Special
Report No. 88
Soviet “Active Measures”
Forgery, Disinformation,
Political Operations
October 1981
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
The following paper was prepared by the
Department of State in response to requests for
information from a number of individuals,
private groups, and foreign governments.
In late 1979, agents of the Soviet Union spread
a false rumor that the United States was
responsible for the seizure of the Grand
Mosque of Mecca.
In 1980, a French journalist was convicted
by a French court of law for acting as a Soviet
agent of influence since 1959.
In August 1981, the Soviet news agency
TASS alleged that the United States was behind
the death of Panamanian leader Omar Torrijos.
These are three examples of a stream of
Soviet “active measures” that seek to discredit
and weaken the United States and other
nations. The Soviets use the bland term “active
measures” (aktivnyye meropriyatiya) to refer to
operations intended to affect other nations’
policies, as distinct from espionage and
counterintelligence. Soviet “active measures”
include:
• Written or spoken disinformation;
• Efforts to control media in foreign
countries;
0 Use of Communist parties and front
organizations;
Clandestine radio broadcasting;
Blackmail, personal and economic; and
0 Political influence operations.
None of this is to be mistaken for the
open, accepted public diplomacy in which
virtually all nations engage extensively Public
diplomacy includes providing press releases
and other information to journalists, open
public broadcasting, and a wide variety of
official, academic, and cultural exchange
programs. By contrast, Soviet “active measures” are frequently undertaken secretly,
sometimes violate the laws of other nations,
and often involve threats, blackmail, bribes,
and exploitation of individuals and groups.
Soviet “active measures” do not always
achieve Moscow’s objectives. In some cases,
Soviet operations have failed because of
ineptitude or because targeted individuals or
governments have responded effectively.
However, Soviet “active measures” have had
some success, and they remain a major, if little
understood, element of Soviet foreign policy.
The approaches used by Moscow include
control of the press in foreign countries;
outright and partial forgery of documents; use
of rumors, insinuation, altered facts, and lies;
use of international and local front organizations; clandestine operation of radio stations;
exploitation of a nation’s academic, political,
economic, and media figures as collaborators
to influence policies of the nation.
Specific cases of Soviet “active measures”
included here are: the Soviet anti-theater
nuclear force (TNF) campaign in Europe; the
Soviet anti- “neutron bomb” campaign; Soviet
activities in support of the leftists in El
Salvador; the Soviet campaign against the U.S.
-Egypt relationship and the Camp David
process.
“Active measures” are closely integrated
with legitimate activities, and Soviet foreign
policy. Decisions on “active measures” in
foreign countries are made at the highest level
of authority in the U. S. S. R. -in the Politburo
of the Communist Party Central Committee-as
are all other important decisions of Soviet
foreign policy.
The activities are designed and executed
by a large and complex bureaucracy in which
the KGB and the International Department of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) Central Committee are major elements. The International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee is also
deeply engaged in such activities. Actual
operations abroad are carried out by official
and quasi-official Soviet representatives,
including scholars, students, and journalists,
whose official. Soviet links are not
always apparent. The highly centralized
structure of the Soviet state and the state’s
pervasive control and direction of all elements
of society give Soviet leaders impressive free
use of party, government, and private citizens
in orchestrating “active measures.”
The open societies of the industrial
democracies and many developing nations, and
the ease of access to their news media, often
give Soviets open season for “active measures.” Many Western and developing
countries ignore or downplay Soviet “active
measures” until Soviet blunders lead to
well-publicized expulsions of diplomats,
journalists, or others involved in these
activities. The Soviets are adept at making their
policies appear to be compatible or parallel
with the interests of peace, environmental, and
other groups active in Western and developing
societies.
By contrast, the Soviet Union denies
access to its mass media for foreigners who
might criticize Soviet society or the foreign
policies of the U.S.S.R.
While the United States remains the
primary target, Moscow is devoting increasing
resources to “active measures” against the
governments of other industrialized countries
and countries in the developing world.
