A comparative study of four different groups of young practicing Muslims in the
post-war Sarajevo. From nationalization to reislamization.
by Beatrice Foschetti
University of Udine (Italy)
Abstract
The nationalization of Islam, strongly linked to secularization, has swept the Muslim population in Bosnia and
Herzegovina during the last decades. How is it perceived by those who, in minority compared to non-believers, are
living religion in everyday practice? It certainly has the support of religious elites, but what happens at the base of the
Islamic Community? How does the younger generation approach the phenomenon of Islam politicization? Do they
perceive an opposition to their faith? And how to circumvent, if they believe it has to be done, the delicate issue of
territoriality 'intimately linked to the evolution of the national Bosniak identity'? And yet, do the national and religious
identities vary according to different Islamic currents in the country?
To answer these questions the main idea is to explore the national and religious identities among young practicing
Muslims in Sarajevo. For this purpose have been outlined four study groups. In particular: the followers of Hafiz
Sulejman Bugari, the imam of the White Mosque (Bijela dzamija), the youth of Naqshbandiyya (Sufi brotherhood), the
organization of Young Muslims (Mladi Muslimani Organizacija) and finally, the young neo-Salafis.
During my stay in the Bosnian capital I prospected their biographical and sociological background, their perceptions
about the Islamic Community (Islamska Zajednica) and the religious authorities in general, their relationship with
politics, particularly with the Muslim parties and their thorny placing in the marriage between Islam and national
identity. The status of “practicing Muslim” will be then analyzed, as well as in relation to the politicization of Islam,
also in relation to the Islamic pluralism, examining the religious practices of young people, including the most
controversials and trying to unravel the nature of relationships with representatives of the other groups. Finally, given
the ongoing debate about Islam in the old continent, I will try an attempt to bring out their perceptions of Europe, and
then extended to the West, as well as their attitudes about the other great monotheistic religions: Christianity and
Judaism.
Given the nature of this project, I decided to collecting mainly qualitative data. Ie: semi-structured interviews with
young practicing Muslims, talks with their leaders and local intellectuals, participant observation and, when possible,
its audio recording and pictures. In order to reconstruct the origins of each study group I also obtained permission (after
eight months of requests) to access the private archive of the Young Muslims organisation. The documents (from 1940
to 1950) provide important information about the organization itself and testify that the condition of practicing Muslims
during the first communist period. The collected data were also crossed with informations coming from a thorough
analysis of the media (press, radio, internet).
The binary system trap
The increasing visibility of Islam in the “after Tito” Bosnia and Herzegovina resulted in a series of
simplistic interpretations. I refer here especially to the media, international and local, who often
acted as a sounding board for the binary system1. The wars of religion, the crystallization of
identities intended in absolute terms as well as the bogeyman of an imminent upperhand by the new
Islam, extremist and imported, on the old Islam, tolerant and local2, are all categories coming from
the Manichean logic through which we look at Balkan Islam, after a misleading first level of
analysis.
The choice of field-study young practicing Muslims reveals, therefore, extremely dangerous. The
beforehand exclusion of not practicing Bosniaks or those who call themselves Bosnians, despite
having a Muslim background, might indeed suggest a massive re-Islamization of the younger
generations. Nathalie Clayer and Xavier Bougarel have instead shown how the Muslim population
of Bosnia and Herzegovina is among the most secular and how an attempt of re-Islamization by
SDA and the Islamic Community since 1990 has resulted de facto in a Islam nationalization3.
A recent study by Dino Abazovic, assistant at the Faculty of Political Science at the University of
Sarajevo, confirms the hypothesis of the two French researchers: only a small part of six hundred
Bosniaks, studied by the sociologist in Bosnia and Herzegovina, are practicing Muslims 4.
