Partnership
forPeace
and beyond
JOHN BORAWSKI
This article
examinesrecent
movestowards
an enlargement
ofNATO to include
countries
WarsawPact,possibly
oftheformer
including
Russia,in thelight
particularly
ofthePartnership
forPeaceproposalsthatemergedfrom
theNATO summit
of
January1994. The authorexaminestheevolution
oftheUS positiononpossible
and highlights
enlargement
thelackofa consensus
viewwithintheallianceon how
theissueofenlargement
shouldbe addressed,
as wellas discussing
thereactions
of
Russiaand oftheVisegrad
countries
to developments
in theallianceposture.*
At theNATO summitin Brusselson Io-i i JanuaryI994, allianceheads of state
and governmentbroke partialsilence on a fundamentalissue of European
securityin thepost-Cold War era: whetherthe timehad arrivedto enlargethe
Atlanticalliance once again by admittingthe new democracies of central
Europe-formerlymemberstatesof theWarsaw Pact.
Althougha pressingpolitical and moral question, the NATO enlargement
issue also went to the veryheartof the identityand raisond'etreof the alliance
itself.The BritishPrime MinisterJohnMajor statedon the eve of the summit
thatreformin Russia, ratherthan securityguarantees,held the best hope of
long-termfreedomforthe formerSoviet satellites.'Yet, if securityguarantees
were now lessimportant,
as thePrimeMinistersuggested,whywas NATO still
needed forPortugalor Canada, but not forPoland or the Czech Republic?
The allied responseadopted at the summitwas the Partnershipfor Peace
(PFP), an Americaninitiativefirstunveiled at the meetingof NATO defence
ministersin Travemunde,Germany,on 20-2I
October I993-less than three
monthsbeforetheBrusselssummit.Buildingon work alreadyunderway in the
North AtlanticCooperation Council (NACC), the PFP offeredsix areas of
cooperationto all 'able and willing'CSCE2participatingstates:(i) transparency
* Views expressedare the author'sown.
I DailyTelegraph,
iojanuary I994.
At itsDecember I994 Summit,the Conference on Securityand Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) decided
to institutionalizethe arrangementand rename itselfthe Organization forSecurityand Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE).
2
International
Affairs
71,
2
(I995) 233-246
233
JohnBorawski
in nationaldefenceplanningand budgetingprocesses;(2) ensuringdemocratic
control of defence forces; (3) maintainingthe capabilityand readiness to
contributeto operationsunder the authorityof the United Nations or the
responsibility
of the CSCE; (4) developingcooperativemilitaryrelationswith
NATO for the purpose of joint planning,trainingand exercisesin order to
the abilityto undertakemissionsin peacekeeping,searchand rescue,
strengthen
humanitarian
operationsand such otherareas as mightsubsequentlybe agreed;
(5) developingover the longertermforcesbetterable to operatewith those of
NATO member states; and (6) consultationswith NATO for any active
participantif it perceived a direct threatto its territorial
integrity,
political
independenceor security.Partnerswere offeredofficesat NATO headquarters
and at a PartnershipCoordination Cell adjacent to SHAPE (Supreme
HeadquartersAlliedPowersEurope). In responseto Frenchconcerns,theterm'at
Mons' in Belgiumwas used, with the Cell physically
separatedby a fencefrom
SHAPE headquarters.
Beyond thesespecificareas,some ofwhich were againalreadybeing explored
withinthe NACC (or were alreadyfeaturesof CSCE agreementsor bilateral
cooperation), the allies also held out the followingprospect regardingthe
'concreteperspective'on enlargementeagerlysoughtearlierin the decade by
Albania, the Baltic states,Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary,Poland,
Romania and Slovakia: 'We expectand would welcome NATO expansionthat
would reachto democraticstatesto our East, as partof an evolutionaryprocess,
takingintoaccountpoliticaland securitydevelopmentsin thewhole ofEurope ...
in thePartnership
forPeace wiliplayan important
Activeparticipation
role in the
evolutionaryprocess of the expansion of NATO.'3 The rationale for this
programme,according to the US Deputy AssistantSecretaryof Defense for
European and NATO policy, Joseph Kruzel, was threefold:PFP 'offersa
traininggroundforNATO membership,providesa securityhome forthosenot
in thefirstgroupof countriesthatbecame members-but stillable to participate
in 95 per cent of what NATO membersdo, and assuresone countrythatwill
notbe an earlyNATO member,Russia, thatNATO expansionis not a threatto
itssecurity.'4
At thesame time,PFP was deliberately
intendedto avoid earlydecisionsbeing
takenon NATO enlargement.
As US PresidentBill Clintonstatedat theend of
the summit,the possibilityof expanded NATO membershiphad been opened
to all othernon-NATO membersin Europe, but 'in a way thatdid not have the
United Statesand NATO prematurely
drawinganotherline in Europe to divide
it in a different
way, but insteadgave us a chance to work forthe bestpossible
futureforEurope-one thatincludesnot onlythe countriesofEasternEurope,
but also the countriesthatwere partof the formerSoviet Union and, indeed,
Russia itself'.
