Trustees of Princeton University
Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States
Author(s): Robert G. Moser
Reviewed work(s):
Source: World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Apr., 1999), pp. 359-384
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SYSTEMS AND THE
ELECTORAL
NUMBER OF PARTIES
IN POSTCOMMUNIST
STATES
By ROBERT G.MOSER*
REND Lijphart concluded his book on electoral systems in con
solidated
A
democracies
with
note on new democracies:
the following
a first electoral system has to be chosen which will
When
hopefully guide the
new democracy s elections for a
long time (or, in the case of a redemocratizing
country, a new system thatwill hopefully work better than the old one), it is im
portant to examine all of the options aswell as their advantages and disadvan
to the extent
tages-Therefore,
democracies
twenty-seven
to electoral
offer
engineers
old democracies.1
will
that
have
this
some
in the new
study
practical
democracies
of
seventy
electoral
it may
utility,
than in these
have
systems
more
in
to
twenty-seven
in this statement
is an assumption
that the effects of elec
Implicit
toral systems are more or less universal
and will therefore hold in new
as well as old. Based on a rational choice
democracies
of
understanding
the behavior
essence
of voters
the influence of electoral
systems
in
for
the shape of party systems
powerful
explanation
democracies.
of
decades
the
After
testing,
empirical
of the major hypotheses
made famous by Maurice
Duverger?
has provided
consolidated
and candidates,
a
that single-member
elections
tend to constrain
the
plurality
a
to a much greater ex
of significant
in
parties operating
polity
tent than multimember
(PR) systems?has
proportional
representation
as
remained
intact.2
democratization
has swept
Thus,
remarkably
namely,
number
*
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Sci
ence Association,
D. C, August 28-31,1997.1
would
like to thank Joel Ostrow, Frank
Washington,
and four anonymous
reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Iwould
Thames,
also like to acknowledge
research support provided by the University
of Texas at Austin
and an IREX
Short-term Travel Grant used for fieldwork
in Russia.
1
Arend
Democracies,
Lijphart, Electoral
Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven
1945-1990
2
Maurice
(Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994), 151-52.
in theModern State (New York
and Activity
Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization
1963); Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 2d ed., (New Haven: Yale
Wiley,
H. Riker, "Duverger's Law Revisited,"
in Bernard Grofman
and
Press, 1971); William
University
Arend Lijphart,
eds., Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences
(New York: Agathon,
1986);
in Bernard
Giovanni
Sartori, "The Influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Method?"
WorldPolitics 51 (April 1999), 359-84
This content downloaded on Tue, 8 Jan 2013 08:59:23 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
360
WORLD POLITICS
southern Europe,
Latin America,
and now the former com
through
states of east central
munist
it has been quite nat
and
Eurasia,
Europe
ural for politicians
and political
to new democracies
knowledge
tablish a new electoral
law.3
to be seen, however,
of electoral
systems, based
It remains
effect
Western
will
democracies,
to apply this body of
scientists
the momentous
making
to es
decision
whether
the hypotheses
the
regarding
on
for the most part
the experience
of
new democracies,
in
hold
actually
particu
larly in the very different social and political context of postcommunist
states. The
of Russia, Ukraine,
and Poland
(Senate elec
experiences
can
shown
that
and
elections
tions)
plurality
majoritarian
produce
s
of
that
the
reach
very fragmented
party systems,
suggesting
Duverger
laws may be limited.4 Such findings
have important
practical
implica
have
new
as
to survive.
also
struggle
They
new institutionalism,
for
which
important
implications
a
seeks to grant institutions
effect that is to some extent inde
political
of their social and political
environments.
pendent
tions
for these
have
democracies
This
article
examines
the effect
in five
(SMD) elections
postcommunist
in the
electoral
systems
postcommunist
some
of those
the standard
states
district
single-member
to ascertain
the effects of
context.
states, most notably Poland
pattern of party consolidation
It will
be shown
that
and Hungary,
have followed
over time in reaction to in
of electoral
have
Ukraine,
cases can be attributed
Cox,
of PR and
and
others, most
systems, while
notably Russia
not. The different
in
effects of electoral
these
systems
centives
found
they
theoretical
to different
levels
states.
in postcommunist
Building
I argue that the constraining
effects
of party institutionalization
on the work
of Sartori and
of electoral
systems
on
the
number of parties will be mitigated by the institutionalization of the
party
system.5
Institutionalization
is defined as
a process bywhich a
practice or organization becomes well established and widely
known,
if not
universally
accepted.
Actors
develop
expectations,
orientation,
and
and Arend Lijphart, eds., Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon,
Grofman
and Matthew
S. Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants
1986); Rein Taagepera
ofElec
toral Systems (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1989); Lijphart (fn. 1).
3
for New Democracies,"
Choices
See, in particular, Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional
Journal ofDe
mocracy 2 (Wmtex 1991).
4
to
"From Solidarity
3 (April 1992);
Journal ofDemocracy
Jasiewicz,
Krzysztof
Fragmentation,"
Robert G. Moser, The Impact of Parliamentary
Electoral
Systems in Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs 13,
no. 3 (1997); Marko
inMarch-April
Elections
1994," Europe
Parliamentary
Bojcun, "The Ukrainian
Asia Studies 47, no. 2 (1995).
5
Votes Count (Cambridge: Cambridge
See Sartori (fn. 2); and Gary W. Cox, Making
University
Press, 1997).
This content downloaded on Tue, 8 Jan 2013 08:59:23 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES
361
behavior based on the premise that this practice or organization will prevail into
the foreseeable future. In politics, institutionalization means that political actors
have
Weak
clear
and
stable
about
expectations
institutionalization
of party
electoral
and majoritarian
plurality
ductive effects in postcommunist
of strategic voting
cases studied here
the behavior
of other
actors.6
can
the failure of
explain
re
to
have
their
systems
expected
states. Moreover,
in the level
variance
over time among
the postcommunist
and learning
can be attributed
systems
to a
level of party institu
country's
states
increased
postcommunist
strategic
showing
over time are those with
most
the
institutionalized
party systems
voting
no
to elec
in the
those that exhibited
region, while
signs of adaptation
tionalization.
Those
constraints
have weaker
party systems.
toral-system
low party institutionalization
of some postcommunist
that PR systems with
may
suggests
legal thresholds
constraint
tions.
Finally,
states,
given the
this study
a
greater
provide
of parties than single-member
district elec
the status of political
them with
parties by providing
on the number
PR elevates
a
over nomination
monopoly
district elections.
procedures
not
found
in single-member
the failure of electoral
effects
systems to have their predicted
Perhaps
not
in new, unconsolidated
democracies
should
be surprising.
Sartori
has argued that strong electoral
(for
systems
example, plurality
systems)
do not have their expected
reductive
effects on the number of national
parties
in countries
with
unstructured
that strategic voting
in all
approximated
political
argued
party
certain
requires
contexts.8
This
systems.7 Similarly, Cox has
conditions
that may not be
article builds on these hy
support from postcommunist
potheses
by providing
empirical
in Latin America,
The
least institutionalized
party systems
states.9
such
as
6
Scott Mainwaring,
in the Third Wave
of Democratization:
"Rethinking Party Systems Theory
of the
Importance of Party System Institutionalization"
(Paper presented at the annual meeting
D. C., August 28-31,1997),
American
Political Science Association, Washington,
p. 7.Mainwaring
is the key variable distinguishing
argues that party institutionalization
party systems in established
The
Western
democracies
and party systems in democratizing
states, and he explains much of the variance
states.
to his measures of
in democratic performance within the broad class of democratizing
According
institutionalization?which
control over candidate nomi
emphasize continuity of party organizations,
nations, and the volatility of electoral support of parties?party
systems in Eastern Europe and the
are among the least institutionalized
former Soviet Union
of the late democratizers.
See also Samuel
Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968), 12.
Huntington,
7
Sartori, (fn. 2), 62.
8
Cox (fn. 5).
9
is important because scholars have not identified many empirical cases that do not fulfill
This
Cox's necessary conditions
for strategic behavior. Cox's primary example of a country with a weakly
institutionalized
party system defying the expected effects of a plurality electoral system is Papua New
on the Indian
a
Guinea.
