American Marines in Haiti, 1915-1922
Author(s): Walter H. Posner
Source: The Americas, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Jan., 1964), pp. 231-266
Published by: Academy of American Franciscan History
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AMERICANMARINESIN HAITI, 1915-1922
landingof marinesin Haition July 28, 1915,wasthe climax
to more than a centuryof political,financial,and diplomatic
problemson that unhappyisland. The Haitianshad not been
on January1,
proclaimed
preparedfor the hard-foughtindependence
1804. In the interveningyears,they had beentheoreticallygoverned
Onlytwo of theirtwenty-sixchiefexecuunderfourteenconstitutions.1
termof officeand
tives hadmanagedto servea regularconstitutional
thenretirealive.2Indeed,the occuptionforceslandedwhenan enraged
Saminto pieces.3
mobwas cuttingPresidentJ. V. Guillaume
hadnot developed.Therewere
A feelingof unity and nationalism
sharp city-countryrivalriesas well as strong color lines between
The ideaof civicresponsiNegroesandthe bettereducatedmulattoes.4
leadersfoughtfor the privilege
bilitywas unheardof.5 Well-educated
at the expenseof the nation.6
of enrichingthemselves
THE
attempts
Manyof the problemsof Haitistemmedfromunsuccessful
to buildrailroads.Whenthe Americantroopslandedin Haitiin 1915,
there were only aboutone hundredforty miles of railroadin the
country.7Someexpensiveattemptshadactuallybeenmadein the past
to bettertheseconditions.In the 1890'swhenWashingtonwas beginningto thinkin termsof dollardiplomacy,manyHaitianshad begun
to believethat the problemof their countrycould be solvedonly
throughthe introductionof foreigncapital.8
1JamesG. Leyburn,The HaitianPeople (New Haven, 1945), pp. 238-240.
2Harold P. Davis, Black Democracy: The Story of Haiti (New York, 1936), pp.
324-325.
3 Ibid., pp. 166-167.
4Arthur C. Millspaugh,Haiti Under AmericanControl,191S-1930(Boston, 1931),
pp. 4, 8, 14, 1S.
in Haiti and the DominicanRepublic,"
5 Carl Kelsey, " The AmericanIntervention
The Annals of the AmericanAcademy of Politicaland Social Science, Vol. C, No.
189 (March,1922), pp. 127-128.
6 United StatesSenateSelect Committeeon Haiti and Santo Domingo,lBquiryInto
Occupationand Administrationof Haiti and Santo Domingo: HearingsPursuantto
S. Res. 112, 67th Congress,Firstand SecondSessions(Washington,1922), Vols. 1 and
2, pp. 114-115.Hereafterreferredto as Hearings.
StatisticalAbstractof the United States,
7 United StatesDepartmentof Commerce,
1919 (Washington,1919), p. 829.
8 Ludwell L. Montague,Haiti and the United States, 1714-1938(Durham, 1940),
pp. 197-198.
231
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232
IN HAITI
AMERICANS
railRudolpheGardere,a Haitan,hadreceiveda contractto builda for
from Gonaivesto Hinchein July, 1904. He sold his rights
road
This proposed
in stockand$50in cashto two Philadelphians.
$62,500
of the
roadwas to openup the backwoodsprovincesin which most
fromtheprofestherewasopposition
began.Consequently,
revolutions
conscieniious
more
the
of
groups.NordAlexis,one
revolutionary
sional
andgavetheAmeriof Haiti,ignoredhisopposinglegislators
presidents
cansfurtherconcessions.They were to extendthe line to Port-auPrinceand to connectit with a recentlycompletedBritishrailroad
firmrepaidthis trustby doing
The Philadelphia
fromCap-Haitian.9
work andby swindlingotherAmericaninvestorsout
noconstruction
oftheirmoney.l°
In 1910,a new concessionwas grantedto anotherAmerican,James
lines,
P. McDonald.l1This concessionprovidedthat two unfinished
line,
to Port-au-Prince
the previouslymentionedCap-Haiiian
including
of the
shouldbe completedand consolidated.A fifty-yearextension
Compagnie
the
company,
olderconcessionswas granted.McDonald's
Haiii),
Nationaldes Cheminsde Fer d'Haiti (NationalRailwayof
at the rateof $20,000a
wasto issuebondsto financethe construction
meetits
kilometeror about$33,000a mile. If the railroadcouldnot
and
interest
6%
pay
to
guaranteed
the Haitiangovernment
obligations,
reto
was
moreon the sinkingfund account.The government
1°/cR
ceive one-sixthof any profitsover 12%andall the railroadproperty
McDonaldalsoobtaineda fiftyof the concession.l2
at the termination
public
year concessionfor the raisingof bananason all unoccupied
a fifteen-year
on eachsideof the railroad,
landup to twentykilometers
import
certain
from
monopolyon bananaexports,and exemptions
oSsiet
have
duties.In return,he was to pay certaintaxesthat would
railwayguarantee.All disputeswere to be settled
the government's
in Haitiancourts.
of Haitiover
The NationalRailwayultimatelycost the government
1924that it
in
reported
The Americanfinancialadviser
$8,000,000.13
financialventuresin the historyof the
was one of the mostdisastrous
when one realizesthat the
country.l4This can be easilyunderstood,
Ibid.,pp. 199-200.
PoliticalScience Quar10Paul H. Douglas," The AmericanInterventionof Haiti,"
terly, XLII (June, 1927),230.
Millspaugh,Haiti Under AmericanControl,p. 21.
York, 1929),p. 334.
RaymondL. Buell,The AmericanOccupationof Haniti(New
230-231.
p.
13 Douglas," AmericanInterqJention,"
Haiti Under AmericanControl,pp. 21-22.
14 Quotedin Millspaugh,
9
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H. POSNER
WALTER
233
annualmcomeof the governmentduringthe 1913-1924periodnever
exceeded$6,800,000,and duringsomeyearsfell below $4,000,000.15
By 1914,the railroadcompanywasbankrupt.It hadissued$3,545,000
worthof bonds,but it hadconstructedonly 108milesof roadin three
unconnectedsegments.The governmentof Haitirefusedto continue
the paymentof the contractedinterestuntil the railroadwas completed, and it began foreclosureproceedings.McDonaldhad been
fromthe railroadcompanyin 1911,andthe NationalCity
eliminated
Bankof New York hadgainedcontrol. RogerL. Farnham,an empresidentof the railroad.Farnployeeof the bank,hadbeenappointed
ham requestedthat the United Statesgovernmentintercedein the
controversywith Haiti.16
factorin the probbecameanimportant
negotiations
The subsequent
lems of the Americanoccupation,but a satisfactoryconclusionwas
29, 1914,the Haitianarguments
neveractuallyreached.On September
were presentedto the AmericanStateDepartment.It was claimed
and defithatthe railroadconcessionsclearlyprovidedfor arbitration
in suchcases;hence,the United
intervention
nitelyforbadediplomatic
hadno rightto intercede.It was alsoclaimedthat
Statesgovernment
calledfor elevencompletedsectionsof railroadby that
the concessions
te; yet, only six sectionshadactuallybeen finished.l7The Haitian
courtesy,they woulddelay
addedthat,as an international
government
but not United
andacceptrailroad-sponsored,
foreclosureproceedings
for solvingthe problem.18
propositions
Statesgovernment-sponsored,
On November12, 1914,Secretaryof StateBryanofferedto recoggovernmentof DavilmarTheodore,but only
nize the revolutionary
to the UnitedStateswith auafterTheodorehad sent a commission
thorityto settleseveralimportantproblems,includingthatof the railroad. The offerwasnot acceptedbecauseof the extremeoppositionof
the Haitiansenators,who actuallyattemptedto maultheirministerof
foreignaffairsfor merelysuggestingthe commissionto the United
States. To the suspiciousHaitiansthat indicatedan attemptto " sell
15 United StatesDepartmentof State,SeventhAnnualReportof the AmericanHigh
at Port-au-Prince,Haiti, to the Secretaryof State: 1928 (Washington,
Cowrmissioner
1929), p. 20.
l6Paul H. Douglas,"The Naiional Railway of Haiti,"The Nation, Vol. CXXIV,
No. 3211 (January19, 1927), p. 59.
of State,PapersRelatingto the ForeignRelationsof the
17 United StatesDepartment
United States, 191S (Washington,1922-1938), pp. 540-542. Hereafterreferredto as
ForeignRelations.
18 Ibid.,1916,pp. 544-545
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234
AMERICANS
IN HAITI
their country" to a foreignpower.lDThe foreclosureproceedings
were never actuallyinstituted,and the matterwas pushedinto the
background
temporarily,
as the problemsof the NationalBankandof
the interventionbecamemoreserious.
In 1881a Frenchcompanyhadbeengivena charterto forma national
bankcalledBanqueNationaled'Haiti.20
The mainprovision
wasa fiftyyearconcessionas sole governmentdepository.2l
Duringthe administrationof Nord Alexisin 1904,it was discoveredthat the bankhad
defraudedthe treasuryof $1,257,993.22
The unexpectedlycourageous
presidentforcedthe indictmentof the Frenchdirector,as well as two
GermanofiRcials
andseveralprominent
Haitians.Thesemenwereconvictedof embezzlement,
but strongpressurefrom outsidegroupsresultedin all but one of the prisoners
beingfreed.
A reorganization
of the bankunderFrenchcontrolwas madein
1910,but UnitedStatesSecretaryof StateKnoxmanagedto havethe
new organization
changedso thatAmericanbankerscouldparticipate.23
Germany,whichcontrolledabout90°/Oof the foreigntradein Haiti,24
haddemanded
a greatdealof controlin the new organization
andhad
opposedAmericanparticipation.On the other hand,France,which
hadgreatinfluencethroughits loans,its railroad
bonds,andits northern
commercialinterests,had opposedany Germanparticipation
in the
new bankunlessthe Americanswere also included.25This demand
prevailed,and,out of the forty thousandsharesof stock in the new
BanqueNationalede la Republique
d'Haiti,theBerlinerHandelGesellschaftacquiredonly two thousand.Four Americanfirmssubscribed
to a totalof eightthousandshares.The remaining
stock,aboutthreefourthsof the totalamount,remainedin the possession
of the Banque
de l'UnionParisienneof France. The bankwas given a fifty-year
monopolyover the issuingof papermoneyand it was to act as the
treasuryforgovernment
funds.Itscommission
wasto be about$100,000
a yearas earnedfrom1%of government
depositsand*5°/O
of the sums
paid out.26
19Ibid., 1914,pp. 359, 363-364.
Kelsey, "AmericanIntervention,"
p. 158.
21 Hearings,p. 105. Testimonyof R. L. Farnham.
22 Montague,
Haiti and the UnitedStates,p. 189.
23 Buell,AmericanOccupation,
pp. 333-334.
24Hearings,p. 110. Testimonyof R. L. Farnham.