I
4
For relevantdocumentationsee NATO Review,
42: i, FebruaryI994.
JosephKruzel, presentationto the North AtlanticAssembly(NAA) Political Committee,J. W. Marriott
Hotel, WashingtonDC, I 5 November I994.
234
Partnership
forPeace
Ever since theJanuaryI994 summit,the allies and the intendedbeneficiary
governmentsof PFP have been debating,some more seriouslythan others,
whetherand how the three US objectivesbehind PFP can all be advanced
simultaneously.
Can NATO 'balance' Russia while at the same time offering
membershipto it?Would 'broadening'NATO mean 'thinning'thecohesionof
thealliance?Was thefailureto bringin the centralEuropeansearlyand directly
tantamountto a 'Yalta ii'? Would enlargementinvariablyantagonizeRussia or
be exploitedby Russian politicianswantingto turnaway fromreform?Did the
vis-d-vis
central
pursuedby priorUS administrations
policy of 'differentiation'
and easternEurope encouragingindependencefromMoscow, no longerapply,
given that PFP was extended to all other CSCE states-rebussic stantibus
IfPFP was intended,as expressedby US SecretaryofDefense
notwithstanding?
William Perryon 24 May I994, to 'lay the foundationfor a new European
securitysystemwith NATO at the center',was this 'NATO-centric' vision
actuallyagreedwithinthe allianceitself?
More broadly,given the open-ended invitationof PFP and its focus on
peacekeeping,would NATO remaina collectivedefenceorganizationguarding
against'risks' in place of past 'threats',taking on 'additional tasks' such as
to serveas a
peacekeepingoutsideitszone, or would it evolve more dramatically
century,subsumingthe CSCE but on a
League of Nations forthe twenty-first
fromtheSovietand thenRussianview sincethe
NATO-centricbasis-as distinct
structure?
I950S thatblocs shouldbe replacedby such an all-Europeansecurity
Or was the debate much ado about nothing,because geostrategicreality
dictatedthatthe Czech Republic would do well to emulate Switzerland;or
because NATO, as some punditshad it, was an anachronism,its attemptto
maintainrelevancehavingbeen torpedoedby the debacle in Bosnia; or because
the futureof European securityrestedin the overallframeworkof the CSCE
withcentralEuropean integration
mostrealistically
concerningtheEU and the
WEU, not NATO, settingaside enormousdoubtsabout theviabilityof such an
arrangement?
What, in short,were NATO allies reluctantto enlarge,and what kind of
organizationdid thecentralEuropean countriesthinktheywould one dayjoin?
Russia first?
Informaldiscussionsabout NATO enlargementbeginningin I993 received a
certainimpetusfromthe Polish-Russian declarationof 25 August I993, in
which PresidentBoris Yeltsin agreed thata decision by Poland to accede to a
NATO 'aimingat all-Europeanintegrationis not contraryto the interestsof
otherstatesincludingalso Russia'. Had Russia at last,perhaps,subscribedto the
on itswesternfrontier
would bestbe servedby itsneighbours
theorythatstability
of defencea
being in an alliancewhich was supposedto make renationalization
moot point-setting aside the imponderableof how any of Russia's former
Warsaw Pact allies could possiblypose a threatto it-much in the way that
easternGermanywas integratedinto NATO?
235
JohnBorawski
At about the beginningof April I993, the US view had been thatthe PFP
would be a substituteforNATO membershipbut nevertheless
a way to move
the NACC towards'real-world'militarycooperation,thusaccountingforthe
similarities
between work alreadyunder way in the NACC and the firstPFP
Work Plan.5 However, therewas a consensusview within the alliance that
enlargement
had at leastto be 'addressed'at a summitintendedto set an agenda
fora 'renewed' alliancein the I99OS and beyond. The need to 'projectstability'
but at thesame timeNATO soughtto
eastwardswas theprimaryconsideration,
ensure that the benefitsof collective defence-the key reasons forjoining
NATO-would not be sacrificed.Also, the operationaland financialaspectsof
had not yetbeen studiedcarefully:
would foreignforcesor nuclear
enlargement
weapons be stationedrightup to the Russian border?Who would pay for
integrating
new members?How could centralEuropean securitybe promoted,
not
Russia
provoked,and the alliancekept cohesive and purposeful,all at the
same time?
There was also,to be sure,an elementofself-interest.
US SecretaryofDefense
Dick Cheney had statedon ii December I992: 'It is essentialthatifNATO is
to be the foundationupon which European securityis built,thatNATO be
perceivedand actuallybe involvedin helpingaddressthosesecurityconcernsof
Central and Eastern Europe.' He advocated, speaking personally,ultimate
membershipof NATO 'forat leastsome of thosenationsof centraland eastern
Europe thatmeet the basic fundamentalteststhatwe have requiredof others
who seek to be partof theAlliancein termsof theircommitmentto democracy
and theirwillingnessto join with us in providingforthe collectivedefence'.