Moscow seeks to disrupt relations between
states, discredit opponents of the U.S.S.R., and
undermine foreign leaders, institutions, and
values. Soviet tactics adjust to changes in
international situations but continue, and in
some cases intensify, during periods of reduced
tensions.
“Active Measures” Techniques
The tactics and emphasis of Soviet “active
measures” change to meet changed situations.
For instance, Soviet use of Marxist-Leninist
ideology to appeal to foreign groups often
turns out to be an obstacle to the promotion of
Soviet goals in some areas; it is now being
deemphasized though not completely aban-
doned. At the same time, some religious
themes-notably the Soviet assertion that the
Islamic religion occupies a favorable position
in the U. S. S. R. -have assumed greater
significance, as Moscow courts Islamic
countries in Africa and the Middle East.
Similarly, while Soviet-dominated
international front groups still are important in
Soviet “active measures” abroad, Moscow is
broadening its base of support by using more
single-interest groups and fronts formed for
particular purposes to promote its goals.
Soviet “active measures” involve a mix of
ingenious and crude techniques. A brief sample
of types of activities includes the following.
Efforts to Manipulate the Press in
Foreign Countries. Soviet agents frequently
insert falsely attributed press material into the
media of foreign countries. In one developing
country, Soviets used more than two dozen
local journalists to plant media items favorable
to the U.S. S. R. Soviets have also used the
Indian news weekly Blitz to publish forgeries,
falsely accuse Americans of being CIA
personnel or agents, and disseminate
Soviet-inspired documents. In another country,
the Soviets used local journalists to exercise
substantial control over the contents of two
major daily newspapers.
Forgeries. Soviet forgeries-completely
fabricated or altered versions of actual
documents-are produced and circulated to
mislead foreign governments, media, and
public opinion. Recent Soviet forgeries are
better and appear more frequently than in the
past. Among forgeries that Soviet agents have
produced and distributed are bogus U.S.
military manuals and fabricated war plans
designed to create tensions between the United
States and other countries. In some cases, the
Soviets used actual documents passed to the
KGB by U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Lee
Johnson (who was eventually arrested and
convicted as a Soviet agent) as models for style
and format in Soviet forgeries. In one case,
Soviet agents, seeking to disrupt NATO theater
nuclear force modernization, circulated a
forged “top secret” letter from Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance to another Western foreign
minister.
Disinformation. Soviet agents use rumor,
insinuation, and distortion of facts to discredit
foreign governments and leaders. In late 1979,
Soviet agents spread a false rumor that the
United States was behind the seizure of the
Grand Mosque of Mecca. In another case,
2
Soviet officials “warned” officials of a West
European country that the CIA had increased
its activities in the country and that a coup was
being planned. Sometimes these disinformation
campaigns appear in foreign media suborned
by the Soviets, enabling Moscow to cite
foreign sources for some of the distortions and
misstatements that often appear in the Soviet
media. A recent and particularly egregious
example was the August 1981 TASS allegation
that the United States was behind the death of
Panamanian General Omar Torrijos.
Control of International and Local
Front Organizations. Moscow controls
pro-Soviet international front organizations
through the International Organizations Section
of the International Department of the CPSU
Central Committee. Front organizations are
more effective than openly pro-Soviet groups
because they can attract members from a broad
political spectrum. Prominent among these
fronts are the World Peace Council, the World
Federation of Trade Unions, the World
Federation of Democratic Youth, and the
Women’s International Democratic Federation.
Moscow’s agents use Soviet “friendship” and
cultural societies in many countries to contact
people who would not participate in avowedly
pro-Soviet or Communist organizations. The
function of front, “friendship,” and cultural
groups is to support Soviet goals and to oppose
policies and leaders whose activities do not
serve Soviet interests.
To complement organizations known for
pro-Soviet bias, the Soviets sometimes help
establish and fund ad hoe front groups that do
not have histories of close association with the
Soviet Union and can attract members from a
wide political spectrum.
Clandestine Radio Stations. The Soviet
Union operates two clandestine radio stations:
the National Voice of Iran (NVOI) and Radio
Ba Yi, which broadcast regularly from the
Soviet Union to Iran and China. Moscow has
never publicly acknowledged that it sponsors
the stations, which represent themselves as
organs of authentic local “progressive” forces.