25 Davis, BlackDemocracy,p. 144.
26 Buell, AmericanOccupation,
pp. 333-33420
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H. POSNER
WALTER
235
The principalaimsof the new bankwere monetaryreformsand a
of customs.A loanof 65,000,000francsat
sharein the administration
French,andAmerithroughtheGerman,
5°/0interesthadbeenarranged
debtto the old bank,to reiire
can intereststo pay the government's
internaldebts,andto eiEectthe desiredmonetaryreforms(10,000,000
francs). Specialtaxeson importsand exportswere reqliiredby the
lendingnationsto securethe serviceof the loan. On the otherhand,a
by theHaitianofficials.27
of 5,000,000francswasdemanded
commission
The bankmadesolemnpledgesto permitfundsto be usedonly for
the exact purposesspecifiedby law. Duringthe 1911-1915period
to obtain
attempted
governments
revolutionary
severalof theephemeral,
someof the depositsin orderto financethe fightagainstthe nextrevolution. " Currentexpenses" was the reasonusuallygiven for these
althoughit was alsoclaimedthatthe requested
requests,28
unsuccessful
moneywas reallya surplusresultingfroma 1903tax law andnot the
As a lastresort,the impoverished
sumlaidasidefor monetaryreform.29
of papermoneyor floated
amounts
large
issued
sometimes
governments
large,internalbond issues. These bondswere usuallypurchasedby
Germaninterests,which apparentlyobtainedmany concessionsas a
result,muchto the detrimentof the morelegitimatecreditorsof the
were actuIt hasbeenclaimedthatGermanmerchants
government.30
andfinancingrevolutionsjustto obtaintheseconcesally encouraging
sionsfromthe victors.31
Becauseof the outbreakof WorldWarI, the politicalunrest,andthe
growingdebt of the governmentto the bank,as well as to stop the
illegal and ruinousfinancialpracticesof the government,the bank
" for 1914-15.This
threatenedto cancelthe " conventionbudgetaire
annualagreementhad allowedthe bankto give the Haitiangovernment monthlyamountsfor operatingexpenses.Legally,the money
couldhavebeenwithhelduntilthe end of eachfiscalyear. Madison
Smith,the Americanministerto Haiti,wrote to the StateDepartment
onJune9,1914:
The suspensionof the "conventionbudgetaire"most likely would
bringthe Governmentto a conditionwhere it could not operate.It
Davis,Black Democracy,pp.144-145.
p. 159.
Kelsey, " AmericanIntervention,"
29Buell,AmericanOccupation,p. 336.
30 Davis, Black Democracy,pp.146-151.
Record: Proceedingsand Debates of the Second Session of the
31 Congressional
Sixty-SeventhCongress,Vol. LXII, Part 6 (Washington,1922), p. 6487. Hereafter
Record.
referredto as Congressional
27
28
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236
AMERICANS
IN HAITI
is justthisconditionthatthebankdesires,for it is the beliefof the
bankthat the Governmentwhen confrontedby such a crisis,would
be forced to ask the assistanceof the United Statesin adjustingits
financialtangle and that Americansupervisionof the customs
wouldresult.32
This statementwas basedupon publicopinion,but it did indicatea
seemingtendencytoward" dollardiplomacy."Controlof Haitiancustomswouldgive a foreignpowercompletecontrolof the country,as
morethannine-tenthsof the revenueof Haiticamefromimportand
exportduties.33
Secretaryof StateBryanwas apparentlystill tryingto preventan
openbreakbetweenthe nations.On July 2, 1914,he submitted
to the
Haitiangovernment,
then underPresidentZamor,the draftof a proposedfinancialconventionthat would have given the United States
the samecontroloverHaitianfinancesthathadbeensuccessfulin helping the financesof the DominicanRepublicsince 1907. Five months
later,the new Theodoregovernment
in Haitirepliedwith a counterproposalthat omittedall provisionsfor financialandcustomscontrol.
Suggestionsfor industrialconcessionswere substituted.In the meantime,Bryanhad notifiedthis new governmentthat the UnitedStates
would withholdofficialrecognitionuntil after the problemsof the
bank,the railroad,the customs,the foreigninterests,anda MoleSaintNicholasnavalcoalingstationhadbeensolved.It wassuggestedthata
three-mancommission
be sentto Washingtonto negotiatethesesettlements,but such a commissionwas never sent. The crisiscame in
December,1914,afterTheodorehadfailedin severalattemptsto obtain
for his own use the fundsearmarked
for redemption
of papermoney.
Fearingthat an attemptwould be madeto seizethe moneyby force,
the bankaskedthe StateDepartment
on December8, 1914,to transfer
$110,000in gold to New Yorkon the firstAmericanwarshipto leave
Port-au-Prince.
Bryanauthorized
the transferon December10. He alsonotifiedthe
government
of Haitithatthe UnitedStateshadno desireto assumethe
financialresponsibilities
of Haitiunlessthe latternationso desired,and
that Haiti would be recognizedwhen a government,electedby the
peopleandcapableof maintaining
order,had beeninstalled.On December14,theAmerican
nister reportedthat$500,000couldbe transported,but thatthe protectionof the marineswouldbe neededwhile
ForeigtzRelxons, 1914,pp. 345-346.
83Kelsey,"AmericanIntervention"p. 157.
32
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H. POSNER
WALTER
237
carryingthe gold to the wharf.34Soonafterthis,the Haitiangovernment demandedthe money,as had been expected. The frightened
Frenchdirectorof the bankwas goingto yield,but an Amencanemployeeshutthe vaultanddefiedthe officials.Whena crowdcollected,
the directorfledto the Frenchlegation.Justat thattime,the American
gunboatMachiasarrived.With the aid of someunarmedmarines,the
gold wastakento the ship.35
The goldwas depositedin the NationalCity Bankof New Yorkat
This was moreinterestthanthe
the rateof 2% interestper annum.36
Haitiangovernmentwouldhavereceivedhadthe moneyremainedin
Haiti. On the otherhand,it waslessthanthe rategivenby otherNew
York banksfor similardeposits.The officialsof Haiti immediately
protestedthe removalof the funds. They claimedthat (1) the conand forbadediplomaticinterventionin
tract providedfor arbitration
in January,1914,hadrevealed
suchcases;37(2) an officialinvestigation
deficitof $238,548in the depositsof the bank38(which
anunexplained
a sign thatthe bankhad not treatedits obligationsso
was apparently
honorablyas it had claimed);(3) therewere laws in Haiti that auand (4)
thorizedthe issuingof papercurrencyby the government;
the bankhadforfeitedits rightto issuethis currencyfor the government,when it violatedthe contract,that is, when it preventedthe
governmentfrom using Haitiandeposits,and when it had enlisted
diplomaticandmilitaryaidin illegallyremovingthe money.
Secretaryof StateBryanexplainedthe situationas follows: (1) a
the moneyonly becauseno merchantvessels
warshiphadtransported
were available;(2) if the moneyhadbeenremovedfor illegalreasons
leadersof Haiti,the bankwouldhavebeen heldreby revolutionary
(3) $400,000
legalgovernments;
sponsiblefor negligenceby subsequent
still remainedin the vaultsfor retiringcurrency,and the $500,000in
wheneverthe processof currencyretireNew Yorkwouldbe available
mentwas renewed;(4) if the Haitiansdid not planto resumethe retirementof currencyat thattime,thereshouldhavebeenno objection
to the $500,000earninginterestin a safe place;and (S) therewas
anotherrevoluiionbeingfomentedin northernHaiti;so the bankwas
justifiedin protectingits gold.39
34Foreign Relaiions, 1914, p. 347-350,359,365-369.
35Kelsey, "AmericanIntervention,"p. 159.
36The money,plus interest,was returnedin 1919.
37Foreign Relations, 191S, p. 502;1914, p. 374.
38lbid., 1914, pp. 372,377-378.
Relations, 191S, p. 502;1914, pp. 372,374,377, 378,380-381.
39 Forei
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238
AMERICANS
IN HAITI
On December29, 1914,the Haitianauthorities
seized$66,910from
the bankandsealedthe vault.40RearAdmiralWilliamCaperton,who
was thenin chargeof the Americanfleet that was followinga revolution down the coast,was instructedto warn the Haitiansthat he
would act to preventany furtherviolationof the rightsof foreign
stockholders.He was alsoinstructedto landtroops,if it was necessary.4lNo furtherattemptswere madeto removethe fundsstill in
the bank.The Haitiansclaimedthatthe restof the currencyredempiion fund of $1,000,000hadbeensecretlytransferred
by the bankto
anothernation.The Theodoregovernment
thenmadearrangements
to
issuepapermoneyto the amountof 16,000,000gourdes(about$3,200,000)andto transferthe treasuryserviceof the countryto private
businessandbankinghousesin eightleadingcities. Strongprotestswere
madeby bothFrenchandAmericanofficials.Apparentlythe transfer
of treasuryserviceswas actuallyaccomplished,
however,as Admiral
Capertonreportedto the Secretaryof the Navy six monthslaterthat
privatebankingfirmswere in chargeof the customs.He addedthat
afterretainingtheirfees, thesefirmswould give the remainingfunds
to any group that exertedsufficientforce or persuasion.Caperton
plannedto returnthe treasuryserviceto the NationalBank. When
the new issueof papermoneyfinallywas delivered,Americanforces
were in a positiontO regulateits use also.42
Practicallyevery year duringthe half-centurybeforethe intervention hadbroughtnew disagreements
betweenHaiti and someforeign
power. Foreignwarshipshadoften beenpresentin Haitianwatersto
protectthelivesandtheinterestsof non-Haitians.43
FrenchandGerman
interests,in particular,
were continuallyexertingpressuretowardthe
controlof Haitianaffairs.The countrywasstillcloselyalliedto France
bothculturallyandfinancially.The Germanshadobtainedcontrolof
the commerceof Haitiandhadstrengthened
thiscontrolthoughintermarriagewith the Haitians.Continualrevolutionshad drainedthe
treasury,and large loans from France,Germany,and Englandhad
beennecessary.Theseloansweresecuredby thecustomsrevenue.Any
defaultin paymentwouldhaveled the creditornationsto desirecontrol of the customs.In spiteof Haiti'sconscientious
attemptsto meet
its foreignobligations,
it was graduallyreachinga positionwherefor40Ibid., l91S, p. 501;1914, p. 382.
41Hearings, p. 292. Testimonyof AdmiralCaperton.
42Foreign Relations, 191S, pp. 508, 510,516-519.
43Hearings. pp. 63-64*
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H. POSNER
WALTER
239
In the 1913-1914 fiscalyear,over
couldbe expected.44
eignintervention
80% of the governmentrevenuewas used for debt service. Three
Frenchloansstillamountedto $21,470,617, andthe totalnationaldebt
was about$32,105,843.45 It was partlyto breakthis hold on Haitian
financesthatSecretaryof StateKnoxhadblockedthe purelyEuropean
severalunenthuof theNationalBankandhadpersuaded
reorganization
siasticAmericanfirmsto participate.ffi6
werecausingthe Americanleadersgreat
in particular,
The Germans,
concern. In 1909, a Germancommercialfirm obtainedthe right to
a coalingstationin Haiti,but the AmericanStateDepartment
establish
Althoughthe UnitedStates
of the agreement.47
forcedthe cancellation
at Mole Saint-Nicholas
station
coaling
had decidedthat an American
withreferwasno longerneeded,the strategicpositionof the peninsula
the preventionof Europeanconenceto the PanamaCanalnecessitated
trol, or anyprivatecontrolnot underAmericandirection.48
by
The threeplacesat whichthe Antilleanlineof defenseestablished
(Danish
Thomas
the UnitedStatescouldhavebeenbrokenwereat St.
West Indies),SamanaBay (DominicanRepublic),and Mole SaintNicholas(Haiti). As the UnitedStatesassumedgreatercontrolover
the affairsof the DominicanRepublicduringthe early 1900's, the
dangerof SamanaBay falling into Europeanhandswas probably
lessened.Earlyattemptsto buy St. Thomaswere not successful,alwas almostmadein 1902, beforethe Danish
thoughthe transaction
defeatedthe treaty. The Germaninfluencewasblamedfor
parliament
notionof the Germanmenace
action,and an exaggerated
Denmark's
increasedthe fearsfor the Mole.49During1913 and 1914, therewere
alsorumorsthat the Germangovernmentwas backinga commercial
to makea loanin returnfor customscontroland
firmin negotiations
Jusserand,
in Washington,
rightsto the Mole.50The Frenchambassador
of
commission
international
an
that
times
several
hadalreadysuggested
the customs.Jusserandadmitted
three,includingFrance,administer
policy
havingfearsthatthe UnitedStatesmightfollowan anti-French
44CongressionalRecord,pp. 6485-6486.