That is, enlargementwould be importantformaintainingNATO's relevance
(and US influencein NATO and world-wide)as well as foranchoringthe new
democraciesin theWesternvalue system.
But therewere also conflictingelements.Secretaryof StateJamesBaker had
statedin Berlinon I2 December I989 thatNATO, havingreconciledhistorical
adversarieswithin its own camp, offeredthe nations of easternEurope 'an
relations'.Did thismean thatthe formernonappealingmodel of international
Soviet Warsaw Pact allies should create theirowncollectivedefencealliance?
thegovernments
SecretaryBakeralso statedthat'whateversecurityrelationships
ofeasternEurope choose,NATO will continueto provideWesterngovernments
the optimalinstrument
to coordinatetheirefforts
at defenseand armscontrol,
and to build a durableEuropean orderof peace', and thatthe maintenanceof
of
ofEasternEurope, and indeed theinterests
NATO would serve'the interests
a
the Soviet Union'. While all of thatwas true,did the Secretaryimply certain
to the way thosecountrieswent,or was the overridingneed then to
indiference
reassurethe Soviet Union thatthe liberationof centralEurope would not be
5 Forelaboration
seeBruceGeorgeMP, Continental
drift,
GeneralReportofthePoliticalCommittee
ofthe
NAA, NovemberI994. Forexample,boththeNACC andPFP workplansreferred
to peacekeeping
exercises,
democratic
controlofthemilitary,
anddefenceplanning,
andneither
contained
preconditions
forj oining.
236
Partnership
forPeace
exploitedby theWest?Ifthelatter,was theimplicationnot thattheexpansionof
a defensivealliancewould or could prove a threatto Russia?
Whicheverwas the case then,more than fouryearslater,on 5 June I993,
Secretaryof Defense Les Aspin stated: 'We favor the growth of regional
understandings
and associationsamong neighbors.For example,the nationsof
Poland, Hungaryand the Czech and Slovak republicscould comprisesuch a
group. Groupingsthatcalm securityconcernsamong neighborsenhance the
widersecurityof us all.' These regionalarrangements,
Aspinstated,would be a
component of a 'new securitysystem'that would in addition include the
and extensionofexistinginstitutions-NATO, NACC, CSCEstrengthening
and bilateralrelations.Was thissuggestinga 'NATO II' forcentraland eastern
Europe-an idea promoted by Polish President Lech Walesa but which,
accordingto a formerPolish diplomat,'certainlydid not come fromhim'?
Only GernnanDefence MinisterVolkerRuihehad spokenout publiclyon the
benefitsof drawingthe Visegradcountries,identifiedexplicitlyby name, into
NATO. As he informedthe Defence and SecurityCommittee of the North
Atlantic Assembly in Berlin on 2I May I993: 'With their forthcoming
associationwith the European Communities,the political foundationshave
been laid [forEU and WEU membership]and forthe Visegradstates-Poland,
Hungary,the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. I thereforesee no
reason in principle for denying futuremembers of the European Union
membershipof NATO.' This epitomizedthe so-called 'Royal Road', whereby
membershipin theEU meantmembershipin theWEU and, because theWEU
was the 'European Pillar' of NATO, membershipin NATO. However, Ruhe
was flexibleas to which organizationshouldbe thefirstto el-large:'Accessionof
new partnersis not so much a questionof "if' as one of "how" and "when". It
is a questionof timingand preconditions.'
Obviously,Germanymaintainedan intenseinterestin seeingthatitsfrontiers
withthe Czech Republic and Poland were stableand did not become gateways
forrefugeesfleeingeconomic or politicalproblems.Secure in NATO and with
the prospect of EU membership,these countriescould then enjoy greater
foreigninvestment
and domesticpoliticalstability.
Polishmembership
Militarily,
of NATO was seen as a strategicrequirementfor the defence of the former
GDR. In contrast,countriessuch as theUnited Kingdom took a more cautious,
pragmatic'approach. It was even suggestedthat should Russia returnto a
hegemonic policy, centralEuropean membershipof Western organizations
could make mnatters
worse fortheWest as a whole.6
Withinjusta fewweeksofthePolish-Russiandeclarationin Warsaw,however,
in a letterof IS September1993 to the governmentsof France,Germany,the
United States and Britain,PresidentYeltsin argued that 'the spiritof [the]
stipulations'of the iggo Treaty on the Final Settlementwith Respect to
6 Sir David Gillmore,'RepresentingBritainoverseas:post-Cold War challenges',RUSIjournal, I38: 6,
December 1993.
237
JohnBorawski
Germany,whichprohibitedthestationingofforeignforcesin theeasternfederal
landeroftheFederalRepublic ofGermany,'rulesout anypossibility
ofa NATO
expansion eastwards'.Instead, the letterstated,Russia and NATO should
offer[theeastEuropean countries]securityguarantees... enshrinedin
'officially
a politicaldeclarationor a treatyon cooperationbetweentheRussian Federation
and NATO'-a proposalperhapsechoingtheidea of associatemembershipof a
unifiedGermanyin both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, a proposalthe Soviet
Union temporarily
put forwardin I989.
