Yarbrough v. Lockheed Martin Co.

Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
205 F.R.D. 655
United States District Court,
N.D. Georgia,
Atlanta Division.
Melvin REID, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS CO. and
Lockheed Martin Corp., Defendants.
Farris Yarbrough, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., et al.,
Defendants.
Civ.A. Nos. 1:00–CV–1182–JOF, 1:00–CV–1183–
JOF. | Aug. 2, 2001.
*657 ORDER
FORRESTER, District Judge.
These cases are before the court on Plaintiffs’ motions for
class certification.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs filed these civil rights actions on May 10, 2000,
alleging claims of employment discrimination against
Defendants Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company and
Lockheed Martin Corporation (collectively referred to as
“Defendants” or “Lockheed”).1 Plaintiffs in both actions
bring the following claims on behalf of themselves and
other similarly situated persons: (1) discrimination on the
basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (2)
discrimination on the basis of race, in the form of
disparate treatment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., as
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §
1981a *658 (“Title VII”); (3) discrimination on the basis
of race, in the form of disparate impact, in violation of
Title VII; and (4) state law breach of contract. Plaintiffs
Melvin Reid, Vonda Moore, Johnnie West, and Clarence
Sinkfield (collectively referred to as “the Reid Plaintiffs”)
seek to bring these claims on behalf of certain black
individuals employed by Lockheed on a salary basis.
Plaintiffs Farris Yarbrough, Calvin Combs, Wendell
Carlisle, Rita Oliver, Wayne Elliot, and Joseph Banks
(collectively referred to as “the Yarbrough Plaintiffs”)
seek to advance these claims on behalf of certain black
individuals employed by Lockheed on an hourly basis.
Each of the aforementioned Plaintiffs is a present or
former employee of Lockheed’s facility in Marietta,
Georgia. Each of the Yarbrough Plaintiffs is or was a
member of the Aeronautical Machinists Local Lodge 709.
Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, front and back pay, lost
fringe and pension benefits, compensatory damages for
emotional distress, compensatory damages for pain and
suffering, punitive damages, prejudgment interest, and
fees and costs incurred in bringing these lawsuits.
1
Plaintiffs in civil action number 1:00-CV-1183-JOF
also named as Defendants the International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, A.F.L.–C.I.O.,
as well as the Aeronautical Machinists Local Lodge
709 (collectively referred to as “the Union”). On May
22, 2001, however, Plaintiffs and the Union filed with
the court a notice of proposed partial settlement. As
such, Plaintiffs urge the court to certify a class only as
to their claims against Lockheed. See Pl. Mem. in
Support of Class Cert., 1:00-CV-1183-JOF, at 2-3. The
settlement agreement has not yet been approved by the
court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e) (requiring court approval
for dismissal or compromise of class action).
As alleged in their complaints, Plaintiffs premise their
employment discrimination claims on two distinct
theories of liability: systemic disparate treatment (i.e., a
pattern and practice of discrimination) and disparate
impact. The Reid Plaintiffs allege that Lockheed engages
in a pattern and practice of systemic discrimination
against its black salaried employees that has resulted in
disparities between those employees and their white
counterparts in the areas of promotions, training and
assignments, compensation, and performance evaluations.
Moreover, this systemic discrimination has allegedly
resulted in a hostile work environment and retaliation
against black employees who exercise their rights. See
Complaint, 1:00CV1182JOF, ¶¶ 23, 20, 2832; 4346.
Similarly, the Yarbrough Plaintiffs allege that systemic
discrimination against black hourly employees has
resulted in disparities between white and black employees
in the areas of promotions, training, and overtime, and has
resulted in a hostile work environment and retaliation as
well. See Complaint, 1:00CV1183JOF, ¶¶ 2-3, 27, 35-38,
51-57.
Plaintiffs filed the instant motions seeking class
certification on May 9, 2001. In moving for class
certification, Plaintiffs have more clearly described their
claims. Plaintiffs assert that Lockheed maintains an
overall corporate culture, originating at the highest levels
of the corporation and flowing to all facilities operated by
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company, that is openly
antagonistic to its black employees. According to
Plaintiffs, this culture has resulted in common and
centralized policies and practices, related to human
resources generally and areas such as training and
compensation specifically, among the facilities run by
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company. Plaintiffs assert
that these policies and practices give supervisors, almost
all of whom are white, wide discretion and autonomy in
1
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
making personnel decisions, which in turn fosters racial
discrimination in the areas of promotions, compensation,
and performance evaluations. See also Pl. Reply,
1:00CV1182JOF, at 3, 4; Pl. Reply, 1:00CV1183JOF, at
34, 5 (stating that (1) Plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claim
is premised on contention that first level supervisors and
managers are permitted too much discretion and have
engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination and
(2) that Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim is premised on
contention that subjective and discretionary systems have
adverse impact on black employees). Additionally,
Plaintiffs contend that the antagonistic culture at
Lockheed has fostered racial discrimination by creating a
racially hostile workplace. Using Lockheed’s Marietta
facility as an example, Plaintiffs contend that black
employees: are generally kept out of management and
supervisory positions, being retained instead in lower
paying jobs; have little or no access to the promotions
system because positions have not been posted and
selections are based on subjective criteria; receive lower
scores than white employees on performance evaluations;2
are compensated in disparate proportion *659 with white
employees; and are subjected to a racially hostile work
environment.
2
Performance evaluations are not at issue with regard to
the hourly employees.
The Reid Plaintiffs seek certification of the following
classes:
(a) All African–American persons employed on a
salary basis by Lockheed Martin Corporation at
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company’s Marietta
facility (and feeder facilities) from May 10, 1996, to
the present, who are or were subject to the Defendants’
employment, personnel and human resources policies
and practices and who have been, continue to be, or
may in the future be adversely affected by the
Defendants’ racially discriminatory employment
policies and practices;
(b) All African–American persons employed on a
salary basis by Lockheed Martin Corporation at
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company facilities in
Marietta, Georgia, Palmdale, California, Ft. Worth,
Texas, and Greenville, South Carolina, (and feeder
facilities) from May 10, 1996, to the present, who are
or were subject to the Defendants’ employment,
personnel and human resources policies and practices
and who have been, continue to be, or may in the future
be adversely affected by the Defendants’ racially
discriminatory employment policies and practices.
The Reid Plaintiffs additionally aspire to be
representatives of the aforementioned classes and to have
the following attorneys certified as class counsel: Josie A.
Alexander; Johnnie L. Cochran; Hezekiah Sistrunk, Jr.; J.
Keith Givens; and Angela J. Mason.3
3
After the filing of their motions for class certification,
attorneys Michael D. Hausfeld and Joseph M. Sellers
filed an entry of appearance on behalf of the Reid
Plaintiffs.
Likewise, the Yarbrough Plaintiffs seek certification of
the following classes:
(a) All African–American persons employed on an
hourly basis by Lockheed Martin Corporation at
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company’s Marietta
facility (and feeder facilities) from May 10, 1996, to
the present, who are or were subject to the Defendants’
employment, personnel and human resources policies
and practices and who have been, continue to be, or
may in the future be adversely affected by the
Defendants’ racially discriminatory employment
policies and practices;
(b) All African–American persons employed on an
hourly basis by Lockheed Martin Corporation at
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company facilities in
Marietta, Georgia, Palmdale, California, Ft. Worth,
Texas, and Greenville, South Carolina, (and feeder
facilities) from May 10, 1996, to the present, who are
or were subject to the Defendants’ employment,
personnel and human resources policies and practices
and who have been, continue to be, or may in the future
be adversely affected by the Defendants’ racially
discriminatory employment policies and practices.
The Yarbrough Plaintiffs also aspire to be representatives
of the aforementioned classes and seek to have attorneys
Alexander, Cochran, Sistrunk, Givens, and Mason
certified as class counsel.
Defendants filed responses in opposition to Plaintiffs’
motions on June 25, 2001. With their responses,
Defendants filed motions to exclude Plaintiffs’ expert
evidence. Additionally, Defendants objected to the
admissibility of several affidavits filed in support of
Plaintiffs’ motions for class certification.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Introduction
Class certification is most warranted in the employment
context where “racial discrimination was the company’s
standard operating procedure—the regular rather than the
unusual practice.” Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467
U.S. 867, 876, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 (1984)
(quoting International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52
L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (footnote omitted)) (discussing
2
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
differences between class-wide suits and individual suits
under Title VII). See also Eastland v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 704 F.2d 613, 618 (11th Cir.1983) (explaining
what plaintiff must show to succeed in action alleging
class-wide discrimination). Class certification is also
warranted where maintenance as a class action constitutes
the most efficient *660 means to remedy an overall
pattern of discrimination. See General Tel. v. Falcon, 457
U.S. 147, 159, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982)
(indicating that class action should advance “the
efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal
purpose of the [class action] procedure”) (internal
quotations omitted). The class action device envisions that
liability can be determined in a single trial, and it
anticipates that members of the class are entitled either to
identical relief or to relief so similar that little more than a
calculator or formula is required to reach the result. See
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 155, 102 S.Ct. 2364 (noting that “the
class-action device saves the resources of both the courts
and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting
every [class member] to be litigated in an economical
fashion.”) (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in
original). Where the alleged discrimination results from
the actions of an individual employee, supervisor, or
decision-maker, maintaining a lawsuit as a class action
may not be appropriate.
In the initial days after the enactment of Title VII, class
action law in the employment discrimination context
developed in a culture where many employers completely
excluded members of minority groups from positions and
other job benefits at any but the lowest levels of the
company. Statistical evidence showing such wholesale
exclusion and deprivation easily established patterns and
practices of discrimination because “nothing is as
emphatic as zero.” Wade v. Mississippi Co-op. Extension
Service, 528 F.2d 508, 517 (5th Cir.1976) (quoting United
States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 417 F.2d 852, 858 (5th
Cir.1969)).4
4
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th
Cir.1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as
binding precedent all decisions rendered by the former
Fifth Circuit prior to October 1, 1981.
approach, a plaintiff suffering a specific injury as a result
of discriminatory policies could represent other class
members suffering different injuries so long as those
injuries resulted from the same discrimination injuring the
plaintiff. See, e.g., Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 F.2d
895 (5th Cir.1978); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir.1969). As the culture has
changed, however, and new statutes have been enacted, it
has become apparent that class certification is no longer a
nearly automatic outcome. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161,
102 S.Ct. 2364 (disapproving of “across-the-board”
approach and holding that Title VII classes can be
certified only after “rigorous analysis”).
In contrast to the early days of Title VII, it is now more
uncommon to find an employer that overtly encourages
wholesale discrimination on the basis of race; race
discrimination today usually comes in more subtle forms.
It is perhaps more unusual still to find an employer such
as a federal defense contractor—required by Executive
Order 11246 and 41 C.F.R. § 602.1 to create and
implement affirmative action programs, and whose
employees are represented by a number of different
unions—that can manage to engage in discrimination on a
class-wide basis in the face of executive branch oversight
and collectively-bargained grievance procedures through
which issues of discrimination can be brought to light.
Thus, the instant cases are brought in a societal milieu and
employment environment notably different from those
existing at the time Title VII was enacted and the first
decisions under that statute were rendered. Furthermore,
the amendments to Title VII enacted as a part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which ensure both the right to a jury
trial and the right to compensatory and punitive damages,
have materially changed the class certification analysis, as
discussed below. Indeed, as the *661 instant cases
demonstrate, claims of employment discrimination
inherently raise many hurdles that must be overcome
before certification of a class action can be achieved.
Plaintiffs here ultimately fail to overcome those hurdles.
B. Evidentiary Matters
1. Expert Evidence
This culture of total exclusion explains the early
development of class action law in the employment
discrimination context. It is the nature of the law, in
common law jurisdictions, to define itself by reference to
the problems immediately at hand. Thus, a review of early
Title VII decisions, which addressed a climate of overt
and comprehensive discrimination, may encourage a
belief that class certification is easily obtained. For
example, the former Fifth Circuit repeatedly approved an
“across-the-board” approach to class certification in cases
alleging discrimination in employment. Under this
Before explaining why class certification is not warranted
in these cases, the court must address the evidentiary
disputes raised by the parties. Defendants urge the court
to exclude the expert opinions of Dr. Burt S. Barnow and
Dr. Frank J. Landy under Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
as interpreted in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993),
and its progeny. Without addressing the full panoply of
issues relevant to the Daubert analysis,5 the court agrees
that the opinions proffered by these experts are
troublesome in several respects. For example, Dr. Barnow
3
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
admitted in his deposition that his reports contain
numerous errors including mathematical mistakes, the
inclusion of wrong and misleading tables, counting as
zeros disparities that really were not zeros, and missing an
implied decimal that rendered some of the disparities
incorrect and changed some of the variances.6 See Barnow
Depo., at 27-30, 238-39, 274-79, 281-83, 335-36, 364,
381-82, 460-64, 485, 491-92, 517-19, 539-40.
Additionally, the court is concerned by Dr. Barnow’s
heavy reliance on assistants in completing his report.
While there is nothing unseemly per se in an expert
relying on his staff, Dr. Barnow seemed a bit uncertain as
to which staff member actually performed which task. Id.
at 117-19. Moreover, in his deposition, Dr. Barnow
displayed a lack of familiarity with the data and source
documents for his report, as well as some of the processes
by which that information was analyzed. Id. at 291-93,
300, 302, 335, 367, 369, 373-74, 455-57, 521-22. This
becomes even more troublesome given Dr. Barnow’s
admission that he neither checked all of the computer
codes used to analyze the data nor compared all of the
numbers provided by his staff with the actual computer
output. Id. at 26-27, 30-31, 113, 115-16.
5
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that “[i]f
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise.” In interpreting this rule, the Supreme
Court has imposed a special gatekeeping role on trial
judges, instructing them to “ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113
S.Ct. 2786. The court does not at this time fully analyze
the reliability and relevance requirements, nor does it
mention all of the problems presented by the opinions
of Plaintiffs’ experts.