The broadcasts of both of these Soviet stations
illustrate the use of “active measures” in
support of Soviet foreign policy goals. For
instance, NVOI broadcasts to Iran in 1979-80
consistentLy urged that the American diplomatic hostages not be released, while Soviet
official statements supported the hostages’
claim to diplomatic immunity
Economic Manipulation. The Soviet
Union also uses a variety of covert economic
maneuvers in “active measures” operations.
For example, a Soviet ambassador in a West
European country warned a local businessman
that his sales to the U.S. S. R. would suffer if
he went ahead with plans to provide technical
assistance to China. In another industrialized
country, Soviet agents sought to increase local
concern over the stability of the dollar by
driving up the price of gold. This was to be
accomplished by manipulating a flow of both
true and false information to local businessmen
and government leaders. The gambit failed
because the Soviet officials who attempted to
carry it out did not fully understand the
financial aspects of the operation.
Political Influence Operations.
Political influence operations are the most
important but least understood aspect of Soviet
“active measures” activities. These operations
seek to exploit contacts with political,
economic, and media figures in target countries
to secure active collaboration with Moscow. In
return for this collaboration, Soviet officials
offer inducements tailored to the specific
requirements or vulnerabilities of the individual involved. In 1980, Pierre-Charles Pathe,
a French journalist, was convicted for acting as
a Soviet agent of influence since 1959. His
articles-all subtly pushing the Soviet line on a
wide range of international issues-were
published in a number of important newspapers
and journals, sometimes under the pseudonym
of Charles Morand. The journalist also
published a private newsletter which was
regularly sent to many newspapers, members of
parliament, and a number of foreign embassies.
The Soviets used Pathe over a number of years
to try to influence the attitudes of the prominent subscribers to his newsletter and to exploit
his broad personal contacts.
In other cases, Soviet officials establish
close relationships with political figures in
foreign countries and seek to use these contacts
in “active measures” operations. Capitalizing
on the host government official’s ambition, his
Soviet contact claims to be a private channel to
the Soviet leadership. To play upon his sense of
self-importance and to enhance his credibility
within his own government, the host government official may be invited to meetings with
high-level Soviet leaders. The Soviets then
exploit the local official to pass a mixture of
true, distorted, and false information-all
calculated to serve Soviet objectives-to the host
government.
Use of Academicians and Journalists.
Soviet academicians, who often are accepted
abroad as legitimate counterparts of their
non-Soviet colleagues, frequently engage in
“active measures.” Unlike their free world
counterparts, they must play two roles-their
legitimate academic pursuit of knowledge for
.its own sake and their political activities on
behalf of the Kremlin. Soviet academicians are
obliged to obey instructions from bodies which
plan and control Soviet “active measures”
activities. Similarly, Soviet journalists often
engage in “active measures” operations in
addition to serving as representatives of Soviet
news agencies. One KGB officer in an
industrialized country used his journalistic
cover to pass forgeries, as well as to publish
numerous propaganda articles aimed at
influencing the media of the host country.
Case Studies
The Soviet Anti-TNF Modernization
Campaign in Europe. The Soviet campaign in
Europe against NATO TNF modernization is a
good illustration of Soviet use of “active
measures.” After a long and unprecedented
buildup of Soviet military strength in Europe,
including the deployment of new SS-20
nuclear missiles targeted on Western Europe,
the NATO ministers in December 1979 decided
to modernize NATO’s TNF capabilities. The
Soviets immediately began an ongoing,
intensive campaign to develop an environment
of public opinion opposed to the NATO
decision. (Of course, not all opposition to the
TNF modernization decision is inspired by the
Soviet Union or its “active measures” activities.)
In this campaign, Soviet diplomats in
European countries pressured their host
governments in many ways. In one European
country, the Soviet ambassador met privately
with the Minister of Commerce to discuss the
supply and price of oil sold by the Soviet
Union to that country. During the discussion,
the ambassador gave the minister a copy of
Leonid Brezhnev’s Berlin speech dealing with
TNF He suggested that if the host government
would oppose TNF modernization, the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs might persuade the
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade to grant more
favorable oil prices.
