation of Soviet behavior.
See Vance, Hard Choices, 105. See also Petrus Buwalda, They Did Not Dwell Alone: Jewish Emigration
from the Soviet Union, 1967-1990 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997), 132.
170
The belief that members of the Brezhnev regime would have little choice but to
moderate their behavior over the long term or accommodate themselves to U.S. human
rights criticisms proved a profound misjudgment. Once the Belgrade conference
concluded, the Soviets convicted Orlov of “anti-Soviet agitation and sentenced him to a
seven-year prison term followed by five years of internal exile. They also convicted
several Ukrainian and Georgian Helsinki monitors, as well as the prominent refuseniks
Ida Nudel and Vladimir Slepak.312 In the summer of 1978, the Soviets put Ginsburg,
Shcharansky, and Maria Slepak (wife of Vladimir) on trial and convicted them of various
offenses related to monitoring Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Accords.
Shcharansky’s trial received worldwide attention because the Soviets also convicted him
of espionage even though Carter had publicly announced that he had never worked for
the CIA. By July 1978, the Soviets had imprisoned or exiled twenty members of the
Moscow Helsinki Watch Group.313
These developments raised the question of how Carter would show Soviet leaders
U.S. displeasure with their internal behavior. Having rejected the option of linking
progress in SALT negotiations to Soviet domestic and international behavior, he had the
options of using economic sanctions or reductions in cultural exchanges to penalize the
Kremlin for its crack down on dissent. Evidence suggests that he preferred not to use
either option, although he never ruled out the possibility of using economic penalties to
312
U.S. Helsinki Commission, Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Volume VII, 48-9. See also
“Human Rights Developments in the USSR, January-May 1978,” NLC-6-79-6-15-7, JCPL. Note: Carter
reviewed this document.
313
Fitzpatrick, The Moscow Helsinki Monitors, 23-9; Fourth Semiannual Report by the President to the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1978), 8; Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Volume VII, 108. See also “Moscow Begins Scharansky
Trial, Three Others,” New York Times, 11 July 1978, A1.
171
enhance the U.S. government’s ability to shape Soviet behavior.314 With these options
off the table, he gradually moved in the direction of using “indirect” linkages to warn the
Soviets that their international and domestic behavior jeopardized the future trajectory of
U.S.-Soviet relations. In January 1978, he indicated in public for the first time that
“continued” human rights abuses would increase the difficulties of concluding and
ratifying a SALT treaty. On 7 March, the U.S. State Department followed suit and
released a statement indicating how the mistreatment of Shcharansky would have an
adverse impact on U.S.-Soviet relations. It also condemned the Slepak and Nudel
verdicts and asked for transcripts of several dissident trials.315
Behind closed doors, Vance voiced American displeasure with the Soviet
government’s treatment of Shcharansky during his SALT negotiations with Gromyko
from 20-21 April 1978. On 11 May, Derian “spoke out” for the imprisoned Ukrainian
Helsinki Monitor Mykola Rudenko when meeting with a Soviet writers delegation. Two
314
Before the summer of 1978, Carter took a number of steps to increase the scope of U.S.-Soviet
exchanges. For example, he helped create Friendship Force, a private non-governmental organization that
sent individuals all over the world to live with host families. See the “Friendship Force.” Available
[Online]: http://www.friendshipforcetwincities.org/ [10 October 2006]. For descriptions of other efforts,
see “CSCE Briefing Book: International Parliamentary Union Spring Conference, 10-16 April, 1977,”
N.D, Box 48, Folder: 04/77 2nd IPU Conference, RCSCE, USHCF, NA; and “U.S. Position,” N.D., Box 37,
Folder: Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, RCSCE, USHCF, NA. See Third Semiannual Report by the
President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 15.
For the best account of Carter’s ambivalent attitude toward U.S.-Soviet economic relations, see Njolstad,
Peacemaker and Troublemaker, 267-72. See also “Weekly Report #18.” See also See Presidential Review
Memorandum/NSC 31. Available [Online]: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/prm/prm31.pdf [26 August
2007]; Letter, JC to Henry Jackson, 26 July 1977, Office of Congressional Liaison, Box 63, Folder:
Correspondence, Jackson, 1977, JCPL; Presidential Directive/NSC 18. Available [Online]:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd18.pdf [26 August 2007]; Samuel Huntington, “Trade, Technology,
and Leverage: Economic Diplomacy,” Foreign Policy 32 (Fall 1978): 63-80; and “Winston-Salem, North
Carolina Address at Wake Forest University.” Available [Online]:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=30516&st=&st1= [10 August 2007].
315
Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 674. See also “President’s News Conference.” Available
[Online]: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=30852&st=&st1= [10 January 2006].
172
weeks later, Carter informed Gromyko in private that Soviet human rights violations and
Soviet-Cuban conduct in Africa threatened to weaken the foundations of stable and
peaceful U.S.-Soviet relations. In reference to human rights, he expressed his concern
that Shcharansky and Ginsburg would receive sentences similar to Orlov’s that in
practice exceeded the penalties outlined in the Soviet criminal code. Although Carter
recognized the Soviet government’s right to “act in these matters as it saw fit,” he “did
have to point out” that these trials would hurt U.S.-Soviet relations and impact matters
“such as trade and scientific and cultural exchanges.”316
Despite Vance’s best efforts to reduce Soviet-American tensions and find more
common ground between the two nations, the Kremlin proved unwilling to halt the trials
of well-known dissenters.317 This development tested Carter patience. Unhappy with
Soviet intransigence, he moved in the direction of direct linkage and cancelled a cabinet
member’s trip to Moscow scheduled to take place on 30 May. One week later, he also
delivered an address at the U.S. Naval Academy that challenged Soviet leaders to adapt
themselves to an international environment consistent with U.S. values and norms. As he
put it, the behavior of Moscow has “demonstrated that the Soviet system cannot tolerate
freely expressed ideas or notions of loyal opposition and the free movement of peoples.”
Its “form of government is becoming increasingly unattractive to other nations” that
“even Marxist-Leninist groups no longer look on the Soviet Union as a model to be
316
See “Memorandum for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski,” 2-3; and Memorandum of Conversation, “SALT,
CTB, Africa, Human Rights,” 27 May 1978,” IV-513-514 in Global Competition and Deterioration of U.S.
Soviet Relations.
317
See “Record of the Main Content of the Conversation Between A.A. Gromyko and the U.S. Cyrus
Vance,” 31 May 1978, IV-54 in Global Competition and Deterioration of U.S. Soviet Relations.
173
imitated.” Given the inherent economic, political, military, and ideological strengths of
the United States, Soviet leaders had it within their grasp to chose “either confrontation
or cooperation” with the United States.318
When these words failed to halt the trials of dissenters, many concluded that
Soviet conduct had put the United States on the defensive. On 7 July, NSC staffer Jessica
Tuchman wrote a memorandum to Brzezinski that referred to the Kremlin’s behavior as
“the clearest test we have faced . . . on the human rights policy. . . . [W]e should respond
appropriately and quickly.” “If we do not respond,” she warned, “the Soviets will feel
free to crack down even harder, and it will not be difficult for U.S. press and public
opinion to draw the obvious connection.” Brzezinski agreed with this analysis.
Disturbed that Carter had received thousands of postcards from the Soviet Union calling
on him to free U.S. political prisoners, he wrote to the President that “your credibility on
human rights is now at stake.”319
Since Carter agreed with Brzezinski’s advice, he went out of his way to show
Soviet leaders that the United States meant business. On 14 July 1978, Carter told an
audience that the behavior of Soviet leaders “reveals a weakness in their system of not
being able to withstand the lonely voice of a dissenter or an accurate newspaper article
318
“United States Naval Academy Address at the Commencement Exercises.” Available [Online]:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=30915&st=&st1= [12 December 2006]. Robert Strong
makes a strong argument that Carter wrote the bulk of this speech and it accurately reflected his views at
the time. See Robert A. Strong, “Jimmy Carter’s Annapolis Address on U.S.-Soviet relations,” Miller
Center Journal 1 (1994): 35-54.
319
Memo, JT to ZB, “Human Rights,” 7 July 1978, WHCF, CO 165, Folder: 3/1/78-4/30/78; and Memo,
ZB to JC, “NSC Weekly Report #66,” 7 July 1978, 1-2, 4, BM, Box 41, Folder: Weekly Reports, 61-71,
JCPL.
174
not printed in the Soviet Union.”320 He also issued a separate statement that read: “We
are all sobered by this reminder that, so late in the 20th century, a person can be sent to
jail simply for asserting his basic human rights. The struggle for human liberties is long
and difficult, but it will be won. There is no power on earth that can long delay its
progress.”321 Echoing this theme, Brzezinski called the Shcharansky trial a landmark
event because “we know that the suffering of the Jews has been connected with . . . the
quest of mankind for higher standards” in behavior.322
Besides producing verbal protests, the dissident trials raised the issue of how the
U.S. government could show its displeasure with Soviet conduct in a manner more
forceful than public and private statements. On 12 July, Tuchman sent Brzezinski a
memorandum warning about how Congress might pass punitive measures that would
make the executive branch look weak. She explained how Senator Henry Jackson’s
proposed bill requiring a 90-day suspension in issuing trade licenses to the Soviet Union
raised the possibility that “the President would be pre-empted on most of the specific next
steps that are being considered vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.” To prevent this development,
she urged Carter to “suspend all trade, government-sponsored exchanges, and technology
transfer with the Soviet Union for 90 days.” As Tuchman told Brzezinski, “political
320
“Statement by Department Spokesman: Shcharansky Trial,” RL, Box 46, Folder: 4/78-4/79, JCPL;
“After the Russian Trials,” U.S. News and World Report, 24 July 1978, 12; and “Moscow Begins
Scharansky Trial, Three Others,” New York Times, 11 July 1978, A5; and Garthoff, Détente and
Confrontation, 674.
321
322
“Statement by the President,” 14 July 1978, RL, Box 46, Folder: Soviet Jewry, 4/78-4/79
“Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by Robert
Pierpoint, CBS, on the banks of the Rhine River, Germany,” BM, 17 July 1978, 5-6, Box 2, Folder:
Brzezinski Interviews, 5/78-5/79, JCPL.
175
realities demand a rethinking of your desire to calibrate the U.S. response so as to save
stronger actions for later sentencing and subsequent acts.” “If we wait it will be too late,”
she lamented. “Congress will have preempted all but the most extreme steps” and we
“will reap nothing but a political loss.”323
Brzezinski once again agreed with the main thrust of Tuchman’s
recommendations and told Carter that words alone would not show Soviet leaders that
“we are seriously concerned” about the trials. Instead of advocating measures as far
reaching as those of Tuchman, however, he suggested that the President consider
“limiting either some exchanges with the Soviets or the flow of U.S. technology to the
Soviet Union.”324 Consistent with the Carter’s preference for calibrated responses, he
cancelled two government missions to the Soviet Union and “postponed the U.S.S.R.
Science-Technology meeting.” He also cancelled the scheduled visits of the heads of
the Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Housing and Urban
Development. On 24 July, he announced that most high-level official visits to the
Soviet Union “were being deferred in protest over Soviet violations of human
rights.”325
Carter also agreed to adopt the National Security Council’s longstanding plans for
tighter restrictions on U.S. trade with the Soviet Union. The State, Commerce, and
Treasury Departments objected to such an action, but Carter wanted to send the Soviets a
323
Memo, JT to ZB, “Human Rights-USSR,” 12 July 1978, BM, Box 28, Folder: 5/77-11/78, JCPL.
324
ZB to JC, “Weekly Report #66.”
325
“After the Russian Trials,” U.S. News and World Report, 24 July 1978, 12; and “Moscow Begins
Scharansky Trial, Three Others,” New York Times, 11 July 1978, A1; “The Moscow Trials,” 24 July 1978,
Newsweek, 20-8; “Handling the Russians,” Ibid., 31-2; and Quotation taken from Garthoff, Détente and
Confrontation, 674.
176
clear message that their behavior had tested the patience of the U.S. government.326 He
directed the Commerce Department “to put oil production technology and related
equipment on the Commodity Control List.”327 He also declined to approve the export
license required for sending the Soviet government a high-powered computer and
deferred decisions on the export of drill-bit factory and an electron beam welder.328
While Carter called these measures “moderate” in public, the United States for the first
time had placed restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union for reasons other than specific
goods’ contribution to Soviet military power. In theory at least, the U.S. government
now restricted goods “for which the Soviets had a critical need, and for which they were
largely dependent upon U.S. supply.”329
Carter may have wanted to show Soviet leaders that their domestic conduct
jeopardized Soviet-American relations, but he refused to withdraw from the SALT
negotiations that took place in Geneva from 12-13 July. During this meeting, Vance met
with Shcharansky’s wife, Avital, and raised the issue of human rights with his Soviet
counterparts. Despite these gestures, Carter’s preference for remaining an active
participant in arms control negotiations opened his administration to charges of
weakness and an unwillingness to challenge Soviet behavior in any sort fundamental
326
See Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 323. Consistent with this viewpoint, PRM-42, which appeared on
24 August 1978, called for the creation of study that outlined the best ways “to mobilize and apply our
economic and technological advantages in the competition with the Soviet Union.” See Presidential Review
Memorandum/NSC 42. Available [Online]: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/prm/prm42.pdf [23 August
2006].
327
To ship a good on the Commodity Control List, an American company needed to receive a license from
the American government.
328
Njolstad, Peacemaker and Troublemaker, 273.
329
Ibid., 277.
177
way.330 For example, a U.S. News and World Report article reported that “there is a
feeling in the Soviet capital that SALT is so important to Carter that the Russians can get
away with almost anything, anywhere.” In the opinion of a Newsweek columnist, “Carter
found and held to the calibrated response he sought; his real problem was that, having
encouraged the dissidents, he was finally powerless to help them.”331
The behavior of Carter’s subordinates did little to undermine these judgments. As
the U.S. reaction to the dissident trials played themselves out in July, U.N. ambassador
Andrew Young made a statement that must have been well received in Moscow. He
caused a political explosion in the United States when he told a French reporter that the
Soviet government’s trial of Shcharansky should have “no real effect on the course of
détente” because “we also have hundreds, maybe even thousands of people in our jails
that I would call political prisoners.” 332 Without consulting Carter or the NSC, the
Commerce and State Departments later approved the sale of the same drill-bit factory and
electron-beam welder that the President had earlier suspended pending a future review.333
330
During this meeting, Vance told Gromyko that the recent trials had “exacerbated relations” and “led to a
gap between us on a number of issues.” Four days after these negotiations ended, Avital met with Walter
Mondale and received a telephone call from Rosalyn Carter expressing her support for the cause of Soviet
dissent. See “Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski,” 3. See also “Ginzburg Gives 8-year Sentence”;
“Vance-Gromyko Hopeful on SALT Pact Despite Trials”; and Vance Gromyko Hopeful on SALT,”
Washington Post, 14 July 1978, A1. See also “U.S.-Soviet Talks Must Continue, Vance Declares,” New
York Times, 11 July 1978, A1; and Memorandum of Conversation, “Vance-Gromyko Meeting,” 13 July
1978,” in Global Competition and Deterioration of U.S. Soviet Relations; and PPOP, 1978, Volume II, 323.
331
“After the Russian Trials,” 13; “At the Wall,” Newsweek, 24 July 1978, 18; and James Burnham,
“Reflections on the Trials,” National Review, 18 August 1978, 1009.
332
“At the Wall,” 18; and “Andy Young, Dissident,” Newsweek, 24 July 1978, 22. See also Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick, “Establishing a Viable Human Rights Policy.” Available [Online]:
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Human%20Rights%20Documents/Kirkpatrick_HRPolicy.html [10
October 2006].
178
Even if the missteps described above had not taken the place, the Carter
administration’s preference for forging a “reciprocal accommodation” all but invited
accusations of weakness. Of course, the “absolute” commitment Carter made to the cause
of human rights during his inaugural address shaped this viewpoint. Whenever he
refrained from condemning Soviet behavior in public forums, many observers concluded
that the executive branch’s willingness to challenge Soviet internal behavior had
lessened.334 No matter what the administration did to show displeasure with Soviet
behavior, many critics remained convinced that the President could nevertheless still do
more. Congressmen Norman Lent (R-NY) expressed these sentiments well during this
testimony before the U.S. Helsinki Commission in July 1978. In reference to the
problem of Soviet human rights violations, he suggested that
It is not sufficient to show official concern merely by canceling the visit of some
U.S. scientists to the Soviet Union, especially while permitting Secretary of State
Vance to meet with Foreign minister Gromyko at Geneva . . . . President Carter
has spoken out strongly about the importance of human rights in the world and his
dedication to that cause. Now is the time for action to back up the rhetoric.335
While many critics have overstated how the Carter administration abandoned its
effort to promote human rights in the Soviet Union, they have every reason to argue that
his approach to U.S.-Soviet relations ignored some basic realities. The ways in which
Soviet leaders equated dissent to domestic subversion precluded any possibility that the
Kremlin would find a U.S. human rights campaign legitimate ideological competition.
333
This move enraged Carter, but he decided not to punish anyone. He feared the domestic political
consequences of such an action. See Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 324.
334
See Ruechel, “Politics and Morality Revisited,” 30; Hoffman, “The Hell of Good Intentions,” 3;
Schlesinger, “Human Rights and the American Tradition,” 503.
335
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Volume VII, 106. Senator Dole gave similar advice. See Ibid.,
33.
179
Daniel Moynihan made this point as well as anyone when he wrote that the Soviets “are
necessarily singled out by any serious human-rights offensive” because they reject
“liberty as a ‘bourgeois’ illusion.” No amount of goodwill, patience, or stressing
Brezhnev’s peaceful intentions could have changed this fundamental reality or
transformed Moscow’s hostile attitude toward dissenters.336
Carter’s identification with U.S. civil rights movement also led him to make
some unsound assumptions. He appears to have viewed human rights as the basis for an
international ideology capable of uniting disparate nations, including the Soviet Union, in
a common effort aimed at improving the treatment of private citizens. Such a viewpoint
failed to place enough weight on the how Moscow’s fear of national uprisings shaped
their attitudes toward human rights.337 Despite all his statements about the powerful
example of democracy, Carter indeed fell short of advancing the position that the Soviets
needed to adopt the governmental institutions necessary for democratic practices to
flourish.338 Instead, he remained convinced that a mixture of calibrated responses and
identifying the United States with the nebulous concept of social and economic rights
336
Moynihan, “The Politics of Human Rights,” 24.
337
Tony Smith makes a similar argument. See Ibid., America’s Mission, 264-5. Although contemporary
CIA reports sometimes questioned the seriousness of Soviet leaders, they nevertheless accurately explained
just how much Soviet leaders hated dissenters and feared the effects of their activities. For example, see
“Soviet Foreign Policy at the Crossroads,” 8 July 1977; “Soviet Objectives and Tactics at the Belgrade
Conference,” 1 May 1977; “The Soviet View of the Dissident Problem Since Helsinki,” 1 May 1977;
“Soviet-U.S. Relations: A Six Month Perspective,” N.D.; “Moscow and the Eurocommunists: Where
Next?,” 1 April 1977. Available [Online]: http://www.foia.cia.gov/ [10 June 2007]; “The Spectrum of
Soviet Dissent,” NLC-6-78-8-25-5, JCPL; and “Dissident Activity in East Europe: An Overview,” 1 April
1977, NLC-7-17-5-4-7, JCPL. See Memo, ZB to Walter Mondale, “Origins of Soviet Campaign Against
Dissidents,’ 19 July 1977, NLC-28-23-3-2-1, JCPL.
338
I find Joshua Muravchik’s arguments on this subject convincing and well-argued. See Ibid., The
Uncertain Crusade, 53-74.
180
held out the possibility of coaxing Soviet leaders in the direction of moderation and
eventual internal reform—a view that increased Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union
only fueled. Such viewpoints pushed aside the basic reality that the adoption of
institutions necessary for the proper functioning of representative government ran in
direct opposition to how the Soviet system operated in practice.
The Helsinki Accords, Private Citizens, and the Fight Against Bureaucratic
Discretion
The task of sorting out the complex ways in which transnational actors shaped the
administration’s approach to promoting human rights in the Soviet Union must begin
with the obvious. Carter and other officials may have appreciated the role private
citizens could play in “globalizing” human rights issues, but they also grasped that these
individuals and Congress wanted to hold Carter accountable for his “absolute”
commitment to human rights. On a regular basis, members of Congress and private
citizens sent letters to the executive branch expressing either their support for or
grievances with the executive branch’s efforts to help individual dissenters and/or
promote human rights in the Soviet Union. They also sent Carter letters about the
importance of securing the right of Jews to emigrate from the Soviet Union. The highlevel of Congressional and public interest in human rights meant that officials had little
choice but to forge a policy designed to enhance the executive branch’s domestic
credibility on the issue. As PRM-28 warned: “There is the potential cost if we do not
pursue a human rights policy---a backlash of public cynicism and Congressional
181
impatience and distrust, which may have an inhibiting or detrimental effect on the whole
range of the Administration's foreign policy.”339
These sentiments are important because executive branch officials often received
letters from private citizens asking them to take advantage of the information they had
amassed about conditions in specific countries. NGOs also sent the executive branch
recommendations outlining the best ways of promoting human rights across the globe.
On one occasion, Jerome Shestack wrote Carter a private letter that applauded how his
“strong commitment to human rights had evoked a wide ‘volunteer response from’ from
private groups that wanted to help implement the new policy.” To give officials the most
up-to-date information about conditions in the Soviet Union and build “’popular support
among the masses,’” he urged the State Department to engage in regular “communication
with human rights movements abroad, including dissidents.”340
Reflecting a mixture of political calculations and the practical need to acquire
accurate information, many officials followed Shestack’s advice and forged working
relationships with private citizens interested in Soviet human right violations. Two
weeks after viewing Shestack’s letter, Carter received a petition from 520 Soviet
Pentecostals asking the U.S. government to help them emigrate. After speaking with the
339
For a good view of the administration’s effort to keep closed tabs on the American public’s view of
human rights, see all the polls in the OPL, Box 75, Folder: Human Rights Reports, 3/77-11/77. In
particular, one poll highlighted the “potency of the ‘Helsinki idea.’” See Memo, Hodding Carter III to Ms.
Derian, “Recent Press Comment on Human Rights,” Ibid., JCPL. For a poll reflecting the world’s reaction
to his human rights campaign, see Memo, ZB to JC, “Foreign Public Opinion on U.S. Advocacy of Human
Rights,” 3 May 1977, NSABM, Box 28, Folder: 5/77-11/78. PRM-28, 16. To gain a feel for the vast
amount of letters Representatives and Senators related to human rights violations in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe, see WHCF, Box HU-1 at the JCPL. See also Hodgman, “Détente and Dissidents,” 269-84.
340
Letter, Shestack to Carter, February 1977, WHCF, Box: HU-1, Folder: 3/1/77-3/31/77, JCPL.
182
President, Derian decided to work behind the scenes with “private organizations to assist
members of the Pentecostal Sect and their families to leave the Soviet Union.” 341 Her
deputy, Roberta Cohen, often “brought together officials and Ambassadors [who are]
home on consultations in order to create a dialogue on policy and exchange
information.”342 Joyce Starr met with and received detailed reports about the plight of
Soviet Jews from Irene Manekofsky, the head of Union of Councils for Soviet Jews
(UCSJ). After these meetings took place, she forwarded the information she had received
to Vance and Brzezinski.343
Vance supported these exchanges. On 30 April 1977, he told an audience how the
administration's human rights policy “has been framed in collaboration and consultation
with Congress and private organizations.” In February 1978, the State Department for
the first time ever sponsored a two-day human rights conference “for about 500
341
In a move that shows how the administration never abandoned “quiet diplomacy,” Derian wanted “no
publicity for this effort, which we hope will result in substantial numbers of the Pentecostals being able to
leave.” See Memorandum for Mr. C Arthur Berg, “Appeal to President Carter from Protestant Pentecostals
in the Soviet Union (S/S/ 7707707),” 23 March 1977, WHCF, CO 165, Folder: 3/16/77-3/31/77 #2, JCPL;
and Memorandum for ZB, “Appeal to President Carter from Protestant Pentecostals in the Soviet Union,”
21 March 1977, Ibid., JCPL.
342
Memo, MH to MC, “Conference of the International League for Human Rights, December 1 and 2,
1977, Ottawa, Canada,” 15 November 1977, OPL, Box 75, Folder: Ottawa Conference Preliminaries,
12/77. See also “Seminar on Advancing Human Rights in Foreign Policy: The American Experience,”
Ibid., Folder: Ottawa Conference, 12/77, JCPL; and “American Participants at Canadian/American
conference on foreign policy and human rights---December 1-2, Quebec Suite, Chateau Laurier, OPL,
Ibid., JCPL.
343
The following works mention these meetings: Martin Gilbert, Shcharansky: Hero of Our Time (New
York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1986), 187-8; The Jerusalem Post, Anatoly and Avital Shcharansky: The
Journey Home (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), 189-93; Korey, NGOs and The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 188. The Carter administration cited an Amnesty International report in its
second semiannual report to the Helsinki Commission. See Second Semiannual Report by the President to
the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1977), 4.
On 19 June 1978, the executive Director of NCSJ told Joyce Starr about the effectiveness of her letter to
human rights NGOs. See Letter, Jerry Goodman to Joyce Starr, 19 June 1978, RL, Box 46, Folder: Soviet
Jewry, 4/78-4/79.
183
representatives of non-governmental organizations.” Vance later informed Carter that the
event’s success stemmed from “the fact that we and the non-governmental organizations
cooperated in designing the program.” Stressing the importance of carrying out an evenhanded human rights campaign, he also praised how the participants discussed “domestic
human rights issues . . . along with foreign policy issues.”344
Some officials favored forming working relationships with private groups because
they worried the willingness of lower-level State Department officials to challenge Soviet
human rights violations. On 19 June 1978, Starr wrote a memorandum lamenting how
the U.S. embassy in Moscow “has not once asked the Soviets on an official basis that”
dissenters “be allowed to exercise their Helsinki Rights.”345 Unhappy with this
development, she encouraged private citizens to hold executive branch officials
accountable for their behavior. Reflecting the existence of a broad international impulse
against bureaucratic authority and discretion described in Chapter II, she told members of
the WCSJ that NGOs
keep the U.S. government honest. . . . [and] put pressure on bureaucrats whose
limited time and global concerns sometimes prevent enough consideration of the
“human” element in policymaking . . . . Groups as yours should be encouraged to
keep the pressure up, to ask searching questions of their government, and to offer
their own ideas for policy. Government insiders do not have all the answers.346
344
During his speech, Vance also noted how the administration welcomed “the efforts of individual
American citizens and private organizations—such as religious, humanitarian, and professional groups—to
work for human rights with commitments of time, money, and compassion.” See State Department
Bulletin, 23 May 1977, 506-7. See also Memo, Cyrus Vance to JC, 1 March 1978, 4, NLC-7-20-1-1-0,
JCPL. For a negative account of this meeting, see Vogelesang, American Dream, Global Nightmare, 152.
345
Memo, Joyce Starr to Robert Lipshutz and Stuart Eizenstat, “CSCE: Failure of U.S. Diplomacy,” 18
June 1978, 2, RL, Box 46, Folder: S.D., 2/77-1/78, JCPL. See also Walter Laquer, “The World and
Carter,” Commentary 65, no. 2 (1978): 59.
346
Memo, MH to MC, “Soviet Jewry,” 15.
184
A mixture of political calculations, fears of bureaucratic discretion, and the larger
goal of “globalizing” human rights issues raised the issue of creating a Human Rights
Foundation (HRF). In defense of such a policy, Brzezinski told Carter and Mondale near
the end of 1977 that the executive branch’s behavior had created a “climate in which
American commitment to human rights is judged solely by the frequency of public
denunciations or aid cut-offs.” Now that the issue of creating a HRF had surfaced in
Congress, he warned, the administration's failure to make the measure its own would
result in more press reports about its “negative and passive role on human rights” in
comparison to “Congress' active and imaginative stance.” If we do not “make a prompt
decision on this” measure, we run “the risk of being preempted” by “Congressional
initiative.”347
Having received substantial input from a “large number” of NGOs, Brzezinski
advised Carter to endorse a NSC proposal aimed at creating a “quasi-governmental”
organization that “provided financial and other support to the non-governmental human
rights organizations in the US and elsewhere.” While this proposal never received
enough Congressional support to be enacted, the ways in which Brzezinski defended it
deserve attention.348 He called cultivating the support of NGOs crucial because they
347
Memo, ZB to JC, “Human Rights Foundation,” N.D., 1-2 and 4, NSABM, Box 28, Folder: 5/77-11/78,
JCPL; Memo, Walter Mondale to JC, “Human Rights,” 7 December 1977, RL, Box 18, Folder: Human
Rights, 12/77, JCPL. President Carter approved creating a HRF in private on 3 December 1977. See
Memo, ZB to JC, “Human Rights,” 3 December 1977, 4, Ibid., JCPL.
348
Despite the President’s behind the scenes endorsement, Congress never authorized the measure.
According to State Department Officials, the bill authorizing creation of the HRF never passed because
some influential NGOs such as Amnesty International expressed their fear that the proposed foundation
would “become oriented only towards Eastern Europe” and the Soviet Union. Even more important, Carter
shied away from showing more open support for the creation of a HRF because of his articulated stance
185
could provide the government with “a critical assessment of how well our policies are
working” and “longer term trends in individual countries and regions.” These
organizations could also provide “direct help and psychological support for dissenters”
by awarding them prizes or “helping to finance the publication and distribution of
suppressed works.” Most of important of all, Brzezinski noted, a HRF could play a vital
role in generating and sustaining a “worldwide constituency for human rights” through
activities such as holding “international conferences on human rights issues” and
“serving as a central clearinghouse for information on human rights.” Over time, a HRF
could become an “’echo-chamber’” that amplified “the voices of individuals and
numerous small groups.”349
The executive branch’s handling of the Belgrade follow-up meeting also reveals
the complex ways in which public opinion, Congressional pressure, and fears of
bureaucratic inertia shaped its efforts to promote human rights in the Soviet Union. As
Chairperson of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, Dante Fascell called for a close
collaboration between Congress and the executive branch on all matters related to the
Final Act. He also called on executive branch officials to work with private citizens as
part of a larger effort to publicize the Final Act violations of communist countries.350 As
William Korey points out in his work The Promises We Keep, Vance proved “responsive
against the “creation of new [federal agencies].“ See Memo, Madeline Albright to ZB, “Congressional
Human Rights Vote,” N.D., NSABM, Box 28, Folder: 2-4/77.
349
350
Memo, ZB to JC, “Human Rights Foundation,” 2-4.
The last point comes across in the following letter: Memo, Dante Fascell to Cyrus Vance, “Discussions
on Cooperation between Department of State and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,”
3 February 1977, Box 48, Folder: Unmarked, RCSCE , USHCF, NA. Fascell praised the role of NGOs
played in bringing public concerns to the attention of the U.S. delegation in his article “Did Human Rights
Survive Belgrade,” Foreign Policy 31 (Summer 1978): 108, 117-8.
186
to the Fascell proposals” concerning how the executive branch should handle Belgrade
meeting. He instructed State Department officials to “share relevant information with
commission staff.” He also “agreed to have the Commission and its staff represented on
the U.S. delegation to the Belgrade preparatory session in June and at the regular session
beginning in October.” 351
Placed in charge of the administration’s handling of follow-up conference,
Warren Christopher ensured that Commission staff members attended State Department
meetings on the Belgrade Conference; he also directed the Bureau of European Affairs
(BEA) to give staff members all classified material related to preparations for Belgrade.
In a letter to Brzezinski, Vance explained why he wanted to form a good working
relationship with Commission members. “I have reason to believe,” he wrote, “that the
CSCE [Final Act] Commission was set up in the first place mainly because of Executive
Branch unwillingness to consult fully with Congress on CSCE.” In practice, “the
consultations that I am authorizing with members of Congress will tend to reduce, not
increase, the chances that they will push for the creation of similar commissions, for
example on SALT.”352
Vance’s efforts to satisfy Fascell’s concerns failed to erase the fundamental
tensions that existed between the Commission and the BEA. In short, some members of
BEA rejected the idea that either Congress or private citizens should play an important
role in how the executive branch monitored signatories’ compliance with the Final Act.
351
Korey, The Promises We Keep, 41-2.
352
Ibid.; and Memo, CV to ZB, Untitled, 22 March 1977, NSABM, Box 13, Folder: 3-10/77, JCPL.
187
Career State Department officials such as Albert Sherer, Jr., who served as head of U.S.
delegation during the Belgrade preparatory session, also rejected Fascell’s calls for the
visible citations of human rights violations at Belgrade. They feared that such a strategy
ran the risk of undermining U.S. relations with NATO and Western European countries
that favored “quiet” human rights diplomacy over public exhortations.353
These sorts of sentiments account for why some members of the Commission
became uneasy with the administration’s willingness to confront the Soviet Union about
the issue of human rights violations at Belgrade. This viewpoint surfaced when Vance
testified before the Commission on 6 June 1977. When he indicated that the U.S.
delegation had no plans to mention the plight of Shcharansky, Clifford Case (R-NJ)
questioned if the State Department had the will to stand up to the Soviet Union. He told
the Secretary of State that he had real concerns “about having this thing [Belgrade
Conference] run by a bunch of professional diplomats.” “I don’t know if you can break
free from it,” he remarked, “because I have not seen yet the kind of spirit to have the
knock-down, drag-out, real confrontation [with the Soviet Union] that I think is called for
at this stage.”354
353
Korey, The Promises We Keep, 68-72. See also Albert W. Sherer, Jr., “Goldberg’s Variation,” Foreign
Policy 39 (Summer 1980): 154-159.
354
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Volume IV, 94-6. Some State Department officials also hoped
that the U.S. delegation would take a low profile at Belgrade in comparison to Western European nations
just like it had during the negotiations that led to the creation of the Final Act. This mentality helps explain
why they became “horrified” when NSA Brzezinski suggested that the administration “have a paper
prepared which deliberately examined the “advisability of a confrontationist approach” at Belgrade. See
Korey, The Promises We Keep, 70-2; Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 135-6, 140; Brzezinski, Power and
Principle, 297; and Letter, Jim Huff to R. Oliver Spencer, 27 July 1977, Box 48, Folder: State Department
Correspondence, 1976-1977, RCSCE, USHCF, NA. Documents at the Carter Library reveal that Goldberg
had to resist State Department Pressure not to name individual dissenters at Belgrade. See “Memorandum
188
Despite Vance’s assurances that the U.S. delegation would discuss specific Soviet
human rights violations, many Congressional members and private citizens remained
uncertain about the State Department’s willingness to engage in public human rights
diplomacy at Belgrade. In a report dated August 1977, the Commission urged the
administration to stand firm during the conference and cite the names of imprisoned
Helsinki monitors. The depth of Congressional concern became even more apparent
when a bipartisan group of 127 Representatives and 16 Senators later sent Carter a letter
that asked the U.S. delegation to cite specific human rights violations in Belgrade.355
Under the intense pressure of the Commission to work with private citizens, State
Department Counselor Matthew Nimetz invited a wide variety of NGOs to attend a
CSCE meeting about Belgrade on 9 September 1977. After sending out the invitations,
he received a reply from “ten leading ethnic groups” that still expressed uneasiness with
the executive branch’s previous behavior. They demanded that U.S. delegates use the
follow-up meeting to describe the human rights violations of Warsaw Pact nations.356
As Congressional and public critics wanted, Carter and Brzezinski proved
sympathetic to arguments calling for a thorough review of each signatory’s Final Act
implementation record at the Belgrade follow-up meeting. Downplaying Western
European concerns that the meeting would turn into “a judicial proceeding” on Soviet
internal behavior, they wanted the State Department to stand firm on the issue of human
of Conversation with Arthur Goldberg, 28 December 1977,” 6 January 1978, RL, Box 46, Folder: SD,
2/77-1/78, JCPL.
355
U.S. Helsinki Commission, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe: Findings and Recommendations Two Years After Helsinki (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1977), 19. See also Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 146.
356
Korey, The Promises We Keep, 73-4.
189
rights.357 The official internal guidelines that Vance approved for this meeting ended up
reflecting this point of view. He asked members of the BEA s to relay the message that
the U.S. delegation “would give clear expression to the President’s commitment to press
Eastern governments for improved Final Act compliance.” The United States would also
not accept arguments that criticizing signatories’ human rights records represented
interference in their “internal affairs.”358
These instructions are also important because they reveal how Vance and other
officials recognized the existence of a broad international impulse against bureaucratic
discretion and authority. Unlike the negotiations “shrouded in secrecy” that resulted in
the creation of the Final Act, U.S. delegates would work with NGOs to show the Soviets
that they could not pull away from Belgrade “without suffering public and political
criticism here and in Europe.” In a fashion similar to Commission, the State Department
also hoped that NGOs would help the U.S. delegation challenge communist
governments’ intolerance for diversity and pluralism by holding public press conferences
and passing out non-official literature in Belgrade They even asked representatives to
“thank” NGOs for: 1) keeping “us honest when bureaucratic expediency creeps into
decision-making”; 2) keeping us “informed by bringing to light detailed concerns related
to the Helsinki Accords”; 3) keeping “us thoughtful by providing innovative suggestions
357
358
Ibid.
“CSCE: Meeting with NGOs,” September 9, 1977, 8 September 1977, 2-3, OPL, Box 53, Folder: HR—
CSCE/Helsinki Commission, Articles and Printed Materials, JCPL. See also Fascell, “Did Human Rights
Survive Belgrade,” 116-8.
190
for better compliance—including here in the U.S”; and 4) helping “to make our policy by
pressing your concerns, even if results do not show themselves immediately.”359
Since Carter had vowed to “let the American people be involved as deeply as
possible” in the creation of U.S. foreign policy during the 1976 campaign, he also proved
sympathetic to the Commission’s goals of encouraging “public diplomacy” and
facilitating “citizen participation.” He instructed the U.S. delegation to include all
members of the Commission; he also appointed public delegates and consultants “from
business, academia, the labor movement and other walks of life.” Because Carter wanted
to have the delegation reflect America’s diversity, the public appointees came from
backgrounds as different as a Polish-American political science professor, an AfricanAmerican female lawyer, and a union representative. To show his commitment to a
thorough review of implementation records, he replaced the professional diplomat Albert
Sherer as head of U.S. delegation in favor of the former Supreme Court Justice and U.N.
Ambassador Arthur Goldberg in late September 1977.360
The selection of Goldberg proved important because he made a conscious effort
to implement the State Department’s official guidelines once the Belgrade meeting
began. Under his direction, U.S. delegates cited specific examples of Soviet human
359
360
“CSCE: Meeting with NGOs,” 3-4.
Korey, The Promises We Keep, 73-4; and Thomas, Helsinki Effect, 141. See also State Department
Special Report, “The Belgrade Followup Meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe: October 4, 1977-March 9, 1978,” June 1978, no. 43 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Public Affairs),
5. See also Second Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 1-2; Third Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 1-4 and 23; and Fourth Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 1-15.
191
rights violations. They also supported the decision of public delegates to hold press
conferences and describe the Soviet Union’s hostility toward human rights criticisms.
Even though some BEA members still favored closed sessions, the U.S. delegation
lobbied to make these meetings open to private citizens. It also made a conscious effort
to hold frequent press conferences and pass out copies of the speeches members had
given behind closed doors.361 Delegates also touched base with the representatives of
NGOS that had sent them volumes of information about individuals who faced
governmental repression and conditions in specific signatory nations. For example,
Ambassador Goldberg met a group of Soviet exiles when he returned to Washington for a
brief visit in January 1978. He also went out of his way to make sure that the
representatives of NGOs that came to Belgrade had the chance to consult with and
provide information for members of the U.S. delegation.362
The complaints of private citizens played a critical role in the decision of the U.S.
delegation to cite the arrest of Ukrainian Helsinki monitors during the Belgrade meeting.
In November, the president of the Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee, Bohdan
Yasen, sent Fascell a private letter complaining how U.S. delegates had ignored the plight
of Ukrainians. He could not understand this oversight. At the State Department CSCE
361
See Michael Wall, “Design to Avoid Confrontation,” in Mastny, ed., Helsinki, Human Rights, and
European Security, 166-7; Lord Thomson Monifieth, Belgrade and After: Report of the Helsinki Review
Group (London: David Davies Memorial Institute, 1978), 7-8, 19. Nils Andren and Karl E. Birnbaum,
Belgrade and Beyond: The CSCE Process in Perspective (Amsterdam: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1980), 7
and 9-10. See also Korey, The Promises We Keep, 74-5. Brzezinski succeeded in having U.S. radios relay
information about the Belgrade conference. See Memo, ZB to Gregory F. Treverton, “Briefing the Press
on CSCE,” 17 February 1978, BSABM, Box 13, Folder: 11/77-4/78, JCPL.
362
Memo, Joyce Starr to Robert Lipshutz, 12 January 1978, RL, Box 46, Folder: S.D., 2/77-1/78; and
Memo, Meg Donovan to Michael Klosson et al., “Paper on Press and Public Participation in the CSCE,” 1
January 1984,” Box 48, Folder: State Department Correspondence, 1984, RCSCE, UHCF, NA.
192
conference, officials had assured him that events in Ukraine would receive “top priority
at Belgrade.” After hearing about this oversight from Fascell, a U.S. delegate raised the
names of the Ukrainian monitors whose plight Bohdan had emphasized in his original
letter to the Commission Chairperson.363
Congressional and public pressure forced reluctant members of the BEA to work
with private citizens within the confines of the Helsinki process. On 27 October 1977,
Commission staffer Al Friendly sent a memorandum to Fascell that called on the State
Department to hold small conferences so “they can engage with the NGOs.” Since these
organizations distrusted the motives of the European Bureau, “they want . . . the
opportunity to eyeball those people and keep heat on them.” American delegates in
Belgrade need such a meeting because “everybody has worked too hard to have” NGOs
“jump off the boat now.” After viewing this letter, Fascell sent a note to Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs George Vest encouraging him to meet with
disgruntled NGO representatives. “They want a chance to lecture you, not just be
lectured at,” he noted, “and in the interests of keeping them from taking their discontents
to the broader public, it might be worthwhile to hear them out while reassuring them.”
Perhaps sensing that the State Department could no longer ignore the wishes of NGOs
interested in the Final Act, Vest followed Fascell’s advice. In late November, Goldberg
and BEA representatives held “a very successful small meeting with representatives of a
363
Letter, Bohdan Yasen to Dante Fascell,” 29 November 1977, Box 48, Folder: Belgrade—U.S.
Statements, RCSCE, USHCF, NA; and “Basket I Statement by R. Spencer Oliver,” 12 December 1977, 12.
193
cross-section of concerned organizations to afford them an opportunity for a first handreport.”364
By holding the executive accountable, Congressional and public opinion made
important contributions to Carter’s long-term goal of creating an international
environment more conducive to human rights. Just after this meeting ended, the North
Atlantic Council issued a communiqué that condemned the Warsaw Pact position that
raising human rights issues represented “interference” in a nation’s “internal affairs.”
The same document also affirmed the important role private citizens played in holding
governments accountable for their internal behavior.365
The steps that the executive branch had taken to strengthen the international
legitimacy of citing governmental human rights violations does not mean that Carter had
given up on his larger goal of forging a “reciprocal détente.” As Chapter VI will show,
the “restraint” the Soviet Union showed in the wake of July trials led him to believe that
signing SALT II would lead to improvement in U.S-Soviet relations, including how the
Kremlin treated dissenters. While he also viewed the signing of an arms control treaty as
a critical step in increasing the global appeal of American ideals, the Soviet Union’s
behavior defied his hopes and expectations. When Moscow launched a systematic
campaign to eradicate dissent and invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Carter became enraged
364
Letter, Al Friendly to Dante Fascell, “General-CSCE,” 27 October 1977, Box 48, Folder: State
Department Correspondence, 1976-1977, RCSCE, USHCF, NA; Letter, Fascell to George Vest, 28 October
1977, Ibid.; and Letter, Vest to Fascell, 19 November 1977, Ibid.
365
Texts of Final Communiques, 1975-1980, Volume II (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1980), 91.
On 7 October 1977, Brzezinski gave Carter a poll showing the Western European public’s overwhelming
support for universal rights such as emigration and “access to information from other countries.” See
Memo, BZ to JC, “Weekly Report #31,” 7 October 1977, BM, Box 41, Folder: Weekly Reports, 16-31,
JCPL.
194
and passed a wide array of punitive measures that left Ronald Reagan with the task of
rebuilding U.S.-Soviet relations.
195
CHAPTER 5: THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT VERSUS DISSENTERS:
CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE “GLOBALIZATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS” AND JIMMY CARTER, JANUARY 1977-AUGUST 1978
Near the end of 1976, the Belgium private citizen Antoon Pype received
permission from Soviet authorities to visit the USSR as part of a student exchange
program. As a member of Flemish Action Committee for Eastern Europe, he decided to
test the Soviet government’s willingness to adhere to the provisions of the Final Act. At
Leningrad University, he passed out leaflets that called for the free flow of information
between Western and Eastern Europe. He also handed out a document from the Russian
émigré organization NTS that advocated the creation of a “democratic and prosperous
Russia.”366 The Soviet government did not stand for this kind of behavior. It arrested
Pype for “anti-Soviet” propaganda and sentenced him to five years in a strict regime
labor camp. An article in an official Soviet newspaper justified this harsh sentence on the
grounds that this individual had consorted with the “fascist” organization NTS before his
trip to Leningrad It also marveled at how tourists who came to Soviet Union “under the
pretext of ‘exchanging information’” thought they could pass out “slanderous and
pornographic publications” without any repercussions.367
Transnational human rights actors made sure that Western governments heard
about this development. In May 1977, the Belgium NGO Helsinki Agreements
Implementation Group (HAIG) sent a letter to all Final Act signatories urging them to
366
HAIG, “The Antoon Pype Case,” OPL, Box 70, Folder: Helsinki Agreements (Watchers), 5/77, JCPL.
367
Hodgman, “Détente and the Dissidents,” 287-90; and CDSP 29, no. 34 (21 September 1977): 12.
196
challenge the Soviet government’s sentencing of Pype. “The infringements . . . of human
and civil rights” in the USSR, it warned, “are a first step towards violent interference
with the internal affairs of all other states.” By preventing the free flow of information
across European borders, the USSR jeopardized the “mutual knowledge and
understanding” among private citizens necessary for peace in Europe. Around the same
time, a U.S. representative of HIAG sent President Carter a letter with a similar
message.368
This episode demonstrates that the importance Carter administration officials
placed on supporting transnational human rights activities was not misplaced. Inside the
Soviet Union, a wide array of dissenters continued to work toward educating the rest of
the world about the inherent brutalities of the Soviet system.369 Shaped by a broad
international impulse against bureaucratic discretion and authority, they managed to form
additional non-official groups aimed at holding Soviet officials accountable for their
behavior and protecting themselves from further repression. Dissenters also had notable
success in advancing the idea that private citizens could not leave the task of creating an
open and free world (i.e. universal glasnost) to governments alone. Taking advantage of
the ever-shrinking globe, dissenters and Western private citizens formed an increasing
number of transnational links with each other. While these activities posed no immediate
threat to Soviet power, they played an important role in moving Western governmental
368
HAIG, “To All Governments of the States Participating in the Helsinki Conference, OPL, Box 70,
Folder: Helsinki Agreements (Watchers), 5/77, JCPL; Letter, HAIG to Jimmy Carter,” Ibid.
369
Edward Bailey Hodgman addresses this issue in his dissertation “Détente and the Dissidents.” See
Chapter VII, especially pages 401-3.
197
and global public opinion in the direction of challenging the totalitarian features of Soviet
society.
Besides examining how dissenters evaluated the Carter administration’s efforts on
their behalf, this chapter will also look at the behavior of the Soviet government. As they
had in the past, orthodox officials continued to link dissident critiques, transnational
human rights activities, and the behavior of the U.S. government to a global conspiracy
designed to destroy the foundations of Soviet power. Bent on preserving the territorial
integrity and international legitimacy of their multinational empire, they employed a wide
variety of measures to discredit and disrupt the activities of dissenters and transnational
human rights actors. They also made a concerted effort to strengthen the international
reputation of Soviet-style socialism and challenge the U.S. government’s human rights
record.
The ways in which Soviet leaders attempted to legitimize their internal conduct
are revealing. From their perspective, they had taken the steps necessary to defend the
ideological conformity and political power structure that made the Soviet Union a
universal model. This ideologically driven mindset complicates arguments that Carter
could have done much more to promote human rights in the Soviet Union during his first
year and a half in office. If anything, the ways in which his administration worked with
and encouraged private actors to “globalize” Soviet human rights violations proved
effective. It helped prevent Soviet leaders from obtaining the international legitimacy
they wanted to capture without changing their domestic and international behavior in any
fundamental way.
198
Soviet Dissenters’ View of the Human Rights Weapon, the Soviet Government, and
the Carter Administration
The Soviet government’s visible arrests of dissenters in the first half of 1977
failed to eradicate non-official activities related to human rights. New private groups
came into existence such as the Initiative Group to for the Defense of the Rights of the
Invalids (Invalid Group), Catholic Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Believers,
and the Association of Free Trade Unions of Workers (AFTU). The publication of nonofficial literature at home and abroad also showed few signs of abating.370 Because
Soviet officials refused to consider their appeals, many dissenters, including avowed
nationalists, went out of their way to stress the binding nature of universally recognized
human rights. This strategy had obvious advantages. Drawing on a common vocabulary
allowed them to subsume their differences while at the same time legitimizing their
struggle. Even a dissident journal as focused as A Chronicle of the Catholic Church in
Lithuania stressed the important unifying power of human rights. “One of the most
remarkable aspects of the dissident movement in the USSR today, an article explained,
“is the way in which it has united [the] Orthodox Christian, Jew, Catholic, and agnostic in
the common cause of human rights.”371
370
See Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, 349-50, 353-5; Roy Medvedev, “The Future of Soviet Dissent,” Index on
Censorship 8 (March-April 1979): 27-8. See also Horvath, The Legacy of Soviet Dissent, 81-138; and
Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent, and Reform in Soviet Russia, 75-131; Valery Chalidze, The Soviet Human
Rights Movement: A Memoir (Washington, D.C.: The American Jewish Committee, 1984), 1-17.
371
CCCL 21 (1978): 1. Valery Chalidze’s analysis supports these insights. See CHRUR 26 (April-June
1977): 48-50. See also Sakharov, Alarm and Hope, 142; Hyung-Min Joo, “Voices of Freedom: Samizdat,”
Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 4 (June 2004): 579-87; and David Kowalewski, “The Multinationalization of
Soviet Dissent,” Nationalities Papers 11, no. 2 (1983): 206-9.
199
Many dissenters also viewed human rights promotion as a flexible ideology
capable of uniting private citizens with very different views of the world. On numerous
occasions, Sakharov called defending human rights “compatible with such wide ranging
ideologies as the communist, the social-democratic, the religious, the technocratic, and
that of the national ‘native roots’.” He also believed that human rights appealed to those
“who are tired of the abundance of ideologies which do not bring people simple human
happiness.” The Ukrainian Watch Group endorsed this position, noting that “the struggle
for human rights is not the internal affair of this or that state, but rather “the internal affair
of a united mankind.”372
These ideals should not obscure that Sakharov and other dissenters viewed the
promotion of universal human rights as the best way of protecting themselves from the
arbitrary authority Soviet bureaucrats wielded over them. For example, a Ukrainian
Watch Group document explained that international human rights agreements “should not
be viewed as the right of a bureaucrat to allow me this or that.” Instead, they should be
viewed as the “right of man to turn the sword of law” on bureaucrats hostile to basic
freedoms.373
Dissenters also stressed the importance of universally recognized human rights for
at least two other important reasons. This strategy lent credibility to their arguments that
372
Sakharov, “The Human Rights Movement in the USSR and Eastern Europe: Its Goals, Significance,
and Difficulties,” in ed., Alexander Babyonyshev, trans. by Guy Daniels, On Sakharov (New York:
Random House, 1982), 259; and Yasen and Verba, The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine, 83.
373
Yasen and Verba, The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine, 79; “Deep Gratitude: Appeal of P. G.
Grigorenko to Norwegian Society,” SB 47 (March 1977): 1. See also “To the World Community, to All
People of Good Will, to All Who Hold Dear the Principles of Democracy, Freedom and Human Rights,”
Ibid, 1.
200
the Soviet Union’s repression of peaceful, non-official activity ran counter to how
legitimate, modern states behaved. Members of the Moscow Watch Group argued that
the “Soviet authorities have literally been reduced to a hysterical state by . . . the exposes
compiled by” our group’s activities. “Nothing else can explain” the return to the
“Stalinist methods” of planting incriminating materials in the homes of dissenters. “In
trying” to apply these methods, the document concluded, “the Soviet authorities have lost
their sense of reality.”374
Many dissenters also stressed how the Soviet government’s lack of respect for
basic human rights posed a threat to the international community. During his
Congressional testimony in February 1977, Vladimir Bukovsky argued that the Soviet
Union will remain a threat to the world “until the time when . . . a public opinion is
established which is capable of controlling the Soviet state.”375 The Soviet émigrés
Andre Amalrik and Valentin Turchin published a letter in the Washington Post that
outlined the close link between Soviet officials’ respect for human rights and American
security. They defended the position that “the best guarantees of American security
would be the evolution of the Soviet Union from a closed society in which the question of
374
Documents of the Helsinki Monitoring Groups in the USSR and Lithuania (1976-1986), Volume I
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 86-7; and CCE 48 (1978): 9. See also
“Psychological Terror of the KGB,” SB 69 (January 1979): 4. See also Yasen and Verba, The Human
Rights Movement in Ukraine, 38, 131. Sakharov spoke about the Soviet Union’s “uncivilized” behavior on
numerous occasions. See Sakharov, Alarm and Hope, 143-163.
375
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Volume I, 28; CCE 47 (1977): 73; and “Sakharov on Human
Rights,” Newsweek, 14 March 1977, 31. See also U.S. Helsinki Commission, The Right to Know, the Right
to Act: Documents of Helsinki Dissent from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1978), 116; and Bukovsky, “How A Dissident Describes ‘Human Rights in
Russia,” U.S. News and World Report 14 March 1977, 22.
201
a nuclear strike is decided by five or ten individuals . . . into an open society . . .
controlled by the people.”376
Since they viewed publicity as their most effective weapon, individual dissidents
also continued to stress the fundamental role private citizens played in holding
governments accountable for their conduct. During his Congressional testimony, an
exiled member of the Ukrainian Watch Group called the Final Act “too important to be
left solely to governments” and announced that private citizens in signatory states should
follow the example of Soviet monitors and publish reports about their government’s
compliance with the agreement. In May 1977 the exiled dissenter Valery Chalidze
expressed his satisfaction that “the movement’s links with Western human rights
organizations . . . . have markedly expanded in recent years.” By working with
governments, he argued, an informed Western public can play a crucial role in securing
the “fulfillment by the Soviet Union of its obligations under international human rights
conventions and agreements.”377
The growing links between Soviet dissenters and the Western private citizens
Chalidze wrote about took many different forms. Near the end of 1977, three dissident
groups chose to align their movements and exchange documents with HAIG. Around the
same time, exiled Soviet lawyers and Western private citizens invited Ambassador
Dobrynin to attend public hearings in Washington, D.C. concerning the Kremlin’s
justifications for arresting Shcharansky. The city of Cleveland, Ohio held a “human
376
377
CHRUR 29 (January-March 1978): 23.
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Volume I, 63; U.S. Helsinki Commission, The Right to Know,
the Right to Act, 74; and CHRUR 26 (April-June 1977): 49-50.
202
rights week,” which included public seminars in which émigrés from Warsaw Pact
countries described human rights violations in their native lands. On 20 April 1978, the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) denounced the Soviet practice
of repressing individuals who attempted to form independent labor unions. Unhappy
with dissident trials of 1978, the United Auto Workers Union cancelled scheduled visits
to Soviet automobile factories.378
Making reference to materials that they received from Western NGOs about
psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union, the World Psychiatric Association censured the
USSR for the “political use” of psychiatry in 1977. Members of the Invalid Group
managed to have their documents published in the West describing the poor conditions
that disabled individuals faced in the Soviet Union. New transnational groups also came
into existence such as Alexander Ginsburg and Orlov Defense Committees, as well as
Scientists for Sakharov, Orlov, and Shcharansky (SOS). The latter group organized an
American moratorium on scientific exchanges with the Soviet Union, which gained the
support of over 2,400 American scientists. In July 1978, the group held a rally for
Shcharansky at the University of California featuring a performance by the folk artist
Joan Baez.379
378
Helsinki Agreements Implementation Group, “Press Release—October 22, 1977—Soviet Citizens Join
the H.A.I.G.,” OPL, Box 75, Folder: Helsinki Agreements and Belgrade Conference, JCPL; “Human
Rights Internet Newsletter,” 3, no. 4 (January/February 1978): 5-8, OPL, Box 75, Folder: Human Rights
Publications, 2/78, JCPL; and CHRUR 30 (April-June 1978): 8-9. See also U.S. Helsinki Commission,
Implementation of the Final Act on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings and Recommendations
Five Years After Helsinki (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Press, 1980), 100-1.
379
CHRUR 29 (January-March 1978): 7-10; and Andre W. Sessler, “Physicists and the Eternal Struggle for
Human Rights.” Available [Online] http://www.aps.org/publications/apsnews/199510/human-rights.cfm
[21 October 2007].
203
The importance many dissidents placed on generating international publicity for
their cause helps explain why they found Carter’s public rhetoric so important. “For the
first time since the establishment of the Soviet regime,” a dissenter wrote, “the head of a
world power communicated directly with the representatives of the human rights
movement in the USSR.” “Until now, communist leaders considered it their exclusive
privilege to offer support to their sympathizers all around the world.”380 The prevalence
of this attitude meant that most dissenters rejected the argument that Carter’s public
rhetoric had increased the scale of Soviet repression.381 Instead, they viewed the
Kremlin’s conduct as a direct challenge to Carter’s human rights campaign designed to
test his resolve. As Amalrik put it, “the Soviet Union wants to see how tough Carter
is.”382
Because many dissenters stressed Moscow’s penchant for intimidation, they
warned Carter not to deemphasize the importance of human rights in deference to Soviet
sensibilities and interests. A Ukrainian dissenter named Geily Sneguirev addressed a
letter to Carter--no evidence he ever received it--arguing that future positive changes in
Soviet behavior will depend on “whether you, Mr. President, will be firm in your actions
380
Sakharov, Alarm and Hope, N.A., N.T., SB 47 (March 1977): 1. One dissident even referred to Carter’s
staunch defense of human rights as a miracle. See CCE 46 (1977): 107; and “Human Rights Internet
Newsletter.”
381
Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents, 235; and “Dissidents versus Moscow, 21. See also, Dave Zimmerman,
The Associated Press, 9 February 1977, N.P.; and “Sakharov on Human Rights.”
382
“The Dissidents v. Moscow,” Time, 21 February 1977, 21; and Implementation of the Helsinki Accords,
Volume IV, 56. See also “Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn’s Statement to the Western Press,” SB 48 (April
1977): 1; Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Volume VII, 48, 51; and “Dissidents to Continue Rights
Battle; Dissidents Vow to Continue Struggle For Human Rights; Sakharov Asks Waldheim to Aid Jailed
Activists,” Washington Post, 16 July 1978, A1.
204
as you announced.”383 Vladimir Shelkov, Chairman of the unofficial Seventh-Day
Adventist Church, asked Carter “not [to] allow the economic ties of your country with
ours” and “all the technical, scientific, cultural, and other such arrangements to take
precedence” over your “holy Christian and humanitarian obligation” to defend
dissenters.384 According to another dissident, “the decisive hour has come in which
either the social-political monster called the Socialist Superpower will gain the upper
hand over human reason once and for all, or human reason will conquer.” Since “our
superpower appears . . . to resemble a wagon rushing down a slope,” “may God give you
the strength to stop the wagon.”385
As these words suggest, many dissenters felt as if the Soviet government’s desire
to test Carter’s firmness on human rights only scratched the surface of its larger goal of
challenging the West’s commitment to human freedom.386 Alexander Solzhenitsyn put
this position in stark terms when he argued that the Soviet repression of dissent “concerns
the people of the West more than is immediately apparent. It is a “substantive step by the
Soviets in their unrelenting preparation” for a wider global struggle against the “strength,
spirit, and very existence of the West.”387 When speaking before Congress in February
1977, Bukovsky argued that “the fate of these people [dissenters] and of the Helsinki
383
384
385
G. Sneguirev, “Sneguirev’s Inspiring Letter to Carter,” SB 54 (October 1977): 2 and 6.
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Volume IV, 94-6.
CCE 47 (1979): 31.
386
“The Dissidents v. Moscow,” Time, 21 February 1977, 21; and Implementation of the Helsinki Accords,
Volume IV, 56. See also “Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn’s Statement to the Western Press,” SB 48 (April
1977): 1; Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Volume VII, 48, 51; and “Dissidents to Continue Rights
Battle; Dissidents Vow to Continue Struggle For Human Rights; Sakharov Asks Waldheim to Aid Jailed
Activists,” Washington Post, 16 July 1978, A1.
387
“Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn’s Statement to the Western Press,” SB 48 (April 1977): 1.
205
agreement depends on the reaction of Western countries.” [I]f the Soviet leaders become
convinced that protests about the persecutions in the Soviet Union are not a temporary
expedient of the West, they will have no choice but to” change their internal behavior
over the long term.388 Sakharov voiced similar sentiments. He believed that the scale of
Soviet repression would only increase if Western governmental officials and private
citizens failed to defend Carter’s statements about Soviet human rights violations.389
The quite accurate perception that the Soviet Union wanted to challenge Western
nations’ commitment to human rights accounts for why many dissenters placed particular
importance on the Belgrade review conference. In reference to this event, Sakharov
posed the question: “Is the West prepared to defend those noble and vitally important
principles? Or will it gradually, in silence, acquiesce” to the Soviet government’s refusal
to respect basic civil liberties? A group of political prisoners sent Carter an appeal that
called on Western states and “world public opinion” to raise the issue of Soviet human
rights violations in Belgrade and call into question the Kremlin’s harassment of private
citizens who had criticized the government “without the permission of the Communist
party.” Timing their actions with the beginning of the preliminary talks in Belgrade,
these individuals also announced their decision to assume the legal status of political
prisoner as defined by international law in hopes of attracting “the attention of the world
public.” Another group of prisoners sent a letter to Final Act signatory states that called
Soviet government officials “barbarians, hypocrites, [and] criminals” who “do not want
388
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Volume I, 29.
389
Sakharov, Alarm and Hope, 53.
206
peace.” They felt obligated to issue such a statement because the world had “not yet
encountered the barbed wire of the concentration camps.” “Your partners in the
negotiations are not diplomats,” the prisoners warned, “but jailers.”390
The Moscow Watch Group demanded that the United States and other Western
nations discuss Soviet violations of the Final Act in detail. It also called on these
countries to reject the argument that such discussions violated Principle XI (noninterference in signatories’ internal affairs). It also asked that the West “agree on . . .
formal criteria on the fulfillment of the obligations concerning human rights” and insist
on the creation of an international organization dedicated to disseminating information
across national borders.391 While some demanded that the West refuse to discuss Basket
III until the Soviets released all “arrested members of the Helsinki Watch Group,” most
appear to have favored Western governmental declarations calling for the immediate
release of individuals arrested for monitoring the Final Act.392
These recommendations in no way imply that dissenters held a uniform view of
what constituted Western “resolve” and “firmness.” The roots of these differences lie in
how individuals defined the proper trajectory of U.S.-Soviet relations and viewed the
costs and benefits of pursuing some form of détente. Like many other dissenters,
Solzhenitsyn expected Western governmental officials and private citizens to denounce
390
Yankelevich, “The Political Thinking of Sakharov”; and CHRUR 28 (October-December 1977): 41-2.
See CHRUR 28 (October-December 1977): 12.
391
“Summarized Document of the Group to Promote the Observance of the Helsinki Accords in the USSR
for the Conference at Belgrade [October 1977],” SB 53 (September 1977): 9-11.
392
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Volume IV, 49. See also “By Andrei Sakharov,” New York
Times, 4 October 1977, 37.
207
Soviet repression in public as much as possible and send dissenters valuable items such
as food and money. On the other hand, he viewed the West’s pursuit of détente as
“another Munich.” Discounting the importance of Basket III, he viewed the Final Act as
a symbol of abject Western capitulation. As a result of this mindset, he advocated that
Americans give up arms control negotiations that in practice only weakened their ability
to defend themselves against the massive Soviet military buildup. To ease the plight of
dissenters, he also called on Western nations to stop the food and technology exports to
the Soviet Union that in practice only contributed to the “Kremlin’s ability to control and
pacify the population.”393
Bukovsky endorsed a similar position. He argued that United States should not
pursue a “Détente with the Soviet Union so long as” the Kremlin “continues to violate
human rights.” In fact, Bukovsky argued that “until the Soviet Union starts to fulfill its
obligations with its treaties, no normal relations and good relations . . . with the Soviet
Union can be granted.” He even likened the continuation of détente to “saying that you
can improve the conditions of the inmates of the jail by drinking champagne with the
jailor.”394
When appearing before Congress, Bukovsky praised Carter’s recent statements
defending dissenters, but pointed that the West would have to do much more to prevent
the Kremlin from crushing the movement. He insisted that the United States would have
393
Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents, 204. See also Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Détente: Prospects for
Democracy and Dictatorship (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980), 23-4. See also Reddaway,
Dissent in the Soviet Union, 141.
394
“Labor Leaders Hear Russians’ Rights Appeal,” Washington Post, 26 February 1977, A8.
208
to rigidly link increases in Soviet-American trade to tangible improvements in Moscow’s
Final Act compliance record. To strengthen this argument, he explained how the devices
the KGB used to monitor dissenters “are made in the West” and indicated that “the
handcuffs he wore when he was expelled from the Soviet Union were inscribed ‘Made in
the U.S.A.’”395 Bukovsky could very well have directed this last statement at Carter, who
had rejected the concept of rigid linkages on a number of occasions. Yet, he refrained
from criticizing the President in public during the first few months of 1977, perhaps
hoping that Carter administration officials would move closer to some of his views.396
Much like Bukovsky and Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov called for a general amnesty for
all nonviolent political prisoners and urged Carter to speak out about human rights abuses
whenever possible. He also feared the consequences of improvements in U.S.-Soviet
relations based on Kissinger-style or a Soviet-defined détente. Without solving
fundamental global problems such as the nuclear arms race, Soviet leaders could exploit
such a path to keep their “closed” society isolated from the rest of the world. He
therefore urged Western governments to utilize their strengths when dealing with the
Soviets. “I do not believe the West utilizes fully the opportunities provided by détente in
assuring the success of the human rights movement,” he argued. “There is not enough
pressure put on the Soviet Union.”397
395
Hearings Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Implementation of the
Helsinki Accords, 95th Congress, Volume 1, 23-24 February and 15, 17 March 1977 , 28; and “Labor
Leaders Hear Russians’ Rights Appeal.”
396
397
Bukovsky, “How a Dissident Describes ‘Human Rights’ in Russia.”
Sakharov, Alarm and Hope, 40, 102-110; Sakharov, “The Human Rights Movement in the USSR and
Eastern Europe,” 25-3; and Efrem Yankelevich, “The Political Thinking of Sakharov,” in Allan Wynn et
209
This position seems clear enough, but Sakharov’s vision of Western firmness
differed from those of Solzhenitsyn and Bukovsky. He endorsed the importance that
Carter placed on a signing a SALT treaty and frowned upon using food embargoes as a
way of punishing Soviet leaders for their human rights violations.398 He supported the
Jackson-Vanik amendment on the grounds that the measure reflected the moral
commitment of Americans to helping individuals who suffered at the hands of the Soviet
government. Yet , he criticized boycotts that required the Soviet Union either to back
down or accept the demands of a foreign government. In his view, these types of
measures often resulted in “dead-end” situations that had little chance of improving
Soviet conduct in either the short or long term. He therefore believed that Western
governments could best show their displeasure with Soviet human rights abuses by
defending Soviet dissenters in public in conjunction with calibrated measures such as
trade restrictions and the cancellation of various cooperative exchanges without rigid
public ultimatums. As this viewpoint suggests, Sakharov shared Carter’s fears that a
wholesale abandonment of détente would only succeed in further cutting off the Soviet
Union from the rest of the world and increase the scale of Soviet repression. He
explained this position to an American journalist: “It mustn't be forgotten that it was only
Détente that created conditions for at least a minimum influence on the policies of
al., ed., Fifth International Sakharov Hearing, 192; and N. Borisov, “The Hopes and Apprehensions of D.
Sakharov,“ SB 60 (April 1978): 1-2.
398
N. Borisov, “The Hopes and Apprehensions of D. Sakharov.”
210
[Communist] countries.” “A [complete] retreat [from Détente ],” he argued, “would be a
disaster.”399
The views of the dissenter/historian Roy Medvedev in many ways diverge from
the positions outlined above. Although his statements in defense of Western communist
parties enraged Yuri Andropov, he believed that Western governmental pressure and
dissenters could not play fundamental roles in reforming Soviet society. With a fair
amount of justification, he argued that a weak and divided dissident movement without a
coherent political program or strong links to the general population could not offer a
viable alterative to the Soviet system for the foreseeable future. Foreshadowing
arguments that Mikhail Gorbachev would later advance, he believed that Soviet Union
could transform itself into a pluralist, law-abiding socialist state along the lines Lenin
supposedly envisioned before Stalin’s bureaucratic distortions appeared. In defense of
this position, he described the existence of committed Soviet reformers who might one
day find themselves in a position to introduce fundamental economic and political
reforms. In other words, he had faith that enlightened Soviet leaders would one day
emerge and transform their centralized, bureaucratic political system in ways designed to
meet the challenges of functioning in an era of economic and political globalization.400
399
Sakharov, “The Human Rights Movement in the USSR and Eastern Europe,” 7. See also Dean,
“Contacts with the West,” 55; and Ernest Clark, “Russian Dissidents Debate on Détente,” Dissent (Spring
1975): 117. Sakharov, “Human Rights: A Common Goal,” New York Times, 27 June 1978, 22; Sakharov,
Alarm and Hope, 25-30; CHRUR 30 (April-June 1978): 20.
400
Roy Medvedev, On Soviet Dissent: Interviews with Piero Ostellino, trans. William A. Packer, ed.
George Sanders (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 13, 51, 78, 120-1, 134-7, 147. See also
Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents, 207-9; Medvedev, “The Future of Soviet Dissent,” 25-31; Medvedev,
“Problems of Democratization and Détente ,” 7.
211
Since Medvedev believed that Soviet-style socialism could become more tolerant
and humane over time, he in effect “separated détente from the democratization of the
Soviet system.” He advanced this view because of his faith in the transformative power
of the global flows of information that accompanied détente. Over time, such
developments would put reformers in a stronger position to carry out the reforms needed
to make the Soviet system more “pluralistic” and tolerant of non-socialist opinions.401
Defending this viewpoint, Medvedev told a journalist that curbing cooperative links to
penalize Soviet leaders for their internal behavior “would play into the hands of the most
reactionary elements in the Soviet leadership.”402 In the end, “it is precisely in periods of
détente that the efficacy of public opinion grows considerably in shaping the internal
affairs of each major power. By contrast, a country which is isolated and cut off from the
outside world by various Cold War barriers becomes insensitive to protests and views
beyond its borders.”403 Needless to say, Medvedev found the Jackson-Vanik amendment
a counterproductive measure and applauded Henry Kissinger’s efforts to improve the
Soviet Union’s respect of human rights through “quiet” diplomacy.404
The small sampling of views described above underscores the reality that the
Carter administration could never have satisfied the expectations of all dissenters. Given
the importance most of them placed on standing firm, however, the executive branch’s
401
Hyung-Min Joo, “Voices of Freedom,” 580; and Medvedev, On Soviet Dissent, 110-2. See also Clark,
“Russian Dissidents Debate on Détente,” 118.
402
Ken Coates, ed., Détente and Socialist Democracy: A Discussion with Roy Medvedev (New York,
Monad Press, 1976), 141.
403
Coates, ed., Détente and Socialist Democracy, 140-1; and Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents, 201.
404
Medvedev, On Soviet Dissent, 68.
212
preference for calibrated responses to Soviet domestic misconduct invited accusations of
weakness. Sakharov may have supported Carter’s SALT negotiations, but he believed
that the President made a bad mistake when he expressed reservations about the State
Department’s denunciations of Soviet behavior after viewing the dissenter’s personal
letter to the President. Carter’s vacillation “had serious repercussions,” Sakharov wrote.
“It was seen in both the USSR and USA as a disavowal of the State Department’s
words.”405 In his memoirs, Sakharov lamented how Carter’s tendency not to back up his
words with forceful action often gave the Soviet government more leeway to arrest
dissenters.406
While evidence strongly suggests that Carter’s comment on the State
Department’s handling of the Sakharov letter was a bureaucratic mix-up, other dissidents
expressed similar views.407 Irina Orlova (Yuri Orlov’s wife), a member of the Helsinki
Watch Group and strong supporter of Soviet-American arms control, blamed Alexander
Ginzburg’s arrest on the Carter administration’s handling of the Sakharov letter. When
she heard about the arrest, she grabbed the nearest Western journalist and told him: “You
betrayed us.” “The U.S. president’s hesitation had sent a message to the KGB that the
United States wouldn’t stand up for the dissidents.”408
405
Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade, 16.
406
Sakharov, Memoirs, 466.
407
See Strong, Working in the World.
408
Goldberg, The Final Act, 219. For a similar view, see Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, 343-4.