6
Dr. Barnow testified, however, that the implied decimal
problem would not change the probability values,
which he uses to determine whether or not a disparity is
statistically significant. See Barnow Depo., p. 492.
culture and climate at Lockheed’s Marietta facility, even
though he admittedly has never been to that facility or
interviewed anyone at that facility. Id. at 105-06, 604,
649, 653.
The foregoing issues cause the court some concern with
regard to the reliability of the reports produced by Dr.
Barnow and Dr. Landy. Nonetheless, for present purposes
of resolving Plaintiffs’ motions for class certification, the
court will consider their expert evidence. Defendants’
motions to exclude Plaintiffs’ experts will be HELD in
ABEYANCE.
This is not to say that the court will consider all of the
expert materials provided in these cases. Dr. Landy’s
supplemental report, dated July 9, 2001, and the
amendments *662 to Dr. Barnow’s reports, produced by
Plaintiffs on July 19, 2001, will not be considered because
they were not timely produced. Pursuant to this court’s
verbal order on April 18, 2001, subsequently
memorialized in writing, Plaintiffs were to produce Dr.
Landy’s reports no later than May 7, 2001 and Dr.
Barnow’s reports no later than May 9, 2001. The court
repeatedly informed counsel of its intention to keep on
schedule in these cases, and it made clear that expert
reports produced after the deadlines would not be
accepted. It appears that Dr. Landy, at least, was made
aware of the court’s instruction in this regard, testifying
that he understood that his original reports would not be
supplemented for purposes of class certification and that
he did not have any undisclosed opinions. See Landy
Depo., at 89. When Dr. Barnow was deposed on June 5
and 6, 2001, roughly four weeks after his report was
produced, he testified that he was not waiting on any
additional information and had no plans to engage in any
more analysis. See Barnow Depo., at 130-31, 287-88, 439.
Despite the court’s admonitions and the testimony just
recited, Dr. Landy produced a supplemental report more
than a month after his deposition. Similarly, almost two
weeks after Dr. Barnow’s deposition, and only one week
before Defendants had to respond to Plaintiffs’ class
certification motions, Plaintiffs produced amendments to
his reports. On these facts, the court finds that the
supplemental and amended reports are untimely.
[1]
Because Dr. Landy admittedly relied on Dr. Barnow’s
analyses in forming his conclusions, these same concerns
arise with respect to Dr. Landy’s opinions. See Landy
Depo., at 76-77, 245-46, 296, 418-20, 430-31, 607, 645.
More problematic still is that Dr. Landy did not have Dr.
Barnow’s full reports until after his own report had been
completed. Id. at 248-56, 618-20. Also of concern is the
fact that Dr. Landy’s reports fail to cite sources for many
of the factual assertions made therein, and Dr. Landy
could not provide specific sources at his deposition.
Finally, much of Dr. Landy’s opinion concerns the work
Plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary is unavailing.
Plaintiffs contend that Rule 26(e)(1) requires them to
supplement incorrect or incomplete information and that
they have until thirty days before trial to do so. The court
agrees that Plaintiffs possess a duty under Rule 26(e)(1)
to provide corrective information to their experts’ reports
and deposition testimony, and it acknowledges that the
rule requires such information to be produced at least
thirty days before trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(1)
(referencing time provisions of Rule 26(a)(3)). Rule 26
does not, however, bestow upon litigants unfettered
freedom to rely on supplements produced after a courtimposed deadline, even if the rule’s pretrial time limit is
4
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
satisfied. In short, Rule 26 imposes a duty on Plaintiffs; it
grants them no right to produce information in a belated
fashion.
[2]
The issues presented by Plaintiffs’ motions for class
certification, not to mention the concomitant issues
concerning their reliance upon expert opinions, are
complex. By producing the supplemental and amended
reports when they did, Plaintiffs diminished Defendants’
ability to pursue discovery on the amendments or to
respond adequately to the morass of issues relating to
class certification. Plaintiffs’ offer to produce Dr. Barnow
for deposition on June 20, 2001, see Ex. 1 to Pl. Daubert
Resp., Mason Aff., at ¶¶ 7, 9, only two business days
before Defendants’ response was due, did not provide
Defendants a meaningful opportunity to conduct
discovery about the amendments. Moreover, Plaintiffs’
assertion that Defendants “cross-examined” Dr. Barnow’s
research assistant, and therefore have no need for further
discovery on this issue, demonstrates a fundamental
insensitivity to the practical needs of counsel in a case of
this sort. Plaintiffs permitted Defendants’ counsel to
speak by telephone with one of Dr. Barnow’s research
assistants. Id. at ¶¶ 11-13. Whatever may have transpired
during that conversation, the answers to Defendants’
questions were neither provided by Dr. Barnow nor made
under oath. The court fails to see how these unsworn
statements, made by someone other than the proffered
witness, obviates Defendants’ need to depose Dr. Barnow
about the changes to his reports.7 Additionally, Dr.
Landy’s supplemental report was produced after
Defendants’ response to class certification, and
Defendants obviously have no opportunity to pursue
discovery on any new information contained therein.8
7
It is clear from Dr. Barnow’s rebuttal reports that he
has revised certain of his prior analyses. See, e.g., Ex. 3
to Pl. Daubert Resp., at 4-5 (discussing revised
regression analyses concerning measure of tenure); Ex
4 to Pl. Daubert Resp., at 3-4 (same). To the extent that
Dr. Barnow’s rebuttal reports rely on data or analyses
revised or added since his deposition, they also will not
be considered for purposes of class certification.
8
To the extent that Dr. Landy’s supplement offers a
point-by-point response to Defendants’ Daubert
motion, the court notes that such a task is the
responsibility of Plaintiffs’ counsel, not Plaintiffs’
expert witness.
*663 2. Affidavits of Putative Class Members
Defendants also urge the court to disregard statements in
several affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs on the bases that
these statements are contradicted by the affiants’
deposition testimony and/or constitute inadmissible
hearsay. A comparison of the affidavits with the
deposition testimony cited by the parties reveals that
several statements contained in the affidavits are
contradicted by the deposition testimony. Moreover, the
depositions cast doubt on the accuracy of several other
statements contained in the affidavits. Nonetheless, for
present purposes of resolving Plaintiffs’ motions for class
certification, the court will not strike the affidavits of the
putative class members. Where those affidavits are
expressly contradicted by deposition testimony without
explanation, however, the deposition testimony will
control. See Van T. Junkins & Assocs. v. U.S. Indus., 736
F.2d 656, 656 (11th Cir.1984) (“[A] district court may
find an affidavit which contradicts testimony on
deposition a sham when the party merely contradicts its
prior testimony without giving any valid explanation.”)
C. Class Certification Standard
Class determinations are governed by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23. “A class action may be maintained
only when it satisfies all the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P.
23(a) and at least one of the alternative requirements of
Rule 23(b).” Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc.,
211 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir.2000) (quoting Jackson v.
Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1005 (11th
Cir.1997)). See also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 613–14, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689
(1997). In addition to the requirements imposed by Rule
23, it is well settled in this circuit that “any analysis of
class certification must begin with the issue of standing
....” Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 810 (11th
Cir.2001) (quoting Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476,
1482 (11th Cir.1987)). See also Carter v. West Publ’g
Co., 225 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir.2000) (“A plaintiff
who brings a Title VII action on behalf of a class must
satisfy two prerequisites: (1) the named plaintiff must
have standing to bring the claim, and (2) the requirements
of Rule 23 must be fulfilled.”). In determining the
propriety of a class action, the court is not to consider the
merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. See Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177–78, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40
L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). Nevertheless, where necessary “to
determine whether the interests of the absent parties are
fairly encompassed within the named plaintiff’s claim,”
the court may “probe behind the pleadings before coming
to rest on the certification question.” General Tel. Co. v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d
740 (1982). “The initial burden of proof to establish the
propriety of class certification rests with the advocate of
the class.” Avis, 211 F.3d at 1233. Thus, Plaintiffs bear
the burden of demonstrating that they have standing to
bring the claims asserted on behalf of the class and that
class certification is proper.
5
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
similar discriminatory treatment in the same time
frame”).11
D. Standing
The court begins its class certification analysis by
addressing several issues related to Plaintiffs’ standing to
represent the classes proposed in their motions. First, the
court concludes that the Reid Plaintiffs have not shown
that they have standing to pursue Title VII claims arising
prior to December 19, 1997 or § 1981 claims arising prior
to May 10, 1998, and that the Yarbrough Plaintiffs have
not shown that they have standing to pursue Title VII
claims arising prior to February 26, 1998 or § 1981 claims
arising prior to May 10, 1998. Second, the court
concludes that, subject to the above temporal limits, there
is at least one named Plaintiff in each case that has
standing to bring the types of discrimination claims
advanced in Plaintiffs’ complaints.9
9
Defendants also challenge Plaintiffs’ standing to
represent multi-facility classes. The court finds that the
multi-facility issue is more properly one of
commonality and typicality than of standing, and this
issue will be addressed when the court examines the
specific requirements of Rule 23(a).
*664 1. Statute of Limitations
Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ ability to bring class
claims arising as early as May 10, 1996, the date set forth
in Plaintiffs’ proposed classes. Title VII requires a
plaintiff to file a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within
180 days of the unlawful act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e).
The earliest charge filed by any of the Reid Plaintiffs was
that filed by Plaintiff Reid on June 16, 1998. See Reid
Depo., p. 395 & Ex. 7; Def. Ex. 11. Thus, as Defendants
point out, the limitations period on the Reid Plaintiffs’
Title VII claims appears to reach only to December 19,
1997. The limitations period on the Title VII claims
advanced by the Yarbrough Plaintiffs does not reach even
that far. The earliest charge filed by any of the Yarbrough
Plaintiffs was that filed by Plaintiff Carlisle on August 25,
1998. See Carlisle Depo., pp. 287-87 & Ex. 13.10 Thus, the
limitations period on the Yarbrough Plaintiffs’ Title VII
claims appears to reach only to February 26, 1998. Both
of these dates are well after the May 10, 1996 date
proposed by Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs have not shown that
they have standing to bring class claims preceding these
dates. See Carter, 225 F.3d at 1263 (explaining that
plaintiff can represent class members pursuant to single
EEOC charge where “at least one plaintiff ... ha[s] timely
filed an EEOC complaint” and “the individual claims of
the filing and non-filing plaintiffs have arisen out of
10
Attached as an exhibit to Plaintiff Banks’ deposition is
a charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC on
November 4, 1996. See Banks Depo., pp. 470-71 &
Union Ex. 10. The events described in this charge have
already been litigated by Plaintiff Banks in a prior
lawsuit. See Banks Depo., Union Ex. 1 & Union Ex. 2.
11
As Defendants point out, Plaintiffs’ motions for class
certification fail to mention any legal basis for their
proposed date of May 10, 1996. Despite this failure,
Plaintiffs make reference to the continuing violation
doctrine in a footnote in their reply memoranda. See,
e.g., Pl. Reply, 1:00-CV-1182-JOF, at 8 n.14. Plaintiffs
do not, however, develop their argument for applying
the continuing violation doctrine to their Title VII
claims. Rather, they merely cite to a discussion of the
continuing violation doctrine made in a previous
pleading that concerned different issues than those
currently facing the court. See Pl.Ex. 104, Reply to
Defendants’ Response in Opposition to the EEOC’s
Motion to Intervene, at 5-7. Not surprisingly, the
application of the continuing violation doctrine in the
context of a class action is not fully addressed in the
cited document. Because Plaintiffs raise the continuing
violation doctrine for the first time in reply, and
because they have failed fully to brief the complex
issues relating to that doctrine, the court will not
consider the continuing violation doctrine for purposes
of ruling on their motions for class certification. See
United States v. Georgia Dept. of Natural Resources,
897 F.Supp. 1464, 1471 (N.D.Ga.1995) (Forrester, J.)
(“This court will not consider arguments raised for the
first time in a reply brief.”).
Similarly, Plaintiffs have not established that they have
standing to bring claims under § 1981 that reach back to
May 10, 1996. Section 1981 does not contain a statute of
limitations, and therefore “federal courts should select the
most appropriate or analogous state statute of limitations.”
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660, 107
S.Ct. 2617, 96 L.Ed.2d 572. In Lukens, the Supreme
Court held that, as with claims under § 1983, federal
courts adjudicating § 1981 claims should borrow the state
statute of limitations governing personal injury actions.
See id. at 661–62, 107 S.Ct. 2617. Accordingly, the twoyear statute of limitations found in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33
applies to Plaintiffs’ § 1981 claims in these cases. Cf.
Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 715–16 & n. 2
(11th Cir.1987) (holding that two-year limitations period
found in § 9-3-33 applies to § 1983 actions brought in
Georgia district courts). Because these cases were filed on
May 10, 2000, Plaintiffs’ § 1981 claims reach back only
to May 10, 1998, and they have not shown that they have
standing to pursue class claims preceding this date.12
6
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
12
Although Plaintiffs do not articulate the argument in
either their motions or their reply briefs, a footnote in
their Reply to Defendants’ Response in Opposition to
the EEOC’s Motion to Intervene contended that the
appropriate limitations period for claims under § 1981
is four years. See Pl.Ex. 104, at 5 (citing Nealey v.
University Health Services, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 1358
(S.D.Ga.2000) (Alaimo, J.)). In Nealey, the court
applied the four-year statute of limitations found in 28
U.S.C. § 1658 to a claim brought under § 1981. See
Nealey, 114 F.Supp.2d at 1364–66. Because Plaintiffs
have not specifically argued with regard to the instant
motions that § 1658 applies to their § 1981 claims, the
court will not address that issue. Moreover, even if
Plaintiffs had properly advanced such an argument, the
court would find it unavailing. See Madison v. IBP,
Inc., 257 F.3d 780, 796–98 (8th Cir.2001) (finding that
§ 1658 does not apply to claims brought under § 1981);
Zubi v. AT & T Corp., 219 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir.2000)
(same); Chawla v. Emory Univ., No. 1:95–CV–0750–
JOF, 1997 WL 907570, at *12–14 (N.D.Ga. Feb. 13,
1997) (Deane, M.J.) (same), adopted in relevant part by
Chawla v. Emory Univ., No. 1:95-CV-0750-JOF, 1997
WL 907571 (N.D.Ga. Mar. 31, 1997) (Forrester J.).
