Freedom and Constraint: An Illusory Contradiction in Zhuangzi
Fang-Ru Kuo
Department of Philosophy, NTU
Introduction
Freedom and constraint seem to be a genuine contradiction for Zhuangzi. There is an
absolute freedom—„If he had mounted on the truth of Heaven and Earth, ridden the
changes of the six breaths, and thus wandered through the boundless, then what would
he have had to depend on?‟ (Watson 1970: 32, Xiaoyaoyou), which is to say, one is
free in everything. There is also an inevitable constraint—„to understand what you
can do nothing about and to be content with it as with fate—this is the perfection of
virtue‟(Watson 1970: 60, Renjianshi), that is to say, one is inevitably constrained by
the fate that we cannot help but accept. Now the problem is, if this contradiction is
prevailing in Zhuangzi, there will be no coherent interpretation of Zhuangzi.
A number of approaches have been attempted to rescue Zhuangzi from this
contradiction, among which the two most popular are what I call the disjunctivist and
the compatibilist. The disjunctivist approach, such as suggested by G. Creel (1970)
and Mori Mikisaburo (1989), sharply distinguishes the concept of freedom from that
of constraint, applying „freedom‟ to only the spiritual and „constraint‟ to only the
physical. Liu Xiaogan (1987) even dichotomizes these two as two disjoined
worlds—spiritual world and physical world. They therefore claim that there is no
contradiction in Zhuangzi at all, for it is simply two different realms governed by two
different concepts. However, it seems to me that this approach over-generalizes the
distinction between freedom and constraint, thus portraying Zhuangzi as a mystic or a
pessimist.
The compatibilist claims that the concepts of freedom and constraint are compatible
with each other. This approach is thus able to see Zhuangzi from a totally different
perspective. As A C. Graham (1989) notices that for a sage there is no distinction
between freedom and constraint at all, let alone contradiction. This special viewpoint
offers a hint for the solution. But it remains the case that Graham does not explain at
length how the idealized picture of the sage may provide the solution to eliminate the
contradiction between freedom and constraint in general.
In my view, the problem concerning the contradiction should be approached from an
account of how xing (human nature, 性) is understood in Zhuangzi. Two points
should be made: first, how a person becomes a sage; and second, how a sage may
solve the contradiction between freedom and constraint. This is where the concept of
xing is crucial. Consider de (德) in the Inner Chapters and xing in the Outer Chapters
of Zhuangzi, both featuring a dynamic picture of the transformation of human nature.
Such a transformation, as characterized by de and xing indicates, on the one hand, the
way in which every individual may become a sage, and on the other, the way in which
the sage sees the contradiction between freedom and constraint as an illusion with the
help of the Genuine Illumination (真知).
This essay contains three parts. First, I shall show how freedom and constraint are
both presented in Zhuangzi as an apparent contradiction. Second, I shall go through
the relevant literature. Finally, I shall show how the contradiction is only an illusion.
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I.
The Contradiction between Freedom and Constraint
In Zhuangzi, there is a „freedom‟ present in each individual—one is absolutely free in
everything: he can transcend all limits, wandering through the boundless without
depending on anything. But in Zhuangzi we also see a constraint on each
individual—the inevitable fate with which one cannot but accept. Therefore, the
absolute freedom and the inevitable constraint can be both present in one and the
same person—one is thus free (by having freedom) and not free (by having
constraint). This is a contradiction. We may illustrate this with some Zhuangzi
fragments, which I shall reconstruct as the following.
A. Freedom
1. Each individual can go beyond his limits
According to Zhuangzi the each individual can go beyond his own perceptive limits.
In the example about Cook Ding, Zhuangzi explains „Now I go by spirit and don‟t
look with my eyes. Perception and understanding have come to a stop and spirit
moves where it wants‟ (Watson 1970: 51, Yangshengzhu). After training for several
years, Cook Ding can see ox without using his eyes and in this way transcends the
limits on his vision.
2. Each individual can wander through the boundless
„Freedom‟ in Zhuangzi is characterized by „wandering‟(遊). As Zhuangzi explains:
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„I‟m just about to set off with the Creator. And if I get bored with that, then I will ride
on the Light-and-Lissome Bird out beyond the six directions, wandering in the village
of Not-Even-Anything and living in the Broad-and-Borderless field‟ (Watson 1970:
93, Yingdiwang). One is absolutely free in that each individual can wander through
the boundless.