45Hearings,pp. 1223-1234. Millspaugh, Haiti underAmericanControl,p. 18.
46Hearings,p. 105.
1941),
Hands OF: A History of the Monroe Doctrine (sostons
Perkins,
4tDexter
p. 262.
48CongressionalRecord,p. 6485.
Adventuresin AmericanDiplomacy,1896-1906(NewYork,
L. P. Dennis,
49Alfred
Haiti and the UnitedStates,pp. 182-184.
1928), pp. 271-278. Montague,
50
Record,p. 6486.
Congressional
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240
IN HAITI
AMERICANS
Bryanstatedthateventhoughthe MonroeDocin Haiti,butSecretary
trine compelledthe United Statesto preventforeigncontrol,a dispolicywouldnot be followedin Haiti.5l
criminatory
IncreasingEuropeanpressurewas being exertedupon Haiti. In
March,1914,the Germanlegationnotifiedthe Haitiangovernment
thatanyplansfor foreigncustomscontrolwouldhaveto includeGerof customscontrol
many.Thiswarningwasinspiredby the assumption
in PetitGoaveby anAmericanconsularagentduringa revolution.The
Haitiansansweredthattherehadneverbeenandneverwouldbe any
foreigncontrolof customs.52
questionof establishing
In June,1914,the Haitiansofferedthe UnitedStatesan annuallease
in returnfor a cashpaymentanda promiseof
for MoleSain-Nicholas
protectionfromothernationsthatdesiredto controlthe customs.This
offermayhavebeeninspiredby thearrivalof a Germancruiserin Portau-Prince.At any rate,the UnitedStateswas not interestedenoughto
sendan answer.The UnitedStatesandHaiticontinuedto searchfor a
solutionof theirmanyproblemsduring1914. On July 15, 1914,two
weeksbeforethe beginningof the war in Europe,the Germanswere
reportedto haveinvestigatedthe possibilitythat the Americanshad
by force. Three
alreadytakencontrolof the customsat Cap-Haitian
wrote to the AmericanDedayslater,the Germancharged'affaires
partmentof State that, althoughpoliticalmotiveshad impelledthe
UnitedStatesto opposeany Europeancontrolin Haiti,the Germans
had largeintereststhat could not be ignored,and that they did not
approveof any changesin the statusquo.
of thewarbetween
A few weeksafterthis,on theeve of theoutbreak
Germanyand Russia,severalboatloadsof armedsailorsbegan to
stationedat Port-au-Prince.
embarkfromthe GermancruiserKclrlsruDe
Thesementurnedbackwhen halfwaydownthe wharf,probablybecauseof ordersfromthe Germanminister.They sailedto St. Thomas
on the beginningof a campaignagainstenemyshipping.Thus, the
Europeanwar preventedwhat mighthavebeena seriousconflictbeandGermansin Haiti,sincethe U. S. S. Connecticut
tweenAmericans
hadbeennearbyduringtheunusualactivitiesof the Germans.President
Wilsonpersonallyframedthe ratherfirmmessagethatwas sentto the
on September16, 1914. He reiteratedhis stand
Germanambassador
on the MonroeDoctrineandaddedthatthe UnitedStateswas trying
51Foreign ReZations, 191S, pp.514-515. Ibid., The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920^,II,
465-466.
52Buell,American Occupation^,p. 338.
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H. POSNER
WALTER
241
whenit assistedHaitiwithherproblems.
to helpallthenationsinYolved
respected,if HaitideThe interestsof Germanywouldbe impartially
The noteto France
withtheUnitedStates.53
sireda customsagreement
firmtone.
in a sirnilar,
was addressed
on January15, 1915,prompted
at Cap-Haitian
A seriousdisturbance
RearAdmiral
consulto requesta warshipfor protection.54
theAmerican
Capertonhadalreadybeenorderedon aninspectioncruisethroughthe
area,but theseorderswere changedabruptly,andhe manCaribbean
by January19. He foundthata revolution
agedto reachCap-Haitian
wasbeinginstigatedby formerfriendsof exiledPresidentZamor.This
new revolutionwas beingled by GeneralVilbrunG. Sam,who was
delegateto the northern
supposedto be the Theodoregovernment's
districts.Samwas one of the four men who had been convictedof
embezzlingfundsfromthe nationaltreasuryin 1901. Capertonlearned
hadno coalfor the fleetthat
Theodoregovernment
thatthe incumbent
wassupposedto be blockadingthe northernportsandthatplanswere
beingmadeto seize a well-stockedAmericanship at Port-au-Prince.
The fundsin the nationalbankwerein dangeralso.
plan.
Capertonknew thatall revolutionsfolloweda well-established
nativescalled" cacos" would be recruited
A groupof back-country
They wouldthenpursuea tour
in the northerncity of Ouanaminthe.
Gonaives,
of pillagingandlootingalongthe coastthroughCap-Haitian,
At St. Marc,
andSt. Marc,whichis sixty rnilesfromPort-au-Prince.
wouldbe encountered.This,however,
opposition
themaingovernment
was often only a tokenresistance.When St. Marcfell, the capitalat
as havingfallenalso. The cacos
wasusuallyconsidered
Port-au-Prince
wouldbe paida smallamountandwouldcarrytheirloot backto the
andSam's
Northandawaitthe nextrevolution.SincebothCaperton's
Capertonsailedslowly enoughto
torceswere goingto Port-au-Prince,
and to remindthemat eachstop to conduct
watchthe revolutionists
Apparently
a morecivilizedtypeof warfarethanhadtheirpredecessors.
and
to do so, althoughbothhiscacomercenaries
Samkepthispromises
new
by
this
be
mystified
said
to
were
forces
the opposinggovernment
type of revolution.
On February20, a Dutchshiparrivedwith moneyfor Sam(possibly
Theodore,
fromGermansources)anda promiseof escapefor President
Record,pp. 6486-6487.
CongressionaZ
The following accounthas been takenmainlyfrom Hearings,pp. 281-294,Testi191S,pp. 461-463.
mony of AdrriiralCaperton,and ForeignReZations,
53
54
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242
AMERICANS
IN HAITI
wholeft the countrythreedayslater.Theodorehadbeenlesssuccessful
thanhispredecessors
in lootingthetreasury,sincehe hadbarelyenough
moneyto pay the fare to the DominicanRepublic.The controlof
Port-au-Prince
was then assumedby a self-appointed
" committeeof
safety,"composedof GeneralsPolyniceandPraedelandtheirfriends.
This grouphadmadea practiceof governlngbetweenrevolutions,
as
it was a profitableenoughpracticeto keepthemlivingin good style
withoutdoingotherwork.
Sam'sforceof aboutfivethousandmenwerein controlof the capital
by February25. The cacosreceivedtheirpay of abouta dollarand
returnedto the North, probablyto join a new revolutionled by Dr.
RosalvoBobo. The HaitianCongress,when it finallyfoundenough
membersto constitutea quorum,confirmedSam'spresidencya few
dayslater. Sincepeacefulconditionshadapparently
returned,Admiral
Caperton
left for CubaandMexicoon hisinterrupted
inspection
tour.
Two monthslater,PaulFuller,accredited
as specialagentandminister plenipotentiary,
attempted
to continuethe treatynegotiations.Fuller'streatyproposedarmedAmericanintervention
to protectHaitiin
case of outsideattackor internalinsurrection.It also obligatedthe
Haitiansto keepMoleSaint-Nicholas
fromforeigncontrolandto settle
the claimsof foreignintereststhroughimpartial
arbitration.The governmentof Haiti agreedto most of the proposals,but it addedthat
disagreements
over the treatybe submittedto the Hague Court. If
Americanswishedto suppressinternaldisorders,they would haveto
leaveat the firstrequestof constitutional
authorities.55
The Samgovernmentneededfinancialsupportbadlyenoughto bringup the question of customscontrolthemselves.They promisedto consultthe
Americanson the choiceof customsofficials,if in returnthe United
Stateswouldencourage
the entranceof capitalfor financialreformand
for economicdevelopment.56
Apparentlyseveralproblemsof long
standingwere aboutto be settledwhen Fullerhad to returnto the
UnttedStateson June5. The Boborevolutionpreventedfurthernegotiations.57SomeHaitiancriticsclaimedthat the AmericanStateDepartmenthad decidedto makemore extremedemandsby meansof
militaryforce.58
554Memoiron the Political,Economic, and FinancialConditionsExistingin the
Republicof Haiti Under the AmericanOccupationby the Delegatesto the U. S. of
the Union Patriotiqued'Haiti,"The Nation, Vol. CXII,No. 2916 (May 25, 1921),pp.
752, 770-771.
56 Montague,
Haiti and the UnitedStates,p. 207.
57 Kelsey," AmericanIntervention,"
p. 135.
58 Buell,AmericanOccupation,
p. 339.
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H. POSNER
WALTER
243
of Samwouldend the long
It hadbeenhopedthatthe inauguration
seriesof revolutions.Samwaspopularin the Northwhereall the revolutionsbegan.He alsohadsufficientmoneywithwhichto begin,since
the customswere beingcontrolledby the governmentratherthanby
the NationalBank.Yet the plightof the averagecitizenwasextremely
serious,becausethe manyrevolutionshad destroyedboth agricultural
productivity.Dr. Bobo'srevolutionhadbeengaining
andcommercial
strengthin spiteof stronggovernmentopposition.When conspiracies
were reported,at leasttwo hundredof
againstSamin Port-au-Prince
the leadingcitizenswerethrownintoprisonon suspicionalone.59Many
were importantbusinessmenwith no politicalconof theseprisoners
nections.60The foreignlegations,with the exceptionof that of the
UnitedStateswhichhadstoppedthe practicein 1903,wereonceagain
filledwith politicalrefugees.6l
Frenchtroopsfrom the cruiserDescarteshadbeen patrollingCapHaitiansinceJune 19.62On July 1, AdmiralCapertonarrivedat this
northerncity in the U. S. S. Washingtonwith ordersto thankthe
Frenchfor theireffortsand "to take the necessarystepsto protect
propertyandpreserveorder."OfficialsfrombothHaitianandGerman
hadbeenvainlyobjectingto the presenceof the French
governments
troops,whichhad beenused mainlyto protectthe church,the bank,
andthe Frenchlegation.Capertonwarnedboth factionsof the revoto useforcein orderto preventfightingin
lutionthathe was prepared
his neutrality
the city proper.On the otherhand,he alsoemphaslzed
andpromisedto recognizewhicheversidewon.
While pursuingthispolicyof neutral,yet watchful,waiting,CaperHe was
ton was notifiedon July 27 of outbreaksin Port-au-Prince.
orderedto proceedto the capitalat once. Englishand Frenchships
fromthosecountries.
were alsobeingrequestedby the representatives
had openly attackedthe presidenton
Apparentlythe revolutionists
July 26, sinceSamhadbeenwounded.He hadsucceededin climbing
overthe wall of the Frenchlegation.By thistimeall but a few of the
by a groupof menled
butchered
hadbeenmercilessly
politicalprisoners
by GeneralEtienne,who wasin chargeof the prison.
When the populacelearnedof the killings,they draggedEtienne
Foreign Relations, 1916, pp. 311-313.
Hearings, p. 306,Testimonyof AdmiralCaperton.
61Davis,Black Democracy, p. 161.
62 Foreign Relations, 1916, p. 472.
59
60
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244
AMERICANS
IN HAITI
fromthe Dominicanlegationandtore himto pieces.They attempted
to takeSamfromtheFrenchlegation,butwerepersuaded
by theFrench
ministerandthe Britishcharged'affaires
not to violateFrenchrights.