*665 2. Types of Discrimination Suffered by the Named
Plaintiffs
The court must also determine whether at least one named
Plaintiff in each case has standing to bring the type of
discrimination claims advanced in Plaintiffs’ complaints,
subject to the temporal scope defined above. See Griffin v.
Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1483 (11th Cir.1987) (“... [A]
claim cannot be asserted on behalf of a class unless at
least one named plaintiff has suffered the injury that gives
rise to that claim.”). As demonstrated, Plaintiffs advance
claims of discrimination relating to promotions, training,
performance evaluations (with regard to salaried
employees), and compensation, as well as claims of a
racially hostile work environment and retaliation. With
regard to the Reid Plaintiffs, the court finds that at least
one of the four named Plaintiffs has alleged an injury
giving rise to each of the claims advanced in their
complaint. See Complaint, 1:00-CV-1182-JOF, at ¶ 43
(alleging that Plaintiff Reid personally suffered racial
discrimination with regard to promotions, compensation,
evaluations, training, hostile environment, and
retaliation); id. at ¶ 44 (alleging that Plaintiff Moore
personally suffered racial discrimination with regard to
compensation, evaluations, training, hostile environment,
and retaliation); id. at ¶ 45 (alleging that Plaintiff West
personally suffered racial discrimination with regard to
compensation and training); id. at ¶ 46 (alleging that
Plaintiff
Sinkfield
personally
suffered
racial
discrimination with regard to promotions, evaluations,
hostile environment, and retaliation). Also, because
Plaintiff Moore remains employed by Lockheed, there
exists a substantial likelihood that she will be affected by
Defendants’ alleged discrimination in the future, and she
therefore has standing to seek injunctive relief. See
Wooden v. Board of Regents, 247 F.3d 1262, 1283 (11th
Cir.2001) (“... [T]o have standing to obtain forwardlooking relief, a plaintiff must show a sufficient
likelihood that he will be affected by the allegedly
unlawful conduct in the future.”).13
13
Plaintiffs Reid, West, and Sinkfield are no longer
employed by Lockheed, see Reid Depo., p. 364; West
Depo., p. 89; Sinkfield Depo., p. 28, and do not have
standing to seek injunctive relief.
Similarly, with regard to the Yarbrough Plaintiffs, the
court finds that at least one named Plaintiff has suffered
an injury giving rise to the claims advanced in their
complaint. See Complaint, 1:00-CV-1183-JOF, at ¶ 51
(alleging that Plaintiff Yarbrough personally suffered
racial discrimination with regard to promotions, training,
hostile environment, and retaliation); id. at ¶ 52 (alleging
that Plaintiff Combs personally suffered racial
discrimination with regard to promotions, training,
overtime, hostile environment, and retaliation); id. at ¶ 53
(alleging that Plaintiff Kirkland personally suffered racial
discrimination with regard to promotions, training,
overtime, hostile environment, and retaliation); id. at ¶ 54
(alleging that Plaintiff Carlisle personally suffered racial
discrimination with regard to promotions, training, hostile
environment, and retaliation); id. at ¶ 55 (alleging that
Plaintiff Oliver personally suffered racial discrimination
with regard to promotions, hostile environment, and
retaliation); id. at ¶ 56 (alleging that Plaintiff Elliot
personally suffered racial discrimination with regard to
promotions, retaliation, and compensation); id. at ¶ 57
(alleging that Plaintiff Banks personally suffered racial
discrimination with regard to promotions, hostile
environment, and retaliation). Additionally, it appears
from their deposition testimony that Plaintiffs Yarbrough,
Combs, Oliver, and Banks remain currently employed by
Lockheed and have standing to pursue injunctive relief.
See Yarbrough Depo., p. 102; Combs Depo., p. 73; Oliver
Depo., pp. 91-92; Banks Depo., p. 54.
E. Requirements of Rule 23(a)
Rule 23(a) allows maintenance of a class action only if all
four of the following requirements *666 are satisfied: (1)
“the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable”; (2) “there are questions of law or fact
common to the class”; (3) “the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class”; and (4) “the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). These four requirements are known
generally as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
7
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
adequacy of representation. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613,
117 S.Ct. 2231. For the following reasons, the court finds
that Plaintiffs have not satisfied all of the requirements of
Rule 23(a) and are not entitled to class certification.
1. Numerosity
[3] [4] [5] [6]
To satisfy the numerosity prerequisite, Plaintiffs
must “show some evidence or reasonable estimate of the
number of class members.” Grimes v. Pitney Bowes, Inc.,
100 F.R.D. 265, 269 (N.D.Ga.1983) (Forrester, J.)
(quoting 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, Moore’s Federal
Practice ¶ 23.05(3), at 23–61 (2d ed.1982)). Precedent in
this circuit, however, holds that “[t]he basic question is
practicability of joinder, not number of interested persons
per se.” Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th
Cir.1980). Thus, mere numbers are not dispositive, and
the court should consider such factors as “the size of the
class, ease of identifying its members and determining
their addresses, facility of making service on them if
joined and their geographic dispersion.” Id. Both
Plaintiffs and Defendants agree that the numerosity
requirement is met in these cases, and the court concurs.
Evidence submitted by Plaintiffs shows that there were
more than 300 black employees paid on a salaried basis,
and more than 700 black employees paid on an hourly
basis, at Lockheed’s Marietta facility during the relevant
time period. See Pl.Ex. 41, at 9; Pl.Ex. 83, at 7. Based on
these figures, the court finds that the proposed classes
contain a large number of members that would render
joinder in one suit impracticable, despite their close
geographic proximity to one another and any ease in
identifying them. As such, the numerosity requirement is
met.
2. Commonality and Typicality
In contrast to the numerosity requirement, the court
concludes that the commonality and typicality
requirements of Rule 23(a) are not satisfied in these cases.
The Supreme Court has explained that the commonality
and typicality prerequisites “tend to merge,” and that
“[b]oth serve as guideposts for determining whether under
the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action
is economical and whether the named plaintiff’s claim
and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of
the class members will be fairly and adequately protected
in their absence.” Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n. 13, 102 S.Ct.
2364. The Eleventh Circuit has further explained that
“commonality refers to the group characteristics of the
class as a whole and typicality refers to the individual
characteristics of the named plaintiff in relation to the
class.” Prado–Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d
1266, 1279 (11th Cir.2000).
[7] [8]
Although the court does not at this stage examine the
merits of Plaintiffs’ case, it may properly consider
evidence relating to the discrimination allegedly suffered
by the class, as well as the manner in which that evidence
fits into the legal framework governing the claims pled in
Plaintiffs’ complaints. See Nelson v. United States Steel
Corp., 709 F.2d 675, 679 (11th Cir.1983). Commonality
requires that “a class action ... involve issues that are
susceptible to class-wide proof,” Murray, 244 F.3d at 811,
and the court must review the evidence to determine
whether this requirement is satisfied. Moreover,
“evidence relevant to the commonality requirement is
often intertwined with the merits.” Nelson, 709 F.2d at
679. In addition, with regard to typicality, the court must
be able to determine whether the named Plaintiffs
“possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as
the class members.” Murray, 244 F.3d at 811. In short,
Plaintiffs’ burden at this stage “entails more than the
simple assertion of [commonality and typicality] but less
than a prima facie showing of liability.” Nelson, 709 F.2d
at 680 (quoting Gilchrist v. Bolger, 89 F.R.D. 402, 406
(S.D.Ga.1981)). A review of the legal framework and the
record evidence *667 leads the court to conclude that
Plaintiffs have not carried their burden.
a. Plaintiffs’ Claims
As explained, Plaintiffs challenge Defendants’
employment practices—relating to promotions, training,
compensation, evaluations, hostile environment, and
retaliation—under both disparate impact and disparate
treatment theories.14 To prove disparate impact, Plaintiffs
will have to demonstrate that Defendants “use[ ] a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate
impact on the basis of race ....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
Plaintiffs, therefore, will have to identify “a facially
neutral employment practice coupled with proof of its
discriminatory impact.” See, e.g., In re Employment
Discrimination Litig., 198 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th
Cir.1999); Eastland v. TVA, 704 F.2d 613, 619 (11th
Cir.1983). Disparate impact is generally established by
statistical evidence, which should “show that there is a
legally significant disparity between (a) the racial
composition, caused by the challenged employment
practice, of the pool of those enjoying a ... job benefit;
and (b) the racial composition of the qualified applicant
pool.” In re Employment Discrimination, 198 F.3d at
1312. Disparate impact claims do not require proof of
discriminatory intent. See EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab,
Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1273 (11th Cir.2000). By contrast,
“[i]n a disparate treatment case proof of discriminatory
motive is essential.” Eastland, 704 F.2d at 618. Statistical
8
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
evidence often plays a vital role in establishing class-wide
discrimination under a disparate treatment theory as well,
and if sufficiently strong and compelling, it may establish
discrimination by itself. See Carmichael v. Birmingham
Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1131 (11th Cir.1984);
Eastland, 704 F.2d at 618. Additionally, Plaintiffs may
offer anecdotal evidence to bolster their claims of
disparate treatment. See Eastland, 704 F.2d at 618.
Establishing commonality or typicality under a disparate
treatment theory, however, is more difficult than doing so
under disparate impact. See Washington v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 959 F.2d 1566, 1570 n. 10
(11th Cir.1992); Nelson, 709 F.2d at 679 n. 9.15
14
15
In their memoranda supporting class certification,
Plaintiffs fail to include a discussion of the required
elements of either their disparate impact or disparate
treatment claims. Similarly, Plaintiffs make little effort
to show how proving the elements of their individual
claims will also prove the claims of the absent class
members. The Supreme Court has made plain that “a
Title VII class action, like any other class action, may
only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a
rigorous analysis, that the requirements of Rule 23(a)
have been satisfied.” Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161, 102 S.Ct.
2364 (emphasis added). Because commonality and
typicality cannot be presumed, the court finds
Plaintiffs’ scanty discussion of these requirements
troublesome.
In an apparent attempt to remedy these deficiencies,
however, Plaintiffs have attached to their replies two
“exhibits” showing why the named Plaintiffs’ claims
are typical to those of the class. See Pl. Reply, Ex.
103 & Ex. 110. These “exhibits” are nothing more
than legal memoranda, each consisting of eleven
pages of briefing followed by evidentiary
attachments, which contain some of the very
discussions that should have been included in
Plaintiffs’ supporting memoranda. Furthermore,
these “exhibits” display a great lack of respect both
for the rules of procedure and the orders of this court.
The court limited Plaintiffs’ reply briefs to ten pages.
Plaintiffs may not avoid that limitation merely by
appending their discussions of typicality to the end of
the briefs and calling them “exhibits.” The court
STRIKES Exhibits 103 and 110 from Plaintiffs’
replies and will not consider them in resolving the
instant dispute.
Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which can be
violated only by intentional discrimination, may be
advanced exclusively under a theory of disparate
treatment. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v.
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 73
L.Ed.2d 835 (1982). “The elements of a claim of race
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are ... the same
as a Title VII disparate treatment claim in the
employment context.” Rice–Lamar v. City of Ft.
Lauderdale, 232 F.3d 836, 843 n. 11 (11th Cir.2000).
b. Multi-Facility Classes
[9]
Because all of the named Plaintiffs in these cases are
current or former employees at Lockheed’s Marietta
facility, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs cannot bring
claims on behalf of black employees who work at other
facilities. The court has found no Eleventh Circuit
decisions analyzing whether and when a plaintiff
employed at one facility of a defendant may represent a
class of employees at other facilities operated by the same
defendant. The consensus among other *668 courts,
however, is that a plaintiff may represent a multi-facility
class only where centralized and uniform employment
practices affect all facilities in the same way. See, e.g.,
Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Telegraph Co., 628 F.2d
267, 279–80 (4th Cir.1980); Lott v. Westinghouse
Savannah River Co., 200 F.R.D. 539, 555–56
(D.S.C.2000); Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Prod.,
Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 238-40 (W.D.Tex.1999); Morgan v.
United Parcel Service, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 349, 356
(E.D.Mo.1996); Seidel v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 93 F.R.D. 122, 124–25 (W.D.Wash.1981); Webb v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.R.D. 645, 651
(E.D.Pa.1978).
[10]
A review of the decision in Webb proves instructive.
In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that one of the
defendant’s business divisions, consisting of four separate
plants in three states, discriminated against them on the
basis of race in the areas of recruitment, hiring, training,
and promotions. See Webb, 78 F.R.D. at 647–48. The four
named plaintiffs, each of whom worked exclusively at the
first plant, attempted to certify a class of all black persons
employed by the division, regardless of the particular
plant at which they worked. Id. at 648. The court rejected
this attempt, however, finding that the evidence before the
court did not establish centralized and uniform
employment practices, but rather demonstrated that
employment practices were set “by a plant manager
located at each [division] facility.” Id. at 651.
Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiffs could
represent only those black employees employed at the
first facility, and it excluded from the class those black
employees that worked at the other three facilities. Id. See
also Zachery, 185 F.R.D. at 239–40 (refusing to certify
multi-facility class where class consisted of seventeen
business units, spread across fifteen states, each with
varying degrees of local autonomy over employment
decisions); Seidel, 93 F.R.D. at 124–25 (denying motion
for certification of multi-facility class where evidence
demonstrated that employment decisions were made at
local branch level).