It therefore seems clear that the use of the religious element building a national identity has had
different effects on the two identity sides. It is true that the link between the two has strengthened,
as proven by the replacement of the term Musliman (Muslim) with Bosnjak (Bosniak) in 1993, but
if considered separately the strengthening of both in equal measure is fake . The nation won on
religion, often emptied of its original content, borrowing symbols, places and celebrations in an
effort to provide Bosnian Muslims with a clear national identity. And if there is someone like Franz
Markowitz, who highlights the reluctance of part of the population answering to the question "What
are you really?", implying that the national identities, including the Bosniak one, not fully
completed their course orchestrated by political and religious leaders5, Xavier Bougarel warns the
Islamic Community, assuming a possible boomerang effect in the long run, highlighting its low
level of credibility6
Indeed the frequent internal crises dictated by special interests affects the reputation of religious
leaders of the Islamic Community (Islamska Zajednica), perceived by many as political actors first
and then as men of faith. 7 Islam, therefore, not only struggles to break through in the privacy of the
1
The philosophical category of binary system belongs to Rada Ivekovic. Refers to Rada IVEKOVIC, La
balcanizzazione della ragione, Roma: Manifestolibri,1999.
2
About the futile opposition between the old and the new Islam refers to Xavier BOUGAREL, “ “Vecchio” Islam e
“nuovo” Islam nei Balcani contemporanei”, in Luciano VACCARO (a cura di) Storia religiosa dell’Islam nei Balcani,
Milano: ITL-Centro Ambrosiano, 2008.
3
Nathalie CLAYER and Xavier BOUGAREL, Le nouvel Islam balkanique: les musulmans, acteur du postcommunisme 1990-2000, Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2001.
4
The research mentioned is the PhD thesis by Dino ABAZOVIC, assistent at the Faculty of Political Science at the
University of Sarajevo. Still work in progress will be published soon. The data collected are quantitative, based on
sixhundreads forms, with one hundread and fifty questions each, distribuited among the Bosniak population in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Personal interview with Dino Abazovich, Sarajevo, 30 September 2009.
5
Fran MARKOWITZ, Census and sensibilities in Sarajevo, in “Comparative Studies in Society and History”, 49
(2007).
6
See Xavier BOUGAREL, Kako je panislamizam zamijenio komunizam, in “Dani”, 109 (1999)
7
About the relation between Islamic community and politics in the conmporary Bosnia see Xavier BOUGAREL,
Balkan Muslims and Islam in Europe. Introduction. in “Journal of Politics and Society” 55 (2007), p.350; Xavier
people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, highly secularized after half a century of communist experience,
but also meets difficulties to be recognized in religious terms in its public expression. Dino
Abazovic said that sixty percent of Bosniaks he studied were in favor of a religion confined to
private life, ignoring that the Bosniak identity is the result of the public use of Islam side by side
with politics. For a subtle ironic reversal, religion as a constituent part of the national Bosniak
identity is perceived as other than itself. Not a religion whose expression in the public sphere
contributed to the construction of a national identity, but more simply one nation, the Bosniak one.
Is enough to understand the relative size of the faith in an enhanced visibility of Islam in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The national identity appropriates of the religious element, gobbling it up, and
returning it back in a new shape, the one of a nation-Islam.