213
As hinted at earlier, Bukovsky ended up finding the Carter administration’s
efforts to promote human rights in the Soviet Union wanting. He believed that the
President had “failed to grasp the dimension of his task” and shied away from penalizing
the Soviets with hard-hitting economic sanctions or reductions in exchanges until the
Afghanistan invasion took place. Instead of utilizing U.S. strengths, Carter contented
himself with toothless rhetoric and in effect turned “the White House into an annex of
Amnesty International.”409 Other dissenters advanced similar arguments. In reference to
the 1978 dissident trials, Amalrik argued that they might not have taken placed if Carter
had engaged in more public human rights diplomacy and taken more concrete steps to
make the USSR comply with the Final Act such as curbing economic relations or
suspending SALT negotiations.410 Of course, Medvedev criticized the Carter
administration from a different angle. He blamed its vocal human rights diplomacy for
causing the Soviet authorities to strike a clause from the 1977 Soviet constitution that
would have permitted free emigration. Without any reference to past Soviet conduct, he
also argued that vocal U.S. human rights diplomacy only increased the likelihood that a
crack down on dissent would take place.411
In sharp contrast to how U.S. representatives viewed their efforts, a number of
dissenters found the results of the Belgrade Conference disappointing. During the
proceedings, the Moscow Watch Group sent a document to signatory states expressing its
409
Vladimir Bukovsky, trans. by Denise H. Wood, ed. Alexis Klimoff, To Chose Freedom (Stanford:
Hoover Institution Press, 1987), 47.
410
Andre Amalrik, trans. by Guy Daniels, Notes of a Revolutionary (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982),
290-5.
411
Medvedev, On Soviet Dissent, 68-9.
214
reservations about Western delegations’ hesitation to address issues such as nationality
problems, the persecution of religious groups, and the political use of psychiatry. It
warned Western nations not “to capitulate or vacillate in the face of this sort of blackmail
or analogous threats” because such a development would cause “irreparable
consequences for the future of mankind.” When the conference ended, the same group
issued a report condemning the failure of the Belgrade concluding document to mention
human rights. Such a development represented “a step backwards from the Final Act
itself which affirmed the unbreakable link between the observance of human rights,
security and cooperation.” This omission prompted Bukovsky to pose the question:
“What did the West do with the information obtained at such a high price [Helsinki
Watch Group reports]? At the first review conference in Belgrade it was decided ‘not to
demand too much’ from the Soviets, which in practical terms meant not to demand
anything at all.”412
Despite these criticisms, many dissenters still appreciated Carter’s efforts to
promote human rights in the Soviet Union. In particular, they praised U.S. efforts to
reach audiences in Soviet Union through international broadcasting and found Carter’s
embrace of human rights inspiring.413 Ida Milgrom, Anatoly Shcharansky’s mother,
wrote an open letter to the President praising his efforts to support her son: “All the
difficult days of the trial, I have been standing in front of the iron barriers, in front of a
412
U.S. Helsinki Commission, Documents of the Helsinki Monitoring Group in the USSR and Lithuania,
Volume I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 169. Korey, The Promises We
Keep, 98; and Bukovsky, To Chose Freedom, 179. See also Sakharov, “Human Rights,” 22.
413
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Volume IV, 55. See also Implementation of the Helsinki
Accords, Volume I, 31; and “Sakharov Speaks to the AFL-CIO.” See also “The Dissidents versus
Moscow,” 24.
215
thick wall of KGB men and militiamen . . . All these days I have heard your sincere,
authoritative voice in defense of innocent men.”414 As a token of their gratitude, Soviet
Pentecostals referred to Carter as nash, best translated as “one of us.” Mstislav
Rostropovich, the world-class cellist who refused to return to the Soviet Union while
traveling abroad, sent Carter a letter reading: “[y]our noble, brilliant, and courageous
defense of the most precious commodity given by God to man---freedom of the soul--will bring you gratitude not only of your contemporaries, but also of their descendants as
well.” After viewing this letter, Carter sent him a reply that thanked him for his kind
words and referred to his music as “an inspiration.” “As President,” he promised, “I’ll try
not to disappoint you.”415
These words are appropriate because the disappointments of dissenters often
reflected a view that the U.S. government could always do more to support their cause.
When speaking on a CBS program speaking about the trial of her husband, Avital
Shcharansky expressed her hope that the Carter administration would carry out even
stronger economic sanctions in the near future designed to increase Jewish emigration
levels and do something “special” to win the release of her husband. 416 Alexander
Slepak thanked administration officials for their efforts to help members of his family
emigrate from the Soviet Union, but also posed the question: “Will you continue to do
414
Drumbell, The Carter Presidency, 126.
415
Letter, Mstislav Rostropovich to JC, 31 March 1977, WHCF, BU-Box 1, Folder: 1/20/77-1/20-81,
JCPL; and Letter, JC to Rostropovich, 5 April 1977, Ibid; and Goldberg, The Final Act, 152. See also
Hodgman, “Détente and the Dissidents,” 285-6.
416
Avital Shcharansky, My Husband, the Soviet Dissident, CBS Tape Recording, July 1978, no.2 (New
York: Encyclopedia Americana/CBS News Resource Library, 1978).
216
more?”417 Pytor Grigorenko, a World War II Soviet general who spent time in a
psychiatric hospital for his dissent activities, expressed similar sentiments. After praising
Carter’s stance on human rights, he asked him for more support: “Mr. Carter! Look after
all of us . . . . in the name of the Lord.” Without delay, “[p]lease invite all these
Christians [to emigrate to the United States] and . . . help them financially.”418
Some dissenters thought that ignorance of how Soviet-style socialism operated in
practice best explained why the United States government had not done more for their
cause. During her testimony before the U.S. Helsinki Commission, Natalia
Solzhenitsyna (wife of Alexander) thanked Americans for speaking out against the Soviet
government’s violations of the Final Act. At the same time, she reiterated that these
gestures did not go far “enough.” To elicit a more forceful response, she begged U.S.
citizens to think about “why these rights and agreements are being violated.” Before
searching for compromise, they needed to remember that a “Communist regime cannot
exist without a Gulag Archipelago.” If Americans kept this consideration close to their
hearts, they would not shy away from difficulties involved in supporting dissenters and
transforming Soviet internal behavior.419
In some ways, Sakharov shared this viewpoint. Near the end of 1978, he wrote
articles about conditions in the Soviet Union that appeared in prominent Western
publications. He used these forums to outline the Kremlin’s scorn for basic human rights
417
Alexander Slepak to Robert Lipshutz, 26 December 1977, RL, Box 46, Folder: S.D., 2/77-1/78.
418
Pytor Grigorenko, “Three Documents in Defense of Mikola Rudenko,” SB 61 (March 1978): 3.
419
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Volume VII, 84.
217
and civil liberties. He also explained how the Soviet government had failed to solve a
myriad of nationality problems in the Baltic republics and Ukraine. Furthermore, he
warned Western audiences not to accept Soviet officials’ arguments about their nation’s
inherent equality and respect for social and economic rights at face value. In reality,
there is “tremendous social inequality between the working masses” and officiallyrecognized professionals and government bureaucrats, as well as the average Soviet
citizen’s paltry salary.420
Although serious problems still existed in the Soviet Union, Sakharov warned
Western governments and private citizens not to fall victim to a “short-sided pragmatism”
capable of seeing “instantaneous solutions for the most complex problems of peace and
justice.” In effect, he asked them and other dissenters to take a longer view of recent
global developments. “Despite some slip-ups and compromises,” he argued, “the West in
general made it very plain that the observance of human rights is a matter of fundamental
significance and will remain a central issue.” In particular, the Belgrade conference
represented the “first time specific human rights violations were discussed at such a
representative international level.” Even more important, the discussions at Belgrade
“drew the attention of the press, public figures, and world opinion.” Despite the best
efforts of the KGB: “The world has not only received a wealth of information, but also
believed in it.”421
420
Sakharov, “The Human Rights Movement in the USSR and Eastern Europe,” in On Sakharov, 244-53;
and Sakharov, “Human Rights,” 22.
421
Sakharov, “Human Rights,” 22; Sakharov, “The Human Rights Movement in the USSR and Eastern
Europe,” in On Sakharov, 255-6.
218
Because of the growing attention private citizens paid to human rights issues and
events like the Belgrade conference, Sakharov concluded that “there is no basis for
stating that the human rights movement has been defeated.” On the contrary, “the human
rights struggle in the USSR and Eastern Europe has substantively changed the moral and
political climate of the entire world.” Over time, he reasoned, the efforts of a “unified
human rights movement” would set the stage for the “moral victory of the ideology of
human rights over the ideology of totalitarianism.”422 While an impressive vision, Soviet
officials did not see global developments in quite the same way and acted to make sure
that Sakharov’s hopes for the future never came true.
“Provocative Damage Control”: The Soviet Government’s Efforts to Curb Dissent,
Neutralize the Helsinki Accords, and Stymie U.S. Human Rights Criticisms
The vast crack down on dissent that the Soviet government appears to have
prepared for near the end of 1976 never materialized. Such a development in no way
stemmed from changes in the reports that Andropov sent to the Central Committee. In a
memorandum dated 5 January 1977, he once again described how private citizens in
Helsinki monitoring groups across the Soviet Union “have significantly stepped up their
collection and dissemination to the West of slanderous materials” that called into
question Soviet compliance with the Final Act. As he had in the past, he equated the
peaceful activities of these groups to revolutionary violence. To justify this charge, he
noted that KGB searches had uncovered (i.e., planted) “weapons, foreign currency, large
sums of Soviet rubles, and pornographic literature” in the homes of several dissenters.
422
Yasen and Verba, The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine, 79; and “Sakharov Speaks to the AFLCIO,” 2.
219
He also connected Watch Group members to subversive foreign groups, noting that
officials had “unearthed a large quantity of slanderous materials prepared . . . for
transportation to the West.”423
On the same day as Carter’s inauguration, Andropov issued another report about
the activities of Orlov, Ginsburg, and several nationalists from various republics. He
described how Western journalists, secret services, and U.S. embassy employees had
stepped up their efforts of “encouraging the anti-Soviet movement. . . . [to] draw the
world’s attention to violations of the Helsinki Accords in the Soviet Union.” These
nefarious forces preyed on susceptible individuals such as “Zionists, Crimean Tatars,
Meskhettian Turks, and religious sects.” They also encouraged individuals to make
appeals to foreign governments “containing vile slander of Soviet life” and hold “press
conferences” for the benefit of foreign journalists. Even worse, the global forces aligned
against the Soviet Union hoped that dissenters would “use the upcoming Belgrade
Conference as a basis for legalizing open anti-Soviet declamations . . . and activity.”424
Andropov advocated a vigorous governmental response to combat these
developments. He justified arresting a wide array of dissenters on the grounds that “we
are depriving them (especially Orlov and Rudenko) of the ability to cause controversy in
the West and the negative reaction in some communist parties.” Carrying out trials
423
Memo from Andropov to CC CPSU, "On Measures for Stopping Hostile Activities of the So-called
Group for Assistance of Implementation of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR,” 5 January 1977.
Available [Online]: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB191/KGB%2001-05-1977.pdf [19
January 2007].
424
“Resolution of secretariat of CC of CPSU, “On Measures for Stopping Criminal Activities of Orlov,
Ginsburg, Rudenko, and Ventslova,” 20 January 1977. Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB191/index.htm [7 January 2007].
220
would also disabuse dissidents of the notion that visible Western support on their behalf
gave them immunity against arrest. By undertaking vigilant “pre-emptive” measures and
conducting trials, “the ruling circles of Western countries” would “be shown the
ineffectiveness of their policy of sabotage and pressure towards the Soviet Union.” The
political significance of these measures, he wrote, “will come from the fact that they will
influence the situation in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Polish People’s
Republic, [and] other socialist countries.” Much like the Soviet Union, Andropov
reported, these nations “are presently being subjected to mass pressure from both hostile
internal elements and international imperialism.”425
In preparation for the arrests that took place over the course of the next several
months, Soviet authorities continued their “prophylactic” work, which consisted of
“intensive surveillance,” searching individual dissidents’ homes, and confiscating any
non-official publications they found. They also kept disconnecting telephone lines and
used the confessions of one-time dissidents to denigrate individuals who called into
question Soviet human rights practices. In an official Soviet publication, a confessor
repudiated his past dissident activities and attacked Alexander Ginsburg for his desire “to
remake our whole country in the Western mold.” He also explained how dissenters
gathered “various embittered, morally unstable persons . . . who blame all their troubles
on Soviet rule” in return from money from the CIA and fame in Western countries.426
425
426
Ibid.
“The Role of the KGB in World Affairs,” SB 51 (July 1977): 1; and CDSP 29, no. 4 (23 February 1977):
3-5.
221
The Jewish doctor S. L. Lipavsky wrote an open confession to the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet, U.S. Congress, and the United Nations. 427 In an obvious attempt to
link the existence of Jews who wanted to leave to the Soviet Union to Western intrigues,
he described how CIA agents tricked Jewish families into emigrating because they
wanted to “weaken the foundations of Soviet power.” “The enemies of socialism and the
Soviet state,” he insisted, “are deliberately exploiting the so-called human rights question
for the benefit of imperialism and world reaction.” On 22 January, the film Buyers of
Souls appeared on Soviet television. It referred to Slepak, Shcharansky, and Yosef
Begun as “’agents of world Zionism’” bent on “destroying the country from within.”428
Carter may have attempted to deflect the impression that his human rights
statements were only aimed at the Soviet Union, but Andropov failed to pick up on the
nuances of the President’s approach to Soviet-American relations. In February, he
reported that “[i]deological centers and Zionist organizations “have involved the new
Carter administration and prominent senators” in treacherous “anti-Soviet activities.” He
also described how U.S. embassy officials “transmitted a large quantity of hostile antiSoviet literature to” a Georgian nationalist and “incited Lithuanian nationalists to
increase their activities.” American officials even had the audacity to disseminate
“Zionist materials” “while visiting the Moscow synagogue.”429
427
S. L. Lipavsky was in all likelihood a KGB informant who had worked with the CIA and dissenters at
the behest of the Soviet government.
428
CDSP 29, no. 9 (30 March 1977): 1-3; and Avital Shcharansky, trans. Stefani Hoffman, Next Year in
Jerusalem (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1979), 86.
429
Andropov to the Central Committee, “U.S. government activities in defense of human rights,” 18
February 1977. Available [Online]:
http://www.yale.edu/annals/sakharov/documents_frames/Sakharov_123.htm. [20 January 2007]. In public,
222
Brezhnev shared Andropov’s evaluation of U.S. behavior. He called the Carter
administration’s human rights campaign an “outrageous” ideological attack on the Soviet
Union that illustrated the President’s willingness to please reactionary domestic opinion.
In March 1977, he stated that “our people demand that such so-called public [dissident]
figures be treated as opponents of socialism, as persons acting against their own
motherland, [and] as accomplices and agents of imperialism”---a viewpoint official
Soviet publications drove home with force.430 He also took the position that Carter had
designed his human rights campaign to “loosen” the Kremlin’s control of the Soviet
Union. These sentiments explain why he sent Carter a letter that criticized the
President’s interference in Soviet “internal affairs” and correspondence with “an apostate
[Sakharov] who has proclaimed himself an enemy of the Soviet state.”431
A few weeks after Brezhnev sent this letter, the Politburo sent detailed
instructions to Ambassador Dobrynin about how to handle the topic of human rights
during his upcoming meeting with Cyrus Vance. “No reference to human rights,” the
document read, can hide the reality that “American intelligence services” have
undertaken a campaign designed to undermine “the Soviet social system.” These
Andropov voiced similar sentiments. See Y. V. Andropov, Speeches, Articles, and Interviews: A Selection
(New Delhi: Allied Publishers Private Limited, 1984), 103.
430
The Collapse of Détente: From March 1977 Moscow Meetings to the December 1979 Invasion of
Afghanistan—The Launch of The Carter-Brezhnev Project: A Conference of U.S. and Russian
Policymakers and Scholars Held at the “Playhouse” on the Rockefeller Estate Pocantico Hills, New York,
22-24 October 1992, 11, Washington, D.C., NSA; and Leonid Brezhnev, Peace, Détente, and SovietAmerican Relations (New York: Harcourt and Jovanovich, 1979), 155.
431
Andropov, Speeches, Articles, and Interviews, 104; and Dobrynin, In Confidence, 391. See also
“Memorandum of Conversation between Averell Harriman and Ambassador Dobrynin, Soviet Embassy,”
14 September 1978 IV-356 in Global Competition and Deterioration of U.S. Soviet Relations, IV-240, V264.
223
instructions also called on Dobrynin to criticize the administration’s approval of
“American journalists” and “USA Embassy personnel in Moscow . . . whose only interest
is to find and publicize the so-called ‘dissidents.’”432
During his meetings with Vance and Carter, Foreign Minister Gromyko stuck to
the position that no American had the right to raise matters that only pertained to Soviet
“internal affairs.” When Carter continued to defend American conduct, Gromyko grew
frustrated. After one of these meetings, he met with Dobrynin and commented, “What
kind of man is he with ‘human rights’? He is always bringing up human rights, human
rights—what for?” As the Ambassador himself later remarked, Gromyko on one
occasion “complained to me” about the President’s behavior “as if I was a representative
of Carter.”433
Besides condemning Carter’s statements about Soviet human rights violations,
Soviet officials also criticized the links that the U.S. executive branch had formed with
NGOs. In the official work Human Rights, Soviet legal expert, Samuel Zivs, castigated
the Carter administration’s determination to make greater use of “non-governmental
channels” and “pseudopublic organizations” such as “Amnesty International” and the
“World Jewish Congress.” Well aware of how these groups helped shape international
opinion, he explained how they prostituted the issue of human rights, “using the issue of
democracy to provoke political confrontation and manipulate public opinion.” When
432
CPSU Central Committee Politburo Decision “About the instruction to the Soviet ambassador in
Washington for his conversation with Vance on the question of ‘human rights’ and the text of instruction,”
18 February 1977. Available [Online]: http://cwihp.si.edu [6 February 2004]
433
See also SALT II and the Growth of Mistrust, Conference #2 of the Carter-Brezhnev project: A
Conference of U.S. and Russian Policymakers and Scholars held at Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons
Island, Georgia, 6-9 May 1994, 210, NSA.
224
combating the activities of these groups, Zivs warned, Soviet officials would “be
objective, informed, and resolute in exposing the enemies of peace and détente.”434
Even though Soviet officials arrested dissenters and condemned transnational
human rights activities, they made pragmatic concessions to satisfy the concerns of
global public opinion. Take the example of how Andropov dealt with Elena Bonner’s
requests to travel abroad for medical treatment. He had little doubt that Bonner would
engage in anti-Soviet activities on such a trip. Nevertheless, he reminded the Central
Committee that approving her previous foreign travel requests had paid dividends in the
past. When Bonner accepted the Nobel Prize for her husband in 1975, she spoke in such
a provocative manner that Sakharov’s reputation “among the Soviet intelligentsia” and
wider world suffered a great blow. He also defended granting Bonner’s request because
the “rejection of a trip for medical treatment will entail large costs [for the Soviet Union]
in terms of propaganda.”435
During the preparatory and main meetings of the Belgrade Conference (June 1977
to March 1978), Soviet leaders still arrested a wide array of dissenters. Yet, they also
made a conscious decision not to put well-known Helsinki monitors such as Shcharansky
on trial until this conference ended.436 They also either forced or allowed a number of
individuals to emigrate from the Soviet Union rather than imprison them. One week
before the International Stern Tribunal conducted hearings in Amsterdam on the
434
Zivs, Human Rights, 180-1.
435
Rubenstein and Gribanov, ed., The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov, 228-9.
436
For a copy of a document outlining this rationale, see Benjamin Pinkus, “The Soviet Regime vs.
Anatolii Shcharansky: New Soviet Documentation,” Shevut 22 (1997): 143-5.
225
treatment of Soviet Jews, the Kremlin released Mikhail Stern, a Jewish doctor who they
had arrested on bribery charges after his sons applied for emigration. This maneuver
coincided with a dramatic rise in Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. The arrests
of Orlov and Shcharansky may have received widespread international attention, but the
Soviet government refrained from arresting as many “Helsinki monitors” as it could
have. In fact, the total number of known dissident arrests in 1977 represented “the lowest
figure since 1965.”437
These pragmatic concessions do not mean that Soviet officials had become less
worried about the ways in which the existence of dissent threatened their regime’s
internal cohesion and image as a legitimate superpower. As they had in the past, Soviet
leaders carried out a wide array of steps designed to curb dissent and transnational human
rights critiques. The decision of the World Psychiatric Association’s General Assembly
to censure the Soviet Union’s use of psychiatry for political purposes had little impact on
Andropov’s behavior. Following his orders, KGB agents continued to put dissenters in
psychiatric hospitals, especially those from Ukraine.438 On one occasion, Andropov
found time to tell the Central Committee “that one third of the ‘activists’ who
engineered” a demonstration on the International Day of Human Rights (10 December)
“are [now] being treated by psychiatrists.”439
437
See Edward Kline, “The Helsinki Process: A Balance Sheet,” in The Fifth International Sakharov
Hearing, 182-3.
438
“One Year After Helsinki: A Group of Soviet Citizens Reports,” SB 48 (April 1977): 1. U.S. Helsinki
Commission, The Right to Know, the Right to Act, 148; and Amnesty International, Prisoners of
Conscience in the USSR: Their Treatment and Conditions (London: Amnesty International, 1980), 183.
439
Rubenstein and Gribanov, ed., The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov, 229.
226
Besides warning Soviet citizens about the dangers of foreign ideological
contamination, the Kremlin continued to keep close tabs on the behavior of Sakharov. In
a Central Committee report dated 26 March 1978, Andropov noted that “Sakharov
champions Ukrainian and Baltic nationalists, Zionists, reactionary clergymen, and
sectarians, and would-be emigrants and passes anti-Soviet documents produced by them
to [U.S. diplomats].”440 This attitude helps account for why “a total of thirty-two active
measures against Sakharov . . . were either in progress or about to commence both within
the Soviet Union and abroad” in “early 1977.” One of these “active measures” consisted
of sending Western European gay rights organizations forged letters claiming that
Sakharov belonged to a gay liberation movement in Byelorussia. Instead of delivering
him an invitation to speak before the AFL-CIO in the United States, the KGB replaced
the invitation with a picture of an “extinct monster brontosaurus,” which Sakharov
understood as a reference to the union’s leader George Meany.441
Andropov also advocated “active measures” when he found out that Ginsburg,
Orlov, and Shcharansky might receive the Nobel Peace Prize for their strong defense of
human rights. He explained global support for this initiative as a result of the ways in
which “the intelligence services and ideological centers of the United States and
European capitalist states” manipulated the “means of mass information.” While some
individuals “were convinced anti-Soviets,” many public figures in areas as diverse as
440
Andropov to the Central Committee, “Sakharov increases his contacts with foreign diplomats in
Moscow,” 26 March 1978. Available [Online]:
http://www.yale.edu/annals/sakharov/documents_frames/Sakharov_130.htm [19 January 2007].
441
Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 325, 549. On more than one occasion, the Soviet
authorities the charge of homosexuality when arresting dissenters. See CCE 47(1979): 129-30. See also
“Sakharov Speaks to the AFL-CIO,” SB 58 (February 1978): 2.
227
“science, literature, and art” only voiced their support because they had fallen prey to
“foreign propaganda.” “Whatever the case,” Andropov wrote, these individuals
“contribute to the formation of public opinion, which is inclined to perceive the award of
the prize as something deserved.” After making these observations, he requested
permission “to organize a statement in the Soviet press” designed to “arouse a perception
of the award of the Nobel Prize” as an “overt provocation” rather than something . . . [to]
be taken seriously.”442
Andropov went so far as to order the residency in Norway to undertake “active
measures” to “ensure” that the dissidents’ [Nobel Prize] candidacy “failed.” In a
campaign that he himself directed, KGB officials used “reliable assets” to pressure
Norwegian political leaders into not granting the award to “provocative . . . anti-Soviet
agitators.” As one report from Norway highlighted, these “reliable assets” told
Norwegian officials that giving such a prize to “Orlov and his committee” would weaken
Soviet-Norwegian relations. According to Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin’s
work The Sword and the Shield, the KGB viewed these operations as a tremendous
success because the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize went to Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin
rather than the dissenters.443
442
“Andropov to the Central Committee; On Western Proposals to award the Nobel Prize to Soviet human
rights activists,” August 1978. Available [Online]:
http://www.yale.edu/annals/sakharov/documents_frames/Sakharov_132.htm [22 December 2006].
443
Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 329-30. As this work also points out, KGB foreign
residencies received instructions in 1977 to combat subversive foreign activities at the local level. See
Ibid., 559. Official Soviet publication also tried to the famous cellist Mstilav Rostropovich to “White
émigré organizations.” See CDSP 30, no. 15 (10 May 1978): 5-6. See also Andrew and Mitrokhin, The
Sword and the Shield, 325, 560
228
The close attention KGB officials paid to Western media was no accident because
the Brezhnev regime also tried to short-circuit the transnational human rights
communication network by utilizing U.N. institutions. On the eve of the July 1978
dissident trials, the Soviet government charged and later convicted (19 July) two
American journalists stationed in Moscow who had reported about dissident activities of
slander and libel. The court ordered the journalists to pay fines and write retractions in
both the Baltimore Sun and New York Times. In a fashion similar to how Soviet members
of UNHRC received instructions to advance the idea that human rights questions only
pertained to state’s “internal competency,” the Soviets advanced a proposal in UNESCO
that in effect would have given governments a document to cite when censoring the press
reports of foreign journalists. It would have accomplished this task by holding
governments accountable “for the activities in the international sphere of all mass media
under their jurisdiction.” In theory, a government could censor all reports that failed to
promote “international peace and security,” détente, and the “national liberation of
peoples.”444
This Soviet-backed proposal produced bitter debates between Western and nonWestern nations concerning the information monopoly of the former. While Western
representatives were in the minority, the declaration that UNESCO ended up making
about the mass media’s role in facilitating the exchange of information failed to
incorporate the Soviet delegation’s main proposals. In particular, the United States and
444
CDSP 30, no. 29 (16 August 1978): 3; N.A., “No, no Unesco; Unesco's draft declaration on the media
threatens press freedom. Britain should tell Mr. M'Bow so,” 16 September 1978, The Economist, 17;
“UNESCO and the Press,” 27 October 1978, Washington Post, A23. See also CDSP 30, no. 17 (24 May
1978): 18.
229
Western European countries succeeded in advancing the notion that the mass media
played an important role in advancing the cause of human rights. One section of the
concluding document called on journalists to draw attention to those “who are unable to
make their voices heard within their own territories.”445
The Soviet Union’s efforts to legitimize a greater governmental role in controlling
press reports about their nations reflected a determination to discredit U.S. human rights
practices and failures to abide by the provisions of the Final Act. For example, official
newspaper articles complained about how American officials refused “to issue visas to a
delegation from the USSR Seaman’s and River Transport Workers’ Trade Union” and
import more Soviet books. They also criticized the decision of the U.S. Congress to reimpose some of the travel restrictions that Carter had lifted the previous year in
retaliation for dissident trials that took place in 1978. During an interview with an
American journalist, Georgi Arbatov posed the question of what the United States would
do if the Soviet government “established close ties with the American Indians who fought
at Wounded Knee?”446 Coinciding with the beginning of the Belgrade conference’s
preparatory sessions, Isvestia ran an interview with the “political prisoner” Ben Chavis,
the main defendant of the “Wilmington 10” court case. He thanked Soviet citizens for
sending him letters of support and explained how “many political prisoners are in
445
“UNESCO Accepts Declaration Avoiding Controls Over Press,” 23 November 1978, Washington Post,
A34. See also “Declaration on Fundamental Principles concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to
Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to
Countering Racialism, apartheid and incitement to war,” 28 November 1978.” Available [Online]:
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13176&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html
[1 October 2007].
446
CHRUR 25 (January-March 1977): 22.
230
American” jails. When questioned about the Carter administration’s human rights
campaign, he replied, “I view it as unparalleled hypocrisy.” “Rights and liberties are
advertised for the purpose of foreign policy, but are fragrantly violated within our
country—that’s the way our system is.”447
On 12 June 1977, Soviet officials participated in a debate with American private
citizens and Carter administration representatives about the status of human rights in the
United States and Soviet Union. During the discussions, which NBC broadcast on U.S.
network television, Soviet representatives became agitated. One took strong exception to
a journalist’s contention that Americans would never be able to “trust a country which
cannot allow its citizens to publish or read whatever they want to.” In response, he posed
the question: “Why are the new administration and mass media so busy defending
human rights?” “This well-orchestrated anti-Soviet campaign, he argued, “is one of the
manifestations of revival of forces hostile to the Soviet Union and Socialism.” “The aim
of the campaign” of such a campaign “is to distract the American people from their own
problems.”448
Soviet representatives at the Belgrade follow-up meeting found the U.S.
delegation’s public statements about human rights issues and the naming of persecuted
dissenters embarrassing and provocative.449 The head of the delegation later called the
Soviet position on human rights “weak,” but at the time he defended the position that the
447
CDSP 29, no. 21 (22 June 1977): 7.
448
CHRUR 26 (April-June 1977): 19-20.
449
SALT II and the Growth of Mistrust, Conference #2 of the Carter-Brezhnev Project, 97, 206, 209;
“Memorandum of Conversation between Averell Harriman and Ambassador Dobrynin, 3 March 1978, IV338 in Global Competition and the Deterioration in U.S.-Soviet Relations, NSA.
231
most important parts of Final Act dealt with the promotion of good relations between
signatory states; he also held fast to the position that the provisions of the agreement in
no way shielded dissenters from imprisonment under Soviet laws. Unhappy with the
behavior of the United States, Soviet delegates started issuing statements that questioned
the right of the United States to judge other nations’ human rights practices. One of these
press releases posed the question: “Are the judges to be those who used napalm and
terrible weapons of destruction to kill hundreds of thousands of people in Vietnam and
wipe hundreds of villages off the face of the earth? Or those who planned secret CIA
programs to try to assassinate foreign statesmen?450
Two weeks before the dissident trials of 1978 began, Izvestia published an article
describing Muhammad Ali’s visit to the Soviet Union. According to the author, Ali
called his private meeting with Brezhnev the “greatest honor accorded me in my entire
life” and referred to the Soviet people as “the most peace loving I have ever seen.” The
boxer also praised the Soviet Union’s religious freedoms and marveled at the fact that
“not less than 100 nationalities live in harmony within” the nation’s borders. When
returning to Chicago, the article pointed out, Ali would have to reconcile his visit with
the news that members of the American Nazi party had received permission from the
proper authorities to hold a demonstration in the city.451
The timing of these attacks on U.S. human rights practices illustrate that the
Brezhnev regime wanted to enhance his nation’s image as a universal human rights
450
“Belgrade Spat on Helsinki Detainees,” N.D., Box 37, Folder: Belgrade, General, USHCF, RCSCE,
NA.
451
CDSP 30, no. 26 (26 July 1978): 15-6.
232
model. In an effort to strengthen this campaign, the Soviet government made its new
constitution official (7 October 1977) around the same time that the Belgrade’s main
working session began (October 4) and Carter signed CAPR and ESACR (October 5).
To show the Soviet Union’s commitment to the Helsinki process, the new constitution
defined the nation’s approach to foreign relations (Article 29) in terms of a truncated
version of the Final Act’s ten principles regulating relations between signatories. For
example, the phrase “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the
freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief” became “respect for human rights
and basic freedoms.” The document also never mentioned the provisions of Principle IV,
which emphasizes how “institutions, organizations,” and private citizens played a pivotal
role in furthering the Helsinki process.452
The Soviet government’s willingness to manipulate language in the Final Act to
enhance its international credibility should not be overlooked. It helps substantiate one
author’s argument that Brezhnev’s 1977 constitution marked an important “landmark in
the project” of creating a “law-abiding totalitarian state.” The document in effect gave
crystal clear legal sanction to the binding nature of Soviet communist officials’
bureaucratic discretion and authority. Shedding the “democratic pretensions of the Stalin
constitution,” Article 6 confirmed the position of the CPSU as “the leading and guiding
force of Soviet society.” To dissuade dissenters from referring to the Soviet constitution
452
For a copy of 1977 Soviet constitution, see
http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/m/c/mcw10/Download/SovietConstitution.htm [10 October 2007].
During his opening statement, the head Soviet delegate at the main Belgrade meeting stressed how the new
constitution showed his government’s commitment to respecting basic human rights. See Birnbaum and
Andren, Belgrade and Beyond, 117-8.
233
when criticizing governmental conduct, Article 59 indicated that the exercise of rights
and freedoms “is inseparable from the performance of . . . duties and obligations” to the
state as defined by CPSU. Some of these duties included the obligation of safeguarding
“the interests of the Soviet state” and combating “anti-social behavior.”453
Brezhnev extolled this document in the World Marxist Review. He argued that
“the new constitution . . . multiplies the magnetic force of the socialist example.” The
cogent synthesis of “civic duties” and democratic freedoms” found in the document will
give “Communists of the world an effective ideological weapon in the global ideological
struggle with” capitalist countries. Over time, he assured his readers, the number of
individuals who denigrated the Soviet state and socialist democracy “will be reduced as
the world learns more about the new Soviet constitution of the USSR and the life of our
people.” This attitude helps explain why the USSR submitted a report to the United
Nations Human Rights Committee in January 1978 extolling the ways in which Soviet
human rights practices now conformed to the requirements of all international
agreements, including the Final Act.454
The steps that Soviet orthodox leaders took to defend the international reputation
of their regime in no way meant that they had actually changed their internal behavior.
At the conclusion of the Belgrade follow-up conference, Andropov saw an excellent
opportunity to put Shcharansky and Orlov on trial. When outlining his plans to the
453
454
Ibid. See also Horvath, The Legacy of Soviet Dissent, 97-8.
L.I. Brezhnev, Socialism, Democracy and Human Rights (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1980), 219-20; and
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Press,
1980), 688.
234
Politburo, he opened with the astonishing claim that the Soviet Union only kept 520
people in prison, of whom 110 were being “held on charges of that have political
coloring.” He prefaced his remarks with that observation that “Carter [had] made a
speech to the effect that Shcharansky should not be brought to responsibility.” Of course,
“we cannot satisfy such a request because” the dissenter had committed crimes and has
taken responsibility for them, including the “betrayal” of his “Motherland.”455
Taking advantage of the broad bureaucratic discretion he possessed, Andropov
explained how the trial would take place in an isolated location with an “appropriately
prepared . . . audience” without correspondents. He also advised the Politburo not to
make any promises to Carter concerning his confidential request of the Soviets not to
mention Shcharansky’s “connections with the CIA” during court proceedings. Because
Soviet courts were very “democratic,” the leadership could not possibly satisfy such a
request.456
Orthodox officials defended the legitimacy of these trials using familiar methods.
They published articles in official publications connecting the convicted dissenters to
foreign intelligence services and “White émigré organizations.” Some focused on how
their punishments in no way violated the provisions of Final Act. An article entitled
“Slanderers and Provocateurs” contained letters from private Soviet citizens who
supported the Kremlin’s conduct. Someone from Lvov wrote that “Orlov, Shcharansky,
and Ginsburg have gotten their just desserts. If there turn out to be others like them, they
455
“Extract from Minutes of CC CPSU Politburo Session on Scharansky,” 22 June 1978. Available
[Online]: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB191/06-22-1978%20t.pdf [7 June 2006].
456
Ibid.
235
should also be convicted without so much as a glance ‘across the border.” After posing
the question “just what are the ‘rights’ in the Soviet Union for which the West shows
such persistent interest,” the same author answered “the right to counterrevolution.”457
Around the same time, an article appeared in Literaturnaya Gazeta that excoriated
Patricia Derian for attending the “’National Conference on Soviet Jewry.’” Citing an
excerpt from the Christian Science Monitor, the article called her conduct
‘unprecedented’” and in strict violation of established diplomatic protocol. It also
pointed out how “world public opinion” found her comments “false” and provocative
because of the U.S. government’s close relations with “despotic regimes, “neocolonialist
adventures in Africa,” and “disregard for” internationally recognized human rights of
U.S. citizens. To drive home this point, the editors of Literaturnaya Gazeta told Derian
to read another article in the same magazine that pointed out how the American
government allowed Ukrainian Nazi war criminals to live in the United States.458 The
Brezhnev regime also organized a citizen postcard campaign against Carter’s human
rights policies in June 1978. The prefabricated cards asked the U.S. President to “stop
the political trials of the american [sic] civil rights fighters.” They also asked him to
support the “broad international campaign of solidarity with political prisoners” in the
jails of the United States and right-wing dictatorships such as Chile.459
457
CDSP 30, no. 31 (30 August 1978): 5.
458
Ibid. 30, no. 28 (9 August 1978): 5-6.
459
Ibid., 6.
236
This postcard campaign reveals much about the attitude of Soviet orthodox
leaders in the summer of 1978. Evidence suggests that they viewed themselves as
successful defenders of the ideological conformity and political power structure that held
their multinational empire together. Even though the full scope of the Carter
administration’s reactions to the recent dissident trials had not yet played itself out in full,
Dobrynin told the Soviet Foreign Ministry that “our expression of firmness in relation to
the prosecution of renegades like Shcharansky” has more than justified itself. “The
Carter administration, despite all its rhetoric, was forced to retreat and to announce its
intention to continue the Soviet-American negotiations on SALT.” In the opinion of U.S.
“political observers,” the “Russians won this mini-confrontation.”460
The notes that East Germany’s leader Erich Honecker compiled during his
meeting with Brezhnev on 25 July 1978 also reveal Soviet satisfaction with the impact of
the recent dissident trials. According to Honecker, Brezhnev indicated that:
In the West a true witch dance has been staged over these two traitors
[Shcharansky and Ginzburg] whose hostile activities were inspired by subversive
imperial centers. . . . Actually this was an attempt of reactionary circles to test our
strength, and we have vigorously demonstrated that any attempts to intervene in
our internal affairs. . . under the pretext of protecting human rights . . . [for the
purposes of] creating a legal opposition against the Socialist order, are doomed to
fail. . . . [T]his should teach them once and for all.461
460
“Political Letter of Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly F. Dobrynin, 11 July 1978” in U.S.Soviet Relations and the Turn Toward Confrontation, 1977-1980—New Russian and East German
Documents, Cold War International History Project. Available [Online]: http://cwihp.si.edu [6 February
2004]
461
Transcript, Meeting of East German leader Erich Honecker and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Crimea,
USSR, 25 July 1978,” in U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Turn Toward Confrontation, 1977-1980—New
Russian and East German Documents, Cold War International History Project. Available [Online]:
http://cwihp.si.edu [6 February 2004]
237
This boast did not mean that Brezhnev saw smooth sailing ahead. While “Carter has
moderated his tone after the decisive rebuff we gave him, there is no reason to assume
that he is willing to eliminate . . . the continuing campaign for the so-called ‘human
rights.’” On the other hand, Brezhnev mused, Carter “is wavering and apparently is
listening to the forces for which détente goes against the grain, although he seems to be
aware that it is necessary to search for agreements with us on the cardinal question of war
and peace.462
These evaluations of Carter raise the question of whether or not his administration
could have done more to promote human rights in the Soviet Union before the visible
dissident trials of 1978 took place. Evidence suggests that the frequency of public human
rights statements only affected at the margins the Soviet government’s determination to
curb dissent. Of course, many Soviet officials viewed these statements as provocative.
Nevertheless, they appear to have cared much more about how the suppression of
dissident activity affected their regime’s international prestige and important interests
such as trade, arms control, and beneficial exchanges. Contrary to the views of some
dissidents, the use of more public rhetoric than administration officials employed would
not have impacted Soviet behavior to any great degree. Like many dissenters argued,
Carter would have had to resort to measures such as canceling SALT negotiations,
cutting off exchanges (scientific ones in particular), and passing even stronger economic
sanctions than he approved to have any sort of fundamental impact on the Soviet
government’s hostility to dissent.
462
Ibid.
238
Arguments suggesting that stronger punitive measures might have resulted in
more restrained Soviet behavior suffer from several shortcomings, however. On the most
basic level, they overestimate the amount of influence American measures could ever
have had on Soviet conduct. Because the Soviet Union was a multinational, multiethnic
empire bound together by a rigid, centralized bureaucracy and strict ideological
conformity, government officials had an ever-present need to combat the existence nonofficial opinion and activities. In other words, the Soviet leadership’s best interests lay in
the consistent suppression of dissent. As subsequent chapters will help show, the
Brezhnev regime was also quite willing to face international condemnation, the
cancellation of exchanges, and economic sanctions when undertaking the measures they
felt necessary to defend Soviet-style socialism. While appealing from a political point of
view, the option of cutting off exchanges over the long run would have only succeeded in
further isolating Soviet government officials and private citizens from global
developments and other points of view, thereby contributing to the closed nature of
Soviet society.
Several former Soviet government officials and Roy Medvedev have advanced
the argument that Carter would have done much more for the cause of promoting human
rights by taking a quieter and more flexible position on issue. In his memoirs, Anatoly
Dobrynin argues that Carter’s efforts “would have been more successfully enhanced
through a combination of permanent and strong but essentially private pressure through
the confidential channel.”463 At a conference about U.S.-Soviet relations that took place
463
Dobrynin, In Confidence, 389.
239
in 1994, he commented that “I was 100% percent convinced that it didn’t matter whether
you solved the case . . . of Shcharansky or Sakharov; they [Carter administration
officials] would always continue with more.” During the same conference, the former
Special Assistant to the head of the KGB and member of the Soviet delegation at
Belgrade Sergei Kondrashev indicated that Andropov wanted to find more quiet and
pragmatic ways of dealing with specific human rights cases and understood that the
Helsinki Process made “it necessary to develop our position [on human rights]
further.”464
These sorts of arguments suffer from some of the same flaws as those that
emphasize how stronger U.S. measures might have produced important changes in Soviet
domestic conduct. The use of “quieter” diplomacy might have succeeded in solving more
individual cases, but such a strategy would not have made orthodox officials like
Andropov any less fearful of domestic subversion. As indicated in Chapter III, the Soviet
arrest rates for dissident activities between the years 1957 and 1979 reached their highest
levels during the early 1970s when the Nixon administration’s “quiet” human rights
diplomacy predominated. Given the inherent shortcomings of this approach, the Carter
administration’s public rhetoric about Soviet domestic misconduct and support for
transnational human rights activities proved excellent policies. They recognized that
dissenters and private citizens deserved U.S. governmental support for creating an
international environment that challenged the legitimacy of systematic human rights
violators like the Soviet Union. More than anything else, the globalization of human
464
SALT II and the Growth of Mistrust, Conference #2 of the Carter-Brezhnev Project, 327, 24, 66, 97.
240
rights issues prevented Soviet leaders from obtaining the international legitimacy and
ideological appeal that they wanted to achieve in the Western world without changing
their domestic behavior in any sort of fundamental way.
Yuri Orlov summarized this position quite well in a message addressed to Soviet
leaders that reached Western audiences in 1979. He warned them that “persecuting
independent humanitarian information” only destroyed “the seeds of healthy political
development” in “our country” and lowered the international prestige of the USSR. Until
you embraced the ideals of the Final Act and “democratic socialism,” the wider world
would continue to view your regime as a “totalitarian” menace.465
Instead of listening to Orlov, Soviet leaders continued to place importance on
curbing transnational reports about Soviet human rights violations and reducing the
Carter administration’s support of dissenters. In a note he sent to Moscow in July 1978,
Dobrynin reminded the Foreign Ministry that the Carter administration “fears a decline of
relations with the Soviet Union,” which explains why it “has shown lately a desire to
smooth them out a little.” “On a practical level,” he pointed out, the executive branch
will make every effort to conclude a SALT agreement in the near future. “It goes without
saying that it is necessary to use this to our interest.”466 As the next chapter will explain,
Soviet leaders only had limited success using the issue of arms control as a way of
curbing the executive branch’s commitment to promoting human rights in their nation.
465
“My Meeting with My Husband, Dr. Yuri Orlov, on August 21 1979,” BEA, Box 30, Folder: Sakharov
Hearings, 10/79, JCPL.
466
“Political Letter of Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly F. Dobrynin, 11 July 1978.”
241
CHAPTER 6: A DELICATE BALANCING ACT TOPPLES: THE CARTER
ADMINISTRATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND PRIVATE CITZENS, SEPTEMBER
1978-JANUARY 1981
Upon first glance, the argument that Soviet leaders exploited the issue of arms
control to weaken the Carter administration’s commitment to promoting human rights in
their nation seems persuasive. Because many officials believed that signing a SALT
treaty would lead to improvements in Soviet domestic and international conduct, they
tried to create an atmosphere more favorable to successful negotiations. Carter made
fewer specific public references to Soviet domestic misconduct than one might have
expected in the wake of the dissident trials of 1978. Under the impression that the human
rights situation in the Soviet Union had improved, he and other officials also carried out
calibrated measures designed to smooth out Soviet-American relations and reward the
Soviets for increasing Jewish emigration rates until at least September 1979.
The steps that the U.S. government took to facilitate a “reciprocal
accommodation” with the Soviet Union only tell one part of the story, however. In many
ways, the administration’s approach to promoting human rights in the Soviet Union
remained consistent. Carter and his subordinates continued to criticize Soviet internal
behavior in a wide variety of forums and take steps to buttress the international
legitimacy of U.S. human rights criticisms. They also kept supporting transnational
human rights activities as part of a larger effort to highlight Moscow’s harsh repression of
dissent. Just as they had in the past, executive branch officials advocated and
implemented policies designed to enhance the American ability to engage in peaceful
242
ideological competition with the USSR. In fact, Carter believed that signing a SALT
treaty would help the American democratic model “prevail” over Soviet totalitarianism in
the eyes of the rest of the world.
Besides examining what Carter meant by the term “prevail,” this chapter will
analyze how transnational human rights activities remained an important element in the
executive branch’s efforts to promote human rights in the USSR. In some ways, this
development was inevitable. During the late 1970s and 1980s, the transnational human
rights network dedicated to monitoring signatories’ compliance with the Final Act and
other internationally recognized human rights agreements continued to gather strength.
The Final Act review conference in Madrid (November 1980-September 1983) revealed
that transnational actors had gone a long way in accomplishing their goal of working with
governments to “globalize” the issue of Soviet and Eastern European human rights
abuses. Whatever missteps the Carter administration had taken, Brzezinski had every
reason to argue that the U.S. executive branch had played an important role in creating an
international “climate” that challenged the legitimacy of nations like the USSR.467
The Pitfalls of Reciprocal Accommodation
Marshall Shulman’s Congressional testimony in September 1978 conveyed the
executive branch’s position that Soviet-American relations had improved in the wake of
the Soviet Union’s mid-July dissident trials. After outlining the recent difficulties, he
commented that “a number of steps on the Soviet side in recent weeks suggest that the
Soviet Union wishes to reverse the [recent] tide of events.” In defense of this position, he
467
Memo for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski: The White House, “Questions and Answers for Human Rights Day
Briefing Session,” 5 December 1978, NSABM, Folder: Human Rights, 12/78-3/79, JCPL.
243
noted that the Soviets had terminated the slander cases against American correspondents
and reduced “the inhumane severity of sentences” in trials that followed the sentencing of
Shcharansky. They had also allowed a “number of families to leave the country who had
previously been denied permission to do so” and increased Jewish emigration rates to the
highest levels since 1973. In words that reflected Carter’s preference for a “reciprocal
accommodation,” Shulman asserted that “the United States would be “fully responsive . .
. if the Soviet leadership chooses the wiser course of restraint and responsibility.”468
When meeting with a group of Senators before their scheduled trip to the Soviet
Union in November 1978, Vance expressed sentiments similar to those of Shulman.
“The dissident trials have left [a] bad aftertaste,” he conceded, but the “problems of the
summer have largely abated.” In defense of this position, he spoke of the increasing rate
of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and the recent increases in U.S.-Soviet trade.
He also mentioned how “some Soviets are increasingly receptive to the concept of interdependence,” which means that we should encourage the USSR to “play a role” in
solving complex global problems and “3rd world issues.”469 As Vance’s notes reveal, he
viewed the signing of a SALT agreement as the “key” to Soviet-American relations
because such a development “would lead to a summit” and open up a “broad discussion
on bilateral and other issues.” He also felt that SALT II needed to pass the Senate
because the agreement would provide a “vital thread of stability in Soviet-American
468
469
State Department, “Overview of U.S-Soviet Relations,” Current Policy 33 (September 1978): 2-3.
“Soviet Union; For Ribicoff Committee (notes prepared for congressional appearance with attached
table on Jewish Emigration),” 8 November 1978 in Global Competition and the Deterioration of U.S.Soviet Relations, 1977-1980, IV-426-9.
244
relations” and make “many problems . . . go away.” In fact, he believed that not
reaching an arms control agreement would amount to a “shattering setback to our foreign
policy” and give the “public initiative to the Soviets.”470
Carter took an even more optimistic view of the effects of signing an arms
control treaty with the Soviet Union. After mentioning Carter’s upcoming meeting with
Gromyko, Brzezinski warned the President about the dangers of placing too much
importance on signing an arms control treaty. “Not only should we be cautious about the
imminence of a SALT agreement,” he wrote, “but we should also be more skeptical about
the centrality of SALT.” While such a treaty would be “a useful and positive element in
the U.S.-Soviet relationship,” it “is not likely to alter profoundly the nature of the USSoviet relationship.” Because the President believed in the possibility of Soviet
moderation over the long term, however, he disagreed with this last sentence. In the
report’s margins, he wrote, “I’m not so sure about that provided a summit meeting is held
to conclude SALT II.”471
Because many top-level officials perceived moderation in Soviet behavior and
saw a successful SALT agreement as way of improving superpower relations, they strove
to create a climate more amenable to signing an arms control treaty. For example, a new
State Department official who raised the issue of Shcharansky’s arrest in a private
conservation with a Soviet official later received a rebuke for amalgamating SALT and
470
“Attention of people everywhere . . ., (notes taken in connection with the Vienna Summit, June 1979 in
Global Competition and the Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1977-1980, IV-435-7.
471
Memo, ZB to JC, “Weekly National Security Report #72,” 22 September 1978, 2, BM, Box 42, Folder:
Weekly Reports, 71-81, JCPL.
245
human rights. Carter also made fewer specific references to specific Soviet human rights
violations. In November, Brzezinski proposed that he meet with the “half-dissident”
writer Andrei Voznesensky because of his friendship with “Robert Kennedy and Martin
Luther King, Jr.” Carter passed on this opportunity even though he admitted that such a
meeting would help keep “intellectual life open in the Soviet Union and strengthen those
with courage to speak out on intellectual issues.”472
Numerous officials employed positive calibrated responses designed to show U.S.
support for the Soviet government’s apparent decision to moderate its behavior. Carter
ended the boycott on all high-level meetings not related to arms control when he sent an
American delegation to a Soviet-American trade conference in Moscow on 10 December
1978. Even though the framework for restricting the flow of American technology to the
Soviet Union existed, Carter decided to use trade as a way of reinforcing positive Soviet
behavior. While in Moscow, the Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal “announced U.S.
approval of 73 outstanding requests for export licenses” related to “oil and gas production
equipment.”473 On 25 January 1979, State Department press officer Hodding Carter
announced that the visit of the U.S. scientific delegation that had been postponed in
August 1978 would now take place in February. He called this visit appropriate because
“the human rights picture in the Soviet Union had improved considerably.” In defense of
this position, he spoke of the increasing number of Jews who had received permission to
472
Drumbell, The Carter Presidency, 126; and Memo, ZB to JC, “Meeting with Andrei Voznesensky,” 6
November 1978, BM, Box 80, Folder: 11/78, JCPL. See also Robert C. Tooth, “Soviet Dissidents Isolated
by West’s Official Silence,” The Los Angeles Times, 4 March 1979, 2.
473
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Sixth Semiannual Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1979), 10; and Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 679.
246
leave the Soviet Union and praised how “judicial repression against dissidents had
‘quieted down.’”474
Because of these perceived improvements, Carter reversed the decision he made
in August 1978 not to “approve the sale of a large American-made computer to TASS.”
When the Sperry-Univac company reduced “the total communication capability” of the
computer in question by about “77 percent,” he approved the sale in April 1979. In
contrast to the previous argument that the computer sale had been suspended because of
Soviet human rights violations, officials now reported how it had declined to sell it
because of national security considerations.475
Carter’s ambivalent attitude toward the Jackson-Vanik amendment resurfaced in
1979. In February, Representative Charles Vanik (D-OH) introduced legislation that
gave the President the authority to waive the requirements of the Jackson-Vanik
amendment if he thought that a nation had liberalized its emigration policies enough.
After deliberations, Carter chose to work toward awarding the Soviets a waiver granting
them most-favored nation (MFN) trade status based on private assurances that the recent
high Jewish emigration rates would continue. Near the end of April, Vance and
Blumenthal told Dobrynin that the executive branch would attempt to waive the
474
Documents of the Helsinki Monitoring Groups in the USSR and Lithuania (1976-1986), Volume I, 2934. In her Congressional testimony about Soviet human rights violations on 16 September 1980s, Assistant
Secretary Derian commented, “After the Orlov and Shcharansky trials and the accompanying strong
international criticism, including our own, there was a definite hiatus in arrests. Stiff repression began to
resume only in late 1979, the result of a larger number of political and economic factors.” See American
Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1977-1980, 452.
475
“Carter Reverses on Tass Computer Sale,” Washington Post, 6 April 1979, A28. See also Thomas, The
Helsinki Effect, 217. See also Letter, S. T. Sherman to Rauer H. Meyer, 26 January 1979, BM, Box 80,
Folder: 2/79, JCPL.
247
requirements of the Jackson-Vanik amendment after the Vienna Summit meeting took
place in June. Carter may have supported granting MFN status to the Soviet Union as
part of his larger effort to grant the same privileges to China without calls of favoritism,
but he also viewed such a move as a way of encouraging the Soviets to keep Jewish
emigration levels high.476
The use of calibrated responses to encourage positive Soviet behavior does not
mean that Carter had given up on the task of engaging in peaceful ideological
competition with the Soviet Union. He held fast to the position that signing an arms
control treaty would only enhance the ability of the United States to outshine the Soviets
in the eyes of the rest of the world. On 19 May 1979, he warned that not ratifying a
SALT treaty “would give the Soviets an enormous propaganda weapon to use against
us.” “They would be identified, at least in their own mind and maybe in the minds of
many nonaligned countries around the world as a peace-loving nation.” Such a
development, he warned, would put the United States “at a decided disadvantage” in the
realm of “peaceful competition” with the Soviet Union.477 Five months later, he
remarked that maintaining approximate military parity with the Soviet Union served
476
Petrus Buwalda, They Did Not Dwell Alone: Jewish Emigration from the Soviet Union, 1967-1990
(Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 132-5; and Garthoff, Détente and
Confrontation, 810. See also Carter, Keeping Faith, 202; and William W. Orbach, The American
Movement to Aid Soviet Jews (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1979), 153-4. Convinced that
Soviet leaders would adapt their policies to larger changes in the international environment, Vance advised
Carter that giving the Soviets MFN status would strengthen “the hand of those who favor détente as a path
to modernizing the economic and social system.” See Memo, Cyrus Vance to JC, 8 June 1979 in Global
Competition and the Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1977-1980, IV-435-7.
477
PPOP, 1979, Vol. I, 904
248
American interests because “we have all the advantages.” When explaining this position,
he argued that
The Soviet Union is a totalitarian government; ours is a free government, a
democratic government. The Soviets believe that the citizen ought to be subject
to the mandates of the state; we believe that citizens as individuals ought to be
honored and the citizens ourselves should control the government. We believe in
individual initiative and the worth of human beings; the Soviets believe that the
state should dominate every aspect. 478
“So, in a peaceful competition with the Soviet Union,” he continued, “we have all the
advantages to prevail.” “That is an important element of the SALT treaties.”479
As this language suggests, the executive branch never really abandoned the task
of creating an international environment more conducive to human rights and holding the
Soviets accountable for their internal behavior. As part of a larger effort “to offset the
emphasis that will be placed on SALT” in the coming months, Carter and other officials
gave prominent speeches commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in December 1978. Carter went out of his way to reject
arguments that he should abandon his human rights campaign. He reminded the audience
that no individual who “is actually taking the risks or suffering for human rights has ever
asked me to desist in our support of basic human rights. From the prisons, from the
camps, from the enforced exiles, we receive one message: Speak up, persevere, [and] let
the voice of freedom be heard.” Well aware that he had become less vocal about specific
Soviet violations, he also reiterated the complexities and trade-offs involved in the very
nature of human rights promotion. Since “we live . . . in a difficult and complicated
478
Ibid., Volume II, 1916.
479
Ibid.
249
world,” he had no choice but to balance the promotion of human rights against other
American interests.480
Behind closed doors, a wide array of officials carried out symbolic gestures and
engaged in “quiet diplomacy” to show their disapproval of Soviet human rights practices.
On 22 September 1978, Ambassador Al Toon met with émigré dissidents while visiting
the United States. Three months later, he and Shulman raised the issue of Elena Bonner’s
eye problem with Dobrynin, while the White House Science Advisor Frank Press
criticized Soviet human rights practices when the American scientific delegation he
headed visited the Soviet Union.481 During the later half of 1979, the U.S. embassy in
Moscow cancelled a reception for Soviet publishers in retaliation for the Kremlin’s
decision to bar an American publisher who had published dissident literature from
attending a book fair in Moscow. Toon also met with the Pentecostals who had taken
refuge in the U.S. embassy and raised their plight during a meeting with the Soviet
Minister of Internal Affairs.482 In sum, various officials made twenty-seven individual
representations in “human rights cases, including “the problem of Shcharansky’s health
480
“Universal Declaration of Human Rights Remarks at a White House Meeting Commemorating the 30th
Anniversary of the Declaration's Signing,” 6 December 1976. Available [Online]:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=30264&st=&st1= [10 December 2006]. When
Brzezinski suggested that the President “reaffirm at some point” his “general commitment” to human rights
on 27 October 1978, Carter responded “I agree.” See Memo, ZB to JC, “NSC Weekly Report #77,” 27
October 1978, 1, BM, Box 42, Folder: 71-81, JCPL. The quote about offsetting the emphasis on human
rights comes from Memo, ZB and Anne Wexler to JC, “A White House Event on Human Rights,” 24
October 1978, WHCF, HU-3, Folder: 9/1/78 to 12/31/78, JCPL. See also Memo, JT and Leslie G. Denend
to ZB, “Commemoration of the 30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” WHCF,
HU-3, Folder: 9/1/78-12/31/78, JCPL; and “The White House Commemoration of the 30th Anniversary of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” BEA, Box 30, Folder: Human Rights, UD on 12/78, JCPL.
481
Memo for ZB, “US Government Initiatives on behalf of Human Rights,” 4-5, BM, Box 29, Folder:
4/79-4/80, JCPL.
482
Ibid., 3, 4-5.
250
and the arrest of Father Gleb Yakunin.” They also made “at least 40 representations”
related to “family reunification cases” and over 60 representations that raised issues such
as travel, marriage, and media representation.483
Brzezinski attempted to carry out a prisoner exchange involving Shcharansky. On
20 September 1978, he raised the possibility of such an exchange with Dobrynin, noting
that the release of Shcharansky “would in itself contribute to a better atmosphere” and
“make SALT ratification easier.” In response to this suggestion, Dobrynin indicated that
“Shcharanskiy could not be involved in any discussions” because “his case has become
symbolic and Soviet leaders feel very strongly about it.” After making this point,
Dobrynin suggested that “it was the Soviet irritation over human rights that made Soviet
leaders so unresponsive to Carter’s repeated expressions of concern regarding the
escalating Soviet-Cuban involvement in Africa.” According to transcripts of the meeting,
Brzezinski rejected the ambassador’s suggestion that the United States “release the two
Soviets charged for espionage in exchange for the less notorious cases” such as “the Vins
family.” “Since the exchange would be designed to have a positive political effect,” he
argued, “it would have to involve some of the cases that have attracted public attention in
this country.” From his vantage point, “[f]ocusing on essentially obscure cases would not
serve the political purposes of such accommodation.”484
After almost seven more months of intense negotiations, the United States agreed
to trade two convicted Soviet spies for ten dissenters, including the well-known
483
On the eve of the Vienna Summit, a State Department official wrote a letter to the Soviet government
complaining about “interruptions in the delivery of mail to dissenters.” See Ibid.
484
Ibid., 4-5.
251
individuals Alexander Ginsburg and the Ukrainian Helsinki monitor Valery Moroz. The
Soviets also agreed to release Baptist minister Georgi Vins and two Jews who had been
sentenced to death for their attempts to reach Israel by hijacking an airplane in 1970.
When a reporter asked him about how his administration concluded the exchange, Carter
commented, “We’ve not forgotten about any human rights activist in the Soviet Union
who is being punished or imprisoned.” When he met with Vins after he arrived in the
United States, Carter told him not to feel guilty about leaving the Soviet Union because
he “had the opportunity to send a Christian message to ten million television viewers who
saw him raise his bible when he arrived in the United States.” A short time later, they
both attended church together.485
Even though the signing of SALT II represented the most important and visible
aspect of the 1979 U.S.-Soviet summit at Vienna, Carter wanted members of his
delegation to raise the issue of Soviet human rights violations. During his preparations
for the summit, he directed his delegation to “register our concern regarding noncompliance with Helsinki” and work toward a Soviet commitment to the “freer flow of
information and people in exchange programs.” He also wanted members to fight for
“greater equality and reciprocity” related to “media and commercial representation.”
Furthermore, Carter agreed to proposals from his subordinates calling on members of the
485
PPOP, 1979, Volume I, 751; and Carter, Keeping Faith, 148-9. See also “Biographical Background on
Five Human Rights Activists Released in Detention or Prison in the Soviet Union,” BM, Box 19,
Geographical File, Folder: Prisoner Exchanges, Alpha 7/78-5/79, JCPL; Memo, ZB to JC, “Update on New
Arrivals,” 28 April 1979, BM, Box 81, Folder: 3-4/1979, JCPL. “Soviet Dissidents Still Speaking Out,”
Newsweek, 17 September 1979, 17; and “Soviets Exchange 5 Dissidents for 2 spies; Five Dissidents Freed
by Soviets,” Washington Post, 28 April 1979, A1.
252
U.S. delegation to raise the cases of dissenters such as Shcharansky, Nudel, and Slepak
during their discussions with Soviet officials.486
In a move designed to show the administration’s commitment to human rights,
Brzezinski held a meeting with one of the recently traded dissenters eight days before the
summit took place. Once in Vienna, American representatives presented their Soviet
counterparts with the U.S. Representation List of Hardship (Human Rights) Cases and a
“list of those denied exit permission to Israel, including prisoners of conscience.” During
his discussions with Brezhnev, Carter asked the Soviet leader to free Shcharansky and
noted that the Senate would pay particular attention to the Soviet human rights record
before agreeing to ratify the treaty. He also expressed his appreciation for the large
increase in Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and told Brezhnev that he would
attempt to give both China and the Soviet Union MFN status when he returned to
Washington.487
Carter’s assurances about how his administration would work to grant the Soviets
MFN status helps illustrate that the possibility of a “reciprocal accommodation” remained
on his mind when he traveled to Vienna. During his preparations for the meeting, he
directed his delegation to ask the Soviets for help in resolving the regional disputes in
Southern Africa and Southeast Asia; he also wanted the delegation to “press the Soviets
to cooperate on global issues” such as increasing economic aid to “poorer LDCs.”
486
Memo, “Decisions on Summit Objectives,” ZB to JC, 24 May 1979, BM, Box 20, Folder: Alpha
Channel, 5/79-8/79; and Memo, “Soviet Prisoners, Refuseniks, and Dissidents,” Edward Sanders to JC, 6
June 1979, BM, Box 19, Folder: USSR-Vienna Summit, 6/79, JCPL; and Note, Robert Gates to ZB, N.D.
in Ibid.
487
Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 810; Drumbell, The Carter Presidency, 127; and Rosati, The
Carter Administration’s Quest for Global Community, 135.
253
During one of his discussions with Brezhnev, Carter thanked him “for initiating the
concept of détente, which provided for increased stability between us.” “It was his firm
hope and highest goal,” he remarked, “to structure our relations with the Soviet Union on
a stable basis in order to preserve peace in our common interests and in the interests of
people throughout the world.”488
Much to the dismay of critics, Carter’s preference for forging a “reciprocal
accommodation” resulted in his signing of a summit communiqué favorable to Soviet
positions. The document included phrases calling for the “deepening of détente” and
strict adherence to the 1972 Basic Principles of Relations between the United States and
Soviet Union. He even embraced Brezhnev during their official singing of SALT II.489
Because he favored a “reciprocal accommodation” on American terms, however, he
chose to ignore earlier Soviet protests and reiterated his message about how the Soviets
had it within their power to choose between a path of cooperation or competition with the
United States. In measured words, he asserted that
I believe that two possible roads lie before us. There is a road of competition and
even confrontation. Any effort by either of our nations to exploit the turbulence
that exists in various parts of the world pushes us towards that road. The United
States can and will protect its vital interests if this becomes the route we must
follow. But there is another way, Mr. President---the path of restraint and, where
possible, cooperation. This is the path we prefer.490
488
Memo, “Decisions on Summit Objectives”; “Carter’s Conversation with Brezhnev, 16 June 1979,” in
The Fall of Détente: Soviet-American Relations during the Carter Years, ed. Odd Arne Westad (Oslo:
Scandinavian University Press, 1997), 230-2. See also Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 807-810. For
a copy of the summit communiqué, see “Vienna Summit Meeting Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Communiquй,” 18
June 1979. Available [Online]: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=32497&st=&st1= [10
July 2006].
489
See Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 807-810.
254
Because Carter remained committed to his “reciprocal accommodation” vision, he
continued to take steps designed to enhance the international legitimacy of American
human rights criticisms. After internal debates, he ordered his subordinates to help the
Helsinki Commission write a comprehensive report on the American Final Act
compliance record.491 Since some domestic critics and the Soviet government argued
that the experiences of the “Wilmington Ten” proved the existence of American political
prisoners, the Justice Department took the unprecedented steps of filing a series of legal
briefs in federal court that supported the defendants’ habeas corpus petitions. The
administration found their actions in defense of these individuals so important that the
Sixth Semiannual Report (1 December 1978-31 May 1979) described them in detail.492
The executive branch also utilized its Congressionally mandated semiannual Final
reports to describe the myriad of steps that the U.S. government had taken to implement
the agreement. These reports described American civil rights legislation, affirmative
490
“Vienna Summit Meeting Toast at a Working Dinner Hosted by the Soviet Delegation,” 17 June 1979.
Available [Online]: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=32494 [12 December 2006].
491
Carter issued a memorandum that called on all departments and agencies to help representatives from
the State Department and Commission identify areas where the United States could improve its Final Act
compliance record. Always concerned about enhancing the credibility of U.S. human rights criticisms, he
defended the Commission’s work on the grounds that “other governments, including the Soviet Union, will
better understand the depth of our concern for full implementation of the Helsinki pledges if we
demonstrate that we are working hard at home to fulfill even more effectively our side of the Helsinki
bargain.” See Department of State Bulletin, February 1979, 41.
492
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Eighth Semiannual Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1980), 4; Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Ninth Semiannual Report
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 4; Fulfilling Our Promises, 56-7; and Sixth
Semiannual Report, 5. See also Hodgman, “Détente and the Dissidents,” 321-2.
255
action programs, and efforts to eradicate sexual discrimination. They also outlined the
government’s efforts to rectify the grievances of Native Americans.493
In November 1979, Carter asked the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to
reconsider the international human rights covenants that he had signed and then
submitted for ratification the previous year. To help secure the passage of these
agreements, he sent Chairman Frank Church (D-ID) a letter explaining how “’the United
States has enhanced its international position as a recognized champion of human
dignity” over the past few ears. Returning to arguments he had made during the 1976
presidential campaign, he claimed that the ratification of these treaties “would ‘sustain
this momentum’ by giving the United States new authority to press for human rights.”
Such a step would also remove the common charge that non-ratification amounted to
American human rights hypocrisy. Even more important from Carter’s perspective, the
Senate’s consent would also allow the “United States to participate in the way these
treaties were interpreted and applied.”494
Despite failing to revamp U.N. human rights institutions, the administration
remained committed to making more effective use of multilateral human rights forums.
When the UNHRC resumed meetings in February 1979, the American delegate Edward
Mezvinsky submitted “responses to complaints raised against the U.S. by private
organizations in the” UNHRC. He also asked the commission to investigate and report
493
Sixth Semiannual Report, 3-5; and Ninth Semiannual Report, 4-5. For an account of the Soviet
government’s criticisms of how the U.S. government treated Native Americans, see CSCE Digest, 31
January 1979, 8.
494
Hodgman, “Détente and the Dissidents,” 322-3.
256
on the arrests of twenty-two dissenters. These moves could have only enraged Soviet
delegates. Official instructions from Moscow had asked them to discredit “the
demagogic slogan [in] the defense of human rights which has been unleashed in all
countries by western” nations and the United States.495
The willingness of Carter to subject the U.S. human rights record to international
scrutiny went hand in hand with efforts designed to stimulate transnational human rights
activities. Near the end of 1978, he invited “300 human rights, civil rights, church and
other liberal activists” to hear him speak at the ceremony commemorating the 30th
Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On the same day that he
voiced his support for the U.S. Helsinki Commission’s efforts to examine and report on
U.S. human rights practices, Carter praised the role NGOs played in raising global
consciousness about Soviet human rights violations: The reports of “Amnesty
International, the International Commission of Jurists, the International League for
Human Rights, and many other nongovernmental human rights organizations amply
document the practices and conditions that destroy the lives and the spirit of countless
human beings.”496
495
See Memo for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “U.S. Government Initiatives on Human Rights,” 4, 6; and
Conference #2 of the Carter-Brezhnev Project: A Conference of U.S. and Russian Policymakers and
Scholars held at Musgrove Plantation, St. Simon’s, Georgia, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.,
V-122-3,
496
Memo, ZB and Anne Wexler to JC, “A White House Event on Human Rights,” 24 October 1978,
WHCF, Box HU-3, Folder: 9/1/78-12/31/78, JCPL; and “The White House Commemoration of the 30th
Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” BEA, Box 30, Folder: Human Rights, UD,
12/78, JCPL. For a copy of Carter’s remarks, see “Universal Declaration of Human Rights Remarks at a
White House Meeting Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Declaration’s Signing,” 6 December
1978. Available [Online]: www.presidency.uscb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=30264 [12 December 2006].
257
In a note acknowledging the human rights medal he had received from the
Campobello Conference on Peace and Human Rights in August 1979, Carter described
how “Nobel Prize winners . . . have [all] been tireless participants in the struggle to
achieve the great dream of universal human rights.” On 4 September 1980, he told the
leaders of NCSJ how “it’s important that we work together in a governmental and extragovernmental way” to increase the levels of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union.”
Since political realities always mattered, he also reported that he and other administration
officials did not meet with any Soviet officials, including Brezhnev, without raising the
issue of “increasing the out-migration of Soviet Jews who want to come to other
nations.”497
These messages complimented Matthew Nimetz’s earlier statements to the
National Interreligious Task for on Soviet Jewry about the pivotal role private citizens
played in advancing the cause of human rights. As he told the audience, “the U.S.
government continues to believe that private citizens and their organizations in all CSCE
countries necessarily play a very important role in encouraging CSCE implementation.”
They had an important contribution to make because
the very nature of private groups . . . puts beyond dispute the humanitarian
concerns to which . . . they . . . are devoted. You are not required to balance
competing interests as governments must do. Your concerns are direct and
specifically focused. You have the enormous advantage in many respects in
bringing public attention, in a believable and effective way, to the areas in which
human rights implementation can and must be improved.498
497
“Campobello Conference of Peace and Human Rights,” WHCF, Box HU-3, Folder: 6/1/79-8/31/79,
JCPL; and “Photo Opportunity with the President and Leaders of the Conference of Soviet Jewry,” Special
Assistant for Ethnic Affairs (SAEA), Box 4, Folder: HRD and B.O.R. Week, 2/80-12/80, JCPL.
498
Department of State Bulletin, January 1980, 22-3.
258
These fine words could not hide the reality the increases in Jewish emigration that
Carter and other officials praised in no way amounted to a move toward liberalization on
behalf of the Soviet government. By March 1979, ten of the twelve original members of
the Moscow Watch Group had been arrested or forced into exile. According to one of
this group’s reports, “the authorities are carrying on an accelerated and everwidespreading [sic] campaign of discrediting the human rights movement in our country .
. . This campaign has been markedly intensified as from the middle of this year [1978].”
On the same day that the U.S. trade delegation visited Moscow in December 1978, the
Soviets convicted the Armenian Watch group member Robert Nazaryan for his antiSoviet activities. Near the end of 1979, the overall dissident arrest began to climb after
the Soviet government launched a systematic campaign aimed at eradicating non-official
activities. In January 1980, Brezhnev accepted Andropov’s recommendation to exile
Sakharov to Gorky, a town off limits to foreigners.499
Carter may have wanted to give Soviet leaders the opportunity of adapting
themselves to type of international environment he preferred, but he had a limited reserve
of patience. Well aware of the U.S. public’s growing disillusionment with Soviet
international behavior, he agreed with Brzezinski’s advice that the United States once
again needed to tighten economic restrictions on U.S. trade with the USSR. While
intense political opposition from Jewish groups and Senator Jackson gave Carter little
choice, he approved granting China MFN trade status without granting the same privilege
499
“Propaganda Campaign to Discredit the Human Rights Movement in the USSR,” SB 72 (April 1979): 1;
and “Soviet Union’ So glad to see you,” The Economist, 9 December 1978, 24.