See Cox (fn. 5), 85. Sartori concentrated
multiparty
example which produced
and a dominant party
system in the electoral realm, but the expected high levels of disproportionality
were
translated into seats. See Sartori (fn. 2), 55-56.
system after votes
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
WORLD POLITICS
362
have
tended
tionalization,
thus
Brazil,
to
PR electoral
systems that foster party frac
to the debate over the con
challenge
The
majoritarian
weakly
systems.10
adopt
no
providing
effects
of PR and
straining
institutionalized
party systems of postcommunist
cases in which
and majoritarian
electoral
plurality
states present a set of
are used (in
systems
a
system), providing
unique
and
the re
strategic voting
or as
a
electoral
part of mixed
to test
opportunity
hypotheses
regarding
ductive effects of these systems.
dependently
Duverger's
Law and Its Limits
originally formulated three laws of the effects of electoral
Duverger
systems:
representation tends to lead to the formation of many inde
(2) the two-ballot majority system tends to lead to the for
pendent parties,...
mation of many parties that are allied with each other,...
and (3) the plurality
(1) Proportional
rule
final
The
to
tends
a
produce
two-party
law, Duverger
system.11
claimed,
was
to a
"the closest
sociological
law."12
Subsequent
studies
have
better
specified
the causal
nature
of these
correlations both empirically and theoretically. District magnitude
number
of representatives
elected
from
was
each district)
found
(the
to be
the decisive influence on disproportionality andmultipartism. Low dis
trict magnitudes,
particularly
single-member
districts,
have
a
powerful
constraining effect on the number of parties and produce high levels of
to seats.
district
High
cause a
not
of
do
(but
greater proliferation
parties
of parties)
and produce
lower levels of disproportional
multiplication
of
effect
electoral
The
systems was found to reside
constraining
ity.13
disproportionality
allow
magnitudes
in the translation
from votes
a
at the district
level.14 Fi
level rather than at the national
directly
was
to
not
interact
the
the
electoral
found
with,
override,
system
nally,
to
structure
in society.15 The major modifications
Duverger's
cleavage
most
laws arise from
these findings.
10
in Comparative
Scott Mainwaring,
"Brazilian Party Underdevelopment
no. 134 (Notre Dame:
stitute Working
of Notre Dame,
Paper,
University
11
Maurice Duverger,
"Duverger's Law: Forty Years Later," inGrofman
12
Ibid., 69.
13
and Shugart (fn. 2); Lijphart (fn. 1).
14Taagepera
Sartori (fn. 2), 54-55.
15
District
and Olga Shvetsova, "Ethnic Heterogeneity,
Peter Ordeshook
ber of Parties," American Journal ofPolitical Science, 38 (1994); Cox (fn. 5),
This content downloaded on Tue, 8 Jan 2013 08:59:23 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Perspective,
1990).
and Lijphart
Magnitude,
203-21.
"
Kellogg
In
(fn. 2), 70.
and the Num
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES
363
at the district
that electoral-system
effects are manifested
to the correlation
level has been used to accommodate
be
exceptions
tween
at
the
For
and
national
level.
systems
systems
two-party
plurality
fact
The
retained three or four significant
par
example, Rae argued that Canada
a
ties
electoral
because
of
the
existence
of
geo
system
plurality
despite
in Canada
concentrated
minority
graphically
parties. Minority
parties
one of the
some dis
major parties in
supplanted
a
re
tricts while
third parties nationally.16
revision
Such
remaining
on the number
tained the plurality
of parties
system's causal influence
at the
elections
still produced
because plurality
two-party
competition
district
level. With
concentrated
minority
parties, how
geographically
survived
ever,
because
the same
district,
they
two
resulting
were
parties
in
not
multipartism
in every
always the major players
at the national
level.
Cox has contributed greatly to this debate by explicating the condi
tions under which
strategic
takes place. Using
voting
a rational
choice
model, he argues that strategic voting (and by implication strategic
that involve
entry and departure
by elites) requires certain conditions
time horizons,
and the availability
actors' motivations,
of
preferences,
accurate
information.
Cox
has
that
Thus,
argued
single-member
plu
to reduce the vote for minor
if one or
rality elections may fail
parties
more
of the following
conditions
arise:
(1) The presence of voters who are not short-term instrumentally rational; (2)
lack of public information about voter preferences and vote intentions (hence
about which candidates are likely to be "out of the running"); (3) public belief
that a particular candidate will win with certainty; or (4) the presence of many
voters who care intensely about their first choice and are nearly indifferent be
tween
Even
date
their
and
second
if conditions
lower
choices.17
are favorable
races at the district
for the establishment
level, the projection
of two-candi
of this bipartism
to the na
tional level is not assured. Rather it depends on the ability of parties to
unite
in single nationwide
If this
party organizations.
two candidates
in
the
elections
accomplished
produced
plurality
across
at the district
to a multitude
level may belong
of different
parties
prominent
elites
is not
the country. Cox cites institutional
the direct elec
forces, most notably
as
tion of a powerful
for
the na
national
executive,
primary
pushing
to
tionalization
of parties that is essential
of Duverger's
the realization
third
law at the national
tionalization,
16
Rae
17
Cox
however,
level. In the absence
the existence
of a general
of nationwide
(fn. 2), 95.
(fn. 5), 79.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
theory of
remains
parties
na
a
364
WORLD
necessary
POLITICS
condition
only for the constraining
to be felt at the national
level.18
effect
of plurality
electoral
systems
of these preconditions
The presence
for
to the national
of
local
projection
bipartism
tionable
communist
initial
during
states with
electoral
previous
may
voters
deny
and the
strategic behavior
level are particularly
ques
elections
in new democracies,
in post
especially
little or no democratic
tradition. The absence of
experience
and elites
and accurate
information
alone
polling
to
information
behave
necessary
the
strategically.
Most
importantly, the lack of well-established
the ability of voters
serve as the
primary mechanism
dermines
ion, while
electoral
and elites
to channel
are a
systems
to behave
secondary
political parties un
Parties
strategically.
and aggregate
public opin
mechanism
the
influencing
number of viable political parties.19 If significant political parties do not
or
political
nor
In weak
of public opinion.
represent
ganizations
large segments
no
voters
the
absence
of
identification
leaves
with
party systems,
party
of
characteristics
candidates
and patron
cues, other than the personal
exist
cannot
they
age, as to how
aggregate
elites
political
to cast their votes. Due
in the most
unstable
organizations
enter and leave the scene
ally
into nationwide
to the
nature of party
transitory
democracies,
parties continu
in tandem with
the political
clout
new
(usually
no
and provide
between
electoral
continuity
periods.
voters to cultivate
Such
little
for
lasting
opportunity
provide
most
For
for one party or another,
uncommitted.
leaving
preferences
in Russia
survey research has put the number of independent
example,
a party identification
at 78 percent,
voters without
13
compared with
of their
leader)
conditions
percent for theUnited States and 8 percent forGreat Britain.20 It is dif
to the
ficult, then, for us to attribute voting preferences
ers in unconsolidated
in the same way we
democracies
to voters in consolidated
with
democracies
preferences
concrete
party systems. Without
strategic
preferences,
cess based
If one
essary
of vot
majority
attribute
voting
institutionalized
voting
as a pro
seems very
on a rank
unlikely.
ordering of preferences
the conditions
consolidated
democracies,
only
nec
examines
for strategic
voting
are
usually
approximated.
Exceptions
are few
and easily accommodated through special conditions for geographically
parties. This
in
the
larly
postcommunist
concentrated
18
Ibid., 182-93.
19
See Sartori (fn. 2), 55-56.
20
Richard Rose,
Steven White,
is not
world
the case for new democracies,
particu
where parties are not well-developed
and IanMcAllister,
How
Russia
Votes (New York: Chatham
1997), 135.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
House,
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES
and voters
It would
systems.
cannot
and elites
easily respond
a mistake
to assume
be
to incentives
that
365
from
electoral
institutional
effects
found in established democracies will be replicated in the very differ
ent social
of new democracies
context
in eastern
Europe
Mdced Electoral
Reconceptualizing
and Eurasia.
Systems
states reflect the influence
of postcommunist
of
some
sort
states
the German
of
mixed
electoral
system. Many
employ
PR contests
in both
in
elected
system with
representatives
party-list
or two-round
districts
and
multimember
large
plurality
majoritarian
The
electoral
systems
in
districts. No exclusively
systems
single-member
plurality
in single-round,
all representatives
district
races,
single-member
certain obstacles
in testing theo
and this
for those interested
produces
states.
ries of electoral
in postcommunist
systems
Mixed
electoral
of electoral
the
systems complicate
categorization
elections
elect
and the analysis
of effects. Most
scholars have thought
of a
systems
as
a
PR
to
mixed
electoral
modified
form of
curb the
system
designed
a
accurate
for
is
Such
party proliferation.21
potential
quite
conception
seats
for those mixed
that
utilize
that
interlock
systems
compensatory
the two halves
of the electoral
system
does. Another
into one, as the German
used in Russia
and Croatia,
system,
type of mixed
seats. Rather,
it calculates
ever, does not use compensatory
the two portions
of the system
and
allows
parties
separately
seats won
other
tier.
in each
Shugart
half
of the
of the
system
how
the vote
to
results
of
keep all
of the
system
regardless
has argued that such a system is actually a modified
to
Since there is no mechanism
the PR tier
prioritize
assumes
that the effects of the plurality por
tier, he
system.
plurality
over the
plurality
tion of the system will
override
the more
feeble
PR tier.22
levels of mul
systems also tend to produce moderate
as
have intended.