The facts of the instant cases are very similar to those in
9
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
Webb. According to the record evidence in these cases,
Lockheed Martin Corporation (“LMC”) was formed in
March 1995 by the merger of Lockheed Corporation and
Martin Marietta Corporation. LMC is currently organized
into five primary Business Areas: Systems Integration;
Space Systems; Aeronautics; Technology Services; and
Global Telecommunications. See Def. Ex. 2, McLaughlin
Aff., at ¶ 3. When LMC was formed in 1995, the
Aeronautics area, or sector as it was then called, was
comprised of four primary facilities: Marietta, Georgia;
Ft. Worth, Texas; Palmdale, California; and Greenville,
South Carolina. See Pl.Ex. 8, Hancock Depo., at 16.
Additionally, within the Aeronautics sector were four
“feeder” facilities: Meridian, Mississippi; Pinellas,
Florida; Clarksburg, West Virginia; and Johnstown,
Pennsylvania. See id. at 26–27; Def. Ex. 6, Gill Depo., at
27. The facilities in Meridian and Clarksburg functioned
as “feeders” for the facility in Marietta, and they were
essentially operated as a department of the Marietta
facility. See Def. Ex. 6, Gill Depo., at 27; Pl.Ex. 11,
Hamlin Depo., at 157-58. In October 1999, the Greenville
facility was moved out of Aeronautics and into
Technology Services. See Pl.Ex. 8, Hancock Depo., at
111. From 1995 to 2000, each of the primary facilities in
the Aeronautics sector had a president, who was the
highest chief executive officer at that particular facility.
See id. at 12, 70; Pl.Ex. 40; Def. Ex. 8, Burbage Aff., at ¶
2. The facility-level president reported to the president of
the Aeronautics sector, who in turn reported to the
executive office of LMC. See Pl.Ex. 8, Hancock Depo., at
13-14.
During the period from 1995 to 2000, LMC issued
Corporate Policy Statements and Corporate Functional
Procedures, “documents used to convey management
philosophy and direction” on the corporate level. See
Pl.Ex. 19, at Y7 0002 00101. These corporate-level
documents, however, constituted only broad-based
statements to provide the lower-level units with an
overarching philosophical framework in which to operate.
The individual business units had the responsibility to
implement that philosophical framework in whatever
specific manner met their particular needs, and LMC did
not monitor compliance with the corporate-level
statements. *669 See Pl.Ex. 14, Powell Depo., at 108-10,
113-16, 165-66; Pl.Ex. 9, Gill Depo., at 34, 36, 88; Def.
Ex. 5, Burbage Depo., at 19. Accordingly, the actual
practices resulting from the corporate-level statements
differed depending on the business unit in question. See
Pl.Ex. 9, Gill Depo., at 36, 88. See also Def. Ex. 2,
McLaughlin Aff., at ¶¶ 4-6 (stating that human resources
data were maintained in decentralized and differing
systems); Def. Ex. 8, Burbage Aff., at ¶ 4 (testifying that
Marietta facility operated independently of other
Aeronautics facilities and possessed its own personnel
policies and procedures).16 In fact, the particular practices
of the individual companies forming LMC remained in
place for some time before LMC even began issuing
corporate policy statements. See Pl.Ex. 14, Powell Depo.,
at 214.17
16
While Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Landy, disagrees with the
distinction between broad corporate policies and local
implementations contained in the testimony of the fact
witnesses, he admits that the local units implemented
the corporate policies according to their needs. See,
e.g., Pl.Ex. 24, Landy Reid Rpt., at 14-15. Moreover, in
opining that the variations in local implementation
“appear trivial,” Dr. Landy cites only to the testimony
of John Gill and Dain Hancock that the local units must
work within the broad guidelines established by the
corporate statements. On the very pages cited by Dr.
Landy, however, the witnesses testify that there is a
difference between overarching corporate policies and
local implementation, and that the actual practices may
be implemented and administered differently. See, e.g.,
Pl.Ex. 9, Gill Depo., at 34-36; Pl.Ex. 8, Hancock Depo.,
at 138. Additionally, in both his report and deposition,
Dr. Landy concedes that there existed differences
between the guidelines established by the corporate
statements and the actual employment decisions made
by local managers and supervisors. See, e.g., Pl.Ex. 24,
Landy Reid Rpt., at 18-19; Landy Depo., at 300-02,
354-55, 416-17. Finally, the court notes that Dr. Landy
often fails to cite specific sources for his factual
assertions, and some of the evidence he does cite has
not been provided to the court. For all of these reasons,
the court finds Dr. Landy’s opinions about the
centralized nature of actual employment practices in the
Aeronautics area to be unpersuasive and rejects those
opinions for purposes of this analysis.
17
The documents submitted by Plaintiffs bear out the lack
of specific corporate-level employment practices. For
example, several of the Corporate Policy Statements
made clear that they were optional for the LMC sectors.
See, e.g., Pl.Ex. 19, at Y7 0002 0086, Y7 0002 0089.
Others contained only very general guidance and left to
management the actual procedures to be implemented.
See, e.g., Pl.Ex. 85. Additionally, it is clear that the
Marietta facility considered itself a separate unit,
promulgating its own procedure for loaning personnel
to or from “other [LMC] companies.” See Pl.Ex. 28, at
LM0022731.
On January 27, 2000, LMC underwent a reorganization
designed to bring the three primary facilities of the
Aeronautics sector, which had been operating as separate
companies, under a single management structure. See Def.
Ex. 5, Burbage Depo., at 38-39; Def. Ex. 8, Burbage Aff.
at ¶ 4. On January 27, 2001, the President of the
Aeronautics Business Area issued a memorandum
declaring that the “transition period is now complete—we
are now operating as one company.” See Pl.Ex. 13. The
record remains a bit ambiguous, however, on the amount
of central control the Aeronautics area currently has over
10
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
employment practices. The entire Aeronautics area, and
indeed all of LMC, currently has a common resume
database and retrieval system, and there is now common
training required for all Aeronautics employees. See
Pl.Ex. 14, Powell Depo., at 131-34; Pl.Ex. 33, Drennan
Depo., at 90-92. It also appears that there is a process in
place to consolidate human resources and employment
practices for the entire Aeronautics area. See Pl.Ex. 21,
Bryant Depo., at 211-12; Def. Ex. 9 & 10. Labor
relations, on the other hand, remain highly decentralized
throughout LMC. There are currently 114 collective
bargaining agreements between the various business units
of LMC and 29 different national unions and 90 different
local unions. Moreover, the particular local business unit
of LMC constitutes the corporate signatory for each of
these agreements. See Def. Ex. 4, Cantwell Aff., at ¶¶ 3-4.
The court finds that, at least until the reorganization of the
Aeronautics area, the facilities at issue in these cases were
not subject to centralized and uniform employment
practices such that Plaintiffs have satisfied the
commonality and typicality requirements with regard to
multi-facility classes. As in Webb, the evidence shows
that employment practices were established at the local
level. Although there existed general corporate
statements, the court *670 finds that the actual
implementation of the procedures visualized by those
statements remained the province of the individual
business units. Moreover, even now, labor relations are
conducted independently by the various business units,
with each local unit negotiating its own collective
bargaining agreement with various national and local
unions. This amount of local autonomy in the
implementation and administration of actual employment
practices, despite the existence of any broad policy
statements at higher levels, counsels against the multifacility class sought by Plaintiffs. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at
159 n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 2364 (noting that “Title VII prohibits
discriminatory employment practices, not an abstract
policy of discrimination”) (emphasis in original).
Also counseling against Plaintiffs’ ability to bring a multifacility class is their core contention that the
discrimination from which they suffered resulted from the
discretion and autonomy given to first-level managers and
supervisors. There is an inherent tension between
Plaintiffs’ arguments that the facilities in the Aeronautics
area had common, centralized employment policies and
their contention that local, first-level supervisors had the
autonomy to make subjective, discriminatory decisions
with regard to promotions, compensation, evaluations,
and training. The best characterization of Plaintiffs’
theory is that Defendants had a centralized policy of
decentralization, which is insufficient on these facts to
satisfy commonality or typicality with respect to
Plaintiffs’ proposed multi-facility classes.
The court acknowledges that a similar theory carried the
day in Morgan, a case relied on by Plaintiffs. The court in
that case found that the employer’s system of allowing
decentralized decision-making did not defeat certification
of a nationwide class. Id. at 356. The facts of Morgan,
however, easily distinguish that case from those sub
judice. The defendant in that case had eleven
geographical regions, headed by regional managers, that
were each divided into six districts run by district
managers. Each district was subdivided into divisions,
each of which had several package operating divisions
possessing several package operations centers. Authority
to promote employees at the division level and below was
vested in the district managers. When making such
decisions, each of the district managers used the same
evaluation and promotion procedures, which were
promulgated by defendant’s national corporate office.
Morgan, 169 F.R.D. at 353–54. Thus, unlike the instant
cases, where Plaintiffs complain that first-level
supervisors were given too much autonomy to make
employment decisions independent of corporate or sector
scrutiny, Morgan involved decisions made by relatively
high-level managers pursuant to uniform procedures
originating at the highest level of the corporation. The
decentralized decisions in Morgan were actually fairly
centralized.
Plaintiffs correctly assert that subjective employment
practices may, under certain circumstances, give rise to a
claim of discrimination. See, e.g., Griffin v. Carlin, 755
F.2d 1516, 1525 (11th Cir.1985) (noting that “subjective
practices such as interviews and supervisory
recommendations are capable of operating as barriers to
minority advancement”). But see Denney v. City of
Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1185 (11th Cir.2001) (explaining
that subjective criteria are not per se improper and will
not show pretext for legitimate employment decision
“[a]bsent evidence that subjective hiring criteria were
used as a mask for discrimination”). But this does not
mean that subjective employment practices necessarily
give rise to a broad, multi-facility class; rather, it leads to
the opposite conclusion. As has been explained by
another court: “The fact that [employment] decisions are
handled by one’s immediate supervisor based on
subjective criteria would be useful evidence in an
individual disparate treatment claim, but works against
class certification of a disparate impact claim when the
proposed class is subject to the same local autonomy in
geographically dispersed facilities.” Zachery, 185 F.R.D.
at
238
(emphases
in
original).
Similarly,
“[g]eographically widespread facilities make it more
difficult to prove a pattern and practice of disparate
treatment.” Id. at 239. See also Stastny, 628 F.2d at 279
(explaining that evidence of local subjectivity may bolster
both individual claim and class-wide claim “in the very
facility where the autonomy is exercised,” but it *671 cuts
against inference that multi-facility class was subjected to
common discrimination).18 Like the court in Zachery, this
court finds that Plaintiffs’ contention of first-level
11
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
subjectivity, coupled with its findings that actual
employment practices for the Aeronautics facilities were
set at the local level, defeats certification of Plaintiffs’
proposed multi-facility classes. See Zachery, 185 F.R.D.
at 239 (“Delving into the practices of each local business
unit and conceivably even into the individual decisions is
precisely the type of individualized inquiry that class
actions were designed to avoid.”). Because none of the
named Plaintiffs worked at any facility other than
Marietta, and because both the evidence and Plaintiffs’
own assertions show that actual employment practices
were highly localized, the court finds that Plaintiffs have
not established commonality or typicality with respect to
the multi-facility classes for which they seek certification.
Further discussion of the class certification issues relevant
to these cases will be addressed only to Plaintiffs’
proposed classes of black employees at the Marietta
facility and its feeders.
18
The Supreme Court has identified discrimination by
“entirely subjective decisionmaking processes,” where
established by “significant proof,” as a claim that could
conceivably justify certification of a class. See Falcon,
457 U.S. at 159 n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 2364. Falcon,
however, neither addressed nor had any occasion to
address the certification of a multi-facility class. See id.
at 152 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 2364 (reciting that district court
in Falcon certified class of employees and applicants at
defendant’s division in Irving, Texas, “and no other
division”).
c. Promotions and Training
[11]
The evidence in these cases fails to demonstrate the
requisite commonality and typicality for class certification
under either a disparate impact theory or a disparate
treatment theory. First, although Plaintiffs claim classwide discrimination with regard to promotions and
training, they have offered no statistical evidence to
support those claims. Plaintiffs’ statistics expert, Dr.
Barnow, expressly testified that he had reached no
conclusions and had formed no opinions about either of
these subjects. See Barnow Depo., at 12, 21, 296, 298-99,
316, 396-97, 453-54. In fact, to the extent that Dr.
Barnow attempted any analysis about promotions, he
testified that “there was no support for the claim of the
plaintiffs, in the analysis we ran.” Id. at 454. Dr. Landy
similarly proffers no opinion with regard to
discrimination in training at the Marietta facility. With
regard to promotions, Dr. Landy does opine that the
resume retrieval system utilized by Lockheed in filling
work positions operates as a decision-maker of sorts by
screening resumes based on various search codes, and he
comments that this system has not been validated. See
Pl.Ex. 24, Landy Reid Rpt., at 24-26; Pl.Ex. 87, Landy
Yarbrough Rpt., at 23-25. In his deposition, however, Dr.
Landy testified that he did not know exactly how
Lockheed used the system, nor had he seen any data on
the potential adverse effect of the system. See Landy
Depo., at 90-92, 358-61. Dr. Landy also opines that there
are common promotional practices that render all
employees at the Marietta facility similarly situated. See
Pl.Ex. 24, Landy Reid Rpt., at 26-28; Pl.Ex. 87, Landy
Yarbrough Rpt., at 26-27. But Dr. Landy offers no
conclusion that these practices had an adverse impact on
black employees or that they were utilized systemically to
treat blacks differently than whites. Finally, the anecdotal
evidence submitted by Plaintiffs, which describes diverse
events concerning different positions and training requests
across a broad time period,19 does not establish
commonality and typicality in the absence of evidence
tending to link these separate events to a class-wide
problem. In short, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated their
ability to prove that Defendants’ promotions and training
practices discriminated against black employees as a
class, nor have they shown that their individual
promotions and training claims are typical to the claims of
the classes.20
19
The affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs describe many
claims, relating to promotions and training as well as
compensation and evaluations, that are outside the
limitations periods for which Plaintiffs have
demonstrated standing.