So, the reality is much more complex than the semplification coming from the binary system might
suggest. First, the authoritarian process which would create a national identity of the Muslim
population of Bosnia, reveals the similar power plays of the Croatian and Serbian elites, which, in
the nineties, fueled conflicts along religious lines, but, if deeply analyzed, correspond to their
particular interests8. The evolution of identities whose path is still in place, put in deep crisis the
absolute crystallization of these, giving way to a more true stratification of identities but with
multiple combinations. So a Bosnian with a Muslim background may defined himself as a not
Muslim Bosnian or Bosnian Muslim, not Muslim Bosniak in religious terms, or practicing Bosniak,
without considering the cases in between of the children from mixed marriages, and also the
converted who expand the range of possible identities. Finally, as explained by Xavier Bougarel the
alarming frame of an imminent upperhand by the new Islam, imported and extremist, on the old
Islam, tolerant and local, has to be significantly resized, taking into account from one side the
power that the neo-Salafis hold in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and from another other side the
religious pluralism that has hit the country after the fall of the communist regime 9, whereby the
Salafi current is just one of the components. Once again the analysis of the Balkans gives us the
fears within the unconscious of Europe. The religious wars, the crystallization of identities, and an
unwarranted attention to the neo-Salafi reflect the Manichean logic submitted to a simplified geopolitical vision, in the limelight today thanks to in vogue scholars such as Samuel Huntington 10
The paradox here is the application of categories related to the clash of civilizations in a country,
Bosnia, which still is not ethnically homogeneous and is late on the path of the nation-state. This
results in the bad habit of considering religion as the root cause of internal conflicts in Bosnia and
as a potential threat to the West. This attitude makes it impossible to recognize clearly the
nationalization of religion in place and at the same time confuses the supposed opposition between
religions / civilizations with the deadly implications of strong national identities whose risk
consists, not so much in the religious element of religion they use 11, but rather in the potential
BOUGAREL “ “Vecchio” Islam e “nuovo” Islam nei Balcani contemporanei”, in Luciano VACCARO (eds) Storia
religiosa dell’Islam nei Balcani, Milano: ITL-Centro Ambrosiano, 2008.
8
About Yugoslav wars see GAGNON JR, The mith of ethnic war. Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s, Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2006; Vjekoslav PERICA, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002; Beatrice FOSCHETTI, “Mitopoiesi etnica nell’analisi delle guerre jugoslave degli anni
novanta” in Francesco GUIDA (a cura di), Dayton dieci anni dopo: guerra e pace nella ex Jugoslavia, Roma: Carocci
editore, 2007.
9
See Xavier BOUGAREL, Bosnie-Herzégovine et Sandžak: Fin de l hégémonie du SDA et ancrage institutionnel du
néo-salafisme available at http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/fr/home/doc/publi/ppol/polit.html; Juan Carlos ANTUNEZ,
Wahabism in Bosnia-Herzegovina available at http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2468.
10
Samuel HUNTINGTON, The Clash of civilations, in “Foreign Affaires” 3 (1993)
11
In order to understand the relationship between national and religious identity it is mandatory to know how it worked
the millet system during the Ottoman Empire. See Ilbert ORTAYLI, “L’impero ottomano, struttura religiosa da
Costantinopoli fino a Buda”, in Luciano VACCARO (eds), Storia religiosa dell’Islam nei Balcani, Milano: ITL-Centro
Ambrosiano, 2008.
demand for a nation-state in a mixed country12. So the real danger is the matter of territoriality in a
non-homogeneous context, and not Islam.
The research project, which referred to the young practicing Muslims, has to be understood in the
light of what has previously been exposed. It is not here to be focused on the re-Islamization of
born-again Muslims or on the conversion of others, providing another warning bell that should be
added to dozens of articles and essays about the binary system, but to better understand how the
nationalization of Islam, strongly linked to secularization, is absorbed by those who, in minority
compared to non-believers, live religion in everyday practice. The nationalization had the support of
religion and religious elites, this is a sure thing, but what happens at the base of the Islamic
Community? How does the younger generation approach the phenomenon of Islam politicization?
Do they perceive an opposition to their faith? And how to circumvent, if they believe it has to be
done, the delicate issue of territoriality 'intimately linked to the evolution of the national Bosniak
identity'? And yet, do the national and religious identities vary according to different Islamic
currents in the country?
Field research among young Muslims in Sarajevo
The research project will explore the national and religious identities of young13 practicing Muslims
in Sarajevo. For this purpose four study groups have been outlined. In particular:
- Hafiz Sulejman Bugari followers, the imam of the White Mosque (Bijela Dzamija)
- the youth of Naqshbandiyya (Sufi brotherhood) at Tekija na Mejtas14
- youngs from organization of Young Muslims (Mladi Muslimani Organizacija)
- and finally, the young neo-Salafis.