The effectof theYeltsinletterwas said to be to induce greatercautionwithin
the alliance in respectof enlargement.But it also alarmedthe centraland east
Europeans, raisingsuspicions-expressed most outspokenlyby Poland-that
somehow a 'Yalta Ii' was in the pipeline.In the end, the PFP was greetedwith
relief,in the words of a NATO diplomat,'in thatit got us out of the hole we
were diggingon enlargement'.
The reactionfrommanyUS Senatorsand membersof Congresswas sharply
negative. Among the leading opponents was Republican Senator Richard
Lugar,who the monthbeforethesummitshed considerablelighton the debate
in Washingtonleadingto PFP:
The PFP proposalreflects
the Administration's
lowestcommondenominator,
even
thoughtheAllieddefense
couldprobably
andforeign
ministers
havebeenpersuaded
to
withtheassociate
accepta bolderapproach... The Americanplan contrasts
sharply
NATO membership
approachpromotedby the Germans... the starting
point(and
to be Russianperhapsendingpointas well)forthiseffort
instance
appearsin thefirst
inWestern
oriented... The problemwiththosewhoproposeputting
Russiafirst
policy
calculations
is that,forthem,thereis nevera good timefortheAllianceto addressany
of thetoughissuesit faces.
SenatorLugararguedinsteadfor'a clearperspectiveforeventualmembership',
and he would
includingspecifiedcriteriaand a timetablefornew membership;7
later caution thatunless the administration
rethoughtits approach,including
adequate fundingforPFP follow-upactivity,PFP would 'remaina "policy for
postponement"'ratherthan a 'fasttrackfor the Visegrad countries'in their
intotheWest.8
integration
Likewise, although independentof NATO, the North AtlanticAssembly
rejected the 'wait and see' approach. In Copenhagen in October I993, the
Assemblyunanimously
called fora timetableand entrycriteriafornew NATO
members, beginning with associate membership.The following year, in
November I994, the Assemblycalled for entryof new members'within the
7 Richard Lugar, 'NATO's
8
"near abroad": new membership,new missions',speech to theAtlanticCouncil
of the United States,9 December I993.
Richard Lugar,'The Russiansare toughrivals,not partners',speech to theAmericanSpectatorWashington
Dinner Club, 7 March 1994.
238
Partnership
forPeace
next2-5 years... withmemorandaof understanding
elaboratingtheprotocolof
accessionto theNorthAtlanticTreatyreachedno laterthanthefirstmeetingin
I995 of theNorthAtlanticCouncil in ministerial
session'.A prominentmember
of theNAA, PeterDuetoft,Chairmanof theDanish ParliamentForeignAffairs
committee,compared PFP to the I938 Munich capitulation,9and the NAA
Peter Corterier,described PFP as risking,unless clearer
Secretary-General,
criteriaformembership
were offered,
establishing
'a no-man'sland ofpermanent
instability
and insecurity
... amongnationswho cannotby themselves
providefor
theirown security'.Io In addition,the Vice-Chairmanof the BritishHouse of
Commons Select Committee on Defence, Bruce George MP, argued the
month before the summit that PFP, in the eyes of the centralEuropeans
'amountsto directacceptanceby the US and itsalliesof a Russian veto on new
NATO members... the appearance,at least,is thatthe West has freelygiven
Moscow thedroit
deregard
overNATO thatevadedtheSovietUnion throughout
theCold War."
This tempestuousdebate continuesto thisday.
From no new lines to no veil of indifference
In fairness,a pathwayinto NATO membershipwould probablyhave looked
forPeace menu-depending, of course,on how
verymuchlike thePartnership
theissueofinformation
as well as thatof
on interoperability
and standardization,
assistancein areas such as technologytransfer
and even weapons systemsand
financialaid, unfolded.For example, the firstIndividualPartnershipProgram
(IPP) concluded with NATO, by Poland on 5 July I9949 emphasized
modernizationof air defence and interoperability
of command and control
and Poland soughtto have liaisonofficesestablishednotjust at NATO
systems,
and SHAPE but in the major subordinatecommands,as well as some kind of
security
guaranteependingfullmembership(althoughthelatterwas not formally
proposedto NATO). By earlyDecember I994, 23 countrieshad become PFP
and nine-Poland, Finland,Sweden, Romania, Bulgaria,Slovakia,the
partners,
Czech Republic, Hungaryand Lithuania-had concluded theirIPPs.
itscritics.The
It was, rather,thelogic behindthePFP thattendedto infuriate
PFP 'invitation'issued at Brusselswas silenton how and when NATO would
enlarge,apartfromsuggestingthat'active' partnerswould be givenpreference.
The Clintonadministration
as a 'threatadvocatedwhat some alliesinterpreted
drivenapproach':ifRussia moved away fromreformsecurityguaranteeswould
be extendedto the centralEuropeans; in the absence of such a development,
and to encouragereformin Russia, 'why draw new lines?' For example, on
9 Berlingske
Tidende,
3I JanuaryI994.