The next morning,whilereturningfromthe funeralof the deadprisoners,the crowdssaw the smokefrom Caperton's
approaching
ship.
They realizedthat their chancesof revengewere slipping,so they
rushedto the Frenchlegation,draggedthe presidentfrom his hiding
place, threw him over the legationwall, cut him into pieces,and
marchedthroughthe streetswith theirgruesomeprizes.
The wildestdisorderprevailedin Port-au-Prince.
It was believed
thatthe mobsmightseizeSam'sformerchief of secretpolicefromthe
Britishembassy.Capertonmetwith the BritishandFrenchofficialson
his shipand,at the insistenceof thesemen,decidedto landAmerican
forceseven thoughno foreigninterestshad been hurtas yet.63This
decisionwasgivenofficialapprovala few hourslaterwhenthe following messagewasreceivedfromActingSecretaryof theNavy Benson:
StateDepartmentdesiresthat Americanforcesbe landedat Port-auPrince and that Americanand foreign interestsbe protected;that
representatives
of England,Francebeinformedof thisintention;
informedthattheirinterestswill be protected,andthatthey be requestednot land. In actingthisrequestbe guidedyourknowledge
presentconditionPort-au-Prince
andact at discretion.Department
hasorderedU. S. S. Jason
with marinesGatanamo,
Cuba,proceed
immediately
Port-au-Prince.
If moreforcesabsolutelynecessary
wire immediately.64
The reasonfor not wantingany assistance
from othercountrieswas
to avoidany entanglements
with the war in Europe.Germanycould
not haveco-operatedwith Franceor Englandat that time, and any
intervention
fromone of thosenationsmighthavebroughtthe World
War into the WesternHemisphere.This was on July 28, 1915. The
nineteen-year
occupationof Haitiwasaboutto begin.
The motivesbehindthe American
intervention
of Haitiweredebated
by manywriters. Those who approvedof the actiondefendedit in
termsof improvingthe chaoticconditionsin Haiti or of preventing
Europeanintervention
there. Thosewho opposedthe actiondid so in
termsof economicor politicalimperialism.
Actually,the motiveswere
dividedintotwo classifications,
immediate
andpermanent.The Ameri63Hearings, pp. 300-307;Foreign Relations, 1916, pp. 314-317;Davis, Black Democracy, pp. 166-167.
64Foreign Relations, 191S, pp. 475-476.
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H. POSNER
WALTER
245
in 1916
Davis,reportedto the StateDepartment
can charged'affaires,
that at the beginningof the occupation,four objectiveswere being
sought. First,Americanand otherforeignlife and propertyneeded
immediateprotection,especiallyin view of the fact thattwo legations
hadbeenviolatedanda thirdthreatened.Second,civilorderhadto be
as the overthrowof Sam'sgovernmenthad left the city
established,
group.
" committeeof safety,"a mostunreliable
withonlytheinevitable
thatis, the threatenThird,constitutedauthorityhadto be maintained,
andthe populacehadto be convinced
ing revoltshadto be suppressed,
was tryingto helpthem. Finally,a meanshadto
thatthe government
be foundto enablethis constitutedauthorityto maintainitselfpermanently.A way to preventthe promiseof customsfromfomentingrevolutionshadto be devised.The over-slzedarmyhadto be replacedby a
smaller,less costly,andmorereliablemilitia.65
the economicmotive,
haveemphasized
of theintervention
Opponents
butofficialrecordsdo not entirelyupholdthatclaim.Forexample,the
of Commercerevealedthat during
datapublishedby the Department
the fiscalyearendingon June30, 1914,only $691,807worthof merof the totalfor the UnitedStates,hadcome
chandiseimports,or .04°/O
fromHaiti. Only $5,540,705worthof Americanexports,or *23%of
approxithetotal,hadgoneto Haiti. Thesesmallamountsrepresented
of the totalimports
mately5°/Oof thetotalexportsfromHaitiand59°/O
into Haiti.67
Americaninvestmentsin Haiti were not large either. Beforethe
they consistedof a cottonplantation,a copperdevelopintervention,
ment companyat Terre Neuve, a 2Q%interestin the French-dominatedNationalBank,a profitlessconcessionin the French-dominated
NationalRailroad,and severalsmall,formerlyGerman,concessions.
The lattergroupincludeda sugarmill, the P. C. S. Railroad(CompagniedesCheminsde Ferde la Plainedu Cul-de-Sac),andthe wharf,
The entireAmerican
electricplant,andtramwayin Port-au-Prince.68
The proinvestmentprobablydid not greatlyexceed$15,000,000.69
justify
alone
not
did
magnitude
this
of
interests
economic
of
tection
ForeignRelations,1916,pp. 310-320.
66United States Departmentof Commerce,Foreign Commerceand Navigationof
the UnitedStatesfor the YearEndingJune 30, 1914 (Washington,1915),pp. xiv-xv.
StatisticalAbstractof the UnitedStoltes,
87 United StatesDeparunentof Commerce,
191S(Washington,1915),pp. 716,724.
Haiti Under AmericanControl,p. 22.
68 MiUspaugh,
Testimonyof R. L. Farnham.
69 Hearings,p. 111-112,
85
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246
AMERICANS
IN HAITI
an occupationthatwasto resultin greatlossof respectfromthe other
Americas,an expenditure
of $50,000,000in Americanmoney,70
and a
deathtoll of over2,250Haitiansandat leastthirteenAmericans,tl
just
duringthe firstsix years. Of course,it may havebeenthe desirefor
new economicexploitation
ratherthanthe needto protectestablished
intereststhat inspiredthe intervention.It is beyonddoubtthat the
NationalCityBankof New YorkdidrequestAmericanaidin protecting its bankandrailroadinvestments
in Haiti,but thereis little proof
that this requestinspiredthe interventionany morethanthe reasons
givenby the Americanofficials.
The objectorsto the intervention,
besidescondemning
" dollardiplomacy,"claimedthatin spiteof the continualunrest,no foreignershad
ever been injuredbecauseof revolutions.They also emphasized
the
followingpoints: (1) all debtsto Americancitizenshad been paid;
(2) theWorldWarhadabsorbed
alltheenergiesof the leadingpowers,
and no foreignintervention
was imminent;(3) the MonroeDoctrine
did not sanctionintervention
into the internalaffairsof the American
nations;(4) the policyof the bankandthe StateDepartment
hadcombinedto preventthe Haitiangovernmentfrom consolidating
its authority,thus deliberatelyincitingrevolution;(S) the United States
had violatedthe 1907 Hague convention,which forbadethe use of
armedforce in collectionof debts;(6) the arbitration
agreementof
1909hadalsobeenviolated;72 and(7) theveryspiritof theConstitution
of the UnitedStateshadbeenviolated.
AdmiralCapertonhadwarnedGeneralPolyniceandhis committee
of theAmerican
plansto land,andtheGeneralhadagreedto co-operate,
even thoughhe could not guaranteea peacefullanding.Two companiesof marinesandthreeof sailorswerethenlandedat Bizoton,three
milesoutsideof Port-au-Prince.
They marchedinto the capitaland
establishedthemselveswith only scatteredoppositionfrom snipers.
Twelve Haitianswere killedor wounded,but therewere apparently
no Americancasualties.73
Withina few days,the Americanforcesin
7°Naaonal PopularGovernmentLeague,Addressto the Secretaryof State of the
United StatesAgainstthe AmericanOccupationof Haiti (Washington,1922), as reprintedin Congressional
Record,Vol. LXII,Part 9, pp. 8969,8971.
71 ErnestH. Gruening," The Conquestof Haiti and SantoDomingo,"CurrentHistory, Vol. XV, No. 6 (March,1922),p. 889.
72 Buell,AmericanOccupation,
pp. 340,344-345.
73 Hearings,pp. 308-309,Testimony of AdmiralCaperton. Two Americanswere
killed accordingto ChargeDavis in ForeignRelations,191S,p. 476.
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H. POSNER
WALTER
247
numberedabout 1,950. Eighty men had also been
Port-au-Prince
at the insistenceof the Frenchconsul.
landedat Cap-Haitian
withthe
andweregenerallyco-operaiive,
The Haitiansweredisarmed
weredemandexceptionof a groupof 1,500cacos.Theserevolutionists
committeeof
The
president.
as
leader,
their
Bobo,
of
election
ing the
AssemN5ational
the
dissolve
Bobo,andwantedto
safetyalsosupported
Bobowouldhave
bly as a meansof furtheringthis end.74Ordinarily
becomethe president.He had alreadyproclaimedhimselfthe chief
executive.He had,however,provedto be ratherhostiletowardthe
UnitedStatesin the past,and Capertondelayedthe electionanddismissedthe committeeof safety.75Since the presidentof Haiti was
electedby the NationalAssembly,which was the combinedSenate
and Chamberof Deputies,Secretaryof StateLansingsuggestedthat
the membersof the Assemblybe impressedwith the fact that only a
capable,co-operativegovernmentwould be countenancedby the
UnitedStates. Capertonalso discussedthe aimsof the UnitedStates
candidates.SenatorPhilipS. Dartiguewithseveralpossiblepresidential
navewas finallyelectedby ninety-fourvotes out of one hundredsixteen. Dr. Bobo,who had triedto preventthe electionby force and
who had tried to bribethe Americans,receivedonly sixteenvotes.
hadusedcoercionin
Althoughtherewasno proofthatthe Americans
SenateInvestigating
States
United
the
election,
Dartiguenave's
obtaining
Committeecameto that conclusionin 1922. The Secretaryof the
Navy had even cabledCapertonbeforethe electionthat the United
Statespreferredthe electionof Dartiguenave.76
for concesThe Haitianleadershadbeenmakingso manyproposals
it might
that
suggested
Lansing
Secretary
that
States
sionsto the United
States
United
be a good iimeto bringup the matterof a treaty. The
wouldwithholdrecognitionuniil a treatyhad beenratified.In addifor financialcontrolsubmittedthe yearbefore,
tion to the suggestions
for
constabulary,
provisionswere addedfor an American-controlled
developingthe naturalresources,for improvingsanitation,and for
Americaninterventionto combatobstaclesto the independenceof
Haiti. Until the treatycouldbe definitelyagreedupon,Capertonwas
who menacedthesafetyof thecitizens
orderedto subduethe marauders
peoplethroughpublic
for theimpoverished
andto provideemployment
74Davis, BlackDemocracy,p. 169.
75ForeignRelations,191S,pp. 465, 470, 477-480;Hearings,p. 313.
7sHearings,pp. 315, 319-321;Millspaugh,Haiti Under AmericanControl,p. 41n,
quoungSenateReportNo. 794, 1922,p. 7.
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248
IN HAITI
AMERICANS
worksand possiblythe re-openingof the NationalRailroad.At the
of its treasuryduties,
insistenceof the NationalBankfor theresumption
Capertonwas orderedto assumecontrolof the customshousesin ten
for the temporary
leadingseaports.After payingfor a constabulary
he
government,
Dartiguenave
publicworks,andfor the supportof the
wasto depositthe surplusin the NationalBankin trustfor the Haitian
people.
seemedto
Duringthe latterpart of 1915a greatmanydifficulties
hinderall attemptsto settledowninto a systematicroutine.First,the
supposedlyco-operativeHaitianofficialsdelayedthe signingof the
treaty. They attemptedto changemuchof the wordingandto reject
groupswere trying
entiresections.It was believedthatanti-American
to delayactionon the treatyuntilthe UnitedStatesSenatemet. Then
lobbiesmightbe ableto createa politicalsituationin Washingtonthat
of the marines.A delaymightalsolead
wouldresultin thewithdrawal
government.Hints abouta large
to the overthrowof Dartiguenave's
finallypushedthe treaty
Americans
by
the
of
force
threats
and
loan
throughthe cabinet,the Chamberof Deputies,and the hostileSenate
was signedto put
on November11, 1915. A temporaryarrangement
the treaty into force immediately.Ratificationswere not officially
untilMay 3, 1916.
exchanged
were conthe Americanauthorities
Duringthe treatynegotiations,
tinuallybotheredwith unrestamongthe opponentsof the occupation,
fromnortherncacogroups.Thissituationwasaggravated
particularily
conditionsin someareasandby supportfromacrossthe
by starvation
Dominicanborder.TtOn September3, Capertonproclaimedmartial
inflammatory
becauseof increasinguneasiness,
law in Port-au-Prince
and disweaknessof the Haitiangovernment,
newspaperpropaganda,
loyalty amongsome otfficials.ColonelLittletonWallerwas put in
charge,and this law was extendedto all coastaltowns and nearby
territoryon September21.