259
to the Soviet Union. Unhappy with the continuation of the Soviet effort to repress
dissent, he criticized Moscow’s insistence on harassing and arresting the members of
organizations “established to monitor compliance with the Helsinki agreement” in August
1979.500 A few weeks later, he agreed with Brzezinski’s recommendation that the United
States should begin engaging in more “assertive competition” with the Soviet Union.501
With Soviet-American relations already faltering under the weight of the U.S.
Senate’s hesitancy to ratify the SALT II treaty, the Kremlin’s invasion of Afghanistan on
27 December 1979 succeeded in exhausting Carter’s patience and goodwill toward the
USSR. In near hysterical language, he called the invasion the greatest threat to world
peace since World War II. No doubt infuriated that the Soviets had chosen the path of
confrontation over cooperation, he commented that the Kremlin’s conduct “made a more
dramatic impact in my opinion of what the Soviets’ goals are than anything they’ve done
in the previous time I’ve been in office.”502
In private conversations, Carter argued that the lessons of the Soviet Union’s
1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia required that the United States carry out a vigorous and
substantial response to such a visible example of aggression. Although he felt that public
human rights criticisms should still correspond to Soviet domestic conduct, he called on
the administration to “step up” American international broadcasting into the USSR. He
500
PPOP, 1979, Volume I, 1352.
501
See Olav Njolstad, “The Carter Legacy: Entering the Second Era of the Cold War,” in Njolstad, ed. The
Last Decade of the Cold War, 208; and Memo, ZB to JC, “Weekly National Security Report #110,” 21
September 1979, 2, BM, Box 42, Folder: Weekly Reports, 102-120, JCPL.
502
John Spanier and Steven W. Hook, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 14th ed. (Washington,
D.C: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1998), 205.
260
once and for all rejected any notion of granting the Soviets MFN status and halted all
discussions about opening an American consulate in Kiev in return for a Soviet
counterpart in New York. Furthermore, he suggested that the administration “send
someone to COCOM and talk with our allies about tightening up on trade with the Soviet
Union so long as it did not disadvantage U.S. businessmen in comparison with our
allies.” When advancing this argument, he stated that “we should deny the Soviets
credits and urge others to do the same.” Carter also suggested that United States curtail
grain shipments, fishing allocations, and exchanges with the Soviet Union.503
After careful consultation with his subordinates, Carter approved a wide series of
measures designed to punish Soviet aggression. For example, the U.S. government
suspended grain sales above the 8 million metric tons required by the long-term grain
agreement. It also placed further restrictions on shipments of sophisticated technology to
the Soviet Union and withdrew the completed SALT II from Senate consideration. Not
content with these measures, the executive branch helped organize an American boycott
of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow and allowed the US-USSR cultural agreement to lapse.
When taken together with the sizable increases in U.S. military spending, Carter’s
insistence that the United States could not “do business as usual” with the Soviets until
they left Afghanistan ended any suggestion that détente still existed.504
In retrospect, the punitive measures Carter approved in the wake of the
Afghanistan invasion grew out of previous steps that his administration had taken to
503
504
“NSC Meeting on Afghanistan, 15 February 1980,” in Westad, ed., The Fall of Détente, 338-45.
Njolstad, “The Carter Legacy: Entering the Second Era of the Cold War,” in Njolstad, ed., The Last
Decade of the Cold War, 214. See also Hawkesworth, “Ideological Immunity,” 67.
261
enhance the U.S. ability to engage in peaceful ideological competition with the USSR.
On 13 September 1979, Brzezinski wrote to Carter that “Radio Liberty/Voice of America
should be instructed to step up broadcasts to Soviet national minorities, notably Moslems
and Ukrainians.” “I see no reason why the Soviets should be free to agitate against us”
on the issue of “Puerto Rico” while “we remain intimidated by the fact that Moscow is
sensitive to the problems of its national minorities.”505
This appeal appears to have put a process in motion that resulted in Carter’s
approval of a Special Coordinating Committee proposal calling for the expansion of
American broadcasts to Muslim audiences in the Soviet Union and Middle East in
December 1979. Despite constant financial problems and bureaucratic infighting,
RL/RFE managed to expand broadcasts to audiences in Georgia, Ukraine, and the Central
Asian Republics “by more than 11 hours per week in 1980.” It also succeeded in
broadcasting more samizdat publications to audiences in Estonia and Lithuania.506
The decision to let the U.S-Soviet cultural agreement lapse grew out of earlier
efforts to use exchanges as a way of combating the closed nature of Soviet society. A
few months after the dissident trials of mid-1978 ended, U.S. representatives only agreed
to renew the cooperative agreements in transportation and energy for two years rather
505
Memo , ZB to JC, “Weekly National Security Report #109,” 13 September 1979, 3-4, BM, Box 42,
Folder: Weekly Reports, 102-120, JCPL.
506
Memo, PH to ZB, “Expansion of VOA’s Muslim-Language Broadcasting,” 17 June 1980, Board of
International Broadcasting (BOIB), Box 9, Folder: 2-9/1980, JCPL; Memo, PH to ZB, “Expanding Radio
Broadcasting,” 13 June 1980, BOIB, Box 5, Folder: 6/80, JCPL; Memo, PH to ZB, “Daily Report Item,” 10
April 1980, BOIB, Box 9, Folder: 2-9/1980, JCPL; Memo, Richard H. Cook to Ralph E. Walter,
“Expansion of First-Run Programming Since January 1979,” 27 March 1980, BOIB, Box 9, Folder: 2-9,
1980, JCPL; and Memo, Stephen Larrabee to ZB, “Baltics: RFE/RL,” 13 June 1980, BOIB, Box 9, Folder:
2-9/1980, JCPL. See also Njolstad, “The Carter Legacy: Entering the Second Era of the Cold War,” 213.
262
than the customary five. In a move to make these agreements more “reciprocal, they also
phased out some scientific exchanges where the Soviets had concealed specific
technologies from American view. On 23 October 1979, International Communication
Agency (ICA) Director John E. Reinhardt informed Brzezinski that the State Department
would not sign a new cultural agreement unless the Soviets agreed to end practices that
violated U.S. standards of “equality, mutual benefit, and reciprocity.”507
Carter’s decision to curb shipments of technology to the Soviets after the invasion
of Afghanistan developed out of an earlier decision to place tougher economic
restrictions on U.S. trade with the Soviet Union in the months following the Vienna
Summit. In contrast to previous attempts, however, the United States now stood firm and
had suspended “426 outstanding validated licenses to the USSR” by mid-March 1980.
The administration also revoked two licenses that had already been validated. Consistent
with his rhetoric in wake of the invasion, Carter went to great lengths to strengthen
“allied support for its more assertive exports-control policy.”508 In a letter to the German
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, he wrote that “with respect to exports of high-technology
507
Memo, Marshall Brement to ZB, “Negotiation of Educational and Cultural Exchange Agreement,” 23
October 1979, BM, Box 82, Folder: USSR, 10/19-31, 1979, JCPL; and Memo, ZB to The Director of the
International Communication Agency, “Negotiation of U.S.-USSR Educational and Cultural Exchange
Agreement,” N.D., Ibid.; and Memo, John Reinhardt to ZB, “Negotiation of US-USSR Cultural
Agreement,” 18 October 1979, Ibid.
508
“President Sets Tougher Standards on High Technology Exports to the USSR,” BM, Box 81, Folder:
Measures Taken After USSR Afghanistan Invasion, 3-9 1980, JCPL. Many officials perceived the
restrictions on technological and agricultural trade as hurting the Soviet economy. For example, see
Memo, ZB to JC, “Impact of Economic Measures on the USSR,” 10 January 1980, BM, Box 82, Folder:
1/9-15 1980, JCPL; and Memo, “Review of Actions Taken Against the Soviet Union,” 14 March 1980,
BM, Box 82, Folder: 3/1-19 1980, JCPL. Officials also created an “open-ended statement” that criticized
“Governor Reagan’s announcement” about the ineffectiveness of the grain embargo on the ground that
such statements gave “false encouragement to the Soviet Union and is not in the best interests of the US
and our stand against Soviet aggression. See “Open-Ended Statement,” N.D. BM, Box 82, Folder: 7/1/80,
JCPL.
263
items to the Soviet Union, I ask that your authorities not request exceptions in COCOM
to the embargo on strategic goods and technology destined for the USSR, except in
hardship cases or where Western security interests dictate.” He also expressed his
preference that “the list of items covered by the embargo should be expanded to include
technology critical to the modernization and expansion of the Soviet industrial base.”509
The steps that the administration took to punish Soviet behavior in the wake of
Afghanistan went hand in hand with more public statements about Soviet human rights
violations. Carter publicly referred to the exile of Sakharov as “a scar on their system
that . . . [Soviet leaders] cannot erase by hurling abuse at him and seeking to mask the
truth.” In a speech that stressed the importance of the Madrid Final Act follow-up
conference scheduled to begin in November 1980, he spoke about the importance of
defending dissenters. “More than 40 courageous men and women are now in exile just
because they worked in private groups to promote the Helsinki agreement.” Since private
citizens facing governmental repression all over the world did not want the United States
to “abandon” them, the administration would use the Madrid conference to amplify their
voices.510 Carter later reiterated this theme when he described how dissenters “applaud”
and “pray” that Americans will not lose faith in their cause.511
509
Letter, JC to Helmut Schmidt, February 1980, BM, Box 1, Folder: Measures Taken After USSR
Invasion of Afghanistan, 2/80, JCPL. See also “Export Policy Review,” Ibid.
510
PPOP, 1980, Volume I, 194; and “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Remarks at a
Ceremony Commemorating the Fifth Anniversary of the Signing of the Final Act,” 29 July 1980.
Available [Online]: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=44835&st=&st1= [17 September
2006].
511
On 2 April 1980, Carter received a letter from a human rights activist complaining that “’in recent
months the Administration has appeared to be downplaying its human rights policy.’” On the letter’s
264
Many other officials also denounced Soviet domestic conduct in explicit terms.
Patricia Derian condemned the Sakharov exile on a Voice of American broadcast,
whereas another official wrote a letter to the chairman of the Soviet State Committee for
Science and Technology rebuking Soviet leaders for their treatment of Sakharov. The
new Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, insisted that the “Soviets dislike and fear our
emphasis on human rights . . . because they know that what a powerful attraction freedom
has for millions of people everywhere on Earth.” No matter what Soviet officials say, he
continued, “the contrast between our system and closed societies of our adversaries is
dramatically visible” to private citizens across the globe.512
After the Soviets exiled Sakharov to Gorky, the new American delegate Jerome
Shestack and his staff worked with a “lawyers’ group” determined to make the UNHRC
take “action on [the] Sakharov case.”513 These efforts bore fruit when a number of
Western delegates backed the American position that the Commission needed to discuss
the Soviet government’s treatment of Sakharov and further investigate the extent of
human rights violations in the USSR. The Commission may have only reached a
consensus to “defer further consideration of the Sakharov case” until its next session, but
margins, he wrote, “’I agree’” and “sent the file with his comment to the Vice-President, Jody Powell, and
Dr. Brzezinski.” See Memo, Lincoln Broomfield to ZB, “Classified Annex,” 40. See also Department of
State Bulletin, September 1980, 50; and PPOP, 1980-1981, Volume II, 1855.
512
Department of State Bulletin (December 1980): 8. See also Edmund Muskie, “The Foreign Policy of
Human Rights,” Current Policy 241 (21 October 1980); Ibid., “America’s Strength: Ideals and Military
Power,” Current Policy 208 (7 August 1980); Ibid., “The Challenge of Peace,” Current Policy 236 (11
October 1980); and Ibid., “Human Freedom: America’s Vision,” Current Policy 208 (7 August 1980). See
also American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1977-1980, 445; Department of State Bulletin (April
1980): 44-5; and Memo for ZB, “US Government Initiatives on behalf of Human Rights in the USSR,” 5-6.
513
Memo for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “U.S. Government Initiatives on Human Rights,” 4, 6.
265
the very fact that the dissenter’s treatment remained an issue testified to the
“globalization” of human rights.514
Around the same time, Carter sent executive branch representatives to a
conference in Warsaw entitled “Peace and Human Rights.” Instead of allowing the
meeting to become a propaganda victory for the Soviets in the wake of the Afghanistan
invasion, Shestack described the plights of numerous dissenters and attacked the
Kremlin’s decision to move hundreds of them out of Moscow in preparation for the 1980
Summer Olympics. Carter even sent a personal message to the attendees explaining how
“world peace is indissolubly linked with human rights.” The conference’s concluding
document had much in common with this position, indicating that “there can be no true
peace in a society in which human rights and fundamental freedoms are violated.”
Instead, “it must be a peace in which human personality and its dignity can flourish.”
The efforts of U.S. delegates also ensured that his document included a specific reference
to how NGOs must play a larger role in “safeguarding peace and the respect of human
rights and fundamental freedoms.”515
Once the main meeting of the Madrid follow-up conference began, U.S. delegates
criticized the human rights violations of Warsaw Pact nations. During his opening
remarks, Co-chairman Griffin Bell referred to the Russian monitors Orlov and
Shcharansky, as well as the Ukrainian Mykola Rudenko and Lithuanian Viktoras Petkus.
514
515
CHRUR 37 (January-March 1980): 43-5.
Letter, Armand Hammer to Ed Muskie, 25 July 1980, Amnesty International Files, Box 1, Folder:
Documents Released on Appeal (1), NSA. See also “European Security Conference Scientific Forum in
Hamburg,” BBC, 5 March 1980, N.P.
266
“When Andrei Sakharov was banished,” he lamented, “some of our best hopes for a spirit
of security and cooperation in Europe were banished.” Another delegate invited Soviet
leaders to engage in peaceful ideological competition with the United States. He warned
communist signatories that arresting Helsinki monitors only “created a situation in which
those of us all over the world join our voices with theirs and become with them Helsinki
monitors. 516 The United States believes in the “inevitability of human rights” and
“individual freedom,” not “some ideologically defined doctrinal concept of
revolution.”517
On the eve of the 1980 Presidential election, Carter returned to the larger theme
that free nations such as the United States held numerous advantages over their
communist counterparts in the realm of peaceful ideological competition. In exaggerated
language, he explained how Soviet international and domestic behavior had done nothing
but undermine the international legitimacy of Soviet-style socialism. “The failure of
communism has been demonstrated by the fact that the Soviets don’t have a single nation
on earth . . . that want[s] to have the same kind of government that exists in the Soviet
Union.” In contrast, “there are dozens of nations now shifting over to the American form
of government, which shows that in the long run, we’ll prevail.” Carter also used his
final State of the Union message to reaffirm his belief in the powerful example of
democratic government, asserting that “the future of our world is not to be found in
authoritarianism . . . that wears the mask of order . . . or in totalitarianism that wears the
516
517
American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1977-1980, 454-6.
Max Kampelman, ed., Three Years at the East-West Divide: The Words of U.S. Ambassador Max
Kampelman at the Madrid Conference on Security and Human Rights (New York: Freedom House, 1983),
12.
267
mask of justice.” Over the long term, private citizens across the world will find their
future “in the human face of democracy, the human voice of individual liberty, [and] the
human hand of economic liberty.”518
The belief that the United States would “prevail” over the Soviet Union in the
coming decades explains why NSC staffers drew plans endorsing “competitive
engagement” as a way of exacerbating Soviet domestic weaknesses during the 1980s.519
In a memorandum he sent to Brzezinski entitled “Dissidence in Eastern Europe and the
USSR-Are We Doing Enough,” Paul Henze regretted that the U.S. government had not
yet done enough to institutionalize policies designed to support dissenters. He wrote that
the “allocation of resources—both manpower and money to programs encouraging
dissidence . . . has not been proportionate to the high level of attention given this field in
statements and demonstrative actions.” He also described how “no new operational
instrumentalities have been created for implementing human rights policies, sustaining
research effort, and channeling and coordinating human rights initiatives on a selfpropelled basis.”520
518
PPOP, 1980-1981, Vol. III, 2995.
519
While this dissertation will not describe all of these proposals in detail, the strategy of “competitive
engagement” drew upon courses of action that the administration had already begun to implement. See
Memo, William Odom (WO) to ZB, “East-West Relations: A Formula for U.S. Policy in 1981and
Beyond,” 3 September 1980, BM, Box 42, Folder: Weekly Reports, 151-161, JCPL. See also Njolstad,
“The Carter Legacy: Entering the Second Era of the Cold War,” in The Last Decade of the Cold War, 2109.
520
Despite these criticisms, Henze praised the administration’s commitment to human rights, noting that
the policy “has generated a worldwide debate on human rights on which dissidents in Communist societies
have capitalized.” He also called last year’s “’spies for dissidents exchange’ . . . one of the most politically
astute moves the U.S. government has ever made on behalf of Soviet dissidents” and lauded how the
Belgrade conference “highlighted Soviet efforts to avoid honoring commitments they accepted in 1975.”
See Memo, PH to ZB, “Dissidence in Eastern Europe and the USSR—Are We Doing Enough,” 17 April
268
Henze also felt as if the executive branch could do more to strengthen U.S.
international broadcasting capabilities. While new investment in transmitters had taken
place, budgetary problems had postponed a “comparable investment in programming”
and “major manpower rejuvenation. Given these realities, “Radio Liberty’s current level
of performance is only a fraction of its potential.” He also pointed out that the
administration needed to allocate more resources to “book and publication programs for
Eastern Europe and the USSR.” As a result of manpower shortages, the United States
could not take quick enough advantage of all the “samizdat” and “tamizdat” literature
“available for republishing and distribution into Eastern Europe and the USSR.”
Increased funding, he believed, would enable the United States to “exploit the new
opportunities for penetrating the communist world with ideas and information which are
constantly developing.”521
In addition to these recommendations, Henze called on officials to do a much
better job of exploiting the national and religious “self-assertion” of Soviet Muslims,
Ukrainians, Georgians, and residents of the Baltic republics. He hoped the United States
could accomplish this goal through the creation of a “tape-cassette distribution program”
capable of augmenting “existing book and magazine programs.” He also revived the idea
of creating “one or more semi-autonomous institutions” with both private and public
1980, 1-2, BM, Box: Horn/Special, Folder: 4/80, 1-2. Olav Njolstad also devotes considerable attention to
this document. See Njolstad, “The Carter Legacy: Entering the Second Era of the Cold War,” in Njolstad, ,
ed., The Last Decade of the Cold War, 217-8.
521
Memo, PH to ZB, “Dissidence in Eastern Europe and the USSR—Are We Doing Enough,” 17 April
1980, 1-4. Lincoln Broomfield also believed that the United States could have done more to support Soviet
dissenters. In a note to Brzezinski, he wrote, “Obviously we could have done more if we had tried.” See
Note, Lincoln Broomfield to ZB, “U.S. Government’s Initiatives on Human Rights in the Soviet Bloc,”
BM, Box 29, Folder: Human Rights, 4/79-4/80, JCPL.
269
funding capable of sustaining pressure for the “implementation of human rights goals.”
Because these programs would only call for modest monetary increases, Henze called
them “the most cost effective” way that the U.S. government could call into question the
legitimacy of Soviet rule. Brzezinski must have liked what he read because he told
Henze “to organize a Soviet working group meeting to discuss possible ways of
implementing these proposals.”522
In September 1980, the U.S. General and NSC staffer, William Odom, sent
Brzezinski a memorandum outlining how the United States should go about completing
the transition from Era I (1945-1975) to Era II (1980s and 1990s) of East-West relations.
Beyond citing Soviet human rights violations, the next Carter administration could “do a
lot more on the nationality question within the USSR.” In an age of nationalism,” he
wrote, “there is nothing permanent about Soviet ‘internationalism’ and . . . borders--something we can imply and encourage others to say explicitly.” Since Soviet-style
socialism “suffers from enormous centrifugal forces,” a “shock could bring surprising
developments within the USSR, just as we have seen in Poland.” Based on this
observation, Odom declared that “the dissolution of the Soviet empire is a not a wholly
fanciful prediction for later in this century.” Perhaps thinking about all the advantages
that American leaders held over their Soviet counterparts, Carter wrote “Very
Interesting” in the margins of this memorandum.523
Transnational Human Rights Activities, The Final Act, and Domestic Politics
522
Ibid. See also See Njolstad, “The Carter Legacy: Entering the Second Era of the Cold War,” in
Njolstad, ed., The Last Decade of the Cold War, 217.
523
Memo, WO to ZB, “East-West Relations” 3 September 1980, 1, 7-8.
270
The steps the Carter administration took to promote human rights in the Soviet
Union should not obscure how private citizens helped “globalize” human rights issues
and held government officials accountable for their behavior. Near the end of 1978, U.S.
Helsinki Commission Chairman Dante Fascell published an article in Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists that thanked dissenters in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for helping
diplomats “break [their] silence” on the subject of human rights. This important
development “was not accomplished by any brilliant strategists in Washington or a
NATO, but by a small branch of intrepid Soviet citizens who began” to speak out about
Soviet human rights abuses. “It was they,” he continued, “who made the West aware of
the value of Helsinki Accords.” During this Congressional testimony defending the U.S.
delegation’s accomplishments at Belgrade, Chairman Arthur Goldberg extolled the role
private citizens played in monitoring how governments implemented the provisions of
the Final Act. In language that reflected the existence of a broad international impulse
against bureaucratic discretion and authority, he told a friend that the U.S. Helsinki
Commission now “needs a private counterpart . . . to keep it honest and active.”524
Goldberg then spoke with a number of leading human rights activists about
creating an American version of the Helsinki monitoring groups that existed in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. After months of deliberation and securing a $400,000 grant
from the Ford Foundation, Goldberg and other activists, including Random House
524
A copy of Fascell’s article “Breaking the Silence Barrier on Human Rights” can be found in the
USHCF, Box 9, Folder: Fascell Article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, National Archives (NA),
Washington D.C. See also Letter, Arthur J. Goldberg to Alfred Friendly, 25 April 1978, Box 37, Folder:
Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, USHCF, RSCE, NA; and The U.S. Helsinki Commission, The Belgrade
Followup Meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: A Report and Appraisal
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Press, 1978), 82-96.
271
Chairman Robert L. Bernstein and editor of the Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR
Edward Kline, formed the U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee in February 1979. Because
they grasped the importance dissenters attached to developing links with Western private
citizens, this group worked to coordinate their activities with and show visible support for
Final Act monitors. Members also decided to publish and distribute accurate, up-to-date
reports about human rights conditions in all signatory states and travel to Warsaw Pact
nations whenever feasible to speak with dissenters.525
As Daniel C. Thomas points out in his work The Helsinki Effect, the U.S. Watch
Group “immediately became a major fixture in the transnational network” dedicated to
globalizing the issue of Soviet human rights violations. Even though Soviet authorities
cut off the connection after thirty seconds, the organization managed to hold a joint press
conference with Helsinki monitors in Moscow who had not yet gone to jail on 31 July
1979.526 The two groups issued a joint statement that vowed to raise international
consciousness about governmental violations of international law and “other arbitrary
actions resulting in infringements of human rights.”527
In September of the same year, Executive Director Jeri Laber met with Helsinki
monitors in Russia, Ukraine, and other Eastern European countries. U.S. Watch Group
525
For a nice account of how this group came into existence and functioned, see Jeri Laber, The Courage of
Strangers: Coming of Age with the Human Rights Movement (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 97-108;
U.S. Helsinki Commission, , Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Hearings Before Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Volume VIII, 56; and U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee: The First
Fifteen Months (New York: U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, 1980), 3-4. See also Thomas, The Helsinki
Effect, 149-51; Korey, NGOS and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 238-9; and CHRUR 33
(January-March 1979): 30-1.
526
CSCE Digest, 17 August 1979, 2; and CHRUR 35 (July-September 1979): 5-6.
527
CHRUR 35 (July-September 1979), 5-6.
272
members also formulated common plans with Soviet émigrés and tried to remain in
contact with individual dissenters via the telephone or mail. After the Kremlin’s exile of
Sakharov, this organization joined other human rights groups and émigrés in holding a
joint press conference that condemned the Kremlin’s behavior as inconsistent with the
provisions of the Final Act. It also sent numerous personal appeals to Brezhnev asking
him to “support individuals and organs of society exercising their rights and
responsibilities to promote the effective observance of human rights.”528
To garner publicity for their cause, U.S. Watch Group members wrote prominent
articles about their efforts to promote human rights in the Soviet Union. In a New York
Times opinion piece, Jeri Laber reported that dissenters “have been dispersed in a variety
of ways: the Sakharovs to the closed city of Gorky, others to prison or internal exile,
[and] still others expelled to the West.” The Ukrainian monitor Oksana Meshko may have
survived “Stalin's gulag,” but the Soviet authorities had recently put her in “a psychiatric
hospital.” During the Vienna Summit, Chairman Robert Bernstein and Vice-Chairman
Orville Schell published an article in the New York Times arguing that “’Soviet leaders
should be told in Vienna that their nation will not receive MFN status unless the
“legitimate rights of the Helsinki monitors are restored.”529
Because the U.S. Watch Group wanted to encourage as much private citizen
participation in the Helsinki process as possible, they contributed to human rights
528
See Laber, The Courage of Strangers, 113-9; and Korey, NGOS and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 239-41; and U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, 13. See also CHRUR 38 (April-June 1980): 7.
529
Jeri Laber, “Moscow versus Rights,” New York Times, 31 July 1980, A19; and CHRUR 34 (April-June
1979): 50; and See U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, 12. See also CHRUR 34 (April-June 1979): 51.
273
conferences held by groups such as the European Helsinki Group and International
League of Human Rights; many delivered speeches at the 1979 International Sakharov
Hearings held in Washington, D.C. To educate the American public, the organization
published numerous reports that described conditions in the Soviet Union and held a
conference that explored ways of increasing Soviet-American exchanges. Even more
important, members participated in “periodic consultations with the White House Staff,
the State Department,” and the U.S. Helsinki Commission staff. They also began
publishing written responses to State Department human rights reports and testified on
numerous occasions before the Commission about human rights violations across the
globe.530
Other organizations besides the U.S. Watch Group continued their efforts to give
dissenters more operational and moral support. For example, the Socialist International
invited Sakharov to attend and speak at their meetings. The World Psychiatric
Association’s Executive Committee established “a Committee to Review the Abuse of
Psychiatry” to examine submitted complaints by private citizens about the use of
psychiatry for political purposes. One year later, the American Psychiatric Association
awarded Semyon Gluzman a “Distinguished Fellowship Award” after he received a stiff
prison sentence for publishing a report describing the Soviet psychiatric abuse that made
its way abroad. In a similar vein, the long-time political prisoner Anatoly Marchenko
530
See U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, 3-19.
274
learned from a foreign radio broadcast that the Congress of American Labor Unions had
invited him to attend its annual meeting.531
In mid 1978, a group of Lithuanians and Western private citizens announced the
formation of a new organization called the League for the Freedom of Lithuania As
envisioned, the group’s executive council in Lithuania would send reports to an overseas
council that would in turn disseminate them to foreign audiences. If governmental
repression prevented the executive council from functioning, the overseas council would
then take over operations. Near the end of 1980, a new organization came into existence
called the Advisory Council for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR. The specific
mandate of this organization called for better coordinating “efforts to defend human
rights in the USSR” and publicizing “the ideas of the human rights movement.” To
accomplish these tasks, members formed several committees “on communications with
international human rights organizations, on economic and social rights, and on departure
from the USSR.” 532
New transnational religious NGOs came into existence such as the Persecuted
Church Commission and Freedom of Faith. The explicit goals of these groups included
speaking out for private citizens in the Soviet Union who faced persecution because of
their religious beliefs and disseminating their reports to foreign governments. Unhappy
with treatment of Soviet Christians, the acting General Secretary of the WCC wrote a
letter to External Church Relations Department of the Russian Orthodox Church. He
531
CHRUR 33 (January-March 1979): 29; Ibid. 36 (October-December 1979): 22-3; and SB 61 (March
1978): 1.
532
CCE 51 (1979): 129; and CHRUR 40 (October-December 1980): 56.
275
voiced his organization’s distress at the “number of cases involving Christian believers
which are presently on trial” and the “disproportionate sentences” that some believers had
received. “Since [numerous] leaders of our member churches have made inquires
concerning this matter, “we intend to make . . . the contents of this letter” public.533
AI may have hesitated before deciding to forge links with dissenters in the early
1970s, but the organization became quite committed to “globalizing” the issue of Soviet
human rights abuses as the decade progressed. In mid-April 1979, members organized
and sponsored a demonstration near the Soviet mission to the United Nations designed to
protest the imprisonment of the 83-year-old Seventh-Day Adventist minister Vladimir
Shelkov. AI even took the step of writing an open letter to Brezhnev indicating that its
members would use the 1980 Olympics in Moscow “as an opportunity to inform
international opinion and . . . visitors to the Olympics Games about the reality of Soviet
political imprisonment.” The following year, AI published reports about the harsh
conditions of Soviet prisons and the use of psychiatry for political purposes in the
USSR.534
As an organization that prided itself on holding all governments accountable for
their behavior, AI also published reports about U.S. domestic conduct. One report
asserted that the U.S. authorities had imprisoned sixteen individuals because of their
533
CSCE Digest, 1 March 1979, 5-6; CHRUR 40 (October-December 1980): 53-4. The leadership of the
International Political Science Association (IPSA) decided not to cancel its 1979 conference in Moscow in
face of American and Canadian protests. Despite this development, a large number of participants agreed
to work with the U.S. Watch Group on creating “human rights initiatives,” some which began part of the
conference’s official program. See CHRUR 35 (July-September 1979): 35-47; and U.S. Helsinki Watch
Committee, 16.
534
CHRUR 34 (April-June 1979): 22; CSCE Digest, 10 October 1979, 1-2; and CHRUR 40 (OctoberNovember 1980): 20.
276
“’beliefs, origins, or involvement with unpopular political groups.’” Two years later,
another publication reported that pardons and paroles had reduced that number to four.
These criticisms helped convince the U.S. Helsinki Commission to examine how
American domestic conduct measured up to international standards. Near the end of
1978, the Helsinki Commission began a series of hearings that addressed topics as
diverse the federal government’s treatment of Native Americans and homosexuals.535 As
a result of public pressure, the Commission decided to publish a comprehensive report on
the U.S. Final Act compliance whose contents Carter endorsed.536
Many executive officials appreciated the diverse array of transnational human
rights activities described above because they grasped that governmental efforts alone
could not change the Soviet government’s domestic behavior. According to one internal
study, dramatic changes in Soviet government’s respect for universally recognized
human rights “cannot be accomplished by American [governmental] efforts alone.”
Instead of “a short-lived outcry provoked by one case or directed at one target,” the
United States had to mobilize “world public opinion” as part of a larger effort to exert
“persistent pressure on governments to observe the norms of international law which they
have accepted.”537 In a similar vein, Henze praised the political scientist Peter
Reddaway’s observation that “the best hope for a peaceful evolution of Soviet society”
535
See Sixth Semiannual Report, 5; and U.S. Helsinki Commission, Implementation of the Helsinki
Accords, Volume VIII, 411.
536
U.S. Helsinki Commission, Fulfilling Our Promises: The United States and the Helsinki Act: A Status
Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Press, 1979), 59-69. See also Sixth Semiannual
Report, 5; and U.S. Helsinki Commission, Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Volumes VIII and IX.
537
“Review of the United States Policy toward the Soviet Union Requested by Section 24(b) of the
International Security Act of 1978,” 19 December 1978, NSABM, Box 80, Folder: 12/1-12/20 1978, JCPL.
277
lay in “public opinion at home and abroad, backed by far-sighted governments, forcing
the Politburo to face up to its profound internal problems.” He favored such an argument
because the larger effects of globalization ensured the continued existence of
constituencies in Eastern Europe committed to human rights ideals.538
This attitude accounts for why executive branch publications often utilized
transnational human rights activities as a way of engaging in peaceful ideological
competition with communist countries. For example, the Ninth Semiannual Report
praised the U.S. Watch Group’s releasing of nine reports examining the American Final
Act compliance record. “These reports identify a number of areas in which the authors
believe improvement is warranted, but Helsinki Watch representatives” feel as if U.S.
internal behavior will improve “because the freedom to monitor is firmly established in
the United States.” Because the American government respected the Final Act’s
stipulations about allowing private citizens “to know and act upon” their rights,
politicians had the opportunity to learn about and rectify the shortcomings of their
policies. Instead of drawing on this potential source of strength, Warsaw Pact nations
persecuted private citizens who only wanted their governments to abide by international
human rights standards.539
The expression of these sentiments did not mean all members of the State
Department had actually embraced the task of pressing their Soviet counterparts on
538
Memo, PH to ZB, “Peter Reddaway on Chronicle of Current Events,” 26 July 1978, NSABM, Box 80,
Folder: 7/78, JCPL.
539
Ninth Semiannual Report, 4-5. See also Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Seventh Semiannual
Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 3.
278
human rights issues. In reference to the follow-up meeting in Madrid, a report from the
BEA suggested that “going beyond the precedents established at Belgrade” would called
in question to the U.S. commitment to making “further progress on implementing other
parts of Final Act.” Such behavior would also substantiate arguments that American
policymakers only wanted to embarrass and provoke Soviet officials. After all, “the
Soviets are aware that Lenin once suggested using human rights advocacy as a tactic for
revolution.”540
This type of language infuriated members of the U.S. Helsinki Commission and
their staff. Much as they had in Belgrade, they engaged in bureaucratic battles designed
to challenge the State Department’s “careerism” and “bureaucratic inertia.” The staff
sent a report to the National Security Council indicating that “domestic political
considerations as well as overall U.S. foreign policy objectives demand that consistent
pressure for implementation of Principle VII and Basket III be maintained.” To help
rally the public behind the agreement, the report called for “conferences and seminars
involving government and private groups [that] could be organized to seek further ways
and means to implement the Final Act.” With solid planning and commitment, these
meetings could “involve private groups and international citizens in cooperative efforts
with their governments designed to enhance the implementation process.” Another
document argued that Carter needed to appoint a “political figure to head the U.S.
delegation” just as he had in Belgrade if his administration wanted to retain “the support
of Congress, NGOs, and [the] public at large.” The Commission also recommended that
540
N.A., “Human Rights in the Review of Implementation,” 3, 5-6, Box 9, Folder: Unmarked, USHCF,
RCSCE, NA.
279
Carter appoint more public members to the Madrid delegation rather than the seven that
had attended Belgrade.541
A wide array of officials proved responsive to the Commission’s
recommendations. Carter announced that thirty private citizens from diverse
backgrounds would serve as public members of the U.S. delegation to Madrid. Before
the meeting began in November, he invited over “330 persons . . . from Jewish, religious,
nongovernmental, labor, and international law groups” to participate in day-long
briefings with executive branch and Congressional officials about U.S. preparations for
the conference. As a State Department press release noted, these meetings followed
“regional meetings” it had already sponsored in “Cleveland, New York, Pittsburgh,
Detroit, Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco.”542 On 29 July, Muskie reaffirmed
that public members would “will be able to meet with U.S. diplomats on the scene and
actually take part in the conference’s closed sessions.543
The executive branch proved responsive to the Commission’s recommendations
for a wide variety of reasons. Fascell’s strong “personal and professional relations” with
541
“Goals and Objectives for the U.S. During the Next Two Years,”13-17, N.D., Box 9, Folder: Unmarked,
NA; and “Human Rights Paper: Our Comments,” Box 9, Folder: Unmarked, NA. See also Korey, The
Promises We Keep, 104-7, 110.
542
Korey. The Promises We Keep, 110; “Meeting to Commemorate the Fifth Anniversary of the Signing of
the Helsinki Accords,” SAEA, Box 27, Folder: Helsinki Accords, JCPL; and Department of State Bulletin,
“Meeting to Commemorate the Fifth Anniversary of the Signing of the Helsinki Accords, 29 July 1980,”
SAEA, Box 27, Folder: Helsinki Accords, JCPL. For a good description of the administration’s
overlapping goals of appearing strong on the issue of human rights in the face of domestic criticism and
putting ideological pressure on the Soviet Union, see Memo, ZB et al. to Jack Watson, “President’s
Remarks at July 29 White House Event Commemorating 5th Anniversary of the Helsinki Accords,” SAEA,
Box 4, Folder: Foreign Policy, 3/80, JCPL.
543
Department of State Bulletin, September 1980, 51-2; and Robert Rand, “America’s ‘Helsinki Lobby,’”
in Mastny, ed., Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, 198.
280
Vance and later Muskie ensured that his views about the importance of public human
rights diplomacy received attention within administration circles. The Commission also
became an important resource for executive branch officials to draw upon because of the
high-rate of post rotation in the State Department. Unlike professional diplomats who
moved around, the Commission’s staff possessed unequaled information about the plight
of private citizens in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It had this advantage because
staff members who remained at their positions for longer periods of time continued to
compile, synthesize, and publish the large amount of information they received from
NGOs and commission hearings. The staff also had a wide array of studies on how the
Soviet Union would attack U.S. human rights practices at their disposal.544
Executive branch officials could also not ignore the large number of letters they
received from private citizens about the need to call out the human rights violations of
Warsaw Pact nations at Madrid and involve the public as much as possible in the
proceedings. In a letter to the Bureau of Ethnic Affairs that expressed distrust of
bureaucratic discretion and authority, the Ohio Helsinki Accords Council demanded that
the U.S. delegation to Madrid “include private citizen involvement in the preparation and
presentation of the U.S. position.” Instead of relying on career diplomats, “we feel that
U.S. [private] citizens who are familiar with language, culture, and history of the various
nations within the USSR would be the most qualified individuals who would be able to
represent American interests in the area of human rights.” Such a move would also show
544
Korey. The Promises We Keep, 106-113.
281
unequivocal American support for “the Helsinki monitors in Ukraine, Lithuania,
Armenia, Georgia, and Moscow.545.
Carter’s decision to appoint Max Kampelman as co-chairperson of U.S.
delegation also facilitated the Commission’s goal of shaping U.S. behavior in Madrid.
His background as a Democratic member of the Committee on the Present Danger and
strong civil rights advocate led him to view his appointment as a chance to make the
meeting a “’bully pulpit’” for freedom and democracy. Once he took up the appointment,
he treated the Commission as a valuable resource and attached particular importance to
receiving information from and consulting with NGOs. As he recounts in his memoirs:
“My political instincts told me that the Madrid meetings needed a constituency to support
our efforts.” “If they [human rights and religious organizations] understood what the
delegation was after and accepted what we accomplished they could be indispensable
supporters and advocates.”546
Kampelman traveled across the country to meet with a wide variety of “citizen
groups” that wanted the United States to advance their agenda at the Madrid meeting.
During these meetings, he worked to overcome the suspicions of ethnic, religious and
human rights groups that questioned the Carter administration’s commitment to human
rights. He also used his travels to discuss the importance of covering events in Madrid
with “newspaper, radio and television journalists.” He also kept in constant contact with
545
Letter, Ohio Helsinki Accords Council to Stephen Aiello,” 5 May 1980, SAEA, Box 7, Folder: Madrid
Conference on Human Rights, JCPL.
546
Max M. Kampelman, Entering New Worlds: The Memoirs of a Private Man in Public Life (New York:
HarperCollins, 1991), 226-7. See also Korey. The Promises We Keep, 110-1.
282
representatives from the U.S. Watch Group. With his help, “a number of the reports that
the Watch commissioned” became part of the “briefing book for the U.S. delegation at
Madrid.”547
The importance that the executive branch attached to public involvement in the
Helsinki process manifested itself in other ways. The U.S. delegation supported the
Commission’s decision to set up a public liaison office in Madrid to brief private citizens,
NGOs, and journalists about the conference’s proceedings. U.S. officials also promised
that NGOs not represented on the Madrid delegation would “be able to meet with
delegation members in the Spanish capital to receive briefings on the progress of the
conference and to exchange views with U.S. officials.” With the help of Commission
staffers, the U.S. delegation succeeded in obtaining press credentials for “representatives
of American ethnic and human rights organizations with newsletters or journals.”548
These descriptions do not convey the magnitude of non-governmental activity that
took place at the Madrid. Just before the conference began, thirty-two NGOs and
fourteen United Nations Associations “called on the participating states to make the
fullest possible use of non-governmental organizations in their plans for implementation
of the Final Act. Once the proceedings began, groups as diverse as the U.S. Watch
Group, World Federation of Free Latvians, and Freedom House passed out reports to
American and Western European delegates and journalists; many of these groups also
547
Kampelman, Entering New Worlds, 230-1; Letter, Max Kampelman to Hedrik Hertzberg, 17 July 1980,
SAEA, Box 7, Folder: 12/79-11/1/80; and U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, 17.
548
Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 240-1; Laber, The Courage of
Strangers, 123-6; Robert Rand, “America’s ‘Helsinki Lobby,’” in Mastny, ed., Helsinki, Human Rights,
and European Security, 198; and Letter, Meg Donnovan to Ambassador Scanlon et al., 1 January 1984,
Box 48, Folder: State Department Correspondence, 1984, USHCF, RCSCE, NA.
283
held regular press conferences. To make their lobbying efforts more effective and further
publicize their activities, the NCSJ worked with other Jewish groups to set up a “full-time
reception center” that distributed “meticulously prepared research studies” to every
delegation. The U.S. Watch Group leased office space so its staff could provide “wellresearched documentation on human rights violations to the hundreds of media
correspondents who had descended upon Madrid.” Freedom House “conducted a weeklong program” that “brought to Madrid a group of internationally recognized dissidents
who addressed human rights issues.”549
Sensing an opportunity to raise international awareness about the issue of Soviet
human rights violations, a sizable contingent of Soviet émigrés descended on Madrid.
Once at the conference, they met with Western delegates, held their own press
conferences, and mingled with the representatives of NGOs. Edward Lozansky was no
exception. He arrived in Madrid ready to do whatever he could to raise international
awareness about the Soviet government’s refusal to let his wife emigrate. With great
effort, he managed to participate in a demonstration in France coinciding with the arrival
of a Soviet delegation. He also used his life savings to organize a “gala performance” in
honor of Sakharov that received widespread coverage in Spanish newspapers. He even
printed five-hundred copies of a telegram he had just received from his wife’s Divided
549
CHRUR 40 (October-December 1980): 32-33; Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, 240-2; Korey, The Promises We Keep, 123-5; Letter, Meg Donnovan to Ambassador Scanlon et
al.”; and “Helsinki Watch Groups,” Freedom at Issue 71 (March-April 1983): 19.
284
Family Group and distributed them to every delegate at Madrid, including those from the
Soviet Union.550
The combined effects of Carter’s determination to engage in peaceful ideological
and transnational pressures meant that U.S. delegates proved even more vocal about
Soviet human rights violations and international misconduct than they had in Belgrade.
During the first phase of the Madrid follow-up meeting (13 November-19 December
1980), U.S. delegates made specific references to sixty-five individuals who had faced
governmental repression in Warsaw Pact nations. This number stood well above the
seven individuals that the United States had mentioned at Belgrade. They also raised a
number of embarrassing issues such as the Afghanistan invasion, state-sponsored antiSemitism, and religious persecution. The U.S. delegation even denounced the Kremlin’s
treatment of national minorities, a topic that their predecessors had considered too
provocative to raise at the previous follow-up meeting.551
Following the Commission’s recommendations, Kampelman also made every
effort to create a more unified Western position on human rights than existed at Belgrade.
While the Soviet Union’s efforts to curb dissent played an important role, his consistent
meetings with NATO delegations and superb negotiating skills made Western European
delegates less reticent about criticizing Soviet human rights abuses. In sharp contrast to
their cautious behavior at Belgrade, “Western allies of the United States” joined in the
550
Edward Lozansky, For Tatiana: When Love Triumphed over the Kremlin (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1984), 232-6, 241.
551
Kampelman, Entering New Worlds, 251-2; CHRUR 40 (October-December 1980): 32; and Korey, The
Promises We Keep, 132.
285
criticism of Soviet practices and, in some instances, named names and cited cases.” They
also began criticizing the Soviet government’s restrictions on Jewish emigration and
imprisonment of refuseniks.552 During a working session, a Belgian delegate even went
so far as to argue that the Kremlin’s “’intensified anti-Semitism’ . . . showed a ‘rising
mercury level in that horrible barometer of hate.’”553
The successes transnational actors and executive branch officials had in
“globalizing” the issue of Soviet human rights violations had obvious limits. At the end
of the day, they failed to curb Moscow’s long-term goal of eradicating non-official
activities. This stark reality raises the question of how Carter understood the term
“prevail” and would have approached the task of promoting human rights in the Soviet
Union had he been reelected. At this moment, no records exist that elucidate what
happened to Henze and Odom’s proposals described above other than the description of
efforts to strengthen the ability of U.S. radios to reach audiences in the USSR. Whatever
steps Carter might have approved, evidence suggests that he viewed “prevail” as an
honest effort of Soviet leaders to abandon the tenets of orthodox Marxist-Leninism and
make their domestic practices more consistent with international standards. To
accomplish this goal, the United States would have remained an active participate in the
Helsinki process and committed to engaging in vigorous ideological competition with
Moscow. In the spring of 1980, Carter made this position clear when he told an audience
552
Korey. The Promises We Keep, 133-5.
553
Ibid.
286
that “we have no reason to fear global competition with the Soviets if we remain strong.
It is our values which promote pluralism and diversity.”554
This attitude does not mean that Carter would have transformed his approach to
promoting human rights in the Soviet Union had he served a second term. He would not
have gone out of his way to stress the centrality of Soviet nationality problems.555 He
also would not have placed rhetorical importance on the need for Soviet officials to build
democratic institutions as soon as possible. Instead, he would have kept calibrating his
public rhetoric about the Kremlin’s human rights violations in relationship to Soviet
internal behavior. He also would have stuck to the position that Soviet leaders had little
choice but to recognize international realities and join Americans in the complex task of
forging an international environment consistent with U.S. principles and values. Even if
Carter had decided to seek ratification of SALT II and rebuild U.S.-Soviet relations after
being reelected, the die had already been cast. Despite a number of missteps and
unrealistic assumptions about the future trajectory of Soviet behavior, the Carter
administration helped private citizens make human rights an integral element of U.S.Soviet relations. During the 1980s, Soviet leaders never came close to curbing
transnational critiques of their domestic behavior. Just as Carter had predicted, this
554
See “Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Address Before the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia,” 9 May
1980. Available [Online]: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=33393&st=&st1= [10
October 2007].
555
Memorandum for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski: The White House, “Questions and Answers for Human
Rights Days Briefing Session,” NSABM, Box 78: Folder, Human Rights, 12/78-3/79, JCPL. There can be
little doubt that Carter examined internal reports that outlined Soviet nationality problems. See Memo, ZB
to Carter, “Soviet National Problems,” 3 June 1977, NSABM, Box 78: Folder 6/77, JCPL.
287
development ensured that the reputation of the Soviet government only grew worse in the
eyes of the Western world as the decade progressed.
288
CHAPTER 7: THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT VERSUS DISSENTERS, PART II:
CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
“GLOBALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS” AND THE CARTER
ADMINISTRATION, SEPTEMBER 1978-JANAURY 1981
Near the beginning of 1980, the U.S. Helsinki Commission published a report that
contained information it had received from NGOs and dissenters about the widespread
use of prison labor in the Soviet Union. The document explained how “some prisoners
have found it particularly unjust that items they have produced” had ended up “part of the
Soviet Union’s trade with the West.” A “former prisoner of conscience” even indicated
that “forced labor had been employed for the manufacture of Misha Bear souvenirs for
the 1980 Moscow Olympics.”556
This example reveals that Brezhnev regime proved unable to prevent dissenters
from undermining the international prestige of the Soviet Union. Bent on combating the
totalitarian features of Soviet society, a wide array of dissenters continued the practice of
citing human rights violations to show the rest of the world how Soviet-style socialism
suffered from a lack of glasnost. They may have remained hesitant about specific
political objectives, but continued to have success in forging transnational links with
Western private citizens and government officials. In addition to exploring how
dissenters had helped “globalize” the issue of Soviet human rights violations, the first
section of this chapter will revisit their divergent evaluations of Carter’s efforts to
556
See U.S. Helsinki Commission, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe: Recommendations Five Years After Helsinki (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Press, 1980), 76, 101.
289
promote human rights in the USSR. While a number of them criticized the U.S.
executive branch for not having done enough to challenge Soviet internal behavior,
others thanked Carter for his decision to defend the cause of Soviet freedom.
The second part of this chapter will describe the Soviet government’s behavior in
detail. Although not averse to making pragmatic concessions that furthered important
foreign policy goals, the pervasive influence of orthodox Marxist-Leninist thinking meant
that Moscow’s attitude toward dissenters changed little after the visible public trials of
mid 1978 took place. When their repressive tactics failed to curb the spread of dissent at
home and transnational attacks on Soviet internal behavior, the Kremlin decided to
accelerate its campaign to eradicate non-official activities near the end of 1979. Because
the USSR lacked democratic political institutions and suffered from a governmental
mindset that equated criticism to ideological subversion, orthodox Soviet leaders felt
obligated to protect their multinational empire’s internal cohesion and international
legitimacy through further repression.
Soviet Dissenters’ View
The steps that orthodox Soviet leaders took to curb non-official activities from the
beginning of 1977 to mid 1979 could not prevent a number of private citizens from
questioning their government’s arbitrary interpretations of internationally recognized
human rights. Following the example of the Moscow Watch Group, new ones came into
existence such as the Initiative Committee to Fight for the Right of Free Exit from the
USSR (Exit Group), the Christian Youth Council, and the Free Interprofessional
Association of Workers (SMOT). Several Seventh Day Adventist and Baptist groups
290
also formed that compiled reports on how the Soviet authorities imprisoned and harassed
church members. 557
As the formation of these groups suggests, Soviet authorities only had limited
success in stemming the publication of samizdat literature at home and preventing its
dissemination abroad. They not only failed to stop the publication of established journals
such as The Chronicle and the Information Bulletin of the Crimean Tatar Movement, but
also could not prevent the appearance of new publications such as the feminist journal
Woman and Russia, and an Estonian journal called The Saturday Newspaper. Even more
impressive, Sakharov and other dissenters managed to hold a meeting with a
representative of Polish Workers Defense Committee (KOR) in Moscow near the
beginning of 1979. After this gathering took place, representatives of KOR and the
Moscow Watch Group held a joint press conference six months later that called on the
Czechoslovak authorities to release the ten leaders of Charter 77 whom they had earlier
arrested.558
The success of members of the Invalid Group in sending their reports abroad also
helps illustrate the troubles the Kremlin had in stemming the “globalization” of Soviet
human rights violations. A U.S. Helsinki Commission report cited a document from the
Invalid Group that recounted how handicapped individuals “who live in state invalid
homes find themselves in the most terrible conditions. There is [even] evidence of
557
See Alexeyva, On Soviet Dissent, 349-50, 209-12, 235; and U.S. Helsinki Commission, Implementation
of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Recommendations Five Years
After Helsinki: Findings and Recommendations Five Years After Helsinki, 89-110, 137-42.
558
U.S. Helsinki Commission, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe: Recommendations Five Years After Helsinki, 86-9; Medvedev, “The Future of
Soviet Dissent,” 27-8; and Medvedev, On Soviet Dissent, 76.
291
terrible beatings and of absolutely helpless, bedridden invalids being driven to
suicide.”559 In another letter that reached a West German newspaper and the radio station
Deutsche Welle, Invalid Group members complained about Soviet bureaucratic inertia
and explained that “the only way of getting something done for the disabled in the USSR
is through publicity.” To give Western audiences the ammunition needed to generate this
publicity, they vowed to supply concrete data without delay on any of the complex
problems concerning the disabled in the USSR.560
Despite their failure to forge a close working relationship with a broad-based
labor movement, dissenters succeeded in telling the rest of the world about the existence
of forced labor in the Soviet Union. According to a Moscow Watch Group document,
Soviet law “provides for forced labor, systematic deprivations in diet, [as well as]
supplementary punishments that include isolation cells in labor camps and solitary
confinement in prison.” In another document that reached foreign audiences, Orlov
estimated that the Soviet prison system had five million people participating in some sort
of “forced labor activity,” whose treatment he equated with the “condition of serfs in
remote times.” While this estimate appears high in retrospect, Sakharov supported
Orlov’s conclusions and called labor in Soviet camps “compulsory, punitive,” and
“slavelike in nature”561
559
U.S. Helsinki Commission, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe: Recommendations Five Years After Helsinki, 103. A document from the Moscow
Watch Group that also reached Western audiences substantiated these charges. See Documents of the
Helsinki Monitoring Groups in the U.S.S.R. and Lithuania, 1976-1986, Volume I, 163.
560
CCE 55-6 (1981): 67. See also Ibid., 59-61 (1981): 220 and Hodgman, “Détente and the Dissidents,”
383.
292
Near the beginning of 1980, workers in West Germany found a note that political
prisoners in Siberia managed to smuggle out in a timber shipment. In words that
expressed their desperation, they wrote that “we do not know whether these products,
manufactured by the slave labor of Soviet prisoners, will be exported to a socialist or to a
free country.” Nevertheless, we “firmly believe that in every land and among every
people our letter will find persons who are willing to listen to what we have to say” and
challenge the “unrestrained tyranny of the CPSU.562 These prisoners were lucky, as the
workers who found this letter forwarded it to the West German Society for the Defense of
Human Rights for public distribution.563 Armed with these sorts of materials, the U.S.
Helsinki Commission issued a report in 1980 that explained how “compulsory labor is an
essential aspect of life in Soviet prison and camps.”564
Besides “globalizing” the issue of slave labor, dissenters also managed to send
messages abroad describing how Soviet workers had fewer rights than their Western
counterparts. For example, a French newspaper published the words of a Ukrainian
worker who explained how Soviet “oppression and direct arbitrariness is directed most
against the working person . . . who” lacks the “opportunity to fight against political and
economic repression.” The Moscow and Ukrainian Watch Groups picked up on these
561
Documents of the Helsinki Monitoring Groups in the U.S.S.R. and Lithuania, 1976-1986, Volume I,
304-6; 349-67; and “Statement by Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Representative of the Moscow Helsinki Watch
Group in the West,” SB 80 (December 1979): 2. See also CCE 51 (1979): 89; and Irina Orlov, “My meeting
with my husband, Dr. Orlov, on August 21, 1979,” BEA, Box 30, Folder: Sakharov Hearing, 10/79, JCPL.
562
“People! We Need Your Help? SB 84 (April 1980): 1.
563
Ibid.
564
See U.S. Helsinki Commission, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe: Recommendations Five Years After Helsinki, 76, 101, 160-6.
293
sorts of reports and published documents describing Soviet laborers’ poor working
conditions and inability to engage in collective bargaining or carry out a strike. In a
speech he delivered to the AFL-CIO near the end of 1979, Vladimir Bukovsky explained
how international human rights agreements actually gave Soviet workers the right to form
independent organizations such as SMOT to protect themselves from arbitrary
government bureaucrats uninterested in the humane treatment of workers.565
These types of reports helped tarnish the image of the Soviet Union as the
international champion of labor. In sharp contrast to its previous unwillingness to
criticize the abridgement of workers’ rights in Eastern bloc nations, the International
Labor Organization (ILO) found reports about “slave labor” in the Soviet Union credible.
After careful deliberation, the ILO issued a report that called on Soviet officials to make
their labor legislation consistent with international standards that forbade “forced labor.”
When the same organization criticized the USSR for preventing dissenters from
procuring work commensurate with their educational levels, the Soviets rejected the
charge with the lame excuse that their “anti-parasite” laws only punished “gamblers and
fortune tellers.”566
565
“Ukrainian Worker Accuses Soviet State of Bourgeois Class System,” SB103 (November 1981) 3;
“Statement by Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Representative of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group in the West”;
and “Speech Delivered by Vladimir Bukovsky on the Workers’ Opposition in the USSR,” SB 79
(November 1979): 1-7. See also “Worker Participation in the Dissident Movement,” Ibid. 94 (February
1981): 1-6.
566
U.S. Helsinki Commission, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe: Recommendations Five Years After Helsinki, 76, 98-102. See also “International
Labor Organization. Available [Online]: http://www.genevabriefingbook.com/chapters/ilo.pdf [12
November 2007].
294
Soviet authorities also had to grapple with visible calls for self-determination in
numerous republics and their inability to extirpate religious practices. In a process one
writer calls the “multinationalization of Soviet dissent,” private citizens in Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia who had worked together in a joint committee for two years sent
the U.N. a “Baltic Charter” in August 1979. This document not only denounced the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, but also called for the independence of their countries from
Soviet rule. After it became public, over 30,000 individuals in Lithuania signed the
charter over the course of the next year and Sakharov voiced his strong approval of the
measure. Baltic dissenters also sent a petition to the Olympic committee arguing that the
yachting events in Estonia represented the “first time in Olympic history” that “a part of
the games will be staged in an occupied territory.”567
After the Carter administration secured his release in 1979, the Ukrainian Watch
member Valentyn Moroz delivered a speech at a National Press Club luncheon that
emphasized Ukraine’s status as a colonial nation. “The tragedy of the Ukraine,” he
observed, “lies in the fact that the world’s attention is focused on the struggle of Blacks
for the decolonization of Africa.” In sharp language, he told the audience that “the arena
of decolonization should shift to Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R where we have dozens
of subjugated nations as well as the largest colony in the world—Ukraine—a nation of 50
million people.”568 The Ukrainian Patriotic Movement defended a proposal to have the
567
See Kowalewski, The Multinationalization of Soviet Dissent 206-30; and U.S. Helsinki Commission,
Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe:
Recommendations Five Years After Helsinki, 19-20. See also CSCE Digest, 23 January 1981, 10.
568
“Of the Valentyn Moroz at the National Press Club Luncheon, held Friday, May 18 1979 at the National
Press Building in Washington, D.C.,” NSABM, Box 81, Folder: 5/18-2/1/79, JCPL.
295
United Nations to supervise a referendum on the political status of Ukraine on the
grounds that “the decolonization of the USSR is the only guarantee of peace in the entire
world.”569 Because of the importance they placed on internationally recognized human
rights, members of the Moscow Watch Group agreed to distribute the documents of their
Ukrainian counterpart and support all private citizens who fought for the right to
“determine their own fate.”570
The Soviet government also had to face the reality that hundreds of thousands of
individuals remained committed to practicing their faith and publicizing their plight.571
For example, the Catholic Committee of Lithuania sent a letter to the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet near the end of 1978 reminding members that “no less than 70% of the
population of Lithuania even today belongs to the Catholic Church and only a
insignificant portion consider themselves atheists.” Five months later, it sent a petition to
UNECSO describing how Lithuanian parents have no right to teach their children religion
and cannot have them participate in religious rites without breaking the law. In addition
569
U.S. Helsinki Commission, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe: Recommendations Five Years After Helsinki, 19; and Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent,
56-8. See also Smoloskyp 1, no. 4 (Summer 1979). A copy of this journal can be found in NSABM, Box
81, Folder: 5/18-2/1/79, JCPL.
570
U.S. Helsinki Commission, A Thematic Survey of Documents of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 6-9.
571
A study released near the end of 1980 confirmed this reality, noting that an estimated 100,000 Baptists
and 500,000 unregistered Pentecostals lived in the Soviet Union. In the case of the later, over 30,000 had
already submitted their requests for emigration. Along with the millions of Byzantine Catholics (Uniates)
in Ukraine who belonged to an outlawed Church, authorities also had to contend with 50,000 Seventh-Day
Adventists who operated an underground printing press that the government failed to locate until 1984. In
addition to the rise of other sects such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, government officials also had to contend
with the ever-increasing number of Jews who had expressed their desire to emigrate from the Soviet Union.
See CSCE Digest, 10 April 1981, 12-4.
296
to these activities, letters from Pentecostals and Baptists addressed to Carter continued to
make their way to the West.572
After attending church with Carter in 1979, the Ukrainian exile and Watch Group
member Georgi Vins set up a U.S. branch of the Council of Churches of the Evangelical
Baptists (CCECB), an organization that represented Soviet Baptists who refused to
register with the state. His wife Lydia became the foreign representative of a dissident
organization called the Council of Relatives of Evangelical Christian Baptist Prisoners.573
The latter used the opportunity of speaking before the U.S. Helsinki Commission to
describe how the Soviet government decided to rescind the permission it gave a Baptist
family to leave for the United States based on the ruling that “their departure could result
in a mass movement among believers to appeal to the authorities for permission to
emigrate.”574
Besides the problems involved in combating the “globalization” of Soviet human
rights violations, authorities also had to deal with individuals who had become
disillusioned with Soviet-style socialism. On 5 December 1978, two hundred “young
people” in Leningrad held a demonstration on Soviet Constitution Day (5 December).
572
CCCL 37 (6 January 1979): 7; and Ibid., 38 (1 May 1979): 32-6. For examples of letters from
Pentecostals and Baptists, see CCE 50 (1979): 154; Ibid, 52 (1980): 19. Ibid., 53 (1980): 153. The Carter
administration also received a series of letters from the Baltic Women’s Council asking the United States to
endorse dissenters’ proposals calling on the United Nations to supervise elections in the Baltic Republics
designed to secure the independence of these nations. See Letter, Baltic Women’s Council to JC, 13
October 1980, BEA, Box 7, Folder: Madrid Conference on Human Rights, JCPL; and Letter, Stephen R.
Aiello to John Bolsteins, 31 October 1980, BEA, Box 7, Folder: Madrid Conference on Human Rights,
JCPL.
573
574
Alexeyva, On Soviet Dissent, 212.
U.S. Helsinki Commission, Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Volume XI (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Press, 1979), 124-5.
297
They gathered to protest the arrest of two students who had formed informal groups
committed to rectifying the Soviet government’s distortions of socialism. Unhappy with
the Soviet Communist Party’s handpicked nominees for the Supreme Soviet elections, a
group of private citizens in Moscow created a voters’ group known as “Election 79.” The
authorities rejected the candidacy of these individuals, including the dissident historian
Roy Medvedev, and warned the group not to carry out similar actions in the future.575
The successes dissenters had in “globalizing” the issue of Soviet internal behavior
helped convince the Kremlin to attack all manifestations of dissent at once in the fall of
1979, a practice the Brezhnev had refrained from since Carter had become President.
According to a report in the Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR that appeared in
January 1980:
The arrests, trials and searches have affected all sectors of dissident activity, but
some patterns have emerged. Individuals who have served as links among
different dissident groups or between dissidents and the West have been particular
targets for repression. Women no longer enjoy relative immunity from
imprisonment. Well known Moscow authors . . . have been urged to emigrate as a
substitute for arrest. The Moscow Watch Group, the Working Commission on the
Misuse of Psychiatry, the Christian Commission, and other organized groups of
dissenters have suffered heavy casualties.576
In the United States, émigré Valery Chalidze argued that “Moscow believes that it can
end Western complaints by cutting off channels of information, by denying citizens all
575
U.S. Helsinki Commission, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe: Recommendations Five Years After Helsinki, 21; Alexeyva, On Soviet Dissent,
350-1, 355-61; CSCE Digest, 1 March 1979, 4; and Medvedev, On Soviet Dissent, 138. See also CCE 54
(1980): 130-1.
576
CHRUR 37 (January-March 1980): 1. Exasperated with Soviet behavior, the head of Solzhenitsyn Fund
for Political prisoners, S. Khodorovich, issued a statement that read “how morally weak that mighty power
which fears honest people must be. And how dangerous are the cowards who posses such power.” See
CCE 55-6 (1981): 97.
298
means of expressing their opinions and by confining the more stubborn civil-rights
activists in labor camps and psychiatric hospitals.” These reports had significant merit
because Soviet authorities arrested 300 dissenters while forcing fifty others to emigrate
between mid 1979 and February 1981.577 From his exile in Gorky, Sakharov and his wife
Elena managed to send messages abroad expressing similar themes.578
The increasing intensity of the Soviet government’s efforts to eradicate nonofficial activities only reinforced the importance dissidents attached to the Madrid
follow-up conference. Anatoly Shcharansky’s mother wrote a letter to Western
delegations describing her son’s tragic fate that in part read: “My son, along with many
other people who are in our country are labeled renegades, believed in the reality of the
Helsinki Accords” because this document affirmed “the interconnection of international
détente and human rights.” Since “you inspired hope in the [Helsinki] monitors,” she
continued, “it is your duty to defend the rights of these honest and courageous people.”
After warning Western countries not to trust Soviet promises about better behavior in the
future, she insisted that their “actions” will only become “valuable” when the Soviet
authorities released “courageous; and innocent” individuals such as her son.579
Andrei Sakharov wrote an article in the New York Times that asked Western
nations to take an “unequivocal, uncompromising” attitude toward Soviet human rights
violations that went beyond “verbal protests.” He rejected calls for a boycott of Madrid,
577
CSCE Digest, 23 January 1981, 8-9; and Ibid., 3 February 1981, 5.
578
After arriving in this closed city, Sakharov denounced the “’arbitrariness on the part of the KGB’” and
vowed to fight the Soviet government despite the possibility that such behavior might “threaten him and his
wife.” See CCE 55-6 (1981): 81. For an excellent example of psychiatric abuse, see CHRUR 41 (JanuaryMarch 1981): 25-6.
579
CSCE Digest, 10 April 1981, 9.
299
but reiterated that “the critical international situation requires that Western participating
States coordinate their tactics and pursue their goals with more determination and
consistency than at Belgrade.” If the West remained determined over the long term,
Warsaw Pact nations would have to concede that the efforts of private citizens to monitor
governments’ compliance with the Final Act only increased “international security and
confidence.” With the help of his wife, Orlov managed to forward a short message to
Madrid that echoed some of Sakharov’s larger points. “As human rights advocates,” he
wrote, “we have a stake in . . . [a] kind of détente which takes account of public control
over governments as a key factor in safeguarding peace.” He also suggested that the
heads of signatory states should “make a major effort to restore the former—precrisis—
situation” in the Soviet Union.580
A wide array of dissenters attached importance to the Madrid meeting because
they viewed themselves as participants in a global struggle against the totalitarian
features of Soviet society. This attitude accounts for why many viewed human rights as
an issue they could exploit to bring more glasnost to the “clandestine” Soviet state. One
publication that reached Western audiences called remaining silent about Soviet human
rights violations the equivalent of being an “obedient cog” in an evil bureaucratic system.
When describing a samizdat document, an excerpt from the Chronicle explained how
“‘one of the most striking features of the Soviet power machine is the ‘isolation of its
580
CHRUR 39 (July-September 1980): 24-6. Before Madrid’s main meeting began in November 1980, the
Moscow Watch Group issued a document that rejected proposals calling on Western nations to boycott the
proceedings and called on the participants to defend the position “that the observance of human rights is not
solely a State’s internal affair, but rather an international obligation.” See Ibid., (July-September 1980): 224. See also Ibid., 40 (October-December 1980): 14.
300
upper echelon . . . from the outside world and from objective information, including
information about KGB activities.” As a result of this unfortunate situation, “‘top-level
inquiries [and petitions] about the fate of’ Soviet private citizens “handed in person to
Brezhnev by public organizations in the West . . . may have a restraining effect on the
Soviet bureaucratic machine.”581 Sakharov himself encouraged “Western man” to
challenge the “totalitarian system” that relies on the “discretion” of a “single center” to
make all important decisions for Soviet society. “It is frightening to think, he wrote,”
that the most honest and generous people who have devoted many years to defending
others with words of truth, have become victims to [this system’s] arbitrary repression.582
The importance Sakharov and other dissenters attached to challenging the global
threat of totalitarianism invites the question of how dissenters evaluated the Carter
administration’s efforts to promote human rights in the Soviet Union. Although he
voiced strong approval for the President ’s early statements about Soviet human rights
abuses, Vladimir Bukovsky concluded that Carter had “discontinued his open [human
rights] campaign and did not resume it during the rest of his time in office.” “Even
Carter,” he lamented, “whose administration started so auspiciously [on human rights],
soon came to side with the ‘experts,’ despite all the information we were able to get into
his hands.” As part of this general criticism, he excoriated Carter’s move toward “quiet”
human rights diplomacy and condemned him for not mentioning human rights abuses as
581
CCE 62 (1982): 152. Another dissenter rejected suggestion of issuing anonymous writings because “the
concept of ‘illegal, underground activity’ is more applicable to the actions of the [Soviet] authorities
themselves and their organs.’” “How else, he asked, “can you describe the existence of secret decrees,
instructions, and directives? Or political trials which consistently violate the principle of public
discourse?” See CCE 53 (1980): 59; and Robert Horvath, The Legacy of Soviet Dissent, 67.
582
“These Disturbing Times,” SB 86 (June 1980): 4-5.
301
one of the reasons why his administration enacted a series of punitive measures in
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.583
Bukovsky’s criticisms of the Carter administration reflected his belief that most
Americans and Western Europeans remained seduced by the siren song of détente.
Despite all the evidence to the contrary, he could not understand how countless Western
“experts” believed that “the USSR is a state just like a Western one” that “desires peace
just like we do.” He also rejected any notion that “détente works for the liberalization of
Soviet society.” To support this argument, he posed the question: “How can one
seriously believe that importing foreign goods can help liberalize the Soviet Union?” No
matter what Western experts thought, they could not change the fundamental reality that
Soviet economic backwardness in no way weakened the Kremlin’s commitment to
waging and winning a global ideological struggle against the West.584
Because Western nations never really attempted to make the Soviets adhere to the
provisions of the Final Act, Bukovsky argued that the West’s preoccupation with
preserving détente only ensured that a “liberalization” of Soviet society would not take
place. “If any positive gains [in human rights] were made [during the Carter
administration],” he concluded, “they came about not because of the policy of détente but
in spite of it.” To put this insight another way, Bukovsky believed that “these positive
gains” owed little to governmental activities. Instead, they “were achieved by individuals
583
Bukovsky, To Chose Freedom, 47, 158-9.
584
Ibid., 153-6.
302
and organizations who took strong exception to the policy of détente and made a point of
opposing it.” 585
Alexander Solzhenitsyn advanced arguments similar to those of Bukovsky. His
wife spoke for him when she argued that Carter’s human rights policy “has been reduced
to mere words.”586 This position grew out of a belief that Western governments made the
“strategic error” of failing to recognize that the oppressed peoples” of the Soviet Union,
especially Russians, were invaluable “allies” in the global struggle against communism.
As he explained, “communism will never be halted by negotiations or through the
machinations of détente.” Instead, “it can only be halted by force from without or by
disintegration from within.” Since the latter option remained the only feasible course of
action to pursue, “a fully united Western world can no longer prevail except by allying
itself with the captive people of the communist world.” This mindset explains why he
urged private citizens all over the world to defend the “threatened, persecuted, and
arrested persons in the USSR.” He may have hated the Final Act, but praised how
“energetic” public “protests” had time and time again had saved private Soviet citizens
from years of imprisonment and hapless existences waiting for permission to emigrate.587
585
Ibid., 153-6, 160.
586
Robert G. Kaiser, “Soviet Dissidents Tell Stories of Life in Motherland,” Washington Post, 30
September 1979, A5. This position grew out of his larger belief that Western political leaders made tragic
errors when they downplayed “the radical hostility of communism to mankind as a whole.” For example,
see Alexander Solzhenitsyn, “Misconceptions about Russia are a Threat to America,” Foreign Affairs 58
(Spring 1980): 820-3.
587
Ibid., 832-4; and “Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s Address to the 1979 Sakharov hearings, BEA, Box 30,
Folder: Sakharov Hearings, 10/79, JCPL.
303
Anatoly Shcharansky shared many of Bukovsky’s and Solzhenitsyn’s criticisms
of détente. They felt as if the policy allowed Soviet leaders to repress their citizens while
obtaining the economic and scientific benefits from the West that they needed to sustain a
viable economy. He may have praised Carter’s statements in defense of human rights,
but criticized the President for signing SALT II even though the Soviets had disregarded
the provisions of the Final Act. In his account on life in the Soviet gulag, he wrote, “The
prison loudspeaker reported that Carter and Brezhnev embraced after singing the SALT II
agreement. We [fellow prisoners] were astounded. Did this embrace mean a speedy
release? The loss of hope?” Shcharansky voiced these sentiments because he believed
that “Carter was almost never willing to back his rhetoric on human rights with decisive
action.” Because the President did not appreciate how the Soviet system operated in
practice, he sometimes lost “moral clarity” and refused to press the Soviet leaders on the
issue of how they treated their private citizens.588
Andrei Amalrik and Edward Lozansky felt much the same way. The former
excoriated Westerners for not seeing that “Soviet leaders have the mentality of thugs”
and made specific criticisms of Marshall Shulman’s position that the U.S. government
could “’educate’” Soviet leaders “through concessions and its own example.” He also
rebuked Carter’s human rights policy as being “inconsistent” and “not supported by
specific actions.” As he put it up: “Once the President “began to tone down his
588
Natan Sharansky and Ron Dermer, The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome
Tyranny and Terror (New York: Public Affairs, 1986), XX-XXII, 2-10, 107-9, 131-4. See also Natan
Sharansky, trans. by Stefani Hoffman, Fear No Evil (New York: Random House, 1988), 257-8. Other
dissenters shared Sharansky’s belief that many Americans with good-intentions had little appreciation of
how Soviet system worked in practice. See N.A., “Ginsburg: Exile Worse Than Prison,” Final Edition
(WP), 5 May 1979, B1.