3. Each individual can be independent in himself from impacts of all constraints
In Zhuangzi we can see not only the wandering through the boundless, but also the
absolute freedom present in one‟s perfection and independence that is free from all
external constraints. As he says,
Among level things, water at rest is the most perfect, and therefore it can serve as
a standard. It guards what is inside and shows no movement outside. Virtue is the
establishment of perfect harmony. (Watson 1970: 74, Dechongfu)
Here the state of being free is drawn which an analogy with water. Just as water can
„guard what is inside‟ (i.e. perfect in itself), each individual can enjoy his freedom in
himself; just as water can show no movement outside, each individual can be free
from external impacts. This is a virtue of „perfect harmony‟.
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B.
Constraint
4. Inevitability of fate
The most important statement in Zhuangzi‟s „Renjianshi‟ is the following: „In the
world, there are two great decrees: one is fate and the other is duty‟ (Watson 1970:59,
Renjianshi). Among these two, „fate‟ and „duty‟, it is clear that Zhuangzi puts more
emphasis on „fate‟. The primary aspect of „fate‟ in Zhuangzi is its inevitability.
Inevitability may refer to two situations: (i). fate as natural inevitability, and (ii) fate
as inevitable haplessness in life.
Consider the conception of fate as natural inevitability. This includes the relationship
between parents and children and the succession of life and death. The relationship
between parents and children is inevitable, or as Zhuangzi says: „it is fate that a son
should love his parents.‟ On the one hand, there is no way for children to choose their
parents, and so, no matter who the parents are, they should love their parents. On the
other hand, the obedience to the commandment of parents is also inevitable, or as
Zhuangzi says that „A child, obeying his father and mother, goes wherever he is told,
east and west, south or north‟ (Watson 1970: 85, Dazongshi). And elsewhere: „And
the yin-yang—how much more are they to a man than father and mother!‟(Watson
1970: 85, Dazongshi). The succession of yin-yang as a natural law is the same as the
relationship between parents and children. Men cannot resist death. As Zhuangzi says,
„Life and death are fated—constant as the succession of dark and dawn, a matter of
heaven. There are some things which man can do nothing about—all are a matter of
the nature of creatures‟ (Watson1970: 80, Dazongshi). Life and death are inevitable.
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We have to admit that there are many things we can do nothing about.
The other conception of fate is the inevitable haplessness in life. Zhuangzi remarks
that „life, death, preservation, loss, failure, success, poverty, riches, worthiness,
unworthiness, slander, fame, hunger, thirst, cold, heat—these are the alternations of
the world, the workings of fate‟ (Watson 1970: 73-74, Dechongfu). Life and death for
men are inevitable; many other hapless events in life are also inevitable. Although
these things such things as poverty and unworthiness may be as repugnant as death,
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death obviously belongs to a different category. The inevitable fate such as life and
death means that one not only cannot decide the time to live or time to die, but also
cannot choose not to die. In other words, everyone has to be born, and everyone has to
die. But for some other hapless events in life it is different, for it is possible for a poor
man to be rich. Therefore fate as the inevitable haplessness in life is weaker than
natural inevitability. The inevitable haplessness simply means one bad experience in
life, but not to the extent of being necessary and unchangeable throughout life. Thus,
strictly speaking, fate as inevitable haplessness in life is not fate; it is of a special use
in Zhuangzi. In other words, the reason that the inevitable haplessness in life is a kind
of fate is that Zhuangzi treats it as a fate.
5. The indispensability of constraint
The constraint in Zhuangzi, as I see it, is based on the conception of dai (dependence,
待). Dai is presented in Xiaoyaoyou (逍遙遊), in which Zhuangzi says that „Liezi
could skill, but after fifteen days he came back to earth. ……He escaped the trouble
of walking, but he still had to depend on something to get around‟ (Watson1970: 32,
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Xiaoyaoyou). There are different interpretations of this passage. Guo Xiang (郭象)
interprets it as „Without wind, one cannot go around. Dependence on wind is
necessary for going around.‟ But Cheng Xuanying (成玄英) interprets it as following:
„Although escaping the trouble of walking, he cannot go around without wind. He still
has to depend on wind.‟ But what is shared by all the interpretations is that it is
inevitable to depend on something. If one is inevitable to depend on something, then
he is constrained by it. When Liezi depends on wind to go around, he is constrained
by the wind—he cannot go around without wind.