ColonelWallerhadto leada numberof Americantroops
Eventually,
caco strongholds.On October1, the revolutionary
the
into
directly
but the promise
leaderagreedto stopinterferingwith the occupation;
was not kept,78and Wallerresumedhis operations.The Americans
by the guerrillatacticsemployedby the
were severelyhandicapped
77ForeignRelations,191S, pp.434, 438447, 452-453,457-461,488-490,493-495,S15516, 549
77,UnitedStatesNavyInformation.
78 Hearings,pp. 67-68,
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H. POSNER
WALTER
249
to break
Americans
for theinexpenenced
cacos.Thismadeit necessary
up into small,separatecolumns.
cameback,suchasthefifty-onekilled
As reportsof Haitiancasualties
by MajorSmedlyButler'sforces at the banditstrongholdof Fort
Riviere,SecretaryDanielsorderedall offensiveoperationsstoppedin
orderto preventfurtherlossof life. By Decemberthenortherncountry
was quiet,the few caco uprisingsbeingmorein the natureof petty
brigandagethan organizedprotestsagainstthe government.Small
Americangroupswere left to patrolthe region.79Althoughthe antithe
AmericansthroughoutHaiti condemnedthesemilitaryoperations,
majorityof the peoplewereextremelyrelievedoverthe endof theconconditions.8°
tinualrevolutionary
The problemof financesheldbackthe plansof the occupationfrom
that it had
the very beginning.The Haitiangovernmentcomplained
only 600,000gourdes(about$120,000)for all expenses,which was
not enough.Capertonhadtakenoverthe leadingcustomshouses,and
fromunsafeprivatefirmsto
the treasuryservicehadbeentransferred
the NationalBank.Whena delayedshipmentof 500,000illegalgourdes
did not allow
arrivedfromNew YorkCity, the Americanauthorities
Caperton
ratified,
finally
was
treaty
the
When
circulate.
to
the money
of the
was authorizedto pay for the publicworks,the organization
government.The
andthe supportof the Dartiguenave
constabulary,
sumof $25,000a week was alsoto be paidfromthe customs,and an
immediateloanof $100,000was authorized.The Haitiangovernment
insistedthat $500,000was neededto keep up its credit. Secretary
Lansingrepliedthat on the basisof the 1914-1915budget,a total of
of Haiti. Admiral
$450,000wouldhavebeenneededby thegovernment
Capertonhad alreadyadvancedthem $385,000;so only $65,000,not
$500,000,shouldstillbe needed.
Capertonwas alsopaying$7,500a monthto the lightplantsin Capimportant
and $7,500to the increasingly
Haitianand Port-au-Prince
on the
arrears,
in
P. C.S. Railroad.Sincea largeamountof interest,
bondsof the railroadwas still due, Capertonsuggestedthat the $1,500,000loan promisedthe governmentduringthe treatynegotiations
secondedthisrequest.A Haitiancommisbe paid. MinisterBlanchard
but
to discusstheloanandotherproblems,
sionwassentto Washington
little.8l
it accomplished
79Foreign Relations, 191S, pp.493-496.
Davis, Black Democracy, p. 189.
81 Foreign Relations, 191S, pp. 447, 521, 528-537.
80
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250
AMERICANS
IN HAITI
During1916,someof the obstaclesconfronting
the occupations
were
clearedaway. Capertonreportedto the Secretaryof the Navy on
January16: "All Haitiquiet.... Militarycontrolof situationandstatus
quo beingmaintained.... Navalpayrnasters
underpaymaster
Conard
continuein chargeof the customsserviceandfiscalmatters.Practically
entireHaitianfinancialsystemis now beingso administered."
82
Therewere manyproblemsof administration
to be solved. Supplementaryagreements
were necessaryin orderto put the treatyinto
effect. On June27, 1916,it was agreedthat the Americanfinancial
adviserwas to receive$10,000a year for his salaryand personalexpenses.The Americanadviser-general
receiverof customswas to receive$9,000a year. It wasre-emphasized
thatthe totalexpensesof the
department
shouldnot exceed5°/Oof all the customsreceipts,as stated
in ArticleVI of the treaty. It was also agreedthat the engineersin
chargeof sanitationand publicimprovement
shouldreceiveno more
than$7,500a year. A separate
agreement
placedthe controlof the few
telephoneand telegraphlines in Haiti underthese engineers.83
The
creationof a gendarmerie
requiredmore detailedconsideration,
as
Congresshad to passa law authorizing
the presidentof the United
Statesto detailmembersof the Navy and MarineCorpsto assistthe
Republicof Haiti.84
A protocolwasalsomadeto providefor 2,533enlistedmen,ranging
from2,100nativeprivatesat $10a monthto an Americancommandant
at $250a month.The sumof $801,063a yearwas to be appropriated
for the gendarmerie,
plus $75,000for a special,forty-fourmancoast
guard.The president
of Haitiwasto decideupontheAmericanofficers
nominatedby the presidentof the UnitedStates.Supposedly,
the sole
directionof the gendarmerie
was in the handsof the presidentof
Haiti.85In actualpracticethe marinebrigadecommander
sometimes
gave orders.86
The Haitianshad madea strongprotestover the disbandingof the president's
" personalguard,"as this extraprotection
for the chief executivehadbeenstipulatedin the Haitianconstitution.
Ratherthan agreeto any potentiallydangerous,
independentmilitia,
the Americanofficialsre-wordedthe treatyto allow the presidentto
Ibid., 1916,pp. 342-343.
Ibid.,p. 332-333,337.
84 United StatesSecretaryof State,Statutesof the United Statesof AmericaPassed
at the First Sessionof the Sixty-FourthCongress,191S-1916(Washington,1916), Part
I, p. 223.
85ForeignRelations,1916,pp. 334-336.
86 MApaugh, Haiti Under AmericanControl,pp. 68-69.
82
83
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H. POSNER
WALTER
251
In
select a personalguardfrom the membersof the gendarmerie.87
replacedone of the mainsourcesof
general,the smallgendarmerie
large
troublein Haiti,the largestandingarmy.This disproportionately
to containalmostone-tenthof the population
armyhadbeenestirnated
haddrained
at onetime. It hadtakenthe ablestmenout of production,
danger.88
revolutionary
of
source
constant
a
been
had
and
treasury,
the
88
Leyburn,The HaitianPeople, pp. 36, 232-233,259.
Becauseof the urgentneed for sewersand pavedroads,the Comhadto be paid$45,000in backdebts
pagnieHatiennede Construction
services.On March13, 1916,
current
for
as well as $7,000 a month
Capertonreporteda total balanceof $850,000. He urgeda $500,000
loanto helpliquidateall of the debtsof Haiti,andaddedthatthe delay
in appointingthe financialadviserandgeneralreceiverwas hindering
reforms.The loanwasgranted.
permanent
The UnitedStateshadbeenin the habitof choosingNegroesto fill
diplomaticofficesin Haitibeforethe intervention.SuchNegro representativesas Langston(1877), Thompson(1885), Douglass(minister,
1889), Powell (1897), and Furnessapparentlydid acceptablework,
the racial
but the factremainedthatthe UnitedStateswas emphasizing
factor.89This tendencywas continuedduringthe earlyyearsof the
occupation,when the white marinesand civilianofficialswere taken
with
fromthesouthernstateson thetheorythatfromlongacquaintance
Negroes,they couldhandlethembetter.This situationwaseventually
about
changed,but only afterthe Haitianshadmademanycomplaints
Americans.90
the
of
the racialprejudices
At any rate,the firstgeneralreceiver,A. J. Maumusof Louisiana,
on June23,1916. His deputyreceiverwasW. S. Matwasnominated
EdgarOberlin,U. S. N., who had
Lieutenant
thews,Jr.,of Mississippi.
was nominated
beenin chargeof mostcivil mattersin Port-au-Prince,
adviser
financial
as
as engineeron July5. AddisonRuanwasnominated
as
on July 8. On December11, ErnestGaler,U. S. N., was nominated
engineer,whileSurgeonNormanT. McClean,U. S. N., wasnominated
wereapproved
asengineerin chargeof sanitation.All thesenominations
by Dartiguenave.
The Haitianshadexpectedthatthe duiiesof the occupationwould
to themunderthe guidanceof theseofficialson October
be transferred
87ForeignRelations,1916,p. 339.
89JohnH. Franklin,From Slaveryto Freedom (New York, 1947),p. 424.
p. 349. Leyburn,The HaitianPeople,p. 103.
90Buell,AmericrnOccupcttion,
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IN HAITI
AMERICANS
252
1, thebeginliingof theirfiscalyear. Secretaryof StateLansingdecided,
however,that the militarycontrolshouldcontinueuntil the civilian
and efficientlyorwere permanently
positionsand the constabulary
ganized.This decisionwas protested,of course,but Lansingreplied
thathe sawno reasonfor complaint.No promiseshadbeenmadeabout
andthe
a definitetime;the workswerebeingcarriedout satisfactorily;
couldnot takeover,as therewas not yet a satisfaccivilianauthorities
tory orgamzatlon.
remindedSecretaryLansing
On May8, 1916,the Frenchambassador
of the NationalRailwayhad not been
that the Frenchbondholders
able to cashtheir couponssinceAugust,1914. These Frenchbondholdersownedover two-thirdsof the $3,500,000of bondsstill outside of the
standing.This promptedLansingto obtainthe railroad's
controversy.PresidentFarnhamof the railroadclaimedthatsincethe
United Stateshad never recognizedthe short-livedgovernmentsof
ZamorandTheodore,he had not consideredit worthwhileto accept
to discussthe problem.He
the invitationsfrom those governments
claimedthatfromApril,1911,to July, 1915,only eighteenmonthshad
work. He
been free enoughfromrevolutionsto do any construction
accusedthe Haitiangovernmentof exactingover $59,000in illegal
andlistedseveralotheraccusataxesfor supposedlyduty-freematerials
tionsof dishonestyandbreachof contract.
*
z
21
on September
refutedtheseaccusations
The Haitiangovernment
1916. As in the past,theirargumentsseemedto havesomevalidity,
and the threatto renewforeclosureproceedingswas still imminent.
On December4, 1916,the Secretaryof Statelearnedthat the Office
of Paris,France,wouldinstituteforeNationaldesValeursMobilieres
of the year in behalfof the French
first
closureproceedingsat the
select an
bondholders.Farnhamrequestedthat the StateDepartment
as soon as possible.91
arbitrator
To allay the Frenchfears,Menos,the Haitianministerin WashBy February
to reachanunderstanding.
attempted
ington,andFarnham
of Haitiwouldpay their
15, 1917,it was agreedthatthe government
in 1914,as
guaranteeon $44,600of bonds,whichthey hadauthorized
well as the six defaultedinterestpayments.It wasalsoagreedto make
the proposedrailroadroutesshorterand moredirect. The new bonds
were delivered,but then the officialsin Haiti refusedto pay the defaultedintereston the olderbonds.They claimedthatthe railroadhad
sl Foreign Relations,1916,pp. 354-357, 361, 366-384.