20
It should be noted that commonality and typicality are
particularly difficult to establish with regard to the
promotions claims of the hourly employees. The record
demonstrates that two collective bargaining units
represent hourly employees at Lockheed’s Marietta
facility. See, e.g., Barnow Depo., at 224-25; Landy
Depo., at 174, 379-82. The Yarbrough Plaintiffs are all
represented by the Aeronautical Machinists Local
Lodge 709, and neither Dr. Barnow nor Dr. Landy read
the collective bargaining agreement for the employees
represented by the other collective bargaining unit.
Barnow Depo., at 241-42; Landy Depo., at 176. A
review of the agreements negotiated with these separate
units demonstrates vastly different promotions
procedures, meaning that employees working under one
agreement will not be common to those working under
the other. Compare Def. Ex. 68, at 72-77 and Def. Ex.
70, at 73-76 with Def. Ex. 69, at 31. Furthermore, since
Local Lodge 709 represented each of the Yarbrough
Plaintiffs, they were promoted under different
procedures than those hourly employees represented by
the other collective bargaining unit, meaning that their
claims are not typical to those employees in the other
unit.
12
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
*672 d. Compensation
[12]
In contrast to their promotions and training claims,
Plaintiffs have offered evidence that Defendants’
practices with regard to compensation significantly and
adversely affected some black employees. That same
evidence, however, also demonstrates that many black
employees do not fall within the group significantly
affected. In comparing compensation of hourly employees
across a total of 43 different pay grades, using January 31
of each year from 1996 through 2000 as the date of
comparison, Dr. Barnow found that only 12 out of a total
of 164 comparisons, or 7.32%, resulted in a statistically
significant disparity adverse to blacks.21 See Barnow
Depo., at 327-28. These significantly adverse disparities
occurred in only six pay grades;22 thirty-seven pay grades
never had a statistically significant disparity adverse to
blacks. See Pl.Ex. 83, Barnow Yarbrough Rpt., at 18-22.
Also, the significantly adverse disparities decreased each
year subject to comparison: six occurred in 1996, three
occurred in 1997, two occurred in 1998, one occurred in
1999, and none occurred in 2000. See Barnow Depo., pp.
329, 330; Pl.Ex. 83, Barnow Yarbrough Rpt., at 18-22. In
fact, the only statistically significant disparity occurring in
2000 favored black employees. See Barnow Depo., at
332; Pl.Ex. 83, Barnow Yarbrough Rpt., at 22. Dr.
Barnow additionally testified that when one excluded the
January 31, 1996 comparisons, which are outside both the
limitations period for which Plaintiffs have demonstrated
standing and the date given in their own class definition,
the overall percentage of significantly adverse disparities
equaled only 4.26%. This number is less than the
percentage of significant disparities that he would expect
to occur merely by chance. See Barnow Depo., at 330-31;
Pl.Ex. 83, Barnow Yarbrough Rpt., at 2.
21
Dr. Barnow’s reports explain that a statistically
significant disparity is one where the probability value
(or “P-value”) is less than 0.05. See Pl.Ex. 41, Barnow
Reid Rpt., at 2; Pl.Ex. 83, Barnow Yarbrough Rpt., at 2.
22
The six pay grades are: Factory GPR Grades 7, 11, 13,
and 17; Georgia Plant Protection; and Tech & Office
GPR Grade 15. See Pl. 83, Barnow Yarbrough Rpt., at
18–22.
Dr. Barnow’s comparison of compensation for hourly
employees by job group similarly displays a wide
variation in those groups significantly affected. Again
using January 31 of each year from 1996 through 2000 as
the date of comparison, Dr. Barnow compared
compensation between black and white hourly employees
in 25 job groups. In making these comparisons, Dr.
Barnow found that 35 of 109 comparisons, or 32.1%,
resulted in a statistically significant disparity adverse to
blacks. See Pl.Ex. 83, Barnow Yarbrough Rpt., at 9.23
While this overall number exceeds the percentage that Dr.
Barnow would expect to occur merely by chance, Dr.
Barnow’s report reveals much variation between the job
groups when each group is considered individually. For
example, there were no statistically significant disparities
in any of the five years with regard to any of the job
groups labeled “Technicians” (i.e., job groups 04B, 04C,
and 04D) or “Laborers” (i.e., job group 09A), as well as
several other job groups. See id. at 11–16. Additionally, in
several of the job groups that experienced statistically
significant disparities, the disparities were not statistically
significant for all years. This is also true with regard to
Dr. Barnow’s multiple regression analyses controlling for
pay grade, which resulted in statistically significant
disparities adverse to black employees *673 in only three
of the five years at issue. The multiple regression analyses
controlling for job group, however, produced statistically
significant adverse disparities for all years compared.24
23
While Dr. Barnow’s report actually portrays this
number as 33%, or 35 out of 107 comparisons, he
testified that there were actually 109 comparisons. See
Barnow Depo., at 278, 283.
24
Although considered by the court for purposes of the
present inquiry, Dr. Barnow’s regression analyses
relating to hourly employees are problematic. Dr.
Barnow testified that he was missing data for large
percentages of the hourly employee population. See
Barnow Depo., at 357–63. As such, the regression
analyses show statistically significant disparities only
for those employees included in the regressions. Dr.
Barnow testified that the analyses did not show whether
or not the group of employees included in the
regressions are the same with regard to racial
composition as the group of employees not included.
Id. at 365–66. Dr. Barnow also testified that the large
percentages of employees not included tempered his
confidence in the analyses. Id. at 361.
As with the hourly employees, Dr. Barnow analyzed
compensation for salaried employees by pay grade, job
group, and using multiple regression analyses. In
comparing compensation of salaried employees across 35
to 50 pay grades, using January 31 of each year from
1996 through 2001 as the date of comparison, Dr. Barnow
found a statistically significant disparity adverse to blacks
in 27 of 147 comparisons, equaling 18.4%. Dr. Barnow
stated in his report that this number was more than the
percentage one would expect to occur merely by chance,
but as with the comparisons of hourly employees, there
exists wide variation when the pay grades are examined
individually. For example, eight of the comparisons
resulted in a statistically significant disparity favoring
blacks. Additionally, of all the pay grades compared, only
13
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
eleven experienced a significant disparity adverse to
blacks.25 One pay grade actually experienced a statistically
significant disparity favoring blacks during all five years
in comparison. See Pl.Ex. 41, Barnow Reid Rpt., at 24-33.
Similar variations are found in Dr. Barnow’s job group
comparisons. Although Dr. Barnow found a statistically
significant disparity adverse to blacks in 38 of 112
comparisons, equaling approximately 34%, vast
differences exist between individual job groups. Job
group 01B, for example, titled “Executive & Middle
Management Managers,” experienced no significantly
adverse disparities in any of the five years in comparison,
while job group 02A, titled “Business Management,”
experienced such disparities in every year in comparison.
Other groups experienced varying disparities. See id. at
15-22. The multiple regression analyses for salaried
compensation resulted in statistically significant
disparities for all five years. See id. at 34-35.26
25
The eleven pay grades are: SM004, SM005, SM006,
SM008, SM0MH, SM0MM, SZ004, SZ007, SZ008,
SZE07, and SZE10. See Pl.Ex. 41, Barnow Reid Rpt.,
at 24–33.
26
Dr. Barnow was missing data for approximately 40% of
the salaried employees at the Marietta facility. See
Pl.Ex. 41, Barnow Reid Rpt., at 34 n.14; Barnow
Depo., at 505. As with the regressions for hourly
employees, Dr. Barnow testified that he did not know
the composition of the group of employees for which
data were missing. He also testified that a possibility
existed that the inclusion of the missing data could
change his conclusions. See Barnow Depo., at 506–07.
Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence relating to compensation
shows neither commonality nor typicality. Rather, it
shows that the experience of both hourly and salaried
employees differed over time based on their pay grades
and job groups. Black employees in pay grades or job
groups for which there was never a statistically significant
disparity adverse to blacks do not readily share common
issues with black employees in pay grades or job groups
where such a disparity existed. This is even more true for
black employees in pay grades or job groups for which
there were statistically significant disparities favoring
black employees. Similarly, in light of the differences
expressed in the statistical evidence, Plaintiffs have not
shown that they are typical to those employees in the
unaffected pay grades and job groups.27
27
As with promotions, the collective bargaining
agreements negotiated by the two separate collective
bargaining units at the Marietta facility contain
different compensation provisions. Compare Def. Ex.
68, at 101-28 and Def. Ex. 70, at 100-29 with Def. Ex.
69, at 62-81. Accordingly, the same problems with
commonality and typicality that affect the promotions
claims of hourly employees also affect their
compensation claims.
*674 e. Performance Evaluations
[13]
Because the Yarbrough Plaintiffs do not raise any
claims of discrimination in performance evaluations, Dr.
Barnow analyzed performance evaluations only for the
salaried employees at the Marietta facility. In comparing
average evaluation scores between blacks and whites
across salaried pay grades from 1996 to 2000, Dr. Barnow
found that 17 of 131, or approximately 13%, resulted in
statistically significant disparities adverse to blacks.
When each pay grade is considered individually,
however, the results once again show wide variations. In
fact, the only pay grade that consistently experienced a
significantly adverse disparity in all five years was pay
grade SM0MS. The other pay grades had varying
disparities over time, and many pay grades showed no
significantly adverse disparities at all. See Pl.Ex. 41,
Barnow Reid Rpt., at 51-62; Barnow Depo., at 537. In
comparing average evaluation scores by job group, Dr.
Barnow found that 26 of 81 comparisons, or roughly
31%, resulted in statistically significant disparities
adverse to blacks. As with the pay grade comparisons,
however, only one job group experienced significantly
adverse disparities over all five years. The other job
groups experienced varying disparities over time, and
many job groups showed no significantly adverse
disparities at all. See Pl.Ex. 41, Barnow Reid Rpt., at 3642, 49. In his multiple regression analyses, Dr. Barnow
found statistically significant disparities adverse to blacks
for all five years when controlling for pay grade, but such
a disparity existed for only three of the five years when
controlling for job group. See id. at 4-5, 63.28
28
Dr. Barnow was missing data for approximately 45% of
the salaried employees in these regressions. See Pl.Ex.
41, Barnow Reid Rpt., at 63 n.19; Barnow Depo., at
543. Thus, the same problems noted earlier with regard
to missing data would apply to these regressions as
well.
Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence relating to performance
evaluations, like that concerning compensation, does not
demonstrate commonality or typicality. As with
compensation, the evidence reveals wide variations over
time depending on job group and pay grade. Similarly,
Plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence does little to bolster their
claims of class-wide discrimination with regard to
evaluations. Most of the statements in the relevant
14
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
affidavits pertaining to evaluations merely complain that
the affiant received scores lower than he or she thought
should have been given, without any reference to a
similarly situated white employee who received better
scores. Thus, most of the affidavits show only that the
affiants were displeased with their evaluations, not that
the evaluations resulted in racial disparities or resulted
from racial animus. Plaintiffs, in short, have not shown
that their evaluations claims are susceptible to common
proof, nor have they linked their own injuries in this
regard to the injuries suffered by the broad classes they
seek to represent.
f. Hostile Environment and Retaliation
[14]
Plaintiffs make no serious effort to explain how their
claims of hostile work environment and retaliation satisfy
the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule
23(a). Plaintiffs’ hostile environment claim will require
Plaintiffs to “demonstrate that the actions of the
defendants altered the conditions of the workplace,
creating an objectively abusive and hostile atmosphere.”
Edwards v. Wallace Community College, 49 F.3d 1517,
1521 (11th Cir.1995) (citing Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295
(1993)). Additionally, Plaintiffs will have to show that the
victims of this hostile environment subjectively perceived
it to be abusive. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22, 114 S.Ct.
367. Cf. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246
(11th Cir.1999) (“Establishing that harassing conduct was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter an employee’s
terms or conditions of employment includes a subjective
and an objective component.”). Furthermore, to establish
their hostile environment claims on a class-wide basis—
i.e., that a racially hostile work environment was
Defendants’ “standard operating procedure,”—Plaintiffs
will need to show “more than the mere occurrence of
isolated or ‘accidental’ or sporadic discriminatory
events.” International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52
L.Ed.2d 396 (1977).
*675 It should be noted that not all offensive conduct
constitutes a hostile work environment under Title VII.
Indeed, the “standards for judging hostility are
sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not
become a ‘general civility code.’ ” Faragher v. Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d
662 (1998) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140
L.Ed.2d 201 (1998)). This means that employees must
tolerate a certain amount of boorishness, ignorance, and
offensive behavior from those individuals with whom
they work. It is only when the offensive conduct is so
severe and pervasive that it alters the conditions of the
victim’s employment and creates an abusive working
environment that the law is violated. See Harris, 510 U.S.
at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367. The racially offensive conduct must
permeate the victim’s workplace. See Edwards, 49 F.3d at
1521 (explaining that, to succeed on racially hostile
environment claim, plaintiff would need to show that
offensive conduct was “so commonplace, overt and
denigrating that [it] created an atmosphere charged with
racial hostility.”) (internal quotations and citation
omitted). Whether or not harassing behavior objectively
alters the conditions of employment requires
consideration of: the frequency of the conduct; the
severity of the conduct; whether the conduct is physically
threatening or humiliating or merely an offensive
utterance; and whether the conduct unreasonably
interferes with the victim’s job performance. See Harris,
510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367; Edwards, 49 F.3d at 152122. In short, hostile environment claims are extremely
fact-intensive, see Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246, and they
require a showing of intentional discrimination after a
consideration of the totality of the circumstances. See id.
These factors weigh against a finding of commonality and
typicality.