Moscow has spurred many front groups to
oppose the TNF decision through
well-publicized conferences and public
demonstrations. To broaden the base of the
anti-TNF campaign, front groups have lobbied
non-Communist participants, including
antinuclear groups, pacifists, environmentalists, and others. In some eases, the activities of
these broad front groups have been directed by
local Communist parties. Soviets have
predictably devoted the greatest resources to
these activities in NATO countries where
opposition to the TNF modernization decision
is strongest.
In the Netherlands, for example, the
Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN)
has set up its own front groupDutch Christians
for Socialism. In November 1980, the Dutch
“Joint Committee-Stop the Neutron Bomb-Stop
the Nuclear Armament Race,” which has ties to
the CPN, sponsored an international forum
against nuclear arms in Amsterdam. The forum
succeeded in attracting support from a variety
of quarters, which the CPN is exploiting in its
campaign to prevent final parliamentary
approval of the TNF decision.
The Soviet Campaign Against Enhanced
Radiation Weapons (ERW). The Soviets,
throughout 1977 and early 1978, carried out
one of their largest, most expensive, and best
orchestrated “active measures” campaigns
against enhanced radiation (neutron) weapons.
(Again, not all opposition to the U.S. decision
to produce the enhanced radiation weapon is
Soviet inspired.)
This Soviet campaign has had two
objectives: first, to halt deployment of ERW by
NATO; second, to divide NATO, encourage
criticism of the United States, and divert
Western attention from the growing Soviet
military buildup and its threat to Western
Europe and the world.
* Phase one occurred throughout the
summer of 1977. The Soviets staged an intense
propaganda blitz against ERW and the United
States, involving numerous demonstrations and
protests by various “peace councils” and other
groups. This phase culminated in a
Sovietproclaimed international “Week of
Action.”
* Phase two began in January 1978 with
Soviet propaganda exploitation of a letter from
Leonid Brezhnev to Western heads of government warning that production and deployment
of ERW constituted a serious threat to detente.
A barrage of similar letters from members of
the Supreme Soviet went to Western parliamentarians. Soviet trade union officials forwarded
parallel messages to Western labor counterparts.
* Phase three came in early 1978 with a
series of Soviet-planned conferences, under
different names and covers, designed to build
up the momentum of anti-ERW pressure for the
U.N. Special Session on Disarmament of
May-June 1978. These meetings and conferences, held throughout February and March,
were organized either by the World Peace
Council or jointly sponsored with established
and recognized independent international
groups.
The Soviet campaign succeeded in
complicating allied defense planning and
focusing criticism on the United States. A top
Hungarian Communist Party official wrote that
“the political campaign against the neutron
bomb was one of the most significant and
successful since World War Two.” The
propaganda campaign did not end in 1978; it
was incorporated into the anti-TNF effort. With
the recent U.S. decision to proceed with ERW
production, the Soviets have begun a new
barrage of propaganda and related “active
measures.”
Soviet “Active Measures” Toward El
Salvador. Complementing their overt public
support for the leftist insurgency in El
Salvador, the Soviets have also engaged in a
global “active measures” campaign to sway
public opinion. These activities include a broad
range of standard techniques, including
forgeries, disinformation, attempted manipulation of the press, and use of front groups. The
obvious dual purpose has been to increase
support for the insurgency while trying to
discredit U.S. efforts to assist the Government
of El Salvador.
In 1980, Salvadoran leftists met in Havana
and formed the United Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), the central political and military
planning organization for the insurgents.
During the same period, the Salvadoran
Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) was
established, with Soviet and Cuban support, to
represent the leftist insurgency abroad. The
FDR and DRU work closely with Cubans and
Soviets, but their collaboration is often covert.