304
statements, Soviet leaders realized they could ignore him.” The latter argued that
Brezhnev “had no intention to please Jimmy Carter” because the President “had already
given” Soviet leaders “more than” they “ever expected to get without demanding
anything in exchange.” In reference to SALT II, Lozansky asserted: “Brezhnev knew
that Carter would sign it and do everything to have it ratified. So why should he release
any hostages? Better to save them for some future time when they could be used to good
advantage in negotiations.”589
Unlike Bukovsky and Amalrik, Roy Medvedev stuck to the position that the
continuation of Soviet-American détente represented the best way to “liberalize” the
USSR over the long term. At the same time, he expressed impatience with the inability
of Westerners to comprehend how Stalin’s supposed distortions of socialism worked
against reform impulses in the Soviet Union. For example, he could not understand why
an Italian journalist asked him a question about why the Soviet government feared
powerless dissenters such as Sakharov. He told the journalist that Soviet officials could
not engage in a dialogue with dissenters because such behavior would “mean confessing
that our unity is imperfect, that the myth of solidarity between the People and the Party is
false, and that all other derivative myths are also false.”590 When asked if Carter and
Italian Communists were naïve in “wondering why the Kremlin can’t confront dissent
‘politically,” he made as a cogent a summary of Soviet behavior as this author as ever
read:
589
Andre Amalrik, Notes of a Revolutionary, 299-300, 311-13; and Lozansky, For Tatiana, 209-10.
590
Medvedev, On Soviet Dissent, 141.
305
The USSR isn’t France or Italy, because the Soviet regime isn’t founded on a
majority or a total consensus, but on ideology. Only Marxists . . . have the right
to rule; conversely, the ruling class justifies itself only by the country’s
ideological foundations. It’s a vicious circle, a religion, if you like. The USSR is
the last great religious state on earth. Therefore . . . every dissident, every heretic
must be flushed out and gagged. This isn’t a problem of quantity, but of basic
principles on which the regime rests. It’s inconceivable that the regime would
accept its own demise.591
Based on these observations, Medvedev criticized the Carter administration for
believing that the United States could change Soviet internal behavior through punitive
actions or high-flown human rights rhetoric. Because “dissent must be repressed at all
costs, he continued, “the will . . . to liquidate” non-official activity will always trump the
“fear of hurting international relations.” After all, “weren’t there arrests and trials even
during the best years of détente?”592
As indicated earlier, Sakharov shared Carter’s preference for signing SALT II and
creating an international environment more conducive to human nights.593 Nevertheless,
he thought that the President’s hesitations about promoting human rights in the Soviet
Union may have contributed to the Soviet government’s decision to repress dissent with
more vigor near the end of 1979. As he wrote in his memoirs, “Jimmy Carter’s inaugural
statement of the need for international efforts in the defense of human rights ruffled the
591
Ibid., 145-6.
592
See Ibid., 142-3; and Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents, 207-9. Despite all of the flaws he saw in the Soviet
dissident movement and Western behavior, the increased scale of Soviet repression made him less wedded
to the idea that dissenters would play only a secondary role in shaping Soviet reform efforts. In sharp to
some of his previous statements, he now argued that no “democratic development or reforms would be
possible” without the existence of dissent. In retrospect, this statement rang hollow, as he ignored
dissenters once Gorbachev came to power. See Medvedev, On Soviet Dissent, 142-3. See also Ibid., “The
Problems of Democratization and Détente,” 6-8.
593
In June 1980, Sakharov wrote that “on the whole, actions taken by Carter in these tragic days win
nothing but respect from me.” See Sakharov, “These Disturbing Times,” 2.
306
Soviet leaders, but his later vacillation may have encouraged them to believe that he was
“manageable” and contributed to the difficulties which followed in other aspects of
Soviet-American relations.” Despite expressing these sentiments, Sakharov still admired
him for raising the issue of Soviet human rights violations and supporting dissenters.
“My critical remarks,” he noted, “should not obscure my appreciation of Jimmy Carter’s
human rights policy. It may not have always been successful; that, after all, is fate. As
for his personal regard for me, I feel certain it is sincere, and not just politics.”594
Many other dissenters expressed positive sentiments similar to those of Sakharov.
In December 1978, three private citizens sent Carter a letter that read: “On Human
Rights Day please accept our tribute of great admiration for you, Mr. President, and for
your administration: in a world becoming wrapped in lies, you have allowed yourselves
to make human rights and moral considerations the basis of your international policy.”
Another dissenter wrote a letter asking Carter “to take an interest in my future destiny for
it is precisely you, by the will of fate, who has become the President of Human Rights
and, therefore, my President as well.” The former Soviet general Petro Grigorenko
thanked him for becoming “the first American President to meet personally and salute
former Soviet political prisoners (human rights defenders).” He also expressed his
“respect” and “gratitude” for the President’s decision to make human rights “a keystone”
of U.S. “foreign policy.” Valentyn Moroz may have wanted Carter to express more
support for Ukrainian self-determination in public, but called the President’s emphasis on
594
Ibid., 466.
307
human rights “the first instance in the post-World War II era when the West has seized
the initiative and is in an undefeatable position.”595
As this position suggests, dissenters often found common ground in the position
that American officials could do more to support their efforts. This point of view comes
across in a letter that Lozansky wrote to the Public Liaison Officer Joyce Starr asking for
updates concerning her promise to raise the issue of his wife’s emigration with members
of the National Security Council. He called the support he had received “from the
American people and [non-governmental] organizations” valuable, but then reminded
Starr of the tremendous influence U.S. policymakers held over the general trajectory of
Soviet behavior. Unless the U.S. government took stronger measures to secure the
release of his wife in the near future, he warned, the Kremlin would never allow her to
emigrate.596
A wide array of dissenters also found common ground in the argument that Soviet
leaders would never succeed in their long-term goal of eradicating non-official
activities.597 This mindset helps account for why many of them remained convinced that
their efforts would bear fruit over the long-term. In a letter he sent abroad, Sakharov
595
CCE 52 (1980): 59; N.A., N.T. SB 69 (January 1979): 1; Letter, Peter Grigorenko to JC,” N.D., Peter
Grigorenko Files, Box 1, Folder: Peter Grigorenko, JCPL; U.S. Helsinki Commission, Implementation of
the Helsinki Accords, Volume XI, 103. See also CCE 51 (1979): 89; and Ibid., 53 (1980): 192.
596
Alexander Slepak to Robert Lipshutz, 26 December 1977, RL, Box 46, Folder: S.D., 2/77-1/78; and
Letter, Edward Lozansky to Joyce Starr, 18 January 1979, OPL, Box 53, Folder: Human Rights
Correspondence, 5/78-2/79. This point of view also comes across in a dissident letter that reached Western
audiences: See “People We Need Your Help” SB 84 (April 1980): 1-2.
597
Medvedev may have held grave doubts about the future of public dissidence, but he also believed that
“opposition and dissidence will inevitably continue to exist in the Soviet Union . . . if only because many of
the most important problems of society have not yet been solved in our country.” See Medvedev, “The
Future of Soviet Dissent,” 27-8; and CCE 62 (1982): 149.
308
explained how the apolitical human rights movement “has changed the moral climate and
created the spiritual precondition needed for democratic changes in the USSR and for the
formulation of an ideology of human rights throughout the world.” Even if the scale of
repression further increased, he wrote, “nothing can erase . . . what has become known to
the world” about Soviet domestic conduct. After visiting her husband in prison, Irina
Orlov voiced her husband’s sentiments that Helsinki monitors had succeeded in bring
about a permanent change “in the leadership’s phraseology” about human rights and
contributed to the “growing sympathy of workers for the propagation of political and
civil freedoms.598
The ways in which dissenters defended their accomplishments does not mean that
they underestimated the inherent difficulties of reforming Soviet society. In fact,
Sakharov informed Western audiences that fundamental changes in the USSR would not
“take place in the near future.” “Our totalitarian society,” he remarked, “with its caste
and bureaucratic structure, its complete lack of freedom of expression or democratic
mechanisms for decision making, is extraordinary inert.” “Because the system can
petrify for years without initiating change,” Sakharov feared that conditions in the Soviet
Union would only worsen before they became better. This mentality helps explain why
many dissenters, including Sakharov, continued to stress the pivotal role that their
transnational links with Western private citizens and government officials played in
598
CCE 55-6 (1981): 87; and Irina Orlov, “My meeting with my husband, Dr. Orlov, on August 21, 1979.”
309
giving them the strength to continue their efforts against a government fearful of genuine
glasnost.599
The Acceleration of “Provocative Damage Control”: The Soviet Government’s
Efforts to Curb Dissent, Neutralize the Helsinki Accords, and Undermine Human
Rights Criticisms
Despite the decline in the arrest rate between 1977 and 1979, Soviet officials had
not changed their changed their hostile attitudes toward dissenters and transnational
human rights activities. For all their boasting about the “monolithic unity” of the Soviet
Union, they still feared the possibility that these forces could transform the international
environment in ways hostile to Soviet-style socialism. In a speech he delivered behind
closed doors to the Fifth Directorate of KGB in March 1979, Andropov expressed dismay
that “’our enemies’” and “’certain comrades from Communist parties in Western
countries’” continue to ask us the following question: “’If . . . you have constructed a
developed socialist society, do various anti-social phenomena or the negative activities of
an insignificant handful of people really represent a threat to it? Are they really capable
of shaking the foundations of socialism?’” 600 He answered this question with a
resounding affirmative. No matter how many times Westerners referred to dissident
activities as innocuous, Soviet authorities could not ignore the reality that these forces
wanted “to create an underground” movement committed to “terrorism” and creating
“conditions for the overthrow of socialism.”601
599
CCE 55-6 (1981): 85-7. See also CCE 62 (1982): 150. Along similar lines, Shcharansky wrote about
how the efforts of Western private citizens gave him the strength to survive his imprisonment. See
Sharansky, Fear No Evil, 169.
600
Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and Shield, 330.
310
This mindset accounts for why the KGB promulgated an order on 28 September
1978 that explained why officials needed to undertake more “active measures” designed
to sever private citizens’ attachment to their religious practices. As they had in past,
“imperialist intelligence services and foreign anti-Soviet centers” wanted to “incite
religious organizations towards confrontations with the state and social order and
stimulate the emergence of an anti-Soviet underground among sectarians.” “With
encouragement from abroad,” the document warned, “hostile elements” wanted to form
“illegal groups and organizations within the sectarian milieu” that could set up “printing
presses” and sustain “contacts with foreign clerical centers.” 602
Unhappy with the tenacious resistance of religious groups such as the Christian
Committee for the Defense of Believers’ Rights, the KGB Collegium issued further
orders in early 1979. These instructions called on officials to increase “the level of
operational work” against “the subversive activity conducted under the cover of religion
by imperialist intelligence services, [foreign] clerical centers . . . and hostile elements
within the country.” Because of the importance of stopping these “subversive activities,”
every KGB organ should “submit proposals for identifying and cutting off subversive
channels, as well as “identifying and interrupting communication channels with hostile
elements in the sectarian milieu.” Each organ also needed to carry out further measures
designed to prevent “individuals with hostile attitudes” from entering the “leading ranks”
of the Russian Orthodox Church.603
601
Ibid.
602
Ibid., 494-5.
311
Since the collective influence of orthodox Marxist-Leninist thinking had not
abated, Soviet officials continued to harass and arrest a wide array of private citizens in
the months following the 1978 July trials. For example, an official publication that
appeared in October 1978 described the arrest and sentencing of two Baptists on the
grounds that they made their children attend religious classes, a practice that Soviet law
forbade. In defense of these trials, an official author explained how “witnesses testified
that the children who attended the religious classes have a narrow mental outlook . . . and
are mentally inactive.” One month before the Vienna summit began, an article appeared
in Izvestia explaining that authorities had not convicted several Seventh Day Adventists
because of their religious beliefs as members of the “Western mass media” alleged.
Instead, these individuals had received punishments because of their efforts to help
“fascist intelligence services” weaken the international prestige of Soviet Union.604
An official newspaper article may have explained how the existence of “four
‘Helen Kellers’” at Moscow State University proved the inherent superiority of “Marxist
theory,” but Soviet authorities found the formation of the Invalid Group an unacceptable
development. They not only threatened to take away one member’s children if she
continued her activities, but also directed “a city maintenance crew to dig a ditch in front
of” another members’ “garage,” thereby confining him to his home. When another
member arrived at work, he had to attend a meeting where his peers shouted out slogans
at him such as “’CIA’” and “Orlov wears ‘foreign underpants.’” Near the end of this
603
604
Ibid., 495-6.
CDSP 30, no. 43 (22 November 1978): 15; U.S. Helsinki Commission, Documents of the Helsinki
Monitoring Groups in the USSR and Lithuania, Volume I, 317-18; and CDSP 31, no. 19 (6 June 1979): 1011.
312
meeting, government officials demanded that the Invalid Group member would have to
appear before KGB officials in the future unless he renounced his “incorrect beliefs” and
joined an official trade union.605
The documents that the Moscow Watch Group sent abroad also help illustrate that
KGB officials continued to harass and conduct searches in the homes of individuals
whom they suspected of engaging in non-official activities in late 1978 and the first half
of 1979. Employing harsh language, one document denounced the U.S. State Department
position that “the human rights situation in the USSR has substantially improved.” KGB
officials had not only broken into the apartments of anyone associated with the
production of the samizdat journal Poiski, but also used violent methods to break a
human rights demonstration in Moscow on 10 December 1978. The Soviet government
had also rejected the petitions of thousands of Jews who wanted to emigrate and
continued to persecute Crimean Tatars. Given these developments, U.S. comments about
Soviet human rights improvements “can only mislead public opinion and undermine the
struggle for human rights.”606
Another Moscow Watch Group Document described in detail how authorities had
ransacked the home of a radio mechanic named Vadim Konovalikhin near the beginning
of 1979. After this “illegal search, authorities then convicted him for “’having been
under the influence of foreign anti-Soviet broadcasts” and his decision to send libelous
605
CDSP 29, no. 7 (16 March 1977): 18; U.S. Helsinki Commission, Documents of the Helsinki Groups in
the USSR and Lithuania, Vol. I, 311-13; CCE 59-61 (1980): 31; U.S. Helsinki Commission,
Implementation of the Final Act, 102-4; and CCE 51 (1979): 176.
606
U.S. Helsinki Commission, Documents of the Helsinki Groups in the USSR and Lithuania, Vol. I, 31522 and 293-6.
313
literature to “international organizations and private individuals abroad.” Besides putting
some dissenters in psychiatric hospitals, Soviet officials also continued to publicize
dissident confessions as part of a larger effort to discredit notions that the Soviet Union
violated internationally recognized human rights. For example, an article published in
June 1979 emphasized how a Georgian Helsinki Monitor admitted that a “pharisaic
campaign launched in the West . . . under the slogan of upholding human rights” duped
him into slandering the Soviet state.607
Because Soviet authorities had an interest in connecting the rising levels of Jewish
emigration to Soviet Jews’ disloyalty and working relationships with foreign intelligence
services, they continued to excoriate Zionism. On 12 January 1979, an article appeared
in Pravda arguing that “the participation on Zionists in the crimes of Hitler concerning
the annihilation of Jews . . . is known from many sources.” One month later, an official
author referred to Zionism as “one of imperialism’s shock-troop detachments in its
struggle against, socialism, democracy, progress and peace,” which accounts for why “18
international Zionist organizations are engaged in directly influencing citizens of Jewish
nationality in socialist countries.” On 18 July, the Chairman of the Association of Soviet
lawyers wrote a glowing review of the “White Book,” a collection of documents that
607
Ibid., 323-32. Here are some other descriptions of the ways in which the Soviet government used
confessions to discredit human rights criticisms. See CCE 57 (1980): 38-40; Ibid. 58 (1980): 28-9; and
CHRUR 40 (October-December 1980): 55; and CDSP 32, no. 35 (1 October 1980): 5-6.
314
purported “to expose the true nature of international Zionism” and “the serious nature of
Zionist conspiracies against” the USSR.608
Official Soviet publications also continued to heap scorn on the Carter
administration’s human rights campaign and the U.S. government’s lack of respect for
universally recognized human rights. In particular, Soviet commentators mocked the
Carter administration’s position that human rights issues had no connection to ideology.
“There is not,” one author noted, a conception of human rights outside ideology, just as
there can be no concrete ideology of human rights outside philosophical systems.”609
According to an article in a publication designed to reach English-speaking audiences,
“the U.S. refusal to adhere to the most important international documents on human
rights and liberties shows the hypocrisy of Washington’s claim to be the supreme judge
and universal mentor on human rights.” After all, FBI agents and corrupt local officials
terrorized Americans who dared question the U.S. government’s behavior. When serving
as the governor of Georgia, Jimmy Carter showed his true colors when he “spoke of
giving the National Guard live ammunition and shoot-to-kill orders in the event” that
student protestors and civil rights activists questioned his authority.610
A Soviet political commentator used the U.S. Helsinki Commission’s favorable
report on American compliance with the Final Act to recount the “’appalling’” extent of
608
U.S. Helsinki Commission, Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Vol. XIII, 18-44; CDSP 31, no. 2
(7 February 1980): 14; and Ibid., 31, no. 29 (15 August 1979): 14. See also “Unusual Attack on Jewish
Religion in Soviet Paper,” RL, Box 46, Folder: Soviet Jewry, 4/78-4/79, JCPL.
609
610
Zivs, Human Rights, 13; and CSCE Digest, 31 January 1979, 8.
Igor Geyevsky, “Washington and the Human Rights Issue,” in N.A., Bourgeois Democracy and Human
Rights (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences, 1978), 70-72. See also Mark Mitin, “The Socialist System
and Human Rights,” in Ibid; and B. Nikiforov, “The United States: The Bill of Rights and Real Civil
Rights,” in Ibid; and V. Granov, “New Realities and Anti-Communists’ Maneuvers,” in Ibid.
315
human rights violations in the United States. No amount of “propaganda maneuvers,” he
wrote, can succeed in hiding “the real picture of the harsh suppression of human rights
and freedoms in the citadel of imperialism.” Not satisfied with these barbs, another
article designed to reach U.S. audiences outlined how the McDonald’s restaurant
“exploits workers with low pay, grinds out poor quality food, supports paramilitary
organizations, [and] sets up secret informer networks” to bend “the minds of America’s
youth.” On 8 August 1980, the Kremlin publicized the contents of a letter that Soviet
citizens of American origin sent to the Democratic convention. The authors lamented
that Carter had “’dealt the first blow at cooperation between two great peoples’ by
starting to exaggerate the non-existent problem of the protection of human rights in the
Soviet Union.”611
The Kremlin’s continuous arrest of dissenters and attacks on allegedly evil
foreign intrigues coincided with behavior designed to enhance the credibility of the
Soviet Union as a universal human rights model. In a move consistent with Orlov’s
arguments about how dissenters had succeeded in changing the “phraseology ” of Soviet
policymakers, the journal Novy Mir published a “roundtable discussion on human rights”
in November 1978. This meeting offered “appraisals of the Western ‘human rights
campaign’” and the determination of Soviet leaders to follow international human rights
standards. As one participant argued, “the consistent efforts of the Soviet state to
consolidate the Soviet citizen’s legal status do not interest” Western governments and
611
CSCE Digest, 15 January 1979, 7; and Ibid., 14 December 1979, 5-10; N.A., “Open Letter to
Democratic Convention from US-born Residents of Gorkiy,” 8 August 1980, BBC. The Soviet government
also organized a letter-writing campaign that called on Soviet citizens to write letters to the U.S. protesting
the brutal suppression of racial riots in Miami.
316
private citizens. “Nor is truthful information” about Soviet citizens’ happiness with their
social system “of any interest to those who raise a hullabaloo about imaginary violations
of human rights in the USSR.”612
Another official Soviet publication called human rights an important “element” in
international relations so long as the issue did not interfere with efforts designed to
strengthen peace. Without making references to the Helsinki Accords or the Universal
Human Rights declaration, he wrote that international law precluded private citizens from
participating in “’inter-state relations.” From his perspective, Western private citizens’
statements about Soviet human rights abuses were misguided because the “’consistent
exercise of human rights is possible only under [Soviet-style] socialism which creates
conditions for the all-around development of the individual.” Near the end of 1978, the
Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact issued a similar statement that read:
“’The very birth of the new social system was engendered by the desire to realize the
basic human rights—the right to a decent existence without exploitation and to create
conditions for a harmonious development of the individual. The banner of human rights
is the banner of socialism.”613
A few weeks after the Warsaw Pact issued this statement, Petr Fedoseyev
delivered a speech to both foreign and Soviet journalists about all the ways in which the
Soviet government protected basic “civil rights in the USSR.” Reflecting the
612
613
CHRUR 32 (October/November 1978): 8.
U.S. Helsinki Commission, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe: Recommendations Five Years After Helsinki, 67-8; and CHRUR 32
(October/November 1978): 8.
317
government’s preoccupation with upholding “socialist legality,” the Kremlin adopted a
new citizenship law in December 1978 that allowed authorities to revoke “Soviet
citizenship ‘if a person has committed acts defaming the lofty title of citizen of the USSR
and harming the prestige or national security of the USSR.’” The new law, which took
effect on 1 July 1979, also allowed the government to reject individual renunciation of
citizenship in cases where “a person has unfulfilled obligations to the state” or “is the
subject of criminal proceedings or punishment.” 614
The decision to promulgate the new citizenship law coincided with the decision of
the U.N. Human Rights Committee (UNHRCM) to conduct hearings covering the Soviet
government’s compliance with CAPR. During a series of meetings, some delegates
asked Soviet officials about the ways in which their 1977 Constitution contravened the
requirements of international law. For example, the delegate from the United Kingdom
pointed out that “there had been cases in the Soviet Union in which severe measures had
been taken against persons who had sought to express their views, propagate their ideas
and promote their rights by peaceful means.” The West German delegate criticized the
Soviet practice of not allowing parents to teach their children religion and asked the
Soviet delegates how they could justify “their discriminatory treatment” of Jewish and
German communities. Even the sympathetic delegate from Norway asked about the
government’s approval of “anti-Semitic” propaganda and whether “a person could be
614
CHRUR 32 (October/November 1978): 8; and Ibid., 27.
318
punished for having an expressed opinion that there was no freedom of opinion in his
country on the ground that such a declaration was untrue.”615
While the Soviet representative must have found these questions objectionable, he
thanked committee members for their efforts to learn about how his nation’s new
constitution protected human rights. “The Soviet peoples,” he commented, “were proud
of their achievements in human rights and had nothing to hide from world public opinion
in that field.” Echoing a common orthodox Marxist-Leninist line of argument, the
delegate took issue with a committee member’s assertion that Soviet domestic conduct
offended global public opinion. After posing the question “who really represented public
opinion,” he responded:
The bourgeois press could not be said to do so . . . [because] it did not even
represent national opinion. The USSR was a signatory to all relevant human
rights instruments, something that could not be said of the Western countries,
including the largest one. Furthermore, the USSR had submitted a comprehensive
report to the Human Rights Committee and had cooperated with it in answering
questions.616
Soviet officials also attempted to give members of UNHRC a favorable image of
their nation through the activities of private citizens. A resolution of the Central
Committee directed official organizations to encourage Western NGOs such as the
“International Union of Students and the International Democratic Federation of Women”
to send materials to the UNHRC. In theory, these documents would condemn the
policies of “colonialism, racism, apartheid, neofacism, [and] the capitalistic exploitation
of workers in western countries.” The same order also asked official organizations to
615
Ibid., 33-8
616
CHRUR 32 (October-December 1978): 33-44.
319
encourage Western private citizens to submit materials outlining the “mass violations of
human rights in Chile, in South Africa, and in the Arab territories.”617
Because Soviet officials lobbied the General Assembly to pass a resolution
declaring peace every human being’s most fundamental right, they either supported or
publicized the activities of individuals and groups sympathetic to this position. For
example, the Kremlin awarded the American Communist Party member Angela Davis the
International Lenin Peace Prize for her efforts to strengthen “peace among nations.” An
official Soviet publication designed for English-speaking audiences explained how
thousands of politicians, U.N. officials, and representatives of NGOs attended the 1980
World Parliament of Peoples for Peace held in Bulgaria. Once they arrived, an
overwhelming majority stressed the importance of preventing “fascist” and “reactionary”
circles from starting another war and perpetuating racism. These attendees also
denounced the representatives of Amnesty International for concocting stories about
Soviet human rights violations.618
The importance many Soviet officials placed on defending their regime’s
international prestige should not hide how pragmatic considerations continued to shape
their longstanding campaign of eradicating dissent. Because he hoped to obtain MFN
status from the United States and facilitate the ratification of SALT II, Brezhnev declined
to act on requests calling for the deportation of Sakharov to a city closed to foreigners.
Along with allowing Jewish emigration to rise to unprecedented levels, he also agreed to
617
Global Competition and the Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet Relations, V-121, NSA.
618
Zivs, The Anatomy of Lies, 62-6.
320
the prisoner exchange described in Chapter VII and either allowed or forced a number of
dissenters to leave the Soviet Union. Although hostile to religion, he agreed to allow
groups of Lutherans from foreign countries to visit their registered Soviet peers and give
them bibles.619 Near the end of 1978, the Soviets permitted Elena Bonner to travel to Italy
for medical treatment even though she had made “a number of anti-Soviet statements” at
“the so-called ‘Sakharov hearings’ in Rome” the year before. Andropov referred to this
decision as “tactically justified because the fact of permission arouses surprise on the part
of her and Sakharov’s accomplices” and “leads to “greater discords [sic] and hostility
within their milieu.” As all of these examples mention above suggest, Brezhnev remained
committed to balancing a wide array of competing interests, including the conflicting
views of his colleagues, when deciding how to curb dissent.620
The “restraint” the Soviet authorities had shown toward dissenters began to
evaporate in the later half of 1979 when they began a campaign to attack all
manifestations of dissent at the same time and curb Jewish emigration. These efforts
differed from those of the previous five years in some important ways. On the most
visible level, Jewish emigration declined from the record high 1979 level of 51,320 to
21,471 the following year, a figure that would further plummet to 914 by 1986. Whereas
the overall dissident and refusenik arrest rate averaged 87 from 1975-1978, the average
619
Joshua Rubenstein describes the consistent delays to exile Sakharov in his work Soviet Dissidents, 2567; and Ninth Semi-Annual Report, 7. A year-to-year summary of Soviet Jewish emigration levels from
1954-1997 can be found at https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/fsuemig.html [10
February 2007]. See also Zubok, A Failed Empire, 233-6.
620
“Andropov to the Central Committee; Elena Bonner travels to Italy, 14 December 1978. Available
[Online]: http://www.yale.edu/annals/sakharov/documents_frames/Sakharov_134.htm [12 December
2007].
321
for the next two years climbed to 207. Authorities not only started handing out fifteenyear sentences for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, but also began add additional
punishments to dissenters who had already served their jail terms. The Kremlin even
resumed the jamming of VOA broadcasts, a practice it had not done since 1973. In
effect, Moscow had begun a campaign to wipe out non-official public organizations as
soon as possible, which accounts for why authorities had succeeded in arresting all the
public members of the Psychiatric Watch Committee by November 1980.621
The Kremlin’s decision to intensify their efforts to curb dissent resulted from a
number of overlapping developments. Because of their inability to eradicate non-official
activities, government officials had to acknowledge that “dissent was no longer limited to
urban intellectuals.” They now faced a wide assortment of Helsinki monitors, religious
believers, ethnic minorities, workers, and “even invalids” who had forged strong links
with Western governments and private citizens on the basis of elucidating Soviet human
rights violations. As part of this phenomenon, thousands of Germans, Armenians, and
Pentecostals had followed the examples of their Jewish peers and asked for permission to
leave the Soviet Union. Just as important, the downturn in Soviet-American relations
that took place after the Vienna summit, which the invasion of Afghanistan only drove
home with force, gave Soviet policymakers less of a reason to take Western sensibilities
into account when deciding how to stamp out non-official activities.622
621
All of these statistics are taken from Peter Reddaway’s article “Soviet Policies on Dissent,” 52. See also
CHRUR 41 (January/March 1981): 5-11; and Ninth Semiannual Report, 5-9.
622
In particular, see Reddaway, “Soviet Policies on Dissent,” 11-21; and Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents,
255-9.
322
The crack down on dissent also grew out of Brezhnev’s growing political
weakness. Beset with deteriorating health, he proved unable to ignore his colleagues’
growing dissatisfaction with the meager benefits of détente had brought the Soviet Union
and the “rapid growth of corruption” in all levels of Soviet society. In August 1979,
Andropov took advantage of these sentiments when he played an important role in
convincing the Central Committee to pass a decree that called for more determined
efforts to “strengthen law and order” across the USSR. Reflecting his growing political
prestige, Brezhnev made Andropov a member of the Order of the October Revolution in
the same month that the Central Committee passed this resolution.623
Given the successes private citizens and the U.S. government had in “globalizing”
the issue of Soviet human rights violations, the Kremlin had little choice but to worry
about what might take place during the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. On 25 April
1979, Andropov sent a report to the Central Committee explaining how “Zionist and
nationalist organizations based abroad,” including the NTS, have convinced “some
antisocial elements in the USSR . . . to use the” Olympics “for their antisocial activities.”
Unlike their earlier efforts to organize an Olympic boycott,” these forces have now put
their main emphasis on “the idea of using the 1980 Olympic Games to conduct terrorism,
sabotage, and other subversive activities of an extremist character on Soviet territory.”624
Because Andropov held fast to the position that increased contacts with Westerners only
raised the risks of ideological subversion, he explained how
623
624
Reddaway, “Soviet Policies of Dissent,” 11-16.
“Andropov to the Central Committee; Preparations for the Moscow Olympics.” Available [Online]:
http://www.yale.edu/annals/sakharov/documents_frames/Sakharov_134.htm [12 December 2007].
323
Nationalist and clerical organizations intend to carry out a massive importation of
anti-Soviet literature to the USSR, and according to their plans, should “inundate
Moscow, Kiev, and the Baltics” during the Olympics Games. Simultaneously,
clerical centers are endeavoring to unite their efforts to collect slanderous
information about the status of believers in the USSR and to encourage religious
fanatics in various oblasts . . . to engage in active illegal activities in the period
preceding and during the 1980 Olympics.625
He also complained about how “the enemy’s intelligence services and foreign anti-Soviet
centers . . . are attempting to use various kinds of insinuations about the ‘violation’ of
human rights in the USSR . . . for the purpose of discrediting the XXII Olympic Games.”
In an obvious attempt to slander the Soviet state, Sakharov had gone so far as to advocate
that foreign sports delegations refuse to participate unless “one or two so-called
‘prisoners of conscience in the USSR’ be released.” 626
Worried about the spread of dissenting opinions in Soviet society and Western
private citizens’ attacks on his government’s domestic behavior, Brezhnev finally agreed
to let the KGB deport Sakharov to Gorky in January 1980. When defending this course
of action, Andropov emphasized that Sakharov “has been taking measures to build a
unified block of anti-Soviet elements inside the country . . . and push them toward
extremist acts.” In a fashion similar to how one Soviet author compared Sakharov to a
Western “broadcasting station,” he recounted how the dissenter had forged “direct
contacts with anti-social elements in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and expressed
solidarity with the Czechoslovakian ‘Chartists’ and members of the Polish ‘Committee of
Social Self-Defense.” Besides urging these groups to “coordinate their anti-Soviet
625
Ibid.
626
Ibid.
324
initiatives,” the dissenter “has been systematically offering aid to foreign states in their
hostile activities against the USSR.”627
Fearing international condemnation for exiling Sakharov, Andropov advised
against holding a public trial. During the several months needed to conduct an
investigation, “the West” would attempt “to stir up clamorous anti-Soviet campaigns
which would be difficult to counter,” as the “legislation governing procedure in criminal
cases prohibits the use of materials from cases under investigation.” Given these
difficulties, he proposed that the government dispense with a trial and “apply
administrative measures . . . that would make it possible to halt his contacts with
foreigners and seriously hamper his hostile activity.” Andropov’s views about how to
handle Sakharov proved persuasive, as the Central Committee enacted all of the
proposals that he submitted in a report dated 26 December 1979.628
Besides targeting Sakharov, Andropov also launched a more determined
campaign against AI in early 1980. Employing familiar language, he recounted how this
organization “received financing and actively uses the secret services of the USA,
England, and other imperialist governments in order to carry out actions of ideological
diversion against the USSR” and other “socialist countries.” “From 1978-1980,” he
pointed out, the group had carried out “a series of hostile actions abroad . . . directed at
discrediting the Soviet government and socialist order, as well as gaining international
627
“Andropov and Rudenko to the Central Committee; The case against Sakharov.” Available [Online]:
http://www.yale.edu/annals/sakharov/documents_frames/Sakharov_136.htm [12 December 2007]. See
also Zivs, The Anatomy of Lies: Amnesty International (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982), 114.
628
Ibid.
325
support for an Olympic boycott.”629 Even more troubling, the Carter administration
“intends to use representatives of ‘Amnesty International’ and materials prepared by
‘Amnesty’ at the Madrid summit with the goal of rendering political ‘pressure’ on the
Soviet Union and other socialist countries in connection with the violation of human
rights.” Following the recommendations outlined in this document, official Soviet
authors published a series of articles that advanced themes similar to those of
Andropov.630
The reports Andropov sent to the Central Committee and Politburo once again
illustrate how orthodox Marxist-Leninist conceptions of the world shaped Soviet
behavior. Despite international condemnation, many felt as if they had little choice but to
intensify efforts to eradicate samizdat literature, which resulted in the destruction of nonofficial publications such as Searches and the feminist publication Women and Russia in
1980. As it had in the past, the official Soviet press continued to publish articles linking
dissenters to Nazism, the émigré organization NTS, and the machinations of foreign
intelligence services. The Kremlin also refused to host the 1980 Paralympic Games on
the grounds “no one in the country was disabled.”631
Brezhnev’s belief that Carter had only undertaken a human rights campaign to
weaken the Soviet government’s control over its territory colored his reaction to
629
“Extract from Protocol 206 of the CC CPSU Politburo on Amnesty International.” Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB191/06-25-1980%20t.pdf [12 December 2007].
630
Ibid. For examples of how official publications attacked AI, see CDSP 32, no. 34 (24 September 1980):
1-4; and Zivs, The Anatomy of Lies, 14-20.
631
See Fred Wier, “Disabled Russians Gain Mobility, Visibility,” Christian Science Monitor, 12 December
2001. Available [Online]: http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1227/p6s3-woeu.html [12 December 2007].
326
American conduct after the invasion of Afghanistan. Behind closed doors, he equated
American behavior with dangerous “brinksmanship” and a crusade against
“Socialism.”632 This hostility helps account for why official Soviet publications went out
of their way to connect Carter and other U.S. politicians to Zionist conspiracies. In early
1980, the Central Committee leaked a report to a Moscow newspaper that explained how
James Earl Carter belongs to a special Masonic order “International Lions” or, in
English “Lions International,” created and directly subordinate to the 33d degree
of the order to the purely Jewish Masonic order of B’nai B’rith. Consequently,
Carter knows very well that in the case of deviation from the discipline and the
instructions of the order, he would have to deal with the B’nai B’rith Gestapo in
the person of the Anti-Defamation League of the B’nai B’rith, the Vice President
of which, Senator Jacob Javits, is obeyed unquestionably by the entire Zionist
Masonic Mafia of the United States Congress.633
U.S. government officials noticed the publication of these sorts of articles. On 9 July
1980, a NSC internal memorandum explained how a Soviet author had connected “the
President and Mrs. Carter with a ‘Zionist conspiracy’ to discredit the Soviet Union.
“This highly objectionable stuff, a staff member wrote, “is part of a ‘vigilance campaign
to alert Soviet citizens not to be taken in by CIA agents who may be visiting the USSR
disguised as Olympic tourists.”634
This observation was not far off. The “Moscow city party committee” had earlier
warned citizens against succumbing to ideological contamination when thousands of
foreigners pour into the Soviet capital for the Olympic games next year. Around the
same time, a Politburo member also told official writers that they must resist “alien
632
Global Competition and the Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet Relations, IV-356, NSA.
633
U.S. Helsinki Commission, Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Vol. XIII, 4-5.
634
Memo, Marshall Brement to David Aaron and ZB, “Soviet Propaganda Attacks on the President and
Mrs. Carter,” 9 July 1980, NSABM, Box 82, Folder: 7-11/80, JCPL.
327
ideas” during the Olympics and do a much better job in the future of glorifying “Soviet
life” and “denouncing foreign views.”635 Consistent with the “law and order” campaign
that would later take shape in August 1979, many Soviet officials still felt as if
strengthening the Marxist-Leninist ideological convictions was an efficacious way of
weakening the proliferation of non-official activities in the Soviet Union. Because they
could not officially repudiate the project of forging “new Soviet man” without calling
into question their right to rule, members of Central Committee passed a resolution
entitled “On the Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Upbringing Work” on
6 May 1979. 636 This resolution “instructed Party committees” and media “executives” to
“heighten the ideological content and effectiveness of” newspaper articles, television
programs, and radio broadcasts.637
The Kremlin’s determination to bolster the ideological fortitude of Soviet private
citizens went hand in hand with a widespread belief that the intensified effort to eradicate
dissent had more than justified itself. In a series of reports he sent to the Central
Committee in 1980, Andropov described how the KGB officers had “learned to quash
undesirable and hostile phenomena in their initial stages.” “Of the 15,580 people who
were suppressed last year, only 107 showed themselves to be hostile a second time.”638
He also reported that many Western and Chinese journalists had either accepted
635
CSCE Digest, 15 May 1979, 3.
636
CSCE Digest, 15 May 1979, 3.
637
CDSP 31, no. 18 (30 May 1979): 8-10. See also U.S. Helsinki Commission, Implementation of the Final
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Recommendations Five Years After
Helsinki, 147-9.
638
Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and Shield, 331.
328
Sakharov’s exile with equanimity or even approved of the measure as a means of
preserving détente. Furthermore, Andropov congratulated KGB operatives for
preventing “anti-social elements” (dissenters) from holding meetings with Sakharov and
“significantly decreased the agitation around his name conducted earlier by foreign
propaganda centers.”639 In fact, the banishment of Sakharov “made it possible to
forestall” the unification” of all “anti-Socialist elements within the USSR. Unhappy with
this bitter reality, Western “secret services” and “propagandistic agencies” had begun an
active search to “find a new figure that could somehow compensate them for the loss.”640
The satisfaction many Soviet officials expressed with the banishment of Sakharov
also comes across in the way Gromyko behaved during a meeting he held with U.S.
Ambassador Thomas Watson on 30 January 1980. When Watson raised the issue of how
the Soviets had treated him, Gromyko responded that “he had never heard of an
American named Sakharov.” In the same breadth, he rejected any suggestion that
Sakharov “was an international figure,” although he admitted that dissenters had made
illegal “intelligence contacts” with U.S. embassy officials. Near the end of the meeting,
Gromyko changed his tune and argued that his government would not discuss the affairs
of Soviet private citizens “with anyone” or allow “anyone else” to “interfere in its
internal affairs.” “The U.S.,” he told Watson, “should look after its own citizens, not
639
“Andropov to the Central Committee; Responses in the West to Sakharov’s Banishment.” Available
[Online]: http://www.yale.edu/annals/sakharov/documents_frames/Sakharov_139.htm [10 October 2006].
640
“Andropov to the Central Committee; Attempts to visit Sakharov in Gorky.” Available [Online]:
http://www.yale.edu/annals/sakharov/documents_frames/Sakharov_142.htm [29 August 2007]; and
“Andropov to the Central Committee; To isolate and harass Sakharov and Bonner.” Available [Online]:
http://www.yale.edu/annals/sakharov/documents_frames/Sakharov_145.htm [29 August 2007]; and
“Andropov to the Central Committee; Sakharov’s first days in Gorky.” Available [Online]:
http://www.yale.edu/annals/sakharov/documents_frames/Sakharov_140.htm [29 August 2007].
329
those of the Soviet Union.” In retrospect, we have every reason to believe that Gromyko
viewed this exchange as a strong defense of the deportation because Watson refrained
from making a “spirited defense of” the U.S. position on Sakharov.” As an NSC staffer
noted, Soviet officials would interpret this silence to mean that the United States “could
not answer their line of argument.”641
While Andropov and in Gromyko both viewed the internal exile of Sakharov as a
necessary and successful course of action, the former recognized that the measure had not
solved all the problems surrounding this dissenter’s behavior. As his reports to the
Central Committee reveal, he understood that Western private citizens and governments
would continue their attempts to use Sakharov’s treatment as a way of slandering Sovietstyle socialism.” For example, he described Elena Bonner’s attempts to keep her
husband’s treatment a visible issue in international relations. In her meetings with
foreign journalists, she “spread provocative rumors about her husband’s situation” and
urged them “to organize protests against the ‘arbitrariness committed toward
Sakharov.”642 Andropov wrote scathing accounts of Bonner’s behavior because he
believed that she played a pivotal role in shaping Sakharov’s behavior. In a telling
passage, he explained Sakharov’s susceptibility to Bonner’s machinations as a function of
his disturbed “mental state.” In the opinion of “leading psychiatrists,” he wrote,
“Sakharov’s behavior does not often correspond to accepted norms” and “patently
641
Memo, Marshall Brement to ZB, “The Gromkyo-Watson Exchange of Afghanistan,” 6 February 1980,
NSABM, Box 19, Folder: 7/78-3/80, JCPL; and Telegram, “Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, Updated
Assessment and Policy Recommendations, Ibid.
642
“Andropov to the Central Committee; Attempts to visit Sakharov in Gorky.”
330
violates common sense.” In the end, his “delusions of grandeur, which increase
proportionally with the efforts of Western intelligence services pass him off as a ‘world
fighter for human rights,’” predispose him to engage in anti-Soviet activities at the behest
of others.643
This description of Sakharov’s mental instability helps illustrate the almost
impossible task the Carter administration faced in convincing the Brezhnev regime to
carry out reforms designed to make the USSR a more humane society. The collective
strength of the orthodox Marxist-Leninist worldview and commitment to defending the
internal cohesion of their multinational, multiethnic empire ruled out any sort of lasting
reconciliation with dissenters in either the near or long term. They may have cared about
projecting the image of a law-abiding socialist-state and obtaining economic benefits
from the United States, but they could not accept dissenters as respectable, legitimate
critics without weakening their justifications for holding a monopoly on political power.
Since they refused to create the political institutions necessary to enter into an honest
dialogue with private citizens who disagreed with the Communist Party’s official policy,
they had little choice to opt for further repression when faced with the success dissenters
had in “globalizing” the issue of Soviet human rights violations.
Given these immense constraints, arguments that the Carter administration could
have done a lot more to promote human rights in the Soviet Union suffer from several
flaws. While many dissenters might argue otherwise, the cancellation of SALT
negotiations or suspension Soviet-American trade would not have removed the
643
Andropov to the Central Committee; The mental stability of Sakharov.” Available [Online]:
http://www.yale.edu/annals/sakharov/documents_frames/Sakharov_145.htm [29 August 2007] .
331
fundamental reasons why many Soviet policymakers viewed attacks on non-official
activities as necessary and proper. Carter’s commitment to forging a “reciprocal
accommodation” may have been unrealistic and invited accusations of weakness, but
evidence suggests that Soviet officials saw little overall moderation in his campaign to
promote human rights in their nation. For example, on 12 April 1979, Dobrynin held a
private meeting with Averell Harriman, Carter’s unofficial representative in Moscow,
concerning Jewish emigration from the USSR. The ambassador complained about how
the U.S. government kept raising the issue of Jews who had not received permission to
leave even though the Soviets had made concession after concession on the issue.
Dobrynin made a similar argument thirteen years later. When summarizing how the
Carter administration’s human rights campaign affected U.S.-Soviet relations, he
criticized the pernicious effects of the President’s penchant for publicity, noting that he
“continued to attack us in public, in public, in public! Always in public!”644
Carter may have failed to protect dissidents from intensified repression, but we
should not lose sight of his administration’s larger accomplishments. The ways in which
officials worked with and encouraged private citizens to “globalize” the issue of human
rights succeeded in putting the Soviet government on the ideological defensive. Because
they clung to the notion that they had found the correct path to “modernize” the world,”
they feared that NGOs such as AI might succeed in “globalizing” the idea that Soviet-
644
Global Competition and the Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet Relations, IV-386, NSA; and “The Collapse of
Détente: From March 1977 Moscow Meetings to the December 1979 Invasion of Afghanistan—The Launch
of The Carter-Brezhnev Project,” 20, NSA.
332
style socialism lacked legitimacy.645 In other words, orthodox officials feared that private
citizens would succeed in showing the falsity of Marxist-Leninist arguments that the
increased participation of the masses in global affairs heralded a move toward Sovietstyle socialism across the globe. They also detested how the reports of private citizens
weakened the image of the USSR as a progressive state in the eyes of international
forums such as the ILO and many Western European Communists. From this angle, the
same measures Soviet policymakers took to insure their regime’s internal security and
defend the veracity of Marxist-Leninist positions only succeeded in weakening the
international legitimacy they craved.
After Carter left office, the Kremlin’s conduct over the next four years confirmed
Sakharov’s prediction that bureaucratic, totalitarian states like the Soviet Union changed
slowly, if at all. Well aware of Soviet system’s stagnation and resistance to internal
reform, the Yugoslavian émigré Mihajlo Mihajlov criticized Carter’s human rights
campaign for its narrow focus on the plight of individuals. He also questioned the U.S.
preoccupation with “just being a [democratic] example” to the rest of the world. Of
course, Carter deserved credit for giving Eastern European dissenters a significant
amount of moral support, he admitted, but “the aim of a human rights policy should not
be simply to help dissidents abroad.” Because of the close link between a nation’s
democratic institutions and its respect for human rights, Mihajlov argued the United
States needed to create and sustain “a truly international democratic movement” and
645
Zubok, A Failed Empire, 343.
333
“fight for the principles of democracy all over the world.”646 These words would prove
prophetic because many leading Reagan administration officials reached similar
conclusions and decided to carry out a “Crusade for Democracy.”
646
“Mihajlov Interview,” N.D., WHCF, HU-3, Folder: 9/1/78-12/31/78, JCPL.
334
CHAPTER 8: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION’S “CONSERVATIVE” and
“PRIVATE” HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, JANUARY 1981-NOVEMBER 1985
Before winning the 1980 Presidential election, Ronald Reagan questioned the
accomplishments of the Carter administration’s human rights campaign on numerous
occasions. Mocking the President’s congratulatory report entitled “Domestic and Foreign
Policy Accomplishments,” he rejected the claim that the United States now stands with
the “‘victims of repression’” across the globe. “Is that why,” he asked, “our
representatives at the Belgrade Conference remained silent in the face of the final report
that contained not one word about Russian violations of the human provisions of the
Helsinki agreement?” “If the Carter administration indeed stood with the “‘victims of
repression,” he continued, suffering individuals “living in Cuba, Panama, Vietnam,
Cambodia, and the mainland of China have yet to hear about it.”647
At the time, these words suggested that Reagan would take a much bolder
approach to the task of promoting human rights in the USSR than its predecessor. In
retrospect, they failed to capture the complexities of how his administration worked to
challenge Soviet internal behavior. As this chapter will argue, Congressional and public
opinion played a fundamental role in checking the desire of a wide array of executive
branch officials, including Reagan himself, to distance themselves from the Carter
administration’s policies and minimize the importance of human rights.648 The strength
647
James C. Roberts, ed., A City Upon a Hill: Speeches by Ronald Reagan Before the Conservative
Political Action Conference (Washington, D.C.: The American Studies Center, 1989), 41.
648
The following works describe Reagan’s failures to downplay the importance of human rights issues after
he entered office. See Charles Maeching, “Human Rights Dehumanized,” Foreign Policy 52 (Autumn
1983): 118-35; Pfluger, “Human Rights Unbound”; Terry Diebel, “Reagan’s Mixed Legacy,” Foreign
335
of these forces also persuaded Reagan and other officials to engage in far more “public”
human rights diplomacy than they would have preferred and exposed the contradictions
of the administration’s initial approach to the task of promoting human rights. More than
anything else, this development resulted in the creation of a “Reaganite” human rights
policy that privileged the goal of building democratic institutions across the globe.
While important differences existed, Carter and Reagan’s approach to
transforming Soviet internal behavior ended up having some important commonalities.
Much like their predecessor, Reagan officials had to accept the reality that they only
possessed a limited ability to shape Soviet domestic developments. Given the Kremlin’s
determination to curb non-official activities, the provisions of the Final Act once again
became the U.S. government’s best available weapon for accomplishing the long-term
goal of promoting democracy in the USSR. Reagan’s decision to embrace a flexible
negotiating agenda designed to improve U.S.-Soviet relations also invited political
complications. When he agreed to renew agricultural exchanges or send a trade mission
to Moscow in 1985, he opened himself up to the same kind of Congressional and public
criticisms about the executive branch’s commitment to challenging Soviet internal
behavior that Carter had faced.
Following in the footsteps of their predecessors, Reagan administration officials
accelerated their efforts to strengthen U.S. international broadcasting capabilities and
draw attention to Soviet nationality problems. They also encouraged and supported nongovernmental human rights activities on the grounds that governmental efforts alone
Policy 75 (Summer 1989): 39-40; Arthur Goldberg, “The Perilous State of Human Rights Then and Now,”
The Center Magazine (January/February 1984): 1-35; Stephen Wrage, “Thinking About Human Rights,”
SAIS Review 3, no. 1 (1983): 219-26; Sellars, The Rise and Rise of Human Rights, 134-7, 142-7.
336
could only go so far in building democratic institutions across the globe. From this angle,
the decision to create the National Endowment for Democracy in 1983 had important
commonalities with the Carter administration’s attempt to create a Human Rights
Foundation in 1978.
The Trials and Tribulations in Forging a “Reaganite” Human Rights Policy
As indicated earlier in this work, Reagan criticized the Final Act on a number of
occasions before becoming President. During the 1980 campaign, he questioned Carter’s
decision to send a delegation to Madrid. “Frankly, he said, “I have an uneasy feeling that
going to Madrid is negating what we thought we could accomplish by boycotting the
Olympics. If the athletes can’t go, why should the diplomats?” Reagan made these
statements even though he understood that the agreement put Soviet officials on the
ideological defensive. “The Russian government doesn’t feel obligated to observe” the
Final Act,” but “Soviet officialdom is taking it’s [sic] lumps and is very uncomfortable in
the face of tourists who argue back with full knowledge of their legal rights and the items
of the Helsinki pact.”649
Reagan may have grasped the utility of the Final Act, but the skepticism he
continued to express about the agreement grew out of his harsh indictments of the Carter
administration’s human rights campaign. In a newspaper article that appeared near the
end of 1978, he criticized the pernicious effects of the State Department’s preoccupation
649
Anthony Lewis, “Abroad at Home, New York Times, 3 November 1980, A23; See also Kiron K. Skinner
et al., ed., Reagan’s Path to Victory: The Shaping of Ronald Reagan’s Vision, Selected Writings (New
York: Free Press, 2004), 334.
337
with preserving détente while punishing allies with less than perfect human rights
records. As he put it:
No sooner had President Carter made his early and strong statement on human
rights than born-again McGovernites began infesting various foreign-policy
making levels, with an eye toward forcing any nation they could to tow the
mark—and they defined the mark. Nearly any charge made against the nations
such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile was assumed to be true. Worse, the Carter
Human Rights office has managed to hold up important sales to these and other
nations.650
Reagan believed that the Carter administration’s misguided behavior resulted
from a debilitating mixture of “well-meaning intentions” and preoccupation with the U.S.
defeat in Vietnam. Just as children believed in the “tooth fairy,” he mused, Carter
appeared to think that mere wishing could make other nations across the globe embrace
“democratic institutions.” Since Vietnam had given the President and his advisers “a
false sense of guilt,” they held the dangerous position that “the United States must prove
and reprove and prove again its goodness to the world.” This misguided view allowed
officials to justify their efforts to improve relations with communist nations guilty of
massive human rights violations; it also explained their lack of faith in American ideals
and institutions. Now more than ever, Reagan intoned, “we need a foreign policy
stripped of platitudes, cant and mere moral earnestness—an earnestness fatally
compromised by the massive crimes of some of the communist world’s newer
members.”651
650
Robert F. Drinan, Cry of the Oppressed: The History and Hope of the Human Rights Revolution
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harper and Row, 1987), 88. See also Kiron K. Skinner, ed., Reagan In His Own Hand
(New York: The Free Press, 2001), 143
651
Skinner, ed., Reagan In His Own Hand, 41-44.
338
Reagan’s arguments exaggerated the extent to which Carter had lost faith in U.S.
ideals and ignored the issue of Soviet human rights violations. Yet for all his hyperbole,
Reagan clung to the position that the U.S. government had done a poor job of defining
America’s role in the world. He also believed that U.S. politicians had done a poor job of
emphasizing the fundamental differences between communism and democratic selfgovernment. On 7 August 1978, he castigated “Nicolai” Lenin’s quest for global
communist domination to buttress his argument that “the ideological struggle dividing the
world is between communism and our own belief in freedom.” During the final months
of the 1980 presidential campaign, he insisted that the “greatest fallacy of the LeninMarxist philosophy is that it is the wave of the future.” In reality, Reagan argued,
“[e]verything about it is as primitive as tribal rule; compulsion in the place of free
initiative; coercion in the place of law; piracy in the place of trade, and empire-building
for the benefit of a chosen few at the expense of the many. We have seen nothing like it
since feudalism.”652
Unlike the founders of Marxist-Leninist political thought who distrusted the
masses, Reagan argued that the American founding fathers refused to design a
government that sanctioned the rule of the “powerful” or the “few.” Because “our
example inspired others,” albeit “imperfectly at times,” he described how “our foreign
policy . . . should be to show by example the . . . greatness of our system and the strength
652
Ibid., 13, 486. For other accounts of Reagan’s long-term hatred of communism, see Paul Kengor, The
Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism (New York: HarperCollins, 2006); Peter Schweizer,
Reagan’s War: The Epic Story of His Forty-Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism (New
York: Doubleday, 2002); and Chester J. Pach, Jr., “Sticking to His Guns: Reagan and National Security,” in
Brownlee and Graham, ed., The Reagan Presidency, 85-113.
339
of American ideals.” When advancing this argument, he extolled Andrei Sakharov’s
view of United States as “the historically determined leader of the [global] movement
toward a pluralist and free society, vital to mankind.” As a result of this special burden,
Reagan declared that his administration would “do a better job of exporting
Americanism” and not compromising “our principles and ideals.” From his perspective,
the U.S. officials had little choice but to act in such a manner because of their nation’s
“pre-ordained destiny to show all mankind that they, too, can be free without having to
leave their native shore.”653
Along with criticizing the Carter administration’s human rights campaign and
moral confusion, Reagan also went out of his way to publicize the ways in which
dissenters struggled against the repression of arbitrary Soviet bureaucrats before he
entered office. For example, he expressed his deep sympathy for the Pentecostals who
had taken refuge in the US. Embassy after the Soviet government refused to grant their
emigration requests. He also praised how private citizens such as Vladimir Bukovsky
“are not skulking in the alleys and basements trying to create an underground
movement.” Because dissenters cherished freedom, “they are speaking out openly, citing
their rights under the Soviet constitution (yes there is such a thing).” “Let our state
department take heed,” he told his radio listeners, “a little less détente with the politburo
and more encouragement to the dissenters might be worth a lot of armored divisions.”654
As many scholars have argued, Reagan had no trouble denouncing MarxistLeninist regimes and stressing the importance of defending freedom once he entered
653
Ibid., 485-6.
654
Skinner, ed., Reagan In His Own Hand, 145, 149-50, and 178-9.
340
office. Even though he sympathized with the plight of dissenters, his administration failed
to articulate a coherent and popular human rights policy. The roots of this failure lay in a
general agreement with Jeane Kirkpatrick’s arguments about the Carter administration’s
naïve approach to promoting internal reform in other countries. She argued Carter’s
human rights policies were misguided because they failed to distinguish between
authoritarian regimes that could liberalize over the long term and their totalitarian
counterparts that remained resistant to democratic evolution. Because authoritarian allies
such as Argentina and Chile could democratize over the long term, the United States had
an interest in helping them prevent Marxist-Leninist groups from taking power through
armed insurrection.655
To avoid debacles similar to ones the United States had just experienced in Iran
and Nicaragua, the State Department’s transition team recommended that policy-making
procedures (i.e., Human Rights Bureau) should no longer “delay decisions on issues
where human rights concerns conflict with the vital interests of the United States.”
Unhappy with Carter’s dangerous naiveté,” Secretary of State Alexander Haig used his
first press conference to announce that “’international terrorism will now take the place
of human rights’” as the chief U.S. foreign policy concern because such conduct
amounted to the “ultimate abuse of human rights.’” National Security Advisor Richard
Allen made a similar argument, noting that this administration “’would not place as much
ideological emphasis on human rights.’” Reagan seemed to endorse these positions when
655
Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., Foreign Policy in the Reagan Presidency: Nine Intimate Portraits
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America), 105-6; and Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double
Standards,” Commentary (November 1979): 34-45. See also Smith, America’s Mission, 286-9.
341
he refrained from nominating a new Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs after he won the election. During an interview with the journalist
Walter Cronkite in early March, he spoke of not letting authoritarian allies fall victim to a
“totalitarian takeover that denies what human rights the people already had.” He also
suggested that American leaders should not shun dialogue with countries like South
Africa as long as they felt comfortable negotiating with the Soviet Union.656
Under intense Congressional pressure to nominate someone, Reagan picked
Ernest Lefever to head the Human Rights Bureau near the end of February. While
serving as Director of the Ethics and Public Policy Center of Georgetown University,
Lefever authored several articles that criticized the Carter administration’s approach to
human rights in ways similar to Reagan. Lefever believed that Carter suffered from an
“excessive confidence” that “reason and [American] goodwill” would convince other
governments to treat their private citizens better. Beyond serving as a good example and
maintaining our security commitments,” he observed, “there is little the U.S. Government
can or should do to advance the cause of human rights . . . other than using quiet
diplomatic channels at appropriate times and places.” Based on the assumptions, he
656
American Association of the International Commission of Jurists (AAICJ), Human Rights and U.S.
Foreign Policy: The First Decade (Washington, D.C.: American Association of the International
Commission of Jurists, 1984): 31-4; Drinan, Cry of the Oppressed, 94-6; and “Excerpts From an Interview
With Walter Cronkite of CBS News,” 3 March 1983. Available [Online]:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=43497&st=Cronkite&st1= [10 February 2007]. See
also Juan Onis, “U.S. Report Says Status of Rights Improved in 1980, The New York Times, 10 February
1981, A10. For Haig’s views on human rights, see Alexander M. Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and
Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 90-1.
342
called for the abolishment of all Congressionally mandated human rights laws and the
same Human Rights Bureau that Reagan had chosen him to lead.657
Since NSC staffer Carnes Lord appreciated the ways in which human rights
concerns still resonated with the American public and Congress, he warned that
downplaying the importance of the issue would only prove self-defeating and invite
political complications. In a memorandum whose contents Allen endorsed, Lord
recommended that the administration needed to correct the impression that “human rights
are being jettisoned or severely downgraded in favor of countering terrorism or
supporting authoritarian allies.” Because “human rights” would have to remain “an
integral part of the Administration’s foreign policy,” he recommended that the review of
U.S. foreign policy “now underway” should focus on correcting the failures of the Carter
administration’s approach rather than abandoning the concept.658
After making these observations, Lord proceeded to write a comprehensive
internal human rights study that he sent to Allen on 27 February. This work suggested
that any reformulated human rights policy would have to close the yawning gap between
human rights issues and “other [important] foreign policy objectives” such as defense and
security. Given the importance of this task, he agreed with the proposition that the
executive branch needed to codify a human rights policy that differentiated between
authoritarian allies whose conduct could improve over the long term and their totalitarian
657
Ernest W. Lefever, “The Trivialization of Human Rights.” Available online at Lexus-Nexus. See also
AAICJ, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, 31-4; and Drinan, Cry of the Oppressed, 94-7.
658
Memo, Carnes Lord to Richard V. Allen, “Interim Policy on Human Rights,” 17 February 1981, Human
Rights, Box 1, Folder: 000001-022999, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (RRPL), Simi Valley, CA.
See also Memo, Carnes Lord to Richard Allen, “Human Rights Policy Study,” 27 February 1981, Human
Rights, Box 1, Folder: 023000-027999, RRPL.
343
counterparts that could not. To make such a policy politically viable, however, officials
would have to convince the public that “supporting regimes whose political systems are
less than impeccably democratic is not necessarily incompatible with support for human
rights.” Whether Americans like it or not, “those systems may provide the best
protection for human rights that is possible under existing circumstances.”659
These arguments proved influential. After this study appeared, Allen and Haig
delivered public speeches over the next several months designed to reaffirm the
fundamental role human rights played in U.S. foreign policy. Just as Carnes suggested,
they focused on the morality of encouraging “the evolution of authoritarian regimes
toward a more humane society” while carrying out defense and security policies designed
to prevent “the establishment of totalitarian regimes” that violated human rights on a
permanent basis. At the same time, they explained how a wide array of cultural and
historical factors weakened the chances that the United States could convince human
rights violators to cease their activities in the near term. Allen also reminded audiences
about the folly of trying to impose our “democratic institutions” on other nations not
ready for them. He also called into question the notion that democratic institutions
ensured a government’s respect for basic human rights.660
This “conservative” approach to promoting human rights only sowed confusion.
Even though totalitarian regimes remained permanent human rights violators, Reagan
659
Lord Carnes, “Human Rights in a Non-Liberal World,” Human Rights, Box 1, Folder: 023000-027999,
RRPL.
660
For a copy of Allen’s speech, see Memo, James M. Rentschler to Allen, 22 May 1981, Human Rights,
Box 1, Folder: 028000-037999, RRPL. See also Vita Bite, “Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Issue
Brief Number IB81125 (Washington DC: The Library of Congress Congressional Research Service), 3-5.
344
chose to follow a plank in the 1980 Republican Platform that stressed the importance of
insisting on full Soviet compliance with the Final Act. Without extensive consultations
or prominent public speeches on the subject, he allowed Max Kampelman to remain head
of the U.S. delegation at the Madrid follow-up conference. From 27 January 1981 until
the meeting concluded in November 1983, Kampelman and his subordinates made
specific references to hundreds of dissenters and cited ILO studies to prove the existence
of forced labor in the Soviet Union. They also delivered countless statements that spelled
out Soviet authorities’ specific human rights violations and inability to tolerate any form
of dissenting opinion, including the activities of a small number of peace activists.
Furthermore, they highlighted the Kremlin’s official sanction of anti-Semitic writings and
acts of imperialism in the Baltic Republics and Poland. Even Haig found time to show
up in Madrid and deliver speeches that stressed the link between following the principles
of the Final Act and promoting peace in Europe.661
Fed up with human rights “double standards,” American representatives at the
United Nations also delivered scathing attacks on the Kremlin’s domestic and
international conduct. Following the lead of Kirkpatrick, U.S. members of the UNHRC
attacked the prevalence of anti-Semitic thought in the Soviet Union and complained
about how the Kremlin put dissenters in “jails, forced labor camps, and psychiatric
wards” just “because they called attention to Soviet denial of basic freedoms.” “In order
for this commission to be worthy of the name,” a representative commented, member
661
See Thompson, ed., Foreign Policy in the Reagan Presidency, 104-7; Kampelman, Entering New
Worlds, 254-7; and Kampelman, ed. Three Years at the East-West Divide; and Madrid CSCE Negotiations,
1980-81 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 1982); and Mastny, ed., Helsinki, Human
Rights, and European Security, 227-30.
345
states had a moral obligation to criticize human rights abuses in the Soviet Union and
other communist nations just as often as they condemned those in South Africa and
Chile. These sorts of speeches failed to keep the issue of Sakharov’s treatment on the
official agenda of the UNHRC. Nevertheless, they played an important role in bringing
about the passage of a U.N. declaration that banned all forms of discrimination based on
religion or belief. In a direct shot at the Soviet Union, this measure stressed the illegality
of preventing parents from teaching their children religion.662
The willingness of American officials to criticize Soviet human rights violations
at the United Nations and in Madrid seemed to confirm statements suggesting that the
executive branch would now focus on the misconduct of totalitarian regimes. Yet, the
administration seemed just as preoccupied with repudiating the Carter administration’s
approach to human rights. When appearing before Congress, executive branch officials,
including the nominee Lefever, refused to repudiate the suggestion that Reagan wanted to
abolish the Human Rights Bureau. During a speech near the end of April designed to
commemorate holocaust victims, Reagan asserted that the U.S. government had “no
business” engaging in negotiations with other nations that avoided the issue of “human
persecution.” Since these remarks were extemporaneous, a White House spokesperson
told reporters the next day that “Mr. Reagan had not meant to alter his policy of playing
down the human rights issue in foreign relations.” “The President,” he reported, “was not
662
Michael Novak and Richard Schifter, “Speeches by the U.S. Delegation before the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights,” World Affairs 143, no. 3 (1980/1981): 226-30, 236-9, 252; and Walter
Laquer and Barry Rubin, ed., The Human Rights Reader, 278-81. See also Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Human
Rights and the Foundations of Democracy,” World Affairs 144, no. 3 (1981/1982): 196-203; and Ibid.,
“East/West Relations: Toward a New Definition of Dialogue,” World Affairs 144, no. 1 (1981): 14-30.
346
saying that this subject must be placed on the agenda before we proceed with discussion
with another government.” 663
Reagan may have sympathized with the plight of dissenters, but he chose not to
make frequent public statements about Soviet human rights abuses during his first year as
President. In sharp contrast to Carter, he and Vice President George Bush sided with
individuals like Lefever who argued that “quiet diplomacy” represented the most
“effective” way of handling the issue of Soviet human rights abuses. Behind closed
doors, Reagan told a critic that “I feel as deeply as you do about the abuse of the people
in the countries you mentioned.” Since the U.S “long term goal is peace and freedom for
the enslaved people behind the ‘iron curtain,’” the executive branch would focus on using
“quiet diplomacy to bring about changes” in Soviet internal behavior, the president
explained..664
These words may seem odd given Reagan’s harsh denunciations of the Soviet
government, but he preferred “quiet” human rights diplomacy for a wide variety of
reasons. As his private correspondence indicates, he was far more pragmatic and willing
to engage in dialogue with Soviet leaders than his harsh denunciations of Marxist-
663
See Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Ernest W. Lefever, 97th Cong., 1st session,
1981 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 85-8, 117-18, 123, 134, 146; and House
Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, Implementation of Congressionally
Mandated Human Rights Provisions, Vol. I, 97th Cong. 1st session, 1981 (Washington D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1982),16-20; and Howell Raines, “Reagan Stirs Flurry with Rights Remark,”
The New York Times, 1 May 1981, A1.
664
Kiron K. Skinner et al., ed., Reagan: A Life in Letters (New York: The Free Press, 2003), 377-8. See
also CSCE Digest, 29 May 1981, 3-4. Behind closed doors William Clark told South African officials:
“’We’re not the Carter administration, whose policy was to berate you in public. We will abhor apartheid,
but we will not emphasize it in public, and we will not embarrass you in public ad did the prior
administration.’” See Paul Kengor and Patricia Clark Doerner, The Judge: William P. Clark: Ronald
Reagan’s Top Hand (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 133.
347
Leninism suggested at the time. He also held a firm belief that governmental leaders
could best solve disputes through personal diplomacy without the interference of
meddlesome and short-sighted bureaucracies.665 Consistent with this viewpoint, he
believed that carping about human rights abuses in public would only embarrass Soviet
leaders and make them even less willing to release political prisoners or allow individuals
to emigrate.666 Reagan also appears to have accepted Richard Nixon’s dubious argument
that the Jackson-Vanik amendment torpedoed the rising levels of Jewish emigration that
“quiet” diplomatic efforts had produced in the mid-1970s.667
The Reagan administration’s emphasis on “quiet” human rights diplomacy and
determination to work with authoritarian regimes produced a multifaceted Congressional
and public backlash. The Republican-controlled Senate Foreign Relations Committee
rejected the Lefever nomination. In defense of his vote, Claiborne Pell (D-RI) indicated
that Congressional approval for this individual “would be taken in many areas of the
world as a signal that the United States has lost interest in human rights.” On 11 March
1981, the United States Catholic Mission Council sent Reagan a letter explaining that
“violations of the rights of the poor were being stepped up by people who no longer
feared the U.S. human rights stance.” Since members possessed “information from the
665
In particular, see Reagan, An American Life, 637-8. See also Cannon, President Reagan, 298-301, 307;
Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to the New Era, 21-2 and 226; and Smith, America’s Mission, 272.
666
This perspective comes across in his personal correspondence. See Letter, Reagan to Brezhnev, 24
August 1981, Executive Secretariat (ES): General Secretary Brezhnev (GSB), Box 38, Folder: 81902048190205, RRPL. For all the controversy this letter caused, see Cannon, The Role of a Lifetime, 299-300;
and Reagan, An American Life, 269-73, 567, 576.
667
This viewpoint comes across crystal clear when he answered a question about why the United States
supported human rights violators such as Chile and Argentina. See PPPOP, 1982, Vol. I, 606. See also
Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 152; and Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to the New Era, 226.
348
grass roots that you are lacking in this area, knowing our concern and sharing our
information” should make you see “the advisability of a stronger stance against
repression throughout the world.”668
Others argued that the Reagan administration only cared about denouncing human
rights violations in the Soviet Union and other communist countries. During a
Congressional session, Dante Fascell argued that “the words and actions of the
administration, to date, have caused widespread uncertainty and concern about whether
the United States is going to continue its leadership in human rights advocacy.” The
“Soviet Union is the biggest human rights violator in current history,” he remarked, but
should “civilized nations . . . only criticize the Soviet Union for human rights violations?”
“That’s just an-anti Soviet policy” that will not attract “much international support.”669
The executive branch even received criticism for not paying enough attention to
Soviet human rights violations. In their testimony before a House subcommittee, Patricia
Derian and other former Carter officials denounced the new administration for allowing
the issue of Sakharov’s exile to disappear from the agenda of UNHRC. They also
expressed their disbelief in the unwillingness of officials to make public criticisms of
Warsaw Pact nations’ human rights violations. In a short article written for
Commentary, Bayard Rustin supported this position, arguing that “President Reagan has
been profoundly disappointing in his failure to highlight the issue of human rights” and
668
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Ernest W. Lefever, 506; and Letter, United
States Catholic Mission Council to Reagan, 11 March 1981, Human Rights, Box 1, Folder: 000001022999, RRPL.
669
House Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, Implementation of
Congressionally Mandated Human Rights Provisions, 38-9.
349
express his concern for the treatment of political prisoners, East or West.” If he did not
change his policies, “President Reagan may prove that a foreign policy without a humanrights dimension will be reduced to a matter of military strength.”670
On 1 October 1981, forty-five Representatives sent Reagan a letter expressing
their dismay with the executive branch’s “reluctance in making a policy statement
concerning human rights.” The letter also criticized administration officials for not
giving Soviet political prisoners as much public support as they deserve: “We believe
that the Reagan administration could become a symbol of hope for the prisoners of
conscience.” “By remaining silent, by not declaring a policy on human rights violations,
by not condemning the Soviets for breaking the Helsinki treaties and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,” the United States had made fundamental mistakes, the
letter continued. “We are letting stand idle one of the most important tools we have in
fighting for the rights that all citizens of the world are entitled to under the international
law.”671
Around the same time, Richard Allen received a copy of a speech given by
Myroslaw Smorodsky, a Ukrainian activist who had served as a U.S. public delegate in
Madrid until Reagan became President. Using blunt language, he explained that “the
public perception of the Administration’s position on human rights is not favorable.”
“The majority of activist organizations in the human rights area are of the erroneous view
670
Ibid., 72, 77, 90-2, 129; and “Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: A Symposium,”
Commentary 72, no. 5 (1981): 62.
671
Letter, House of Representatives to Reagan, 1 October 1981, Human Rights, Box 1, Folder: 038000046999, RRPL.
350
[of] the Administration’s policy as totally ignoring human rights issues within the
international arena.” One year ago, Reagan received a tumultuous greeting from “10,000
people” at a Ukrainian festival in New Jersey. “This . . . supportive attitude,” he warned,
has been waning because of” the executive branch’s lack of interest in “nationalities and
humanitarian issues.” In the meantime, “[t]he Democratic Party has been exploiting”
these issues “in its bid for votes in future elections.” This attitude helps explain why the
Helsinki Watch Group sent Reagan a letter expressing concern that he would not raise the
issue of human rights if a summit meeting with Leonid Brezhnev took place.672
The criticisms cited above help illustrate the strength of the broad international
impulse against bureaucratic discretion and authority described in previous chapters. As
they had during the Carter and Ford administrations, private citizens and members of
Congress challenged the executive branch to take a strong stand on the issue of human
rights. A mid-level State Department official named Elliott Abrams grasped these
realities. A staunch neoconservative who had earlier served as Senator Patrick
Moynihan’s aide, he received an excellent chance to shape policy when Reagan picked
him to lead the Human Rights Bureau after the Lefever nomination tanked. In October
1981, he helped write an “eyes only” State Department memorandum that evaluated the
shortcomings of the administration’s human rights policies. Employing language that
Reagan appears to have endorsed, the document maintained that the “Congressional
belief that we have no consistent human rights policy threatens to disrupt important
foreign policy objectives.” Not appearing interested in this issue has “been one of the
672
Memorandum from Myroslaw Smorodsky, N.D., Human Rights, Box 1, Folder: 050000-052698, RRPL.
351
main avenues for domestic attack on the Administration’s foreign policy.” Unless” we
create a foreign policy that “relates to American ideals and to the defense of freedom,” he
advised, “we will never maintain wide public support for our foreign policy.”673
According to the memorandum, reaffirming the fundamental role human rights
played in U.S. foreign policy would accomplish two important goals. Such a move
would not only answer the complaints of domestic critics, but also give the administration
a powerful ideological weapon to wield against the Soviet Union. Because many critics
will not be satisfied with a policy that focuses on Soviet domestic misconduct, however,
“we will have to speak honestly about our friends’ human rights violations and justify
any decision” when other considerations (economic, military, etc) are determinative.”