In practice,
tipartism and disproportionality
designers
reason
such results are laudatory
and are a major
the
system has
why
Mixed
electoral
been
replicated
electoral
systems,
tween
most
so
widely
however,
in east
add
and Eurasia. Mixed
Europe
to the dichotomous
debate be
central
little
PR and
has shown that the
systems. Western
plurality
scholarship
on
is
effect
of
electoral
the
number
of parties
systems
powerful
the constraining
21
22Lijphart
Matthew
effect
of single-member
plurality
systems.
Taken
at
(fn. 1), 39-46.
Shugart, "Building the Institutional Framework: Electoral Systems, Party Systems, and
no. 2.26
and European
Presidents," Working
Studies, 1994),
Paper,
(Berkeley: Center for German
10-15.
This content downloaded on Tue, 8 Jan 2013 08:59:23 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
366
WORLD POLITICS
face value,
the electoral
of east central
systems
Europe
and Eurasia
do
not offer any persuasive cases to test this hypothesis. The high levels of
states can be attributed
to
party fractionalization
usually found in these
structure and an in
the combination
of a fractionalized
social cleavage
state
that no postcommunist
system. Given
strong electoral
sufficiently
the strongest
exclusively
system?single-member
employs
plurality
can not test whether
a
elections?one
electoral
system would
plurality
have
been
able
to curb
the party
fractionalization
in many
found
such
states.
Mixed
electoral
also offer certain opportunities
for
systems, however,
a
one
can
treat
the comparison
of electoral
I
that
mixed
argue
systems.
electoral
system that employs
separate votes for each tier of the system
as its name
a mixture
of two separate
electoral
exactly
implies?as
a
side
side.
Such
arrangements
by
operating
conceptualization
provides
or PR tiers
a
to
the
of
effects
separate
study
plurality
unique opportunity
of a mixed
variables
nomic
system while
holding
such as culture,
social
constant
other
and
cleavages,
intervening
possible
the level of socioeco
development.
This
conceptualization
of mixed
electoral
systems
follows
the
method of controlled comparison, which studies "cases that differ with
regard
to the variables
one wants
to
investigate,
but
similar with
regard
to all other important variables thatmay affect the dependent variables;
can then be treated as control vari
variables
these other
important
a
ables."23 Although
tool, cases that are simi
powerful methodological
are
in certain
variables
lar except
very hard to find. This
independent
studied the interre
has been used effectively
method
by Putnam, who
in Italy,
institutions
and social environment
political
lationship between
over
time
in
electoral
examined
and by Lijphart, who
systems
changes
a
that when
countries.24
within
individual
country
argued
Lijphart
its
electoral
system "many potentially
explanatory
important
changes
can be controlled
in the sense that they can be assumed not to
variables
the same country, the same political
differ or to differ only marginally:
elec
combination
the same voters, and so on."25 The
by mixed
parties,
and
electoral
toral systems of dichotomous
(PR
systems
plurality/ma
joritarian)
in a single
social
environment
contributes
a
significant
dimension of comparability not found in Lijphart's study.Despite
theoretical
malleability,
electoral
systems
are resilient
23
(fn. 1), 78.
24Lijphart
Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work' Civic Traditions
Press, 1993); Lijphart (fn. 1).
University
25
Lijphart (fn. 1), 78.
inModern
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
institutions.
Italy
(Princeton:
their
All
Princeton
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES
the same broad categories
changes within
the class of PR systems. Mixed
elec
systems, mostly within
to
the
the
diametri
compare
systems provide
unique opportunity
of Lijphart's
of electoral
toral
cases
367
involved
cally opposed categories of PR and plurality elections upon which the
debate
over electoral
systems has been based.
to mixed
electoral
systems
is not without
approach
precedent.
some scholars have
test for
the PR and
strategic voting,
compared
to one another.
mixed
tiers of Germany's
electoral
system
plurality
and
Cox
have
all
used
the
mixed
electoral
Fisher, Jesse, Bawn,
system of
to show the greater level of
in
West
the plu
strategic voting
Germany
This
To
rality tier than in the PR tier. Such analyses have consistently found that
inWest
received more votes
large parties
Germany
than in the PR tier and vice versa for smaller parties,
in the
tier
plurality
as the
vot
strategic
ing hypothesis would predict.26 By showing that voters behave differ
tiers of a mixed
such studies bolster
the
system,
ently in the separate
case for
tiers
of
the
mixed
electoral
different
systems separately
treating
as
as a vote is cast in each tier.
long
of different
tiers of mixed
controlled
electoral
The
sys
comparison
is not without
tems, however,
problems. The greatest problem
potential
cross
is cross-contamination
the two cases compared. Unlike
between
across time, the electoral
systems
analysis
Lijphart's
test are not
in
of one another. They
this
being compared
independent
form two halves of one electoral
system for the same legislative body in
same
matter
the two halves of the
the
election. No
how independently
into two sys
of mixed
electoral
the separation
system operate,
systems
two tiers of
tems for the purpose
remains artificial. The
of comparison
one another
some extent.
a mixed
to
will
electoral
affect
system
surely
For example,
that run in the PR tier of the election have
small parties
national
analysis
or
costs
of electoral
and could be
competition
as well with
districts
in
the
single-member
expected
in terms of seats. Or, one or two large parties
little regard to payoffs
the
dominate
races, having coattail effects
may
single-member
plurality
the ef
that produce greater vote shares in the PR contest. Consequendy,
a
PR
fective number of parties
half of mixed
in the
system may tend to
already
assumed
the entry
to run candidates
be lower than if the system had a strictly PR electoral system.
26
Vote Thesis," Comparative Politics 5, no. 2 (1974); Eckhard Jesse,
Steven Fisher, "The Wasted
of the Federal Elections from 1953 to
in the Federal Republic of Germany: An Analysis
"Split-voting
1987," Electoral Studies 7, no. 2 (1988); Kathleen Bawn, "The Logic of Institutional Preferences: Ger
no. 4 (1993); Cox
man Electoral as a Social Choice Outcome," American Journal
of Political Science 37,
(fh. 5), 82-83; Samuel H. Barnes, Frank Grace, James K. Pollack, and Peter W. Sperlich, "The German
1962).
Party System and the 1961 Federal Election," American Political Science Review 56 (December
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368
WORLD
POLITICS
to
in
important
keep the danger of cross-contamination
it does not ruin this experiment.
Incentives
for strategic
mind,
entry
in the single-member
tier may be
and withdrawal
district
by elites
While
weakened
it is
the costs
because
voting,
Strategic
West
Germany.
and payoffs
should remain
however,
Rational
voters
will
are
of competition
changed.
intact as shown in studies of
still have
incentives
to abandon
small parties in the plurality tier in favor of large parties with a better
chance
of winning.
district
elections
in favor
ality
time
the mechanical
effects of single-member
Moreover,
should remain intact producing
greater disproportion
PR tier. Over
than in the corresponding
of large parties
should produce
strategic behavior
in the translation
of votes into seats.
such mechanical
ties who
are
effects
punished
The Effects
of pr Systems
Do
electoral
systems
states and consolidated
affect
in Postcommunist
by par
States
in
of parties
postcommunist
answer this
To
similarly?
question,
the number
democracies
states will be examined. Three
in five postcommunist
electoral
systems
a mixed
electoral
and Lithuania,
of these, Russia, Hungary,
sys
employ
tem of various combinations
elected
of PR and plurality or majoritarian
as
two tiers of these systems will be
seats. The
individually
analyzed
separate
scribed
Poland
These
and
de
method
controlled-comparison
with
electoral
systems,
single-tier
also be studied.
the
systems
following
countries
above.27 Two
and Ukraine,
cases were
single-member
of varying
will
selected
district
levels
examples
to
of PR
roughly
equal coverage
provide
cases
The
also
electoral
systems.
provide
of party
institutionalization.
Poland
and
Hungary have the highest level of party institutionalization. Parties mo
nopolize
the nomination
ginal phenomena. While
process
making
independents
rare and mar
there is significant volatility in popular support
or
to election,
tenden
ideological
major parties
and Ukraine
the
time.28 Russia
oppo
represent
site end of the spectrum. Parties do not control the nomination
process
in single-member
the field of candidates
dominate
and independents
for parties from election
cies have survived over
27
data was not available for the single
In the case of the 1992 Lithuanian
elections, district-level
PR tier of the 1992 Lithuanian
election was included in the
district tier. Therefore,
only the
member
study.