Peter Corterier,GraduationKeynote Address,NATO Defence College, Rome, i i FebruaryI994.
" Bruce George, 'NATO should offerthe eastmore thanpartnership',Wall StreetJournal
Europe,
I5 December I993.
239
JohnBorawski
I2 January1994
in Prague, PresidentClinton insistedthat PFP was not a
'permanentholdingroom' fornew NATO members.PFP, he said,borrowinga
line fromVolker Ruhe, changedthe entireNATO dialogue,so that'now the
questionis no longerwhetherNATO will takeon new members,but when and
how. It leaves thedoor open to thebestpossiblefutureoutcome forour region,
democracy,marketsand securityall acrossa broaderEurope, while providing
time and preparationto deal with a lesser outcome.' This line of reasoning
promptedHenryKissinger,among others-despitehis havingtakentheview in
I990 that'the most realisticsecuritysystem'forPoland, Czechoslovakia, and
'has
Hungarywas one of neutrality-to claim thatthe Clinton administration
embracedthe proposition,rejectedby all of its predecessorsfor40 years,that
NATO is a potentialthreatto Russia'.'2 Moreover, why would it be more
conduciveto stability
to enlargeNATO onlywhen Russia once moreconstituted
a threat?
at thatpointbe an invitation
to apocalypse,or at
Would not enlargement
leasta severecrisisas decisionswere made about the compositionof East-West
relationships?
Would it not, indeed, as Zbigniew Brzezinskisuggested,be
objectivelyantagonistic
and 'guarantee'Russian hostility?'3
The conclusioncould be drawn,therefore,
thatthequestions'What is NATO?'
and 'Should NATO expand?' remainedunanswered.The 'bestpossiblefuture'
and admissionof a limitednumberof statesseemed to be presented,even if
inadvertently,
as contrasting
results.And if Russia joined NATO, would not
NATO become in effecta duplicate CSCE as an all-European collective
security organization?Yet President Clinton clearly stated that NATO
membershipwas on offerto othernon-NATO countriesin Europe, something
whichwentbeyond even the declaredRussian aim of enhancingtherole of the
CSCE to coordinatea 'divisionof labour' between the CIS, NACC, European
as
Union, Council of Europe, NATO and WEU-which could be interpreted
meaningthatNATO and the CIS should be seen as equals, each withthe right
to existalongsidetheother.Be thatas it may,Russian presidential
adviserSergei
Karaganovdid not help to put thebestpossiblefaceon thePFP when he wrote
shortlyafterthe NATO summit:'In September-Octoberof lastyear [I993], it
seemedthatitwould not provepossibleto haltthemechanismoftheadmittance
offourcentraland East European countriesto NATO. But in the end, Russia's
cooperationwithforcesin NATO countrieswhich do not want theAllianceto
be expandedseemsto have avertedthe inevitable.'"4
NATO foreignministers,
meetingin Istanbulon 9 June I994, declaredthat
theywere 'interestedin a broad dialogue with Russia in pursuitof common
goals in areaswhere Russia has a unique or particularly
importantcontribution
to make'. They also statedthatNATO retainedits'rightto takeitsown decisions
2
Henry Kissinger,'Be realisticabout Russia', Washington
Post,25 JanuaryI994.
Brzezinski,presentationto the NAA Political Committee,J.W. MarriottHotel, Washington
'3Zbigniew
DC,
'4
I5
NovemberI994.
'We mustbe the firstat NATO's doors', Izvestia,24 FebruaryI994, in ForeignBroadcast Information
Service (FBIS) CentralEurasia, i March I994.
240
forPeace
Partnership
by consensusof its members,includingdecisionson
on its own responsibility
the enlargementof the Alliance'. Nevertheless,Russia came up in every
conversationregardingenlargement,despiteclaims thatMoscow was not the
' I7th silentmember'of NATO.
It was because of all the mounting unknowns-what did the Clinton
with
reallywant,had Germanyconcluded some understanding
administration
the then Soviet Union that East Germanywould be the last new NATO
member,were some NATO countriesputtingthe Russiansup to demandinga
fora clearstatementthat
'specialrelationship'-thatPoland lobbied intensively
supportedPolish membershipof NATO. Recognizing
the US administration
thateithera countryis in NATO or it is not, Poland soughta clear expression
objective of expanding the alliance. If the
of the Clinton administration's
between Russia
Council of Europe, the EU and the WEU could differentiate
with the
and othereastEuropean countrieswhy was NATO so uncomfortable
issue?A 'line' would alwaysexistand should servesome rationalpurpose-or
was NATO not well pleasedthattheWarsaw Pact had dissolved?