“There is no escaping this [reality], the memorandum noted, “without destroying the
credibility of our human rights policy, for otherwise we would simply be coddling friends
and criticizing foes.”674
After this document appeared, Abrams played an important role in defining and
articulating a “Reaganite” human rights policy. The positions that he and others outlined
had some commonalities with those of Carter administration. Each recognized that
exploiting human rights issues gave the United States an excellent way of engaging in
673
See “Human Rights Victory,” New York Times, 5 November 1981, A27; Judith Miller, “A
Neoconservative for the Human Rights Post,” The New York Times, 31 October 1981, 7; and Aryeh Nier,
“Of Reagan and Rights,” The New York Times, 12 November 1981, A31. See also Bite, “Human Rights
and U.S. Foreign Policy,” 3-4; Caleb Rossiter, “Human Rights: The Carter Record, the Reagan Reaction,”
International Policy Report (September 1984): 23-7; and Tamar Jacoby, “The Reagan Turnaround on
Human Rights,” Foreign Affairs (Summer 1986): 1066-1081; and John Ehrman, The Rise of
Neoconservatism: Intellectuals in Foreign Affairs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 156-8.
During his confirmation hearing, Abrams indicated that Reagan agreed with the memorandum’s contents.
See Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nomination of Elliott Abrams, 97th Cong., 1st session, 1981
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Press, 1981), 20.
674
Bite, “Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy,” 3-4
352
peaceful ideological competition with the Soviet Union and other communist countries.
They also favored participating in international human rights institutions such as the Final
Act follow-up conferences and the UNHRC. In theory at least, each administration also
endorsed the notion of carrying out an “even-handed” human rights policy that employed
a mixture of both private and public diplomacy. As the next section of this chapter will
explain, officials also recognized the important role private citizens played in holding the
Soviets accountable for their human rights violations.675
Yet there were important differences. Unlike their predecessors, Reagan officials
made the explicit argument that preventing the spread of communism and strengthening
American power in and of themselves amounted to a universal victory for human rights.
They also chose not to recognize a separate category of social and economic rights.
Raising these “aspirations” to the level of rights, a publication warned, only muddled the
fundamental connection between human freedom and economic development; such a
category also gave governments convenient rationales for justifying repression. Just as
important, they rejected the rhetorical importance Carter placed on public criticisms of all
human rights violators. Instead, the executive branch would now focus on using “quiet”
diplomacy to effect change in “friendly” authoritarian regimes because they were more
susceptible to American leverage than their totalitarian counterparts.676
675
Country Reports for Human Rights Practices for 1981 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Press, 1982), 2-3, 9.
676
Ibid., 6; Country Reports for Human Rights Practices for 1982 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Press, 1983), 5, 7-9.
353
Well aware of negative Congressional and public opinion, members of the
Reagan administration gravitated toward internal and public studies that urged the United
States to make the promotion of democracy an important U.S. foreign policy objective.677
The ways in which Abrams defended this approach are revealing. Unlike Carter, he
rejected any suggestion that U.N. documents proved the existence of an international
consensus on human rights. “The only alternative to democracy as a contemporary
system of legitimacy,” he wrote, “is Marxism-Leninism.” Because Marxist-Leninist
regimes abhorred diversity, “the Reagan administration has developed a two-track human
rights policy.” In the short term, the executive branch would oppose specific violations
through an “effective” mixture of public and private diplomacy. Over the long haul, the
“positive side” of promoting human rights would consist of supporting the “long-term
development of “democratic institutions “throughout the world.”678
In sharp contrast to Allen’s earlier speech, Abrams defended this approach on the
grounds that the existence of democratic institutions and practices provided private
citizens with powerful tools to protect themselves from governmental repression. When
compared to other forms of government, “democracy is the nearest thing we have to a
guarantee on human rights.” The promotion of democracy would also allow the
677
In particular, NSDD 11-82 called on the United States to “provide political assistance and support to
democratic elements in the USSR and other countries.” This document is available from the Digital
National Security Archive. See also Country Reports for Human Rights Practices for 1982, 8-9. See also
See also Schweizer, Reagan’s War, 192-9; and Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan and his Quest to Abolish
Nuclear Weapons (New York: Radom House, 2005), 60-80; Kengor and Doerner, The Judge, 166-70; and
John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security
Strategy during the Cold War, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 355.
678
Country Reports for Human Rights Practices for 1982, 4-5, 8-9; and Country Reports for Human Rights
Practices for 1983 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Press, 1984), 5-7, 11
354
administration to engage in the global ideological struggle with communism in a much
more effective way than the United States had in the past. The executive branch, Abrams
maintained, “believes that we should not treat not only the symptoms but the disease [of
human rights violations].” The main aim of any effective human rights policy must
involve “working to establish democratic systems in which human rights violations are
less likely to occur.”679
Unlike the rhetorical importance Jimmy Carter placed on making U.S. laws and
behavior consistent with international human rights standards, Abrams chose to focus on
the task of democracy promotion. As a result of this preference, he held up the United
States as a universal democratic model. Drawing upon arguments found in the Federalist
Papers and Abraham Lincoln’s speeches, he explained that the American government’s
respect for human rights developed over time because of founding principles that
recognized the importance of recognizing private citizens’ “minority rights” and diverse
interests. In other words, Americans found an efficacious strategy for mitigating the
ever-present tensions between “majority rule” and minority rights: “democratic
government in the political sphere, diversity and pluralism in the social sphere, both
operating under the principle of equality.”680
While Abrams might have mentioned the large amount of violence and coercion
needed to forge the Soviet Union, he explained this country’s poor human rights record in
terms of its leaders’ refusal to respect minority rights and private citizens’ diverse
679
Country Reports for Human Rights Practices for 1982, 8-9; Country Reports for Human Rights
Practices for 1983, 5-6.
680
Country Reports for Human Rights Practices for 1983, 7-11.
355
interests. In effect, Soviet private citizens could not make their leaders live up to the
“internationalist” and “egalitarian” principles of the “Bolshevik revolution” because the
Soviet Union had become a vast bureaucratic machine that lacked pluralism. This
argument very much conveys the position that Soviet leaders would never respect human
rights as long as they refused to allow an autonomous civil society to develop and
function within the bounds of a democratic political system.681
Reagan had no trouble embracing the goal of building democratic institutions
across the globe. Speaking before the British Parliament on 8 June 1982, he explained
how Soviet-style socialism “runs against the tide of history by denying human freedom
and human dignity to its [private] citizens.” Rejecting any suggestion that promoting
democracy amounted to “cultural imperialism,” he explained that the United States would
carry out a global campaign for democracy designed to aid “the gradual growth of
freedom and democratic ideals.”682 Because of the close link he saw between functioning
democratic institutions and the respect for human rights, he stated:
The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of
democracy, the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities which
allows a people to choose their own way to develop their own culture, [and] to
reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.683
Ever the optimist, he predicted that Soviet leaders could not insulate themselves from
“the renewed strength of the [global] democratic movement” forever. To drive this point
home, he asserted that “the march of freedom and democracy will leave Marxism681
Ibid.
682
“Address to Members of the British Parliament,” 8 June 1982. Available [Online]:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42614&st=&st1= [10 September 2006].
683
Ibid.
356
Leninism on the ash-heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom
and muzzle the self-expression of the people.” In support of this vision, the
administration ended up creating the National Endowment of Democracy in December
1983, a “quasi” NGO that used federal funds to help promote democracy all over the
world.684
Reagan’s views and temperament predisposed him to make democracy promotion
the “positive side” of his human rights policy. Yet, as Abrams later admitted, the
President “did not intervene in the human rights policy often.” As a result of this
detachment, George Shultz played a fundamental role in raising the visibility of the issue
and strengthening the Human Rights Bureau after he replaced Haig as secretary of state
in the summer of 1982.685 Because he recognized political realities, he went out of his
way to articulate the importance the United States placed on carrying out an effective,
even-handed human rights that always held the Soviets accountable for their conduct. He
also endorsed the position that “support for the development of democracy is an essential
part of” the U.S. human rights policy.686
The emphasis Shultz placed on democracy promotion and holding Soviet leaders
accountable for their domestic conduct became the administration consensus. No
document better illustrates this development than NSDD-75, which appeared on 17
684
Ibid.
685
See Thompson, Foreign Policy in the Reagan Presidency, 106.
686
In particular, see “Human Rights and the Moral Dimension of U.S. Foreign Policy,” 22 February 1984,
Current Policy, no. 551 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1984), 1-2, 4-5. See also “Soviet Jewry
and U.S.-Soviet Relations,” 22 October 1984, Current Policy, no. 628 (Washington, D.C.: Department of
State, 1984); and “America and the Struggle for Freedom,” 22 February 1985, Current Policy, no. 659
(Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1984). See also Petro, The Predicament of the Human Rights, 53.
357
January 1983. In language that had much in common with the Carter administration’s
PRM-28, this memorandum emphasized the need “to promote within the narrow limits
available to us, the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic
political and economic system in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is
gradually reduced.” To accomplish these goals, officials needed to stress “the superiority
of U.S. and Western values” such as “individual dignity” and a “free press.” They also
had to strengthen “the President’s London initiative to support democratic forces” and
“U.S. governmental efforts to highlight Soviet human rights violations.” When
negotiating with the Soviets, the United States “must insist that Moscow address the full
range of U.S. concerns about Soviet internal behavior and human rights violations.”687
Principled Flexibility: Wielding the Human Rights Weapon against the Soviet
Union
As his speech in London suggests, Reagan never veered far way from his prepresidential statements about the pivotal role the United States needed to play in
defending freedom across the globe. Unlike Carter, he sometimes used controversial
expressions such as “evil empire” to express his deep beliefs in the benefits of democratic
practices and inherent weaknesses of Marxist-Leninist regimes. For all the controversy
these words caused, he more often than not expressed his deep belief in freedom and the
moral superiority of democratic government using measured language that the average
American could understand. During his first two years in office, he strung together
phrases such as “our democratic dream of human fulfillment through individual equality
687
National Security Decision Directive Number (NSDD) 75, 17 January 1983, 1-3, 5-6. Available at the
Digital National Security Archive.
358
and opportunity is still the most exciting, successful, and revolutionary idea in the
world.” He also described how “limited government” that empowered private citizens
provided “mankind’s best defense against tyranny.”688
Reagan may have used words to engage in ideological competition with the
Soviet Union, but he attempted to project a pragmatic attitude toward Soviet human
rights violations behind closed doors. After holding a private meeting with Avital
Shcharansky about her husband’s fate in May 1981, he referred to Soviet leaders as
“inhumane bastards” in his diary and vowed to gain his release. While angry, the private
letter he sent to Brezhnev one month later struck a much different tone. He asked the
General Secretary to release Shcharansky and a group of Pentecostal Christians who had
taken refuge in the U.S. embassy. Using language more pragmatic than Carter ever
employed, he assured Brezhnev that these matters would remain “between the two of us”
and “I will not reveal that I made any such requests.” He also reminded him that “actions
on your part would contribute to lessening my problems in the future negotiations
between our two countries.”689
Although Reagan deleted specific references to Sakharov and Shcharansky in a
letter he sent to Brezhnev in November 1981, he became alarmed when the Pentecostals
began a hunger strike near the beginning of 1982. He once again wrote to the General
Secretary and asked him to “intervene personally in this matter” before the chances of
688
689
PPOP, 1981, 586, 1143; and Ibid, 1982, Vol. I, 62-3.
Douglas Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 21; and Letter, Reagan to
Brezhnev, 16 June 1981, ES: GSB, Box 37, Folder: 8105567-8105658, RRPL.
359
finding a “humanitarian solution” evaporated. 690 After Shcharansky began a hunger
strike to protest his harsh treatment, Reagan sent Brezhnev another letter that expressed
“American sympathy” for this dissenter’s plight. To appease Soviet sensibilities, Robert
McFarlane of the NSC staff suggested that Reagan meet with Dobrynin so he could
convey his intention of not seeking “to embarrass the Soviets” or “publicize this letter.”
The President could use such a meeting to relay his consistent position that he “only
wants to see some results [on specific cases] without a test of manhood.”691
According to Dobrynin’s memoirs, Shultz conveyed a private message to him a
month later that had much in common with the one McFarlane had recommended. He
admitted that the U.S. government could not ignore the issue of Soviet human rights
violations given the “widespread domestic reaction it causes.” Nevertheless, Shultz told
the Ambassador that Reagan had accepted Nixon’s advice about the importance of
dealing with this sensitive issue in private. When Dobrynin meet with Reagan in
February 1983, the President once again raised the issue of the Pentecostals, noting that
the American public would view their release “with greater enthusiasm than any other
bilateral agreement.” He also told the Ambassador that he would not stand in the way if
Congress decided to repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment. These messages only
690
Letter, Brezhnev to Reagan, 14 January 1982, ES: GSB, Box 37, Folder: 820225-8204854, RRPL.
Alexander Haig also engaged in vigorous “quiet” human rights diplomacy. See Memo, Haig to Reagan, 18
September 1981, ES: GSB, Box 37, Folder: 8190211-8290012, RRPL.
691
Earlier drafts included these names, but the transmitted letter did not. Reagan went over the drafts with
care. See Letter, Reagan to Brezhnev, 17 November 1981, ES: GSB, Box 37, Folder: 8106607, RRPL.
The drafts are located in the same location. See also Letter, Reagan to Brezhnev, 20 October 1982, ES:
GSB, Box 38, Folder: 8290742-8290870, RRPL; and National Security Council Memorandum, 16 October
1982, Ibid.
360
complemented Reagan’s private assurances to Soviet leaders that solving “humanitarian
issues” would have a “positive influence” on U.S.-Soviet relations.692
Reagan and Shultz’s statements about their preference for “quiet” human rights
diplomacy flowed from the same conclusions found in the memorandum that Abrams
wrote in 1981: Congressional and public pressure all but necessitated that the executive
branch make public statements that condemned Soviet human rights violations and
supported individual dissenters. In practice, the House and Senate forced Reagan’s hand
when they began passing resolutions condemning Soviet domestic misconduct at a much
greater rate than they ever had during Carter’s Presidency. Not wanting to appear weak
on the issue of human rights, Reagan signed many of these resolutions. For example, he
signed a proclamation designating 9 November 1982 Ukrainian Watch Group Day. 693
The following year, Reagan signed another congressional resolution, which designated 21
May 1983 “’National Andrei Sakharov Day.” 694
The administration also took other steps to address the concerns of public critics.
In deference to the concerns of NGOs committed to the cause of freedom in the Baltic
republics, Reagan revived the practice of signing Captive Nation Proclamations in
accordance with a Congressional resolution passed in 1959. He also named 14 June 1982
692
Dobrynin, In Confidence, 514-5.
693
For a good summary of the ever-increasing number of Congressional resolutions concerning Soviet
domestic misconduct, see Bite, “Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy,” 13-19; and Margaret E. Galey,
“Congress, Foreign Policy, and Human Rights Ten Years After Helsinki,” Human Rights Quarterly 7
(1985): 352-5.
694
PPOP, 1983, Vol. I, 731.
361
“Baltic Freedom Day” in accordance with S. Joint Res. 201.695 Near the beginning of
1982, George Bush met with the leaders of “major Jewish organizations” to express the
administration’s firm commitment to increasing the rate of Jewish emigration from the
Soviet Union. For the first time ever, the White House also sent a representative to attend
the “daily noon vigil across from the Soviet embassy.”696 In the early months of 1983,
Reagan sent a personal message to the Third World Conference on Soviet Jewry
confirming his commitment to making human rights an integral part of Soviet-American
relations. He also told the leaders of World Jewish Congress that the U.S. government
would make every effort to raise Jewish emigration rates to the record high levels of
1970s.697
As Richard Pipes recounts in his work Vixi, steady Congressional pressure played
an important role in the decision to hold a Presidential luncheon in March 1982 for
dissidents who held “diverse political opinions” and came from different ethnic groups.
When the meeting took place, Reagan listened to each dissenter’s story and spoke about
his private diplomatic efforts to win the release of individuals through private diplomacy.
He also tried to regale the audience with a wide assortment of jokes about life in the
Soviet Union. Although officials tried to keep the meeting out of the headlines through a
ban on photographs and the distribution of Reagan’s remarks to interested parties, the
695
Ibid., 1982, Vol. I, 798, 936-8, 103; and Ibid., 1984, Vol. II, 1046-9.
696
“Bush Pledges Forceful Policy on Soviet Jews,” The New York Times, 29 January 1982, A6; and House
Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, Soviet Jewry, 98th Cong., 1st session
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Press, 1984), 47-9.
697
The CSCE Digest, 15 March 1983, 6; Ibid., 28 February 1983, 2; and Bite, “Human Rights and U.S.
Foreign Policy,” 13.
362
event received some media attention because of Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s public refusal
to attend “’symbolic encounters’” and identify himself as a dissenter.698
Despite all these actions, the administration was not acting merely from political
expediency. Reagan expressed his concern about the Soviet government’s treatment of
Sakharov and other dissenters on numerous occasions while in office. The deep
sympathy he felt for individual suffering rather than political calculations explains why
he sent Avital Shcharansky a private letter of support in 1983 and later identified himself
as a dissenter. All available evidence indicates that George Shultz felt the same way.699
Consistent with the language of NSDD-75, many officials came to appreciate how
citing Soviet human rights violations amounted to an effective and popular way of
engaging in ideological competition with the Soviet Union. On 15 June 1983, Shultz told
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that human rights performance “is as central to
Soviet-American dialog as any other theme.” “If we can put the East-West competition
on an ideological basis or on the basis of alternative economic systems,” he explained,
“we will walk away with it.” To underscore the administration’s commitment to holding
the Soviets accountable for their internal behavior, he publicized the executive branch’s
deep commitment to monitoring Soviet compliance with the Final Act. When speaking at
the concluding session of the Madrid conference in November 1983, Shultz argued that
698
699
Richard Pipes, Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 184-7.
For a description of Reagan’s letter, see Sharansky, Fear No Evil, 398; PPOP, 1982, Vol. I, 581; Ibid.,
1983, Vol. I, 174, 731, 856; Ibid., 1983, Vol. II, 1054; Ibid., 1984, Vol. I, 731, 894; Ibid., 1984, Vol. II,
1047, 1547, 1881-2; Ibid., 1985, Vol. I, 247, 459, 617-8; Ibid., 1985, Vol. II, 1289. For his quote about
being a dissenter, see Ibid., 1983, Vol. II, 1174. Reagan also held private meeting with Jewish émigrés.
See House Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, Soviet Jewry, 47. See also,
Reagan, An American Life, 606; Cannon, The Role of a Lifetime, 312, 784.
363
“the struggle for human rights is unstoppable” and will always “remain a priority of
American foreign policy.” He also raised the issue of human rights each time he met
with Andrei Gromyko and Dobrynin.700
Executive branch officials also held the Soviets accountable for their treatment of
national minorities. When Elliott Abrams appeared before the Baltic-American Freedom
League’s Third Annual Human Rights Conference, he posed the question: “In an age
such as ours when all the colonial empires have all but vanished . . . is it realistic to
assume that the sole remaining colonial empire, the Soviet empire, will survive forever?”
After quoting de Tocqueville to illustrate how the “idea of democracy . . . cannot be
destroyed,” he expressed his confidence “that the last word on the human rights situation
in the Baltic states . . . and throughout the Soviet bloc . . . has not yet been spoken.” This
attitude helps explain why the State Department’s Annual Reports on human rights began
offering separate treatments of the Soviet Union and Baltic Republics in 1983.701
Committed to engaging in vigorous ideological competition with the Soviet
Union, Reagan agreed to accelerate the Carter administration’s efforts to strengthen the
ability of U.S. radios to reach audiences in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. He
favored such a course of action because he wanted the rest of the world to know the
“truth” about Soviet international and domestic misconduct; he also grasped the
700
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States-Soviet Relations, Part I, 98th Cong., 1st session,
1983 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 10-2; George Shultz, “The Challenge of
the Helsinki Process,” 9 September 1983, Current Policy, no. 598 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1983), 2-3; and George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New
York: Maxwell Macmillan, 1993), 266 and 277.
701
7.
American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1984 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1986), 285-
364
importance dissidents attached to receiving messages from abroad. His first budget
included a small increase in the substantial rise in funding for American radios that Carter
had planned to request during his second term. On 15 July 1982, he signed NSDD-45,
which called for “a major, long-term program of modernization and expansion” for VOA
and RFE/RL over the next five years.702
Almost one year after he signed this directive, Reagan announced the creation of a
separate Baltic States Service within Radio Liberty on Latvian Independence Day (18
November 1983). When defending this action, he asserted that the “people of the three
Baltic Republics look to the United States international broadcasting services as their
informational lifeline.” By announcing formation of Baltic Radio Liberty Division on
Latvian Independence Day,” he continued, “this administration reaffirms its resolve to
maintain our commitments to the people of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in their
struggle to regain freedom and self-determination.”703
702
CSCE Digest, 20 March 1981, 6; and Christopher Simpson, ed., National Security Directives of the
Reagan and Bush Administrations: The Declassified History of U.S. Political and Military Policy, 19811991 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 70, 155. See also Schweizer, Reagan’s War, 192-9; Alvin
Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation: American Propaganda, Soviet Lies, and the Winning of the Cold War,
an Insider’s Account (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1995), 32-42 ; and Sosin, Sparks of Liberty, 169-94.
703
“Statement on the Establishment of the Baltic States Service of Radio Liberty,” 18 November 1983.
Available [Online]: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=40786 [10 July 2007]. Because
Reagan attached importance to engaging in effective “public diplomacy,” he supported efforts to set up a
satellite television network called WORLDNET designed to shape the ways in which private citizens all
over the world viewed the United States. The main impetus for this venture may have come from
combating Soviet propaganda in Western Europe, but the administration managed to set up links with over
100 cities “in 80 foreign countries” by the time Reagan left office. See Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation,
38-42, and 85-92. See also American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1985 (Washington, DC:
Department of State, 1986), 301-5, 310; Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 100th Cong., 1st session, 17,
1987 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 356, 2-47, 405-11; and David Ottaway,
“Cynicism Marks Helsinki Gathering 10th Anniversary Finds Little Accord in East-West Relations,”
Washington Post, 30 July 1985, A1
365
There can be little doubt that Reagan understood that the issue of human rights
put Soviet leaders on the ideological defensive. At the same time, he believed that U.S.Soviet relations would not improve in any sort of fundamental way unless the Kremlin
modified its domestic behavior. As a result of this mindset, he directed Max Kampelman
and State Department Representative Walter Stossel, Jr. to discuss the issue of Soviet
domestic conduct with nine different European leaders throughout 1983 and 1984.
Reagan hoped to gain insights from U.S. allies because “Soviet performance on human
rights has deteriorated badly in several specific areas.” To his dismay, the Kremlin
appeared committed to maintaining “drastic cutbacks in Jewish emigration and
eliminating “ties between the Soviet people and the outside world that are not under . . .
[their] complete control.” In his letter to the Prime Minister of Spain, he pointed out that
“human rights” must “have a central role in our discussion with the Soviets” because “of
the importance I attach to the Helsinki Final Act commitments” and “the terrible costs
that are being paid by individual human beings.” Even more important, “our overall
relationship with the Soviets is seriously affected by human rights violations.”704
This attitude never disappeared. In the same conciliatory speech Reagan
delivered on 16 January 1984 that some scholars have used to show his abandonment of a
hard-line approach to U.S.-Soviet relations, he argued that the Kremlin’s refusal to
respect basic human rights has “created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our
relationship . . . as much as any other issue.” “Our request is simple and
straightforward,” he announced, Soviet leaders must start abiding by the provisions of the
704
Letter, Reagan to Felipe Gonzalez, 2 July 1983, Human Rights, Box 2, Folder: 142000-1507365, RRPL.
See also Memo for Robert C. McFarlane, “Ambassadors Kampelman and Stoessel’s Recommendations,” 2
March 1985, ES: NSC Systems Files, Box 2, Folder: 8501710, RRPL.
366
Helsinki Accords and other international human rights covenants they signed on their
own accord. In the end, “[e]xperience has shown [us] that greater respect for human
rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.” He
advanced the same argument in his private letters and conversations with Soviet
officials.705
After delivering this speech, Reagan and Shultz succeeded in institutionalizing a
“four-sided” negotiating agenda designed to improve U.S.-Soviet relations that included
human rights, bilateral issues, arms control, and regional conflicts. This strategy meant
that taking steps to improve Soviet-American relations required no substantial decrease in
public rhetoric about Soviet human rights violations. As he had in the past, Shultz
continued to deliver speeches that highlighted the American commitment to supporting
“the forces of freedom in communist totalitarian countries” and speaking “out at every
opportunity against Soviet human rights violations.” During a gathering commemorating
the tenth anniversary of Final Act that took place on 30 July 1985, he denounced the
Soviets for putting peace activists, feminists, and Social Democrats in either jails or
psychiatric prisons. “We cannot talk about the Helsinki Process without talking about
human beings,” he told the audience, “for they are supposed to be the true beneficiaries
705
“Address to the Nation and Other Countries on United States-Soviet Relations,” 16 January 1984.
Available [Online]: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=39806 [20 February 2006]. Beth
A. Fischer stresses how Reagan made a conscious effort to improve U.S.-Soviet relations before Mikhail
Gorbachev came to power, but never really addresses the issue of human rights. See Fischer, The Reagan
Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997),
102-143; and Beth A. Fischer, “Reagan and the Soviets: Winning the Cold War?” in Brownlee and
Graham, ed., The Reagan Presidency, 113-32. Jack Matlock has a very good account of all the work that
went into the address Reagan delivered on 16 January 1984. See Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 78-87.
367
of the Helsinki Final Act.”706 Reagan behaved in a similar fashion both behind closed
doors and in public. On the tenth anniversary of the Final Act, he criticized the Kremlin
for not allowing Soviet private citizens to “’know and act upon’ their rights” and have
regular contacts with their Western counterparts.707 In 1984 and 1985, he delivered
speeches at the United Nations that stressed the crucial links between peace, individual
freedom, and governments’ respect for basic human rights.708
The statements described above only reinforce the reality that the Helsinki
process had an important place in the administration’s “four-sided” negotiating agenda.
At the 1985 Final Act experts meetings on human rights and cultural affairs held in
Ottawa and Budapest, executive branch officials held the Soviets accountable for their
internal behavior and mistreatment of non-Russian nationalities. At the former meeting,
the new head of the Human Rights Bureau Richard Schifter criticized the Soviet
706
“Managing the U.S.-Soviet Relationship Over the Long Term,” Current Policy, no. 624 (Washington,
D.C.: Department of State, 1984); and “Ten Years After the Helsinki Final Act,” Current Policy, no. 728,
30 July 1985 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1985), 2-3. To reinforce these arguments, Shultz
raised the issue of human rights when he met with Mikhail Gorbachev and the new Soviet Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze. See also Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 573-77, 586-7; Eduard Shevardnadze, trans.
by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, The Future Belongs to Freedom (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 70-2 and
85-6; and Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era, 110, 122, 137.
707
These remarks come from a statement Reagan released commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Final
Act. See PPOP, 1985, Vol. II, 955-6.
708
See “Address to the 39th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, New York,”
24 September 1984. Available [Online]:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=40430&st=United+Nations&st1=Address [20
December 2006]. See also “Address to the 40th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New
York, New York,” 24 October 1985. Available [Online]:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=37963&st=United+Nations&st1=Address [21
December 2007]; Letter, Reagan to Chernenko, 7 December 1984, ES: GSC, Box 39, Folder: 84912378491334, RRPL; Letter, Reagan to Chernenko, 11 March 1985, ES: GSG, Box 39, Folder: 85902728590419, RRPL; Reagan, An American Life, 645-9; and Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom,
81-2; and “Statement on the Exile of Andrei Sakharov and Human Rights in the Soviet Union,” 15 May
1985. Available [Online]: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=38637&st=&st1= [10 March
2006].
368
government’s efforts to repress homegrown peace and anti-nuclear activists. He also
explained the Kremlin’s imperialistic attitude toward non-Russian nationalities. “It is
ironic” that Soviet leaders refuse to hold their domestic practices up to international
scrutiny, he told his fellow delegates, when they follow a political philosophy “based on
the concept of historic inevitability.” Since human rights have become a “legitimate . . .
subject of international discourse,” they “are [actually] swimming against the tide of
history.”709
Reagan may have continued to make statements about the fundamental
distinctions between Marxist-Leninist and democratic regimes, but the “four-sided”
agenda gave him the flexibility to pursue his longstanding goal of facilitating contacts
between Soviet and American private citizens.710 In practice, he wanted to accomplish
this goal from the moment he entered office. Consistent with language found in the
Helsinki Accords, Reagan voiced his strong support for “Sister City” exchanges and
signed the International Tourism Policy Act in 1981. Overcoming Congressional
resistance, he then signed legislation that “doubled funding for international exchange
programs over the next four years.” Determined to have more young Americans
participate in exchanges, he also created the President’s Council for International Youth
Exchange in 1983.711
709
U.S. Helsinki Commission, The Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting and the Future of the Helsinki
Process, 99th Congress, 1st session, 1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 1845.
710
See PPOP, 1984, Vol. I, 809. See also U.S. Helsinki Commission, The Ottawa Human Rights Experts
Meeting and the Future of the Helsinki Process, 70.
369
After intense bureaucratic infighting, Reagan sided with Shultz and ordered the
State Department to negotiate a new cultural exchange agreement with Moscow in July
1983 under the umbrella of “bilateral issues.”712 Reagan’s defense of this policy is
revealing.713 Without ignoring the issue of Soviet human rights violations and harsh
treatment of dissenters, he expressed his fear of punishing the “proud peoples” of the
“multinational” Soviet empire for their government’s sins. He wanted to negotiate
agreements that would allow Soviet private citizens to meet their American counterparts
in greater numbers. He painted the picture of a day when “Americans and Soviet citizens
from “all walks of life” could “travel freely back and forth, visit each other's homes . . .
and, if they feel like it, sit up all night talking about the meaning of life and the different
ways to look at the world.” On the eve of the 1985 Geneva summit, he voiced similar
711
“Remarks to Representatives of the Sister Cities International Program,” 27 March 1981. Available
[Online]: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=43604&st=sister&st1=cities [10 October
2005]; U.S. Helsinki Commission Report, Report: Progress in Perspective, 138-41, 241-2. Available
[Online]:
http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=ContentRecords.ViewDetail&ContentRecord_id=304&Region
_id=0&Issue_id=0&ContentType=R&ContentRecordType=R&CFID=6546930&CFTOKEN=96369328
[10 March 2006]; Memo, Haig to Reagan, 18 September 1981, “My forthcoming Meeting with Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko, Executive Secretariat: NSC, Head of State Files (HOSF), Box 37, Folder:
General Secretary Brezhnev, RRPL; and PPOP, 1983, Vol. I, 78.
712
See Memo, William P. Clark to Reagan, “U.S.-Soviet Relations: Decisions on New Consulates, Cultural
Exchange Agreement and Reciprocity,” 21 May 1983, William Clark Files, Box 8, Folder: U.S.-Soviet
Relations Working Papers, RRPL, 6/7, RRPL; and Letter, McFarlane to Clark, N.T., 23 March 1983, Ibid.,
Folder: U.S.-Soviet Relations Working Papers, RRPL, 3/7. See also Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 275-6.
713
The proposals he advanced may have been far from novel, as one notable scholar notes, but he
nevertheless made an effective argument that only uncivilized nations that violated human rights with
impunity “insisted on sealing their people off” from the rest of the world and limiting the information they
could receive. See Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 281; and “Remarks to Participants in the Conference on
United States-Soviet Exchanges,” 27 June 1984. Available [Online]:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=40102 [10 March 2006]; and Raymond L. Garthoff, The
Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1994), 156-7.
370
sentiments, noting his preference for exchanging “thousands of undergraduates” with the
Soviet Union each year and facilitate the creation of “new sister city” arrangements.714
Even though Reagan saw nothing wrong with reminding Americans about the
fundamental distinctions between democratic and Marxist-Leninist regimes, his
willingness to negotiate a new cultural agreement with Soviets helps show that he never
tried to modify their internal behavior through rigid linkages. He may have wanted to put
the Soviets on the ideological defensive, but he never delayed progress in arms control,
imposed economic penalties, or suspended cooperative agreements and high-level visits
because of Soviet human rights violations. For example, he lifted the Carter
administration’s grain embargo as a “goodwill gesture” even though Jewish emigration
levels remained low and Soviet human rights abuses had in no way abated. He also
allowed the economic sanctions he placed on the Soviet Union and Poland in December
1981 to drop over the course of next three years without obtaining any visible
concessions on human rights or dramatic changes in Soviet behavior.715
On 11 May 1985, Reagan informed Gorbachev in a private letter that Secretary of
Commerce Malcolm Baldrige would visit Moscow in April 1985 so he could attend the
714
715
“Remarks to Participants in the Conference on the United States-Soviet Exchanges,” 27 June 1984.
Reagan, An American Life, 269-71. See also Skinner, ed., Reagan, 740; and U.S. Helsinki Commission,
Basket II—Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe:
Findings Eleven Years After Helsinki, 100th Congress, 1st session, 1987 (Washington, D.C: Department of
State, 1987), 44-58; United States Information Agency, The President’s U.S-Soviet Exchange Initiative:
Fact Sheet (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Information Agency, 1986). Alan Dobson makes a cogent argument
that Reagan failed to carry out economic warfare against the Soviet Union on a consistent basis. See
Dobson, “The Reagan Administration, Economic Warfare, and Starting to Close Down the Cold War,”
Diplomatic History 29, no. 3 (2005), 534-5, 552-6. In his work Survival Is Not Enough, former NSC
Staffer Richard Pipes argues that Reagan gave up on the enforcement of “industrial controls” against the
Soviet Union. “By 1983, he seemed to have given up trying.” See Richard Pipes, Survival Is Not Enough:
Soviet Realities and America’s Future (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 265. See also Norman
Podhoretz, “The Reagan Road to Détente,” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1984/1985): 459.
371
first meeting of the U.S./U.S.S.R Joint Commercial Commission that had taken place
since 1978.716
As his private correspondence reveals, Reagan took many steps designed to
stabilize U.S.-Soviet relations without demanding visible Soviet concessions on human
rights. He signed a long-term grain deal with the Soviet Union in 1983; he also agreed to
renew the U.S-Soviet cooperative agreement in agriculture. During the next two years,
he either renewed or took steps to strengthen cooperative agreements in environmental
protection, space travel, and industrial cooperation. In contrast to some officials’ earlier
statements, Reagan allowed the United States to negotiate confidence-building measures
(CBM) within the confines of a Final Act forum in Stockholm known as Conference on
Security and Disarmament in Europe (CDE).717
While always interested in negotiating from a “position of strength,” Reagan
shied away from rigid linkages because he accepted language found in NSDD-75 that
warned against the futility of engaging in an “open-ended,” sterile confrontation with
Moscow.” He believed that Soviet leaders would never engage in negotiations designed
to produce agreements consistent with American interests and principles if the U.S.
remained rigidly hostile.718 Shultz made this viewpoint clear in a speech he delivered
716
See Letter, Reagan to Gorbachev, 11 May 1985, ES: GSG, Box 40, Folder: 8590475-8590495, RRPL.
Baldrige delivered the same message to Dobrynin before leaving for Moscow. See Memo, Lionel H.
Olmer to Jack Matlock, N.D., Ibid.
717
United States Information Agency, The President’s U.S-Soviet Exchange Initiative. See also Letter,
Reagan to Chernenko, 1 January 1985, ES: GSC, Box 39, Folder: 8491139, ½, RRPL; and See
Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, Eighteenth Semiannual Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1985), 3.
372
concerning U.S.-Soviet relations on 18 October 1984. Even though Soviet leaders had
little respect “our standards of human conduct and rule of law,” he explained that
Linkage as an instrument of policy has limitations; if applied rigidly, it could
yield the initiative to the Soviets, letting them set the pace and the character of the
relationship. We do not seek negotiations for their own sake; we negotiate when
it is in our interest to do so. Therefore, when the Soviet Union acts in ways we
find objectionable, it may not always make sense for us to break off negotiations
or suspend agreements. . . . We should not sacrifice long-term interests in order to
express immediate outrage.719
Reagan’s decision not to let Soviet human rights abuses rule out progress in other
areas of the U.S.-Soviet relationship invited the same kind of Congressional and public
criticisms that Carter had encountered. When Reagan decided to participate in the CDE
forum, some members of the U.S. Helsinki Commission suspected that he had become
less interested in holding the Soviets accountable for their human rights violations. In his
private letters to Reagan and Shultz, Fascell criticized U.S. delegates in Stockholm for
not mentioning dissenters. “By failing to raise the Sakharov issue at the Stockholm
meeting, he wrote, “the U.S. is falling prey to the long-term Soviet objective of
decoupling the military-security component from” the human rights provisions “of the
Final Act.” Because the United States had a duty to defend all private citizens who faced
governmental persecution, “the Sakharov case . . . . should not be shunted aside . . . in
your efforts to improve U.S.-Soviet relations.”720
718
NSDD-75, 8. See also Letter, Reagan to Chernenko, 16 April 1984, Executive Secretariat: GSC, Box 39,
Folder: 84090236-84905461, RRPL.
719
George Shultz, “Managing the U.S.-Soviet Relationship Over the Long Term,” 18 October 1984,
Current Policy, No. 624 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of State, 1984), 2-3. Evidence suggests that
Reagan supported the main thrust of this view. See Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, 142 and 277; and
Reagan, An American Life, 572.
720
The CSCE Digest, 15 June 1984, 18-9.
373
After replacing Fascell as Chairman of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, Senator
Alfonse D’ Amato (R-NY) excoriated Reagan’s willingness to exchange agricultural
advisers with the Soviet Union and send Baldrige to Moscow for an economic
conference. In reference to the latter decision, he quipped: “Perhaps we are seeking
advice on how to destroy our system of agriculture” and carry out “forced
collectivization.” Unhappy with Baldrige’s visit, he suggested that “there’s a growing
feeling in Congress that our support for human rights is just rhetoric.” At the end of the
day, “many feel that the Soviets view our activities in this area as nothing more than
meaningless talk they can ignore.” This charge had merit, as some human rights activists
criticized Reagan for refusing to link progress in arms control and trade to visible
improvements in Soviet human rights practices. In particular, a number of Jewish groups
took Reagan to task for allowing U.S-Soviet trade to increase during his first term
without obtaining visible emigration concessions.721
Reagan officials also had to contend with Congressional and public criticism for
refusing to certify that the Soviet Union used “forced labor” on a regular basis to produce
products exported to the United States and complete large construction projects. Even
though American delegates in Madrid had raised this issue, thirty-five members of
Congress filed a lawsuit in federal court demanding that the executive branch follow the
provisions of the Hawley-Smoot tariff and ban the importation of goods “produced with
721
U.S. Helsinki Commission, The Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting and the Future of the Helsinki
Process, 2-3, 21. See also U.S. Helsinki Commission, Human Rights and the CSCE Process, 99th Cong., 2nd
session, 1986 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 24, 39, 48, and 57; and U.S.
Helsinki Commission, Soviet Jewry, 47. See also Andrew Harrison, Passover Revisited: The Philadelphia’s
Efforts to Aid Soviet Jews, 1963-1968 (Madison: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 2001), 196-200; and
Stuart Altshuler, From Exodus to Freedom: A History of the Soviet Jewry Movement (Lanham, MD:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 53-62, 174-187.
374
forced labor in the Soviet Union.” When this action went nowhere, the House passed a
resolution calling on Reagan to show American displeasure with the Soviets’ “forced
labor practices” by “refusing to permit the importation of any of its products made in
whole or in part by such labor.” Representative Steny Hoyer (D-MD) defended this
measure on the grounds that the United States should not assist “in the perpetuation of the
Gulag system by importing goods made there.” These sorts of doubts about Reagan’s
commitment to promoting human rights in the Soviet Union explain why he received
several Congressional petitions urging him not to shy away from raising the issue during
the Geneva summit.722
Congressional and public pressure certainly factored into Reagan’s decision to
become more vocal about Soviet human rights violations as his presidency progressed,
but these forces in no way diminished his deep belief in the efficacy of “quiet” human
rights diplomacy. In his private diary, he expressed regret for having signed the 1983
Congressional resolution concerning Sakharov’s treatment because such a move “would
wreck his quiet diplomatic efforts to win his release.” “This kind of public demand,” he
lamented, “puts the Soviets politics in a corner where they lose face if they give in.” 723
Reagan also continued to dismiss any suggestion that he wanted to put “public pressure”
on Soviet leaders or take credit for their humanitarian decisions behind closed doors. In
his mind, the Kremlin’s decision to grant the Pentecostals’ emigration requests in mid
722
CSCE Digest, 2 November 1984, 11-13; and Ibid., 14 June 1985, 8. See also Letter, Powell to Percy,
N.D., Human Rights, Box 2, Folder: 094143, RRPL. See also Letter, U.S. Senate to Reagan, 22 October
1985, FO, Box 2, Folder: 350400-350458, RRPL; and Letter, “U.S. Senate to Reagan, 24 October 1985,
Ibid.
723
Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, 153.
375
1983 as a way of facilitating the conclusion of the Madrid follow-up meeting only
confirmed that “quiet” human rights diplomacy worked better than vocal posturing. In a
private letter dated 6 March 1984, he told General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko that
“I was touched by this gesture. In my view, this shows how quiet and sincere efforts can
solve even the most sensitive problems in our relationship.”724
Not averse to repeating examples he found instructive, Reagan once again went
back to the example of the Pentecostals a few months later. Before meeting with
Gromyko in September 1984, he sent the Foreign Minister a letter that acknowledged the
Soviet position that “we are invading your sovereignty . . . when we get into the area of
human rights.” To assuage Gromyko’s sensibilities, he once again expressed his hope
that Soviet officials “noticed that we would prefer quiet diplomacy on this subject.”
After offering these explanations, he then indicated that he had little choice but to raise
the issue of human rights because he operated within the confines of a “governmental
system responsive to public opinion.” He would encounter difficulties signing
agreements with the Soviets as long as “segments of our population are . . . upset by what
they feel is a violation of human rights in the land of their ancestry.” Given this reality,
he reminded Gromyko that “your handling of that [Pentecostal] matter helped the
administration justify the recent singing of a grain agreement” between our two nations.
To encourage similar humanitarian actions in the future, he told him that no official
724
This viewpoint comes across clearly in a telephone conversation he had with Dobrynin in the early part
of 1984. See “Telephone Call to Dobrynin,” Jack Matlock Files: U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations, January-April
1984, Box 42, Folder: 92219, RRPL. See also Reagan, An American Life, 558, 567, and 597; Reagan, ed.
Brinkley, The Reagan Diaries, 168; and Letter, Reagan to Chernenko, 6 March 1984, ES: GSC, Box 39,
Folder: 84090236-84905461, RRPL.
376
would indicate that the release of the Pentecostals “was anything other than a generous
action by your government,” a promise he never broke.725
When preparing for the summit, Reagan complained in private that “’we are
somewhat publicly on the record for human rights. Front page stories that we are
banging away at them will get us cheers from the bleachers but it won’t help those who
are being abused.’” He also indicated that Gorbachev needed “‘to show his strength to
the Soviet gang back in the Kremlin. Let’s not limit the area where he can do that to
those things that have to do with aggression outside the Soviet Union.’” When speaking
to a European journalist, he reiterated his intention of raising the issue of human rights in
Geneva, but cautioned against putting “things of this kind in public.” Too much publicity
only decreased the chances that the Soviets would satisfy American concerns because
“any change in policy would be viewed as succumbing to another power.”726
Some treatments suggest that Reagan neglected to press Gorbachev on human
rights once the Geneva summit meeting began in 1985.727 This viewpoint has some
merit, but overlooks one fundamental point. When viewed in light of his earlier conduct,
Reagan’s behavior only reflected the path he had chosen to rectify Soviet human rights
violations. He criticized Gorbachev for his government’s unwillingness to follow the
725
Reagan, In His Own Hand, 496-8. The connection Reagan drew between a Soviet gesture he never
publicized and an agreement that did not require Congressional approval defied sound logical reasoning.
Nevertheless, he still clung to his inclination that “quiet” human rights diplomacy represented a better route
to rectifying Soviet human rights violations than vocal public posturing. See Letter, Morris Abram to
Reagan, 15 October 1985, FO, Box 1, Folder: 342180-342299, RRPL; Reagan, ed. Brinkley, The Reagan
Diaries, 153; and Dobrynin, In Confidence, 553.
726
727
Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 152; and PPOP, 1985, Vol. II, 1352.
Cannon, The Role of a Lifetime, 753; and Kenneth L. Adelman, The Great Universal Embrace: Arms
Summitry—A Skeptic’s Account (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 128-30. To see a particularly
poor misreading, see Jacoby, “The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights,” 1082-86.
377
Helsinki Accords and presented him with a list of Soviet private citizens who wanted to
emigrate. To make these criticisms more palatable, he informed the General Secretary of
his decision not to raise this issue “in the full meeting” because he wanted to dispel any
impression “that he was trying to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.” He
also repeated the Pentecostal example and gave his word that he would neither take credit
for nor exploit any humanitarian gestures on behalf of dissenters that the Soviet
government decided to make. To give Gorbachev the chance of showing “strength” in
the face of domestic critics, Reagan suggested that Soviet bureaucrats might violate
human rights on a regular basis without the General Secretary’s knowledge.728
As he had in the past, Reagan also told Gorbachev that the issue of human rights
violations created obstacles in the fundamental task of improving U.S.-Soviet relations.
He explained this development as a function of the way in which religious and ethnic
groups made Congress distrustful of Soviet intentions. According to Reagan:
it would be easier for him to fulfill some of the possible agreements between the
two countries if he were not beset by people in the U.S. Congress and by
organizations that hear of their relatives and friends and complain about the
restraints which they consider should not be imposed on them, such as . . . the
right to live in other places or the right to emigrate.729
While Reagan attempted to project a pragmatic attitude toward rectifying Soviet
human rights violations, he could not resist the temptation of explaining how well
democratic practices worked in the United States. Unlike their counterparts in the USSR,
728
Memorandum of Conversation, 20 November 1985, 10:15-11:25 AM, 2-4, Geneva: Memcons, Box 52,
Folder: 92137, 2/3, RRPPL. To see how Reagan planned to raise the issue of human rights at Geneva, see
“Talking Points on the Geneva Meeting,” N.D., 3. Geneva Memcons, 11/19-/2, 1985, Box, 92137, Folder:
1/3, RRPL; and “Road to Geneva and Beyond: Themes and Perceptions for Public Presentation,” FO 0069, Box 1, Folder: 32934, RRPL.
729
Memorandum of Conversation, 20 November 1985, 7.
378
American Jews did not feel the need to emigrate because their government allowed them
to practice their religion and learn Hebrew. “Perhaps some people would not think of
emigrating from the Soviet Union if they were allowed to practice their religion.”
Gorbachev found this line of argument vexing, noting that Reagan’s words suggested that
“there are no rights in socialist countries” whereas “they are in bloom in the
democracies.” When he criticized American human rights shortcomings, Reagan always
responded that discrimination in his country resulted from the individual prejudice rather
than governmental laws that made such behavior illegal.730
The Geneva summit also marked important progress toward accomplishing
Reagan’s goal of opening the USSR to the outside world. Building on earlier
discussions, U.S. and Soviet representatives agreed to consulate exchangers and signed a
new cultural exchange accord. While this latter agreement had much in common with
arrangements that predominated before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the new
version included a number of proposals that their counterparts in the Carter
administration had wanted to implement. For example, new language appeared that
endorsed “reciprocity and mutual benefit in exchanges” and the expansion of lecturer
exchanges. Echoing steps the Final Act urged signatories to take, the U.S. and Soviet
Union also agreed to expand undergraduate exchanges, youth exchanges, and contacts
between archival organizations.731
730
731
Ibid., 4-5.
Yale Richmond, U.S-Soviet Cultural Exchanges, 1958-1986: Who Wins? (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1987), 97-111 and 141-165. See also Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the
Iron Curtain (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1994), Chapters 17, 18, 19, and Section Six
of the Final Act. Available [Online]: http://www.hri.org/docs/Helsinki75.html [24 August 2006]; and
379
The Helsinki Accords, Private Citizen Diplomacy, and Democracy Promotion
Even though Reagan believed in the efficacy of “quiet human rights diplomacy,
numerous other officials embraced the idea that private citizens now shaped the ways in
which governments conducted foreign policy to a greater degree than they had in the
past.732 Picking up where the Carter administration left off, they accepted the important
roles the U.S. Helsinki Commission and private citizens played in monitoring Soviet and
Eastern European compliance with the Final Act. During the Madrid conference, Max
Kampelman and State Department officials held frequent consultations with Commission
members and their staff. They also listened to the concerns of hundreds of NGOs at
conferences hosted by the Commission. When the meeting concluded in November
1983, Shultz wrote a letter to Fascell explaining how the executive branch had
undertaken “parallel efforts” with “private organizations” to make sure that the Soviet
Union and Eastern European nations “will incur a political cost” for not fulfilling their
Final Act commitments.733
At least in part, these “parallel efforts” referred to the ways in which the executive
branch worked with private citizens and Commission members to prepare for the experts
“Joint Soviet-United States Statement on the Summit Meeting in Geneva,” 21 November 1985. Available
[Online]: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/112185a.htm [10 October 2006]; “Road to
Geneva and Beyond;” Talking Points on the Geneva Meeting,” 4; and Memo, Ben Elliot to Pat Buchanan,
“Summit,” 9 September 1985,” FO 0006-09, Box 1, Folder: 330000-338299, RRPL.
732
In particular, see American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1986 (Washington, D.C: Department of
State, 1987), 228-35.
733
The CSCE Digest, 29 October 1982, 11; 2 February 1983, 11-12; Ibid, 8 August 1983, 3; Ibid., 2
November 1985, 3-4; and Ibid., 10 June 1985, 5-10; and Letter, Shultz to Fascell, 11 January 1984, Box 48,
Folder: State Department Correspondence, 1984, RCSCE, USHCF, NA.
380
meetings in Ottawa and Budapest. 734 When describing the U.S. delegation’s experience
in Budapest, Chairman Walter Stoessel reported that “we drew heavily on the material
prepared by non-governmental organizations in connection with the forum.” In a private
letter to D’Amato, a State Department official took a similar position, noting that her
Department “attaches the highest importance to public and Congressional involvement in
the CSCE process.” “We also recognize the value of tapping the expertise of NGO
leaders and reflecting their views in the positions we take at CSCE meetings.” Consistent
with these positions, U.S. delegates at Ottawa created a liaison office that provided
briefings about the proceedings for the hundreds of NGOs that attended the meeting.735
The Helsinki Commission also continued to have appreciable success in pressing
“its views” on the executive branch. After Fascell publicized his letters about
unhappiness with U.S. conduct in Stockholm, Kampelman made a surprise trip to
Sweden. After meeting with U.S. delegates, he held a press conference that criticized the
Soviet government’s failure to abide by the Final Act’s human rights provisions and
harsh treatment of Sakharov. These statements produced tangible results. When
compared to their previous conduct, U.S. delegates became much more willing to cite
Soviet human rights violations in the CDE forum.736
734
The CSCE Digest, 2 November 1985, 3-6; U.S. General Accounting Office, Helsinki Commission: The
First Eight Years (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1 March 1985), 14.
735
U.S. Helsinki Commission Hearings, Restrictions on Artistic Freedom in the Soviet Union and the
Budapest Cultural Forum, 99th Congress, 1st session, 1985 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1986), 137; Letter, Ridgeway to D’Amato, N.D., Box 48, Folder: State Department
Correspondence, 1986, RCSCE, USHCF, NA; and U.S. Helsinki Commission, Annual Report of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe for the Period Covering January 1 through December
31, 1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 5-6.
381
In addition to consulting with NGOs and members of Congress, both Allen and
his successor, William Clark, held meetings with private citizens to reassure them about
Reagan’s commitment to the issue.737 Abrams also held numerous meetings with NGOs
interested in human rights issues. Even though he sometimes met with fierce critics, he
called these “sessions useful . . . because they have given us an opportunity to exchange
views with a whole range of organizations on a wide variety of human rights topics.”
Since political calculations were never absent, Abrams and other State Department
officials also held frequent meetings with Jewish groups and Congressional members
concerned about Soviet emigration restrictions. They used the information they gathered
from these meetings to update the emigration lists that U.S. representatives presented to
their Soviet counterparts.738
Because State Department officials wanted to have up-to-date information, they
refused to repudiate the activities of AI. This organization may “not always share or
support official U.S. views” about domestic conditions in countries such as Turkey and
736
U.S. General Accounting Office, Helsinki Commission, 13-5; and The CSCE Digest, 2 November 1984,
3-4; and U.S. Helsinki Commission, Stockholm Meeting of the Conference on Confidence and SecurityBuilding Measures in Europe (CDE), 99th Congress, 2nd session, 1986 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1986), 65, 76-82.
737
In late September 1981, Richard Allen told a private group that abolishing the Human Rights Bureau
would in no way indicate a downgrading of the issue’s importance. See The CSCE Digest, 10 October
1981, 3. William Clark met with members of U.S. Helsinki Watch Group and Americas Watch in June
1982. See Memo, Carnes Lord to Clark, “Your Meeting with Helsinki Watch Group Members,” 22 June
1982, Human Rights, Box 1, Folder: 085626-094142, RRPL.
738
See Jeri Laber, The Courage of Strangers: Coming of Age in the Human Rights Movement (New York:
Public Affairs, 2002); Jay Winik, On the Brink: The Dramatic, Behind the Scenes Saga of the Reagan Era
and the Men and Women Who Won the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 434-7; Letter,
Abrams to Spencer Oliver, 22 May 1984, RCSCE, USHCF, Box 48, Folder: State Department
Correspondence, 1984, NA. See also The CSCE Digest, 25 January 1985, 11; Stuart Altshuler, From
Exodus to Freedom: A History of the Soviet Jewish Movement (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield,
2005), 4-7 and 35-50; Myrna Shinbaum, “Mobilizing America: The National Council on Soviet Jewry,” in
Friedman and Chernin, ed., A Second Exodus, 173-180; and Naftalin, “The Activist Movement,” in Ibid.,
234-5.
382
El Salvador, a State Department official told a critic. Nevertheless, “we” still support
“Amnesty” because of its ability to raise international awareness about the issue of
human rights and keep updated lists of political prisoners. An official State Department
publication confirmed these views, noting that “we are particularly appreciative of . . .
and make reference to” the reports of “non-governmental organizations,” including those
of “Amnesty.” 739
Members of the State Department hesitated to repudiate the reports of AI because
many understood that private citizens played an important role in “globalizing” the issue
of Soviet human rights violations. In mid-1985, Abrams made this position crystal clear
during a speech he delivered at the Fifth International Sakharov Hearing. After
highlighting the Kremlin’s domestic misconduct, he reminded audience members that
many Soviet policymakers worried about the ways in which human rights criticisms
tarnished their regime’s legitimacy in the eyes of the entire Western world. Given this
reality, he urged them not to view the “human rights struggle” as a contest between
governments. Instead, the fight for human rights had become an all-encompassing battle
between Western and Communist societies. Because governments could not change
Soviet internal behavior on their own, Abrams argued that “one of our crucial goals and
methods must be to mobilize private opinion in the West.” As he explained, Soviet
leaders would never find the international legitimacy they craved as long as a sizable
739
Letter, W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. to Chalmers Wylie, 6 January 1984, Human Rights/Amnesty
International, Box 1, Folder: January-May 1984, NSA; and Country Reports for Human Rights Practices
for 1984 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Press, 1985), 3-4; and Implementation of the
Helsinki Final Act, Twelfth Semiannual Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1982), 5-6.
383
number of Western private citizens from diverse backgrounds questioned their
commitment to basic human freedoms.740
In addition to playing an important role in holding the Soviets accountable for
their human rights violations, private citizens became an integral part of the
administration’s campaign to promote democracy. During the planning stages of the
NED, officials drew on arguments outlined in the American Political Foundation’s
bipartisan study on “how American nongovernmental organizations can help strengthen
democracy abroad.” They also invited private citizens to attend State Department
conferences that addressed the issues of how to democratize communist countries and
increase the frequency of free elections across the globe. At the former conference,
Shultz told the audience that “in the final analysis, internal forces must be the major
factors for democratization of Communist states.” “Only the people of those countries
can muster sufficient pressures for reform.”741
This sort of rhetoric reveals that the NED had much in common with the Carter
administration’s proposed Human Rights Foundation (HRF). Both of these “quasi”
NGOs accepted the premise that governments needed the help of private citizens to
accomplish their goals. According to an official description of the NED, “the expansion
of private, voluntary initiatives to promote democracy internationally cannot be
accomplished through governmental action alone.” The Endowment therefore “seeks to
740
Allan Wynn et al., Fifth International Sakharov Hearings: Proceedings (London: Andre Deutsch,
1986), 148-50.
741
The CSCE Digest, 29 October 1982, 8; and American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1982
(Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1985), 367-71 and 378-82; and American Foreign Policy
Documents 1983 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1985), 365-8.
384
enlist the energies and talents of private citizens and groups in the United States to work
with those abroad who wish to build for themselves a democratic future.” Much like the
HRF proposals outlined in Chapter IV, defenders of the NED focused on how the
institution’s flexible, bipartisan structure would keep members insulated from partisan
squabbles or short-term U.S. foreign policy objectives. As envisioned, the Endowment
would tap the creative energies of American political parties, labor organizations,
businesses, and private groups to help “indigenous efforts to build free and independent
institutions” across the globe.742
The importance that the executive branch now placed on helping private citizens
accomplish the goal of building democratic governments is revealing. On one level, such
a position repudiated Kirkpatrick’s argument that totalitarian regimes could never reform
themselves. It also raised the following question: How could dissenters even begin to
build enduring democratic institutions when the Soviet authorities put them in jail for
expressing non-official opinions and moved to crush any attempts to form an independent
civil society? This question had special relevance because a wide array of CIA reports
indicated that dissenters had little chance of convincing Soviet leaders to abandon their
goals of eradicating non-official activities and curbing private citizens’ contacts with the
outside world for the foreseeable future.743
742
743
American Foreign Policy Documents 1984 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1986), 324-5.
See, “Andropov’s Approach to Key US-Soviet Relations,” 9 August 1983, 16-7; “Dissent and Religion
in the USSR,” 1 January 1984, 1-10; “Soviet Problems in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects,” December
1982, iii-v, 20-33; and “Dimensions of Civil Unrest in the Soviet Union,” 1 April 1983, 1 and16. All of
these documents can be located at the CIA website. See http://www.foia.cia.gov/ .
385
The inability of dissenters to build viable democratic institutions raises an issue
that few works on the Reagan administration’s foreign policy have emphasized. In
practice, the Helsinki Accords rather than NED became the administration’s best
available weapon for promoting democracy in the USSR. While conservative critics
continued to refer to the agreement as a pernicious sham, remaining in the Helsinki
process forced the Soviets to make a rhetorical commitment to respecting activities that
by definition helped contribute to diversity and the building of democratic institutions.
For example, the concluding document of Madrid called on participating states to ensure
“the right of workers to freely establish and join trade unions as laid down in relevant
international instruments [ILO].” The same document also defended the right of
religious organizations and institutions from different signatories to exchange
information and hold “meetings among themselves.” The agreement even called for the
convening of voluntary “round-table meetings” that signatories could use “to discuss
[the] issues of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”744
The Helsinki process also gave Reagan officials visible forums to challenge the
Soviet government’s refusal to recognize the legitimacy of pluralism. They went about
accomplishing this goal by challenging the Soviet practice of only dealing with private
groups whose activities they exercised control over or found acceptable. In the face of
vehement Soviet and Eastern European opposition, American delegates in Ottawa
744
Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, Fifteenth Semiannual Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1982), 2-4. For a copy of the concluding document, see
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/osce/text/MADRI83E.htm [10 October 2006]. See also Korey, The
Promises We Keep, 163-7; and “An Assessment of the Madrid CSCE Followup Meeting,” Current Policy,
no. 500 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1983).
386
advanced proposals that confirmed the rights of private citizens to meet with delegations
and have access to the closed plenary sessions. They also advocated procedures that
would have required each signatory to investigate and respond to governmental and nongovernmental inquires about human rights violations within their states. Not satisfied
with obtaining these far reaching goals, U.S. delegates even called on participating states
to “increase the opportunities” for representatives of NGOs to inspect correctional
facilities and meet with prisoners.745
These proposals went nowhere because of the obstinate opposition of Warsaw
Pact nations. Even when faced with this setback, American delegates defended the right
of private groups to hold gatherings during a Final Act forum that took place in Budapest
just like they had done in Madrid and Ottawa. The Hungarian government put this
commitment to the test when it reneged on earlier promises and forbade members of the
International Helsinki Federation (IHF) from holding an international cultural symposium
in the “public facilities” they had reserved. When Western delegations and the U.S.
State Department lodged formal protests, the authorities relented and allowed the IHF to
hold the meeting in the “private apartments” of “Hungarian intellectuals.” As one
participant noted, this gathering marked “the first time that private citizens from both
East and West had met openly in a Warsaw Pact country to discuss such topics as
“‘writers and their integrity’” and “‘the future of European culture.’”746
745
U.S. Helsinki Commission, The Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting and the Future of the Helsinki
Process, 56-62.
746
U.S. Helsinki Commission Hearings, Restrictions on Artistic Freedom in the Soviet Union and the
Budapest Cultural Forum, 98-109 and 158; The CSCE Digest, 2 November 1984, 3-4; and Korey, The
Promises We Keep, 184-88.
387
The administration’s efforts to make Soviet leaders recognize the legitimacy of
diverse opinions were by no means confined to the Helsinki Process. In June 1985,
Reagan allowed executive branch officials to attend the “citizen diplomacy” conference
about U.S.-Soviet relations held in Chautauqua, New York. During this meeting,
American private citizens saw U.S. and Soviet delegates engage in debates about issues
as diverse as human rights, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and regional conflicts.
While the Kremlin chose not to send a delegation of private citizens, Soviet
representatives had to field questions from their American counterparts and audience
members. As one author notes, the Chautauqua conference put Soviet delegates “in the
unfamiliar role of taking part in a free and open atmosphere of dialogue” and debate. By
participating in these discussions, they became better acquainted with the “values the
United States espouses—freedom of speech, press, and religion.”747
Perhaps as expected, the diverse steps that the Reagan administration took to
promote human rights in the Soviet Union from 1981 to 1985 failed to make a substantial
dent in the pervasive influence of orthodox Marxist-Leninist thinking. The accelerated
campaign to eradicate dissent that had begun in 1979 only intensified during the early
1980s. Even after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet government did not
move in the direction of creating democratic institutions and continued to throw a wide
variety of dissenters in prison. Despite these shortcomings, the Reagan administration
deserves credit for aligning itself with the transnational human rights activities based on
monitoring Soviet compliance with the Final Act and other internationally recognized
747
Ross Mackenzie, When Stars and Stripes Met Hammer and Sickle: The Chautauqua Conferences on
U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1985-1989 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2006), 18-43 and 186-9.
388
human rights agreements. This movement not only gathered strength during the 1980s,
but also helped protect the emergence of an autonomous civil society in the USSR. In
other words, Western governments and private citizens pressured Mikhail Gorbachev and
Soviet bureaucrats to respect the provisions of the Final Act and institutionalize laws that
limited the power of the state. Before examining this development, however, we need to
explore how Soviet leaders failed either to revive or enhance the international reputation
of Soviet-style socialism during the early to mid 1980s.
389
CHAPTER 9: THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT VERSUS DISSENTERS:
CONFLICTING VIEWS OF THE “GLOBALIZATION” OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
PEACE, AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, JANUARY 1981-SEPTEMBER
1986
In 2005, Mikhail Gorbachev engaged in a spirited discussion about contemporary
global problems with Daisaku Ikeda, a well-known Japanese peace activist. During the
course of their conversation, Gorbachev reminisced about why he decided to reform the
USSR after he became General Secretary in 1985. While he pointed to economic
difficulties, he also admitted that the behavior of private citizens and government
officials had factored into his calculations. “At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of
the 1980s,” he argued, “a spontaneous, sometimes conscious movement arose” against a
“system” that “fettered [individual] freedom and initiative.” Fed up with the
government’s official ideology, “the intelligentsia waged war” against the CPSU “in the
name of creative liberty and freedom of discussion.” Therefore, “to be faithful to
historical truth,” Gorbachev conceded, “the demand for change [in the Soviet Union]
ripened first in society and was, in that sense, from below.”748
These words deserve attention because they help show the limitations of
arguments that focus on the inherent weaknesses of Soviet dissent during the 1980s.749
748
See Moral Lessons of the Twentieth Century: Gorbachev and Ikeda on Buddhism and Communism,
trans. by Richard L. Gage (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 31.
749
Robert Horvath addresses this topic in his work The Legacy of Soviet Dissent. See Ibid., 1-8, 81-2, 2368. See also Robert Sharlet, “Soviet Dissent since Brezhnev,” Current History 85, no. 513 (1986): 321-4
and 340; Roy Medvedev, “Andropov and the Dissidents: The Internal Atmosphere under the New Soviet
Leadership,” Dissent 31, no. 1 (1984): 97-102; Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 8-9, 18-23; W.D. Connor, “Differentiation, Integration, and Political Dissent,” in
390
To illustrate this position, this chapter will move beyond the confines of human rights
activities and calls for a universal glasnost. It will argue that the steady rise of nonofficial groups and informal associations revealed the growing difficulties orthodox
Marxist-Leninist leaders faced in accomplishing their long-term goal of imposing
“official norms” on Soviet private citizens and members of the intelligentsia.750 Instead
of becoming more obedient, an increasing number of individuals decided to carve out
separate spheres of existence outside the confines of official ideology where they could
pursue their interests without state interference.751 From this angle, orthodox
policymakers proved unable to prevent private citizens and “liberal-minded” reformers
from forging “the first cells of a potential civil society” that by definition challenged the
Kremlin’s monopoly on decision-making, education, information, and political
participation.752
Dissent was also not as weak as it appeared because of the growing strength and
sophistication of the transnational network dedicated to holding the Soviets accountable
Rudolf Tokes, ed., Dissent in the USSR (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975), 155. See also
Marshall S. Shatz, Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981).
750
See Gail W. Lapidus, “State and Society: Toward the Emergence of Civil Society in the Union,” in
Seweryn Bialer, ed., Politics, Society, and Nationality Inside Gorbachev’s Russia (Boulder and London:
Westview Press, 1991), 128.
751
752
Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, 209.
See Hosking, The Awakening of the Soviet Union, 39; and Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, 209-14.
See also Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms, 1985-1990, 200. Nicolai N. Petro advances a similar
argument. See Petro, “Perestroika From Below: Voluntary Sociopolitical Associations in the RSFSR,” in
Alfred J. Rieber and Alvin Z. Rubinstin, ed., Perestroika at the Crossroads, 105. See also Jim Butterfield
and Judith B. Sedatis, “The Emergence of Social Movements in the Soviet Union,” in Jim Butterfield and
Judith B. Sedatis, ed., Perestroika From Below, 2-5. For a cogent analysis of the limitations dissenters
faced in autonomous civil society, see Geoffrey A. Hosking, “The Beginnings of Independent Political
Activity,” in Geoffrey A. Hosking et al., ed., The Road to Communism, 1-4; and U.S. Helsinki Watch
Committee, Nyeformaly, 1-5; and Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, 209-14.
391
for their human rights violations. Dissenters and émigrés continued to provide Western
private citizens and governments with information about conditions in the Soviet Union;
they also participated in activities that showed the hypocrisy of the Kremlin’s vocal
support for the Western European peace and American nuclear freeze movements.
Shaped by a broad international impulse against bureaucratic discretion and authority, a
wide array of Eastern European dissenters and Western private citizens, including some
peace activists, advanced arguments that linked international security to holding
governments accountable for how well they respected human rights and public oversight.
As the international prestige of the USSR plummeted, Western European leaders became
far more vocal in their criticisms of Soviet internal and international conduct.
In addition to exploring Soviet internal developments in detail, this chapter will
examine the diverse ways that dissenters and émigrés evaluated Reagan’s efforts to
promote human rights in the Soviet Union. It will also analyze the growing
disillusionment some of them felt for the viability of the Helsinki process. They had
every reason to feel this way given the enduring influence of orthodox Marxist-Leninist
thought. Instead of heeding global public opinion, many officials felt even more
compelled to protect their population from ideological subversion and repress dissident
activities. To defend the international prestige of Soviet-style socialism, they continued
to attack the legitimacy of capitalist countries and the validity of reports about Soviet
human rights violations. Not unaware of their regime’s worsening international
reputation, Moscow created “public” organizations designed to counter the influence of
392
transnational actors that could sometimes transmit reports about human rights violations
across borders in a matter of hours.753
The Questioning of Bureaucratic Authority Continues
The Soviet government’s accelerated campaign to eradicate dissent that began in
1979 only grew in intensity after Reagan entered office. Between 1979 and 1983,
authorities arrested around 1,000 dissenters while Jewish and German emigration levels
continued to plummet. By 1982, the original Helsinki Watch Groups and the Working
Commission on Psychiatry had either disbanded or ceased to function. One year later, an
AI report estimated that 1,479 prisoners of conscience existed in the Soviet Union. Of
course, the Politburo failed to root out all non-official activities. Periodic demonstrations
against “Russification” and poor working conditions took place in Georgia, Ukraine, the
Baltic republics, and Russia. A small number of private citizens continued to face certain
arrest for celebrating the International Human Rights Day (December 10) at Pushkin
Square. In 1984, 40,000 Jewish citizens gathered in Minsk “to commemorate the 40th
anniversary of the Minsk ghetto executions.” Against all odds, Baptists, Seventh-Day
Adventists, and Pentecostals continued to print samizdat literature using underground
presses.754
753
754
Applebaum, Gulag, 554-6.
Alexeyeva, On Soviet Dissent, 198, 212-4, 222-31, 243 and 360-76; U.S. Helsinki Commission, Basket
I—Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings
Eleven years After Helsinki, 100th Congress, 1st session, 1987 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1987), 127, 139-142, and 183-190; Peter Reddaway, “Dissent in the Soviet Union,”
Problems of Communism 32 (November-December 1983): 10-15; Roy Medvedev, “Andropov and
Dissidents: The Internal Atmosphere under the New Soviet Leadership,” Dissent 31, no. 1 (1984): 97-100;
Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, Tenth Semiannual Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1981), 7-9; Twelfth Semiannual Report, 17-9; Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act,
393
The scale of Soviet repression convinced many private citizens and some
members of the CPSU to take their non-official activities underground or move in the
direction of engaging in more practical political activities. After arrests decimated their
ranks, the Christian Committee and Solzhenitsyn Fund refused to announce the names of
replacements. In the summer of 1981, an anonymous movement called the Democratic
People’s Front emerged in Estonia that began circulating leaflets calling on the Kremlin
to “free all political prisoners” and adhere to the provisions of the Final Act “in order to
create a democratic society.” Unhappy with the unwillingness of human rights activists
to embrace specific political objectives, anonymous private citizens in Moscow
announced the existence of a new organization dedicated to making the Soviet Union a
“people’s democracy.”755
Other groups advocated a similar social-democratic agenda. Unhappy with the
bureaucratic distortions of Soviet-style socialism, several Soviet youths, one of whom
worked in an official foreign policy think tank, formed an anonymous group called the
“Young Socialists” in 1982. The KGB felt compelled to arrest these individuals because
they rejected any suggestion that “‘real socialism’” existed in the Soviet Union and
praised the democratic credentials of European communist parties. In December 1984,
Soviet authorities discovered and took steps to eradicate another underground group
called the “Mensheviks” who wanted to create a social-democratic party capable of
Fourteenth Semiannual Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 10-4;
Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, Sixteenth Semiannual Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State
Department, 1984), 7-15; Eighteenth Semiannual Report, 5-9. See also USSR News Brief (31 December
1984): 6-8; Ibid., (15 July 1985): 4; Ibid., (31 October 1984): 3; Ibid., (15 January 1985): 1-2; Ibid. (29
February 1984): 1-2; Ibid (15 February 1984): 1-2.
755
Alexeyeva, On Soviet Dissent, 380, 384; and Rein Taagepera, Softening Without Liberalization in the
Soviet Union: The Case of Juri Kukk (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), 186-7.
394
generating mass working-class support. Around the same time, “young” researchers at an
official Moscow engineering institute created an independent study group that discussed
the problems of “bureaucracy and corruption” within Soviet society.756
These groups were only the tip of the iceberg. Soviet authorities also repressed
“above ground” and underground manifestations of dissent as diverse as feminist clubs,
Hare Krishna sects, yoga clubs, unofficial artist seminars, Christian rock groups, and nonofficial karate lessons. They also saw signs of virulent Russian nationalism and repressed
genuine fascist gatherings that praised Nazi Germany.757 To the dismay of the Kremlin,
Soviet and Eastern European private citizens were not immune to the explosive growth of
grassroots anti-nuclear and peace activities that took place in the United States and
Western Europe during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In June 1982, a group of Moscow
intellectuals announced the formation of the Group to Establish Trust Between the USSR
and USA (Moscow Trust Group), a loosely affiliated peace organization with likeminded branches throughout the country.
While Trust Group members stressed their loyalty to Moscow, they had a
profound distrust of governmental bureaucratic discretion and authority. As part of a
larger effort to make Moscow consult domestic opinion on arms control issues, they
announced their own proposals designed to reduce the risk of nuclear war. They also
released documents explaining how Cold War tensions and the threat of nuclear war
756
“Soviet ‘young socialists’ on trial for doubting Kremlin’s socialist credentials,” The Christian Science
Monitor, 14 February 1983, 7. See also USSR News Brief (15 March 1984): 3-4. For an account of the
Menshevik arrests, see Ibid. (31 January 1985): 3
757
See also USSR News Brief (15 August 1984): 7; Ibid., (15 March 1984): 4-5
395
would not disappear until the Soviet Union and the United States became enmeshed in
“’four-sided dialogue’” that included equal contributions from politicians and private
citizens. To make this vision a reality, they urged the adoption of measures designed to
increase the level of mutual trust between the two countries, including pen-pal programs
and exchanges that included the children of politicians. Since members feared the
bureaucratic inertia of official Soviet peace groups, they held independent peace
demonstrations and petition drives that garnered hundreds of signatures.758 Around the
same time, two pacifist “hippie” groups known as “Good Will” and “Independent
Initiative” found inspiration in the messages of John Lennon and managed to hold
demonstrations with hundreds of participants. Fed up with “total state control” and “the
suffocating domination of moribund dogma,” members called for the abolition of the
death penalty, an end to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and “grass roots contacts
between peoples of the East and West.”759
These activities were by no means unprecedented developments in Soviet history.