During my stay in the bosnian capital15 my aim was to to explore their biographical and
sociological background, their perceptions about the Islamic community (Islamska Zajednica) and
the religious authorities in general, their relationship with politics, especially with Muslim parties,
and their place in the difficult marriage between Islam and national identity. The status of
practicing Muslim has been analyzed, as well as in relation to the politicization of Islam, including
in relation to Islamic pluralism, examining the religious practices among young people, including
the most controversial (niqab / hijab for example) and trying to steal the nature of relationships
between members of other groups. Finally, given the ongoing debate about Islam in the old
continent 16, I tried to bring out their perceptions of Europe, and by extension of the West, so as
their attitudes about the other great monotheistic religions: the Christianity and Judaism.
From reality to the four study “groups”
12
See la teoria dell’irradiazione culturale di Arnold TOYNBEE, in Il mondo e l’Occidente, Palermo: Sellerio Editore,
1993.
13
Informants’age goes from 18 to 35 years old.
14
Initially I worked with Naqshbandiyya Halidi, whose šeih Sultan Sejd Abdullbaki Sultan El-Husseini lives in
Turkey. Following several months of fieldwork I then opted for another Sufi case study. While remaining within the
Naqshbandiyya the Tekija na Mejtas, led by Bosnian Seih Brzina, is much more successfull than the first among young
Muslims in Sarajevo. The key of interpretation consists in the peculiar figure of the Seih, which is "something new" in
Sufi, according to Catharina Raudvere, coordinator of the PhD in History of Religions, University 'of Copenhagen.
Personal interview, April 27, 2010.
15
The fieldwork began in July 2009.
16
See Enes KARIĆ, Is Euro-Islam a Myth, Challenge or Real Opportunity for Muslims and Europe?, in: Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs, Jeddah, 22 (October 2002) 2, pp. 435–442, Jorgen NIELSEN, Towards a European Islam,
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999.
The choice of the above groups needs some clarifications. The combination of reality so differing
in number, degree of accessibility and level of structuring has to be found in the principles of the
project, namely the politicization and pluralism of Islam in the Balkans. The Mladi Muslimani are a
must for the analysis of the relationship between politics and Islam. The organization, founded in
193917, was for decades the current bosnian pan-Islamic and in 1990 contributed to the creation of
the SDA with eight founding members of a total of forty. The recent distance of the organization
from the party, that in the whiletime has become more pragmatic18, emerged forcefully in the semistructured interviews with the new generations, thus providing an important anchor for a correct
analysis of the today scenario.
The involvement of Naqshbandiyya and the other two groups is much more pluralist. The Sufi
brotherhood should somehow contain the idea of exclusivity influence from the Arab world in
today Bosnia. As noted by Anne Ross Solberg, the Turkish Islamic networks in the Balkans
received much less attention compared to the salafis19. Yet over the past two decades, Turkish
actors have developed a strong religious policy in the Balkans. This is reflected through the bonds
of Naqshbandiyya in Sarajevo considered by many Bosnian Muslims a "second home", so as the
good success, described by Solberg, of other Turkish neo-Sufi brotherhoods present in Bosnia. The
analysis from the bottom of Naqshbandiyya then it is also useful to better understand the opposition
against the Salafi current, yet the phenomenon linked to the figure of Hafiz Sulejman Bugari, who,
although not a Sufi, uses typical Sufis techniques to communicate with the faithful.
With regard to neo-Salafi we have to make instead a division of the baseline study group. The
Salafi current in Bosnia is not unlike what you might think, a monolithic block. In fact in recent
years most of the ultra-conservatives led by Nezim Halilović
have been absorbed by the Islamic Community making a shift in the politics of reis-ul-Ulema
Mustafa Cerić, and unleashing a series of domestic disputes within the Faculty of Islamic Sciences
(FIN) in Sarajevo. In any case the majority does not present jihadists marks, so as evidenced by the
frequent anti-terrorism articles published on the magazine Saff. The hard core of the current Salafi
fringe is instead outside the auspices of religious institutions in the country, recluiting talents also
within the Bosniak Diaspora. Obviously, neo-Salafi here means the majority incorporated by the
Islamic Community.