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H. POSNER
WALTER
253
1lpon
andhadbroughtthe foreclosure
operations
voluntarilysuspended
itself.92At this point,the railroadproblemapparentlymergedwith
the multitudeof otherproblemsthatfacedthe occupationofficials,as
When
theofficialrecordsfor 1919-1922 containno furtherinformation.
in 1919, the controversyoverthe
was established
a claimscommission
authority,thus recognizing
interestwas takenfrom the commission's
the claimof the railroad.93
underFarnham.It
In 1920, the railroadwasplacedinto receivership
to note thatthe annualsalaryof Farnham($25,000) and
is interesting
to aboutone-halfof thetotalannual
of hislawyers($20,000) amounted
receiptsof the railroadand absorbedalmostall of the amortization
couldhave
fundsthathadbeenset aside.At thattimethe government
railroadbonds
the depreciated
solvedthe entireproblemby purchasing
for a little more than $800,000;yet, the Americanfinancialadviser
waiteduntil 1923 and then decidedto pay over $1,900,000in back
interestinstead.The railroadstockwas thenexchangedat a 25%discount for SeriesC governmentbonds. It has been claimedthat the
NationalCity Bank of New York or an unknownclient madean
process.
refinancing
unethicalprofitof over$2,000,000 fromthe railroad
Apparently,somemembersof the Americanoccupationforcesconfor not living
sideredanylossessufferedby the Haitiansas punishment
an authorwith anti-interventionist
up to theircontracts.Nevertheless,
of a countryhavea
hasstatedthatthe citizensandtaxpayers
tendencies
rightto expectprotectionagainstdishonestofficials.SinceSam's1910
shouldnot have
contracthadbeenso taintedwithfraud,the Americans
Suchwasourattitudetowardthe Teapot
recognizedit as a contract.94
Domeleaseat thattime.95A lesscriticalwriterhasstatedthatthe 1910
contractsweremadein good faith,althoughtheremayhavebeensome
doubtsaboutthe 1904 agreements.96
Someheadwaywas madewith the gravefinancialsituationin Haiti
duringthe nextfew years,althoughthe criticismsof Americanpolicy
neverabated.The Europeanwar hadlessenedthe possibilityof strong
but later
FrenchandGermanoppositionto the Americanintervention,
92ForeignRelations,1917,pp. 829-833.
ForeignRelations,1919,p. 348.
94Paul H. Douglas," The AmericanInterventionof Haiti,"PoliticalScience Quarterly, Vol. XLII, No. 3 (September,1927), pp. 383-385.
Oil Co. vs. United States,27S,U. S. 13, S3,as quotedin Buell,Slmerican
95 Mammoth
Occupation,p. 372n.
96Montague,Haiti and the United States,p. 247.
93
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254
IN HAITI
AMERICANS
moredifficultby causinggreatchangesin trade,
it madethe occupation
currencyvalues,andgeneraleconomicconditions.97
The largeloan expectedby the Haitianswhen they hadsignedthe
treaty,wasdelayedfor a longtime,mainlybecauseof theWorldWar.
By February22, 1917,theirrequestshad increasedto $30,00O,000.98
Sincefew Americanbankerswould havebeen willingto risksuch a
largeloanunderthe existingtreaty,whichwas to expirein ninemore
years,the Haitiansagreedto extendthe treatyanotherten years (to
1936). Althoughthis actionintensifiedthe accusationsof American
in conit was apparently
dishonestyby opponentsof the occupations,
an
extension
authorized
which
the
treaty,
of
formitywithArticleXVI
the aimsof the treaty.
of ten yearsif necessaryto accomplish
of a
A protocolwassignedon October3, 1919,for the establishment
to settleall the foreignclaimsagainstHaiti,withtheexcepcommission
the NaiionalBank,and
tion of the claimsof the Frenchbondholders,
the two railroads.Thisprotocolalsoprovidedfor a thirty-yearloanof
$40,000,000to pay for the claimsallowedandfor the four exempted
wasto be in effectfor two years.99Controversies
debts.The agreement
and the new financialadviser,John
betweenPresidentDartiguenave
delayedthe plannedloan. Partof the opposiMcIlhennyof Louisiana,
tion to Americanfinancialsuggestionswas a resultof the American
attemptsto buy out the foreigninterestsin the NationalBank. The
hadseizedthe Germanstockin the bankafterthe
Frenchgovernment
outbreakof the warin Europe,andhadalsoaskedthe Americandirecof thebank.Secretaryof StateBryan
torsto takeoverthe management
thoughtthatthe bankshouldbe Americaninsteadof French.By 1917,
for the NationalCity Bankof New Yorkto buy OUt
he hadarranged
the threeotherAmericanstockholders.This gave the NationalCity
Bankeightthousandsharesof stockout of the totalof forty thousand.
In 1919,the remainingshareswere boughtfrom the Frenchfor $1,in Washingtonhad
400,000. Althoughthe Haitianrepresentatives
was plannedas a
organization
new
agreedto the transfer,when the
Bank,they refusedto approve
Haitianbankratherthanas an American
NationalBankof Haiti
the transferlater. Thus,the American-owned
Frenchemployees.100
and
charter
French
old
the
hadto continuewith
Haiti Under American Control, pp. 84-85,from reportsof the Snan97 Millspaugh,
receiver.
cial adviser-general
815-817.
98 Foreign Relations, 1917, pp. 803-804,
99Foreign Relations, 1919, pp. 347-351.
Hearings, pp. 106-107,Testimonyof R. L. Farnham.
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255
H. POSNER
WALTER
to agree
The bankdid manageto persuadethe Haitiangovernment
obligations.When this was done on
to pay cenain pre-intervention
April 12, 1919,a retirementfund of $1,735,664was agreedupon to
withnew ones. The Haitianmerchants
replacethe worn-outbanknotes
had been acceptingthe oldernotesonly at a 25% discount,and the
laboringcitizenswere losinginterestin workingbecauseof this. Becondiiions,an increasedamountof
causeof the post-war,inflationary
agreementauthorizedthe return
same
This
moneywas also needed.
fromNew Yorkof the $500,000seizedin December,1914,plus 2%
the ratioof
annualinterestfor four years. In all of thesetransactions
pre-interthe
for
reason
One
maintained.10l
was
dollar
a
to
gourdes
five
hadbeenthe desireof the Haitiansto makethe ratio
ventionarguments
on thefive-to3.5to 1. They hadevenclaimedthatthebank'sinsistence
by loweringthe valueof wages
insurrections
one ratiohadencouraged
the cost of living.l02
andincreasing
plan,McIlhennyattemptedto
As part of this currency-retirement
enforcethe articlethat regulatedthe importaiionand exportationof
foreigncurrency" to avoidthe possibilityof anycurrencycrisisduring
the periodof the retirementof governmentpapermoney." The
vigorouslyopposedthe
Haitians,backedby the RoyalBankof Canada,
allimports
measureon thegroundsthatit wasanattemptto monopolize
Possiblya more
and exportsand to controlthe rate of exchange.l04
of the oppositionwas the fact that the Canadian
logicalexplanation
bank,the only real competitorof the NationalBankin Haiti, was
the standingof the latterbank. The transfer
to undermine
attempting
NationalBankto the Americaninterestswas
the
of the Frenchstockin
stillawaitingthe approvalof Haiti,andthe RoyalBankof Canadahad
thestock. They hadevenclaimedthattheAmerican
hopesof acquiring
gourde,was the legal moneyof Haiti. This
Haitian
the
not
dollar,
wouldhavetakenfromthe NationalBankthe solerightto issuepaper
in the valueof the gourdehadbeena traditional
Speculation
money.105
in Haiti. To stabilizethegourde,
practiceamongbankersandmerchants
McIlhennyinsistedupon controllingthe foreignmoneysin Haiti.106
He is saidto havewithheldthe paymentof expensemoneyfromthe
Haitiangovernmentto forcetheminto ratifyingthe measure.Never103
01Foreign Relations, 1919, pp. 352, 357-368.
340.
102 Buell, American Occupation, pp. 335-336,
103 Foreign Relations, 1920, pp. 763-767.
104
105
106
p. 160.
Kelsey, "AmericanInterYeniion,"
Foreign Relations, 1920, pp. 766-767.
Hecrrings,p. 1420,Testimonyof John McIlhenny.
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256
AMERICANS
IN HAITI
theless,with strongforeignsupport,the Haitiansmanagedto havethe
proposaldropped.
By thisiime,the HaitianswereactuallyopposingAmericanovertures
for the long-delayedloan. They claimedthatthe two-yeartimelimit
of the 1919 protocolhadended.Anotherstrongobjeciionwasthestipulationin the protocolthatwouldnecessitate
Americancontrolof customsuntilthe debt had been completelyliquidated(1942).1°7These
objectionswere eventuallyoverruledby the new administration
of
PresidentLouisBorno,whichprovedto be moreco-operative
thanthe
Dartiguenave
government,and a loan of $40,000,000was announced
in 1922.1°8
The firstpartof theloan,in theformof SeriesA bonds,soldthrough
a subsidiary
of the NationalCity Bankof New York,brought$15,039,94S. Of this amount,$6,037,6S0 was used to retirethe debt to
France;$4,129,701 wentto the NationalBank;and$2,160,8S7 waspaid
to the NationalRailroad.The Frenchdebt had been worth over
$21,000,000 in 191S, but the franchadlost valuesincethen.109
In spite
of the greatsaving,McIlhennywas criticizedfor losing$1,000,000by
not refundingthe debtsooner.1l0
An issueof SeriesB bondsworth$4,234,042 wasalsoissued.Of this
amount$1,883,262 was used to refundunpaidbalanceson previous
internaldebts. A similaramountwas used (alongwith someSeriesA
funds)to pay for the claimsallowedby the claimscommission.This
commissionhad workedfor three years and had considered73,269
claunsagainstHaitifromthe years1899 to 1916. Of the $39,929,277
claimed,only $3,S26,170 wasallowed.Therewere1S7 American
claims
for over S6,000,000, but ody $4SS,729 was allowed.1llManyclaims
from non-Haitianswho held revolutionary
bondswere rejected,as
" foreignersareprohibited
fromtakingany partin the internalpolitics
of the countryin whichthey reside."112 Anotherbondissue,SeriesC,
brought$2,660,000 to be exchanged
for oldNationalRailroadbonds.tt3
Paul H. Douglas," AmericanIntervention,"
pp. 380-381,388-389.
ForeignRelations,1922,p. 500.
109Montague,Haiti and the United States,p. 245; Foreign Relatiozzs,
1923,pp. 411418.
110SenateReport 794, 1922,p. 9, as in Montague,Haiti and tSe United States,p.
245n.
t1 Montague,Haiti and tSe United States,p. 246n.
112 Le Moniteur,1925,p. 355,and 1926,p. 211ff., as m BueH,AmericanOccupation,
p. 371n.