After reviewing the anecdotal evidence submitted by
Plaintiffs, the court cannot find that the various acts
allegedly constituting harassment are common among
members of the putative classes or typical to the
harassment suffered by the named Plaintiffs. As an initial
matter, a significant portion of the affidavits submitted by
putative class members do not even complain about a
hostile work environment, severely weakening Plaintiffs’
assertions of commonality and typicality as to their claims
of harassment. Additionally, as with the complaints
regarding promotions, training, compensation, and
evaluations, many of the incidents of hostile work
environment described in the affidavits are outside the
limitations periods for which Plaintiffs have demonstrated
standing. Of those that are within the limitations periods,
the evidence shows several different allegations of
harassment. For example, Plaintiff Reid complained that
he saw “racially hostile graffiti” in the restroom. See Reid
Aff., at ¶ 27. Plaintiff Moore testified that she was
watched and monitored constantly even though her white
co-workers were not, and that some of her co-workers
displayed Confederate flags at their work stations. See V.
Moore Aff., at ¶ 27. Plaintiff West complained that he had
to document his overtime and relinquish his driving pass
even though white co-workers were not treated similarly.
See West Aff., at ¶ 22. Plaintiff Combs testified that he
was subjected to racial jokes and slurs on several
occasions and was once shown a “Back to Africa” ticket.
See Combs Aff., at ¶ 17. Plaintiff Elliot complained of
several references to a “Back to Africa” ticket, several
racial slurs, and one instance where a co-worker displayed
a noose for two weeks. See Elliot Aff., at ¶ 18. Putative
class member Floyd Baxter stated that he overheard a
supervisor refer to a black employee as “nigger” on one
15
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
occasion. See Baxter Aff., at ¶ 16. Putative class member
Anthony Cook stated that, on one occasion, a white coworker sprayed disinfectant at him. See Cook Aff., at ¶
14. Putative class member Garfield Baptiste complained
about one incident where a white co-worker told him that
blacks cannot paint as well as whites. See Garfield Aff., at
¶ 15. Putative class member Marvin Barber stated that he
was approached on two occasions by co-workers with Ku
Klux Klan paraphernalia, including a “Klu [sic] Klux
Klan knife,” and that it was common for white
supervisors in his area to refer to blacks as “niggers,”
“monkeys,” or “apes.” See Barber Aff., at ¶ 17.
These examples demonstrate that the actions constituting
the alleged hostile environment *676 occurred with
varying frequency and possessed varying degrees of
severity. Moreover, the events described in the affidavits
tend to focus on individual actions rather than show an
overarching policy of subjecting blacks as a group to a
common hostile work environment. The court does not
see a common discriminatory pattern in the affidavits
submitted by Plaintiffs, and those individuals who have
complained only about the occasional, sporadic acts of
co-workers are not typical of other individuals who
described much more severe and pervasive conduct.29
Plaintiffs have made no attempt to explain how their
hostile environment claims can be proven on a class-wide
basis given that many members of the class did not
experience harassment and that those who did complained
of harassment in various forms. Based on the record, and
Plaintiffs’ failure to engage in any discussion that their
harassment claims are susceptible to class-wide proof, the
court cannot find that commonality and typicality have
been satisfied with respect to such claims.
29
[15]
The fact that many of the Plaintiffs complain about the
acts of co-workers rather than supervisors could affect
their typicality to the class and their adequacy to
represent the class in a hostile environment claim. See
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 2364
(explaining that commonality and typicality tend to
merge not only with each other, but with the adequacy
of representation requirement as well). An employer is
strictly liable for harassing conduct if the harasser is a
supervisor and took a tangible employment action
against the victim as a result of the harassment. See
Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broadcasting
Service, Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 509 (11th Cir.2000). If the
harasser is not a supervisor, however, the employer is
only liable if it “knew (actual notice) or should have
known (constructive notice) of the harassment and
failed to take remedial action,” which is significantly
more difficult to prove. Id. at 510.
Similarly, the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate commonality or typicality with respect to
their retaliation claims. As with their hostile environment
claims, Plaintiffs’ claims of retaliation are fact-intensive
and require a showing of intentional discrimination. See
Wideman v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1454
(11th Cir.1998) (stating that plaintiff alleging Title VII
retaliation must show causal relation between statutorily
protected activity and adverse employment action).
Plaintiffs point to no evidence whatsoever supporting a
claim of class-wide retaliation. Based on the record, and
Plaintiffs’ failure to engage in any discussion that their
retaliation claims are susceptible to class-wide proof, the
court cannot find that the commonality and typicality
requirements have been satisfied as to these claims.
g. Plaintiffs’ Assertions of Discretionary Decisionmaking
[16]
In support of their motions for class certification,
Plaintiffs cite to several decisions for the proposition that
classes are properly certified in employment
discrimination cases where it is shown that the decisionmaking processes are subjective. The cases cited by
Plaintiffs are distinguishable and do not bolster Plaintiffs’
claims of commonality and typicality in the instant cases.
For example, in Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784
F.2d 1546 (11th Cir.1986), where the court found
erroneous the decertification of a class of female
employees alleging gender discrimination, the employer
had a policy of “overt workforce sex discrimination.” Id.
at 1551. Pursuant to this policy, the higher-paying jobs in
the employer’s production plant were deliberately
reserved for men, and women were confined to lowerpaying non-plant jobs. This system was maintained by
word-of-mouth hiring; there was no posting or
announcing of vacancies, nor was there a bidding process
or formal job applications. There were also no written
selection criteria. Id. at 1551–52. In other words, “the
system was one of entirely subjective evaluation.” Id. at
1552 (emphasis added).
In the instant cases, by contrast, Plaintiffs have shown
neither an overt policy of discrimination nor that the
promotions, training, compensation, and evaluations
systems the Marietta facility were entirely subjective. The
collective bargaining agreements for hourly positions, as
well as certain management directives for salaried
positions, introduced at least some objective criteria with
regard to compensation and promotions. See generally
Def. Ex. 29, Hamlin Depo., at ex. 7; *677 Def. Ex. 33,
Bagerski Depo., at ex. 3, 11, 12; Def. 68, at 72-77, 10128; Def. Ex. 69, at 31, 62-81; Def. Ex. 70, at 73-76, 10029. Moreover, the statistical evidence shows that
whatever subjective processes were utilized, they did not
affect all black employees in similar ways.
Plaintiffs also cite the non-binding decision in Caridad v.
Metro–North Commuter R., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir.1999).
16
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
This case is also distinguishable. In Caridad, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant’s disciplinary procedures and
promotions policy vested too much discretion in
department supervisors, resulting in discrimination
against black employees. The court reversed the district
court’s denial of class certification for failure to meet
commonality and typicality, concluding that subjective
decision-making did not automatically preclude a finding
that those requirements were satisfied. The court
explained, however, that “class certification would not be
warranted absent some showing that the challenged
practice is causally related to a pattern of disparate
treatment or has a disparate impact on African-American
employees ....” Id. at 292. The court also commented that
“[w]here the decision-making process is difficult to
review because of the role of subjective assessment,
significant statistical disparities are relevant to
determining whether the challenged employment practice
has a class-wide impact.” Id. Noting that the statistical
evidence showed significant disparities with regard to
discipline in 48 of 69 work positions and that being black
reduced the likelihood of promotion by 33%, the court
concluded that the evidence supported a finding of
commonality and typicality as to promotions for all black
employees and as to discipline for black employees in the
relevant 48 positions. Id. at 292–93.
Unlike Caridad, the statistical evidence in the instant
cases demonstrates wide variations in disparities
depending on job group, pay grade, year of comparison,
and the particular claim for which relief is sought.
Additionally, unlike either Cox or Caridad, Plaintiffs in
these cases seek relief for hostile environment and
retaliation claims for which there appears to be no classwide proof. The addition of these claims, and the broad
class definitions proposed by Plaintiffs, make the instant
cases look more like improper “across-the-board” classes
than the narrowly focused classes at issue in Cox and
Caridad. See Washington, 959 F.2d at 1569–70.
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has indicated that
“entirely subjective decisionmaking processes” may
“conceivably justify” certification of a broad class when
the claim is supported by “significant proof.” See Falcon,
457 U.S. at 159 n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 2364. Plaintiffs have not
submitted “significant proof” that the decision-making
processes at Lockheed’s Marietta facility were entirely
subjective, that these processes resulted in statistically
significant disparities for all black employees regardless
of job group or pay grade, or that these processes were
part of a general policy of intentional discrimination.
Simply put, Plaintiffs have not shown “the existence of an
identifiable employment pattern, practice or policy that
demonstrably affects all members of a class in
substantively, if not completely, comparable ways.”
Stastny, 628 F.2d at 273. Despite the discretion allegedly
given to first-level supervisors, the court cannot find
commonality and typicality on this record for the
expansive classes Plaintiffs seek to represent. As
explained by the Supreme Court:
Conceptually, there is a wide gap
between (a) an individual’s claim
that he has been denied a
promotion [or other job benefit] on
discriminatory grounds, and his
otherwise unsupported allegation
that the company has a policy of
discrimination,
and
(b)
the
existence of a class of persons who
have suffered the same injury as
that individual, such that the
individual’s claims and the class
claims
will
share
common
questions of law or fact and that the
individual’s claim will be typical of
the class claims.
Id. at 157, 102 S.Ct. 2364. See also Morrison v. Booth,
763 F.2d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir.1985) (indicating that
plaintiffs may not “simply leap from the premise that they
were the victims of discrimination to the position that
others must have been”). In the instant cases, Plaintiffs
have not bridged that gap.
h. Summary
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Plaintiffs
have not satisfied Rule 23(a)’s *678 commonality and
typicality requirements. The evidence shows that the
actual employment practices in Lockheed’s Aeronautics
area were developed and implemented on the local level,
and Plaintiffs have not shown commonality and typicality
with respect to employees at facilities other than Marietta.
With regard to the Marietta facility, Plaintiffs have
offered no evidence that their promotions, training, hostile
work environment, or retaliation claims are susceptible to
class-wide proof or are typical to the proposed classes.
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence relating to their
compensation and evaluation claims demonstrates that
those claims are not common or typical. Finally,
Plaintiffs’ assertions of discretionary and subjective
decision-making do not satisfy the commonality and
typicality requirements in the instant cases.
3. Adequacy of Representation
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that “[t]he adequate
representation requirement involves questions of whether
plaintiffs’ counsel are qualified, experienced, and
17
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
generally able to conduct the proposed litigation, and of
whether plaintiffs have interests antagonistic to those of
the rest of the class.” Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516,
1533 (11th Cir.1985). See also Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157–
58 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 2364 (indicating that adequacy
requirement “raises concerns about the competency of
class counsel and conflicts of interests”). The court notes
that, even though it is their burden to prove adequacy of
representation, Plaintiffs’ motions do not cite to a single
piece of record evidence in support of their assertions that
this requirement is satisfied.30 This failure does little to
allay those concerns of the court, expressed to Plaintiffs’
counsel on prior occasions, about the manner in which
these cases have been prosecuted by Plaintiffs. For
example, counsel’s mismanagement of expert discovery
nearly resulted in Plaintiffs’ experts being stricken, and
there has been more than one episode during this
litigation where the attorneys for Plaintiffs appeared to be
less than adequately prepared. Nonetheless, given the
court’s conclusions with regard to commonality and
typicality, as well as the following discussion of the
requirements of Rule 23(b), the court sees no need at this
time to engage in a full analysis of the adequacy
requirement and will not rely on that requirement in
denying Plaintiffs’ motions.
30
With their replies, Plaintiffs have submitted the
affidavit of attorney Keith Givens to bolster their
contentions regarding the adequacy of counsel. See
Pl.Ex. 105. As a general rule, a party may not submit
evidence with a reply that was available but not
included with the original motion.
F. Requirements of Rule 23(b)
Because Plaintiffs must satisfy the requirements of both
Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b) to achieve class certification,
the court’s foregoing conclusions dispose of the
certification issue. Nonetheless, assuming arguendo that
Plaintiffs could meet all of their Rule 23(a) obligations,
their motions still fail because none of the proposed
classes is certifiable under Rule 23(b). For the following
reasons, the court finds that Plaintiffs cannot achieve class
certification under the requirements of either Rule
23(b)(2) or Rule 23(b)(3), nor will the court certify a class
under Plaintiffs’ proposed “hybrid” approach.
1. Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2)
Plaintiffs first urge the court to certify their proposed
classes under Rule 23(b)(2). That provision allows the
maintenance of a class action where “the party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2).
[17]
Although the rule expressly speaks only in terms of
injunctive and declaratory relief, “[m]onetary relief may
be obtained in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action so long as the
predominant relief sought is injunctive and declaratory.”
Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 812 (11th Cir.2001).31
*679 “[M]onetary relief predominates in (b)(2) class
actions unless it is incidental to requested injunctive or
declaratory relief.” Id. (alteration and emphasis in
original) (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151
F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir.1998)). In the instant actions,
Plaintiffs seek monetary relief in the form of “front and
back pay, lost fringe benefits, including any lost benefits
that would have otherwise been included in the 401(k)
pension plans of Plaintiffs and the class,” see Pl.
Complaints, Prayers For Relief, ¶ d, as well as
“compensatory damages, emotional distress damages,
pain and suffering damages, and punitive damages.” See
id. at ¶ e. Because Plaintiffs clearly seek monetary relief
on behalf of the putative classes, the question becomes
whether the monetary relief sought is incidental to any
injunctive relief also requested.
31
“Prior to 1991, only equitable relief, primarily back
pay, was available to prevailing Title VII plaintiffs; the
statute provided no authority for an award of punitive
or compensatory damages.” Kolstad v. American
Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 533–34, 119 S.Ct. 2118,
144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999). With the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Title VII plaintiffs may now seek
both compensatory and punitive damages. See id.; see
also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b).
In Murray, the Eleventh Circuit was confronted with the
same question in the context of a Rule 23(b)(2) class
action alleging disability discrimination. At issue in that
case was whether the plaintiffs’ claims for compensatory
damages, which sought to remedy the plaintiffs’ “pain
and suffering, mental anguish, and humiliation,” were
incidental to their claims for injunctive and declaratory
relief. See Murray, 244 F.3d at 812. Noting that it had not
previously established specific criteria for determining
when monetary relief is incidental to equitable relief, the
court turned to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Allison for
guidance. Quoting Allison, the court in Murray explained:
By incidental, we mean damages
that flow directly from liability to
the class as a whole on the claims
forming the basis of the injunctive
or declaratory relief .... Ideally,
incidental damages should be only
those to which class members
automatically would be entitled
once liability is established ....