By thetimeofPresidentClinton'svisitto Warsawon 6 and 7JulyI994, theline
of US reasoningseemed to have changed.In remarksbeforethe Sejm on the
seconddayofhisvisit,thePresidentstatedthat'expansionwill not dependon the
appearanceof a new threatin Europe'. The United Statesbelieved,he said,'that
when NATO does expand,as it will,a democraticPoland will have placed itself
forPeace, and planningfor
amongthosereadyand able to join. The Partnership
meanthatwe willnotlettheIronCurtainbe replacedwitha veil
NATO's future,
The Presidentalso announcedhisintentionto request$25 million
ofindifference.'
PresidentClintonalso
fromCongressto assistPoland in itsPFP implementation.
announced,just over six monthsafterthe Brusselssunirnit,thatthe tasknow
that
would be to have thealliesdiscuss'whatthenextstepsshouldbe', suggesting
both a timetableand entrycriteriashouldbe settledby the alliesin I995.
Act,sponsored
Furtherimpetuswas providedby the I994 NATO Participation
by CongressmenBenjamin Gilman and Gerald Solomon and SenatorsHank
surplus
Brown and Paul Simon. The Act authorizedthe Presidentto transfer
and
to
and
the
Czech
Republic
weapons equipment to Poland, Hungary
includethosecountries'in all activities... relatedto the increasedstandardization
ofequipmentand weaponssystems'undertakenby
and enhancedinteroperability
NATO members.Althoughadoptedby theSenate on I S Julyby 74 votesto 22,
it was defeatedin conferencewith the House, having reportedlydrawn a
responsefromthe State Departmentsuggestingthat the legislationbe either
withdrawnor widened to include Russia and other countriesof the former
betweenthe
Warsaw Pact"5-an exampleofNATO's reluctanceto differentiate
in
chambers
Act
both
passed through
potentialnew partners.However, the
October and became law in November I994. It will, no doubt, serve as a
Is Tomasz Wroblewski,'Poland-United States,withRussia in thebackground',Zycie Warszawy,7JulyI994,
in FBIS East Europe, 7 JulyI994.
24I
JohnBorawski
referencepointforthe new Republican majorityin both houses,the 'Contract
withAmerica' offeredby Republican candidateshavingincluded an expanded
NATO.
Precepts
Furtherevidence of a move in the US administration
away fromthe 'threatdrivenapproach'was givenby thePrincipalDeputy AssistantSecretaryof State
for European and Canadian Affairs,and former US Deputy Permanent
Representativeto NATO, AlexanderVershbow, on 2I June I994 at an US
AtlanticCouncil-WEU defenceministers
meetingat theUS StateDepartment.
Vershbow stated:'Some people thinkNATO expansion more likely only if
Russia moves away fromreform.But thereare otherscenarios.'
Then, towardsthe end of October I994, an articleappearedin the New York
Timescitinga 'senior administration
official'as conceding what a numberof
criticsof PFP had feltfromthe beginning:'Much of the rhetoricthatwas used
in the past was emptyof substance.PartnershipforPeace is like gettingguest
privilegesat theclub-you can playgold once in a while. Now we wantto send
the bylawsand ask: "Do you want to pay the dues?"."6 The publicationof this
was not coincidentalbutsignalleda new approachbeingpromotedby individuals
said to include the new AssistantSecretaryof StateforEuropean and Canadian
Affairs,Richard Holbrooke, who chaired a Working Group on European
Securityestablishedthatmonthto review the 'how', albeitnot the 'when', of
enlargement.This new approachwas describedin the followingtermsby the
Deputy AssistantSecretaryof DefenseJosephKruzel on I5 November I994:
We cannotgiveyoua checklist
thatyoucantickoff,andwhenyouhavecompleted
your
It is muchmoreofa politicalprocessthanthat.But
lastrequirement
you areadmitted.
therearetwothings
thatI wouldinsist
on ofanyprospective
member
oftheAlliance.The
first
isto showusyouareworthdefending.
Showusthatyoushareourvalues... Second,
to thetable,thatyou can makea contribution
showus thatyou bringsomething
to
collective
defence... Otherwise,
Article
Treaty[thecommitment
5 oftheNorthAtlantic
to come to the defenceof an aRlycomingunderarmedattack],in the contextof
defencebudgetsbutexpanding
couldbe madehollow.
declining
commitments,
Kruzel also cautioned:
We in NATO havea lotofworkto do beforewe arereadyforexpansion.
We needto
thinkabouthow to bringthesecountries
intothe military
commandstructure.
We
needto thinkaboutforward
defence-willwe needto station
of
forcesin theterritory
willwe needto putnuclearweaponsthere,
thesenewmembers,
pre-position
equipment
there?How will we take on thischallengeof defending
a considerably
increased
reduceddefenceposture?'7
strategic
spacewitha considerably
,6
17
HeraldTribune,
International
28 OctoberI994.
Kruzel, presentationto NAA Political Committee.