Finally a note about the size of the group, not exactly correct for all four categories of young
Muslims outlined for research purposes. The young people who follow Hafiz Sulejman Bugari, in
particular, categorically refuse membership to any organization / sect / order related to the figure of
Bugari. The fact remains that they represent a significant “group" in terms of number, of course, but
not just that. First of all it can help us to better understand the figure of the White Mosque Imam
(Bijela Dzamija) in Vratnik, known for its success with young people in Bosnia and abroad.
Secondly their statements and attitudes, more similar to the young Sufi, except the size of a
structured group, often contrast with those of coeval neo-Salafi and members of the religious Mladi
Muslimani, providing important points of comparison. Please therefore to consider the term
"religious group reference" merely a simplification of reality, necessary for research purposes.
Methodological notes and quantification of sources
Given the nature of work, I decided to procede collecting mainly qualitative data. Recently then, I
obtained permission to inspect documents located at the private archives of the Organization of
Mladi Muslimani. In addition to providing valuable data about the evolution of the Organization,
17
Even if the idea of the organization was born in 1931. Personal interview with Almedina Zuko, member since 1968.
Sarajevo, 3rd of March 2010.
18
See Xavier BOUGAREL, Fin de l’hégémonie du SDA et ancrage istitutionel du néo-salafisme, in “Politorbis”, 43
(2007).
19
Anne SOLBERG, The role of Turkish Islamic networks in the Westerns Balkans, in “Journal of Politics and Society”
55 (2007), pp.429-462.
theyhave been essential to better understand the situation of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina
during the communist period (note that there are no monographs about this).
Below is a list of sources and their quantification:
• semi-structured interviews with young practicing belonging to different Muslim groups outlined
for research purposes. Currently (April 2010) were performed a total of thirty valid interviews. In
particular:
• the followers of Hafiz Sulejman Bugari: Ena, Emina, Abdul Kerim, Bilal, Aida, Latif, Adis,
Lejla
• Sufi Naqshbandiyya (Tekija na Mejtas) Ehlimana, Kalender, Mirza, Lejla, Amina, Mirsad,
Hussein, Amir, Malik, Emir, Busra
• Mladi Muslimani: Emir, Adem, Aziz, Zinka, Mirsad, Firdevs, Emina, Damir
• Neo-Salafi: Edina, Zinaida, Tarik Mohammed, Mustafa
• interviews with leaders of interest:
• Hafiz Sulejman Bugari, personal interviews (September 1, 2009, February 25, 2010)
• Seih Brzina, personal interviews (February 28, 2010, April 25, 2010)
• Almedina Zuko (MM), personal interview (March 3, 2010)
• interviews with local intellectuals
• Srecko Latal, journalist (15 August 2009)
• Amir Turkovic, Centar Izlaz (August 18, 2009)
• Sabina Niksic, journalist (22 August 2009)
• Mersiha Resic, CIPS (from September 2009 on a regular basis)
• Adis Crnovacanin, CIPS (from September 2009 on a regular basis)
• Dino Abazovic, sociologist (30 September 2009)
• Resid Hafizovic, professor FIN (October 24, 2009)
• Samir Beglerovic, assistant FIN (October 27, 2009)
• interviews with practicing Muslims during the communist period (Zlatan, Mirsad)
• participant observation and recordings, when possible, audio or photo (iftar, hutbe, dzumme,
Tekija visits).