113 Ibid., p. 370.
107
108
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H. POSNER
WALTER
257
By this time the governmentof Haiti had approvedof the new
the controlof the NaiionalBankof Haiti
contract,whichtransferred
to the NationalCity Bankof New York. In general,the new terms
weremorefavorableto Haitithanthe old ones. The Haiiiangovernmentdid,however,refuseto acceptintereston its depositsin the bank,
by the
andit triedto arrangefor 100%of its depositsto be maintained
bank.l14They claimedthatif interestwere paidon theirdeposits,the
andthey wantedthe money
moneywouldbe loanedout to borrowers,
to be keptin the vaultsat all timesto avoidanyrepetitionof the 19141915 difficulties.Once againthe Americanofficialsand the National
this time for taking
City Bankwere censuredby anti-interventionists,
of theseincorrecttheoriesof banking.ll5
advantage
the 1889 constitutionof
At the time of the Americanintervention,
itemsin this constitution
Haiti was still in eSect. Two objectionable
andtheparliamenby foreigners
of land-ownership
weretheprohibition
to veto
legislature
elected
the
allowed
which
taryformof government,
in forcingthe hostilelegislature
The difficulties
actsof the president.l16
thatthisbody
to ratifythe 1915 treatyhadindicatedto the Americans
limitationon
The
occupation.
the
to
hindrance
a
continual
be
might
of
wasalsofelt to be a barrierto the development
alienland-ownership
by thetreaty.ll7A few weeksbefore
ascontemplated
Haitianresources
the legislaturewas to meet in April, 1916, it was reportedthat the
to opposeanyAmericanproposalsfor changmemberswerepreparing
ing the constitution.They were also planningto impeachPresident
Dartiguenave
for violaiingthe existingconstitution.l18
Dartiguenave
him,
impeach
to
einough
strong
were
opponents
his
that
didnot believe
but he did admitthat the reformsthat he had insiitutedduringthe
did
hadmademanyenemies.He addedthatif thelegislature
occupation
not revisethe constitution,he could dissolveboth housesand call a
specialconstituentassemblyto makethe desiredchanges.He asked
for a promiseof militaryprotectionfromAdmiralCaperton.Thisprotectionwas promisedand,whenthe expectedoppositionin the legisladissolvedthe Senateandthe Chamber
Dartiguenave
turematerialized,
of Deputies.He reconvenedthe lattergroupas a specialconstituent
assemblyto revisethe constitution.He alsocreateda Councilof State
of twenty-onemembersto formulatelaws.
114
115
116
117
118
Foreig7sRelations,1922,pp. 534, 527.
pp. 386-387.
Douglas,"AmericanIntervention,"
Buell, AmericanOccupation,p. 347.
Montague,Haiti and the United States,p. 227.
Davis,BlackDemocracy,p. 201.
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258
AMERICANS
IN HAITI
The senatorstriedto meetthenextday,butthepresident
hadordered
the doorslockedoverthe protestsof Major-General
Waller,theAmericancommander
of theprotectinggendarmerie.
AlthoughDartiguenave
claimedthatthelockouthadbeenprompted
by the effortsof the legislatureto blockhisattemptsto revisethe constitution,
the generalimpressionwasthathe hadfearedimpeachment.
Whenthe constituent
assembly provedto be equallyunco-operative,
thepresident
threatened
to call
electionsfor a new legislature.A nonpartisan
committeeof " notables,"
led by ex-President
Legitimeand backedby AdmiralCaperton,attemptedin vainto findsomebasisfor conciliation.1l9
Whenthe termsof the deputiesexpiredin January,1917,Dartiguenave announcedthe electionfor new membersof both houses. He
reducedthe numb-er
of senatorsto fifteen (fromthirty-nine)and the
deputiesto thirty-six(fromone hundredtwo).120The electionswere
held underthe supervision
of the Americanmarinesand withoutthe
bloodshedandfraudthathadheretoforeaccompanied
suchevents.At
thistimemessages
weresentby boththe Navy andStateDepartments
to occupationleadersto supportDartiguenave
so long as he followed
the agreements
madebetweenHaitiandthe UnitedStates.Any opposition,legislativeor otherwise,wasto be put down.12l
The newly electedlegislature
met in April,1917,andcontinuedthe
hostileactivitiesof its predecessor.As a directaffrontto the United
Statesthe membersrefusedto declarewar on Germany,eventhough
the leaderof the Americanmarinesclaimedthat Haiti had excellent
reasonsfor supporiingthe French.Haitianliveshadbeenlost on ships
destroyedby the Germans;manyHaitianswere in the Frencharmy;
the Haitiancivilizationwas entirelyFrench;andall educatedHaitians
lookedforwardto livingin Paris.The legislature
continuedto oppose
the president's
suggestionsfor revisingthe constitution,
and both the
presidentand Brigadier-General
Cole, who had succeededGeneral
Wallerasmarinecommander,
considered
anotherdissolution.Colesent
to Washingtonfor adviceandwasgivenfull discretionary
powers,providedthathe triedto accomplish
his endswithoutusingmilitaryforce.
By this time, it had becomeapparentthat some of the prominent
Haitians,possiblyeventhe president,
weresecretlyopposingthe American efforts,while outwardlyappearingtO co-operate.The private
correspondence
betweenthe Americanministerandthe executivede119
Hearings, pp. 415-420, 622-624.
120
121
Davis, Black Democracy, pp. 202, 204-205.
Foreign Relations, 1917, p. 802.
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H. POSNER
WALTER
259
withoutcomin Haitihadbeenturnedoverto the legislature
partment
the handsof the opposition,whichwas
ment. This hadstrengthened
thatwasat variancewithmostof theAmerican
a constitution
preparirlg
requestedthe helpof the
1917, the president
19,
June
On
suggestions.
was not only rushing
which
in dissolvingthe legislature,
gendarmerie
but wasalsoinsultinghim. Apparthroughthe forbiddenconstitution,
for
to bearthe responsibility
wishedthe Americans
entlyDartiguenave
that
insisted
Butler,
Brigadier-General
the act,but Cole'srepresentative,
hadsent
the presidentsignthe decree.Althoughthe StateDepartment
an ordera few hoursbeforeto takeno actionuntilfurtherinstruction
action.
weresent,it was decidedthatthe situationrequiredimmediate
a
suffered
He
personally.
the decreeto the legislature
Butlerpresented
barrageof verbalabusefromboth the presidentof the Senate,Stenio
hismissionwithbut he accomplished
Vincent,andfromthe members,
out any seriousdifficulties.
resulted
Jointplanningby officersof the StateandNavy departments
in a constitutionthatwas to be voteduponby the generalpublicon
for the adoptionof the
campaigned
June 12, 1918. The gendarmerie
the elections.Sincemost of the voters
documentand alsosupervised
didnot haveanyideawhattheywerevotingfor, andhadalwaysbeen
was a foregoneconclusion.The vote
told how to vote, the ratification
was69,337 to 335 in favorof the constitution.It hasbeenclaimedthat
only the ballotsmarked" oui" (yes) were givento the voters,who
usuallycouldnot read,andthatmostof the oppositionhadrefusedto
in the farce.l22
participate
The new constitutionwas similarin manyrespectsto the old one,
but therewere someimportantchanges.Article4 gave foreignersin
theright
Haitithe sameprotectionascitizens.ArticleS gaveforeigners
for
country
the
outside
to own realestate,providedthey did not live
morethanfive years.Article32 cut the numberof deputiesto thirtysix. Article36 cut the numberof senatorsto fifteento be electedby
directsuffrageratherthanby the lowerhouse. Article118established
as the only armedforce. The additionof amendments
the gendarmerie
but Article 128 madethe
still hadto be approvedby the legislature,
the existingorder,a
protect
To
necessary.
also
citizens
approvalof the
during
government
States
specialarticlevalidatedall actsof the United
the occupation.There were also severaltransitoryprovisionswhich
the elections
termin May, 1922,and established
endedDartiguenave's
122
Ibid.,
pp.192, 263-264, 536-539, 566-567, 692-703, 1508.
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260
AMERICANS
IN HAITI
for the legislature
on January10 of an even-numbered
yearto be fixed
by the president.Until that iime a Councilof Stateof twenty-one
members
wasto exercisethelegislative
power.The life tenureof judges
was suspendedfor six months.l23
These latterprovisionswere probablyintendedto preventpopular
electionsfor whichthe peoplewere considered
unprepared
(although
they hadbeenconsideredcapableof votingfor the constitutionwhich
was to takeawaytheirvotingrightstemporarily),
andto preventany
obstructive
legislatures.PresidentDartiguenave
nevercalledany legislativeelections,andhe ruledwith his appointedCouncilof State. He
hadrecommended
sucha formof government
the yearbefore.124
Havingusedthe Americansto rid himselfof any potentialHaitian
opposition,
the presidentchangedhistacticstowardthe occupationand
beganto showmuchmoreopenhostility.The UnitedStates,however,
hadapparently
decidedthatit couldalsodealwith the presidentmore
firmly.l25Manyof the difficulties
arosefromthe interpretation
of the
1915treaty. Althoughthe detailed,interpretative
commentary
oflered
by the Haitianshad been rejectedby the United States,Secretary
Lansinghadrevisedthewordingof certainpartsof thetreatyaccording
to the suggestionsmadeby the Haitianministers.126
These changes,
althoughexpressed
in very ambiguous
wording,hadalteredthe meanings of certainimportantsections. Lansingmay have been caught
napping,but at any rate, the Americanscontinuedto insiston the
originalinterpretations,
andtheHaitians"splithairs" overeachpossible
deviation.127
Thesetacticswereespeciallyevidentduringthearguments
overthe bank,the railroad,andthe dutiesof the treatyofficials.l28
The Haitianshad expectedto conducttheir own affairs,with the
Americantreatyoiiicialsactingonly as advisers;
yet, the Americans
retainedfull controlandlookedto Washingtonfor ordersratherthanto
Haiti. Mattersweremadeevenworseby the completelackof sufficient
organization
in Washington.President
Wilsonwastoo busywithworld
aSairsto havemuchtimeforHaiti. The policiesof theoccupation
were
beingmadeby severalindependent
groups.The financialadviserre3 ForeignRelations,1918,pp. 687-702.
4 Hearings,p. 699,Testimonyof GeneralCole.
5 Montague,Haiti and the UnitedStates,p. 230.
ForeignRelations,1915,pp. 443445;1916,pp. 324-326.
7 Montague,Haiti and the United States,pp. 221-222.
ForeignRelations,l91S, pp. 501-510;1916,pp. 379-383,362-365;1919,pp. 317-328.
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WALTER
H. PasNER
261
ceivedinstruciionsfromthe StateDepartment,
which,in the absence
of anybetteragency,turnedthe responsibility
overto its Lain-American Division.l29
The chief of the gendarmerie
was responsible
to the
MarineCorpsheadquarters
in Washington,but he usuallytook orders
fromthe commander
of the navalforcesin Haiti. The receivergeneral
wasalsoundertheStateDepartment,
butmoreresponsible
to theBureau
of InsularAffairsof the War Department.l30
The chief engineersreportedto the Navy Department,
whichwasin chargeof all non-financialaSairsof the occupation.l31
Becauseof disturbances
in the DominicanRepublicafter1916,the seniornavalofficerhadto be awayfrom
Haiti most of the iime, leavingthe Haitiancommandto the brigade
commander
of marines.
Besidesthe militaryorganization
andthe treatyofficials,therewere
also the regularHaitiangovernmentandthe Americanlegation.The
latterreceivedordersfromthe StateDepartment
buthadlittleinfluence
overanyotherofficialsexcept,perhaps,
the financial
adviser.From1915
to 1922the marinesin Haiii had nine commanding
officers,and the
gendarmerie
for four chiefs. Therewerealsosix chiefsof the Division
of Latin-American
Affairsin Washington.Therewerefiveseniornaval
officersdirectingaffairsfrom the DominicanRepublic,l32
four secretariesof state,andtwo Americanpresidents.This divisionof authority
andcontinualturnoverof leadersresllltedin conflictingorders,argumentsoverresponsibilities,
jealousies,
andgeneralinefficiency.l33
As a
result,manyof the expectedimprovements
in Haitiwerelong delayed.