242
Partnership
forPeace
These questions,or an elaborationof 'precepts',were not new and presumably
should have alreadybeen addressedwithinNATO when the heads of stateand
governmentsignalledtheirwillingnessfor the alliance to expand. In an era
when therewas no 'threat'to NATO, were calculationssuch as force-to-space
all thatrelevant,at leastforthe
ratiosand othertraditional
military
requirements
Even ifnot,would not theVisegradcountriesadd a substantial
near-term
future?
militarycontributionto allianceforces-did no one have anyuse forten Polish
divisions?Moreover,theUS PermanentRepresentativeto theUnited Nations,
Madeleine Albright,seemed quite relaxed in speaking on these issues on
25 October I994: she asked whether Poland was democratic,whether it
respected human rights, whether it was willing to undertake security
commitmentsand whetherit acted responsiblytowardsits neighbours.Her
answerwas 'yes' to all fourquestions.
Proponentsof NATO enlargementnaturallysuspecteda stalingtactic,with
prospectivemembercountriesviewing explanationsto them of how much it
would costtojoin NATO (in contributions
to civilian,defenceand infrastructure
budgets)as an attempt'to scareus away fromthe alliance'.Zbigniew Brzezinski
formembership
be primarily
geopolitical-commitmentto
urgedthatthecriteria
democracyand sharedvalues-and not technical;the latteraspectscould be
solvedaftermembership:
I suspectthattheinclination
of somepeople,includingwithintheUnitedStates,to
technicalcriteriais a reflection
of a hiddenbut
emphasizeprimarily
operational,
intention
to delaytheexpansionoftheAlliance... thereis a deliberate
effort
capricious
on theprinciple
itself
to refight
thestruggle
on the
bythosewho havelostthestruggle
to degreeswhichcannotbe metin
levelofqualifications,
byraising
thesequalifications
thenearfuture.'8
Even assumingthe Clinton administration
had a firmposition on NATO
therewere fifteenother allies to consider.Both Kruzel and the
enlargement,
Directorof Strategic
Plansand Policyin theJointChiefsof Staff,
Lt-Gen.Wesley
on
in
a
November
had
stated
presentationto the Political
Clark,
I994
I5
Committeeof the NorthAtlanticAssemblythattheysoughta more activePFP
and beyondpeacekeeping.But
training
programme,
movingtowardsrealmilitary
iftheEuropeanallieswere not entirely
enthusiastic
aboutveryactivecooperation
the
as
had
been
the
case
with
over
activities
NACC
years(forexample,theUnited
Stateshad been pressingfortwo yearsto have NACC peacekeepingexercises
about the admissionof new
held), why would theybe any more enthusiastic
members?NATO Secretary-General
Willy Claes indicateda somewhatmixed
in his addressto theNorthAtlanticAssemblyon i8 November I994:
assessment
It servesa
PFP was not designedprimarily
as thevehicleforNATO's enlargement.
foranycountry
wide purpose.But it is also thebestpreparation
wishingto join the
Alliance.Insteadof goingthrough
thecomplexprocessof integration
aftertheyjoin
18
Brzezinski,Ibid.
243
JohnBorawski
thealliance,partner
countries
will do it beforehand-intheknowledgethatifthings
wentseriously
wrongin Europetomorrow,
something
I do notexpect,theycouldbe
takenintoNATO quickly.
is a complexissue,butwe are determined
Enlargement
to findanswersto themany
in the
questions
it poses.Thuswe havebegunthisweek ourfirst
informal
discussions
... Letme
Alliance,noton thewhether,
buton thehow andtheprocessofenlargement
underscore
... thatenlargement
is nota cost-free
operation.
It willmeanbeingwilling
or ableto defenda muchlargerexpanseofterritory.
We mustexpectnewmembers
to
to thinkthatit willbe
contribute
theirfairsharebut it would be whollyunrealistic
withoutconsequences
forour own defencebudgetsand forcestructures.
At the same time,however,the Secretary-General
describedthe alternativeto
enlargementas 'a dangerouslack of stabilityin Central and EasternEurope
which could entail much higher costs in the long term'. If this were true,
partnerssaid,thentheyhad everyrightto know the 'who, 'when', and 'how' of
enlargement.
Yet, accordingto FrenchPrimeMinisterEdouard Balladuron 2I
November I994: 'The aim is not to speed up the enlargementof securitybodies
suchas NATO or theWEU. Everyoneis well awarethatthesuddeninclusionof
new countriesin these alliancescould cause more instability
than stabilityon
were reportedas displeasedwiththe US effort
our continent';and UK officials
to quicken the pace of enlargement.'9
WhetherUS and Germanleadershipon
thisscore will prove successfulremainsto be seen, but it can be expectedthat
the Republican majorityin the US Congresswill assumea proactiverole. (To
what extentthiswill include financialassistanceis anotherissue.20)
At the time of writing,the latestdevelopmentsconcern the meetingof the
NATO foreignministersin Brusselson i December I994. US Secretaryof
State Warren Christopherinformedthe meeting that 'The United States
considersthePartnership
an integraland lastingpartof thenew Europe security
and thatexerciseprogrammesforI995 and beyondshouldbe put
architecture',
on a five-year
planningcycle,buildingtowardsmore complextraining
scenarios,
witha partnership
defenceplanningprocessestablishedby earlyI995.