28
inHungarian
Six major parties have remained dominant
politics since the end of communist rule.
has argued that the political system
the party system in Poland has been more fluid, Tworzecki
While
is actually more consolidated
around a small number of political tendencies. Hubert Tworzecki, Parties
of
Poland (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
and Politics in Post-1989
Press, 1996). The recent consolidation
reformist forces into the AWS would tend to support this assessment.
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ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES
district
elections.
and long-lasting
resents a middle
cases. Like
369
are fluid, and voters tend not to have a
strong
a
with
identification
Lithuania
rep
particular
party.29
the east European
and former Soviet
ground between
Parties
to monopo
and Hungary,
Lithuanian
parties tend
in
lize nominations
but are not as stable or firmly grounded
society.30
on the electoral
1
Table
basic
information
systems of the
provides
five
Poland
countries
cases
Each
individual
election
for which
data were
as an individual
case.
sys
By separating mixed
PR and
tiers, fifteen
component
plurality/majoritarian
result: nine PR elections
and six elections
conducted
under a plu
available will
tems
analyzed.
be treated
into
their
measures
common
to the electoral
system.31 Two
majoritarian
to
examine
will
be
these
the effective
literature
used
systems:
systems
number of parties and the
index of
The
least-squares
disproportionality.
a
measure
of parties provides
effective
number
of party system frac
rality
or
tionalization
seats
The
by counting
by their
parties weighted
so that very small
not count as much
do
parties
shares
as
of votes
or
large parties.32
level of disproportionality produced by an electoral system is the
deviation
between
tion
the proportion
of seats
and the proportion
to cross-national
cording
studies
in an elec
party receives
in
the
gets
legislature. Ac
to be
tends
highest
disproportionality
of votes
a
it actually
in plurality
more
parties
small parties
and reward large
systems, which
penalize
than multimember
district PR systems. Like the effective
index of
the least-squares
measure,
number-of-parties
disproportional
29
is perhaps best captured by the unusually high level of split-ticket voting in
This characteristic
Russia. In 1993, 70 percent of voters planned to split their votes in the PR and plurality tiers, voting for
different parties or for a party and an independent candidate in the two halves of the election. Only 19
(fn. 20), 139-40.
Rose, and McAllister
percent planned to vote a straight party ticket. White,
30
Kitschelt provides an index of the chances of program-based
party formation for postcommunist
to the classification
of the cases in
of the level of party institutionalization
states, which
corresponds
s scale
this study. Using Kitschelt
and Poland have the highest scores at 5.5 and 5.0 respec
Hungary
are
lower at 3.5 to 5.0. Russia, Ukraine,
and other Soviet republics
tively. The Baltic states
marginally
in Postcommunist
have a much lower score of 0.5. Herbert Kitschelt,
"Formation of Party Cleavages
no. 4 (1995), 457. Moreover,
Evans andWhitefield
Democracies,"
argue for a similar
Party Politics 1,
classification
of postcommunist
states' potential for the development
of stable party systems, with east
central Europe (Poland, Hungary,
the greatest potential for stable
and the Czech Republic) possessing
and other Soviet successor states
followed by the Baltic states with Russia, Ukraine,
party development
of stable party systems. Geoffrey Evans and Stephen
having much lower chances for the establishment
in Eastern Europe," British Journal of Politi
the Bases of Party Competition
Whitefield,
"Identifying
cal Science 23, no. 4 (1993).
31
a vote is cast are
seats in
compensatory
Only tiers in which
analyzed here. Therefore,
Hungary
and Poland calculated on the basis of previous votes are not included.
32
The effective number of parties index is calculated by squaring the proportion of the vote or seat
shares of each party, adding
these together,
See Lijphart
andTaagepera
1 by this total:
then dividing
Nv=l/X(Vl2)orN=l/Z(Si2)
(fn. 1), 67-72;
and Shugart
(fn. 2), 77-81,104-5.
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WORLD POLITICS
370
TABLE1
Country
Russia
Hungary
in Five Post-Communist
Systems
Electoral
Electoral
PRTier
System
Plurality/Majoritarian Tier
225 seats elected by
225 seats elected in one
nationwide district with
5% legal threshold
mixed
same
Lithuania
70
mixed
seats
rules
second
single-member
top three go
round
plus
to
any
in one
71
of first-round
seats
elected
vote
under
nationwide district with
two-round
4%(1992)and5%(1996)
in single-member
two go
districts;
top
round
second
391 seats elected in 37
multimember districts;
PR
under
candidate with 15% or
more
legal threshold
Poland
elected
majoritarian
in
districts;
thresholds
elected
seats
176
two-round
in one nationwide district
with
single-member
districts
seats elected
compensatory
in
plurality
152 seats elected in 20
multimember districts
with 4% (1990) and 5%
(1994) legal threshold; 58
mixed
States
majoritarian
rules
to
none
seats
69 compensatory
elected
in one nationwide
district; no legal threshold
(1991),5%(1993)
Ukraine
450 seats elected under
none
majoritarian
two-round
majoritarian
in single-member
districts;
top two go to
rules
second
SOURCE: Cox
v 1993
godu
round
(fh. 5), 50-54; Bojcun (fn. 4); "Polozhenie o vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoy
dumy
in 1993), Rossiiskie vesti, October
for elections of deputies of the State Duma
(Provisions
12,1993.
ity weights
tions have
the deviations
less effect
than
between
seats and votes
so that small devia
large ones.33
33
share differ
is calculated by squaring the vote-seat
index of disproportionality
The least-squared
ences and adding them together; this total is divided by 2; and then the square root of this value is
taken:
LSq
For discussion
of these two measures
see
=
SqRtofl/2*I(vrs.)2
Lijphart
(fn. 1), 67-72;
and Taagepera
77-81,104-5.
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and Shugart
(fn. 2),
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES
2
Table
for Proportional
Effects
Representation
Effective # of
Electoral
Legal
Case
371
Tier/Election
Effective # of
Least-Squares
Index of
Disproportionality
Parliamentary
Threshold
Parties (N )
Parties (N)
5%
5%
7.58
10.68
12.50
6.40
4.94
20.56
Russia 1993
Russia 1995
Poland 1991
Poland 1993
Poland 1997
Lithuania 1992
Lithuania 1996
Hungary 1990
Hungary 1994
5%
4.59
3.32
10.87
3.86
2.95
4%
4.10
2.86
5%
7.94
3.16
17.81
10.63
7.55
16.34
4%
6.71
4.31
9.34
5%
5.49
3.73
8.53
none
5%
9.80
6.11
Cox (fn. 5), 159. Poland: Frances Millard,
ed.,
"Poland," in Bogdan
Szajkowski,
ofEastern Europe, Russia and the Successor States (Essex, U.K.: Longman Group, 1994),
313-42. Hungary:
Benoit
Lars Johannsen,
and Anette Pedersen,
(fn. 40). Lithuania: Ole Norgaard,
of Multi-Party
"The Baltic Republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: The Development
Systems," in
SOURCE: Russia:
Political Parties
ed., Political Parties
60; Lithuanian
Szajkowski,
Bogdan
1994),
Longman Group,
online at http://rc.lrs.lt/rinkimai/seim96.
Table
nist
2 shows
states. The
tern
and the Successor States (Essex, U.K.:
ofEos
Europe, Russia
Seimo rinkimo
'96," dataset,
Seim, "Lietuvos Respublikos
of PR systems
striking characteristic
the effects
most
the number
which
postcommu
of all the states is the level
party proliferation is expected in PR
of party fractionalization. While
elections,
states
outstrips
fective number
in the selected
of significant
found in
anything
parties
developed
for the cases
parties
of elective
in
postcommunist
The average ef
studied here is 7.71,
operating
countries.
is higher than all electoral systems in consolidated democracies
except Belgium
and nearly
twice
the average
for consolidated
democra
cies using PR (D'hondt method).34 It is also higher than inmost new
democracies with the exception of Ecuador and Brazil, both of which
have
ten effective
around
the high
Clearly,
in part to
fragmented
parties.35
states is due
in postcommunist
of parties
structures. However,
the high
and fluid cleavage
number
level of disproportionality
used
in every
electoral
case but one)
produced by legal thresholds (which were
suggests
an absence
of strategic
behavior
in
those cases with the highest level of disproportionality. The average
level of disproportionality produced by PR systemswas 11.31 (11.96 ex
more than
cluding Poland 1991, which had no legal barrier). That is
34
Lijphart (fn. 1), 96,160-61.