In the aftermath of Nikita Khrushchev’s “secret speech” on Stalin’s crimes in 1956, many
758
Vladimir Tismaneanu, “Unofficial Peace Activism in the Soviet Union and East-Central Europe,” in
Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., In Search of Civil Society: Independent Peace Movements in the Soviet Bloc
(New York: Routledge, 1990), 11-13, Edward Kuznetsov, “The Independent Peace Movement in the
USSR,” in Ibid., 54-70. See also “Address to Peace Supporters” and “Appeal to Governments and Peoples
of the East and West,” Freedom at Issue 70 (January-February 1983): 40-1; “Moscow’s Independent Peace
Group,” Ibid., 68 (September-October 1982): 28-9. U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, From Below:
Independent Peace and Environmental Movements in the USSR and Eastern Europe (New York: The
Helsinki Watch Committee, 1987), 107-135; USSR News Brief (31 May 1984): 8; and Ibid. (15 June
1984): 3
759
See also U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, From Below, 145-8, 155-63. See also USSR News Brief (31
May 1984): 7; Ibid. (29 February 1984): 2; U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, Violations of the Helsinki
Accords: August 1983-September 1984 (New York: U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, 1984), 118-22; U.S.
Helsinki Watch Committee, Ten Years Later: Violations of the Helsinki Accords (New York: U.S. Helsinki
Watch Committee, 1986), 207-15.
396
educated Soviet private citizens began meeting in small groups to discuss Soviet internal
behavior and foreign policy.760 Yet, evidence suggests that non-official associations and
groups became even more prevalent during the 1970s and early-to-mid 1980s. According
to one publication, “rock groups, sports clubs, amateur choirs and theaters, poetry circles
and seminars on religion and philosophy . . . that kept their political profiles low or nonexistent” proliferated before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power.761 Of course, the growth
in non-official activities in no way represented an immediate threat to the Soviet
leadership’s tight grip on power. The chances of a successful nationalist uprising taking
place remained low and the vast majority of Soviet workers remained passive. As one
dissenter put it, far too many Soviet citizens lacked a “sense of human rights” and viewed
the “struggle for freedom of speech and the free exchange of information as an
unacceptable attack on the public order.” “Our national blindness in this respect,” he
wrote, “stems from the old Russian misconception that state and society are identical.”762
The importance that some scholars have placed on the “authoritarian character of
Russian and Soviet . . . political culture” has led them to emphasize the weakness of
Soviet dissent during the early to mid 1980s.763 Such arguments have significant merit,
760
Hosking, The Awakening of the Soviet Union, 37-41. See also Alexeyeva, The Thaw Generation, 90115.
761
U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, Nyeformaly: Civil Society in the USSR (New York: U.S. Helsinki
Watch Committee, 1990), 5.
762
763
CHRUR 46 (April-June 1982): 6.
For example, see Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, 8-9. He advances this argument even though he fully
endorses the position that “Soviet society was in 1985 at least better prepared for democratizing change
than it had been a generation earlier, just after Stalin’s death.” See Ibid., 18-23. From my perspective,
Brown could have gone further in showing how the activities of private citizens contributed to Gorbachev’s
397
but they tend to obscure the larger picture. The growth in official activities that took
place in the 1970s and 1980s reveals the difficulties orthodox Marxist-Leninist leaders
faced in accomplishing their long-term goal of imposing “official norms” on Soviet
private citizens and members of the intelligentsia. In other words, a better educated,
increasingly urbanized population with greater knowledge of the outside world had
become less tolerant of their leaders’ inability to solve long-standing problems such as
food shortages, economic stagnation, and “the despotism and corruption of local
officials.”764 Suffocated by the ritual of public obedience, an increasing number of
individuals decided to carve out separate spheres of existence outside the confines of
orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology where they could live in “truth.”765
The writings of the Czech dissenter Vaclav Havel help illustrate the importance of
this development. In his article “The Power of Powerlessness,” he described how
activities as innocuous as playing in rock bands behind closed doors or discussing
unorthodox ideas at cocktail parties represented a powerful form of dissent that struck at
the heart of the Marxist-Leninist project.766 Because “post-totalitarian” regimes like the
Soviet Union strove for conformity at every level of society, he posed the question:
What else are those initial attempts at social organization than the efforts of a
certain part of society to live—as a society—within the truth, to rid itself of the
self-sustaining aspects of totalitarianism and, thus, to extricate itself radically
from its involvement in the post-totalitarian system. What is it but a non-violent
mindset that the Soviet system needed fundamental reforms. See also Peter Osnos, “Soviet Dissidents and
the American Press,” Columbia Journalism Review (November/December 1977): 32-7.
764
CHRUR 48 (October 82-April 83): 6.
765
Vaclav Havel, “The Power of Powerlessness,” in John Keane, ed., The Power of the Powerless
(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe: 1985): 79.
766
Ibid., 80.
398
attempt by people to negate the system within themselves and to establish their
lives on a new basis, that of their own property identity.767
Once again, the internal cohesion of the USSR remained secure as long as
orthodox Soviet policymakers dominated the levers of power. Dissenters themselves also
were in no position to create enduring democratic institutions during the early to mid
1980s. Nevertheless, the signs of an independent civil society that became more visible
during the early 1980s meant that Soviet leaders actually sat on a large reservoir of
potential dissent.768 According to Havel, each decision to find a way of living in “truth”
helped discredit governmental structures designed to stifle an individual’s humanity.
Over time, private citizens could erode the legitimacy of Soviet institutions to the point
that they would have to be replaced by new ones that had evolved from “below” and were
put together in a fundamentally different way.769
The emphasis Havel placed on grassroots institution building proved unrealistic in
the case of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, his words appear prophetic because Politburo
member Mikhail Gorbachev worried about the potential ill-effects of a society becoming
more disillusioned with official ideology and governmental performance. While by no
means a Western-style democrat, he and other “liberal-minded” reformers within the
Soviet Communist leadership feared that the broad impulse against bureaucratic authority
767
Ibid., 79.
768
After he gained his political freedom in 1986, Yuri Orlov made the appropriate observation that “I was
personally acquainted with in one way or another with about 10,000 intellectuals, mostly scientific
colleagues, and I can say that the [open] dissidents were only the tip of the iceberg that now, in the
Gorbachev era, is revealing itself.” See Orlov, Before and After Glasnost (New York: The Jacob Blaustein
Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, 1989), 17.
769
Havel, “The Power of Powerlessness,” 84-5. See also Moral Lessons of the Twentieth Century, 31.
399
that pervaded Soviet society during the early 1980s would one day make their nation
ungovernable. “At some administrative levels,” he later wrote, “there emerged disrespect
for the law and encouragement of eyewash and bribery, servility and glorification.
Working people were justly indignant at the behavior of people who, enjoying trust and
responsibility, abused power, suppressed criticism . . . [and carried out] criminal acts.”
“In general,” Gorbachev continued, the “practical steps which were taken by the Party
and State bodies lagged behind the requirements of the time and of life itself. On the
whole, society was becoming increasingly unmanageable.”770
Along with facing a society increasingly disillusioned with everyday life and
official ideology, the Kremlin had other problems. In the face of systematic repression,
the transnational human rights network dedicated to monitoring Soviet compliance with
the Final Act and international human rights standards continued to operate. As a
member of the U.S. Helsinki Watch Group explained in 1985, Western governments and
private citizens have continued to work “in concert” to publicize Soviet human rights
“violations” and “extend moral support to oppressed groups.”771 This observation has
merit because a number of dissenters took steps to keep transnational human rights
activities alive. Members of the Lithuanian Catholic Committee managed to operate
“above ground” until the summer of 1984 and sent reports abroad describing the
770
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: Harper &
Row, 1987), 23. The former Soviet General Dimitri Volkogonov agreed with Gorbachev’s observations.
See Volkogonov, Autopsy for an Empire, 340. According to future Soviet foreign minister Eduard
Shevardnadze, he told Gorbachev that” Everything is rotten. It has to be changed.” See Shevardnadze, The
Future Belongs to Freedom, trans. Catherine Fitzpatrick (New York: The Press, 1991): 37. For other
accounts of the general malaise that gripped Soviet society in the early 1980s, see Laquer, The Long Road
to Freedom: Russia and Glasnost (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1989), 195-6.
771
U.S. Helsinki Commission Hearings, Human Rights and the CSCE Process, 32.
400
destruction of churches and prevalence of sanctioned discrimination against religious
observers. Even when forced “underground,” members kept contributing to and
distributing The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania.772
In 1982, a new group emerged in Ukraine dedicated to legalizing the Uniate
Church known as the Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church.
Following the example of its Lithuanian counterpart, this group began publishing and
distributing the publication The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine in 1984.
After the Ukrainian Watch Group disbanded, a new organization known as the Ukrainian
Helsinki Initiative Group emerged and began to send documents to the representatives of
foreign governments outlining Soviet human rights violations.773 In a similar vein,
members of the Invalid Group and the non-official union, SMOT, continued to produce
documents that reached Western audiences. The Chronicle of Current Events may have
ceased appearing in 1983, but publications documenting Soviet domestic abuses such as
the USSR News Brief, Bulletin V, and The Herald of the Human Rights Movement found
their way abroad. 774
As they had in the past, Soviet émigrés brought samizdat literature to the attention
of Western audiences. For example, an organization called the External Representation
772
For example, see CCCL 51 (19 March 1982): 17; and U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, Violations of the
Helsinki Accords, 169-73. See also USSR News Brief (15 August 1984): 4
773
Jaroslaw Bilocerkowycz, Soviet Ukrainian Dissent: A Study of Political Association (Boulder and
London: Westview Press, 1988), 93-5, 98-9, 86-9.
774
U.S. Helsinki Commission, Basket I—Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe: Findings Eleven years After Helsinki, 135-8; Alexeyeva, On Soviet Dissent,
373-78. See also USSR News Brief (31 March 1984): 6; and Reddaway, “Dissent in the Soviet Union,” 123.
401
of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group under the direction of Petr Grigorenko forwarded the
accounts of dissenters to Western publications and governments. The journal Freedom at
Issue published some of these documents, including a letter that a group of prisoners in
“Perm camp No. 36” addressed to Reagan. After explaining the reprisals taken against
prisoners whose writings reached the West, the authors wrote that “the existence of
political prisoners in our enlightened age is as much an anachronism as the slave trade.”
Well-aware of developments in the United States because of international broadcasts,
they asked Reagan to ensure that his administration’s “‘Project Truth’” included “facts
about Soviet political prisoners.” They also urged him to endorse the creation of a
Western humanitarian commission that would issue a report after visiting “camps in
Ulster, South Africa, and the Soviet Union.” A former member of the Moscow Watch
Group moved to Washington, D.C. and helped found the Center for Democracy, a NGO
that worked to “maintain communication” with dissenters and democratize the Soviet
Union.775
Soviet émigrés also continued to attend Final Act follow-up conferences and
experts meetings. In Madrid, U.S. delegates went out of their way to secure Avital
Shcharansky the credentials necessary to hold press conferences. They also continued to
deliver testimony before Congressional committees and the U.S. Helsinki Commission
outlining the Soviet government’s behavior and the plight of dissenters as diverse as Jews
and Crimean Tatars. To cite one example, Grigorenko told U.S. Helsinki Commissioners
775
“Letters from the USSR to the President of the United States Ronald Reagan,” Freedom at Issue 72
(May-June 1983): 32-3; and U.S. Helsinki Commission Hearings, Human Rights and the CSCE Process,
46-7.
402
that “the so-called Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of today is no more than a
bureaucratic hierarchy of overseers over a people wholly deprived of rights.” The
dissolution of the Ukrainian Watch Group, he commented, “in no way amounted to a
“Soviet victory.” Instead, this group succeeded in becoming “a factor in the national
liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people” and an important part of “international
life.”776
The U.S. Helsinki Commission, Congressional committees, and the executive
branch continued to publish and disseminate a significant amount of documents related to
dissent and transnational human rights activity. After holding hearings on the status of
human rights protection in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe near the end of 1983, the
House Committee on Foreign Relations published a report that showed official antiSemitic posters commonplace in Moscow, one of which showed “Zionists and Jews”
constructing “Nazi death camps” in Lebanon.777 The U.S. Helsinki Commission also
published the documents “of the Helsinki monitoring groups in the U.S.S.R. and
Lithuania.” Committed to publicizing Soviet human rights violations, commission
staffers utilized samizdat literature to prepare short commentaries that hundreds of
American radio stations broadcast such as “National Rights Issues in the USSR,”
776
CSCE Digest, 17 May 1983, 3; and U.S. Helsinki Commission, Fifth Anniversary of the Formation of
the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, 97th Congress, 1st session, 1981(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1982), 9 and 31-2.
777
The copies of the anti-Semitic posters can be found in U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, The
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 98th Cong., 1st
session, 1983 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Press, 1983), 100-4.
403
“Religion in the USSR,” and “Social and Economic Rights in the USSR.” They also
provided information to “European youth groups interested” in the Helsinki process.778
In December 1983, the State Department published a report that explored the
history of the Soviet regime’s efforts to eradicate manifestations of dissent from the
October Revolution right up to the present day. Despite the dissolution of “the Moscow
Helsinki watch group,” the report indicated, “the human rights movement survives and
continues to attract new adherents.” No matter what Soviet officials might say, “known
activists are only the visible peak of a much larger iceberg of silent sympathizers from
which new activists step forward even in the most difficult periods.”779 These
publications complemented the detailed reports about the appalling extent of repression
in the Soviet Union that NGOs such as AI and the U.S. Helsinki Watch Group created.780
The steady outpouring of information coincided with other developments that
showed the growing sophistication and strength of the transnational human rights
network dedicated to monitoring Soviet and Eastern European compliance with the Final
Act and international human rights standards. Following the advice of Orlov and
Sakharov, Helsinki Committees from countries such as the United States and Norway
created the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) in 1982. Designed
778
CSCE Digest, 11 July 1983, 11; and Ibid., 12 October 1982, 13.
779
U.S. State Department, “Human Rights in the U.S.S.R,” Foreign Affairs Note (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of State, 1983), 1.
780
For example, see U.S. Helsinki Watch Group, The Independent Peace Movement in the Soviet Union:
Information booklet on the Moscow Group to Establish Trust between the USSR and the USA and its
Affiliates (New York: U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, 1984); 39 Who Believed : Helsinki monitors in the
USSR (New York: U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, 1980); Fitzpatrick, The Moscow Helsinki Monitors; A
Decade of Dedication : Charter 77, 1977 to 1987 (New York: U.S. Helsinki Watch, 1987). See also
Amnesty International Report, 1983 (London: Amnesty International, 1983).
404
to coordinate and strengthen the activities of private groups with similar agendas, as well
as speak for imprisoned political prisoners, members of this “umbrella” organization
forged working relationships with Western governments. They also wrote numerous
reports about conditions in nations as diverse as Turkey, Romania, and the Soviet Union.
Much like the Moscow Trust Group, IHF reports argued that the “Helsinki Process”
meant that private citizens had a pivotal role to play in breaking down the governmental
barriers that had kept Europe divided since the end of World War II. Committed to this
ideal, the IHF played a pivotal role in bringing about the meeting of Western and Eastern
private citizens that took place in Budapest near the end of 1985 at the Final Act experts
meeting on cultural affairs.781
Émigrés from the Baltic republics and their Western supporters also took other
important steps to “globalize” the issue of Soviet human rights violations. In the summer
of 1985, the Baltic World Conference held an international tribunal against the USSR in
Copenhagen, Denmark. The organizers of this meeting wanted to raise global awareness
about “the illegal Soviet occupation” of the Baltic republics and “document the atrocities
and genocide committed against the Baltic people.” To accomplish this task, witnesses
gave testimony and submitted reports on topics as diverse as Soviet atrocities committed
during World War II, the “militarization of . . . Baltic youths,” and Soviet “colonization”
of the Baltic republics. After this body issued a “guilty” verdict, some participants flew
to Stockholm and embarked on a “Baltic Peace Cruise” to Helsinki so they could hold
781
For a good account of how the IHF came into existence see, Laber, The Courage of Strangers, 174-5,
178-9, and 199. The quotes can be found in International Citizens Helsinki Watch Conference,
International Citizens Helsinki Watch Conference Bellagio Study and Conference Center, Lake Como,
Italy, September 6-10, 1982 (Vienna: International Helsinki Federation, 1982), 6-7 and 45-49.
405
demonstrations at the same time that signatories gathered to commemorate the tenth
anniversary of the Final Act.782
Besides taking its lumps in the United Nations, the Soviet government also
encountered difficulties in other international bodies. Several delegations at the 1983
Socialist International (SI) meeting criticized Moscow’s decision to arrest and prosecute
the “young socialists” for their political beliefs. Even more troubling, Soviet delegates
had to swallow this organization’s printing of Italian Communist Party documents that
advocated the “democratization” of the Soviet system.783 In February 1983, the Kremlin
withdrew from the World Psychiatric Association instead of defending Soviet practices
against resolutions calling for the suspension or expulsion of “the Communist Country
for the abuse of psychiatry to suppress dissidents.” An official publication explained this
course of action as necessity because “it is perfectly clear that the WPA leadership has
allowed itself to become involved in outright political activity and has supported slander
against the Soviet Union.”784
Like the Danes, Western European governments showed greater willingness to
focus international attention on the issue of Soviet human rights violations During the
Final Act follow-up meeting in Madrid and experts meeting in locations such as Ottawa,
Western European delegations continued to document Soviet human rights with much
782
Baltic Tribunal Against the Soviet Union, July 25 & 26, 1985 Copenhagen (Rockville, Maryland: World
Federation of Free Latvians, 1985), 1, 7-8, 31-8, 45-7, 60-64, and 190-4; and “Baltic tribunal strains
relations with Moscow/Soviet attack Copenhagen Convention on human rights in Baltic Republics,” The
Guardian (London), 23 July 1985.
783
784
CSCE Digest, 17 May 1983, 5.
“Soviet Union Quits World Psychiatric Association,” 11 February 1983, The Associated Press; and The
CDSP 35, no. 13 (27 April 1983): 1-3.
406
more intensity than they had in Belgrade. In 1983, the European Parliament passed a
resolution that referred to the Soviet Union’s continued occupation of the Baltic
Republics as inconsistent with Article VIII (self-determination) of the Final Act. After
making reference to the Nazi/Soviet pact of 1939 and an appeal that Baltic dissenters had
sent to the United Nations in 1979, the document called on Helsinki signatories to discuss
the “plight” of Baltic peoples. It also urged private citizens to “submit the issue of the
Baltic States to the Decolonization Subcommittee of the U.N.”785
Consistent with these positions, the Norwegian foreign minister publicly
denounced the Soviet government’s lack of compliance with the human rights provisions
of the Final Act in 1983. Not to be outdone, the Norwegian parliament later conducted
international hearings on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and forwarded the results of
the meeting to the U.N. Secretary General. It also asked the Soviet Union to let Andrei
Sakharov and his wife Elena Bonner live in Norway.786 One year later, over two-hundred
legislators from six Western countries such as the United States and Austria gathered for
the first formal meeting of the International Parliamentary Group for Human Rights in
the Soviet Union. The participants discussed the Kremlin’s treatment of Sakharov and
“the plight of Soviet Germans and Jews.” They also issued a statement stressing the
“need for a free flow of information in the Soviet Union.”787
785
See U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, The Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 47.
786
“Norwegian Leaders’ ‘Unseemly Accusations of Soviet Human Rights Violations,” BBC, 30 March
1983.
787
“New Human Rights Group Condemns Soviet Union,” The Associated Press, 27 May 1984. See also
“Statement by Hon. Rita E. Hauser: Chair, Advisory Board--The International Parliamentary Group for
407
Near the end of 1983, the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl wrote a private letter
to Reagan thanking him for Walter Stoessel’s recent discussions with German officials
concerning Soviet violations of the Final Act. Instead of focusing on the plight of Soviet
Germans as previous chancellors had, he “strongly appealed to Andropov to release
Sakharov and allow him to emigrate to the West.” His “Foreign Minister [Hans-Dietrich]
Genscher raised the cases of Shcharansky, Orlov, Ida Nudel and Rudenko.” “I am
convinced,” Kohl wrote, “that the human rights situation [in the Soviet Union] can be
improved . . . through dogged, silent diplomacy combined with public pressure.”788
When attending a banquet during his visit to Moscow in 1984, French President François
Mitterrand defended the legitimacy of transnational human rights activities. He also told
his hosts in plain view that Sakharov’s fate “cast doubt” on the Soviet Union’s
commitment to the Final Act. One year later, both the Italian Prime Minister and the
Pope held private meetings with Elena Bonner when she received permission to travel
abroad.789
The growing willingness of Western European officials to voice their criticisms of
Soviet domestic conduct and the creation of coordinating groups such as the IHF only
reveal one part of a larger story. The Moscow Trust Group and other peace activists
Human Rights in the Soviet Union,” Federal Government Organizations (FG) 101, Box 1: Folder: 348858,
RRPL. U.S. Helsinki Commission Staffers attended a preparatory conference on the International
Parliamentary Union on Human Rights in the Soviet Union from 26-27 May 1984. See CSCE Digest, 15
June 1984, 14.
788
Letter, Helmut Kohl to Ronald Reagan,” N.D., European and Soviet Affairs Directorate: NSC Records,
Box 3, Folder: USSR-Human Rights—Stoessel Mission (3/5), RRPL.
789
“French President Says Sakharov Case an Issue Because of Helsinki Accords,” The Associated Press, 21
June 1984; and “Bonner, Craxi Meet,” Washington Post, 6 December 1985, A34. Unlike her meeting with
the Italian prime minister, Bonner refused to comment on her meeting with the Pope. See “Bonner has
Secret Meeting with the Pope,” AAPINTNEWS (Associated Press International News), 8 December 1985.
408
showed the hypocrisy of the Soviet government’s support for Western peace movements.
They did so by capturing the attention of Western journalists and sending documents to
foreign audiences that explained the harsh repression they faced for carrying out nonofficial peace activities.790 For example, the U.S. Helsinki Watch Group published an
interview with Sergei Batovrin, a Trust Group member who Moscow put in a psychiatric
hospital and later expelled. When asked why so few peace activists existed in the Soviet
Union, he replied:
If Oleg Kharkhardin (vice-president of Soviet Peace Committee) were in
Lefortovo Prison and Yury Zhukov (chairman of same) were in a psychiatric
hospital, and if the apartments of activists in the Soviet Peace Committee were
surrounded twenty-four hours a day by security vehicles, and if they were
subjected to exhausting interrogations, endless threats, detentions, and searches,
then it would be hard to imagine how many members and supporters the Soviet
Peace Committee would have.791
Soviet peace activists also became a thorn in the side of Soviet officials because they
took steps to link the issues of peace, nuclear disarmament, and respect for basic human
rights. Near the beginning of 1984, a group called “Estonian Peace Supporters” sent a
letter to the Final Act meeting in Stockholm calling for a nuclear free zone in Northern
Europe that included Scandinavian countries and the Baltic republics. Instead of limiting
their appeals to nuclear weapons reductions, however, the letter explained how
“adherence to human rights [was] a prerequisite for trust and security among nations.”792
790
For an excellent complication of the documents that the Trust Group sent to Western audiences and the
reports of Western journalists, see U.S. Helsinki Watch Group, The Independent Peace Movement in the
Soviet Union (New York: U.S. Helsinki Watch Group, 1984). See also USSR News Brief (31 January
1984): 7-8.
791
U.S. Helsinki Watch Group, The Independent Peace Movement in the Soviet Union (New York: U.S.
Helsinki Watch Group, 1984), N.P.
409
Even though many Western peace activists found criticisms of the Soviet Union
anathema, a number of American private citizens endorsed the specific link between the
respect for human rights and reducing the risk of nuclear war. On 5 June 1984, voters
approved a proposition that required the Los Angeles county board to transmit a message
to American and Soviet leaders indicating that the “risk of nuclear war can be reduced” if
“all people have the ability to express their opinions freely” and all signatories follow the
provisions of the Final Act. Four months later, the Massachusetts House of
Representatives adopted a resolution urging “the Soviet Union to abide by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights . . . and the Helsinki Agreements as a means of reducing
the threat of nuclear war.”793
The close link between the respect for human rights and international security
gained ground in Western peace circles. Near the end of 1986, a broad collation of
Eastern and Western activists sent a document to the Final Act follow-up meeting in
Vienna called “Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords.” Employing forceful language,
this document advocated a “détente from below” that rejected “all kinds of double
standards for East and West in the application of basic [human] rights.” “In our view,
working for civil liberties and social rights is not only a moral obligation for everyone
cherishing human dignity and democratic ideals, but also a political necessity if we want
to create the conditions for a stable, lasting and democratic peace.” In the end, “official
792
Rein Taagepera, “Citizens’ Peace Movement in the Soviet Baltic Republics,” Journal of Peace Research
23 (June 1986): 190.
793
Vladimir Bukovsky, “Peace as a Political Weapon,” in Sidney Hook et al., ed., Soviet Hypocrisy and
Western Gullibility (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1987), 31-2. See also CSCE
Digest, 15 June 1984, 4-5. This publication linked the passage of the L.A. proposition to Soviet
persecution of the Moscow Trust Group.
410
pledges of peaceful intentions” meant little unless members of society trusted one another
and governments subjected themselves to the oversight of private citizens.794
These arguments are of the utmost importance because they echoed long-standing
dissident arguments about the close connections between glasnost, détente, and peace. In
1981, Sakharov managed to send a message abroad that reiterated this position. “The
most important conditions for international trust and security,” he told Western
audiences, “are the openness of society . . . [and] the observation [sic] of civil and
political rights.” The Soviet government failed this litmus test because “the key features
of the system formed under Stalin have basically survived,” which included “the
monopoly of the Party and the state in economics and ideology.”795 An anonymous
political prisoner essentially endorsed the same view: “As long as respect for the
individual and his rights are trampled upon [in the Soviet Union], the world is in danger
of being blown up and dialogue founded on mutual trust is not possible.” Given this
reality, “each country and each person must realize today that détente is inseparable from
the question of human rights.”796
The growing strength and sophistication of the transnational network dedicated to
monitoring Soviet and Eastern European compliance with the Final Act and international
human rights standards raises question of how dissenters and the growing Soviet émigré
community viewed the Reagan administration’s behavior during from 1981 to mid 1986.
794
U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, From Below, 240-5.
795
Sakharov, Memoirs, 662
796
CCE 61 (1981): 201.
411
Plenty of evidence suggests that Reagan’s harsh denunciations of the Soviet Union and
vocal defense of freedom inspired dissenters. The mother of “prisoner of conscience”
Mart Niklus wrote a private letter to the President that applauded his “staunch” defense
“of human rights.” A group of female political prisoners managed to smuggle out a letter
that described their hunger strikes and congratulated the President for his reelection.
After being denied emigration permission, a group of Soviet Jews issued a statement that
expressed its “’deep gratitude to Reagan for not letting down our hopes for exit from the
Soviet Union.’”797 Behind bars, Anatoly Shcharansky and other prisoners applauded
Reagan for speaking the “truth” about the Soviet Union in his “evil empire” speech.
They also called their bible study sessions “‘Reaganite readings’” after the President had
declared 1983 “‘the Year of the Bible.’”798
These positive assessments were by no means unanimous. In a public letter
explaining his refusal to attend a White House luncheon for dissenters, Alexander
Solzhenitsyn excoriated the administration’s public hesitations about meeting with “‘an
extreme Russian nationalist.’” Elena Bonner thought Reagan could have done more to
secure the release of her husband and criticized the executive branch’s preference for
“quiet” human rights diplomacy. Many émigrés and dissenters continued to view the
Soviet government’s harsh repression of dissent as a function of Western weakness and
797
Letter, Elfriede Niklus to Ronald Reagan, 17 December 1981, Human Rights, Box 1, Folder: 052700063999, RRPL; and Kiron Skinner et al., Reagan, 287-8; and “Soviet Jews Urge Washington to discuss
human rights in arms talks,” United Press International, 7 December 1984.
798
Natan Sharansky, trans. Stefani Hoffman, Fear No Evil (New York: Random House, 1988), 366. See
also Natan Sharasnky, “The Prisoner’s Conscience.” Available [Online]:
http://jewishworldreview.com/0604/sharansky_reagan.php3 [10 August 2007]; and Schweizer, Reagan’s
War, 190-1.
412
vacillation.799 After receiving permission to emigrate, Yury Yarim-Agaev criticized
Western politicians for allowing the dissolution of the Moscow Watch Group without any
threats of retaliation. “It can definitely be stated that the powerful West, with a
population of many millions, has capitulated once again.” Before signing any new
cooperative agreements with the Soviet Union,” he recommended, “Western countries
should present the ultimatum that these people first be released.”800
Vladimir Bukovsky voiced similar concerns near the end of 1985. He believed
that “the combination of Soviet psychological warfare and Western willingness to be
deceived has paralyzed the will of even the most resolute and wise leaders.” He accused
the Reagan administration of “reluctantly sliding into détente” and could not account for
why “meaningless arms control negotiations are still on top of the American agenda,
while issues of human rights are on the bottom.” “In the joint statement issued after the
recent summit meeting in Geneva,” he observed, “human rights problems are barely
mentioned and described only as “‘humanitarian cases.’” Echoing commonplace
criticisms of Carter, he asserted that Reagan failed to grasp that “human rights in the
Soviet Union is the central political issue, not a humanitarian one.”801
Sensitive to Western appeasement of Soviet belligerence and repression,
Bukovsky also castigated Reagan for remaining an active participant in the Helsinki
process. “The West seems to have accepted another Soviet idea,” he lamented, “and
799
“Solzhenitsyn to Reagan: Spasibo, Nyet,” Washington Post, 16 May 1982, C2.
800
“Moscow’s Helsinki Watch Group,” Freedom at Issue 69 (November-December 1982): 21-2.
801
Bukovsky, To Chose Freedom, 187-8.
413
agreed to discuss ‘trust-building measures’ with the Soviet Union separately from the
issue of human rights.” “The Stockholm conference is probably the most vivid example
of how little Western politicians understand about the nature of the problem they
confront.” According to Shcharansky, the results of the Madrid follow-up meeting failed
to meet the expectations of many political prisoners. “We read it [the concluding
document] carefully” and noticed “how all sides. . . . made promises” to respect basic
human rights. “The politicals did not conceal their disappointment, and one of them
began to circulate a new curse: ‘Madrid, you mother . . cker.’”802
This harsh language resonated with a wide variety of Soviet émigrés. After a
several Helsinki monitors died in Soviet prisons, a number of them wrote a letter to the
New York Times in 1985 calling on the United States to abrogate the Final Act on the
grounds that the agreement “provides a degree of complicity and acceptance by the West
of Soviet” human rights violations and international violence.803 During testimony before
the U.S. Helsinki Commission, Yarim-Agaev took specific shots at the Reagan
administration’s conscious decision not to link the signing of cooperative agreements to
tangible improvement in Soviet internal behavior:
Ironically, the Helsinki accords designed to establish linkage between security,
cultural cooperation and human rights, is now serving to destroy such linkage.
There is a total disjunction in the Geneva arms control talks between arms control
and human rights. A scientific exchange, a vital concern of the Soviet leadership,
was, in effect, detached from concern for human rights when Dr. Frank Press, the
802
Ibid., 179-80; and Sharansky, Fear No Evil, 364. Alexander Ginsburg voiced a similar message. On 22
November 1982, he argued that “the West should cancel the gas-pipeline deal. Then, keep up the pressure,
relentlessly. Don’t give the Soviet leadership another inch. The West has never been as conciliatory
toward the Soviet Union as it is now.” See “As Dissidents See It,” Newsweek, 22 November 1982, 47
803
U.S. Helsinki Commission Hearings, Human Rights and the CSCE Process, 74.
414
president of the National Academy of Sciences signed a new agreement with the
Soviets precisely on the fifth anniversary of Sakharov’s banishment to Gorky.804
When pressed to offer an opinion on the Reagan administration’s efforts to promote
human rights in the Soviet Union, he stressed the lack of concrete results. Since “[f]ive
Helsinki monitors died recently in the camps,” he could not say “anything positive” about
the executive branch. Because of the tools at their disposal, every American politician
has “a complicity” in the death of these individuals.805
Although sympathetic to arguments calling on Western nations to move in the
direction of firm linkage, some émigrés found the idea of giving up on the Helsinki
process short-sighted. Ludmilla Alexeyeva, the foreign representative of the now defunct
Moscow Watch Group, called “opposition to the Helsinki Final Act . . . a weak argument
mainly because this idea arose among Soviet emigrants and not within the country.” “To
this day . . . not one voice from within the Soviet Union has supported this idea.”806 She
may have overstated her case, but there can be little doubt that many émigrés and even
well-known dissenters such as Sakharov felt a growing frustration with Moscow’s
determination to punish non-official activities.807 This frustration was not out of place
804
Ibid., 48.
805
Ibid., 57.
806
Ibid., 39.
807
On 29 July 1985, Nuam Meiman, one of the two former Moscow Watch Group members still living in
the Soviet Union outside the confines of jail, told a Western journalist that “the dissident movement of the
1970s is dead” and “the human rights situation in the Soviet Union is worse today than it was when the
Helsinki Pact was signed.” See “Soviet Human Rights Battle: Only Isolated Voices Remain,” The New
York Times, 29 July 1985, A1.
415
given the inability of many Soviet policymakers to escape the confines of orthodox
Marxist-Leninist thought.
Defending the Fortress of Marxist-Leninism: The Soviet Union, Transnational
Dissent, and Human rights, January 1981-February 1985
During the early to mid 1980s, official publications portrayed the Soviet Union as
a fortress under siege. In September 1981, the first deputy Chairman of the KGB
Semyon Tsvigun published an article called “The Intrigues of Foreign Intelligence
Services” in the Communist Party journal Kommunist. Paying particular attention to the
activities of private citizens across the globe, he recounted how “more than 400 antiSoviet centers, organizations, committees and groups engage in subversive activities
against our country.” He also mentioned the World Congress of Free Ukrainians.
Besides working with Zionist organizations, it had outlined a joint program of action that
called on Ukrainian groups and organizations in the Baltic republics to publicize Soviet
violations of the Helsinki agreements.808
Well aware of the rise of Solidarity movement in Poland and the existence of
transnational human rights critiques, Tsvigun castigated individuals who wanted to
“’improve and democratize the Soviet model of socialism.” He even felt compelled to
denounce “religious mystical groups” such as “the Krishna Consciousness society.”
Disturbed at the growth of independent thought, he warned how class adversaries wanted
to “organize groups of young men and women on the basis of an enthusiasm for ‘pop
music’ and ‘the Western way of life.’” He also referred to how “the creation of ‘various
unions,’ ‘clubs,’ theaters and seminars made up of anti-social elements” called into
808
CDSP 33, no. 49 (6 January 1982): 4-5.
416
question the legitimacy of “existing social associations and organizations of the working
people.”809
These words had much in common with Andropov’s evaluations of domestic
developments in 1981. A report he sent to the Central Committee explained how the
KGB had sent various administrative bodies over “eight thousand items of information”
concerning “the hostile plans and the anti-Soviet activities of the secret services of the
USA and other foreign states.” In practice, KGB agents had “destroyed” a large number
of illegal Baptist printing presses and identified over 1,500 authors who had either written
or distributed “anonymous anti-Soviet and slanderous documents.” In the months leading
up to the Twenty-Six Party Congress, “15,557 Soviet citizens have been cautioned” about
their anti-Soviet activities while “433 [had been] arrested for hostile activity.”810
The ever-present fear of domestic ideological subversion explains why some
KGB agents in foreign countries received instructions to carry out “active measures”
against the forces of international Zionism over the course of the next four years. While
not an exhaustive list, this document called for the “disruption of Zionist-sponsored
congresses and other anti-Soviet gatherings.” It also recommended “running operational
ploys with leaders of the World Jewish Congress.” As described, Soviet agents would
garner support for the idea that “an intensification of the ‘cold’ war” might very well
result in “the isolation of the WJC from Jewish populations in socialist countries.”
Another provision advocated using “Soviet institutions abroad” to help foreign writers
809
Ibid.
810
Volkogonov, Autopsy for an Empire, 340.
417
“publish objective material in the Western press about the position of Jews in the
USSR.”811
As a result of the pervasive influence of orthodox Marxist-Leninist thinking, Reagan
failed to change the Soviet government’s negative attitude toward U.S. human rights
criticisms. Plenty of evidence suggests that many Soviet officials abhorred Reagan’s
“crusade against socialism” and at least some saw important continuities between his
administration’s and Carter’s manipulation of human rights issues. An article that
appeared in Pravda on 11 August 1981 described how “the campaign for defense of
human rights has long been used as an ideo- logical [sic] tool of US foreign policy”
designed to scuttle improvements “in relations between the USSR and the USA.” If any
difference existed, Reagan’s vocal support of right-wing dictatorships showed that “the
sanctimonious hypocrisy of the former White House masters is being replaced by the
calculated cynicism of the current ones.” Georgi Arbatov voiced similar sentiments. He
argued that “the conservatives now in power do not put much soul into their human rights
policy since they apparently never really believed in those rights in the first place.” Of
course, “this does not prevent them from conducting a fierce, if hollow, propaganda
campaign on the subject.”812
The Soviet government’s enduring hostility to human rights criticisms explains
why Reagan’s efforts to win the release of dissenters through “quiet” diplomatic efforts
811
Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, ed., More “Instructions from the Centre”: Top Secret Files
on KGB Global Operations (Portland, OR: Frank Cass & Co, 1992), 92-8.
812
“US Re-adoption of Human Rights Campaign: a ‘Political Weapon’ Against the USSR,” 12 August
1981, BBC; and Georgi A. Arbatov and Willem Oltmans, The Soviet Viewpoint (New York: Dodd, Mead
and Company, 1983), 152-3.
418
failed to impress Brezhnev. In January 1982, he sent Reagan a private letter that
criticized the President’s petition on behalf of the Pentecostals residing in the U.S.
embassy. Because American officials had advised these individuals to violate Soviet
laws, “the entire responsibility for the existing situation rests with the U.S. side,
including the responsibility of a humanitarian nature.” After reading Reagan’s private
letter about the possibility of releasing Shcharansky eight months later, Brezhnev sent
a short reply that in part read “there is no basis for your concern” because the
individual had committed “grave anti-Soviet crimes.”813
When Andropov became General Secretary near the end of 1982, he recognized
the economic stagnation and corruption that permeated Soviet society. Instead of
thinking outside the prism of orthodox Marxist-Leninist thought, he extolled the virtues
of “discipline and accelerated “the general campaign against all forms of disobedience,
indiscipline, and infringement of the law.”814 This mentality meant that the already harsh
repression of dissent and non-official activities only intensified during the mid 1980s. To
cite one example, a wide variety of reports indicate that prison conditions worsened. A
U.S. Helsinki Watch publication noted that “there has been an increase in the number of
incidents of severe, systematic beatings of political prisoners, as well as deaths of
political prisoners due to mistreatment.” Since the “accession of Andropov, “new
arrivals are threatened with beatings and rape if they refuse to join the ‘volunteer’
813
Letter, Brezhnev to Reagan, 21 January 1982, ES: GSB, Box 37, Folder: 8200225-8204854, RRPL; and
Letter from Brezhnev to Reagan, 30 October 1982, ES: GSB, Box 37, Folder 8290742-8290870, RRPL.
814
Zhores A. Medvedev, Andropov (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1983), 158; Volkogonov,
Autopsy for an Empire, 345-7; and Arbatov, The System, 267-8 and 273-82; and Solovyov and Klepikova,
Yuri Andropov, 268-287.
419
brigades” that enforce work discipline. Administrators also began to use mind-altering
drugs in labor camp hospitals.815
As part of a larger effort to combat the rise in non-official activities, Soviet
authorities took steps such as fining a Lithuanian priest for permitting a Santa Claus to
give children gifts without first obtaining official permission.816 Around the same time,
KGB agents arrested five individuals for participating in a “collective meditation”
ceremony aimed at neutralizing the evil around political prisoners. Always interested in
strengthening the ideological fortitude of Soviet private citizens, the Central Committee
banned Moscow establishments from playing a wide array of Western rock groups,
including the Ramones, Blue Oyster Cult, Van Halen, Depeche Mode, and Kiss.817 The
same body also introduced a campaign that called on private citizens to send in
anonymous postcards when they viewed misconduct such as “irregular earnings” and
“violations of social order and socialist social life.” The KGB used information from one
of these cards to charge a Jewish activist with knowledge of a plot to “place bombs in the
Peter and Paul fortress in the Hermitage.”818
Near the beginning of 1983, the Soviet government exercised its bureaucratic
muscle and passed new laws that codified the already standard practice of extending the
815
U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, Violations of the Helsinki Accords: USSR—A Report Prepared for the
Helsinki Review Conference Vienna, November 1986 (New York: The U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee,
1986), 189-204.
816
CCCL 56 (14 February 1983): 43.
817
Glasnost: Information Bulletin 2-4 (July 7 1987): 30-1; U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, Violations of
the Helsinki Accords: USSR, 45-6.
818
Freedom at Issue 77 (March-April 1984): 29; and USSR News Brief 21 (15 November 1984): 5.
420
terms of disobedient prisoners from three to five years. Even more telling, the Kremlin
amended Article 64 of the criminal code to read that “treason” included all acts that
violated the government’s “‘all-encompassing’” definition of “‘state security.’”819 Not
even the “loyal opposition” of Roy Medvedev escaped the attention of the Kremlin.
Speaking on behalf of the Soviet leadership, a representative warned him that “‘you
[must] cease writing such articles and books or we shall put you in jail.’” This open
threat prompted Medvedev to issue a public statement through Western journalists that
read: “It is difficult to be a political writer in a country where the constitution requires
every citizen to work for the strengthening of the authority of the state, yet where many
in high positions do not care about this authority at all, abusing their power, using it for
personal enrichment or for the elimination of their own rivals and critics.”820
These words were appropriate because Soviet authorities only intensified their
efforts to keep Soviet private citizens cut off from the West. After the Madrid conference
ended in November 1983, the Kremlin amended Article 70 to criminalize the possession
of samizdat literature and issued a decree that forbade private citizens from giving
foreigners “shelter, transportation, or other services . . . without official permission.” In a
direct shot at the Solzhenitsyn fund, Soviet officials gained the right to sentence those
found guilty of receiving money or valuables from foreign sources to concurrent terms of
“ten years in [a] labor camp” and five years of internal exile. Another addition to the
819
See also U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, Violations of the Helsinki Accords: August 1983-September
1984, 129-135; Ibid., Violations of the Helsinki Accords: USSR, 51-64; Ibid., Ten Years Later, 168-183 and
225-7; and Reddaway, “Dissent in the Soviet Union,” 9.
820
Z. Medvedev, Andropov, 158-9. See also CSCE Digest, 2 February 1983, 12-3.
421
criminal code in effect allowed bureaucrats to imprison anyone for eight years who gave
“unauthorized information” to foreigners that resulted in “‘grave consequences’” for the
Soviet state. Just as important, the Soviet government no longer allowed foreigners to
pay for packages sent to Soviet private citizens and reduced the number of phone circuits
with the West “by about two-thirds.”821
No example better illustrates the determination of Soviet leaders to crush dissent
and keep private citizens cut off from foreign audiences than their treatment of Sakharov
and Bonner. In March 1982, Andropov sent a report to the Central Committee that
excoriated Bonner’s determination to keep up contacts with members of the U.S.
embassy. She “takes Sakharov’s anti-Soviet and libelous articles to Moscow and
transmits them to the American embassy and foreign correspondents for further
dissemination.” “The documents are subsequently used widely by the mass media in
capitalist countries to harm the political interests of the USSR.”822
When defending the seizure of Sakharov’s memoirs that took place eight months
later, Andropov emphasized the key role Bonner played in using illegal channels in
Moscow to transmit anti-Soviet messages to “foreign public opinion” and “coordinate
anti-Soviet campaigns planned abroad.” “The contents of the autobiography, diary, and
correspondence provide documentary proof that for ten years Sakharov’s anti-Soviet
activity has been fomented and directed by his wife.”823 Two years later, the new KGB
821
U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, Violations of the Helsinki Accords: USSR, 178-188.
822
Rubenstein and Gribanov, ed., The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov, 268-9.
823
Ibid., 274-5.
422
Chairman Viktor Chebrikov reported that the U.S. government had managed “to involve
government and political figures as well as representatives of the intelligentsia from
Norway, Switzerland, and Holland in a provocative campaign on” this couple’s behalf.
“Upon instructions from Washington,” these forces at the very least hope that Bonner
will receive permission to reside abroad and serve “as a leader of” the Soviet emigration
movement. 824
The Soviet leadership finally lost patience when Sakharov sent a letter to the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in January 1984 calling on the authorities to let his wife
travel abroad so she could receive medical treatment in Italy and visit her relatives in the
United States. Once the KGB found out that Sakharov would conduct a hunger strike
while Bonner sought asylum in the U.S. embassy to force the government’s hand, the
Central Committee acted. It approved a resolution that brought criminal proceedings
against Bonner on the grounds that she and Sakharov were active participants in an
international conspiracy designed to make her “one of the leaders of “the anti-Soviet
scum” abroad.825
After affirming this measure, a Soviet court sentenced Bonner to five years of
internal exile in Gorky while the Soviet Ministry of Health worked to break her
husband’s hunger strike through a series of force-feeding sessions, one of which
employed a lever to pry his jaw open. Well-aware that Sakharov’s hunger strike might
produce an international outcry, Chebrikov assured the Central Committee that “this
824
Ibid., 282.
825
Ibid., 288-90.
423
method of feeding is harmless and does not produce any medical consequences or
complications.” He also described how “TASS and the State Radio and Television of the
USSR have distributed abroad information refuting the insinuations of subversive centers
of the West about the state of Sakharov’s and Bonner’s health.”826 When these measures
failed to stem international speculation about Sakharov’s health, the Soviet government
released a twenty-minute video tape in September 1984 that purported to show how the
couple lived a healthy, enjoyable life in Gorky. To erase any doubt, this “KGB movie”
contained clips of Sakharov planting a tree and reading a copy of Newsweek.827
Internal documents reveal that Soviet leaders viewed these methods as an
appropriate way of curbing Bonner’s and Sakharov’s “contact with intelligence agencies
and anti-Soviet organizations in the West.”828 Although reports indicated that Western
audiences still paid close attention to Sakharov’s fate, Chebrikov informed the Central
Committee in mid-1984 that “the measures taken by the KGB to isolate Sakharov and
Bonner from foreigners . . . and to put an end to their ability to listen to foreign
broadcasts . . . have been fully justified.”829 When the Politburo discussed the possibility
of Francois Mitterrand’s raising the issue of Sakharov’s hunger strikes and health during
his 1984 visit to Moscow, numerous members praised Sakharov’s condition as robust.
Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov concluded the meeting with the assertion that
826
Ibid., 292-4.
827
“A KGB Home Movie,” Newsweek, 3 September 1984, 49.
828
Rubenstein and Gribanov, ed., The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov, 289.
829
Chebrikov to the Central Committee, “How the KGB is handling the hunger strike,” May 20, 1984.
Available [Online]: http://www.yale.edu/annals/sakharov/documents_frames/Sakharov_173.htm [24
January 2007].
424
“we have every basis for making a calm and firm reply” on the correctness of our actions
if Mitterrand should mention Sakharov.830 Two weeks after this gathering, Shultz raised
the issue of Sakharov’s health during a private meeting with Dobrynin. After the
ambassador pointed out that “the Soviets consider Sakharov purely a domestic matter,”
Shultz replied that “the issue was a real problem of concern to many people, especially
scientists worldwide.” While not discounting the importance of world public opinion,
Dobrynin responded that “the Soviets are willing to live with the problem.”831
Despite their intense hatred of human rights criticisms, Soviet officials still felt
obligated to defend the morality of Soviet-style socialism and publicize the violations of
capitalist countries. In early 1981, Arbatov held a series of interviews with a Dutch
journalist designed to elucidate how Soviet leaders viewed the world. During these
discussions, Arbatov called human rights a Cold War weapon foreign governments and
private citizens used “to modify . . . our domestic order according to Western liking.”
Then again, he mused, “how can one be against human rights nowadays?” It’s just like
being “against motherhood.” This statement led him to outline the Soviet Union’s longstanding commitment to human rights. Since Western countries did not care about
workers, “it fell to the Soviet Union to develop a new, broader approach to human rights
by including social rights largely neglected before that time.”832
830
“Meeting of the Politburo,” 31 May 1984 in Rubenstein and Gribanov, ed., The KGB File of Andrei
Sakharov, 294-5.
831
Memorandum from George P. Shultz to President Reagan, “Meeting with Dobrynin 12 June,” 14 June
1984, ES: GSC, Box 39: Folder 8490695, RRPL.
832
Arbatov and Oltmans, The Soviet Viewpoint, 148 and 144.
425
When asked how he could reconcile this comment with his government’s harsh
treatment of dissenters, Arbatov praised the Soviet Union’s monolithic unity in
comparison to individuals who suffered from personality weaknesses. He then reiterated
the familiar argument that members of the “prodissident campaign are simply trying to . .
. foster an ersatz opposition inside our country . . . [and] create the image of the USSR as
a police state.”833 To draw attention away from the subject of Soviet violations, Arbatov
outlined the massive violations that took place in the United States. “We know that if
authorities in the United States deem it necessary, they not only harass people, but even
kill them. This happened . . . to leaders of the Black Panthers,” Martin Luther King, Jr.,
and the radical students at Kent State University. After offering these observations,
Arbatov posed the question: “How would Americans have reacted if Soviet journalists in
the United States had begun to cooperate with members of some clandestine groups like
the Weather Underground?”834
This interview set the tone for how Soviet officials defended their nation from
foreign criticism during the early to mid 1980s. A Soviet Central Committee member
endorsed the practice of putting Moscow Trust Group members in psychiatric hospitals or
stripping their citizenship on the grounds that “all forces speaking out for peace and
socialism have an objective interest in strengthening the Soviet Union.” Another official
told an Italian disarmament assembly that the Soviet government had a right to repress
non-official peace activities because “’public opinion and official opinion are the same in
833
Ibid., 161-2.
834
Ibid., 149-50.
426
our society.’”835 During his concluding address at the Madrid follow-up meeting, Andrei
Gromyko asserted that “the Great October Socialist revolution was accomplished in the
name of” freedom and for “the sake of human rights.” Besides defending the recent
downing of the South Korean commercial airplane KAL-007 that strayed into Soviet
territory, he also announced his government’s intention of standing firm on the issue of
human rights. Neither international human rights documents nor the provisions of the
Final Act would dissuade the Kremlin from delivering a decisive “rebuff” to hostile
attacks on Soviet-style socialism.836
To paint the United States as an international outlaw, Pravda ran an article on the
international “Human Rights Day” (12 December 1984) condemning the U.S.
government’s human rights record. The Russian Minister of Justice attacked the Reagan
administration for not adhering to a number of international human rights agreements and
engaging in small wars around the world that resulted in the deaths of thousands. He also
insisted that “the working people in a society of class exploitation can only dream about
the extensive set of rights and freedoms being enjoyed by the Soviet people and by the
peoples of the fraternal countries of the socialist community.”837 In the same year, the
Soviet delegates who attended the fortieth session of the UNHRC argued that the U.S.
835
CSCE Digest, 9 March 1984, 9; and U.S. Helsinki Commission, Basket I, 130.
836
“Statement by Andrei Gromyko, Chairman of the Commission of the USSR,” N.P., RCSCE, USHCF,
Box 9: Folder: Madrid, Final Analyses and Speeches, NA.
837
“Human Rights Day: Soviet and Western Attitudes Contrasted,” 12 December 1984, BBC.
427
and Western European view of human rights amounted to little more than “stressing the
power of the rich, the omnipotence of the monopolies,” and “chronic unemployment.”838
In an obvious attempt to blunt the impact of Reagan’s public statements in
defense of Sakharov, the Soviet government carried out a public campaign on behalf of
Leonard Peltier, a Native American activist imprisoned for murdering two FBI agents in
1975. On 27 July 1984, TASS announced that four Soviet scientists who had received
the Nobel Prize sent a petition to the White House on behalf of this political prisoner. It
called the treatment of Peltier “a typical example of [the] politically motivated
persecutions of Americans who are fighting for human rights against the predatory
practices of . . . the government and monopolies.” The document also described how the
“heroic” activist’s hunger strike endangered his life and the international reputation of the
United States. In language similar to Reagan’s statements about Sakharov and Bonner,
the Kremlin asked the U.S. government to “do the humane thing” and release Peltier.839
Official Soviet publishers also produced a wide array of literature designed to
convince foreign audiences about the correctness and validity of their behavior toward
dissenters. In 1981, the future General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko wrote The
CPSU, Society, and Human Rights. After making the obligatory reference to the
greatness of the October revolution, he went out of his way to combat arguments
suggesting that the Soviet Union had become a vast bureaucratic machine. “The Party
works tirelessly, he wrote, “to secure even broader participation of the people in
838
839
“Soviet Position at UN Human Rights Commission Session,” 10 February 1984, BBC.
Seth Mydans, “Soviets Point Finger at a Civil Rights Case in U.S.,” New York Times, 27 June 1984,
Section A, 3.
428
managing state . . . affairs . . . and to achieve . . . constant responsiveness to public
opinion.”840 Two years later, Nikolai Yakovlev released the third edition of his work CIA
Target—USSR, which outlined how Bonner had forced Sakharov to participate in a
Zionist conspiracy against the Soviet Union. In 1985, an official Soviet publisher
released a work entitled Europe, Ten Years After Helsinki aimed at convincing Western
audiences that the Soviet Union’s Final Act compliance record compared favorably to
those of their governments, especially the United States.841
Besides publishing book in foreign languages, the Soviet government also took
other steps to combat the human rights critiques of NGOs. In 1983, the Kremlin
appointed “a third secretary” at its “embassy in Washington” to monitor the explosive
growth of “nongovernmental American initiatives” related to human rights.842 Around
the same time, Andropov “agreed to discuss ‘at the highest level’ the question of ‘using
Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality for active participation in counter-Zionist
propaganda.’” This initiative resulted in the creation of a “public” group under the
direction of the KGB known as The Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public. On 22
June 1983, members held a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists so they
could outline this group’s agenda to the rest of the world. Just as they had in the past,
840
See K.U. Chernenko, The CPSU, Society, and Human Rights (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency
Publishing House, 1981), 11.
841
For an excellent description of Yakovlev’s work, see Richard Lourie, Sakharov: A Biography (Hanover,
NH and London: Brandeis University Press, 2002), 326-8. See also V. I. Kuznetsov, Europe, Ten Years
After Helsinki (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985). For a typical defense of the Soviet government’s
treatment of Jews, see Avtandil Rukhadze, Jews in the USSR: Figures, Facts, Comments (Moscow:
Novosti Press, 1982).
842
James L. Hickman and James A. Garrison, Jr., “Psychological Principles of Citizen Diplomacy,” in
David. D. Newson, ed., Private Diplomacy with the Soviet Union (Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, 1987), 140.
429
they rejected any suggestion that hundreds of thousands of Jews wanted to leave the
Soviet Union. They also repeated the charge that Zionists had made a “deal with the
ringleaders of the Gestapo and SS” to save themselves during World War II.843
Even though Soviet officials still felt comfortable expressing this view in public,
they sometimes felt compelled to make pragmatic concessions in deference to
international opinion. After Sakharov and Bonner threatened to continue a hunger strike
for the indefinite future in 1981, it allowed Liza Alexeyeva to join the latter dissenter’s
son in the United States. Two years later, authorities discontinued Sergei Batovrin’s
psychiatric incarceration and allowed him to immigrate to the United States. Perhaps
stung by criticisms commonplace at the SI and Madrid follow-up meetings, the Politburo
suspended the trial of the “young socialists.” It also would have permitted Shcharansky
to emigrate if he had signed an official statement asking for his release on the grounds of
poor health. On 18 May 1984, General Secretary Chernenko agreed to release two
dissenters serving terms in a psychiatric hospital after a Western newspaper reported that
the couple had sent him a letter protesting their treatment. 844
Despite these pragmatic concessions, the Soviet government’s determination to
punish individuals for engaging in non-official activities and keep them cut off from the
outside world appeared as strong as ever in early 1985. In retrospect, the steps that
orthodox policymakers took to keep their multinational empire bound together amounted
843
844
Volkogonov, Autopsy for an Empire, 353.
“Dissidents freed from mental hospital,” United Press International, 18 May 1984. For accounts of
Chernenko’s attitude toward dissenters and U.S. human rights criticisms, see Volkogonov, Autopsy for an
Empire, 392-3 and 424; and Ilya Zemtsov, Chernenko: The Last Bolshevik—The Soviet Union on the Eve of
Perestroika (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 219-225.
430
to little more than a pyrrhic victory. They could not prevent dissenters and private
citizens from “globalizing” the shortcomings of Soviet-style socialism. Since “power
exists in multiple forms,” private citizens and some Soviet government officials helped
the wider world see that Moscow’s pretensions to superpower status rested on military
strength alone. 845 This development played a key role in Mikhail Gorbachev’s decision
to undertake a drawn out campaign aimed at making the Soviet Union a universal
socialist model after he rose to power in 1985.
845
Gaddis, We Now Know, 283-4.
431
CHAPTER 10: HOLDING MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AND SOVIET BUREAUCRATS
ACCOUNTABLE: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE FINAL
ACT, DECEMBER 1985-JANUARY 1989
In a private meeting that took place during the fall of 1987, George Shultz asked
Eduard Shevardnadze to tell Ronald Reagan about the general trajectory of the 1917
Bolshevik revolution in Russia. The Soviet Foreign Minister obliged, telling the
President that “the USSR had gone through several stages after the Revolution: War
Communism, the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” and now “a quest for overall
democracy.” Instead of speaking about “Nicolai” Lenin’s quest for global domination as
he had in the 1970s, Reagan took a different approach. He asked Shevardnadze “whether
some of the innovation being pushed by Gorbachev harked back to [the] concepts of
Lenin which had been blocked under Stalin.”846
The willingness of Reagan to accept Lenin’s credentials as a “liberal-minded”
reformer raises important questions about how he approached the task of promoting
human rights in the Soviet Union after the Geneva summit took place. In many ways,
Reagan’s behavior remained consistent. He continued to challenge Soviet internal
behavior in a pragmatic manner without blurring the fundamental distinctions between
democratic and Marxist-Leninist regimes. He also continued to place importance on
building democratic institutions in the USSR and opening Soviet society up to the outside
world. Yet, as his second term progressed, the cumulative effects of Mikhail
Gorbachev’s reform campaign and transnational critiques of “quiet” human rights
846
Washington Summit Memcons, “Meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze of the USSR,”
15 September 1987, 12:00 PM-2:00 PM, 8, ES: NSC, Box 8, Folder: 8790982, RRPL.
432
diplomacy changed Reagan’s behavior. He became much more willing to support
dissenters in public and endorse transnational human rights activities. To help
Gorbachev transform Soviet government, Reagan agreed to have executive branch
officials engage in bilateral human rights conferences that allowed each side to exchange
information about topics as diverse as prison conditions and capital punishment. He even
proved receptive to the General Secretary’s proposals that called for American and Soviet
legislators to meet and exchange information on the subject of human rights violations.
These changes only underscore the reality that the Reagan administration
embraced the Helsinki process. Far from viewing the Final Act as a “sham,” as one
author writes, Reagan and other officials recognized that this agreement gave the U.S.
government a powerful tool to accomplish the larger goal of promoting democracy in the
Soviet Union.847 They also recognized that working with and encouraging and
transnational human rights activities had become the executive branch’s best available
weapon for holding Gorbachev and Soviet bureaucrats accountable for their internal
behavior. The importance that the Soviet government placed on appearing in compliance
with the Helsinki Accords put the administration in the favorable position of setting the
terms of how the Vienna follow-up conference (November 1986-January 1989) would
end. Shultz took advantage of this situation and succeeded in obtaining Soviet
acceptance of a concluding document that furthered the goals of reducing the power of
the CPSU and building democratic institutions in USSR.
847
Kengor, The Crusader, 105. For a conflicting view, see Ronald Reagan Oral History Project, “Interview
with George Shultz,” 18 December 2002, 20.” Available [Online]:
http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/oralhistories/reagan [10 December 2007].
433
Principled Flexibility: Wielding the Human Rights Weapon against the Soviet
Union, Part II
The importance Reagan placed on rectifying Soviet human rights violations
through “quiet” human rights diplomacy did not disappear after the Geneva summit took
place. During the first eight months of 1986, he made few specific public criticisms of
Soviet human rights violations. On 6 February 1986, he signed NSDD-209, which
indicated that the Secretary of State would “primarily” rely on “vigorous . . . private
diplomacy” to make Soviet leaders address the issue of human rights violations. When
Gorbachev allowed Elena Bonner to travel abroad so she could receive medical treatment
and meet family members in March 1986, Reagan declined to meet with her during her
American visit. Instead, she ended up discussing U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union
with National Security Advisor John Poindexter. He told Bonner that the President
preferred to “pursue these concerns through confidential diplomatic channels.” As a
White House official later explained, Reagan “doesn't want to do anything to lessen the
chances of others being released.”848
Reagan behaved much the same way a few months later when he agreed to hold a
private meeting with Natan Sharansky849 after securing his release through a prisoner
exchange. Worried about the consequences of publicizing this gathering, he followed the
advice of his subordinates and declined to invite reporters or allow photographs. When
members of the press corps asked for more details about what Reagan and Sharansky had
848
NSDD-209, 6 February 1986, 2. Available [Online] from the Digital National Security Archive (DSA);
David Hoffman, “President Declines Visit From Bonner,” Washington Post, 21 March 1986, A1.
849
After being released prison, Anatoly Shcharansky legally changed his name to Natan Sharansky. I will
use the latter name for the rest of the dissertation.
434
discussed, a White House spokesperson demurred. He defended his silence on the
grounds that such behavior would complicate the President’s goal of advancing the cause
of human rights in the Soviet Union through “‘quiet diplomacy.’”850
These examples in no way imply that the administration officials remained silent
about Soviet human rights abuses or backed away from engaging in vigorous ideological
competition with the USSR. U.S. representatives continued to utilize United Nations
forums to highlight the human rights violations of communist nations. Reagan never
stopped stressing the fundamental and enduring moral distinctions between democratic
and communist regimes. He also reiterated his commitment to strengthening U.S.
international broadcasting capabilities and engaging in effective public diplomacy.
During a public ceremony commemorating Captive Nations Week held on 21 July,
Reagan voiced his strong support for the activities of dissenters. To drive home this
point, he described how female political prisoners had managed to send him a letter
describing the terrible conditions of Soviet prisons. He also spoke of how dissenters who
faced the same harsh conditions as these women depended on the support of free
individuals to maintain their struggles against the Soviet system.851
Disregarding the advice of conservative critics and even some Soviet émigrés,
Reagan chose not to repudiate the Final Act. In spring of 1986, U.S. delegates outlined
850
David Remnick, “Shcharansky Meets Reagan; ‘Quiet Diplomacy Unchanged,” Washington Post, 14
May 1986, A1. After settling in Israel, Anatoly Shcharansky changed his name to Natan Sharansky. See
also Brinkley, ed. The Reagan Diaries, 388.
851
PPOP, 1986, Vol. II, 977. See also Ibid., 1986, Vol. 1, 159, 344-5, 348, 339, 499, 808, 827; and 1986,
Vol. II, 896, 973, 1020, 1069. On 4 December 1986, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution that
criticized the massive human rights violations of Afghan authorities and their foreign supporters. See
American Foreign Current Documents 1986, 473. See also Garthoff, The Great Transition, 219.
435
the appalling extent of Soviet and Eastern European human rights violations at the human
contacts experts meeting held in Bern, Switzerland. Chairman Michael Novak criticized
the Soviets for repressing non-Russian nationalities and imprisoning dissenters for
exercising their basic civil liberties. Because the Final Act’s provisions had little
meaning unless the lives of ordinary citizens improved, he defended the right of Soviet
private citizens to have regular contacts with their Western counterparts. In defense of
this position, he praised Helsinki monitors in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for
raising international awareness about the shortcomings of Soviet internal behavior. Near
the end of the meeting, Novak became unhappy with language in the proposed
concluding document that appeared to give the Soviets legal cover for restricting
emigration and foreign contacts. Against the wishes of every other delegation, he chose
to withhold American approval and allowed the meeting to end without any type of
formal agreement.852
While the administration remained committed to engaging in vigorous ideological
competition with the USSR, Reagan appears to have become less worried about taking
Soviet sensibilities into account on human rights issues near the end of 1986. The roots
of this change lie in the Kremlin’s internal behavior. After the Geneva summit,
Gorbachev made some small concessions on human rights. In addition to permitting
Elena Bonner to travel abroad, he allowed more private citizens to emigrate so they could
852
Former NSC Staffer Richard Pipes equated the Helsinki Accords to the Yalta agreement. See Richard
Pipes, “Assessing the Final Act, 10 Years Later, A Loss for the West,” The New York Times, 1 August
1985, A19. See also Michael Novak, Taking Glasnost Seriously: Toward an Open Soviet Union
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1988), 132-4, 145-7, 69-83; Vojtech Mastny, ed., The
Helsinki Process and the Reintegration of Europe, 1986-1991 (New York: New York University Press,
1992), 1-10, 61-70; and U.S. Helsinki Commission Hearings, Bern Human Contacts Meeting, . 99th
Congress, 1st session, 1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 13 and 61-5.
436
reunite with their spouses. Despite these small gestures, the Soviet government had
shown few signs of relenting on its long-standing campaign to eradicate dissent and seal
off private citizens from subversive foreign ideas. For example, Jewish emigration levels
reached record-low levels. Authorities also continued to put many dissenters in jail and
psychiatric institutions for the mere possession of non-official literature. In the summer
of 1986, the Kremlin decided to arrest and charge the American journalist Nicholas
Daniloff with spying in retaliation for the U.S. arrest of a Soviet U.N. employee on the
charges of espionage. Because this arrest infuriated Reagan, he sent Gorbachev an angry
letter of formal protest.853
Convinced that the U.S. government had manipulated the Daniloff arrest to
launch a hostile campaign against the Soviet Union, Gorbachev proposed that the two
hold a meeting in “near future” designed to stabilize U.S.-Soviet relations and set the
stage for future arms control agreements. Before agreeing to such a gathering, Reagan
demanded that the Soviet government release Daniloff. After a confusing series of
events, he in effect agreed to a prisoner exchange that traded the dissenter Yuri Orlov and
Daniloff for an accused Soviet spy on 20 September. With this issue settled, the two
sides agreed to hold a “mini-summit” the following month in Reykjavik, Iceland. 854
853
See Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, Twenty-Second Semiannual Report (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 4-5 and 7-9; Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, TwentyThird Semiannual Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 6-10. See also
Vojtech Mastny, ed., Soviet-East European Survey, 1986-1987: Selected Research and Analysis from
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 19-32 and 47-51.
854
Letter, Gorbachev to Reagan, 15 September 1986. Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Document01.pdf [10 October 2007]. For a good
account of these events, see Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 198-210; Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 728,
732-5, 737, and 746-8; and Garthoff, The Great Transition, 281-3.
437
The lack of fundamental improvements in the Soviet attitude toward human rights
only increased the determination of Reagan administration officials to hold them
accountable for their internal behavior. When he appeared before the United Nations a
few days after Orlov and Daniloff gained their freedom, Reagan denounced the Soviet
government’s treatment of the American journalist and refusal to follow the stipulations
of the Final Act. “The persecution of scientists, religious leaders, peace activists,
political dissenters and other prisoners of conscience continues unabated behind the Iron
curtain,” he told the audience. Without improvements in the “human rights area,”
Reagan warned, no dramatic improvements in “East-West relations” can take place.855
Nine days before the Reykjavik summit began, Shultz informed Reagan that the
American public expected “substantial progress (but no agreements per see) at the
meeting.” Of course, “we will work across the full agenda, but the reality is that our
work will not be seen as effective without some progress on the big issues: arms control
and human rights.” To reinforce this position, Shultz told Reagan that “Gorbachev must
go home with a clear sense that Moscow’s continuing insensitivity to the humanitarian
dimension of the relationship will assume greater significance as prospects open up in
areas of mutual concern.” 856 A State Department internal memorandum advanced
similar arguments a few days later. Despite Gorbachev’s release of a few high profile
dissenters, “human rights is the one area of relations where we have not made adequate
progress.” “We need to emphasize that without substantial progress . . . on emigration”
855
856
PPOP, 1986, Vol. II, 1228-32.
Memo, Shultz to Reagan, “Reykjavik,” 2 October 1986. Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Document04.pdf [10 October 2007].
438
in the near future, “other areas of our relationship will be affected.” The “record-low”
levels of Jewish emigration had also produced unwanted political complications. “Jewish
groups” and members of Congress have begun to challenge the executive branch’s
emphasis on “‘quiet diplomacy.’”857
These arguments proved influential. A few days before he departed for
Reykjavik, Reagan publicized the private consultations he had held with Orlov, human
rights activists, and members of Congress. Using much stronger language than he had on
the eve of the Geneva summit, he reiterated that “true peace requires respect for human
rights as well as arms control.” In Reykjavik, “I’ll make it amply clear to Mr. Gorbachev
that unless there is real Soviet movement on human rights, we will not have the political
atmosphere necessary to make lasting progress on other issues.” A few days later,
Reagan told reporters about how “a group of human rights leaders reminded me of how
important America’s missions of both peace and freedom are.” “We must never forget”
private citizens like Yuri Orlov. “They’re our inspiration, and we are their hope.”858
Much as he had in Geneva, Reagan attempted to convey these positions to
Gorbachev in a forthright, yet pragmatic manner. After handing the Soviet leader a list of
individuals who wanted to emigrate, he promised that his administration would not
“exploit” any Soviet decision to ease emigration restrictions. Instead, “we would simply
express our appreciation.” According to a Soviet transcript of the meeting, Reagan also
857
Memo for George Shultz, “Materials on the President’s Meeting in Reykjavik,” 4 October 1986, 7, and
“Walk-Through for the Reykjavik Meeting,” 7 October 1986, 7. Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Document07.pdf [10 October 2007].
858
PPOP, 1986, Vol. II, 1338. 1362.
439
reminded Gorbachev that U.S. private citizens remained worried about the extent of
Soviet human rights violations. “If the “Soviet side” refused to “ease its position on
human rights,” the U.S. public “will not give the American government [any] credit for
implementing . . . [beneficial] agreements” in the future.859
Despite Reagan’s use of pragmatic language, the Reykjavik summit marked an
important turning point in the role human rights played in U.S.-Soviet relations. For the
first time, Gorbachev formally agreed to make human rights a legitimate part of the two
countries’ negotiating agenda. This change meant that he now accepted the same “foursided” negotiating agenda that Reagan hoped would result in improved U.S-Soviet
relations. Over the next three years, the General Secretary took some concrete steps to
implement his policies designed to reform Soviet society known as glasnost and
perestroika. After well-known, incarcerated dissenter Anatoly Marchenko died in
December 1986, he decided to release Sakharov and Bonner from their confinement in
Gorky. By the beginning of 1989, the Soviet government had released over six-hundred
political prisoners and allowed emigration levels to rise to levels not seen since the late
1970s. Although many shortcomings remained, thousands of public organizations began
to operate in the open, and articles critical of conditions in USSR appeared in official
publications. Gorbachev even promised to pass laws that guaranteed freedom of
conscience and curbed the use of psychiatric institutions for political purposes.860
859
Reykjavik Memcons, 12 October 1986, 10:00 AM-1:35 PM, 13-15, 17-9, ES: NSC System Files, Box 6,
Folder: 8690725, RRPL; Ibid., 11 October 1986, 3:30-5:40, 14-5. Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Document11.pdf [10 October 2007]; and “Russian
Transcript of Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik, 12 October 1986, Morning.” Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Document14.pdf [10 October 2007].
440
Interested in bolstering the Soviet Union’s credentials as a legitimate member of
the European community, Gorbachev also decided to embrace the Helsinki Accords.
During the Vienna follow-up meeting (November 1986-January 1989), Shevardnadze
became the first Soviet official to announce his government’s commitment to respect the
human rights provisions of the Final Act. He also proposed that Moscow host a Final Act
conference dealing with humanitarian affairs once this meeting ended. A few months
after the foreign minister advanced these positions, Gorbachev delivered a public address
that confirmed his commitment to satisfying the requirements of Basket III. In defense of
this position, he and other officials emphasized the Soviet government’s release of
political prisoners and intention of carrying out a comprehensive reform of the penal
code.861
Gorbachev’s behavior weakened Reagan’s initial impression of him as a
“confirmed [Soviet] ideologue.”862 In both public and private settings, he referred to
Gorbachev as the first leader not to endorse the traditional Soviet goal of “establishing a
world communist state.” He also expressed his general agreement with the General
Secretary’s book Perestroika and “welcomed” Soviet “moves toward” “democratization”
860
Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, Twenty-Fourth Semiannual Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1988), 8-11; Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, Twenty-Fifth
Semiannual Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 8-13; and Mastny, ed.,
Soviet-East European Survey, 1986-1987, 24-32 and 374-91.