• documents (archive private organization of Mladi Muslimani)
• Magazine Mudzahid 3 (1943)
• Magazine Pakistan February 3, 1948
• Magazine El-Hidaje 6-7-8 (1943)
• List of suspects, nine hundred and fifty, held by the organization during the process of 1949
(1949)
• Cards dell'UDBA (uprava državne bezbednosti / sigurnost / varnost literally State Security
Administration, Secret Police of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) containing
information about the members of the MM (1950)
• Pravile Organisatije, the Rules of the organization (1943-1944)
• Document prepared from UDBA (1958) with directions to be given to imams and
indications for all staff on how to do their job.
This raised data were crossed with information derived from careful analysis of the media (press,
radio, internet). In this case, particular attention is devoted to the systematic examination of various
religious publications, including Preporod, Takvim, Glasnik, Saff, Horizonti Novi, Novi Muallim,
Znakovi Vrijemena, Kelamu'l Sifa and major newspapers for information, the daily
Osloboñenje(Liberation) and the weekly Dani (Day). BIR radio broadcasts are valuable if religious
leaders involved in the project are guests of the issuer of the Islamic Community 20. Internet instead,
requires a separate treatment, being a whole new fieldwork 21.
20
Hafiz Sulejman Bugari uses radio BIR as a medium since the 5th of March 2009, every Thursday from 15 to 17.
See Jorgen NIELSEN, Mustafa DRAPER, Galina YEMELIANOVA, “Transnational Sufism. The Haqqaniyya” in
Jamal MALIK e John HINNELS (eds), Sufism in the West, pp.103-114.
21
The virtual projection of the case-studies. Internet, a second fieldwork.
The huge quantity of data and the nature of the medium oblige the observer to filter constantly the
collected information. The first step of the job was to draw up a classification according to the casestudy, in order to move aound easier in such a maze which is the web. Since the beginning
it has emerged how differently each group uses Internet. It goes from the almost total absence of the
Naqshbandiyya22 to the massive presence of neo-Salafis' sites , advertised regularly in the center of
the town by the guys of the entourage of the King Fahd Mosque (Dzamija Kralj Fahd).23
The young members of Mladi Muslimani and the followers of Hafiz Sulejman Bugari are active on
average from this point of view, even if in different ways. The Mladi Muslimani, as the neoSalafis, have the chance to communicate with their leaders just through the classical system of
“questions and answers” (“Pitanja i odgovori”). In the case of Hafiz Sulejman Bugari's followers
instead, there is a direct contact with their leader, wich often is behind the scope of the official
home page of the imam. The classic form “questions and answers” (“Pitanja i odgovori”) vanishes
here in order to make space for a range of messages posted on one of the most famous social
network: Facebook. The habit, undoubtedly unusual for an imam, can easily be explained by the
content of the messages, de facto subjected to fixed deadlines. The use of social networks by Bugari
it has been seen as a tool to organize meetings in the real life: what we contemplate is a series of
events, invitations to participate, statements of the joy of sharing. The great Islamic themes are
however, in the official website of the imam, a location definetelly more suitable, but they never
fall in the scheme allowed / forbidden (halal / haram), frequent among the sites close to neo-Salafis
enviroment, and carefully avoiding terms related to national identity, wich are used massively by
Mladi Muslimani. Also, current affairs have proved an important dividing line between the groups
in question. They are totally absent on the site of Hafiz Sulejman Bugari, but differs, depending on
the region considered and treated in the content, among the other two groups on the network. In the
case of Mladi Muslimani current affairs regard mainly politics and are limited to local context,
except for some articles on the Palestinian issue, while sites in the neo-Salafis are extended to the
global, revealing the massive network of web pages connected to them and an inclination to level
off the contents. If the group of sympathizers of Hafiz Sulejman Bugari uses the electronic medium
for returning to an unstructured and non-political community in the real life, the neo-Salafis seem in
need of creating a virtual umma. Their geographical dispersion and the relative difficulty to
integrate into the Bosnian society could be the reason of that need. The neo-Salafis in Bosnia would
approach the brothers living in Western countries, although being in a country where Muslim
religious evidence is strongly increasing.