The FDR also supported the establishment
of Salvadoran solidarity committees in Western
Europe, Latin America, Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand. These solidarity committees
have disseminated propaganda and organized
meetings and demonstrations in support of the
insurgents. Such committees, in cooperation
with local Communist parties and leftist
groups, organized some 70 demonstrations and
protests between mid-January and mid-March
1981 in Western Europe, Latin America,
Australia, and New Zealand.
The FDR and DRU are careful to conceal
the Soviet and Cuban hand in planning and
supporting their activities and seek to pass
themselves off as a fully independent, indigenous Salvadoran movement. These organizations have had some success in influencing
public opinion throughout Latin America and
in Western Europe. The effort of the insurgents
to gain legitimacy has been buttressed by
intense diplomatic activity on their behalf. For
example, at the February 1981 nonaligned
movement meeting in New Delhi, a 30-man
Cuban contingent, cooperating closely with six
Soviet diplomats, pressed the conference to
condemn U.S. policy in El Salvador.
3
At another level, the Soviet media have
published numerous distortions to erode
support for U.S. policy. For example, an article
in the December 30, 1980 Pravda falsely stated
that U.S. military advisers in El Salvador were
involved in punitive actions against noncombatants, including use of napalm and herbicides.
In another particularly outrageous distortion, a
January 1, 1981 article in the Soviet weekly
Literaturnaya Gazeta falsely stated that the
United States was preparing to implement the
so-called centaur plan for “elimination” of
thousands of Salvadorans.
Campaign Against the U.S.Egyptian
Relationship and the Camp David Process.
In the Middle East, Moscow has waged an
“active measures” campaign to weaken the
U.S. -Egyptian relationship, undermine the
Camp David peace process, and generally
exacerbate tensions. A special feature of
Middle East “active measures” activities has
been the use of forgeries, including:
* A purported speech by a member of the
U.S. Administration which insulted Egyptians
and called for “a total change of the government and the governmental system in Egypt.”
This forgery, which surfaced in 1976, was the
first of a series of bogus documents produced
by the Soviets to complicate U.S.-Egyptian
relations.
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* A forged document, allegedly prepared
by the Secretary of State, or one of his close
associates, for the President, which used
language insulting and offensive to President
Sadat and other Egyptians and also to other
Arab leaders, including King Khalid of Saudi
Arabia. This forgery was delivered anonymously to the Egyptian Embassy in Rome in
April 1977.
* A series of forged letters and U.S.
Government documents, which criticized
Sadat’s “lack of leadership” and called for a
“change of government” in Egypt. These
forgeries surfaced in various locations during
1977.
* A forged dispatch, allegedly prepared by
the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, which suggested
that the United States had acquiesced in plans
by Iran and Saudi Arabia to overthrow Sadat.
This forgery was sent by mail to the Egyptian
Embassy in Belgrade in August 1977.
* A forged CIA report which criticized
Islamic groups as a barrier to U.S. goals in the
Middle East and suggested tactics to suppress,
divide, and eliminate these groups. This
forgery surfaced in the January 1979 issue of
the Cairo-based magazine Al-Dawa.
* A forged letter from U.S. Ambassador to
Egypt Herman F. Eilts, which declared that,
because Sadat was not prepared to serve U.S.
interests, “we must repudiate him and get rid of
him without hesitation.” This forgery surfaced
in the October 1, 1979 issue of the Syrian
newspaper Al-Ba’th.
Conclusion
The Soviet Union continues to make extensive
use of “active measures” to achieve its foreign
policy objectives, to frustrate those of other
countries, and to undermine leadership in many
nations. On the basis of the historical record,
there is every reason to believe that the Soviet
leadership will continue to make heavy
investments of money and manpower in
meddlesome and disruptive operations around
the world.
While Soviet “active measures” can be
exposed, as they have often been in the past,
the Soviets are becoming more sophisticated,
especially in forgeries and political influence
operations. Unless the targets of Soviet “active
measures” take effective action to counter
them, these activities will continue to trouble
both industrialized and developing countries.
Published by the United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs - Office of Public
Communication * Editorial Division Washington,
D.C. - October 1981 - This material is in the public
domain and may be reproduced without permission;
citation of this source is appreciated.
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