theSecretary
ofStateuseda new formula:
Withrespectto NATO enlargement,
'An exclusionarypolicy would risk maintainingold lines of division across
'believesit
new ones.' The UnitedStates,therefore,
Europe or creatingarbitrary
is time ... to begin deliberateconsiderationof the practicalrequirementsfor
addingnew membersto the Alliance'. Views would be presentedto interested
would explainthe'practicalimplications
partners
duringI995; thesepresentations
19
20
22 November I994.
TheIndependent,
'The possibilitythatthe collective defence capabilitywill be whittledaway by default(ratherthanby
design) in order to supportthe new role of Peacekeeping Operations and the cooperation in thatrole
with thepartnersis veryreal.' Air Vice-MarshalJohnCheshire,'European defenceand security-keeping
pace with change', RUSIjournal, I39: 5, October I994. At the same time,NATO cooperation authorities
staffto deal with all the various PFP
expressedconcern thattheresimplywould not be sufficient
programmesin addition to the NACC: 'there is complete saturation',according to a not uncommon
view at the time of writing.
244
Partnership
forPeace
and obligationsofNATO membership'
butare 'not intendedto be thebeginning
ofaccessionnegotiations.
Neitherwill theyindicatethatanypartneris necessarily
a candidateforadmission.'New NATO members'mustbe marketdemocracies
committedto responsible
security
policiesand able to make a contribution
to the
Alliance'.Christopher
also statedthat'expandingWesterninstitutions
to Central
Europe will benefitRussia'. It was announcedthata NATO studygroupwould
in twelvemonths.
be established
to reportto theministers
Lightat the end of the tunnel?A Polish diplomatconcluded thatthe central
European countrieshad, despite the appearance of a new phase of NATO
deliberation,'been pushed to the dustbin.We are being cheated-this is very
Itwas reportedthattheUnitedStatessoughtcompletionofthereview
distressing.'
by springI995, but thiswas rejectedas too ambitiousby otherallies,21whereasit
was reportedthatRussia had threatened
not to concludeitsIPP withNATO on
i December I994 if a timetablefor expansionwere issued by the ministers.22
Nevertheless,
althoughtheforeignministers
agreedthat'it is prematureto discuss
thetimeframe
or
which
countrieswould be invitedto
forenlargement
particular
join the Alliance', they also statedthat 'when it occurs, enlargementwill be
decided on a case-by-casebasis and thatsome nationsmay attainmembership
beforeothers'.The onlyreferenceto criteriawas the following:
the effectiveness
of the alliance,contribute
to the
Enlargement
shouldstrengthen
of the entireEuro-Atlantic
stability
and security
area,and supportour objectiveof
an undividedEurope.
maintaining
the alliance'sabilityto
Enlargement
shouldbe carriedout in a way thatpreserves
itscorefunctions
of commondefenceas well as to undertake
perform
peacekeeping
andothernewmissions
andthatupholdstheprinciples
andobjectives
oftheWashington
was thenmadeto thePreamble].
Treaty[reference
Allnewmembers
ofNATO willbe fullmembers
ofthealliance[suggesting
thatfull
withthemilitary
structures
was expected].
integration
In response,the Russian ForeignMinisterKozyrev refusedto sign eitherthe
IPP or a bilateraldocument on Russia-NATO cooperation,claiminghe had
been 'surprised'by the decisionto studyNATO enlargement.
The way ahead
theNATO enlargement
issuedefiesanyconsensusview on thepart
Admittedly,
of the allies. The timingof the issue's emergence,coincidingas it does with
NATO's difficult
experiencesin Bosnia, is not particularly
auspicious.Indeed,
on I5 November I994 UK Defence SecretaryMalcolm Rifkindcautionedthat
thatthe new democracieswant to participatein the
althoughit is not surprising
Westernfamilyof nations,what is also requiredis an 'AtlanticCommunity'
going beyond defenceand securityto give expressionto the whole range of
2' Wall StreetJournal
Europe,30 November I994.
International
HeraldTribune,I December I994.
22
245
JohnBorawski
common interestsand to ward offan inward-lookingEuropean Union and
United States.Looking eastward,US SecretaryofDefense,WilliamPerry,on 5
FebruaryI995, proposed a standingconsultativecommissionbetween NATO
and Russia, and a charteroutliningareasforpermanentcooperation-counterproliferation,
military
technology,defencepolicytransparency,
crisismanagement
and peacekeeping.
It is too earlyto make reasonablejudgementsabout the costsinvolved,and
The decisionwill not be made by
about timetablesand criteriaforenlargement.
of
technicalguidelines,but in capitalson political
committeeson the basis
grounds.All we know is thatthe US Presidenthas declaredthe enlargement
issueto be a questionnot ofwhetherbut ofwhen and how. The taskahead is to
determinewhetherall sixteenalliessharethatview sufficiently
to takedecisions
on at least the 'how', which presumablysuggestsa differentiated
approach
towardsthelikely'who'.
246