35
Cox (fn. 5), 309-11.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
372
twice
dated
WORLD
the average
democracies
POLITICS
level of disproportionality
than
and is also higher
in consoli
for PR systems
the average of majoritarian
systems.36
to
According
proportionality,
and Shugart's Law of Conservation
of Dis
Taagepera
the number of parties and hence the level of
dispropor
tionality produced by a systemwill be underestimated by the actual vote
shares
make
to real voter
because voters and elites
(as opposed
preferences)
decisions
the vote even
strategic
favoring
larger parties before
takes place.37 Thus,
parties
postcommunist
ticipated the disproportionality
and voters
should
have
an
that would be produced by the legal
threshold
toward larger parties capable of
imposed and have gravitated
the
threshold.
Then
there
would
have been fewer electoral
overcoming
on sure losers, and
votes would
have been wasted
parties, fewer
dispro
would
have been lower. This process
should increase over
portionality
time as voters and elites learn the rules and adapt to the incentives
of
the system.
Among
varied ways.
our cases
Poland
this phenomenon
seemed to occur in significantly
to the
the
strongest evidence of adaptation
provides
incentives of a legal threshold and learning over time. Poland had the
party proliferation
was
legal threshold. There
highest
there was no
among our cases in 1991 when
limited
consolidation
and
very high dis
very
proportionality in 1993 when a 5 percent legal threshold was first in
an absence of
troduced,
strategic behavior. But in 1997 elites
suggesting
to learn from the
effect of the 5 percent
seemed
devastating
legal
on small
in broad electoral
and
consolidated
threshold
parties,
they
blocs
the effective
cutting
number
of electoral
parties
in half. As
a con
sequence, the level of disproportionality dropped significantly because
there were
A smaller
small parties
left without
representation.
over
in the effective
number of parties and disproportionality
decrease
time in Hungary
also shows support for the learning of strategic be
havior
both
fewer
over
countries
time.
Russia
the number
and Lithuania
of parties
show an opposite
in the PR tier increased
trend.
In
substan
tially from the first to the second election raising disproportionality
exponentially.
accounts
What
in the learning of strategic behav
for this difference
our
ior among
cases? Party fragmentation
does not seem to be the cul
on the one hand, had the most fractionalized
party system
prit. Poland,
in its first election, yet it displayed the greatest amount of adaptation to
36
(fn. 1), 96.
37Lijphart
and Shugart
Taagepera
(fn. 2), 123; Lijphart
(fn. 1), 97; Cox
(fn. 5), 173-78.
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ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES
over
constraints
electoral-system
time. Hungary
373
a
also has
relatively
high degree of party fractionalization but a low degree of dispropor
tionality. On the other hand, Lithuania had the lowest degree of party
fragmentation in 1992 but almost doubled the number of significant
electoral
parties
at the next
election
threshold from 4 to 5 percent.
an increase
despite
in the
legal
I argue that the difference
in learning over time is caused
by the de
most
of
institutionalization.
has
the
stable
gree
party
party
Hungary
same six
in this
It is dominated
system
sample.
by the
major parties
that have consistently crossed the legal threshold and left little room for
tumul
party system has been much more
marginal
parties. Poland's
but
Tworzecki
that
underneath
has
its
fluid
tuous;
surface, Pol
argued
ish society is divided
and is evolving
along several dominant
cleavages
a
toward
is different
structure similar toWestern
cleavage
in countries
of the former Soviet
tion of the Baltic
these
countries
or even
statehood
governance
independent
is
Politics
and
century.
polarized,
parties with
political
social constituencies
have been slow to emerge.
In Russia
with
experience
in the twentieth
identifiable
the most
republics,
democratic
situation
Europe.38 The
Union. With
the excep
recent
have no significant
the extreme
ends of the political
occupy
parties
a small
of
dedicated
followers.
This
leaves
spectrum
minority
a broad and
center that encompasses
voters
the
of
amorphous
majority
a multitude
a lesser ex
and is represented
of
minor
fluid,
by
parties. To
saw the former communist
which
tent, the same is true for Lithuania,
a
return
to
in
1992
with
of seats, only to be re
power
party
majority
developed
and have
of the right at the next elec
over time. Under
of the center increasing
such
voters
to defect from
the
conditions
incentives
ignore
marginal
parties
no clear
because
for a major party representing
ei
they have
preference
placed by the Lithuanian
tion, with minor
parties
Conservatives
ther end of the political spectrum. Moreover,
which
parties
in most
This
are viable
or "out of the
running"
are the "undecideds."39
opinion
polls
is not to say that voters
and elites
it is difficult to decide
since
in Soviet
the largest group
successor
never respond to the incentives of legal thresholds. The
con
by social
we
of political
parties. Thus,
to
in response
strategic behavior
in these states, however,
strategic behavior
that retard the institutionalization
ditions
may
expect
Lithuania
to
experience
states will
likelihood of
is undermined
38Tworzecki(fn.28),194.
39
This is particularly true in Russia where surveys regularly report that 40 percent of respondents an
swer "don't know" to
questions about whom
they will vote for in the next election, more than twice the
and McAllister
(fn. 20), 141.
percentage
supporting the most popular political party. Rose, White,
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
374
WORLD POLITICS
sooner
systems
there is a better
electoral
because
tion
than Russia
or other
environment
for future party
former
Soviet
republics
institutionaliza
there.
of Plurality
and Majoritarian
Postcommunist
States
Effects
Systems
in
even more
ex
conundrum
perplexing
by postcommunist
presented
has
been
in
and
elec
party proliferation
perience
plurality
majoritarian
have been deemed
the most
reductive electoral
tions, which
powerfully
An
in the
systems
In two
literature.
not
and Ukraine,
cases, Russia
only
have single-member district elections failed to produce local bipartism
at the district
chanical
due
to
level, but
they also have
the number
effect?reducing
failed
is seen
disproportionality?that
to
produce
a dramatic
me
of parties entering
the legislature
in comparative
experience. The
failure of strategic behavior in single-member district elections typically
leads to an overwhelming
advantage
for the largest party
in the system
and thus to a dominant party system as found in India until the 1990s.
Russia
and Ukraine,
therefore,
in the legislature
arising
ation
are
from
cases of
party prolifer
district
elections.
single-member
truly unusual
Table 3 shows the effects of single-member district plurality andma
joritarian elections. In three cases (Lithuania 1996, Hungary 1990 and
1994) there was a significant mechanical effect in the SMD tier. In all
cases
these
half
the effective
the effective
number
of parliamentary
parties
of elective
parties. Moreover,
number
was
the
less than
level
of
disproportionality in SMD elections in Lithuania and Hungary was
extremely high with values equal to or higher than themost dispropor
tional
PR election
isons
further
district
in the study, Russia
1995. Within-country
compar
the
increased
reductive
force of single-member
support
elections
number
in these
of parliamentary
cases.
parties
In Lithuania
and Hungary
the effective
in the single-member
district elections
was lower and the level of disproportionality higher than in the corre
PR tier,
just
sponding
Hungarian
number
tiers
expect
from
the
experience is particularly striking. Although
of electoral
in the 1990
mentary
as one would
parties
parties
and 1994
produced
literature.
The
the effective
was
PR and
majoritarian
quite similar in the
the effective
number
of parlia
elections,
in the single-member
districts was less than
half of that in the PR tier. Indeed, the impressive victories of theHungar
ianDemocratic Forum (MDG) in 1990 and theHungarian Socialist Party
(MSZP)in 1994 were driven in large part by seatswon in single-member
districts. The MDF won 67 percent of the 176 single-member district
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ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES
375
TABLE3
for Plurality
Effects
and Majoritarian
Effective
Effective
#of
*of
Electoral
Case
Electoral
Russia 1993
Russia 1995
Lithuania 1996
Hungary 1990
Hungary 1994
Ukraine 1994
Parties (N )
6.13
5.00
maj.
3.23
6.10
7.75
maj.
7.14
2.03
maj.
6.17
1.35
maj.