861
862
For a good account of this speech, see Korey, The Promises We Keep, 188-90.
A short time after Gorbachev became General Secretary, Reagan wrote the following note in his private
diary: “If he [Gorbachev] wasn’t a confirmed ideologue he never would have been chosen by the
Politburo.” A few weeks later, he observed that “he’s [Armand Hammer] convinced that ‘Gorby’ is a
different type than past Soviet leaders and that we get along. I’m too cynical for that.” See Brinkley, ed.
The Reagan Diaries, 317, 337. He made his first positive private reference to Gorbachev on 24 June 1986.
See Ibid., 421.
441
and “glasnost.”863 Perhaps influenced by his meetings with the Soviet scholar Suzanne
Massie or assurances from Moscow, he proved sympathetic to arguments that Gorbachev
had repudiated Stalinism in favor of practices more consistent with Lenin’s “progressive”
ideas.864 As one Soviet scholar points out, Reagan told a reporter in February 1988 that
“[Gorbachev] is the first leader . . . who has gone back before Stalin and he is trying to do
what Lenin was teaching.” In other words, “I think that . . . glasnost and perestroika . . .
is much more smacking of Lenin than of Stalin.865
These positions are revealing for at least two reasons. On the most basic level,
they help illustrate Reagan’s belief that Gorbachev wanted to make important changes in
how the Soviet government conducted its domestic affairs. They also reveal his
suspicion that Gorbachev’s policies would facilitate a radical and fundamental
improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. Reagan refers to these viewpoints on several
occasions in his memoirs. “As the pages of the calendar were turning in 1987,” he
writes, “we were seeing more and more evidence that Gorbachev was serious about
introducing major economic and political reforms in the Soviet Union.” Even more
important, “Gorbachev made a blistering attack on Stalin, opening the way for a new
863
During the Reykjavik meeting, Reagan commented, “it was a fact that every Soviet leader but
Gorbachev—at least so far—had endorsed in speeches to the Soviet Communist Party Congresses the
objective of establishing a world communist state.” See Memorandum of Conversation, 12 October 1986,
10:00 AM-1:35 PM, 13-4. Reagan read Perestroika on 15 January 1988. See Brinkley, ed. The Reagan
Diaries, 568. He made a favorable reference to the work on several occasions in public. See PPOP, 1988,
Vol. I, 666, 709, and 748. During the Moscow summit, he told Gorbachev that he had read the work. See
Memcon, “President’s Second One-on-One Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev,” 31 May 1988,
10:08-11:07 AM, 3, Fritz Ermath Files, Box 1, Folder: 1988 Summit Memcons, 26 May-3 June, 1988,
RRPL.
864
For documents pertaining to Reagan’s meetings with Suzanne Massie, see Coordination Office: NSC,
Box 2, Folder: Meeting with Suzanne Massie, RRPL. (Various Dates).
865
Anthony D’ Agostino, Gorbachev’s Revolution (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 3.
442
freedom to examine the Soviet past and its mistakes.” “Whatever his reasons,” Reagan
mused, “Gorbachev had the intelligence to admit that Communism was not working, the
courage to battle for change, and . . . the wisdom to introduce the beginnings of
democracy, individual freedom, and free enterprise.”866
Instead of viewing successful internal reform as inevitable, however, Reagan and
his subordinates took nothing for granted. Because Gorbachev accepted the “four-sided”
agenda as the official superpower negotiating framework, they continued to hold the
Soviets accountable for the continuation of repressive practices and promises to respect
basic human rights. Consistent with the provisions of NSDD-75, they used negotiations
as a way of convincing the Kremlin to abandon orthodox Marxist-Leninist dogmas in
favor of practices and laws that resembled those of successful and legitimate democratic
states. In sharp contrast to the way Carter had behaved, Reagan responded to positive
changes in the USSR by becoming more vocal about the problem of Soviet human rights
violations. Well aware of the importance Gorbachev attached to the agreement, he told
the Canadian parliament that “we [still] look for signs that the Soviet Union intends to
abide by its commitment to all its citizens under its own laws and the Helsinki Accords.”
“A system that keeps Europe artificially divided, that suppresses religion, and arrests
American journalists on trumped-up charges is a problem for other nations.” Reagan also
showed less hesitation in publicizing the frequent meetings he held with dissenters whom
866
Reagan, An American Life, 686, 708. See also PPOP, 1986, Vol. I, 750; Ibid., Vol. II, 1008-9, 1515;
Ibid., 1987, Vol. I, 76; Ibid., 1987, Vol. II, 1088, 1421, 1426; Ibid., 1988, Vol. I, 678, 718, , 746, Ibid.,
1988-1989, Vol. II, 1638, 1670.
443
the Soviets had either forced to emigrate or allowed to travel abroad--including Sakharov
when he visited the United States in 1988.867
Reagan even became more vocal about the fundamental role private citizens
played in promoting human rights across the globe. During a speech celebrating Human
Rights Day on 10 December 1986, he argued that tangible progress “will require not only
support from governments but the active commitment of [private] citizens . . .
unhampered in their humanitarian activities by politics or the affairs of the state.” He
also congratulated AI for mobilizing “the world, government officials and private citizens
on behalf of political prisoners and in defense of human rights.” On the same day that he
delivered this speech, the State Department held a panel discussion about human rights
issues with former dissenters and other private citizens who had been imprisoned in
communist countries and Iran.868
While political calculations were always present, Reagan decided to send the
leader of UCSJ a private letter in September 1987. “This organization,” he wrote, “has
played an outstanding role in focusing the world’s attention on the plight of Jews in the
USSR and in bringing political pressure on the Soviet government to recognize their
fundamental rights.” “The cause of human rights for Jews in the Soviet Union is the
cause of human freedom everywhere.” A few days before the Washington summit
commenced in December 1987, the State Department held another panel discussion that
867
PPOP, 1987, Vol. I, 332-4. See Ibid., , 53, 365-8, 617; Ibid., 1987, Vol. II, 843, 929, 1039, 1061, 1271,
1309, 1421, 1507; Ibid., 1988, Vol. I, 336, 506, 550-1, 555, 609, 631, 656, 658, 675, ; Ibid., 1988-19898,
Vol. II, 946-8, 1005, 1220-2, 1286, 1600, 1712.
868
3.
Renewing the U.S. Commitment to Human Rights (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, 1987), 2-
444
allowed nine NGOs to present their recommendations on how the U.S. government
should approach the task of improving Soviet domestic behavior. In conjunction with
this meeting, Reagan followed the advice of a Congressional resolution and met with the
spouses of Soviet private citizens who had not yet received permission to emigrate.
Quoting Theodore Roosevelt, Reagan told the representatives of these groups that “each
one of you carries on your shoulders . . . the burden of” making sure that “this nation
does well for the sake of mankind.” In the end, government officials cannot change the
Kremlin’s internal behavior on their own. “We need your involvement, your continued
support, and your stalwart involvement to our country’s ideals.”869
During a private meeting he later publicized, Reagan told Sharansky that he saw
nothing wrong with “holding a massive rally of hundreds of thousands of people on the
behalf of Soviet Jewry” just before the summit took place. George Bush attended this
huge gathering. Unlike his earlier defenses of “quiet diplomacy,” he posed the question:
“‘If we in the United States are not strong . . . [and] courageous enough to stand up for
human rights, who will?” He then added, “Mr. Gorbachev: Let these people [refuseniks]
go.” During one of his private meetings with Gorbachev in Washington, Reagan
mentioned this event to illustrate the American commitment to human rights, noting that
“over the previous weekend 200,000 individuals had gathered to demonstrate” against
Soviet internal behavior.870
869
For a copy of this letter, see Altshuler, From Exodus to Freedom, 53-4; Memo, Colin Powell to Reagan,
“Drop-by Human Rights Event,” 2 December 1987, Matthew Zachary Files, Box 1, Folder: OA 17027,
RRPL; and PPOP, 1987, Vol. II, 1420-1.
870
See Sharansky, The Case for Democracy, 139-40; “Remarks by Vice President George Bush as
Delivered at the National Summit for Soviet Jewry, Washington, D.C., 6 December 1987, Matthew
445
While never reticent about criticizing Soviet internal behavior in public, Shultz
also became less worried about upsetting Gorbachev’s sensibilities on human rights
issues. In the spring of 1987, he told the General Secretary and Shevardnadze that Soviet
economic performance would never improve unless private citizens gained the right to
exercise their basic civil liberties without fears of governmental reprisals. After this
meeting took place, he chose to attend a seder with refuseniks at the residence of the U.S.
ambassador to the Soviet Union (Spaso House). Before this Passover celebration began,
he told these individuals that “you are always on our minds; you are in our hearts. We
never give up, we never stop trying, and in the end some good things do happen.” 871
Convinced that the Kremlin faced a religious revival among the Soviet
population, Reagan made a similar gesture several months later. Even though the Uniate
(Byzantine Catholic) Church remained an illegal organization in the Soviet Union, he
chose to address the participants of the State Department’s Conference on Captive
Nations at the Ukrainian Catholic National Shrine in Washington, D.C. Reagan told the
audience that “we know that Communist governments do not represent those whom they
govern, otherwise they would not suppress the people’s right to speak or travel or have
free elections.” “Those brave souls who endure such regimes are our allies. They, more
than anyone else, realize that communism is a failed philosophy, a theory that creates
only misery, deprivation, and oppression wherever it’s [sic] put into practice.”872 A few
Zachary Files, Box 1, Folder: Soviet Jewry, RRPL; and Memorandum of Conversation,, “Meeting with
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, 10:45-12:30 PM, 8 December 1987, 3, ES: NSC System Files, Box
8, Folder: 8791384, RRPL.
871
Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 887-94.
872
PPOP, 1987, Vol. II, 867-9. See also Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, 412.
446
weeks later, he applauded how “over 200 underground Ukrainian Catholic Church
leaders and laity fearlessly and for the first time disclosed their names in an appeal to
Gorbachev to legalize their church.” Three weeks before the Moscow summit convened
in May 1988, he held a press conference to thank those who had attended a White
Seminar on the status of religion in the Soviet Union. Along with citing the names of
dissenters who had suffered for trying to practice their faith, he agreed to have his
photograph taken with a Ukrainian Cardinal.873
Besides engaging in visible public human rights diplomacy, Reagan also went out
of his way to explain why the United States needed to hold the Soviets accountable for
their internal conduct. Echoing arguments found in internal documents, he explained
how the Soviets would never gain the trust of the American public or the international
community unless they started to accept the legitimacy of pluralism instead of molding
private citizens to fit the requirements of an obsolete ideology. Sensitive to the lessons of
Soviet and Russian history, he also refused to discount the possibility Gorbachev’s
reforms effort might fail. When addressing the Western European public via
WORLDNET in February 1988, he posed the question: “can we afford to forget that the
policy called glasnost coexists today is separated from the era of the gulag by fewer years
than NATO has existed?”874 People around the world needed to remember that the U.S.
government was
873
874
Ibid., 1392; and Ibid., 550-2; and Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, 604-5.
PPOP, 1988, Vol. I, 242-4. In a private letter to Gorbachev on 10 April 1987, Reagan wrote, “I am
encouraged by many of the steps you are taking to modernize your own country and by the improved
dialogue between us on arms reduction. There had also been some progress on human rights, although
447
dealing with a political system, a political culture, and a political history going
back decades, even centuries. Swings between glasnost and the gulag are not new
or even peculiar to the Soviet regime. In history, they recurred again and again as
the throne passed from czar [sic] and czar [sic], and even within the reign of a
single czar [sic]. We cannot afford to mortgage our security to the assessed
motives of particular individuals or to the novel approaches of a new leadership,
even if we wish them well. 875
These words grew out of Reagan’s fear that Gorbachev might fall victim to
domestic opposition or the machinations of Soviet bureaucrats bent on preserving their
privileged positions and status. In his private diary, he chose not to dismiss Massie’s
private warning that “Gorbachev might well be killed if he came here [for a summit
meeting].” “There is so much opposition to what he’s trying to do in Russia,” he wrote,
“they could murder him here and pin the whole thing on us.” “The KGB is capable of
doing just that.” On several occasions, Reagan advanced a similar type of argument in
public. For example, he explained how Khrushchev’s tentative reforms became distant
memories after his peers removed him from power. Such a development remained a
possibility as long as the “one party system” remained unchecked by “democratic
institutions.”876
This mindset accounts why Reagan argued that glasnost would only succeed over
the long term if Gorbachev took “steps to make it permanent . . . and to institutionalize
it.” Instead of letting Soviet bureaucrats use their privileged positions to enforce
conformity, the Kremlin needed to create institutions such as an independent judiciary
much more needs to be done.” See Letter, Reagan to Gorbachev, 10 April 1987, ES: GSG, Box 41, Folder:
8790364 (1/2), RRPL.
875
Ibid.
876
Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, 478.
448
that limited the power they could wield over private citizens. Gorbachev also needed to
curb “arbitrary” decision-making and pass laws that protected basic civil liberties and the
right to emigrate. Because he wanted Soviet officials to accept the legitimacy of
pluralism, he also asked them to end the jamming of Western radio broadcasts and allow
the publication of outlawed authors such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn.877
As countless scholars have pointed out, Reagan also called on Gorbachev to
remove the structure that best symbolized the Cold War divisions that separated Eastern
and Western Europe: The Berlin Wall. In June 1987, he delivered remarks at the
Brandenburg Gate that acknowledged the positive steps Moscow had taken to address
Western concerns about human rights violations. Nevertheless, he posed the question:
“Are these the beginnings of profound changes in the Soviet state? Or are they token
gestures, intended to raise false hopes in the West, or to strengthen the Soviet system
without changing it.” “If you seek liberalization,” he told Gorbachev, then “tear down
this wall!”878
During the Vienna follow-up meeting, U.S. delegates made sure that their Soviet
counterparts heard many of the same arguments that Reagan had advanced in public. To
combat any suggestion that the Soviet internal practices now conformed to the
requirements of the Final Act, they went out of the way to describe the harsh conditions
of the Soviet gulag and the sorry plight of hundreds of individual dissenters, including the
death of Marchenko. Chairman Warren Zimmerman admitted that Gorbachev had taken
877
PPOP, 1987, Vol. I, 594; Ibid., Vol. II, 1239, 1271; Ibid., 1988, Vol. I, 128, 434, 452, 551, 555, 643,
720; Ibid., 1988, Vol. II, 993, 1499, 1614, 1634-5.
878
PPOP, 1987, Vol. I, 634-7.
449
many positive steps, but told the other delegations that the Soviet leaders still had not
gone far enough. “To bring the Soviet Union into full compliance with its Helsinki
commitments . . . the process which he [Gorbachev] has . . . initiated must be continued,
enlarged, and institutionalized. I stress the word “institutionalized” because credible
mechanisms are essential to ensure that this important process will not be reversed.879
As Reagan and many of his subordinates understood, the steps that they had asked
Gorbachev to take amounted to repudiating the ideological underpinnings and
governmental structures that bound the multinational, multiethnic Soviet empire together.
As a result of his pragmatic instincts, Reagan worked to combat suggestions that Soviet
reform represented a capitulation to American demands. On 4 May 1988, he spoke of
how “the Soviets should recognize basic human rights . . . . because they have accepted
international obligations, particularly in the Helsinki Final Act.” Then again, he
admitted: “If they recognize human rights for reasons of their own---because they seek
economic growth or because they want to enter into a more normal relationship with the
United States and other nations—well, I want to say here and now, that’s fine by me.”880
Reagan’s pragmatic instincts continued to shape how he went about holding the
Soviets accountable for their internal behavior behind closed doors. On 15 September
1987, he told Shevardnadze that he appreciated the Soviet government’s recent decisions
to allow long-time refuseniks such as Iosif Begun to emigrate. At the same time, he
879
U.S. Helsinki Commission, Phase I of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference and Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 100 Congress, 1st session, 1986 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1987), 33.
880
PPOP, 1988, Vol. I, 554. He also explained that he did not want Gorbachev to appear as a “loser.” See
Ibid., 557.
450
reiterated that “more must be done to assure free emigration, to release political
prisoners, to let divided spouses rejoin, [and] to end the persecution of religious
dissenters.” Reagan then reminded Shevardnadze about the importance of tearing down
the Berlin Wall. “People would believe you mean glasnost at home and abroad, if you
acted in Berlin.”881
Despite uttering these strong criticisms, Reagan made a conscious effort to make
his positions more palatable to Shevardnadze. Instead of emphasizing international
standards, he explained that “we do not belabor human rights issues to put you on the
political defensive or to gain bargaining advantage.” “We are simply trying to
communicate what we deeply believe it takes to bridge this gap between us.” He also
recognized “the special sensitivity involved” in permitting the emigration of a woman
whose husband had defected to England. Given potential complications, he suggested
that “the Soviets might handle this matter by simply exiling him or banning her.” If the
Soviets felt uncomfortable tearing down the Berlin Wall, Reagan advised him that they
might take smaller steps such as “improved air access, international conferences, and
perhaps . . . [holding] an Olympics in Berlin.”882
During the Washington summit, Reagan once again raised the issue of Soviet
human rights violations. After handing Gorbachev another list of Soviet private citizens
who wanted to emigrate, Reagan asked the American transcribers to put down their pens
so he could “make a purely personal suggestion in the area of human rights.” In response
881
Memorandum of Conversation, “Meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze of the USSR,” 3-
5.
882
Ibid., 3 and 7.
451
to this gesture, Gorbachev thanked the President for his consistent “tact” and reassured
him that “the Soviet government would do its utmost to remove” the issue of emigration
“from the agenda.” 883 Instead of recounting the litany of Soviet human rights abuses that
cast doubt on this argument, Reagan chose a different a path. “[W]hile there were
different philosophies,” he told Gorbachev, “even primitive African tribes had some idea
of God and worship.” From this angle, Soviet restrictions on such a basic human impulse
explained why “some one-half million Jews sought to leave the USSR for religiouscultural freedom.” To ease Gorbachev’s obvious discomfort with these words, Reagan
told him that he had “meant no threat by his line of argument.” Yet, when the General
Secretary equated Soviet restrictions on Jewish emigration to American quotas on
Mexican immigration, Reagan refused to move an inch. He rejected the analogy and told
him that “the fundamental point was that the USSR prevented people from getting out,
that it compelled them to stay.”884
Reagan’s concerns about Soviet sensibilities and domestic opposition to reform
predisposed him to accept Gorbachev’s suggestion that experts from each country hold
regular panel discussions that allowed them to exchange their mutual concerns about
domestic conditions in the United States and USSR. The first of these meetings took
place in March 1988 and covered the topics of psychiatric treatment, capital punishment,
freedom of conscience, and “the relationship between national and international standards
governing human rights.” Five months later, a “’Rule of Law Conference’” took place in
883
Memorandum of Conversation,, “Meeting with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, 10:45-12:30 PM,
8 December 1987, 1-3.
884
Ibid., 3-4.
452
Moscow. The two sides “discussed various guidelines needed to ensure an independent
judiciary” and the “admissibility of wiretap evidence.” They also discussed the conditions
of Soviet and American prisons.885 These negotiations served U.S. interests because they
required Soviet bureaucrats to hear about the steps involved in creating democratic
institutions. They also forced “Soviet officials” to concede “that there are [human rights]
problems that they have to face . . . [and] are trying to correct.” At the same time, as
Reagan must have gleaned from his private conservations with Gorbachev, they also
allowed the Soviet reformers to tell their domestic critics that they had not capitulated to
American demands and raised the issue of U.S. human rights violations.886
Besides raising issues related to human rights, Reagan remained committed to
opening up Soviet society. While ideological considerations were never absent, he
continued to believe that Soviet internal behavior would not improve unless they allowed
their private citizens to have regular and normal contacts with their counterparts across
the globe. In April 1986, he signed NSDD-223, which called on the U.S. government to
build on the exchange agreement signed in Geneva and “expand dramatically contacts
and communications between the peoples of our two countries.” Once again reflecting
language found in the Final Act designed to break down the barriers between Eastern and
Western Europe, this document advocated the expansion of ‘sister city’ relationships,”
the “inauguration of regular media exchanges,” and further exchanges between Soviet
885
American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1988 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1989),
323-6; and CSCE Digest (July/August 1988): 5.
886
American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1988 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1989),
323-6.
453
and American youths.887 Along with calling for more frequent exchanges among “civic,
religious, and other groups,” this document also advocated the “increased publication and
distribution of each other’s books and publications.” Because Reagan placed particular
importance on expanding person-to-person exchanges, he also approved the creation of a
new office under the jurisdiction of the USIA called the Coordinator for the President’s
U.S.-Soviet Exchange Initiative. On paper, the person holding this position would focus
on working with the private sector to increase the level of U.S-Soviet exchanges.888
Some critics argue that Reagan could have spent more government money to
ensure the lasting success of his exchange initiative. While debates about appropriate
funding levels will always exist, USIA Director Charles Wick held exhaustive
consultations with Soviet officials designed to increase the scope of information
exchanges between the two nations. He attempted to create a framework whereby each
side could challenge the “alleged disinformation” and false public statements “of the
other.” In addition to negotiating the expansion of book and movie exchanges, he
encouraged his Soviets counterparts to bypass the U.S. government and negotiate
exchanges with the American private sector. Wick also played an important role
increasing the number of interviews Reagan held with Soviet journalists in 1987.
Although bureaucratic resistance made the implementation of the agreement all but
impossible, Wick accepted a Soviet proposal that pledged the U.S. government to help
the USSR “obtain transmission time on a U.S. radio station” in return for “VOA access to
887
Simpson, ed., National Security Directives of the Bush Administration, 690-3.
888
Ibid.
454
a local Soviet radio facility.” In a similar vein, Soviet bureaucratic resistance stood in the
way of implementing another agreement allowing the VOA to open an office in
Moscow.889
The emphasis Reagan placed on increasing U.S.-Soviet exchanges once again
reminds us that he never followed rigid linkages to modify Soviet internal behavior. The
Soviets may not have “institutionalized” democratic institutions as quickly as he wanted,
but he permitted officials either to renew or sign new cooperative agreements in areas as
diverse as environmental protection and space travel. As part of his efforts to improve
U.S.-Soviet relations, he continued to support American participation in the Final Act
forum in Stockholm known as the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). While
some members of Congress and private groups argued that these negotiations
downgraded the visibility of human rights issues within the Helsinki Process, they
produced important results. For the first time, the Soviets agreed to the on-site
verification of military confidence-building measures (CBM). Because Reagan had
always wanted to sign verifiable nuclear reduction agreements, the Soviet government’s
change of attitude toward inspections laid the groundwork for the 1987 IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.890
889
Richmond, U.S.-Soviet Cultural Exchanges, 1958-1986, 109-110; Letter, Wick to Reagan, 22 December
1987, NSC: SF, Box 8, Folder 8709497; and Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation, 90-1, 115-6, 169-74,
178-9, 183-4. The expansion of the books and movies took place in practice. See “USSR-USA: Widening
of Book Exchange,” TASS, 10 November 1988; and “U.S., Soviets to Exchange Recent Movies,” The
Associated Press, 22 June 1988.
890
U.S. Helsinki Commission, Phase I of the Vienna Review Meeting of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 3; and Ibid., Stockholm Meeting of the Conference on Confidence and SecurityBuilding Measures and Disarmament in Europe, 2, 52-64, and 73. See also Korey, The Promises We Keep,
221-7.
455
Besides signing an arms control treaty, Reagan took some small steps to address
the Kremlin’s concerns about the low levels of Soviet-American trade. Of course, unlike
Carter, he never really considered certifying Soviet compliance with the requirements of
the Jackson-Vanik amendment. He also saw no reason to ease restrictions on the transfer
of “strategic technologies” that weakened U.S. national security. Yet, he continued to
sanction American participation in the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R Commercial Commission
sessions designed to facilitate Soviet-American trade. Near the beginning of 1987, he
chose to ease restrictions “on the export of [oil] drilling equipment to the Soviet Union”
that Jimmy Carter had imposed in 1978.891
Reagan’s willingness to pursue arms control and discuss economic issues with the
Soviet Union led some Congressional and public critics to argue that the executive
branch cared more about improving U.S.-Soviet relations than rectifying Soviet internal
behavior.892 These critiques serve as a reminder that Reagan’s approach to improving
Soviet-American relations had some important commonalities with the Helsinki process.
891
Anne Swardson, “U.S. Lifts Controls on Export of Drilling Gear to Soviets,” Washington Post, 16
January 1987, A1. See also “US to rethink Soviet Oil Ban,” The Guardian (London), 30 December 1986;
and “A Way to Help,” Oil & Gas Journal, 23 June 1986, 27; and “U.S. Approves Efforts to Widen Trade
with USSR,” TASS, 7 April 1988. At one point, he also rejected suggestions to place a ban on the
importation of Soviet chocolate and tea because “we can’t confirm whether products are made by
convicts.” See also Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, 632. For a description of Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R
Commercial sessions, see “Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission (JCC),” WHORM IT086-IT101,
Folder: IT095, RRPL.
892
CSCE Digest (July/August 1988): 3; U.S. Helsinki Commission, Soviet Jewry Struggle, 100 Cong., 1st
session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 45-8; U.S. Helsinki Commission
Hearings, Bern Human Contacts Meeting, 71; and U.S. Helsinki Commission Hearings, Stockholm Meeting
of the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, 69.
Although he goes much too far, Stuart Altshuler advances the argument that private citizens checked the
Reagan administration’s interest in increasing U.S.-Soviet trade. See Altshuler, From Exodus to Freedom,
60-4. Commerce Secretary William Verity received a letter from the Coalition of Free Soviet Jews that
criticized the administration for thinking about supporting “Soviet membership in the General Agreement
on Trade and Tariffs and the International Monetary Fund.” See Letter, Coalition of Free Jews to William
Verity, 4 February 1988, Matthew Zachary Files, Box 1, Folder: Soviet Jewry, RRPL.
456
On the eve of the Moscow summit, Reagan told an audience in Helsinki that the “General
Secretary and I have developed a broad agenda that is linked directly to the agenda of the
Final Act.” As he put it:
The Final Act grapples with the full range of our underlying differences and deals
with East-West relations as an interrelated whole. It reflects the belief of all our
countries that human rights issues are less likely to be abused when a nation’s
security is less in doubt; that economic relations can contribute to security, but
depend on the trust and confidence that come from increasing ties between our
peoples, increasing openness, and increasing freedom.893
After outlining how Soviet internal practices still fell far short of Final Act
standards, he raised the issue of Gorbachev’s emphasis on a “common European home.”
Instead of focusing on geography, he asked the audience to think about “what is it that
cements the structure of clear purpose that all our nations pledged themselves to by their
signature on the Final Act?” He called the answers to these questions obvious: “the
belief in the inalienable rights and dignity of every single human being” and a
“commitment to true pluralist democracy.” As the twentieth century drew to a close,
Reagan remarked, the failures and brutalities of totalitarian regimes promising a “perfect
world” had become clear for all to see. “Once it was the democracies that doubted their
own view of freedom and wondered whether utopian systems might be better. Today the
doubt is on the other side.”894
These words set the stage for Reagan’s memorable performance at the Moscow
summit. This meeting represented logical outcome of the approach he had taken to
rectify Soviet human rights violations since the end of 1986. Before he arrived, Reagan
893
PPOP, 1988, Vol. I, 656-60.
894
Ibid.
457
made a pragmatic concession. After internal debates, he cancelled a planned visit to the
home of a refusenik family when a Soviet spokesperson indicated that such a meeting
would prevent the individuals in question from ever receiving emigration permission. 895
This decision did not dampen his determination to raise the issue of Soviet human
rights violations. Standing in the Danilov monastery, he quoted the words of the
outlawed author Solzhenitsyn to highlight the inherent religiosity of the Soviet people.
He also voiced his hope that members of the illegal Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox
Churches “will soon be able to practice their religion freely and instruct their children . . .
in the fundamentals of their faith.” When addressing dissenters at Spaso House, Reagan
articulated his determination to remind Gorbachev that restrictions on emigration and
freedom of speech still violated Final Act standards. Recognizing the enormous
sacrifices involved in their struggles, he told them that “I came here hoping to do what I
could to give you strength.” “Yet I already know it is you who have strengthened me,
you who have given me a message to carry back [home].”896
Reagan also addressed the students and faculty of Moscow State University.
Reflecting his belief in the importance of making Soviet society more open and free, he
went out of his way to highlight the benefits of democratic freedoms and institutions. He
not only linked them with economic growth and prosperity, but also explained in detail
how they their existence in the United States accounted for all the fundamental freedoms
Americans enjoyed. “Freedom is the recognition that no single person, no single
895
Buwalda, They Did Not Dwell Alone, 159-60.
896
PPOP, 1988, Vol. I, 674-7.
458
authority or government has a monopoly of truth,” he told the audience. “It is [also] the
right to put forth an idea, scoffed at by the experts, and watch it catch fire among the
people.” After calling on Gorbachev to institutionalize democratic reforms and tear
down the Berlin wall, he spoke of a day when the divisions between the East and West
had disappeared. “Nothing would please me more,” he observed, “than to see the day
that a concert promoter in . . . England could call up a Soviet rock group, without going
through any governmental agency, and have them playing in Liverpool the next night.”897
Behind closed doors, Reagan felt comfortable enough to express his hope that
U.S.-Soviet non-strategic trade would increase in the near future, but offered no firm
promises. He also raised the issue of Soviet human rights violations and stressed the
importance he placed on emigration issues. When Gorbachev criticized U.S. internal
behavior, he reiterated how U.S. democratic practices preserved the initiative and
freedom of private citizens. Since his pragmatic instincts never disappeared, Reagan
reassured him that he would not tell anyone that he had demanded Soviet human rights
concessions. Yet, “because they were friends,” he offered Gorbachev a suggestion in
light of the positive American experience with religious freedom.898 According to a
transcript of the meeting:
The President asked Gorbachev what if he ruled that religious freedom was part
of the people’s rights, that people of any religion—whether Islam with its
mosque, the Jewish faith, Protestants or the Ukrainian church—could go to the
897
898
Ibid., 677-80.
Memorandum of Conversation, “President’s Second One-on-One Meeting with General Secretary
Gorbachev,” 31 May 1988, 10:08-11:07 AM,” 7-9, Fritz Ermath Files, Box 1, Folder: 1988 Summit
Memcons (1/2), 26 May-3 June 1988, RRPL; and Memorandum of Conversation, “President’s First Oneon-One Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev,” 29 May 1988, 3:26-4:37 PM,” 3-7, Ibid.
459
church of their choice. . . . Potential emigrants often wanted to go because of their
limited ability to worship the God they believed in.899
To pique Gorbachev’s conscience, Reagan described how a Russian solider on the
Eastern Front questioned his atheism just before he died and wrote a note expressing his
hope that “God would accept me.”900
Well aware that he had asked Gorbachev to repudiate an important tenet of
Soviet-style socialism that might embolden domestic critics, Reagan couched his request
as an intimate personal favor. He indicated that granting religious freedom would make
the Soviet leader “a hero” and reduce the amount of international animus directed toward
the USSR. “If there was anyone in the room who said [that] he had given such advice,”
Reagan would call him a liar and reject any notion that he had made such a request. In
the end, “[t]his was not . . . something [that] someone should be told to do.” Because he
did not want Gorbachev to appear weak in the eyes of his domestic critics, he articulated
a similar position in public. During the question and answer session at Moscow
University, he blamed the inertia of the Soviet bureaucracy rather than Gorbachev for the
backlog of private citizens who had not yet received permission to emigrate.901
Although arms control negotiations stalled in Moscow, the two sides reached a
number of agreements consistent with American goals for the meeting. They signed a
new “implementing program” that increased the level of high school exchanges and
called for the opening of “culture/information centers in the U.S. and U.S.S.R.” They
899
Memorandum of Conversation, “President’s First One-on-One Meeting with General Secretary
Gorbachev,” 29 May 1988, 3:26-4:37 PM, 6.
900
Ibid., 7.
901
Ibid., 7; and PPOP, 1988, Vol. I, 692.
460
also agreed to institutionalize the U.S.-Soviet human rights forums that had started the
previous year. Echoing the suggestions of Gorbachev, the Moscow concluding document
called for American and Soviet legislators to hold regular meetings where they could
articulate their mutual concerns about the other side’s human rights violations. The
Soviet leader may have wanted to keep all human rights meetings between the two
countries “closed,” but ended up accepting U.S. language that reaffirmed the important
role private citizens and NGOs played in facilitating the exchange of information
between “their two societies.”902
These agreements produced tangible results consistent with courses of action that
the Final Act encouraged signatories to follow. In November 1988, American and Soviet
legislators participated in a seminar on humanitarian cooperation and human rights held
in Moscow. During the proceedings, a Soviet spokesperson blamed his country’s poor
human rights record on “Stalin’s personality cult, his authoritarian rule,” and the
continued existence of the “administrative-bureaucratic system which developed in those
years.” “At the present,” he told his American counterparts, “the Soviet Union is trying
to overcome the negative phenomena inherited from the past and create a system of legal
norms which would establish democratic principles governing relations between man,
society, and law.” At another meeting, “representatives of the Soviet and U.S. public”
902
For a copy of this summit’s joint statement, see: Available [Online]:
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1988/060188b.htm [10 December 2007]. See also
“Soviet-U.S. Parliamentarians’ human rights seminar in Moscow,” BBC, 16 November 1988; Michael R.
Gordon, “Moscow Summit; U.S. and Soviet Agree to Widen Student Exchange,” The New York Times, 1
June 1988, A1; and “Reagan, Gorbachev Hail Mammoth U.S.-Soviet Cultural Fest,” The Associated Press,
12 March 1988; and Memo, Nelson Ledsky to Paul Schott Stevens, “Moscow Public Diplomacy Themes,”
6 May 1988, Fritz Ermath Files, Box 1, Folder: Moscow Summit—Public Diplomacy, 26 May-3 June
1988, RRPL.
461
created a “joint action” program designed to solve human rights “problems . . . still
persisting in both countries.” To accomplish this task, the agreement called for the
exchange of legal education and television programs devoted to human rights issues. It
also advocated the exchange of experts, lecturers, and students interested in legal issues
and penal reform.903
While sensitive to the issue of domestic opposition, Reagan continued to make
public statements in defense of dissenters. On 8 December 1988, he praised the role
private citizens played showing the world how governments suppressed the exercise of
basic human freedoms. He also continued to argue that Soviet leaders would not
overcome international distrust until they institutionalized democratic laws and practices.
During his last private meeting with Gorbachev, Reagan handed the General Secretary
such a list and voiced his happiness “with the progress that had been made in the human
rights field since their last meeting.”904
The steps that the Soviet government took to create a more humane form of
socialism confirmed Reagan’s core belief that freedom would one day triumph over
tyranny. Near the end of his presidency, he reminded Americans that the Cold War had
not begun because of some sort of tragic mistake:
903
“Soviet-U.S. Human Rights Seminar Continues in Moscow,” TASS, 16 November 1988; and “SovietAmerican Forum for “’Life and Human Rights,” TASS, 7 December 1988. The Soviet side raised the issue
of homelessness in the United States and the “harboring of undocumented illegal aliens in the United
States.” See “U.S.-Soviet Human Rights Talks End,” United Press International, 18 November 1988; and
“Human Rights Dialogue Makes Headway,” 21 December 1988, CDSP. This article can be located at
Lexis-Nexis.
904
See Memorandum of Conversation, “The President’s Private Meeting with Gorbachev,” 7 December
1988, 1:05-1:30 PM, Executive Secretariat, Box 10, Folder: 8890944, RRPL.
462
Far to the contrary, it was understanding—not misunderstanding—that was the
root cause. . . . I speak here of the clear consensus that developed in the West
shortly after World War II on several vital points: the true nature of the Soviet
regime, the fundamental distinction between totalitarianism and democracy, and
the moral duty to resist the international threat to human rights posed by Soviet
expansion.905
Reagan’s speeches about the demise of totalitarianism and “forward march of
freedom” remain important testaments to the winding down of the Cold War and the
chain of events that resulted in the dissolution of the Soviet empire. As the next section
of this chapter will explain, however, Reagan’s words were probably less important than
his commitment to holding the Soviets accountable for their violations of the Final Act.
The Helsinki process ended up giving the administration a powerful way of making sure
that the Soviet government continued to move in the direction of respecting basic human
rights. It also gave the United States a legitimate and visible way of protecting the civil
society that began to emerge in the Soviet Union as a result of Gorbachev’s reforms.906
The Helsinki Accords, Private Citizen Diplomacy, and Democracy Promotion, Part
II
Reagan’s willingness to mention the important role private citizens played in
holding the Soviets accountable for their human rights violations only reflected the
conclusions that many of his subordinates had already drawn. Voicing sentiments similar
to those of Elliott Abrams, Shultz told an audience in 1986 “that we must . . . work
closely with our concerned domestic constituencies.” “One of the highlights of the recent
meeting in Reykjavik,” he explained, “was its intimate relation to one of the most
905
906
PPOP, 1988, Vol. II, 1404.
For a similar argument, see Stefan Lehne, The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 1986-1989: A Turning Point in East-West Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1991), 138, 185.
463
intensive series of domestic human rights consultations in history.” “Nongovernmental
organizations and members of Congress directly participated in the formulation of our
negotiating position.” While political considerations were not absent, Shultz noted that
these consultations contributed to “American successes at the summit.” Because
Gorbachev grasped that the American public supported Reagan’s position on human
rights, “we succeeded in obtaining grudging Soviet acknowledgement of the rightful
place of” this issue in U.S.-Soviet negotiations.907
Shultz had every reason to articulate these positions. Before the Reykjavik
summit, State Department officials held frequent meetings with and accepted materials
from members of the UCSJ, NCSJ, IHF, and the U.S. Helsinki Commission.908 During
one of these meetings, IHF member Jeri Laber told a high-ranking State Department
official that the Soviets preferred to deport refuseniks rather than political prisoners who
testified to the existence of domestic opposition. As a result of this information, the U.S.
government insisted that settling the Daniloff affair required the Kremlin to release a
political prisoner such as Orlov rather than someone who wanted to emigrate.909 Near the
end of 1988, Assistant Secretary Richard Schifter received an award from UCSJ for his
services on behalf of Soviet Jews. In his acceptance speech, he told the audience that
907
George Shultz, “Human Rights and Soviet-American Relations,” Current Policy, no. 882 (Washington,
DC: U.S. State Department, 1986), 3-4.
908
Altshuler, From Exodus to Freedom, 35-74; Walter Ruby, “The Role of Nonestablishment Groups,” in
Freidman and Chernin, ed., A Second Exodus, 203-7, 218-22; Richard Schifter, “American Diplomacy,
1985-1989,” in Ibid., 144-8; and Myrna Shinbaum, “Mobilizing America: The National Conference on
Soviet Jewry,” in Ibid., 174-80; Naftalin, “The Activist Movement,” in Ibid., 225-30; Andrew Harrison,
Passover Revisited: Philadelphia’s Efforts to Aid Soviet Jews, 1963-1998 (Teaneck, PA: Farleigh
Dickinson Press, 2001), 207; and Laber, The Courage of Strangers, 250-3 and 260-5.
909
Laber, The Courage of Strangers, 252-4. See also Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts, 300-1; and Brinkley, ed.,
The Reagan Diaries, 389.
464
“[y]ou and all those who have joined you in this effort have indeed been instrumental in
putting the issues of Soviet Jewish emigration on the US public agenda.” This statement
was more than a public relations stratagem. As he later recounted, he utilized the
information private citizens gave him to challenge Soviet emigration refusals based on an
applicant’s possession of “state secrets.”910
The U.S. Helsinki commission and private citizens also continued to play pivotal
roles in shaping how the executive branch both prepared for and behaved during the Final
Act meetings in Bern and Vienna. Before the former meeting took place, Michael Novak
held numerous meetings with NGOs and Commission staffers with the specific purpose
of obtaining information about dissenters and conditions in the Soviet Union. He called
the materials he received during these sessions valuable because “they facilitate our
substantive preparations” and “add to the ammunition in our briefing books for the actual
work of the session.” 911 Warren Zimmerman behaved in a similar fashion. He held
informal private meetings with Soviet émigrés and a wide array of NGO representatives.
As they had in the past, State Department officials worked with the Commission “in
writing detailed briefing books, files, and reports prepared for use by the U.S. delegation
in Vienna.” As another report indicated, “the Commission’s lengthy report on
910
“Address by Richard Schifter, “U.S. Representative to the UN Commission on Human Rights at the
Union of Councils for Soviet Jewry Awards Banquet,” Federal News Service, 16 October 1988; and
“Question and Answer Period Following Remarks by Rozanne Ridgeway, Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs and Richard Schifter, U.S. Representative to the UN Commission on
Human Rights at the Union of Councils for Soviet Jewry Awards Banquet,” Ibid.; and Schifter, “American
Diplomacy, 1985-1989,” in Freidman and Albert D. Chernin, ed., A Second Exodus.
911
Novak, Taking Glasnost Seriously, 10. See also U.S. Helsinki Commission Hearings, Bern Human
Contacts Meeting, 3-30.
465
implementation of the Helsinki Final Act served as an important reference throughout the
meeting.”912
In the months preceding the Vienna follow-up meeting, the State Department
once again accepted many of the Commission’s recommendations. Executive branch
officials and Commission staffers organized “NGO briefings” designed to solicit the
input of private citizens. They also held numerous open forums in cities such as Miami
and New York aimed at further increasing public interest in the Helsinki process.
Following the precedent Carter had established at Belgrade and Madrid, Reagan agreed
to appoint fifteen public members to the U.S. delegation in Vienna. Once this meeting
began, “the U.S. delegation established a public liaison office” that “provided NGOS
with information, facilitated access to the conference site, and arranged interviews with
the press.” U.S. delegates also “held formal NGO briefings and numerous meetings, both
formal and informal, with” private citizens. In particular, Warren Zimmerman went out
his way to discuss American positions with Soviet émigrés who attended the meeting.913
While executive branch officials recognized the important role NGOs played in
providing information about conditions in the Soviet Union, they also supported the
912
Laber, The Courage of Strangers, 261-2; U.S. Helsinki Commission, Phase I of the Vienna Meeting of
the Conference and Security and Cooperation in Europe, 3-7; U.S. Helsinki Commission, Phase III and IV
of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference and Security and Cooperation in Europe, 100 Congress, 2nd
session, 1988 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 10-37; and Annual Report of
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe for the Period Covering January 1 through December
31, 1986 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 3-4, 6-9. See also Annual Report of
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe for the Period Covering January 1 1987 through
December 31, 1988 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 3-4; and U.S. Helsinki
Commission Hearings, Stockholm Meeting of the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe, 81.
913
Annual Report of Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe for the Period Covering January
1 through December 31, 1986, 7 and 21-2; and Laber, The Courage of Strangers, 261-2. See also Korey,
The Promises We Keep, Chapters 11-13.
466
activities of private citizens for more practical reasons. As indicated in Chapter VIII,
they grasped that defending the right of private citizens to participate in the Helsinki
process and monitor governments Final Act compliance record gave the U.S. government
an excellent way of challenging Soviet leaders’ traditional intolerance of diversity and
pluralism. Much like their predecessors, U.S. delegates in Vienna and Bern never
stopped advancing proposals that allowed private citizens to attend closed sessions.
When defending this position, Novak reminded his fellow delegates that “thoughtful
citizens are ahead of governments” on most issues. They “often generate new ideas,
imagine new horizons, and help to shape the agenda of the future.” Aware of the broad
international impulse against bureaucratic discretion and authority described in previous
chapters, he argued that “nongovernmental organizations keep governments honest.”
“Governments generally need that,” he argued, because they “like to project a favorable
image of themselves.”914
The ways in which Gorbachev’s calls for “democratization” increased the number
of private citizens engaged in public non-official activities created problems for Soviet
officials. Visible signs that a Soviet civil society had begun to emerge left U.S. delegates
in a much stronger position to challenge the continuation of Soviet practices that violated
the ability of individuals “to know and act upon their rights.” Zimmerman told the other
delegations in Vienna a Final Act meeting in Moscow could not place as long as Warsaw
Pact delegates continued to argue that “the monitoring of [human rights] commitments
can only be entrusted to” governments. If Gorbachev really wants Soviet private citizens
914
Novak, Taking Glasnost Seriously, 3-7 and 110-2. See also Lehne, The Vienna Meeting of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1986-1989, 76-86.
467
“to teach and learn democracy,” he asked, “why not give them valuable experience by
encouraging them to monitor the Soviet government’s Final Act compliance record?”915
In defense of his argument, Zimmerman pointed out that the Soviets had invited
the IHF to attend an official human rights seminar in Moscow. While an important step,
they still had to prove that they could tolerate non-official monitoring of their domestic
behavior before any Final Act meeting could take place in their country. He therefore
challenged the Kremlin to sanction the efforts of the Press Club Glasnost (PCG) to hold
its own human rights seminar in Moscow near the end of 1987. Citing this group’s
appeal to the Vienna gathering, Zimmerman called the Soviet attitude toward this
meeting “an important test” because PCG “sees itself as part of the non-governmental
element of the Helsinki Process.”916
One month before the Moscow summit took place, Shultz used his private
meeting with Shevardnadze to relay the message that the Soviets would have “to resolve
difficult issues” to satisfy American concerns about Soviet human rights violations. To
drive home this point, he reminded the Foreign Minister that the U.S. government had
allowed Soviet physicians to visit Leonard Peltier in prison “even though we did not
agree with” your government’s “characterization of him as a political prisoner.” When
“an American organization sought to examine several Soviet political prisoners” several
months ago, he continued, “their appeal went unanswered.” “If the Soviet government
915
U.S. Helsinki Commission, Phase III and IV of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference and Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 19-21.
916
Ibid.
468
endorsed the visit to Mr. Peltier, it must surely recognize the humanitarian principle on
which that request was based” and reciprocate.917
Reagan also tested Gorbachev’s commitment to reform by keeping the U.S.
government an active participant in the Chautauqua Conferences on U.S.-Soviet
relations. These “town-hall” meetings continued to give American private citizens the
opportunity for asking government officials tough questions about emigration restrictions
and the existence of political prisoners. This forum also proved particularly valuable
because Gorbachev allowed these meetings to take place on Soviet territory every other
year after they began in 1985. During the 1988 meeting in Tbilisi, Georgia, a number of
Georgian private citizens complained to Soviet representatives about their living
conditions, restrictions of religious practices, and “Russian domination of [official]
policy.918 The State Department favored participation in Chautauqua Conferences
because they gave the U.S. government an excellent way of reaching Soviet domestic
audiences. During the 1986 meeting in Jurmala, Latvia, the opening address of NSC
staffer Jack Matlock appeared on local televisions stations. Using a mixture of Latvian
and Russian, he explained how the United States had never recognized the Soviet
incorporation of the Baltic republics. He also described why Americans placed so much
importance on how governments behaved toward their citizens. According to Matlock, a
917
Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, “The Secretary’s Initial Meeting with
Shevardnadze,” 7. Available [Online]: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB251/7.pdf [8
June 2008].
918
Mackenzie, When Stars and Stripes Met Hammer and Sickle, 140.
469
number of Latvians who later worked for independence from Moscow drew inspiration
from his words.919
While the next chapter will explain Gorbachev’s behavior in greater detail,
Soviet officials took a number of steps to address U.S. governmental and public
criticisms of their Final Act compliance record and inability to tolerate non-official
opinions. The Foreign Ministry created an office devoted to cultural and humanitarian
affairs in mid-1986. The Soviet government also set up a “public” organization devoted
to “humanitarian problems and human rights” “composed of journalists, intellectuals, and
workers” on the eve of the Washington summit.920 Resembling the U.S. Helsinki
Commission, this organization defined its task as educating government officials about
the importance of human rights and monitoring Soviet compliance with the Final Act. It
also pledged to work with “corresponding international public organizations” as part of
the universal campaign to make all governments respect all basic human rights.921
Soviet officials at all levels of government also began to back away from the
argument that citing human rights violations represented interference in their country’s
“internal affairs.” In Bern and Vienna, they started hold press conferences about
domestic conditions in the USSR and the proposals they had supported behind closed
919
Ibid., 47-8, 53, 55, 75-6, 189, 91; and Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 203-5. See also Memo for
George Shultz, “Materials on the President’s Meeting in Reykjavik,” 4 October 1986, 8.
920
“Human Rights Commission Established in the Soviet Union,” Xinhua General Overseas News Service,
26 December 1987; “Soviet Publicist on Human Rights Commission in the USSR,” TASS, 26 December
1987; and “Soviet Human Rights Commission Complaints Committee and Legislation Planned,” BBC
Summary of International Broadcasting, 1 January 1988.
921
“Soviet Publicist on Human Rights Commission in the USSR,” TASS, 26 December 1987; “Soviet
Human Rights Commission Appeals for Amnesty for Religious Prisoners,” BBC Summary of International
Broadcasting, 12 August 1988; and “Soviet Human Rights head seeks Pardon for Religious Prisoners;
Fydor Burlatsky,” The Times (London), 30 January 1988.
470
doors. They also held discussions with Western private citizens both inside and outside
Final Act forums. When IHF representatives arrived in January 1988, they participated
in “high-level” meetings with a wide array of Soviet bureaucrats, including those who
represented the Soviet Helsinki Commission, the Serbsky Institute for Forensic
Psychiatry and Council on Religious Affairs. According to a Helsinki Watch publication,
Soviet authorities did not prevent IHF delegates from meeting with a wide array of nonofficial groups, including Perestroika ’88 and the Moscow Trust Group.922
While American and Soviet delegates traded barbs in Bern, Gorbachev held a
private meeting with members of the U.S. Helsinki Commission concerning the Soviet
government’s respect for basic human rights. Over the course of the next two years,
Commission members participated in human rights debates with deputies of the Supreme
Soviet that appeared on both American network and Soviet television. Near the end of
1988, Commission members accepted the General Secretary’s invitation to discuss
human rights issues with Supreme Soviet deputies in Moscow.923 The efforts of Soviet
officials to illustrate their new commitment to respecting basic human rights took some
unexpected turns. In the fall of 1988, a Soviet delegate in Vienna accepted an invitation
to outline Moscow’s reform efforts at a conference on international human rights
standards hosted by the United National Human Rights Center in Milan, Italy. Around
the same time, Soviet representatives at the Chautauqua conference in Tbilisi admitted
922
U.S. Helsinki Watch, “International Helsinki Federation Mission to Moscow”; and Jeri Laber, “Mission
to Moscow,” The New York Times Review of Books 35 (2 June 1988). See also Korey, The Promises We
Keep, 220-5. See also Amnesty International, News From the USSR (22 February 1988).
923
Annual Report of Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe for the Period Covering January
1 1987 through December 31, 1988, 6-7
471
that Western criticisms of the Soviet government’s systematic human rights violations
had significant merit. “It was senseless to deny them, even unnecessary,” he commented.
“The most important thing was that the Soviets themselves” had “on their own initiative
had decided to correct the situation.”924
Even though authorities still arrested some private citizens for holding nonofficial views and broke up demonstrations, Soviet representatives tried to appear more
tolerant toward dissenting opinions than their predecessors had. The summit in
Reykjavik marked the first time that Soviet officials agreed to “meet with former . . .
dissenters and protesters now living abroad.” These meetings continued during the
Vienna follow-up meeting. Although authorities closed “meeting halls” and detained a
number of “organizers,” they ended up allowing the well-attended human rights seminar
of PCG to take place in December 1987. In the spring of 1988, members of the Soviet
Helsinki Commission agreed to meet with an IHF delegation in Moscow that included
Orlov.925
The steps that the Soviet government took to address the critiques of the U.S.
government and private citizens only gave the Reagan administration further leverage in
setting the terms of how the Vienna conference would end. Shultz and U.S. delegates in
effect told their Soviet counterparts that the United States could not sign a concluding
document until took further steps to satisfy Western positions. In the immediate future,
924
Schifter, “American Diplomacy, 1985-1989,” 150-1; and Mackenzie, When Stars and Stripes Met
Hammer and Sickle, 140-1.
925
Korey, The Promises We Keep, 226; U.S. Helsinki Watch, “International Helsinki Federation Mission to
Moscow” Vol. II, no. 1 (22 February 1988): 1-6; and Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts, 300-5, 309-10. See also
U.S. Helsinki Watch, Dissidents Push the Limits of Glasnost: New Publications Reach the West (New
York: U.S. Helsinki Watch, 1987).
472
the Kremlin needed to stop jamming all Western radio broadcasts and implement
emigration procedures that limited the ability of bureaucrats to exercise arbitrary
discretion.926 Gorbachev proved receptive to these demands. As 1988 drew to a close, he
agreed to cease the jamming of all international broadcasts and used an address at the
United Nations to voice his intention of further easing emigration restrictions. When
taken together with the release of hundreds of political prisoners and rising levels of
emigration, Shultz decided that the Soviet government had done just enough to meet the
administration’s requirements. He therefore signed a concluding document on 17
January 1989 that called on Paris, Copenhagen, and Moscow to host “human dimension”
conferences over the course of the next three years.927
While holding a meeting covering human rights issues bolstered Gorbachev’s
image as a bold reformer, the U.S. government signed the Vienna concluding document
for one important reason: The contents of the agreement were consistent with Reagan
administration’s long-term goal of promoting the “process of change in the Soviet Union
toward a more pluralistic political and economic system in which the power of the
privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced.” For the first time, the Soviet government
admitted that human rights performance in no way fell within a nation’s “internal
affairs.” It even affirmed the right of signatories to call into question their counterparts’
performance in the “human dimension” of the Helsinki process. By accepting this
926
William Korey explains how the U.S. officials indicated that they would not agree to conclude the
meeting until the Soviets met their minimum human rights and emigration requirements. See Korey, The
Promises We Keep, 233-55.
927
For a copy of the Vienna follow-up meeting’s concluding document, see the following website.
Available [Online]: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/osce/text/VIENN89E.htm [10 April 2006]. See also
Korey, The Promises We Keep, 258-71.
473
position, all participating states also agreed to answer these “representations” through the
appropriate diplomatic channels. 928
In sharp contrast to the positions they had advanced at previous Final Act
meetings, the Soviets also for the first time accepted language referring to emigration as a
universal human right that no government could impede in an “arbitrary manner.” The
Vienna agreement also contained a significant amount of new language about religious
affairs. It called on signatories to respect the rights of religious communities to choose
their own personnel and “establish . . . accessible places of worship or assembly.” In
addition to protecting “the right of everyone to give and receive religious education in the
language of his choice,” the agreement pledged each signatory to respect the right of
religious communities to “produce, import and disseminate religious publications and
materials.”929
By signing the Vienna concluding document, the Soviet government also agreed
to engage in consistent dialogue with NGOs and private citizens designed to remove
“legal and administrative impediments inconsistent with CSCE provisions.” This
provision implied that Soviet officials would allow NGOs and private citizens to operate
with as much freedom in the upcoming Moscow conference as they had in Vienna and
Madrid. The agreement also forbade signatories from punishing private citizens for
permitting foreigners to stay in their homes. In language that Western nations must have
included to protect dissenters all over Eastern Europe, the document reaffirmed the right
928
“Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting.” For a more complete analysis of this mechanism, see
Korey, The Promises We Keep, 267-8.
929
“Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting.”
474
of private citizens “to obtain, possess, reproduce and distribute information materials of
all kinds.” The Soviets even swallowed a plank that called on participating states to
“ensure the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons belonging to
national minorities within their territory.”930
The Soviet government’s acceptance of this document does not mean that the
USSR had become a democratic state with bureaucrats who accepted basic civil liberties
and always tolerated pluralism. Nevertheless, the Reagan administration deserves credit
for remaining in active participant in the Helsinki process and working with transnational
actors to hold Soviet leaders accountable for their behavior. Given the larger Soviet goal
of becoming a “normal” Western nation, Gorbachev and other “liberal-minded” had little
choice but to take steps to show that their nation was no longer a systematic human rights
violator. From this angle, Reagan’s praise of U.S. democracy and military buildup did
not induce Soviet internal reform. Instead, he helped promote democracy in the USSR
because he made the executive branch an active participant in transnational movement
based on monitoring how well governments treated their private citizens. George Shultz
spoke about this reality long after he left office, noting that the Final Act “turned out to
be a great advantage to us. We used that [agreement] very effectively” to promote
internal reform in the Soviet Union.931
930
931
Ibid.
See Ronald Reagan Oral History Project, “Interview with George Shultz,” 18 December 2002. Available
[Online]: http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/oralhistories/reagan [10 December 2007].
475
CHAPTER 11: REVOLUTIONS FROM ABOVE AND BELOW: MIKHAIL
GORBACHEV, SOVIET BUREAUCRATS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE
TRIBULATIONS OF SOVIET CIVIL SOCIETY
At a Politburo meeting that took place in 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev explained why
he had reservations about denouncing Joseph Stalin in explicit terms. The Soviet citizens
who suffered from unwarranted persecution at this leader’s hands “worked without . . .
counting on using the fruit of their hellish labors.” These individuals deserved our
respect because “they were building the country, preparing it against fascism . . . [and]
fighting for” the idea of socialism. “Are we [now] . . . smart” enough to say that “‘[y]ou
did the wrong thing?’ No . . . [w]e need to respect the people.”932 Almost twenty years
later, Gorbachev reminisced about how dissenters complicated his efforts to transform
Soviet-style socialism. He insisted that the “originators of the dirtiest, most cynical
attacks on me are the very ones who received freedom at my hands” and “gained power
over peoples’ minds thanks to the openness policy called Glasnost.” Given his goal of
making Soviet government more democratic, he called the “malicious mudslinging” of
“people whom I literally helped to their feet . . . hard to understand.”933
These sentiments raise important questions about the reasons why Gorbachev and
other “liberal-minded” reformers took steps to make Soviet internal practices more
consistent with international human rights norms.934 To explain this development, some
932
See “Chernyaev Diary—1987,” 14-5. Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB250/Chernyaev_Diary_1987.pdf [15 June 2008].
See also Volkogonov, Autopsy for an Empire, 454; Laqueur, The Long Road to Freedom, 59-61.
933
See Moral Lessons of the Twentieth Century, 30.
476
constructivist political scientists have relied on processes such as “ideational persuasion”
and “rhetorical entrapment.” While these accounts have significant explanatory power,
they do not always illustrate the complexities and contradictions in Soviet behavior.935
Instead of privileging theory, this chapter will grapple with the contours of ideological
change that actually occurred in the minds of top-level Soviet policymakers and lowerranking officials. It will argue that the origins of Soviet reform lay in the dissatisfaction
Gorbachev and other “liberal-minded” reformers felt with the bureaucratic stagnation and
poor economic performance that plagued the USSR. Many of these individuals,
including Gorbachev, hoped to forge a superior “synthesis between socialism and
democracy” that would enhance the ability of the Soviet Union to engage in ideological
competition with capitalist nations like the United States.936
The steps that Gorbachev took to create a “more participatory” society ended up
shaping the general trajectory of his reform campaign.937 Working with transnational
human rights actors, Soviet private citizens exploited the “liberalized” political terrain to
challenge the legitimacy of the General Secretary’s preference for a “directed” glasnost.
They also called into question his determination to create a loyal civil society that
accepted his definitions of appropriate behavior. Although they loathed non-official
934
For a good account of the difficulties involved in showing how ideas shaped Gorbachev’s behavior, see
William C. Wohlforth, “The End of the Cold War as a Hard Case for Idea,” Journal of Cold War Studies 7,
no. 2 (2005): 165-73.
935
See Daniel Thomas, “Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War,”
Journal o f Cold War Studies 7 (Spring 2005): 110-141.
936
Jacques Levesque, “The Messianic Character of Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’: Why and What For?” in
Njolstad, ed., The Last Decade of the Cold War, 162.
937
John Gooding, “Gorbachev and Democracy,” Soviet Studies 42, no. 2 (April 1990), 205
477
activities, Gorbachev and other reform-minded officials found that they had little choice
but to carry out a wide array of steps designed to identify their government as an active
participant in a universal campaign for human rights.
The final section of this chapter will grapple with the successes and limitations of
Gorbachev’s reform campaign. In light of Russian and Soviet history, the signing of the
Vienna concluding document marked an important step toward creating a law-abiding
socialist state that had an obligation to respect each individual’s basic freedoms. Despite
this positive development, the cumulative impact of U.S. governmental and transnational
human rights critiques failed to change Gorbachev’s negative attitude toward non-official
activities that he viewed as a inconsistent with socialist “norms” or as a threat to the
continued existence of the USSR. In the end, the inability or unwillingness of many
Soviet officials to tolerate diversity had a predictable result. As the authority of CPSU
crumbled, the Soviet government failed to institutionalize the laws and practices
necessary to create a stable civil society capable of checking government behavior in a
stable manner.
“Curbing the Absurdities”: The Soviet Government, Human Rights, and Dissenters,
1985-1986
As a number of scholars have pointed out, when Gorbachev became General
Secretary in March 1985, he was ready to carry out reforms designed to revitalize Soviet
society, albeit without a master blueprint.938 The myriad of ills plaguing his nation such
938
For example, see English, Russia and the Idea of the West, 12-15, 193-240; English, “The Sociology of
New Thinking: Elites, Identity Change, and the End of the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 2
(Spring 2005): 43-80; English, “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War’s End: A Reply to
Brooks and Wohlforth,” International Security 26 (Spring 2002): 70-92; Brown, The Gorbachev Factor,
24-52; Daniel Thomas, “Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War,”
478
as economic stagnation and the prevalence of alcoholism may have shaped this
viewpoint, but he also saw a need for fundamental reform for other important reasons.
The cumulative effects of his work as an agricultural bureaucrat, as well as trips to
prosperous Western countries and Brezhnev’s crushing of the “Prague Spring, left him
with misgivings about how Soviet-style socialism operated in practice. As a result of
these doubts, Gorbachev began an active study of international relations and socialdemocratic thought. Unlike orthodox policymakers, he held extensive consultations with
the “liberal-minded” intellectuals such as Alexander Yakovlev who had managed to
retain positions within the Communist Party despite their sympathy for non-official
views.939 He also read dissident tracts and works on socialist democratic thought,
including “a collection of essays [on the Prague Spring] entitled The Dubcek Drama . . .
books by Antonio Gramsci, Roger Garaudy [the French Communist theoretician], and
articles by the West German Social Democratic leader Willy Brandt and the French
Socialist Party leader Francois Mitterrand.”940
Gorbachev’s interest in social-democratic thought flowed from his belief that
socialist countries had a number of inherent advantages over their capitalist counterparts.
118-23; John Gooding, “Gorbachev and Democracy.” Vladislav Zubok also describes Gorbachev’s
determination to move Soviet foreign policy and internal behavior away from the “imperial-revolutionary
foundation of the past.” See Zubok, “New Evidence on the ‘Soviet Factor’ in the Peaceful Revolutions of
1989,” Cold War History Project Bulletin 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001): 5-14; Zubok, A Failed Empire, 27887. See also Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms, 1-20; and Jacques Levesque, “The Messianic Character
of Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’: Why and What For?” in Njolstad, ed., The Last Decade of the Cold War,
159-178.
939
See Thomas, “Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War,” 119122; and English, Russia and the Idea of the West, 201-215.
940
Gorbachev cited these works during an interview he participated in with the Czech reformer Zdnek
Mlynar. See Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdenek Mylnar, trans. by George Shriver Conversations with
Gorbachev: On Perestroika, The Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2002), 50. See also Moral Lessons of the Twentieth Century, 30-1.
479
Based on this position, he viewed the growth and improvement of socialist systems as the
“logical . . . future of humankind.” This attitude accounts for why he attempted to
improve the performance of Soviet economy during his first two years in office through
the strengthening of social discipline and the acceleration (uskorenie) of “scientific and
technical progress.”941 It also explains why he felt obligated to keep the Soviet Union a
credible ideological power capable of winning the global struggle with capitalism within
the confines of a peaceful framework.942
Even though Gorbachev continued to make many statements consistent with
orthodox Marxist-Leninist positions, he took some steps to move beyond the confines of
his predecessors’ “old thinking.” The ways in which he grappled with the
interdependence of global civilization and social-democratic thought led him to identify
with the broad international impulse against bureaucratic discretion and authority
described in previous chapters. As his stint as General Secretary progressed, he became
more and more convinced that “the hierarchy of vassals and chiefs of principalities was in
fact the way the country was run. The democratic façade did not change the essence of
941
Gorbachev, M.S. Gorbachov: General Secretary of the CPSU and Member of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Volume II (Pergamon Press, 1987), 184. The quote about socialism being the
“logical . . . future of humankind” comes from the notes Alexander Yakovlev prepared for a Politburo
meeting near the end of 1988. See “Notes for Presentation at the Politburo session, December 27, 1988.”
Available [Online]: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB168/yakovlev05.pdf [10
December 2006]. For a good description of Gorbachev’s acceleration goals and policies, see McCauley,
Gorbachev, 50-79.
942
Gorbachev advanced the idea of engaging in peaceful ideological competition with capitalist powers
throughout his stint as General Secretary. See Gorbachev, Mandate For Peace: The Charismatic Soviet
Leader Speaks to the World (Toronto; New York: PaperJacks Ltd., 1987), 89, 104, 246, 406; Gorbachev, At
the Summit: Speeches and Interviews 1987-July 1988 (New York: Richardson, Steriman and Black, 1988),
8, 74, 88-9, 94, 120, 126, 193, 211-213, 240, and 274; Gorbachev, M.S. Gorbachov, Volume II, 184-87,
201, 219; Gorbachev, Selected Speeches and Articles (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987), 342, 347, 3569, 362, 364, 393, and 601. This point has much in common with Sakwa’s viewpoint. See Sakwa,
Gorbachev and His Reforms, 353.
480
the matter. It was a caste system based on mutual protection.”943 To rectify this
situation, he worked to implement reform programs known as perestroika (restructuring)
and glasnost (openness) that at least in part aimed at curbing the arbitrary bureaucratic
authority party officials wielded over private citizens and workers. During his opening
address at the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress that took place in February 1986, he
defended the necessity of holding bureaucrats accountable through glasnost, noting that
“there is not and cannot be any democracy, political creativity by the masses or their
participation in management . . . without public openness.”944
As several works have pointed out, Gorbachev worked to surrounded himself with
“liberal-minded” reformers and rehabilitated some former Communist Party members
who had been expelled during the Brezhnev era. He also moved in the direction of
identifying the Soviet Union with universal values such as the rights of private citizens to
work and chose their own form of government. He also mentioned his nation’s links with
a “common European home.”945 Because of his close identification with European
civilization, he and Shevardnadze discussed ways of reinvigorating the Helsinki process.
The former explained this mindset during his trip to France in October 1985. “Like
France, we support the implementation of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act in all
its parts. . . . [I]t is my strong conviction that an improvement of the situation in Europe
would be enormous importance to the whole world.” As a result of the Helsinki process,
943
Gorbachev and Mylnar, Conversations with Gorbachev, 48.
944
CDSP 38, no. 8 (26 March 1986): 27.
945
Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 428-9. See also Thomas, “Ideas, the Demise of
Communism, and the End of the Cold War,” 428-9.
481
he continued, “there exists a legal base making it possible to advance along the road of
cooperation and security.”946
Despite Gorbachev’s decision to articulate a reform program, evidence suggests
that his initial use of the term glasnost had much more in common with the ideas of
Lenin than those of dissenters such as Sakharov. As one author writes, Gorbachev
preferred a “Leninist glasnost” designed to punish bureaucrats for violating socialist
norms and private citizens for their poor discipline. Instead of advocating “freedom of
expression,” he preferred to explain how individuals “’who have grown accustomed to
doing slipshod work . . . will indeed be uncomfortable in the light of public openness,
when everything done in the state and in society is done under the people’s supervision
and in full sight of the people.” 947 Anatoly S. Chernyaev, a “liberal-minded” reformer
who became a top-level foreign policy adviser in 1986, captured the essence of this
position in his memoirs. He wrote that Gorbachev at first viewed democracy “as
946
Gorbachev, M.S. Gorbachov, Volume II, 253-4. See also Roy Medvedev and Giulietto Chiesa, trans. by
Michael Moore Time of Change: An Insider’s View of Russia’s Transformation (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1989), 168-9
947
The idea of Gorbachev’s preference for a Leninist glasnost and quote taken above come from the work
of Robert Horvath. See Horvath, The Legacy of Soviet Dissent, 54. See also Horvath, “The Dissident
Roots of Glasnost,” in Stephen G. Wheatcraft, ed. Challenging Traditional Views of Russian History
(Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 173-89. Gorbachev discusses his attachment to past Soviet practices in his
memoirs. See Gorbachev, Memoirs, 177. See also Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, 59-67. The accounts of
conservative Soviet officials only buttress this view, as they generally voice support for Gorbachev’s
conduct from 1985 to 1987. For example, see Valery Boldin, trans. by Evelyn Rossiter, Ten Years That
Shook the World: the Gorbachev Era as Witnessed by His Chief of Staff (New York: Basic Books, 1994),
75.
482
something the Party could employ in restructuring society” instead of an “underlying
principle” or “universal human value.”948
Like his orthodox predecessors, Gorbachev viewed dissenters with hostility and
found the idea of discussing human rights issues with foreign leaders objectionable. In a
private letter dated 10 June 1985, he told Reagan that “there should be no
misunderstanding concerning the fact that we do not intend and will not conduct any
negotiations relating to human rights in the Soviet Union. We, as any other sovereign
state, regarded and will regard these questions in accordance with our existing laws and
regulations.”949 During his visit to France three months later, he defended the practice of
putting a wide array of dissenters in prison. “We have some people who by some logic or
another are at odds with the Soviet form of government, with socialism, and profess some
different ideology.” He then added that “problems in such cases arise when one
individual or another comes into conflict with the law. That was what happened to
Shcharansky.”950
This attitude only softened at the margins during his first year in office. When he
met with Reagan in Geneva, he accused the U.S. executive branch and “various [antiSoviet] political organizations” of using “the issue of human rights . . . for political
purposes.” “The Soviet Union was prepared to resolve them,” he promised, “but if
948
Anatoly S. Chernyaev, trans. Robert D. English and Elizabeth Tucker, My Six Years with Gorbachev
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 2000), 95. In recent times, Gorbachev admits that he did not start
his reform campaign to create a pluralism of opinions in the Soviet Union. See Gorbachev and Mlynar,
Conversations with Gorbachev, 115.
949
Letter, Gorbachev to Reagan, 10 June 1985, ES:GSG, Box 40, Folder: 8590683-8590713, RRPL.
950
Gorbachev, Selected Speeches and Articles, 207.
483
questions of human rights were used for political purposes, the Soviet side would rebuff
such attempts.” He also rejected the President’s suggestion that the Soviet Union placed
undue restrictions on Jewish emigration. While he showed some flexibility in Geneva, he
went right back to orthodox Marxist-Leninist positions a few months later.951 In response
to a question from a French Communist journalist about political prisoners, he insisted
that “we have none, just as we have no persecution of people for their convictions. We
do not put people on trial for their convictions.” He also described how “’Stalinism’ is a
notion made up by opponents of communism and used on a large scale to smear the
Soviet Union and socialism as a whole.”952
Gorbachev’s ambivalent attitude toward Stalin and hostility toward dissenters
paled in comparison to the conduct of Soviet bureaucrats. As they had in the past, they
continued to arrest and harass dissenters from groups as diverse as Georgian
independence groups, members of Hare Krishna sects, and Yoga practitioners. They also
used public forums to discount any suggestion that their regime violated human rights.
To cite a few examples, The Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania described
how KGB agents kidnapped a non-registered Catholic priest and left him tied to a tree on
22 August 1985. On the International Day of Human Rights (December 10), “a
contingent of plainclothesmen and uniformed police” arrested and beat up a small
number of dissenters who attempted to hold a silent vigil in Moscow Square. Around the
same time, a Soviet television program described the broad support Ku Klux Klan cross
951
Memorandum of Conversation, Geneva Summit, 20 November 1985, 10:15-11:25 AM, Geneva:
Memcons, Box 52, Folder: 92137, 2/3, 3-5, RRPL. See also Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 175.
952
Gorbachev, Selected Speeches and Articles, 331.
484
burnings received in the United States and referred to the pop signer Michael Jackson as
“a black person who sold out to exploiting capitalists.” To mold international public
opinion, the Soviet Anti-Zionist Committee held a press conference for international
journalists extolling the Soviet Union’s human rights record and humane treatment of
Jews.953
When a small band of dissenters decided to hold a rally on the International Day
of Human Rights in 1986, the behavior of authorities changed little. They arrested the
participants and allowed “an official rally” to take place whose participants held banners
praising Moscow’s human rights policy. In the background of all this commotion, a
Soviet folk band played American anti-war songs,” including Bob Dylan’s “‘Blowin’ in
the Wind.’” The use of a folk band may have appealed to KGB operatives because the
government had already arrested a non-official musical ensemble known as Phantom
Group that issued documents and wrote songs in support of the Helsinki process.954 In
the same week that Gorbachev agreed to the spy trade that secured the release of
Sharansky, Soviet authorities arrested sixteen Trust Group members and placed one of
them in a psychiatric hospital.955
953
CCCL 77 (5 May 1988): 17; “Soviets Arrested on Human Rights Day,” United Press International, 10
December 1985; and “Soviet marks Human Rights Day; Breaks Up an Unauthorized Demonstration,” 11
December 1985, A12. For accounts of Gorbachev’s attachment to making Soviet-style socialism more
humane and moral, see Laquer, The Long Road to Freedom, 195-6.
954
“Analysis Human Rights Day sees Clampdown in Soviet Union, United Press International, 11
December 1986; and “Musicians Face Charges/Members of the Dissident Phantom Group in the Soviet
Union, The Guardian (London), 1 July 1985.
955
USSR News Brief 3 (15 February 1986): 3.