Discourses with the young practicing Muslims in Sarajevo.
Biographycal background
The analysis of biography (education, profession, social status) led to expected data. For the
supporters of Hafiz Sulejman Bugari is absolutely impossible to draw a profile type, even
considering only the young practicing, and let me add practicing Muslims (even atheists, nonpracticing Muslims, Christians, lovers of reiki and new age practices were among those who waited
hours in line to be able to listen to him at the BKC24). The followers of Sulejman Bugari indeed
vary for the place of origin, the cultural level, and any kind of employment making almost
22
The lack of the Naqshbandiyya can’t be in any case linked to the impossibility to use the medium. Indeed the
cultural level of the group is really high.
23
Once in month. Usually on the last Saturday of the month during the summer.
24
BCK is for Cultural Bosnian Center (Bosanski Kulturni Centar). For a testimony in this sense please see Srecko
LATAL, Another side of Islamic Fundamentalism (or Truth is out there), pubblished on Balkan Insight the 5th of
February 2009. Available at http ://www.balkaninsight.com.
impossible any simplification of reality . The members of Naqshbandiyya show instead rather high
social profiles. Many artists and professionals, even people of a certain popularity ', were cited
during the interviews in quality' of members of the Sufi tarikat, and of course, have constituted the
direct informants. Their predilection for knowledge has been a leitmotiv during our speeches. Mladi
Muslimani's members, who I met during the opening hours of their cafe in Morica Han, show rather
low profiles clashing with the organization's image in the past, as the cradle of Bosnian Muslim
elites. At least this is true till we speak about the attenders of the MM cafe, who actually are few
guys (men), highlighting the lack of capacity's organization to attract young people. Indeed those
who, as members, occasionally take part in various activities of a social nature (for example the
kurbanski bajaram for poorer households) have shown generally high profiles. The interesting data
consists here in a gender issue. This kind of members, who I would call more “social” then
“political” contains highly active and well educated women. Switching to the neo-Salafi and their
social background, they proved so far, instead, not only to be the most timid group, but also the
most problematic in terms of bad experience in their life. There are several former alcoholics or
former drug addicted among the ranks of ultra-conservatives. That was enough to inspire a group of
researchers at the University of Psychology in Sarajevo to carry out some works on them: these
scholars had assumed a sort of jump from one form of addiction (drugs, alcohol) to another: the
Islam of the first generations.
Religious practices. Direct and reverse osmosis among the groups
Religious practices could represent another starting point for a further discussion. The informants
are practicing Muslims, who follow what indicated by their religion: they do not drink alcohol, they
do not eat pork, theey pray five times a day, respect the fasting during the Holy Month of Ramadan,
aspire to go on pilgrimage once at least in their life, and if they are men they attend the dzumma on
Fridays, if women they refrain from praying, fasting and touching the Qr'an during their periods.
Therefore it seems clear that, being all of them practicing Muslims, the object of interest here
consists not so much in mandatory beliefs but rather in those facoltativ ones. For example, not all
regularly practice zakat (alms ritual) outside of Ramadan's period, or they have been more times on
pilgrimage (local, as Ajatovica, or to Mecca) during their lifetime . Members of Naqshbandiyya,
for example, have to attend some optional rituals. In addition to daily appointments indeed they
have to go to Tekija at least once a week for the collective zikir (the act of remembering Allah).
Anyway, finally, we can say that the debate about the most controversial practices, such as the
headscarf (hijab/niqab), physical contact with the opposite sex, or about extreme religious practices,
such as the tafkir, are all elements that allow us to uncover perceptions about Muslim brothers in
other currents, especially around the neo-Salafis, often described by others as "those who don't have
not knowledge." If the supporters of Bugari are afraid to make too strong judgments (gibet)25, the
dervish of Naqshbandiyya are much more explicit, opposing the joy of being a Muslim believer
based on positive values, to the sadness of "Muslims living in denial and prohibition".