Someof the importantpublicworksand healthprojectshad to wait
severalyearsbeforebeingadequatelyprovidedfor. The internalhindranceswere furtheraggravated
by the Americans'
lack of sympathy
for the Haitianpeople,ignoranceof the Haitianlanguages,and racial
prejudices.l34
In August,1918,it was agreedthatanylaw bearinguponthe objects
of the 1915treatywouldbe sent to the Americanauthorities
for approvalbeforebeingsubmitted
to the Haitianlegislature.135
The AmeriMHlspaugh,
Haiti UnderAmericanControl,p. 65. Hearings,p. 1411.
Davis, Black Democracy,p. 239.
131 Montague,Haiti d
the United Stues, p. 225, from the AnnualReport of the
Secretaryof the Navy, 1920.
132 Hearings,pp. 88-89,643, 1391-1392.
133 Millspaugh,
Haiti Under AmericanControl,pp. 64, 67-71.
134 Montague,
Haiti and the UnitedStates,p. 225.
135 ForeignRelations,1919,p. 309.
129
130
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262
AMERICANS
IN HAITI
cansinterpreted
thisto includealllegislation,
buttheHaitiansproceeded
to considerlegislationwhichhadbeenopposedby the occupationofficials. Amongtheselaws was one whichtook awaythe rightof foreignersto own property.Whenthe long anddetailednegotiations
that
followedfailedto bringan understanding,
the financialadviser,who
was alsohavingdifficultywith hismonetarychanges,decidedto withholdthe wagesof the Haitianoicials. He thenproceededto stop all
plansfor the nextyear'sbudget.
AmericanMinisterBailly-Blanchard
was notifiedon September8,
1920,thatRearAdmiralHarryKnappwasbeingsentas a specialmilitaryrepresentative
to Haiti. The ministerwasalsonotifiedby the State
Departmentthat the Americanshad no legal right to suspendthe
Haitiansalariesand that the moneyshouldbe paid. Apparentlythe
occupationofficialswerebecomingtoo aggressive,
as the StateDepartmenthadto sendinstructions
on November17 to allowa smuggling
caseto be triedin Haitiancourtsinsteadof militaryprovostcourts.By
thattimethe controversial
legislation
hadalsobeenrepealedor modified
to the satisfaction
of everybody.136
In 1922,therewas a re-organization
of the occupational
machinery
thatimprovedmanyof the unsatisfactory
conditions.The one factor
which hastenedthis reorganization
mostwas the caco insurrection
of
1919and1920.Effortsby Haitianofficialsto appealdirectlyto Wilson
and Lansingat the peaceconferencein Europehad failed,as it was
realizedthattheseappealscamefromrepresentatives
of a minuteportion of the Haitianpeople. The smallnumberof educatedelite spent
as muchtimefightingamongthemselvesas they did in criticizingthe
occupation;
therefore,no authoritative
spokesman
for the Haitianshad
everarisen.It wasthe lowly cacoof the backcountrywho finallyled
the opposition.t37
Mostof the peasants,freedfromthe dangerof banditattacks,had
been satisfiedwith the occupation,even thoughthe educatedclasses
had been so hostileto it. To completethe pacification
of the entire
country,the Americanshad decidedto buildroadsinto all partsof
Haiti,especially
theisolatedinterior,thebirthplace
of revolutions.Since
therewerenot suff;cientfunds,the corveewas revived.This practice
had beenusedrarely,althoughit was authorizedby an 1863law of
136
ForeignRelations,
1920,pp. 762-797,800, 806-808,810, 815, 816. Hearings,pp.
1405-1408.
137
Montague,Haitimndthe UnitedStates,p. 232.
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H. POSNER
WALTER
263
Haitiandhadexistedin practiceas farbackas Frenchcolonialtimes.l38
Everymanwas requiredto workon the roadsin his districtfor three
dayseachyear.t39At first,therewas little complaint,and about470
milesof old Frenchroadswere rebuiltby March,1918. When the
sparselysettledregionswere reached,abusesbeganto creepinto the
system.The menwereforcedto workoutsidetheirown districtsand
were
for muchlongerperiodsthanthreedays. The nativegendarmes
the
maltreated
they
and
militaryideas,
stillimbuedwithpre-occupation
workersandrevivedthe old habitsof graftandbribery.Peasantsfled
agitatorshadconvincedthem
to the hillsto escapewhatanti-American
wasa revivalof slavery.l40
When the officialsof the occupationrealizedwhat was happening,
they abolishedthe corvee. This was in October,1918,but somegenthe orderand
officersin the isolatedcaco areamisinterpreted
darmerie
theleaderunder
Thisincitedthe cacosto unite
continuedthecorvee.l41
Peralte,an escapedconvict,andto rebelopenly
ship of Charlemagne
againstthe gendarmes.Thereweresupposedto be fivethousandcacos
moreavailable.Opposingthemat first
in the fieldwithtwelvethousand
most
andonethousandmarines,
werepossiblytwo thousandgendarmes
of whomwere neededelsewherefor policeduty.142The insurrection
andLascain theinteriorareasof Hinche,Mirebalais,
wasconcentrated
the
provedincapableof suppressing
hobasat firstbut the gendarmerie
rebels.The uprisingspreadtowardthe capitalwith the encouragement
of politicalopponentsof the occupation.
on
The Haitianministerin Washingtonaskedthe StateDepartment
April5, 1919,to act at once to restoreorder.He addedthatthe dishadbeencausednot only by the low moralityof the gensatisfaction
darmes,but alsoby discontentover the entireoccupaiion.He listed
since
eightcausesfor discontent:(1) the illegalmartiallaw maintained
courts;(3) violationsby
1916; (2) the severityof the gendarmerie
Americanofficialsof both the 1915treatyandthe 1918constitution;
paidto
of intereston thepublicdebt;(5) low salaries
(4) non-payment
by Americansof publicopinionin Haiti;
the Haitians;(6) disregard
(7) disregardof advicefrom qualifiedHaitianleaders;and (8) the
financesandeducationin Haiti.t43
slownessin improving
Hearings,pp. 82, 142, 529, 605.
Record, Vol. LXII, Part 9, p. 8960.
Congressional
140 Davis,BlackDemocracy,pp. 216-218.
Hearings,p. 83, United StatesNavy Information.
141
142 Montague,Haiti and the United States,p. 233.
Relations,1919,pp. 329, 331-336.
l43Foreige2
138
139
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264
AMERIGANS
IN HAITI
The marineswerecalledin, andby June,1920,the insurrection
had
beenput down aftera long, hard,guerrillawar. Overtwo
thousand
Haitianshad been killed,and the marinesand gendarmerie
had lost
thirteenmen,with twenty-eightmore beingwounded.At one time,
threehundredcacoswerekilledwhileattacking
Port-au-Prince.l44
This
attack had been widely publicizedby the previously
disinterested
Americanpress.MostAmericans
learnedfor the firsttimethatnot all
Haitiansweregratefulfor theyearsof Americaneffortsto helpthem.146
Storiesof Americanatrocities
werecirculated,
anddemands
for invesiigationswere made. One magazine,The Noltion, printedmore
than
thirtycriticalariiclesduringthe latterhalfof 1920alone.l46
Frequentlyquotedin theseatacks was a letterwrittenby MajorGeneralBarnettto ColonelRussell.Barnetthadwrittenthatat a courtmartialof an Americanprivatechargedwith killinga native,it
had
beenrevealedthat" practically
indiscriminate
killingof nativeshasbeen
goingon for sometimes."This letterhadbeenmarked"personal
and
confidential,"
but the Navy Department
hadallowedit to be released
to the press.147
It was inevitablethatthe occupationwouldhaveto be
investigated
by the government,
if only to "saveface."
From1920through1922therewere severalinvestigations
of conditionsin Haiti. Favorable
reportsaccompanied
by constructive
werereceivedfromthe MarineCorps(GeneralsLejeuneandcriticism
Butler),
fromthe Navy Department(RearAdmiralsKnappand Mayo),
and
froma groupof Senatorsled by WilliamKing of Utah.l48
At the requestof the LatinAmericanDivisionof the U. S.
Departmentof State,ProfessorCarlKelseyof the Universityof
Pennsylvanis
investigated
the situationin Haitifor fivemonths.His highlyregarded
report
statedthatthe UnitedStatesshouldeitheradmitthe impossibility
of helpingHaiti and withdrawor else declarea definite
program,
organize
its forces,andmakegood. " Get in, or get out."
A five-manSenateinvestigating
committee,
ledby MedillMcCormack
ofIllinois,accumulated
1,842pagesof testimonyduringits ten months
ofhearingsin this countryandin Haiti. On June26, 1922,
the final
149
144
145
146
147
148
149
Davis,BlackDemocracy,pp. 219-223,318.
Montague,Haiti and the United States.
The Nation,Vol. CXI (July 1-December31, 1920).
Hearings,pp. 1722,425-432,Testimonyof Major-General
George Barnett.
Ibid., pp. 86, 239, 1753-1754.
Kelsey, " AmericanIntervention,"
p. 165.
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H. POSNER
WALTER
265
2ndSession)statedthat
report(SenateReportNo. 794,67thCongress,
was
mostof thestoriesof Americancrueltywerefalse.The occupation
peacefulandbackedby the approvalof the peasants.
The reportcriticizedthe lackof purposein Americanactivities,the
of Americanauthority,andtheunwisechoiceand
lackof centralization
of
greatturnoverof personnel.The reportpraisedthe achievements
in suchmattersasthe cleaningandlightingof cities,the
the occupation
of currency,thepayingof public
of highways,thestabilizing
expanding
debtsandsalaries,increasedforeigntrade,organizingan efficientgenpeaceandsecurityfor the peasants.
andestablishing
darmerie,
that justice,schools,and agricultural
The committeerecommended
educationbe broughtto the masses.Specialadvisersshouldbe sent.
to end existing
Stepswereurgedto preventlargeforeignlandholdings,
militarycontrol,and to encouragethe co-operationof the leading
thatis,
Haitiancitizens.The occupationwas to continueindefinitely;
alone.
stand
could
Haiti
until
JohnRussellhad alreadybeenappointedas high
Brigadier-General
In Washto co-ordinatethe workof the occupation.150
commissioner
in the
of the occupationwere concentrated
ington,the responsibilities
only overthe 1,300
StateDepartment.The Navy retainedjurisdiction
marinesin Haiti.15l
led by SenatorsKingandBorah,failed
of the occupation,
Opponents
in their attemptsin Congressto limit the occupationby cuttingoff
andHaitiansworked
Duringthenexttwelveyears,Americans
funds.152
in sanitation,education,
togetherto accomplishmany improvements
safetyfrombanditry,andfinancialstability.
was not permanent.The
muchof thisimprovement
Unfortunately,
who
groupof aristocrats, had run the government
samedomineering
beforethe occupation,regainedcontrol. They still believedthat the
peasantsexistedonly to supportthe upperclass. The plight of the
hadnot improvedenoughto enablethemeitherto understand
peasants
or to disputethe point.153
150
151
152
153
ForeignRelations,1922,pp. 461466.
Montague, Haiti and the UnitedStates,pp. 238-240.
Record,Vol. LXII, Part 9, pp. 8938-8974.
Congressional
Leyburn, The Haiian People,pp. 99-110; Davis, BlackDemocracy,pp. 272-280.
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266
AMERICANS
IN HAITI
An investigation
revealedthataslateas 1930thefailuresof theoccupationwerepartlydueto the lackof understanding
of the socialproblemsinvolved,to unsuccessful
attemptsto plantdemocracy" by drill
andharrow,"
to unsuccessful
attemptsto establish
a middleclass,andto
negligencein trainingHaitiansto take over the governmentafterthe
occupation.l54
WALTER
H. POSNER
SanDiegoStateCollege,
SanDiego,Corlifornior
154Reportof the PreslGent's
Commissionfor the Study and Review of Conditions
in the Republicof Haiti, 1930,pp. 8, 19, as quotedin Millspaugh,Haiti UnderAmerican Control,p. 185.
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