2.46
4.15
plurality
plurality
Least-Squares
Parliamentary
Parties (N )
System
Tier/Election
Index of
Disproportionality
Effective
# of
Candidates
4.27
11.09
20.37
31.88
40.89
7.06
7.36
5.59
3.06
n/a
5.97
5.64
5.44
Information
8, 1993;
Service, Report on Eurasia, December
Foreign Broadcasting
na
v
Commission
of the Russian Federation,
"RezuTtaty golosovaniya
vyborakh
on elections
Dumu po odnomandatnym
of
(Results
Gosudarstvennuyu
voting
izbiratel'nym okrugam"
to the State Duma
in single-member
Election
report, Central
voting districts)
(Unpublished
o
1 okruzhnykh
komissii
Commission,
Moscow,
1994); "Dannye protokolov No.
izbiratel'nykh
SOURCE: Russia:
Central
Electoral
rezultatakh vyborov deputatov Gosudarstvennoy
Federatsii
Dumy Federal'nogo
Sobraniya Rossiiskoy
no. 1 of distict electoral
of
(Data
vtorogo sozyva po odnomandatnym
izbiratel'nym okrugam
protocol
on the results of elections of
commissions
deputies of the second State Duma of the Federal Assembly
of the Russian
"Dannye
protocol
Hungary:
Federation
electoral district), Rossiiskaya gazeia, January 17,1996;
by single-mandate
no. 2 ob
izbiratel'nomu
po federal'nomu
protokolov
itogakh golosovaniya
okrugu (Data of
no. 2 on results of vote for federal electoral
okrug)," Rossiiskaya gazetay January 24, 1996.
Benoit
and Anette Pedersen, "The Baltic
(fn. 40). Lithuania: Ole Norgard, Lars Johannsen,
Latvia
Estonia,
Republics
ed., Political
Szajkowski,
Longman
1994),
Group,
and Lithuania:
of Multi-party
in Bogdan
The Development
Systems,"
of Eastern Europe, Russia and the Successor States. (Essex, U.K.:
Seimo rinkimo
'96," at
60; Lithuanian
Seim, "Lietuvos Respublikos
Ukraine parliamentary
dataset
this
online
(fn.
4),
239;
Bojcun
parties:
Parties
http://rc.lrs.lt/rinkimai/seim96.
is an estimate of partisan affiliations
in April
Project,
districts
for 338 deputies who were elected after the first run-off election
for Election
parties: International Foundation
Systems Ukrainian
at
this is a dataset of first-round
election results for all 450
http://ifes.kiev.ipra.ua;
1994. Ukrainian
elective
1996,
in Ukraine.
least-squares
to the incongruence
Due
of the data for electoral
index of disproportionality
for Ukraine was not computed.
and parliamentary
a
parties
seats on 24 percent of the first-round vote in 1990 while the MSZPwon
86 percent of those seats on 31 percent of the first-round vote.40
a different
situation
Russia
and Ukraine
present
altogether. The
ef
fective number of parties reaching parliament (4.15 for Ukraine 1994
and over 5.00 for Russia 1993 and 1995) show none of the dramatic
mechanical
probably
effect
found
underestimates
in the other
the amount
cases. Moreover,
this measure
of party fractionalization
pro
40
from data in Kenneth Benoit,
"Votes and Seats: The Hungarian
Electoral
Computed
in G?bor T?ka, ed., The 1990 Election to theHungarian
the 1994 Parliamentary
Elections,"
and Data.
Dataset,
(Berlin: Edition
Sigma, forthcoming).
Assembly: Analyses, Documents
fas. harvard.edu/stafi7ken_benoit.
http://data.
This content downloaded on Tue, 8 Jan 2013 08:59:23 AM
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Law
and
National
online
at
376
WORLD POLITICS
duced
by Ukraine's
system
majoritarian
in which
independents
made
up the largest "bloc"of representatives entering parliament (40.2 percent)
a cohesive
and can hardly be considered
group. They were, however,
a
measure
treated as
in
the
of the effective num
single entity
computing
ber of parliamentary parties.41The high effective number of candidates
per district in Russia shows that Russia's plurality system failed to have
its most
basic
an effect
What
effect?local
Sartori
claimed
two-candidate
even held
the cases
distinguishes
contests
at the district
level?
in unstructured
party systems.42
and Russia
from the others
in Ukraine
in single-member
is the
of
district
candidates
proliferation
independent
a small
In Ukraine,
of the candidates
elections.
(11 per
only
minority
were
vot
nominated
rather
than
cent)
by parties
by groups of
officially
ers or worker
collectives.43 This percentage,
overestimates
the
however,
a
number of independents
because many candidates with
partisan affil
iation
chose
to be nominated
rather
membership
sure of
partisanship
vote went
Russian
than party
methods.
by nonpartisan
as the more
nomination
Using
accurate
party
mea
61 percent
of the first-round
candidates,
among
to the
This
candidates.44
independent
corresponds
roughly
in
which
48
candidates
percent
experience
nonpartisan
gained
to
of the vote in 1993 and 36 percent in 1995. In Lithuania independents
won
only
3 percent
of the vote.
In Hungary
the vote
for
independent
candidates dropped from 7 percent in 1990 to only 2 percent in 1994.
in Ukraine
and Russia not only made up a large propor
Independents
tion of candidates
for office,
for the
they also accounted
competing
in the
winners.
winners
of
the
of
percent
Fifty-two
largest proportion
Russian elections in 1993 were independents and 34 percent in 1995,
while 40 percent of Ukraine's winning candidates did not belong to a
party. In Lithuania's 1996 andHungary's 1990 elections, independents
made
up only
6 percent
and 3 percent
of the winners,
respectively.
41
on estimates of
The effective number of parliamentary
parties is based
partisan affiliation in the
were
of
Ukrainian
for
338
450
who
deputies
successfully elected after the first run-off elec
parliament
tion inApril 1994. Bojcun (fn. 5), 239. Only 338 of the 450 district elections were declared valid after
the first run-off because the other districts failed to fulfill the required criteria of both 50 percent par
candidate. The rest of the seats were filled in special
ticipation and 50 percent support for the winning
the fluid and unstable nature of partisan affiliation
in
elections
held until 1996. Given
make-up
In the Russian
this figure should be considered only an estimate of party fractionalization.
Ukraine
on
in parliamentary
case, the effective number of parliamentary
factions,
parties is based
membership
in the legislature.
which
renders a more accurate reflection of party fractionalization
42
Sartori (fn. 2), 62.
43
Bojcun (fn. 4), 233.
44
for Election Systems (iFES), which
This figure is based on data from the International Foundation
voter group, workers
and the
for a candidate
listed both the mode of nomination
collective)
(party,
party affiliation of the candidate. The latter was used to estimate the percent of vote going to inde
ipri. kiev. ua.
pendents. See IFES, online, http://ifes.
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ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES
There
were
There
no
is some
tion procedures
dates without
377
1994 election.45
winners
in Hungary's
nonpartisan
over nomina
are
control
that
evidence
gaining
parties
at least in Russia where
the number of winning
candi
a partisan affiliation declined in 1995. Both Russia and
to have a
continue
of independent
however,
Ukraine,
large contingent
a
weakness
in
candidates winning
elections, which
signals
continuing
countries
in
their party systems not found in the other postcommunist
this study.46
is just another
candidates
The proliferation
of independent
sign of
as
in Russia
and Ukraine
the lack of party institutionalization
opposed
not
to the other cases in the
and Russian
parties have
study.47 Ukrainian
in
in
districts
these
the nomination
controlled
process
single-member
countries
and have
not
enjoyed
a consistent
level of significant
support
nationwide (with the possible exception of the Communist Party of the
one or
in 1995). Consequently,
without
beginning
or
to benefit from
two
strategic voting
disproportionality,
large parties
the number of candi
elections
fail to constrain
district
single-member
their own
districts
dates per district. Rather,
produce
single-member
candidates
and allow individ
of partisan and nonpartisan
proliferation
name
resources
to find
financial
ual candidates
and
with
recognition
Russian
Federation
success
in parliament,
of party affiliation. Once
regardless
as
a
not
act
does
unified group but
candidates
independent
ther. Some join parties they eschewed
during the campaign;
this mass
of
splinters fur
others form
new
to electoral
associations
factions unrelated
fielding
parliamentary
in the
members
of
still
others
become
atomized
candidates
campaign;
a
affiliation with
any consistent
larger group.
parliament without
45
on the vote for
and their success in gaining seats are based on the following
independents
Figures
sources: IFES (fn. 44); Bojcun
Information
Service, Report on
(fn. 4). Russia: Foreign Broadcasting
of the Russian Federation,
Eurasia, December
8, 1993; Central Electoral Commission
"Rezul'taty
na
v
Dumu
po odnomandatnym
izbiratel'nym okrugam,"
Gosudarstvennuyu
golosovaniya
vyborakh
re
in single-member
(Results of voting on elections to the State Duma
voting districts) (Unpublished
1
No.
izbi
Central
Election
1994);
Commission,
Moscow,
port,
okruzhnykh
"Dannye protokolov
o rezultatakh
Sobraniya
Dumy Federal'nogo
vyborov deputatov Gosudarstvennoy
ratel'nykh komissii
Federatsii vtorogo sozyva po odnomandatnym
izbiratel'nym okrugam" (Data of protocol
Rossiiskoy
on the results of elections of
no. 1 of district electoral commissions
deputies of the second State Duma
of the Federal Assembly
electoral district), Rossiiskaya
of the Russian Federation
by single-mandate
izbi
po federal'nomu
gazeta, January 17, 1996; "Dannye protokolov No. 2 ob itogakh golosovaniya
ratel'nomu okrugu" (Data of protocol no. 2 on results of vote for federal electoral okrug), Rossiiskaya
Benoit
Seim, "Lietuvos Respub
(fn. 40). Lithuania: Lithuanian
gazeta, January 24, 1996. Hungary:
1rs. It/rinkimai/seim96.
likos Seimo rinkimo '96," dataset, online at http://rc.