“The neo-Salafi in Sarajevo are similar to date palms. You can grow them and make them prosper in Bosnia but it will
constitute a major cost and a waste of resources. In Bosnia there are alternatives to date, alternative local plums. They
cost less and they are very tasty.” Interview with Hussein (Sufi)
If the words of Hussein are an example of reverse osmosis, the attitude of Mladi Muslimani gives
us back acts of ordinary direct osmosis towards the most conservatives ones. Informators who are
“politic” members of Mladi Muslimani have friends among the neo-Salafis, they do not indulge in
strong comments about them. Also, there were visits by ultra-conservatives to their cafe' during my
stay.
25
Judging the others’s sin.
Privatization of Islam vs European Islam and nation
However the direct cases of osmosis among the four groups don’t limit themselves to a simple level
of friendship. Among young practicing Muslims there are some “mixed” informants. Zinka, for
example, a member of Mladi Muslimani, dresses like an ultra-conservative: “they think I am one of
them because of my outfit”, she said, “but they are just furka (somebody who wishes to be what he
or she actually can’t). She also declared to love Bugari’s spechees, “even if I do not completely
agree with his ideas about Islam” she added when I asked her about her potential religious leader.
Bilal and Amela are “mixed” as well: both are among the dervishes of Seih Brzina and followers of
Bugari in the meantime...and so on. The new practicing Muslim can choose to live Islam picking up
aspects of this and that current, personalizing their own way to practise their beliefs. If Grace
Davie’s theory about the “European exception” is right this could suggest us that Islam in Bosnia
is an example of European Islam not because, as people love to say, it is tollerant since “Bosnian
Muslims are used to live among non Muslim for centuries” but rather because with the fall of
communist Yugoslavia the religious market gives the chance to believe without belonging, or at
least belonging according to personal views.
Anyway the informants seem to agree with the image of Bosnian Islam as European Islam’s model
advertised by the Islamic Community26. They condemn the lack of spirituality of the Western
lifestyle (and their spiritual diseases, homosexuality' included), praising the power of science or, as
Arnold Toynbee would say, the “tecnological superiority” of the West. Thus the European Islam
appears as the balanced way in order to reach happiness.
This finding about the West still does not reveal anger or hostility in most cases. A good deal of
resentment for the West's behavior in the management of the tragic conflicts of the nineties appears
instead where “Bosniak idenity” is strong. In other words, when the nation emptied thereligion of
its content original content. Those who have developed a clear national identity began to feed at the
same time a certain amount of anti-Western feelings, suggesting that the aversion toward the West
has more to do with the national sphere than with their faith: Islam. The supporters of Hafiz
Sulejman Bugari, together with the followers of the Sufi brotherhood, rarely accept to be called
Bosniaks, or at least just Bosniaks (unlike the members of Mladi Muslimani) and they are aware, so
they explained, “that a clear national identity would lead to another war.” According Bugari’s
followers and Naqshbandiyya’s members opinion " politics should solve people's problems and not
deal with religious symbols." For this segment of believers , therefore, religion is de facto relegated
to private life. Are we in front of the true faith? One that resists any form of hybrid religionpolitics?
Talking about the territorial issue, no informant has opted for a separation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, even if it would happen peacefully. According to Olivier Roy not only the spiritualist
Islam but also the neo-fundamentalism of religion would be the answer to the thorny issue of
deterritorialization. As the author of Global Muslim notes: “the concept of Islamic state is
contradictory and impossible to achieve because if there a state, it means that there is a primacy of
politics, and thus a form of secularization. Hence the need 'to create a virtual umma (beyond the'
boundaries). Following the thought by Olivier Roy, the Muslim population of Bosnia and
Herzegovina is not very different from any other Western countries, except that the Islamic state in
the Balkans, and therefore the nation-state, would bring not just secularism, but also ethnic cleaning
.
26
See the “Declaration of the European Muslim” by Mustafa Cerić, available at the Islamic Community’s official home
page.
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