485
The harassment of non-official groups described above only confirms that the
KGB continued to defend their sacred campaign of protecting the Soviet population from
domestic ideological subversion after Gorbachev became General Secretary.956 In a
repeat performance of the previous year, Soviet officials force-fed Sakharov to break the
hunger strike he had undertaken to show his displeasure with the Kremlin’s decision to
deny Bonner’s foreign travel requests. To quell subversive rumors about this incident,
the Soviet government sold Western newspapers videotapes showing Sakharov’s robust
health. When Gorbachev asked KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov and Shevardnadze to
review the treatment of these individuals, the former issued a scathing report. He
explained Sakharov’s behavior as a function of his wife’s pernicious influence and
mental defects. On a more optimistic note, he relayed how recent conversations with him
had “neutralized” his influence during the meeting in Helsinki commemorating the tenth
anniversary of the Final Act.957
Well aware of the international climate, Chebrikov suggested that his government
allow Bonner to travel abroad in deference to world public opinion. At the same time, he
warned that “one must expect the onset of another [Sakharov] campaign, which will
inevitably be joined by the leaders of some countries, deputies of parliaments, public
figures, and representatives of science and culture, who would prefer to succumb to this
provocation or even act as its organizers.” To his dismay, “a few Communist parties may
956
See Raymond Garthoff, “The KGB Reports to Gorbachev,” Intelligence and National Security 11 (April
1996): 235-6. Chebrikov also kept close tabs the successes Western intelligence services had in subverting
the ideological underpinnings of official Soviet writers. See “Anatoly S. Chernyaev Diary: 1986,”
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB220/Chernyaev_1986.pdf [10 December 2007].
957
Rubenstein and Gribanov, ed., The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov, 302-3, 313, and 307-8.
486
also become involved in this type of campaign.”958 After Gorbachev accepted
Chebrikov’s advice and allowed Bonner to emigrate, the KGB Chairman sent reports to
the Central Committee that described her anti-Soviet activities in painstaking detail.
“Starting in February,” he wrote, “Bonner became actively involved in various antiSoviet gatherings . . . that included participation by the leaders of Zionist organizations,
Jewish religious activists, heads of anti-Soviet émigré groups, and representatives of the
press, radio, and television.” She also held “unprecedented meetings” with Western
European political leaders and the “national security adviser to the U.S. President.” 959
The orthodox thinking that dominated the ranks of the KGB also continued to
shape how Soviet officials handled human rights issues within the confines of the
Helsinki process. In his private diary, Chernyaev derided the behavior of Soviet
delegates attending the Ottawa experts meeting. “MFA people [Minister of Foreign
Affairs] are afraid of the concept itself” and “demand to discuss it behind closed doors.”
“[B]y hiding from the people at the conference [journalists and private citizens],” they
gave the matter over to the hands of Americans, who are eagerly proceeding to exploit
the theme of human rights.”960 The Soviet delegates at the next experts meeting in Bern
became more active about pointing out American human rights abuses, but took the time
to lodge a formal complaint that “the film Rocky IV depicts the Soviet Union in the image
of a stupid idiot.” This accusation prompted U.S. delegates to issue an official reply that
958
Ibid., 308.
959
Ibid., 319-20.
960
“Anatoly S. Chernyaev Diary: 1985,” 95. Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB192/Chernyaev_Diary_translation_1985.pdf [10
December 2007]. See also Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, 60.
487
explained how free private citizens rather than the U.S. government had released the
movie. The same reply also contained the memorable retort: “Those in our delegation
who have seen that movie found that the two boxers portrayed seemed to be
approximately equal in intelligence.”961
Despite the continued persecution of non-official activities, the cumulative impact
of Gorbachev’s flirtations with more democracy and glasnost helped “liberalize” Soviet
society.962 Near the beginning of 1987, Chernayev described these changes using
emotionally charged, albeit exaggerated language: “[P]eople are [now] really writing
what they are thinking without glancing over their shoulder or being afraid of anybody. . .
. . There is [now] a storm in literature, film, and theater.” To his satisfaction, “people are
[now] writing openly” about the causes of the deep stagnation that permeated Soviet
society from the 1960s to the early 1980s.963 Inspired by these changes, “blue-collar
workers” in Latvia created an NGO called Helsinki ‘86. This organization sent
documents abroad that denounced the Soviet government’s illegal occupation of their
nation and systematic human rights violations. Around the same time, Zviad
Gamsakhurdia, cofounder of the Georgian Watch Group in 1977, “launched a new
movement for the independence of Georgia.”964
961
Novak, Taking Glasnost Seriously, 55.
962
Archie Brown also refers to this stage of the Soviet reform process as liberalization. See Brown, The
Gorbachev Factor, 126.
963
“Chernyaev Diary—1987,” 1. Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB250/Chernyaev_Diary_1987.pdf [15 June 2008].
964
Thomas, “Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War,” 131. See
also “Documents: Helsinki ’86 Group,” Voice of Solidarity 131-2 (July/August 1987): 31-33; and Rasma
488
The liberalization of Soviet society and the formation on non-official groups such
as Helsinki ‘86 accompanied a slow transformation in how Gorbachev viewed human
rights issues. For all his bluster about the shortcomings of capitalist nations, he began to
harbor doubts about the Soviet government’s respect for basic human rights and
freedoms. When describing the Geneva summit in his memoirs, he recounted how “he
spent time trying to fend off accusations of human rights abuses, even though I was not
always convinced that these were not justified.”965 In the wake of the Chernobyl nuclear
disaster, he delivered a speech to the Politburo that in effect called for a foreign policy
that would facilitate Soviet integration into the larger community of Western nations. In
defense of this vision, he spoke about the importance of “new priorities” such as
“facilitating economic integration, expanding cultural ties, cooperating in the fight
against terrorism, and, above all, raising the profile of “‘humanitarian issues.’” In
reference to this last item, he remarked:
The very words “human rights” are put in quotation marks and we speak of socalled human rights, as if our revolution had nothing to do with human rights. . . .
But would there have been a revolution if such rights had been observed in the old
society? We need to reject decisively this outdated approach to the problem . . .
and view it more broadly, particularly with regard to specific issues as
reunification of families, exit and entry visas. . . all this is part of the process of
building trust.966
These words indicate that Gorbachev had become more sensitive to the argument
that the Soviet Union would never gain the trust of Western governments unless he
Karklins, Ethnopolitics and Transition to Democracy: The Collapse of the USSR in Latvia (Washington,
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), 69-71, 76, 78, 96. The “blue-collar” quote is taken from page
69 of this work. See also Mastny, ed., Soviet-East European Survey, 1986-1987, 52-94.
965
Gorbachev, Memoirs, 406.
966
English, Russia and the Idea of the West, 220.
489
changed the internal behavior of his regime. As Robert English explains, Gorbachev and
other reformers moved in this direction because of their close identification with the
values of Western Europe. In practice, they proved sensitive to the ways in which
European leaders such as Margaret Thatcher linked the building of international trust to
the expansion of democratic practices in the Soviet Union. Behind closed doors,
Gorbachev often heard arguments such as: “‘You have no democracy, so there’s no
control over the government. It does what it wants. You stress the will of the people,
that they don’t want war, but they’re denied the means to express the will. Let’s say we
trust you personally, but if you’re gone tomorrow, then what?’” Reflecting on these
conversations, Gorbachev later observed that “[w]e had to think long and hard to grasp
that human rights are . . . universal” and “understand that [without democracy] we’d
never achieve real trust in foreign relations.’”967
With the idea of building international trust bubbling in his mind, Gorbachev took
some steps to address Western concerns about Soviet human rights abuses. Unlike his
predecessors, he agreed to hold a private meeting with members of U.S. Helsinki
Commission in April 1986. During these discussions, Commission members outlined
American concerns about issues as diverse as the imprisonment of Helsinki monitors, the
plight of Soviet Jews, and the continuation of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. They even
“asked about the possibility of meeting with Sakharov.”968 With his active support,
Shevardnadze used the Vienna follow-up meeting to his express his country’s
967
This quote is taken from Robert English’s description of a speech that Gorbachev gave about his private
meeting with Margaret Thatcher. See Ibid., 219.
968
Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, 58. See also The CSCE Digest, May 1986, 7.
490
determination to host “an international conference on humanitarian problems” within the
confines of the Helsinki process. “I was convinced, he later wrote, that this conference
could become an “impetus for democratization and . . . legislation in everything relating
to human rights.”969
Transnational critiques also played an important role in the Soviet government’s
decision to end the internal exile of Sakharov and Bonner. After members of the U.S.
Helsinki Commission visited Moscow, Gorbachev and other “liberal-minded” reformers
worked behind the scenes to overcome opposition to the internal exile of Sakharov and
Bonner. These discussions reached their endpoint after the well-known dissenter Anatoly
Marchenko died in jail on 8 December. Well aware of the Vienna follow-up conference
and Gorbachev’s determination to resolve this issue, Central Committee Secretary Yegor
Ligachev and Chebrikov produced a memorandum designed to reverse the Politburo’s
negative attitude toward releasing these individuals. According to this document, the
negative consequences of releasing Sakharov were obvious. His “apartment . . . might
[once again] become the center of all kinds of press conferences with the participation of
foreign correspondents; it might become the place where anti-social elements will meet to
work on statements and demands of a negative character.” In the end, “no matter what
we threaten to do, “Sakharov himself is hardly likely to refrain from participating in the
so-called “’defense of human rights.’”970
969
Thomas, “Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War,” 75. See also
Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, 75.
970
Rubenstein and Gribanov,, ed., The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov, 324-5.
491
Even though many potential liabilities existed, Chebrikov and Shevardnadze
justified the release of Sakharov and Bonner on the grounds that the former had “returned
to his scientific work” and “criticized the American ‘Star Wars’ program.” He had also
“commented favorably on the peace initiatives of the Soviet leadership . . . and made an
objective assessment of the events at the Chernobyl Atomic Power Station.” When taken
together with the present international circumstances, these positive changes meant that
“Sakharov’s return to Moscow will mean fewer political costs than his continued
isolation in Gorky.971 Five days after this document appeared, Gorbachev telephoned
Sakharov to relay the message that he and his wife could now return to Moscow and
carry out “patriotic work.” While happy to leave Gorky, Sakharov took the time to
inform the General Secretary that he still needed to release other “prisoners of conscience
. . . prosecuted for their beliefs.”972
This statement was appropriate because Gorbachev and other reformers had
already begun the discussions necessary to prepare the Soviet government for a largescale release of political prisoners.973 This campaign gathered steam after Sakharov sent
Gorbachev a letter in February 1986 that criticized the General Secretary’s refusal to
admit the existence of political prisoners in the USSR and outlined how the Russian
criminal code violated international human rights standards. Instead of ignoring this
inquiry, he in effect told Chebrikov to write a report on the validity of Sakharov’s
971
Ibid., 323-4.
972
Sakharov, Memoirs, 615.
973
See Pavel Palazchenko, My Years with Gorbachev: The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter (University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 53. Daniel Thomas makes the same point. See Thomas,
“Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism and the End of the Cold War,” 131.
492
charges. Reading between the lines, Gorbachev must have also asked the KGB to submit
reports that explored dissenters’ attitudes toward the policies of glasnost and
perestroika.974
Although put on the defensive, Chebrikov stood firm and deemed all of
Sakharov’s arguments incorrect. “The twelve people cited in . . . [Sakharov’s letter] . . .
were convicted of committing concrete criminal acts as stipulated in current law and in
strict keeping with those norms. Their guilt was fully proved by the materials of the
preliminary investigations and court proceedings.” From his perspective, “the number of
individuals prosecuted under the criminal code for these types of crimes is insignificant”
and shows every sign of decreasing in the future.975 This letter complemented other
KGB reports sent to the Central Committee warning that dissenters “were [now]
beginning to ‘connect their statements’” to the political changes of perestroika.”976
By the fall of 1986, Gorbachev was no longer satisfied with orthodox arguments
that advocated preserving the status quo on dissenters and human rights issues. During a
Politburo session on 13 November, he commented, “[w]e need to think it all through
seriously, to work out a [new] conception on human rights, both at home and abroad.”
Given international realities, we have little choice but to end a routine that “only
produces dissidents.” Gorbachev then argued that if dissenter “wants to run away, let
him run away.” The Soviet Union would only benefit “if all kinds of trash” like “Orlov”
974
Ibid., 607-8. See also Rubenstein and Gribanov, ed., The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov, 315-6.
975
Ibid., 316-9.
976
Thomas, “Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War,” 131-2.
493
and “Shcharansky” left the country. Consistent with this position, he ignored the
warnings of orthodox officials and decided to carry out a large-scale release of political
prisoners just before the main meeting of the Vienna follow-up conference began in
November 1986.977
The harsh language Gorbachev used to gain support for the extensive release of
political prisoners reveals that he had more on his mind than just making the Soviet
Union a normal, legitimate member of the Western European and international
community. Despite the influence of international public and governmental opinion, he
still saw the necessity of appeasing orthodox critics. He had also not relinquished his
intense hatred of dissenters, which explains why most political prisoners had to sign a
pledge not to engage in future anti-Soviet activities before they received their freedom.
Even more important, he feared that the issue of human rights violations would weaken
the ability of the Soviet Union to engage in peaceful ideological competition with
capitalist countries, especially the United States. As a result of this position, the Kremlin
carried out public activities designed to lessen the blow of releasing political prisoners.
For example, on the same day that Sakharov and his wife received permission to leave
Gorky, the Soviet Anti-Zionist Committee held a well-publicized reception for a group of
977
“USSR CC CPSU Politburo session. About discussions between Shevardnadze and Shultz in Vienna, 13
November 1986,” 2-3. Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Document26.pdf [10 December 2006]. Thomas
employs this quote but does not include Gorbachev’s references to Orlov and Scharansky as “trash.” He
must have done so to highlight Gorbachev’s reform credentials. See also Thomas, “Human Rights Ideas,
the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War,” 131.
494
Soviet émigrés who returned home after becoming disillusioned with evils of life in the
United States978
Because he retained a strong faith in the moral superiority of socialism,”
Gorbachev found the idea of letting the United States dominate the human rights agenda
in either bilateral or Final Act forums abhorrent. In his work Perestroika, he indicated
that “what we know does not support the idea of” America “as a shining city atop a hill.’”
U.S. politicians have a penchant “for preaching human rights and liberties” with a
“missionary passion” while they take few steps to ensure “those same elementary rights
at home.” Displeased with how the hesitancy of Soviet delegates in Ottawa to discuss
human rights issues in public served American interests, Gorbachev called for the
creation of an official plan designed to strengthen the ability of officials to raise “our
banner of human rights.” To satisfy the General Secretary’s expectations, the Soviet
Foreign Ministry created an office to deal with human rights issues. Soviet officials also
became more interested in discussing human rights issues in public forums such as press
conferences and holding meetings with representatives of Western NGOs in 1986.979
Unhappy with issues as diverse as the U.S. bombing of Libya and repudiation of
SALT II, Gorbachev returned to topic of human rights on the eve of Reykjavik summit.
During a Politburo meeting on 8 October 1986, he complained that every Soviet official
should “not . . . feel shy about showing what is happening in America: unemployment,
978
979
“Back to the USSR,” The Sunday Times (London), Issue 8474, 4 January 1987.
Gorbachev, Perestroika. See also Anatoly S. Chernyaev Diary: 1985,” 215. Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB192/Chernyaev_Diary_translation_1985.pdf [10
December 2007]; and Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 265.
495
poverty, lack of personal safety, drug problems.” “We should call things by their proper
names” and show how “America [is] pushing the world with such values.” In reference
to human rights issues, he reminded his subordinates that “[w]e need some acceleration
here” and must “open the way back to the USSR for thousands of emigrants.”980
Consistent with these themes, Gorbachev informed Politburo members about his
intention of going on the human rights “offensive” when he sat down with Reagan in
Iceland. “I will tell him that his concern [about human rights] is a result of
misinformation. You misinform your population and try to misinform us.”981
The internal transcripts of the Reykjavik meeting reveal that Gorbachev pressed
Reagan on the issue of human rights and information asymmetries between the two
societies. He reminded the President that “Soviet public opinion was also concerned
about the state of human rights in the United States.” After alluding to the ability of
VOA broadcasts to penetrate the Soviet Union, he asked the President to help his
government secure transmitters so “both sides . . . [could] relay their points of view to the
others’ population.” He also expressed his unhappiness with reality that many more
Soviet citizens saw American movies than vice-versa. When Reagan responded that “the
U.S. government could not dictate what private entrepreneurs show, the Soviet General
Secretary called such an arrangement “a paradox.” “[I]n an allegedly democratic country
there are obstacles to Soviet films; in an allegedly non-democratic country half the
980
“USSR CC CPSU Politburo Session on Preparations for Reykjavik, 8 October 1986.” Available
[Online]: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Document08.pdf [10 December 2007].
981
“Gorbachev's instructions for the group preparing for Reykjavik, 4 October 1986.” Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Document05.pdf [10 December 2007].
496
foreign films were American. This did not tally with the view of Soviet society that
President had described earlier.”982 In the press conference following this summit’s
conclusion, Gorbachev emphasized similar themes. “It appears that the United States is
becoming an increasingly closed society. People there are being isolated from objective
information in a cunning and effective way.”983
Once Gorbachev returned to Moscow, he told members of the Politburo about the
successes he had outlining the closed nature of American society and fending off U.S.
accusations of Soviet human rights violations. In comparison to the recent past, “[w]e are
getting though not only to the European, but also to the American public.” Curious about
arms control proposals and his reform program, U.S. private citizens have begun to show
more interest in their Soviet counterparts and hearing the “Soviet point of view.” As
expected, U.S. government officials “are afraid” of this development and have decided to
practice “the tactics of silencing information about our big speeches . . . [and]
statements.”984 While Soviet officials will have to work diligently to overcome these
obstacles, Gorbachev noted, we can still take solace in the fact that “Reagan completely
failed with human rights. He sounded almost apologetic when he raised the issue.”985
982
“U.S. Memorandum of Conversation, Reagan-Gorbachev, Third Meeting, 12 October 1986, 10:00 a.m. 1:35 P.M,” 18-20. Available [Online]
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Document13.pdf. This transcript is also available
at the Reagan Library. See Ibid., Executive Secretariat: NSC System Files, Box 6, Folder: 8690725 (1/3),
RRPL.
983
984
Mikhail Gorbachev, Reykjavik and Results (Madison, Conn.: Sphinx Press, Inc., 1987), 79-80.
Gorbachev Conference with Politburo Members and Secretaries of the Central Committee, 1 December
1986, 1-2. Available [Online]: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Document28.pdf
[10 December 2007].
497
Revolutions from “Above and “Below”: “Directed Glasnost,” Private Citizens, and
the Inertia of the Soviet System, 1987-January 1989
The large-scale release of political prisoners and moves toward accepting a
universal human rights standard that began near the end of 1986 coincided with a
“radicalization” of Gorbachev’s reform efforts. Still dissatisfied with bureaucratic
stagnation, he decided to accelerate his campaign to democratize and restructure Soviet
society. Without a firm blueprint in hand, he came to see himself “as an instrument of
perestroika” who would one day give the Soviet Union “a totally different socialism from
the one that was advertised for 60 years and which has entered the Soviet Union’s
‘genotype.’”986
Speaking at the Central Committee Plenum in January 1987, he told conservative
and orthodox critics that “the further democratization of Soviet society is becoming the
Party’s most urgent task.” “It is only through the consistent development of the
democratic forms inherent in socialism . . . that our advancement . . . in all areas of social
life . . . is possible.” 987 One year later, the lack of a fundamental change in how Soviet
bureaucrats behaved once again led him to outline the crucial link between
democratization, glasnost, and perestroika. Now convinced of the need to publicize his
985
“USSR CC CPSU Politburo session on results of the Reykjavik Summit, 14 October 1986,” 10.
Available [Online]: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Document21.pdf [10
December 2007].
986
987
“Chernyaev Diary—1987,” 4.
M.S. Gorbachov, Volume II, 119. See also CDSP 39, no. 6 (11 March 1987): 11-14. See also Brown,
The Gorbachev Factor, 126-7. Philip Boobbyer makes a strong argument that Gorbachev faced three forms
of conservative opposition during his reign: 1) Neo-Stalinists (orthodox Marxist-Leninists); 2) National
Bolsheviks; and (3) conservative nationalists. See Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent, and Reform in Soviet
Russia, 194. See also Keep, Last of Empires, 284-306 and 384-6; and Horvath, The Legacy of Soviet
Dissent, 150-84.
498
desire to sever his regime’s connection to Stalinism, he told an audience that “we must
reject the dogmatic, bureaucratic” legacy of Soviet-style socialism because such a view
“has nothing in common either with Marxist-Leninism or . . . genuine socialism.”988
Gorbachev uttered these words because he envisioned a “new form of socialism
that would keep the best features of the Soviet-system and take the best of liberal
democracies.” In other words, he wanted to move the Soviet Union toward a Western
social democratic model within the confines of a multinational, multiethnic empire whose
population and government officials had little experience working under democratic
conditions.989 The importance Gorbachev placed on solidifying the democratic
credentials of the Soviet Union involved far more than building international trust or
securing the international legitimacy of his regime. Intent on keeping his country a
strong ideological power, he believed that a democratized USSR would increase the
international prestige of socialism vis-à-vis capitalist countries, especially the United
States. Over time, the divisions of Europe would break down through a gradual
convergence of political systems. In theory at least, the “erosion of anticommunism”
associated with transformations in Europe would play a fundamental role in creating a
988
CDSP 40, no. 7 (16 March 1988): 3-5, 10. For a good account, of Gorbachev’s new willingness to
repudiate Stalin in public, see “Chernayev Diary—1988,” 41. Available [Online]
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB250/Chernyaev_Diary_1988.pdf [7 June 2008]; and
Chernyaev, My Six Years With Gorbachev, 159. See also Medvedev and Chiesa, Time of Change, 107.
989
Levesque, “The Messianic Character of Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’,” in Njolstad, ed., The Last
Decade of the Cold War, 162. See also “Memorandum of Conversation, 9 December 1987, 10:35-10:45
A.M.,” Executive Secretariat : NSC System Files, Box 8, Folder: 8791384, RRPL. For other accounts of
Gorbachev’s ever-evolving views toward socialism, see Chernyaev, My Six Years With Gorbachev, 138142.
499
“new international order” based on nonviolence, mutual cooperation, and the
strengthening of international institutions.990
The ways in which Gorbachev touted the benefits of expanding democratic
practices in the Soviet Union meant that he had accepted the task of creating a more
“participatory society.” Unlike previous Soviet leaders who only paid lip service to such
a notion, he tried to implement the idea that the expansion of democratic practices and the
development of a genuine pluralism of opinions would result in the creation of a strong
socialist state responsive to the needs of its citizens. In practice, he hoped that private
citizens would take hold of their new freedoms and hold politicians accountable for their
behavior and provide them with independent ideas on how best to govern the Soviet
Union. During the Nineteenth Party Congress of June 1988, he expanded the concept of
democratization to the election of local party officials and the partial democratic election
of a national governing body called the Congress of People’s Deputies. Over time, he
even took steps to give workers more control of their lives by reviving the role of the
moribund Soviets in economic management.991
To legitimate this vision, Gorbachev played up the anti-bureaucratic sentiments
Lenin enunciated during the last years of this life. Employing language similar to
Yakovlev’s private memorandums about the complexities of reform, he explained how
Lenin “often spoke about the need to live in the midst of people, to heed their opinion, to
990
Levesque, “The Messianic Character of Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’,” in Njolstad, ed., The Last
Decade of the Cold War, 163-4. Roy Medvedev called Gorbachev’s reform campaign as an attempt to
forge a synthesis between the French and Russian revolutions. See Medvedev and Chiesa, Time of Change,
270.
991
The term “participatory society” comes from Gooding’s article “Gorbachev and Democracy,” 205. See
also Gorbachev, Memoirs, 249 and 271.
500
understand their sentiments and translate their aspirations into practical policy. So the
true initiator of this style [glasnost] is Lenin, and such people as him appear once in a
century.” In practice, perestroika has an organic connection “to mass initiative, socialistself government,” and the expansion of democratic practices in Soviet Union.992 As he
explained:
It is a distinctive feature and strength of perestroika that it is simultaneously a
revolution “from above” and “from below.” This one of the most reliable
guarantees of its success and irreversibility. We will persistently seek to ensure
that the masses, the “people below,’” will attain all their democratic rights and
learn to use them in a habitual, component and responsible manner.993
These words testify to the appropriateness of Jacques Levesque’s arguments about
the inherent ambiguities of Gorbachev’s ever-evolving search for a superior “synthesis
between socialism and democracy.” “At the peak of his power,” he wrote, Gorbachev
was a “mutant” who had forsaken the main tenets of orthodox Marxist-Leninism without
yet becoming a Western social democrat.994 The ambiguities of his thinking in large
measure resulted from his inability to forsake his attachment to Leninist glasnost. Instead
of identifying with political pluralism and the unfettered free exchange of information, he
on the whole wanted private citizens and members of intelligentsia to work within the
bounds of how he and other reformers saw the proper trajectory of democratizing and
restructuring Soviet society. Because he took the universal appeal of socialism as a
992
Gorbachev, Perestroika, 34-5. See also CDSP 39, no. 4 (25 February 1987): 3-6, 32; Ibid., 34, no. 6 (11
March 1987): 11-14; Ibid., 39, no. 5 (4 March 1987): 8-11, 19; Ibid. 39, no. 7 (18 March 1987): 12. See
also Gorbachev and Mlynar, Conversations with Gorbachev, 51.
993
994
Gorbachev, Perestroika, 57.
Levesque, “The Messianic Character of Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking,’” in Njolstad, ed., The Last
Decade of the Cold War, 162.
501
given, he hoped to create a loyal, albeit well-informed and creative, civil society
committed to his program of making Soviet-style socialism more “humane” and
combating the orthodox and conservative resistance located at all levels of
government.995
Espousing a vision he referred to as “socialist pluralism,” Gorbachev argued that
“democracy is” neither “the opposite of discipline” nor “the opposite of responsibility.”
Instead, “democracy means society exercising self-control, based on confidence in the
civic maturity and awareness of social duty on the part of the Soviet people.” In other
words, “democracy is the unity of rights and duties.”996 During the Moscow summit, he
told a Western reporter that “the most substantial thing that perestroika has demonstrated
is that our people, while being firmly in favor of a renewal of society, and of change, has
[sic] firmly expressed the view that changes should happen only within the boundaries of
socialism and on the basis on socialist values.”997 Behind closed doors, he expressed the
same sentiments to Reagan.998
995
Gorbachev and Mlynar, Conversations with Gorbachev, 84. See also Walter Connor , “Soviet Society,
Public Attitudes, and the Perils of Gorbachev’s Reform,” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 4 (Fall 2003):
71; Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent, and Reform in Soviet Russia, 2-4and 172-177; and Palazchenko, My
Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, 370.
996
See Gorbachev, At the Summit, 191. For a more in-depth analysis of “socialist pluralism,” see Brown,
The Gorbachev Factor, 96, 127, 128, 361; Brown, “Ideology and Political Culture,” in Seweryn Bialer, ed.,
Politics, Society, and Nationality Inside Gorbachev’s Russia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 8-11.
Gorbachev’s preference for channeling the trajectory of reform comes across in his memoirs. See also
Gorbachev, Memoirs, 175 and 213.
997
998
M.S. Gorbachov, Volume II, 169-70; and Gorbachev, At the Summit, 224.
See Memorandum of Conversation, “President’s Second One-on-One Meeting with General Secretary
Gorbachev,” 31 May 1988, 10:08-11:07,”4, Fritz Ermath Files, Box 1, Folder: 1988 Summit Memcons, 26
May-June 3, 1988
502
Gorbachev subscribed to this vision because he remained committed to the idea
that the Soviet Communist Party had the moral mandate and prestige necessary to direct
the democratization of Soviet society. For good reason given Soviet realities, he also
believed that without firm hand in control of events, perestroika and glasnost would
result in chaos. These sentiments pervade his public statements. When holding a private
interview with NBC anchor Tom Brokaw on the eve of the 1987 Washington summit, he
indicated that he and Soviet private citizens saw “no need for any other party.” “We have
built up a new atmosphere in the country, an atmosphere of glasnost, openness, and we
have plans to move forward the process of democratization and glasnost. All this is being
done on the initiative of the Communist Party.” During the Nineteenth Party Congress,
he outlined how a strong communist party working together with responsible private
citizens would produce “the sort of democracy that has never been dreamed of by” other
nations “who present themselves as a model of democracy.”999
Since societies do not behave like well-oiled machines, the task of enforcing
“socialist pluralism” proved almost impossible in practice. Heeding Gorbachev’s call for
a “revolution from below,” thousands of informal, open associations (nyeformaly) began
to form in both official and non-official circles.1000 While an in-depth summary of these
999
Gorbachev, At the Summit, 92; and CDSP 40, no. 28 (10 August 1988): 7. See also Gorbachev and
Mlynar, Conversations with Gorbachev, 115.
1000
For a good description of this process, see U.S. Helsinki Watch Group, Nyeformaly: Civil Society in the
USSR (New York: U.S. Helsinki Watch Report, 1990). See also Vladimir Brokvin, “Revolution from
Below: Informal Political Associations in Russia, 1988-1989,” Soviet Studies 42 (April 1990): 233-57;
Geoffrey Hosking et al., ed., The Road to Post-Communism; Hosking, The Awakening of the Soviet Union,
50-75; Petro, “Perestroika From Below: Voluntary Sociopolitical Associations in the RSFSR” in Alfred J.
Rieber and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed., Perestroika at the Crossroads (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1991);
Judith B. Sedatis and James Butterfield, “The Emergence of Social Movements in the Soviet Union,” in
503
groups lies outside the scope of this work, many of them at least in part linked their
agenda to democratizing Soviet society and/or improving the government’s respect for
basic human rights. Near the beginning of 1987, a group of liberal-minded reformers in
Moscow who “had been arrested in 1982” for “propagating unorthodox socialist ideas”
became active participants in a discussion group known as Klub Perestroika (KP). Loyal
to the general contours of Gorbachev’s reform program, they organized “specialist
sections” on socialist “’self-administration’” and “’citizens’ diplomacy.”1001
Without heeding official registration requirements, a group of Jewish activists,
former Helsinki monitors, and Moscow Trust Group members “set up a seminar in
Moscow entitled Humanism and Democracy” in July 1987. Around the same time,
former political prisoners announced that they would exercise “public oversight of the
Soviet judicial system” by establishing an independent group called Civil Dignity.1002
Over the course of the next two years, this group and the Democracy and Humanism
Seminar formed links with other like-minded associations and held public demonstrations
in defense of themes such as “glasnost for legislators” and “Ideology has no place in the
Constitution.”1003
Judith B. Sedatis and James Butterfield, ed., Perestroika From Below: Social Movements in the Soviet
Union (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Jim Butterfield and Marcia Weigle, “Unofficial Social Groups and
Regime Response in the Soviet Union,” in Ibid., Thomas, Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism,
and the End of the Cold War; and Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms, 200-17. Even handicapped
individuals began to demonstrate to defend their rights and rise awareness of their plight. See David
Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire (New York: Random House, 1993), 56.
1001
Hosking et al, ed., The Road to Post-Communism, 13-5.
1002
U.S. Helsinki Watch Group, Nyeformaly, 25-6, 50-3; and Hosking et al., ed., The Road to PostCommunism, 11, 15-6, 17, 19.
1003
See USSR News Brief 19/20 (October 31 1987): 13.
504
This neat division should not obscure how the line between non-official and
official opinion often became blurred in practice. Still worried about the existence of
political prisoners and the slow pace of perestroika, a group of intellectuals, including
Sakharov, joined forces with some of Gorbachev’s academic advisers to form the
Moscow Tribune in October 1988. 1004 In practice, the leadership of KP proved unable to
reconcile or contain the conflicting views of its members. Reflecting the appearance of
numerous articles in the official press denouncing Stalin’s crimes, some KP members
“started to collect signatures calling for a thorough examination of the illegal repressions
of the past and the erection of a memorial to Stalin’s victims.” These efforts soon
resulted in the creation of a separate organization called Memorial. Other members grew
unhappy with the leadership’s emphasis on preserving socialism and working with
bureaucrats to reform Soviet society. Because they preferred exercising independent
oversight, they broke away and formed Perestroika-88. Against the wishes of local
officials in Moscow, this new group worked with both Memorial and the Democracy and
Humanism Seminar to organize a large public demonstration commemorating “Stalin’s
victims” on 6 March 1988.1005
The emergence of independent groups committed to internal reform coincided
with the reinvigoration of domestic human rights networks. In fashion similar to Helsinki
‘86, “veteran human rights” activists and other private citizens produced and distributed
1004
Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms, 201; U.S. Helsinki Watch Group, Nyeformaly, 64-8. See also
Vladimir Brovkin, “Revolution from Below: Informal Political Associations in Russia 1988-89,” Soviet
Studies 42, no. 2 (1990): 240-2.
1005
Hosking, The Road to Post-Communism, 13-4, 17; USSR News Brief 5/6 (31 March 1988): 7-8. See
also Butterfield and Weigle, “Unofficial Social Groups and Regime Response in the Soviet Union,” 176,
180-1, 185-6, 189-90; and Sakwa, Gorbachev and his Reforms, 94, 98-99, 205-6, and 208.
505
samizdat literature across the Soviet Union that documented human rights violations and
“agitated for more fundamental reforms.”1006 Following the example of the Chronicle of
Current Events, Alexander Podrabinek set up Express-Chronicle and Sergei Grigoryants
founded Glasnost and its “off-spring” Daily Glasnost. These publications only
complimented other publications that documented Soviet human rights violations such as
Bulletin of the Christian Community, Information Bulletin of the Group of Long-Term
Refuseniks, and the Ukrainian Herald.1007
In July 1987, former Helsinki monitors and political prisoners announced the
formation of a group called Press Club Glasnost (PCG). Although distrustful of
bureaucratic authority, members invited Soviet journalists and “public figures” to attend
and cover their meetings. They also pledged to help Soviet officials prepare for the
proposed Final Act conference on humanitarian issues that Gorbachev wanted to take
place in Moscow. Committed to the idea of ensuring “public participation” in the Soviet
government’s handling of the Helsinki process, they also invited members of the IHF to
attend their seminar on human rights. Despite the efforts of the KGB to disrupt the
meeting, the PGB succeeded in holding discussions that addressed issues as diverse as
human rights abuses, the Soviet judicial system, political prisoners, as well as national
and emigration rights. The summarized report that members sent to the Soviet authorities
represented “the first major [non-governmental] joint statement on civil rights and
political liberties in the glasnost era.” Its publication also became the first “means of
1006
1007
Thomas, “Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War,” 134.
Ibid., 134-5; U.S. Helsinki Watch Group, Nyeformaly: Civil Society in the USSR, 32-4; and Hosking,
The Road to Post-Communism, 4-7; and Brovkin, “Revolution From Below,” 242.
506
restoring the ties that the human rights movements had established” before the vast crack
down on dissent began in 1979.1008
Once again ignoring official registration requirements, former Helsinki monitors
and political prisoners in Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, and the Baltic republics formed
committees in 1987 dedicated to securing the release of remaining political prisoners.
One year later, three of these groups merged to form an International Committee for the
Defense of Political Prisoners whose strong defense of national and ethnic rights became
“working fare” for “the Popular fronts” that later agitated for independence in republics
such as Latvia and Ukraine.1009 One month after Reagan called for the legalization of the
Uniate Church during the Moscow summit, a group of former political prisoners and new
activists formed the Ukrainian Helsinki Union. Much like the PCG, this group demanded
that the Soviet government adhere to the provisions of the Final Act by respecting every
Ukrainian citizen’s right to and religious freedom and cultural autonomy.1010
1008
U.S. Helsinki Watch Group, Nyeformaly: Civil Society in the USSR, 18-21; U.S. Helsinki Watch,
Dissidents Push the Limits of Glasnost: New Publications Reach the West (New York: U.S. Helsinki
Watch, 1987). For an in-depth examination of the conference, see Gilligan, Defending Human Rights in
Russia, 72-5. See also International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, On Speaking Terms: An
Unprecedented Human Rights Mission to the Soviet Union , January 25-31, 1988 (Vienna: International
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 1988), 1-2, 5-7, 11; U.S. Helsinki Watch, “International Federation
Mission to Moscow,” Vol. II, no. 1 (22 February 1988): 1-6; Jeri Laber, The Courage of Strangers, 291-4;
and Laber, “Mission to Moscow,” The New York Review of Books 35, no. 9 (2 June 1988). This author
purchased an electronic copy of this publication from this publisher.
1009
Hosking, The Road to Post-Communism, 4-5. See also Thomas, “Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of
Communism, and the End of the Cold War,” 134.
1010
Taras Kuzio, Dissent in Ukraine under Gorbachev (London: Ukrainian Press Agency, 1989), 31-4.
Members of the Moscow Trust Group also held demonstrations where participants held signs with slogans
such as “’There is a Helsinki Charter of Human Rights’” and “Respect the Dignity of the Individual.”
507
The importance that organizations such as PCG and the Ukrainian Helsinki Union
placed on human rights shaped the behavior of the Democratic Union, “the Soviet
Union’s first oppositional party.” This group formed when members of Perestroika-88
and the Democracy and Humanism Seminar grew tired of Gorbachev’s constant praise
for Lenin and merged in May 1988. Instead of voicing any support for perestroika, the
founding congress passed resolutions that described how Lenin’s behavior during the
October revolution paved the wave for Stalinism and the totalitarian features of Sovietstyle socialism.1011 Because of the collective influence of former Helsinki monitors and
other human rights activists, the Democratic Union called for “genuine political pluralism
encompassing a multi-party system,” parliamentary democracy, free trade unions, “full
civil liberties,” and the right for each republic to secede from the Soviet Union. On 21
August 1988, members “organized public demonstrations” in Pushkin square to
commemorate the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. On 10 December, they held a
similar gathering in the same location to celebrate “the fortieth anniversary of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”1012
The explosive growth and continued existence of non-official groups operating in
public view once again illustrates that Gorbachev introduced fundamental changes in
how the Soviet system operated in practice. Official publications now contained articles
that discussed topics once considered off limits such as police brutality, the conditions of
Soviet prisons, psychiatric abuse, and Stalin’s heinous crimes. In addition to
1011
Michael McFaul and Sergei Markov, The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy (Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1993), 31. See also Brovkin, “Revolution from Below,” 242-44; Sakwa, Gorbachev and
His Reforms, 206-8, 213, 217; and Hosking, The Road to Post-Communism, 12, 19-20, 22.
1012
Thomas, “Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War,” 135.
508
rehabilitating Bolsheviks such as Nicolai Bukharin, the Soviet government backed away
from enforcing Article 70 (anti-Soviet agitation and slander) of the Russian criminal code
and continued to release political prisoners. In 1989, various official publications even
began to serialize sections of Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s monumental work Gulag
Archipelago1013
Despite these positive changes, the average bureaucrat nevertheless fell back on
orthodox and conservative assumptions when dealing with non-official groups they
deemed anti-socialist or tainted by links with former political prisoners. Over and over
again, they harassed and broke up non-official demonstrations that criticized the Soviet
Union’s lack of democracy and poor human rights record.1014 They also wrote scathing
attacks on non-official publications and groups who they deemed as a threat to the
internal cohesion of the Soviet empire.1015 While they had every reason to worry about
nationalist demonstrations in the Baltic republics and the dramatic rise in ethnic violence,
some continued to pin domestic disturbances on the machinations of foreign intelligence
1013
For a good the positive changes that had taken place in the Soviet human rights record, see
Memorandum, Lisa Jameson to Peter Robinson, N.D., Speechwriting Research Office, Box 26, Folder:
Worldnet Address, 5/23/88, RRPL. On the publication of Solzhenitsyn’s work, see Boobbyer, Conscience,
Dissent, and Reform in Soviet Russia, 192-3 and David Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, 264-76. See also CDSP
40, no. 5 (2 March 1988): 1-2; Ibid., 40, no. 32 (9 September 1988): 1-2; Ibid., 41, no. 10 (5 April 1989): 15; Ibid., 40, no. 46 (14 December 1988): 10; and Amnesty International, USSR: Human Rights in
Transition (February 1989): 5 and 11.
1014
There are countless examples of these practices. For contemporary accounts, see USSR News Brief
19/20 (31 October 1987): 1-2; and Ibid.., 19/20 (31 October 1988): 17. In December 1988, local authorities
raided the office of a Democratic Union member and confiscated the paper used to create a party
publication. See Ibid., 24 (31 December 1988): 4-5. See also Laquer, The Long Road to Freedom, 265-8.
1015
For example, see CDSP 39, no. 51 (20 January 1988): 1-5; Ibid., 39, no. 37 (14 October 1987): 6; Ibid.,
40, no. 20 (15 June 1988): 11-12; Ibid., 40, no. 10 (6 April 1988): 16-17; 39, no. 27 (5 August 1987): 3-4;
40, no. 16 (18 May 1988): 5; Ibid., 40, no. 4 (24 February 1988): 15-16; and “Soviet Position on Human
Rights and Dissent,” BBC, 4 February 1988. For another treatment of this subject, see Horvath, “The
Dissident Roots of Glasnost,” 189-98.
509
services. Relying on their close connections to the CIA, an article noted, Grigoryants and
his colleagues feel “that they can guarantee the security of their enterprise by taking
advantage of Glasnost.” Without shame, “they are waging a . . . propaganda campaign
aimed at discrediting the Soviet state and its social system.” In her well-known antiperestroika manifesto “I Can’t Forgo my Principles,” Nina Andreyeva excoriated the
ways in which “anti-socialist forces” exploited glasnost for their own selfish purposes. In
some cases” she warned, “”extremist elements” have begun to obtain leadership positions
in “grassroots organizations” and politicized them “on the basis of a pluralism that is far
from socialist.”1016
The KGB may have made some attempts to reconcile itself to Gorbachev’s reform
efforts, but the organization on the whole proved resistant to sanctioning anything
resembling freedom of expression and the free exchange of opinions.1017 Near the end of
1987, Chebrikov sent the Central Committee a memorandum that described the efforts
his agency had undertaken to prevent the PCG human rights seminar from taking place.
He also voiced his agency’s intention of devising “additional measures” that would
unmask “’the hostile . . . character of this organization’” and prevent similar meetings in
the future. On 28 September 1988, he defended such conduct when he told an official
journalist that the KGB still had a duty to “help a person who has gone astray dispel his
delusions and grasp the relationship between the interests of the . . . citizen and the state.”
1016
CDSP 40, no. 40 (2 November 1988): 24; and Ibid., 40, no. 13 (27 April 1988): 6. Another article
reported how the Democracy and Humanism Seminar followed the orders of the CIA with alacrity. CDSP
39, no. 51 (20 January 1988): 4.
1017
See Garthoff, “KGB Reports to Gorbachev,” 239-242.
510
“I want to emphasize in no uncertain terms that the hostile elements and other people
who embark on a path of antistate activity will be held accountable under the law.”1018
Even as late as 30 June 1989, the KGB prepared a special report for Gorbachev
that described the internal deliberations of the Moscow Tribune. Employing measured
language, the document marshaled evidence to substantiate the charge that this group
wanted to “challenge the leading role of the CPSU.” Not happy with the status-quo,
“[i]ndividual club members propagated the idea that it is necessary to counterpoise
grassroots social groups and associations (including those of a nationalist and separatist
persuasion) against the Party and state bodies on the subject of implementing
perestroika.” They also supported the immediate goal of “uniting and politicizing the
elements of an emerging civil society.”1019
The pervasive influence of orthodox thinking by no means confined itself to the
Soviet bureaucracy and the KGB. Such attitudes also continued to shape Soviet behavior
at the Vienna follow-up meeting. During his private meeting with Shevardnadze on 21
April 1988, George Shultz voiced his complaints about the attitudes of Soviet
representatives. “Religious freedom, he commented,” was one area where” they “had
retreated from earlier expressions of flexibility.” Such behavior left U.S. delegates with
the impression that their Soviet counterparts were “taking positions from an earlier era”
1018
Gilligan, Defending Human Rights in Russia, 75-6. CDSP 40, no. 35 (28 September 1988): 2. For
another account of Chebrikov’s belief in the close links between foreign intelligence services and nonofficial groups, see Ibid., 39, no. 37 (14 October 1987): 7-8. See also Laquer, The Long Road to Freedom,
254-5, 303.
1019
Rubenstein and Gribanov, ed., The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov, 336-9. See also Ibid., 335. For more
examples of KGB reports written during the late 1980s and early 1990s that could have come from the mid
1970s, see Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, More ‘Instructions from the Centre’: Top Secret
Files on KGB Global Operations, 1975-1985 (London: Frank Cass, 1992),125-8.
511
instead of “Shevardnadze and Gorbachev.” In response to these queries, the Soviet
Foreign Minister explained that “[w]e have a hard delegation in Vienna. “We tell them
one thing,” but “[t]hey do something different.1020
Shultz had every reason to voice these concerns because even “liberal-minded”
Soviet reformers exhibited a reflexive distaste for former dissenters and non-official
activities that violated socialist “norms.” During an interview with a representative from
Marxism Today in February 1987, the “reformer” Fedor Burlatsky rejected any
suggestion that the Soviet Union would move in the direction of Western “political
pluralism.” He also hinted that Sakharov would receive better treatment than other former
political prisoners because the Soviet scientist “has performed valuable service for the
Soviet Union . . . in the past.” Under the new conditions in the Soviet Union, he added,
former political prisoners “will be given a chance to define their attitude to the
democratic changes now taking place in our country and some will come back to play
their part in society.” This narrow view of appropriate political behavior led Burlatsky to
form the Soviet Helsinki Commission a few weeks after PCG emerged. 1021 Serving as
head of this organization, he discounted the significance of dissenters and non-official
groups whenever he met with Western private citizens.1022
1020
Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, “The Secretary’s Initial Meeting with
Shevardnadze,” 9. Available [Online]: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB251/7.pdf [8
June 2008].
1021
“The Gorbachev Revolution,” Marxism Today (February 1987): 14, 19. See also Cohen and Vaden
Heuvel, Voices of Glasnost, 179-80. 185.
1022
See Laber, The Courage of Strangers, 285-6, 288.
512
Gorbachev may have hoped that grassroots support of his restructuring efforts
would discredit and weaken conservative and orthodox opposition, but he also shared
“liberal-minded” reformers’ distaste for dissenters and non-official groups that had links
with foreign NGOs. Just before the Washington Summit took place, he explained
emigration from the Soviet Union as a function of an organized American “brain-drain”
campaign. In private, he told Reagan that he saw little difference between conservative
and democratic critics. He even called the later “the equivalent of Red Guards in China .
. . who wanted to push ahead without thinking.” On the eve of the 1988 Moscow
summit, Gorbachev felt compelled to tell an American journalist that “our people know
that Grigoryants’s ‘organization’ is tied not only organizationally but also financially to
the West.” Such a development also “happens in nature: all kinds of parasites attach
themselves to a living organism and try to harm it.”1023 At a Politburo meeting five
months later, he expressed alarm at the nationwide growth of Memorial. “Its latest
efforts” to raise the issue of NKVD burial grounds “show that it is trying to get bigger
than society.” “Party organizations in the localities should take all this business into their
own hands” because Memorial is “a cover for something else.”1024
1023
Gorbachev, At the Summit, 89; Memorandum of Conversation, “President’s Meeting with Mikhail
Gorbachev,” 8 December 1987, 2:30-3:15 PM, Executive Secretariat: NSC System Files, Box 8, Folder,
8791377, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library; and Mikhail Gorbachev, At the Summit, 224-5. Dmitri
Volkogonov has cogent observations on Gorbachev’s distaste for non-official democratic groups and anticommunist groups. See Volkogonov, Autopsy for an Empire, 484 and 509. See also Chernyaev, My Six
Years With Gorbachev, 142; and Andrei Sakharov, Moscow and Beyond: 1986 to 1989 (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1991), 94.
1024
Volkogonov, Autopsy for an Empire, 518. These comments flew in the face of earlier comments
suggesting that Gorbachev had resigned himself to the existence of Memorial. See “Chernayev Diary—
1988,” 41. See also David Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, 119 . Gorbachev also retained a lukewarm toward
Sakharov and threw a tantrum when a poll showed that he was less popular than the former political
prisoner. See Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, 281. See also Sakharov, Moscow and Beyond, 45-6.
513
The hostility many Soviet officials showed for non-official groups and one-time
political prisoners did not go unchallenged. In effect, transnational actors became
important democracy builders. With support of Western governments, they held Soviet
bureaucrats accountable and often gave them little choice but to participate in activities
that challenged their intolerance for diversity and pluralism. They challenged
Gorbachev’s restrictive understanding of glasnost and the average Soviet official’s
reflexive distaste for political pluralism. We can see this process at work in a letter that
Yuri Orlov and Vladimir Bukovsky, as well as several Soviet cultural figures, managed
to have published in Moscow News. Even though accompanying articles suggested that
these individuals suffered from a “’personality cult,’” the letter challenged the official
ideology of the Soviet regime. The authors defended the position that “glasnost
essentially implies some public discussion where everybody can take part without fearing
reprisals irrespective of views expressed.” “If Soviet leaders wish to enjoy trust among
the public, it is necessary for them to recognize at least several independent publishers
not subject to Party control.1025
Once released from prison, Natan Sharansky delivered speeches to countless
Western audiences that highlighted the shortcomings of Gorbachev’s glasnost vision.
Displeased with a new law passed in January 1987 that actually increased the difficulties
of emigrating from the Soviet Union, he delivered a speech at the U.N. Human Rights
Commission that called into question Gorbachev’s reputation as a committed reformer.
Behind the scenes, Sakharov continued to send the General Secretary letters calling for
1025
Quote is taken from Horvath, “The Dissident Roots of Glasnost,” 190. See also “Let Gorbachev Give
Us Proof,” Moscow News, no. 13 (1987): 10.
514
the further release of political prisoners. On one occasion, he suggested that the Central
Committee hold a meeting concerning political prisoners with representatives of domestic
human rights groups and various members of the “intelligentsia.”1026
After becoming an official member of the IHF, PCG sent a wide variety of
petitions and documents to delegations attending the Vienna follow-up meeting. Given
the attention these documents received from Western delegations, they went a long way
in challenging the bureaucratic authority of Soviet officials and the shortcomings of
Gorbachev’s reform efforts. One of the appeals outlined how Soviet officials make “a
point of refusing to engage in dialogue with independent public opinion” even as they
utilize our ideas and pass “them off as their own.” No matter what Gorbachev says, “it’s
high time for Soviet officials to understand that independent public opinion is by nature a
far more powerful fountainhead of productive ideas than any official agency.”1027
The Ukrainian Helsinki Union endorsed a similar position. Once it became a
member of IHF, this organization sent documents to international audiences and Vienna-
1026
“Rights Violations Have Worsened under Gorbachev,” The Toronto Star, 6 March 1987, F13; and
“Around the World: Free More Jews, Gorbachev Urged,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), 6 March 1987,
Press Release. Sakharov, Moscow and Beyond, 5. To read accounts of other letters he sent to Gorbachev
about conditions in the Soviet Union, see Ibid., 47-8, 65, and 94. See also “Honoring a Small Giant,”
Newsweek, 26 May 1986, 63; “Shcharansky: Soviet Union still Human Rights Tragedy,” United Press
International, 10 December 1986; “No Real Change in Soviet System, Sharansky says,” The Toronto Star,
5 April 1987, A17; “Natan Sharansky: Challenging Glasnost, MacLean’s (Canada), 12 October 1987, 8B;
“Sharansky Warns the West, The New York Times, 8 February 1987, Section 4, page 2; and “Sharansky
urges West to help Jews,” 9 September 1987, The Globe and Mail (Canada), N.P.; and “Soviet Mission is
Protest Target for Sharanskys,” 20 February 1987, B4. The U.S. News & World Report also published
excerpts of Sharansky’s work Fear No Evil. For example, see The U.S. News & World Report, 30 May
1988, 34.
1027
“Appeal from Press Club Glasnost to the Annual Meeting of the International Helsinki Federation for
Civil Rights,” Glasnost Information Bulletin, no. 5 and 6 (October 1987): 48. At a meeting called
“Commission of Inquiry,” held in Washington in January 1987, Yuri Orlov called into question
Gorbachev’s credentials as a reformer. See Mastny, ed., Soviet-Eastern Survey, 1986-1987, 342-4.
515
follow-up meeting that raised questions such as: Why do Soviet officials and KGB
agents born in Ukraine “hate freedom so much? Why don’t they permit their fellow
countrymen to gather for meetings to talk about common issues? Where do they get such
hate for everything that is Ukrainian and such blind persistence in destroying all that is
ours?”1028 In December 1987, a group of Lithuanian Bishops managed to send a letter
abroad that they had sent to Gorbachev demanding genuine religious freedom.1029
After arriving in Moscow to discuss human rights issues with the Soviet Helsinki
Commission in January 1988, a delegation from the IHF held private meetings with
members of their affiliate PCG. Disturbed at the arrests and harassment of non-official
groups they witnessed, the delegates decided to drive home the point that “the Soviet
government must listen to its own people.” To accomplish this goal, they brought
representatives of non-official Soviet groups to their scheduled meeting with the Soviet
Helsinki Commission. This move enraged Burlatsky. After the proceedings began, he
denounced the IHF for wanting to create a “confrontation” and “scandal.” He also
commented “this is not an appropriate moment for meeting with” PCG. “It is like forcing
a bride on us in a marriage we do not want.”1030
Bowing to the demands of IHF delegates, Burlatsky relented and allowed
Timofeyev to deliver a short address. The former political prisoner used this opportunity
1028
Kuzio, ed., Dissent in Ukraine Under Gorbachev, 21-3, 44-6. See also See USSR News Brief 5/6 (31
March 1988): 13
1029
1030
CCCL 76 (14 February 1988): 7.
International Helsinki Federation, On Speaking Terms: An Unprecedented Human Rights Mission to the
Soviet Union, January 25-31, 1988 (Vienna: International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 1988), 5,
14-5.
516
to argue that the Soviet Helsinki Commission would not succeed in improving the
government’s attitude toward human rights unless it worked in close concert with
“independent public opinion.” As the meeting drew to a close, Larissa Bogoraz, the
widow of Marchenko, handed Burlatsky “a fifty-page report on the December [human
rights] seminar of Press Club Glasnost and a list of political prisoners.” In a move that
probably angered Burlatsky, a member of the Hare-Krishna sect passed out “homemade
sweets” to all attendees without asking for permission.1031
Much like they held Gorbachev and other Soviet bureaucrats accountable for their
behavior, Soviet private citizens and émigrés also evaluated the Reagan administration’s
commitment to curbing Gorbachev’s attachment to a Leninist glasnost. Many drew
inspiration from Reagan and his subordinates’ staunch defense of freedom and vocal
support for reformers.1032 A former political prisoner told U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet
Union Jack Matlock that “’Reagan’s visit is one of the greatest events in all Russian
history” because his “words and gestures had emboldened reformers throughout the
country.”1033 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Sharansky has time and time again
praised Reagan for having the courage and vision to link improvements in U.S.-Soviet
relations to dramatic changes in Soviet internal behavior.1034
1031
Laber, “Mission to Moscow.” See also Documents from the Moscow Trust Group Prepared by the U.S.
Helsinki Watch Committee (New York: U.S. Helsinki Watch, 1987), 10-18.
1032
For example, see The Jerusalem Post, Anatoly and Avital Shcharansky: The Journey Home (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), 294-5, 281
1033
Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, 124. See also Yuri Tarnopolsky, Memoirs of 1984 (Lanham, MD:
University Press of America, 1993), 235; and Alexander Lerner, Change of Heart (Minneapolis: Lerner
Publications; Rehovot, Israel: Balaban Publishers, 1992), 209-11.
517
During the late 1980s, Sharansky actually had a more ambivalent view of Reagan.
In the wake of Moscow summit, he rejected the President’s suggestion that the
continuation of Soviet human rights stemmed from bureaucratic inertia. He may have
appreciated Reagan’s embrace of human rights, but he accused him of softening “his
criticism of the Soviet Union’s human rights policies because he was ‘frightened to death
by Western correspondents’ who were saying it was harmful to the atmosphere of the
summit.” After holding a well-publicized meeting with other dissenters, he argued that
no informed individual could advance the position that the evils of the Soviet system only
stemmed from “bureaucratic” distortions. Like many of his peers, he also argued that the
“Reagan administration . . . is not yet ready to make the direct link between human
rights” and other “aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations.”1035
These sentiments explain why many Soviet private citizens and émigrés placed
much more importance on the role global public opinion could play in transforming the
Soviet Union than either the firm resolve of the U.S. executive branch or Gorbachev’s
good intentions. As a PCG publication explained, “there is no government, no political
force in the world today whose destiny does not depend on international public opinion.”
In fact, “the impact of international public opinion on the political, social, legal and moral
climate in each country may be the most important feature of modern history.” At a rally
for Soviet Jews, Sharansky described how “the KGB often tried to convince me that my
1034
“The View from the Gulag,” The Weekly Standard 009, no. 39 (21 June 2004). Available [Online]:
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/004/224ncdel.asp [10 September 2006].
See also Sharansky, The Case for Democracy, 11-12, 135-43
1035
“Activist Says Reagan aiding Kremlin’s Deceit,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), 3 June 1988. For a
similar view, see “The View from Home,” MacLeans (Canada), 13 June 1988, 20.
518
life, like the lives of other prisoners of Zion, was in its hands and not in the hands of
‘students and housewives.’” “But an army of ‘students and housewives,’” he told the
audience, “was able to prove the KGB wrong. Today, the Soviet leaders may again
believe that the fate of Soviet Jews is entirely in their hands. Let us again prove them
wrong.”1036
Soviet private citizens and émigrés had every reason to praise the value of
international public opinion. The successes Western governments and private citizens
had in “globalizing” the issue of Soviet human rights violations and the limitations of
glasnost had important consequences for Gorbachev’s reform efforts. By definition, they
raised questions about whether or not Moscow’s democratization efforts had done
enough to protect the basic human rights of Soviet private citizens. They also
undermined the international legitimacy of and trust in the Soviet Union that Gorbachev
and other reformers hoped to build. Without generating favorable international public
opinion in the area of human rights protection, they had little chance of completing the
larger task of forging a new type of socialism that would one day result in the integration
of Europe and a “universal reconciliation” in international affairs1037 The cumulative
impact of these concerns led Gorbachev and other reformers to link their restructuring
1036
Appeal from Press Club Glasnost to the Annual Meeting of the International Helsinki Federation for
Civil Rights,” 47-8; and Natan Sharansky, “Jews’ Summit Message to Gorbachev,” The New York Times
30 November 1987, A19. See also The Jerusalem Post, Anatoly and Avital Shcharansky: The Journey
Home, 296; Yuri Tarnopolsky, Memoirs of 1984, 230-33; Irina Ratushinskaya, Grey is the Color of Hope,
translated by Alyona Kojevnikov (New York : Knopf, 1988), 179, 311, 349; Lerner, Change of Heart, 201;
and Valery Chalidze, The Soviet Human Rights Movement (New York : Jacob Blaustein Institute for the
Advancement of Human Rights, American Jewish Committee, 1984), 36; and Orlov, Before and After
Glasnost, 1-27.
1037
Levesque, “The Messianic Character of Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking,’” in Njolstad, ed., The Last
Decade of the Cold War, 162.
519
efforts to a broad-based international movement designed to improve every government’s
human rights record. While he still spoke about punishing “hooligans” and working
within the confines of “our socialist choice,” Gorbachev used the Nineteenth Party
Congress to point out the organic link between democratization and protecting every
individual’s basic human rights in the Soviet Union. Because human rights issues have
become “internationalized,” he told the audience, “we are prepared to cooperate actively
with all other countries . . . to scrupulously fulfill the commitment we have made.”1038
As part of the on-going process of severing Soviet-style socialism’s links with
Stalinism, Gorbachev outlined the close link between internal reform and human rights
when he appeared before the United Nations in December 1988. Since the USSR has
“gone substantially and deeply into the business of constructing a socialist state based on
the rule of law,” we hope to codify a series of laws that will go a long way in “ensuring
the rights of the individual.” In contrast to the recent past, “there are now no people in
places of imprisonment in . . . [the USSR] who have been sentenced for their political or
religious convictions. Just as important, “the problem of the so-called ‘refuseniks’ is
being removed.” After announcing these changes, Gorbachev voiced his intention to
“expand the Soviet Union’s participation in the United Nations and . . . the pan-European
process.” “Within the Helsinki process, we are also examining an end to jamming of all
foreign radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union.”1039
1038
1039
CDSP 40, no. 26 (27 July 1988): 12-13.
Mikhail Gorbachev, “43rd U.N. General Assembly Session, December 7, 1988.” Available [Online]
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/23/documents/gorbachev/ [10 December 2006].
520
Heeding international public opinion, Gorbachev and other “liberal-minded”
reformers took a number of steps designed to create a law-abiding socialist state and
improve the Soviet Union’s human rights record. In addition to allowing Jewish
emigration levels to reach record high levels, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
eliminated the provisions of the criminal code (Articles 190 and 70) used to penalize
dissenters for their political convictions. Reformers also secured passage of a law that at
least on paper allowed individuals to appeal the “unlawful acts” of Soviet officials and
created commissions designed to fight against unlawful psychiatric detention. Along
similar lines, they also began the process of creating new laws that protected press
freedoms and an individual’s right to hold non-official opinions.1040
Well aware of the upcoming one-thousandth anniversary of Kievan Rus’s
acceptance of Christianity, Gorbachev took unprecedented steps to repair the
government’s relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church and other religious groups
in 1988. In greater numbers than ever before, authorities allowed the importation of
bibles and other religious literature; they also permitted groups as diverse as Pentecostals
and Hare Krishna sects to hold open public meetings. As part of the process of building a
law-abiding socialist state, reformers decided to hold meetings with U.S. Congressional
members about human rights issues and attend meetings with U.S. representatives that
addressed topics such as judicial reform and criminal procedures. They even ended up
1040
Jerome Shestack, Glasnost and Human Rights (London: University College, 1989), 8-10, 12, 15-16;
See also Amnesty International, “USSR: Human Rights in Transition,” (February 1989): 4-12; Ibid., USSR
Human Rights in a Time of Change: A Survey of the Issues that Concern Amnesty International, including
information collected on a visit to Moscow from March to April 1989 (October 1989): 8-28; and U.S.
Helsinki Watch, “News From the USSR,” 15 September 1987, 19.
521
allowing representatives of Western NGOs to visit psychiatric institutions and meet some
political prisoners.1041
Soviet reformers placed importance on holding these meetings for two
fundamental reasons. Although sensitive to the issue to “false” accusations of human
rights violations, Soviet Foreign Ministry officials used the information they received
about political prisoners and emigration refusals to make “other agencies of the . . .
government” resolve long-standing cases.1042 Well aware of domestic critics, they also
wanted to portray themselves as equal participants in a human rights dialogue that flowed
in both directions. Both of these attitudes surfaced during Shevardnadze’s private
conversations with Shultz. On one occasion, after hearing U.S. complaints about Soviet
internal behavior, the Foreign Minister expressed his satisfaction with the cooperative
exchanges on human rights that had taken place and lauded the “visits by unofficial U.S.
groups, including psychiatrists.” These sorts of exchanges meant that “the U.S. now had
a more realistic understanding of the need for a . . . ‘two-way’ street’” on human rights
issues.1043
Not content with letting Shultz’s charges stand without a firm response,
Shevardnadze proceeded to criticize the U.S. government’s behavior. He accused the
executive branch and Congress of relying on out-of-date information about conditions in
1041
Jerome Shestack, Glasnost and Human Rights, 12; and Twenty-Fifth Semiannual Report, 8-12; TwentyFourth Semiannual Report, 6-11; Twenty-Third Semiannual Report, 5-9; and Twenty-Second Semiannual
Report, 5-9.
1042
For descriptions of this mindset, see Richard Schifter, “American Diplomacy, 1985-1989,” 145; David
K. Shipler, “Dateline USSR: On the Human Rights Track,” Foreign Policy 75 (Summer 1989): 169.
1043
Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, “The Secretary’s Initial Meeting with
Shevardnadze,” 10-11.
522
the USSR and overestimating the number of Soviet political prisoners. “The role of
ministers’ experts on human rights,” he explained, “should be to provide their chiefs with
solid, accurate information which could lead to practical results.” With good reason, he
also complained about the executive branch’s tendency to brush aside the validity of
Soviet complaints about U.S. human rights violations.1044 Just as troubling, the
executive branch had not yet followed Soviet advice and ratified the “international human
rights covenants which could provide the basis for bilateral and multilateral cooperation
in the field.” At the Moscow summit, Shevardnadze took these criticisms one step further
and told Shultz that American and Soviet experts needed to discuss charges that eleventhousand political prisoners existed in U.S. jails.1045
Gorbachev behaved in a similar fashion. At the Washington summit, he told
Reagan about the “Soviet readiness” to participate in reciprocal human rights discussions
that involved members of the U.S. Congress and Supreme Soviet. In defense of this
vision, he described how “it would be unacceptable for one side to assume the role of a
prosecutor and other side that of the accused.” “One side” should not assume “the role of
teacher and the other that of the student.” At their next private meeting in Moscow,
1044
Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, “The Secretary’s Initial Meeting with
Shevardnadze,” 11, 13. In a private memorandum to George Shultz, Deputy Secretary Richard Schifter
suggested that “the Soviets continue the charade of raising U.S. human rights cases. We go through the
formalities of responding in a serious fashion. But it is clearly understood that both sides are aware that
this is a charade.” See Memorandum, Richard Schifter to George Shultz, “Human Rights Group at
Moscow Summit, “ 1 June 1988. Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB251/25.pdf [7 June 2008]. Ronald Reagan’s briefing
book for the Moscow took the same position. See Department of State, Background Book, “President
Reagan’s Meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev,” 29 May-2 June 1988, N.P. Available [Online]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB251/10.pdf [7 June 2008].
1045
Memorandum of Conversation, “First Shultz-Shevardnadze Meeting, Evening of May 29,” 6, Fritz
Ermath Files, Box 1, Folder: 1988 U.S.-Soviet Memcons (3/3), RRPL.
523
Gorbachev reiterated that “the Soviets had many comments to make about U.S. human
rights problems such as “political rights, the rights of blacks and colored people, social
and economic rights, [and] the treatment of anti-war protestors and movements.” 1046
Not impressed with Reagan’s spirited defense of existing conditions in the United
States, Gorbachev responded that “he had not been inventing figures” and “was [only]
citing facts from the American Congress.” He then tried to relay the message that the
President might have something to learn from the “self-critical” Soviet society.1047 He
repeated similar sentiments in a private letter he sent to Reagan a few months after this
meeting ended. “We seem to have agreed, he wrote, “that these [human rights] problems
require an in-depth consideration and clear understanding of the true situation in both the
United States and Soviet Union. Traffic along this two-way street has begun and I hope
that it will be intense.”1048
The emphasis Soviet reformers placed on holding a “two-way” human rights
dialogue worked in tandem with the larger goal of engaging in peaceful ideological
competition with the United States. Since he hoped to forge a superior “synthesis
between socialism and democracy,” Gorbachev rejected suggestions that he had
embraced the Helsinki process only to emulate successful capitalist countries. At a
Kremlin banquet held to celebrate Margaret Thatcher’s visit to Moscow in March 1987,
1046
See “Memorandum of Conversation, 9 December 1987, 10:35-10:45 A.M.,” 8.
1047
Memorandum of Conversation, “The President’s First One-on-One Meeting with General Secretary
Gorbachev, 29 May 1988, 3:26-4:37,” Executive Secretariat: NSC, Box 10, Folder: 8890497, RRPL.
1048
Letter, Gorbachev to Reagan, 20 September 1988, USSR: General Secretary Gorbachev, Box 41,
Folder: 8890725-8890750, RRPL
524
he explained his willingness to discuss human rights issues at Final Act forums. He
hoped that Soviet voices would be heard in the West
by the millions of unemployed, homeless and destitute, by those beaten by the
police and victimized in court, and by those whose civil rights and human dignity
are subjected to glaring discrimination simply because of the color of their
skin.1049
He voiced similar sentiments a few hours after Reagan left the Moscow summit. At a
conference that included Western peace activists and Native American representatives, he
insisted that “[w]e do not need anyone else’s model. We don’t need anyone else’s
values.” Gorbachev also “autographed a copy of the work “‘Perestroika’” for Leonard
Peltier.1050
While always willing to voice familiar Soviet critiques of U.S. domestic behavior,
Gorbachev and other reformers also made a conscious effort to move away from the
crude Marxist-Leninist human rights propaganda of the past. 1051 In a private
memorandum he wrote to the General Secretary, Yakovlev favored such a course because
the Soviet government had more than enough ammunition to counter “propaganda that is
hostile to socialism and to our country.” Because we are “giving socialism back to the
world,” we now have the ability to work with “our friends” abroad to “globalize” the
“creative potential of socialism” and rehabilitate the international prestige of the Soviet
Union.1052
1049
M.S. Gorbachov, Volume II, 187.
1050
“Gorbachev Defends Soviet Human Rights Record,” The Associated Press, 2 June 1988.
1051
David K. Shipler was right on the mark when he made this observation in 1989. See Shipler, “Dateline
USSR: On the Human Rights Track,” 170-1.
525
Confident in the global appeal of a reformed Soviet Union, Yakovlev and other
officials concluded a wide variety of exchange agreements that in practice increased the
level of “information flows” between the United States and the Soviet Union. Taking
advantage of this new climate, an official Soviet journalist of African descent wrote a
series of articles in the Christian Science Monitor describing her impressions of the
African-American community in Boston. Employing arguments more reminiscent of an
American liberal-Democrat than a committed Marxist, she explained the validity of the
well-known argument that “there are black fields of achievement and white ones” in the
United States.1053
During the first official U.S.-Soviet seminar on human rights that took place in
November 1988, a Soviet representative attempted to tap into the transnational human
rights network so he could strengthen his contentions about U.S. human rights
shortcomings. After criticizing U.S. laws that violated the Final Act’s “Third Basket,” he
utilized a letter from an American “defense attorney” to substantiate charges that
“’prisoners of conscience” existed in the United States. Familiar with how human rights
criticisms gained legitimacy in Western countries, he told Steny Hoyer (R-MD) that this
letter deserves your attention because the author supported her charges with citations
from a number of legitimate sources, including “the Amnesty International organization,
1052
“Notes for Presentation to Politburo, December 27, 1988. Available [Online]:
Eduard Shevardnadze’s account supports this view. See Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom,
63. See also Shipler,”Dateline USSR,” 165; CDSP 41, no. 8 (22 March 1989): 15; Ibid., 40, no. 41 (9
November 1988): 18; and “Soviet Spokesman on Human Rights,” TASS, 31 July 1987.
1053
“Soviet-US Meeting on Information Exchanges addressed by Yakovlev,” BBC, 8 October 1988; and
Yelena Hanga, “What a black Soviet found out about American blacks,” The Christian Science Monitor 24
February 1988, 5. See also “U.S., Soviets to Exchange Movies,” The Associated Press, 22 June 1988;
“USSR-USA: Widening of Book Exchange,” TASS, 10 November 1988; and “A U.S.-Soviet Cultural
Rapprochement,” The New York Times, 17 February 1988, C17.
526
minutes from Congressional hearings in 1984 and 1985, broadcasts on National Public
Radio, [and] the 20/20 analytical news program produced by ABC.”1054
The CSCE Endgame
The decision of Gorbachev and other “liberal-minded” reformers to sign the
concluding document of the Vienna follow-up meeting grew out of their larger goals of
strengthening the Soviet Union’s international legitimacy and ability to engage in
peaceful ideological competition with capitalist nations. By agreeing to clear-cut
stipulations that allowed private citizens and signatories to challenge Soviet internal
behavior, they could combat any suggestion that the USSR stood outside the mainstream
of Western debates about what legitimate governments owed private citizens. In light of
the Soviet and Russian past, they had also taken an important step toward creating a lawabiding socialist state that had an obligation to respect the basic freedoms of each private
citizen. The sections of this agreement that called on signatories to respect the right of
private citizens to organize and disseminate information without governmental
interference represented an important move toward the creation of “a pluralistic
democracy based on a revived civic society” and “equal citizenship.”1055
The creation of a well-functioning civil society and law-abiding socialist state that
many hoped would emerge in the wake of the Vienna agreement never took place
because of bureaucratic inertia and the inherent instabilities of the Soviet empire.
Gorbachev may have agreed to relinquish the Soviet Communist Party’s leading role and
1054
CDSP 40, no. 47 (21 December 1988): 15.
1055
Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms, 230.
527
the reunification of Germany in 1990, but he never fully relinquished his preference for
Leninist glasnost and hostility toward democratic critiques. During a meeting with
“media bosses” in October 1990, he “denounced a variety of eminent reformers ‘who in
their chase after popularity, are ready to speak out against their mother.’” Even though a
new law appeared guaranteeing freedom of the press in June 1990, party officials still
refused to register Grigoryants’s publication Glasnost. Instead, “the Central Committee”
launched a new publication of the same name “that was combined with ‘political
vigilance and implacability toward views that are alien to us’ and ‘ideological work that
is creative and aggressive.’” Facing a substantial economic downturn, ethnic violence,
and independence movements, Gorbachev asked legislators to suspend press laws
because “only the Supreme Soviet” can “‘ensure complete objectivity in the media.’”1056
The inability of many Soviet officials to repudiate past traditions and the
unraveling of the USSR that accompanied Gorbachev’s reform campaign had predictable
consequences. The Soviet government never managed to pass or institutionalize the
basic laws and practices necessary to “transform the social relationships between state
and society into a stable pattern of democratic bargaining” associated w