46
elections under a new mixed electoral system similar
InMarch
1998 Ukraine held parliamentary
to Russia's, which was not included in this study for lack of data. The results show a continued preva
district elections in Ukraine. Of the 225 deputies
candidates
in single-member
lence of independent
elected in plurality elections, 114 (51 percent) were independents.
47
uses the
candidates as one characteristic of his
of strong independent
Mainwaring
proliferation
index of party institutionalization.
6).
(fn.
Mainwaring
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378
WORLD POLITICS
The fact that proliferation of nonpartisan candidates did not occur
cases
in all the
that party institutional
postcommunist
again suggests
are
ization varies in the region. While
and fluid
relatively weak
parties
a
in all the emerging
clear
distinction
democracies,
postcommunist
needs to be made between
those states with parties that dominate
the
and control
the choices voters face and those that
process
electoral
role in the
system plays an important
develop
on
center attention
of parties in this context. PR
systems
party-list
nomination
do not. The
ment
as the
for nomination,
while
dis
parties
only vehicles
single-member
to enter the contest. At the
trict elections
candidates
allow nonpartisan
same time, the effects of electoral
on the number of
are
systems
parties
mitigated by the institutionalization of the party system itself.
Finally, itmust be reiterated that while plurality and majoritarian
effect in some postcom
systems had a significant mechanical
to have no
munist
districts
states, single-member
appeared
surprisingly
in any of the cases under ex
effect on the number
of electoral parties
electoral
In no case does
amination.
the effective
number
of elective
parties
in
SMD elections approach the number expected in the literature (M + 1
where M signifies the number of candidates winning election). Of
are more
elections
course, majoritarian
in this sense for they
ambiguous
provide more incentives for party proliferation in the first round. For
majoritarian
mains M
vance
cases,
to the
second
the expectation
however,
+ 1with M
of reductive
influence
re
signifying the number of candidates that can ad
For Lithuania
M
+ 1 would
equal three
is between
effective
candidates
the two top
per district since the run-off
an
vote getters,
not come close to
Lithuania
does
expectation
approxi
allows the top three finishers
mating. Hungary
plus any candidate with
round.48
15 percent
of the vote into the second round. Thus,
only in Hungary
can the
to a
of
attributed
number
effective
candidates
be
high
permis
sive electoral
of compensatory
since Hungary
tier
has a third national
system, especially
seats that uses votes not used to win seats from both
the single-member district tier and the territorial PR tier.This situation
provides
candidate
chief
incentive
no chance
with
can be used
The
for party proliferation
because a vote for a
to the next round is not wasted;
it
of getting
seats in the national
tier.
for compensatory
even more
consequence
of the failure
of voters
and parties
to act
strategically is a high level of disproportionality in those countries with
relatively developed
dent candidates. Up
48
Cox
of
the proliferation
parties that constrain
indepen
to now, most
elites
(with the
party
postcommunist
(fn. 5), 123.
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ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES
379
exception of Poland) have failed to anticipate being punished by the
mechanical effect of effective thresholds of single-member districts.
to fail to achieve representa
thus have entered competition
They
only
voters have tended not to
tion. Likewise,
postcommunist
anticipate
or do not care.
on
that their vote will be wasted
marginal
parties
cases
all the postcommunist
Thus,
employing
dis
single-member
tricts examined here provide some surprising and intriguing findings.
In Ukraine
and Russia,
single-member
districts
produce
party prolifer
ation defying both the expectation of strategic voting and mechanical
effects due to disproportionality. In Lithuania andHungary, large par
ties benefit
from
greatly
the mechanical
effect
of single-member
dis
tricts due to high disproportionality, but voters and elites did not seem
or able to react to these
willing
incentives
and behave
strategically.
The big question for both PR and single-member district electoral
systems iswhether the lack of strategic voting found in this study is a
or
elections. Will
there
permanent
transitory feature of postcommunist
over time as
be greater party consolidation
hold
and
takes
democracy
to
elites and voters
learn the rules and better adapt
the incentives
pro
vided by the electoral system? Perhaps time and repeated electoral cy
cles are all that
found
for electoral
so
to
the types of outcomes
regularly
produce
democracies.
Cox has argued that time is required
to take effect in new democracies:
is needed
in established
systems
The typical scenario in emerging democracies, whereby a great number of par
ties spring up in the first elections, and there is a relatively slowwinnowing out pro
cess, makes sense. A large number spring up in the first election because it is not
clearwho will be viable andwho not. As information is revealed about voter pref
erences,
the more
serious
groups
will
continue
to enter,
even
against
poor
short
term odds, in the hopes of convincing less committed competitors to drop out.49
While
there have
not yet been
enough
elections
to make
any defini
tive judgments about learning, these initial findings suggest some in
cases and between
In
differences
electoral
among
systems.
teresting
both PR and single-member
with
district
the
countries
the
elections,
more
showed
institutionalized
the strongest
party systems
signs of
over time. In PR elections,
saw their ef
Poland
and
learning
Hungary
over
fective number
of electoral
and disproportionality
parties
drop
rose
the number of parties and disproportionality
time, while
sharply in
to the second. In
and Lithuania
Russia
from the first election
single
member
district elections,
showed
signs of party consol
only Hungary
idation over time, and Russia (the only other country with full data for
49
Ibid., 159.
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WORLD POLITICS
380
more
saw fractionalization
increase over time. In
election)
PR and
the
district elections,
under
single-member
comparing
learning
in PR elections was, contrary
evidence
of learning of strategic behavior
to
evidence
greater than in SMD elections. This
suggests
expectations,
one
than
states PR elections
in postcommunist
in controlling
effective
the number
that
more
the dramatic
Given
with
legal thresholds may be
of parties than SMD elections.
and
effects produced
by effective
mechanical
legal thresholds in both PR and single-member
in
district elections
states, one could expect the winnowing-out
process de
postcommunist
as
as
are
some
to
scribed by Cox
give
long
developed
enough
parties
in
of party preferences.
semblance
Voters,
then, can behave
strategically
are weakest
can not even
of
and
those
Where
parties
light
preferences.
the nomination
control
process,
however,
such as in Russia
and Ukraine,
district elec
in single-member
less likely, particularly
learning becomes
are allowed to
candidates
tions where
proliferate.
independent
System Effects
Electoral
The
and elites.
New Democracies
systems in postcom
suggest that electoral
a
to
of
level
led
strategic behavior
by
significant
cases the number of effective
In most
electoral parties
findings
presented
states have not
munist
voters
in Other
here
to ex
the carrying
of the electoral
system
leading
capacity
a trend
to post
Is
this
of
levels
tremely high
peculiar
disproportionality.
in all new
in initial elections
communist
states, or can it be found
exceeded
democracies?
of electoral
the proliferation
Perhaps
parties
in postcom
munist states is a normal condition of initial elections thatwill subside
as increased
out
information
should
tion
similar
show
in the number
most
and experience
If so, comparisons
ones.
nonviable
party proliferation
of electoral parties
reward viable
other
with
in initial
over
parties and weed
new democracies
elections
and contrac
time.
the electoral
sys
comparison
use
tems of the
states and new democracies,
which
plu
postcommunist
show whether
the most powerful
would
rality systems. The comparison
The
would
effective
be between
electoral system has faced party proliferation in initial elections in other
new democracies
elites
learn
mocratizers
to
only
to
consolidation
produce
the system. Unfortunately,
navigate
have adopted
plurality
over
time as voters
few
systems.50 Therefore,
50
Eleven
third-wave
the most
and
de
in
elections in the 1980s adopted plurality systems
initial democratic
countries experiencing
islands. Such cases do not provide the most suitable
very small states, mostiy Caribbean
states. Nevertheless,
these new democracies
did not experience
comparison with large postcommunist
states in the study. The
exhibited by the postcommunist
the same high level of party proliferation
but all were
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ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES
structive
is a historical
comparison
democracies
new
older,
Two
postwar
that have
one with
now
of
elections
initial
consolidated.
become
relatively
Federal
Republic,
the German
democracies,
the
381
its
with
mixed electoral system employing both plurality elections and PR, and
India, with its pure plurality system, will be examined to shed some
light on the degree of party proliferation in initial elections under a plu
on the system
rality system and
sult of learning.