Liability for incidental damages
should not ... entail complex
individualized
determinations.
18
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
Thus, incidental damages will, by
definition, be more in the nature of
a group remedy, consistent with the
forms of relief intended for (b)(2)
class actions.
Id. (alterations and emphasis in original) (quoting Allison,
151 F.3d at 415). Under this standard, the court held that
the plaintiffs did not seek damages as a group remedy but
rather as a remedy for “inherently individual injuries” that
would “compel[ ] an inquiry into each class member’s
individual circumstances.” Id. Accordingly, the plaintiffs
sought damages “to which they would not be
automatically entitled even if [the defendants’] liability to
the class [was] established,” and the district court abused
its discretion by certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class that
encompassed the plaintiffs’ damages claims. Id.
As in Murray, Plaintiffs’ claims for compensatory
damages in the instant cases are not incidental to their
claims for injunctive relief and therefore may not be
certified in a class action under Rule 23(b)(2). Like the
plaintiffs in Murray, Plaintiffs here seek damages to
remedy their alleged emotional distress and pain and
suffering, injuries that are “inherently individual.” See
Murray, 244 F.3d at 812. Moreover, similar to Murray,
assessing damages for these injuries would necessitate an
inquiry into the specific circumstances of each individual
class member. See id. See also Lemon v. International
Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local No. 139, 216 F.3d 577,
581 (7th Cir.2000) (explaining that claim for damages
under Title VII “depends on an individualized analysis of
each class member’s circumstances and requires
additional hearings to resolve the disparate merits of each
individual’s case”); Allison, 151 F.3d at 417–18 (stating
that “[t]he very nature of these damages ... necessarily
implicates the subjective differences of each plaintiff’s
circumstances” thereby “requiring individualized proof of
discrimination and injury to each class member”). Thus,
the compensatory damages sought by Plaintiffs are not
incidental to the requested injunctive relief, and
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is inappropriate.
Ignoring the significance Murray has on the instant cases,
Plaintiffs rely extensively on the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d
1144 (11th Cir.1983). In that case, the district court *680
certified a Rule 23(b)(2) class for purposes of approving a
settlement of the plaintiffs’ employment discrimination
claims. Under the terms of the settlement, the plaintiff
class received not only injunctive and declaratory relief,
but also a lump sum back pay award of $43,775.
Approximately one-half of this back pay award was to be
received by the eight named plaintiffs, with the other half
being distributed among the remaining 118 members of
the class. A substantial number of the class members
objected to the method of distributing the back pay award,
and they appealed the settlement to the Eleventh Circuit.
See id. at 1146–47.
Finding that the back pay allocation was facially unfair
and that the evidentiary record was not adequately
developed to overcome that unfairness, the court of
appeals first reversed the district court’s approval of the
settlement and remanded for further proceedings. See id.
at 1148–51. The court then held that the district court
abused its discretion by not affording an opt-out
procedure to members of the settlement class. The court
began by acknowledging that the class was properly
certified under Rule 23(b)(2) and that an award of back
pay was cognizable under that provision because it was
“an integral part of [Title VII’s] statutory equitable
remedy.” Id. at 1152. Nonetheless, finding that the
monetary relief at issue was “functionally more similar to
a(b)(3) class than to a(b)(2) class,” the court concluded
that “the opt out procedure of (b)(3) must be applied.” Id.
at 1155. The court explained its conclusion by stressing
the differences between the Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule
23(b)(3) mechanisms. Rule 23(b)(2) by its very nature
contemplates claims on behalf of a homogeneous and
cohesive class, “claims resting on the same grounds and
applying more or less equally to all members of the
class.” Id. Accordingly, the relief envisioned by Rule
23(b)(2) is that which remedies an injury to the class as a
whole. Id. Back pay constitutes such relief because it is
equitable in nature and can be determined by the
discretion of the court without the need for a jury. See id.
at 1152. Money damages, by contrast, “are directly
related to the disparate merits of individual claims and are
not generally applicable to the claims of the class as a
whole.” Id. at 1156 (internal quotations omitted). As such,
cases seeking money damages are more properly certified
under Rule 23(b)(3), which envisions a class more
heterogeneous in nature. Id. Because of this
heterogeneity, however, Rule 23(b)(3) requires findings
that common issues predominate over individual issues
and that class treatment is superior “to all other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
dispute,” findings not required under Rule 23(b)(2). Id.
Moreover, Rule 23(b)(3) classes require certain
procedural safeguards, such as notice and opt-out rights,
that are not normally provided in Rule 23(b)(2) class
actions. Id. Pursuant to the method of distribution
approved by the district court, the named plaintiffs
received substantially more back pay than did the other
members of the class, which reduced the cohesion of the
class by blurring somewhat the distinction between classwide equitable relief and individual compensatory
damages. Id. at 1159–60. Accordingly, the court required
that opt-out rights be given to the members of the
settlement class. Id. at 1160.
Plaintiffs assert that Holmes allows their damages claims
to be certified in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action. The court
disagrees. First, Holmes was concerned only with claims
19
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
for equitable monetary relief awarded by virtue of a
settlement agreement. That decision did not address, nor
did it have any occasion to address, claims for legal
monetary remedies such as compensatory damages that
would be tried to a jury. Therefore, Holmes is inapposite
to the issue currently facing this court. Second, if
anything, the decision in Holmes reinforces that Plaintiffs’
claims for compensatory damages are not properly
included in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action. By stressing the
need for cohesion and homogeneity under Rule 23(b)(2),
and by pointing out the differences between back pay and
money damages, the court in Holmes demonstrated that a
Rule 23(b)(2) class action is not the proper device for
seeking individualized legal remedies. Although the
Holmes court expressed concern that the method of
allocation at issue in that case somewhat blurred the
distinction *681 between back pay and money damages,
the relief was still equitable in nature, determined by the
court and designed to remedy a common injury suffered
by all the class members.
The distinction between back pay and money damages is
not inconsequential. Once liability is established in an
employment discrimination class action certified under
Rule 23(b)(2), each member of the class, solely by virtue
of being a member of the class, is entitled to equitable
remedies designed to make him or her “whole.” See
Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1157 (stating that finding of liability
on claims common to class results in equitable relief). An
award of back pay, although somewhat individualized,
falls within the class of remedies available because it is
“subsumed by the traditional equitable concepts of
reinstatement and restitution,” which apply to the class in
common. Williams v. Owens–Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918,
929 (9th Cir.1982). See also Allison, 151 F.3d at 415
(describing back pay as “equitable remedy similar to other
forms of affirmative injunctive relief”). Not so with the
damages sought by Plaintiffs here. Compensatory
damages “are anything but equitable in nature; they are, in
fact, the very definition of legal relief.” Rutstein v. Avis
Rent–A–Car Systems, Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1239 (11th
Cir.2000). Thus, to obtain compensatory damages,
especially for emotional distress, “individual plaintiffs
must prove that ‘injury actually was caused.’ ” Id.
(quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264, 98 S.Ct.
1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)). For this reason, unlike
back pay, compensatory damages are not automatically
available to class members “even if Defendants’ liability
to the class is established.” Murray, 244 F.3d at 812.32
32
Moreover, “establishing the amount of compensatory
damages due each plaintiff is a far more complex and
uncertain exercise than the determination of back pay,
and greatly complicates the management of a class
action.” Williams, 665 F.2d at 929.
The same is true with regard to Plaintiffs’ claims for
punitive damages. To recover punitive damages on their
Title VII claims, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants
acted “with malice or with reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (emphasis added); see also Kolstad,
527 U.S. at 534, 119 S.Ct. 2118. The statute plainly
requires a fact-specific inquiry into the circumstances of
the individual plaintiff, see Lemon, 216 F.3d at 581, and
punitive damages therefore “cannot be assessed merely
upon a finding that the defendant engaged in a pattern or
practice of discrimination.” Allison, 151 F.3d at 417.
Furthermore, any punitive damages awarded to Plaintiffs
must bear a reasonable relationship to their compensatory
damages. See BMW of N. America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 580–83, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996).
The amount of punitive damages Plaintiffs may obtain
therefore depends directly on the amount of compensatory
damages recovered, and “being dependent on nonincidental compensatory damages, punitive damages are
also non-incidental.” Allison, 151 F.3d at 418.
In sum, Plaintiffs’ claims for compensatory and punitive
damages seek to remedy inherently individual injuries and
can be recovered only after examining the particular
circumstances of each individual class member. These
claims are not properly sought as a group remedy and are
not incidental to the injunctive relief prayed for in
Plaintiffs’ complaints. As such, certification of the
proposed classes under Rule 23(b)(2) is not appropriate.
2. Certification Under Rule 23(b)(3)
Plaintiffs also urge the court to certify their proposed
classes under Rule 23(b)(3), which allows the
maintenance of a class action if “the court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any other questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). A nonexhaustive list of matters pertinent to the required
findings of predominance and superiority are delineated
in the rule: (a) “the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions”; (b) “the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning *682 the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class”; (c) “the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum”; and (d)
“the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3)(A)(D). See also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 615–16, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). As
mentioned above, Rule 23(b)(3) classes are generally
heterogeneous in nature, and the predominance and
superiority requirements, which are not found in Rule
23(b)(2), reflect that heterogeneity. Also, because classes
[18]
20
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
certified under Rule 23(b)(3) lack the inherent cohesion of
Rule 23(b)(2) classes, individual notice to all class
members is required, and each class member must be
provided with the opportunity to opt out of the class
litigation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2); Holmes, 706 F.2d at
1156. Plaintiffs assert that their proposed classes satisfy
Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirements because the common
question of Defendants’ alleged pattern and practice of
discrimination predominates over individual issues and
because resolution of their claims in class litigation is
superior to hundreds of individual lawsuits. The court
disagrees.
The court begins its analysis of these issues by reviewing
the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Allison, an employment
discrimination case very similar to the ones brought by
Plaintiffs here. The plaintiffs in Allison brought suit on
behalf of black employees and applicants of the defendant
employer, alleging that the defendant engaged in classwide race discrimination “with respect to general hiring,
promotion, compensation, and training policies.” Allison,
151 F.3d at 407. The plaintiffs moved for class
certification, which motion was denied by the district
court, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. After first
determining that the plaintiffs could not achieve class
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) due to their claims for
damages, the court turned its attention to the requirements
of Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that the plaintiffs
could not meet the rule’s predomination requirement
because their claims for compensatory and punitive
damages focused “almost entirely on facts and issues
specific to individuals rather than the class as a whole.”
Id. at 419. Examples of such facts and issues included:
“what kind of discrimination was each plaintiff subjected
to; how did it affect each plaintiff emotionally and
physically, at work and at home; [and] what medical
treatment did each plaintiff receive and at what expense.”
Id. Because of these individual issues, the court
explained, “an action conducted nominally as a class
action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits
separately tried.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). This
degeneration, in turn, diminished the superiority of the
class action device for adjudicating the plaintiffs’ claims
by creating numerous manageability problems. The
requirement that the claims be tried to a jury exacerbated
those problems. Id. at 419–20. Therefore, despite their
contention that the defendant engaged in a pattern and
practice of discrimination common to all black
employees, the plaintiffs’ claims actually depended on the
resolution of individual issues, and certification under
Rule 23(b)(3) was improper. Id. at 420.
Similar conclusions were reached by the Eleventh Circuit
in two decisions addressing discrimination claims outside
of the employment context. See Avis, 211 F.3d 1228 (11th
Cir.2000); Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130
F.3d 999 (11th Cir.1997). In Jackson, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant had “a nationwide practice or
policy of discriminating against its customers and its
employees on the basis of race.” Jackson, 130 F.3d at
1001. Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted, first, that the
defendant either refused to provide them with
accommodations or provided them with substandard
accommodations, and second, that the defendant’s
discrimination against blacks created a retaliatory and
hostile work environment. The district court entered an
order allowing communication with potential class
members, and it subsequently certified a class with regard
to the plaintiffs’ customer-based claims. The question of
class certification with regard to the plaintiffs’
employment-based claims was referred to a magistrate
judge. The defendant sought relief from these orders via a
petition for mandamus in the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at
1001–03. The court of appeals granted the writ, directing
the district court *683 to vacate its order concerning class
communications and to decertify the customer class.
Rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the defendant’s
alleged pattern and practice of discrimination satisfied
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement, the court
explained that the plaintiffs’ claims would “require
distinctly case-specific inquiries into the facts surrounding
each alleged incident of discrimination.” Id. at 1006.
Indeed, the court expressed its expectation that “most, if
not all, of the plaintiffs’ claims [would] stand or fall, not
on the answer to the question whether [the defendant]
ha[d] a practice or policy of racial discrimination, but on
the resolution of these highly case-specific factual issues.”
Id. The court advanced a similar opinion as to the not-yet
certified employee class, expressing its doubt that the
pattern and practice issue common to the class would
predominate over “those issues that are subject only to
individualized proof.” Id. at 1008.
In Avis, the Eleventh Circuit again addressed the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) where the plaintiffs alleged
systemic discrimination. The Avis plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant, pursuant to a pattern and practice of racial
discrimination, had refused to give the plaintiffs corporate
accounts on the basis of their Jewish ancestry. The district
court certified a class under Rule 23(b)(3). See Avis, 211
F.3d at 1230-33. Relying on its prior decision in Jackson,
the Eleventh Circuit reversed. As in Jackson, the court
concluded that common issues did not predominate
because each plaintiff bore the burden of establishing
“that he or she suffered from intentional discrimination,”
and liability therefore rested on individualized and casespecific issues. Id. at 1235. In drawing this conclusion,
the court specifically rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that
the defendant’s alleged pattern and practice of
discrimination, common to all of the class members,
predominated over any individual issues. After listing
several issues pertinent to each plaintiff’s individual case,
the court explained:
The
importance
of
these
21
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
individualized issues, relative to the
one common issue of whether [the
defendant] maintains a policy or
practice of discrimination, is
amplified by the fact that even if
plaintiffs can demonstrate that a
general policy or practice of
discrimination was applied in their
cases, [the defendant] can escape
liability by showing that an
individual plaintiff would have
been denied or terminated even if
no such policy or practice had
existed.