s reductive
over
properties
time as a re
support for the
history provides
a
common
in new
idea that party proliferation
may be
phenomenon
do
but that reductive
effects of the electoral
take
democracies
system
Postwar
Germany's
over
hold
time.
electoral
early
Scholars
found
have
of strategic voting
totals for parties between
under
evidence
in vote
the PR
rules in the difference
plurality
two
tier. The
district
tier and the single-member
par
largest German
more
votes
in the
the
CDU/CSU
and
the
have
SPD,
ties,
single
gained
member districts than in the PR racewhile
lost votes. This
situation
suggests
smaller parties like the FDP
that voters
from
defected
small par
ties less likely to win in single-member districts and gravitated toward
in
the discrepancy
for representation. While
a
tiers is not that significant,
averaging
gain
for the three parties most
2 percent
affected
parties with better chances
the vote between
the two
or
loss
of
less
than
evidence
of strate
(CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP), it does provide persuasive
the vote does not really in
rules even when
gic voting under plurality
of seats among parties.51
the final distribution
fluence
This
did not occur
phenomenon
in the first election
under
the mixed
system in 1953. In that election the SMD tier produced over three effec
tive electoral
parties
a
(3.38),
higher
effective
of electoral
number
par
ties than in the corresponding PR tier (3.31). By the next election the
in the single-member
parties produced
to 2.75,
tier pro
district
and the single-member
duced fewer effective
electoral parties than the PR tier (2.78), as the lit
erature would
This
trend has grown over the years reducing
expect.52
in the single-member
dis
the chances for victory by marginal
parties
effective
number
districts
had
of electoral
fallen
tricts to virtually
nothing
and solidifying
a
two-party
system
in the SMD
tier. Since the third election held under the mixed system in 1961, no
party
other
than
the CDU/CSU
average effective number of electoral parties
in Russia's
lower than the average produced
Cox (fn. 5), 309-11.
51Jesse(fn.26),112.
52
of effective
Calculations
number
or SPD has won
a
single-member
district
is 2.26, which
ismuch
for this group of new democracies
cases see
two
plurality elections. For data regarding these
of parties were
based on data in Barnes
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et al. (fn. 26), 906.
382
WORLD POLITICS
seat. Thus,
Germany
a case of
provides
increased
consolidation,
pre
sumably due to learning, which began to take place in the second elec
tion. German
voters
and elites did not need much
time
to
adjust
to the
incentives
of the electoral
system.
an
India provides
of the opposite
example
phenomenon?a
ent absence of
a
system. Party
strategic voting under
plurality
persist
prolifer
ation at the district level has remained high in India despite the fact
that the plurality system consistently produced very high dispropor
tionality,
severely
penalizing
marginal
parties.
As
a consequence,
until
the late 1980s, India experienced a dominant party system inwhich the
Congress
Party maintained
votes while
the opposition
no evidence
of consolidation
first
two
elections,
a
of seats based on a minority
of
majority
was
is
there
Unlike
Germany
fragmented.
over time as a result of
In
India's
learning.
the effective
number
of electoral
parties
stood
at
4.21 despite the fact that the high disproportionality of the plurality
system
narrowed
that number
down
to less than
two effective
parlia
expect voters and elites to
against small parties, the high level of
adjust
not subside over several decades of
did
fractionalization
party
repeated
In six elections
from 1962 to 1984, India actually
democratic
elections.
had more effective electoral parties, an average of 4.31, even though the
mentary
one would
(1.79). Although
parties
to the severe disincentives
electoral
system's mechanical
effect
repeatedly
reduced
the number
of
effective parties entering parliament to 221P By the end of the 1980s
the mechanical effect of India's plurality electoral system even failed as
the Congress
majorities
Congress
party lost power and the manufactured
In 1996 thirty
decades
for
gave way to coalition
governments.
enjoyed
were
in parliament with 5.88 effective parliamentary
parties
represented
a similar outcome
1998 parliamentary
elections
The
produced
parties.
similar to the frac
strikingly
district
elections.54
tionalization
single-member
two
in initial elections
These
show that party proliferation
examples
a
a
common
occurrence.
while
be
However,
may
Germany
provides
with
5.29
effective
parliamentary
produced by Russia's
parties,
case of learning that produced strategic voting beginning in the second
53
(fn. 1), 161.
54Lijphart
elections were based on seat distribu
Calculations
for the 1996 and 1998 Indian parliamentary
indiavotes. com. One crucial difference be
tions provided by the India Votes '98website, http://www.
tween the Indian and Russian cases is that the Indian case tended to produce two- or three-candidate
races at the district level. The multiparty
system at the national level was produced by the fact that the
two
in each district did not belong to the same two major parties from district to dis
major candidates
saw an average of seven significant candidates compete in
trict. This was not the case in Russia, which
in Indian elections see
districts. For district-level
analysis of the number of candidates
single-member
and the Number
of Parties in India and
and Ken W. Kollman,
"Party Aggregation
Pradeep Chhibber
the United
States," American Political Science Review 92 (1998), 332.
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383
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS/NUMBEROF PARTIES
peated
that the passage of time and re
to promote
sufficient
strategic behavior.
the Indian
election,
elections
shows
experience
alone are not
As in the postcommunist cases, Iwould argue that the key determining
factor
is the
institutionalization
tivelywell-established
strategic
voting
while
India failed to do so.
of the party
system,
in which
a rela
party system inGermany provided the basis for
a more
weakly
institutionalized
party
in
system
Conclusions
The findings presented here suggest that electoral systems affect the
states and in more established
of parties in postcommunist
de
in very different ways. These
findings
provide greater empir
ical support for Cox s theoretical work on the conditions
for
necessary
a
to take
Without
institutionalized
strategic voting
place.
relatively
party system, voters and elites may not have the ordered party prefer
ences to behave
or may not have
to
information
strategically
enough
differentiate
viable from nonviable
contenders.
Under
such conditions
one would
not expect the
reductive
of
elec
impact
powerful
plurality
tions to take effect. Cox
anecdotal
evidence
from
only
provided
Papua
number
mocracies
to illustrate how such conditions in the realworld may
produce party proliferation under plurality rules.55The findings pre
New Guinea
states may
suggest that many postcommunist
under such circumstances.
transition
ing democratic
sented
here
be undergo
This study has reemphasized the importance of party institutional
ization
as an
variable
intervening
systems and the number
electoral
the relationship
influencing
of parties. The constraining
between
effects
of
thresholds
seemed to vary with
the institutionaliza
legal and effective
states. Countries
tion of the party system in postcommunist
like Poland
and Hungary
with more developed
showed
party systems
greater ten
to electoral system incentives
dencies for strategic adaptation
and learn
ing over time while
countries like Russia and Ukraine with weakly
no
or
systems showed
signs of strategic behavior
an eventual
not
guarantee
learning. The passage of time will
necessarily
to electoral
in
found
consolidated
systems
along patterns
adaptation
institutionalized
party
never
a
institution
relatively
produces
as
case
alized party system
the
of India powerfully
demonstrates.
Under
conditions
of extreme party underdevelopment,
the electoral
use
that
the
of
system
party labels?proportional
promotes
representa
democracies
55
Cox
if the social context
(fn. 5), 85.
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WORLD POLITICS
384
be more
tion?may
effective
in constraining
the number
of parties
than
the plurality system, provided a legal threshold is used. Indeed, inRus
sia a PR system with
effect than
a
5-percent
its plurality
time PR elections with
legal
legal
chanical
over
in a
threshold
had
Poland
counterpart.
can reduce
thresholds
state as elites
and voters
a
has
stronger
shown
me
that
the number
of
learn the incentives
parties
postcommunist
of the system. Our cases have shown no such dramatic
reduction
over time in
of electoral
number
district
single-member
parties
in the
elec
to curb party fractionaliza
systems may find better results with
tions. Therefore,
electoral engineers
tion in states with developing
party
hoping
PR and a legal threshold than with single-member district elections.
states
Postcommunist
provide
that defies
a
to electoral
studies with
challenge
even the
electoral
systems.
strongest
such as those found in Russia
systems,
party fractionalization
The most
party
underdeveloped
such fragmentation
and Ukraine,
produce
fect of single-member
district elections
nomena
suggest
that
in integrating
that even
does
not
the mechanical
take hold.
postcommunist
states
ef
Such phe
into the field
of electoral studies greater attention will need to be paid to the impli
cations
puzzle
which
of party systems. The main
under
is the process
and conditions
this analysis
states.
in democratizing
become
institutionalized
of low levels of institutionalization
arising
party
from
systems
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