Id. at 1236.
The Avis court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that
the Supreme Court’s decision in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), compelled a
different result. The court recognized that under
Teamsters and its progeny, once a discriminatory pattern
or practice is established in an employment discrimination
class action, a presumption arises that the individual
members of the class have been discriminated against in
accordance with that pattern or practice. See Avis, 211
F.3d at 1236–37. See also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361–62,
97 S.Ct. 1843. Nonetheless, the court in Avis found two
important differences between Teamsters and the case
before it. First, the court distinguished Teamsters by
pointing out that the case before it did not allege
employment discrimination. The court noted that the
Teamsters presumption applies in employment
discrimination cases only as a substitute for a plaintiff’s
prima facie burden of showing that he or she was
qualified for the job. See Avis, 211 F.3d at 1238
(“Teamsters therefore stands for the proposition that
where a plaintiff class can demonstrate a policy or
practice of discrimination so pervasive that a court is
justified in concluding that qualifications were entirely
irrelevant to the employer ... then individual plaintiffs are
relieved of the prima facie burden of demonstrating that
they were qualified for the job at issue in subsequent
individual proceedings.”). In the case before it, however,
the plaintiffs had to show “an actual intent to discriminate
against an individual plaintiff on the basis of his or her
ethnicity,” and a finding that the defendant had a pattern
or practice of discrimination was not a “meaningful
substitute” for that element of the plaintiffs’ case. Id. at
1239. Second, and according to the court “more
important,” the relief to which a plaintiff class is entitled
after a finding of a discriminatory pattern or *684 practice
is equitable in nature. The court specifically found the
Teamsters framework inappropriate in the case before it
“because the establishment of a policy or practice of
discrimination cannot trigger the defendant’s liability for
damages to all the plaintiffs in the putative class.” Id.
(emphasis added). Instead, to recover damages, each
plaintiff would “have to prove that [he or she] suffered
some injury,” and “[t]he idea that individual injury could
be settled on a class-wide basis [was] preposterous.” Id.
The foregoing cases demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ claims
cannot satisfy the predominance and superiority
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). As in Allison, Jackson,
and Avis, the resolution of Plaintiffs’ discrimination
claims in the instant case will require the court to focus on
the individual circumstances of each member of the
plaintiff class. As all three of the cited decisions attest,
entitlement to the compensatory and punitive damages
pled in Plaintiffs’ complaints will not derive merely from
a finding that Defendants engaged in a pattern and
practice of racial discrimination. But it is not the matter of
damages alone that renders certification under Rule
23(b)(3) inappropriate. The true problem with certifying
Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims under Rule 23(b)(3)
concerns not merely a question of relief but a question of
liability itself. Claims of discrimination, in employment
or elsewhere, depend heavily on the specific
circumstances and conditions in which the victim finds
himself or herself. An individual’s qualifications,
experience, and background for a particular job or
contract must be considered in any case where
discrimination is alleged. See Avis, 211 F.3d at 1235
(listing age, financial criteria, expected use of rented
vehicles, geographic area, and veracity of applicant as
individual issues relevant to plaintiffs’ discrimination
claim); Jackson, 130 F.3d at 1006 (listing availability of
vacant rooms, lack of reservations, and other non-racial
characteristics as individual issues relevant to plaintiffs’
discrimination claim); Communications Workers of
America, Local 3603 v. BellSouth Telecommunications,
Inc., No. 1:99–CV–0857–WBH, 2000 WL 33321176, at
*5–6, 85 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 596, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20729, at *19–20 (N.D.Ga. Oct. 27, 2000)
(Hunt, J.) (listing qualifications, experience, seniority,
training, employment record, and employer’s specific
reasons for not selecting a particular employee as
individual issues defeating class certification of plaintiffs’
employment discrimination claim). Such individual issues
are present in every employment discrimination claim
regardless of the type of relief sought, although claims for
damages certainly enhance such issues. This is especially
true where the plaintiffs’ claims involve allegations of
discrimination in promotions and hostile work
environment, which are by their very nature extremely
individualized and fact-intensive claims. Moreover, even
where a pattern and practice of discrimination has been
proven, the employer still has the right to demonstrate that
it would have treated any given member of the plaintiff
class exactly as it did absent the discrimination. See
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362, 97 S.Ct. 1843 (explaining
that, after showing of discriminatory policy is made, “the
burden then rests on the employer to demonstrate that the
22
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
individual applicant was denied an employment
opportunity for lawful reasons”). In short, a claim of
employment discrimination focuses on “the reason for a
particular employment decision,” Cooper v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 876, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 81
L.Ed.2d 718 (1984), and “[q]uestions affecting individual
[class] members, such as how they were discriminated
against and how it affected them individually, involve not
merely separate issues concerning damages, but
differences in whether individual members can prove
their claims.” Faulk v. Home Oil Co., 186 F.R.D. 660,
664 (M.D.Ala.1999) (Albritton, J.). Under such
circumstances, the common issues concerning a
defendant’s pattern or practice of discrimination will not
always predominate over the individual, case-specific
questions relevant to each plaintiff’s claim, nor will the
class mechanism envisioned by Rule 23(b)(3) readily
constitute a superior method of adjudication. See Allison,
151 F.3d at 419–20 (explaining that individual issues
relating to plaintiffs’ claims, exacerbated by demand for
jury trial, detract *685 from superiority of class action
device).33
33
It is also important to remember that, pursuant to the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, an injured employee has the
possibility of obtaining up to $300,000 in compensatory
and punitive damages on his or her Title VII claim. See
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). The potential damages for
violations of § 1981 are not limited. In light of the
substantial recoveries available to each putative class
member in his or her individual lawsuit, “the most
compelling justification for a Rule 23(b)(3) class
action...the possibility of negative value suits...is absent
in this case.” Avis, 211 F.3d at 1241 n. 21 (citations
omitted).
Pointing out that the court in Avis distinguished Teamsters
on the ground that Avis did not involve employment,
Plaintiffs nonetheless maintain that the presumption
created in Teamsters and its progeny renders predominant
in these cases the common issue of Defendants’ alleged
pattern and practice of discrimination. Plaintiffs correctly
assert that, even after Avis, the Teamsters presumption
may apply “in private class actions alleging systemic
disparate treatment in employment.” Avis, 211 F.3d at
1237. The cases in which that presumption has been
applied or discussed, however, almost uniformly concern
certification under Rule 23(b)(2). See, e.g., Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47
L.Ed.2d 444 (1976); Foster v. Board of Sch. Comm’rs,
872 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir.1989); Cox v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir.1986); Freeman v.
Motor Convoy, Inc., 700 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir.1983).
Because that rule contains no predomination or
superiority requirements, the individual issues that are
inherent in a claim of employment discrimination do not
defeat certification under Rule 23(b)(2). As demonstrated,
however, the primary relief sought in a Rule 23(b)(2) case
must be injunctive or declaratory. Until 1991, this
requirement was routinely satisfied in employment
discrimination cases because only equitable relief was
available to Title VII plaintiffs. There was, therefore, little
need to attempt certification under Rule 23(b)(3), and the
courts rarely had occasion to analyze the predominance of
individual or common issues in cases alleging violations
of Title VII.
In contrast to pre–1991 litigation, compensatory and
punitive damages are now available in Title VII cases.
Because Plaintiffs seek legal damages in the instant cases,
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is not appropriate, as
discussed above. Plaintiffs must therefore achieve
certification, if at all, within the confines of Rule 23(b)(3),
which requires a showing that common issues
predominate over individual ones. Thus, the individual
issues relating to Plaintiffs’ employment discrimination
claims are relevant to class certification under Rule
23(b)(3) in a way that they are not under Rule 23(b)(2).
This point is implicit in the second, “more important”
distinction made by the Avis court, a distinction wholly
ignored by Plaintiffs: that the Teamsters presumption
entitles individual plaintiffs only to equitable relief but
does not trigger liability for individual damages. In other
words, the Teamsters presumption applies chiefly in Rule
23(b)(2) cases, where the primary relief available remains
equitable in nature and the particularized issues inherent
in employment discrimination claims matter little to the
class certification decision. Once under the framework of
Rule 23(b)(3), on the other hand, these same issues
present intrinsic problems for class certification that must
be overcome by those seeking certification, no matter
what type of relief is sought. The emphases on damages
found in Avis and Allison reflect the fact that, practically
speaking, there is no reason to conduct a Rule 23(b)(3)
analysis where the plaintiffs seek only equitable relief.
Because Plaintiffs seek more in these cases, the court
must evaluate the many particularized issues involved,
and under the circumstances presented by these cases,
such issues defeat Rule 23(b)(3) certification.34
34
The court has no occasion to decide that the problems
associated with the individual issues inherent in
discrimination claims will in all circumstances defeat
certification under Rule 23(b)(3). Rather, the court
simply notes that claims of employment discrimination,
by their very nature, present individualized issues that
create obstacles for achieving certification under the
Rule 23(b)(3) framework. In the instant cases, those
obstacles have not been overcome. Under what
circumstances they might be overcome is not an issue
before this court.
In sum, Plaintiffs cannot achieve class certification under
Rule 23(b)(3) because the *686 individual issues relating
23
Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (2001)
to their employment discrimination claims predominate
over the common issue of Defendants’ alleged
discriminatory pattern and practice. Additionally, the
presence of these particularized issues diminishes the
manageability of any class litigation and would result in a
series of essentially separate lawsuits. As such, a class
action is not superior to other available methods of
adjudication For these reasons, certification under Rule
23(b)(3) is not appropriate.
3. Hybrid Certification Under Both Rule 23(b)(2) and
Rule 23(b)(3)
Finally, Plaintiffs urge the court to certify a “hybrid”
class, whereby their claims for injunctive relief are
certified under Rule 23(b)(2) and their claims for damages
are certified under Rule 23(b)(3). As demonstrated,
Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims are not amenable to
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) because individual
issues predominate and because class adjudication is not
superior to other available methods. Severing Plaintiffs’
claims for injunctive relief does not remedy these
problems. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ proposed “hybrid”
certification is not warranted.
[19]
There remains, however, the issue of certifying only
Plaintiffs’ claims for equitable relief under Rule 23(b)(2).
See Murray, 244 F.3d at 812 (implying that Rule 23(b)(2)
class may be maintained if damages claims are
exempted). The court finds that the Seventh Amendment
prohibits such a course of action in the instant cases. The
Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial “in
Suits at common law.” U.S. Const. amend. VII. Although
the amendment specifically mentions suits at common
law, the Supreme Court has made clear that the right to
jury trial applies in any suit “in which legal rights [are] to
be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to
those where equitable rights alone [are] recognized, and
equitable remedies [are] administered.” Ross v. Bernhard,
396 U.S. 531, 533, 90 S.Ct. 733, 24 L.Ed.2d 729 (1970)
(quoting Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson, 28
U.S. 433, 447, 3 Pet. 433, 7 L.Ed. 732 (1830)). See also
Waldrop v. Southern Co. Services, Inc., 24 F.3d 152, 156
(11th Cir.1994) (“The amendment extends the right to a
jury trial to all suits where legal rights are involved,
whether at common law or arising under federal
legislation.”). Because the Civil Rights Act of 1991
expressly grants both plaintiffs and defendants the right to
demand a jury trial when compensatory and punitive
damages are sought in Title VII cases, see 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(c), and because both sides have so demanded in the
instant cases, a jury trial is required with regard to
Plaintiffs’ claims for damages.
Many of the factual issues relevant to Plaintiffs’ damages
claims, however, are also relevant to Plaintiffs’ equitable
claims. As such, the litigants have the right to a
determination of these issues by a single jury. See Ross,
396 U.S. at 538–39, 90 S.Ct. 733 (“[W]here equitable
relief and legal claims are joined in the same action, there
is a right to jury trial on the legal claims which must not
be infringed either by trying the legal issues as incidental
to the equitable ones or by a court trial of a common issue
existing between the claims.”); Alabama v. Blue Bird
Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 318 (5th Cir.1978) (recognizing
that Seventh Amendment guarantees “the general right of
a litigant to have only one jury pass on common issues of
fact”). Adjudication would therefore require one jury to
resolve the many individual and case-specific issues
relating to Plaintiffs’ employment discrimination claims
prior to any ruling by the court with regard to equitable
remedies. See generally Allison, 151 F.3d at 423–25
(explaining difficulties in partial certification of equitable
claims). See also Miller v. Hygrade Food Prods. Corp.,
198 F.R.D. 638, 644 (E.D.Pa.2001); Ramirez v. DeCoster,
194 F.R.D. 348, 354 (D.Me.2000).35 The court finds that
such a task would be overly *687 cumbersome and would
result in litigation characterized by confusion and
incoherency.
35
This is true even if the court certifies only Plaintiffs’
equitable claims because, with regard to the back pay
issue, Defendants still have the right to rebut the
presumption that the adverse employment action was
due to discrimination and to show that individual
members of the class are not entitled to back pay. See
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362, 97 S.Ct. 1843; Holmes,
706 F.2d at 1157–58. Because these issues are
interwoven with the liability issues on Plaintiffs’
damages claims, the same jury would have to resolve
all of these issues.
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES
Plaintiffs’ motions for class certification [123-1; 191-1].
The individual Plaintiffs, of course, may maintain these
actions pursuing their own individual claims, and the
members of the putative classes similarly may file
lawsuits advancing their own individual claims.
24