For Zhuangzi, constraint is indispensable. We may distinguish between internal
constraint and external constraint. Internal constraint is the constraint on the
self-adjustment of disease and death, while external constraint is the constraint on
coping with dilemmas. Disease and death, as Zhuangzi sees them, are hard to be
adjusted for oneself. Zhuangzi reports these words from Confuvius: „Life and death
are great affairs, and yet they are no change to him‟ (Watson 1970: 68, Dechongfu). In
addition to that one cannot change the time of one‟s death, it is hard to face death. The
same is also true for diseases. A figure in Zhangzi, Ziyu (子輿), says „If the process
continues, perhaps in time he‟ll transform my left arm into a rooster. In that case I‟ll
keep watch on the night. Or perhaps in time he‟ll transform my right arm into a
crossbow pellet and I‟ll shoot down an owl for roasting‟ (Watson 1970: 84,
Dazongshi). It seems easy for a sage when he experiences disease, but for common
people it is still hard to adjust changing the physical constraint on their bodies.
Most external constraints are on the political affairs. Zhuangzi says „In all affairs,
whether large or small, there are few men who reach a happy conclusion except
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through the Way. If you do not succeed, you are bound to suffer from the judgment of
men. If you do succeed, you are bound to suffer from the yin and yang.‟ (Watson 1970:
59, Renjianshi) Whether the thing he has to cope with is successful or not, it is not
good for him. The eventual suffering seems inevitable.
C.
The Contradiction between Freedom and Constraint
The characterization in 1-5 above shows the contradiction between freedom and
constraint. One is free and at the same time not free. It is questionable why these two
parallel opinions both stand in Zhuangzi. How can one and the same individual be
absolutely free and at the same time inevitably constrained?
II. Disjunctivist Approach
Having noticed this contradiction, a number of scholars propose a disjunctivist
approach to solve it. Some of them attempt to interpret the seeming contradiction by
taking one of these two concepts as primordial to assimilate the other. Some others
intend to sharply distinguish the application of these two concepts. Nevertheless,
these interpretations may easily turn Zhuangzi into a mystic or a pessimist, which is
problematic and this is problematic and unacceptable to me.
Herrlee G. Creel (1970: 37-47) and Mori Mikisaburo (1989: 34-35) are two of the
most prominent scholars to take the disjunctivist approach. Creel groups the Daoists
into two streams: contemplative Daoism and purposive Daoism, and claims that only
the former one is the real ground of Daoism. According to Creel, a contemplative
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Daoist is interested more in detaching himself from, and thus going beyond, those
secular affairs, while a purposive Daoist is more willing to participate and find ways
to handle ordinary affairs. Creel rejects the view that the difference between the two
streams is merely verbal, and he thinks that they differ essentially. As he notices,
Genuine Illumination of ordinary life comes from the strength of our will and thought,
which is in our spiritual lives. As a result, spiritual life must hold the primordial
position that transcends all physical constraints, and physical constraints are merely
insignificant and trivial matters to be assimilated by one‟s spiritual freedom.
Nevertheless, this picture turns Zhuangzi into a mystic. Although Zhuangzi indeed
regarded thought and will as primordial compared to mundane matter, still a great
deal of ordinary affairs should not be neglected, such as ming (命) and yi (義). This is
what each one has to fight and struggle with. In this sense physical constraints are
significant to spiritual lives. Creel‟s assimilation of the physical part of actual life into
the spiritual life would certainly neglect these things, and therefore turns Zhuangzi
into a mystic who holds that by our spiritual contemplation alone we can detach
ourselves from the physical constrained world.
Unlike Creel, Mikisaburo grounds his disjunctivist interpretation of Zhuangzi on the
„negative method‟ that starts with our inevitably physical constraints to assimilate the
concept of freedom in accordance with them. He claims that the very core of
Zhuangzi‟s theory is wu wei (無為). In other words, the main point in Zhuangzi is the
obedience to Nature. As Mikisaburo sees it, „Nature‟ means „necessity‟, and this
necessity means that we can do nothing about it, which is what Zhuangzi calls „fate‟.
We have to accept and realize the inevitability of fate which constrains our physical
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lives. There is no use resisting or rebelling against fate. We have to obey Nature—wu
wei, which, as Mikisaburo analyzes it, is not „not to act at all‟, but to accord with the
power of Nature. Based on the reinterpretation of wu wei, Zhangzi becomes a
Prometheus with an undeceivable mind, or a pessimist with unmatched wisdom. This
picture of Zhangzi is certainly quite far from what is widely recognized.
As we have seen, the disjunctivist approach by assimilation would more or less have
to „transfigure‟ Zhangzi into another form that we can hardly recognize, re-shaping
him either as a mystic or a pessimist according to the side to be assimilated. To avoid
such an imbalanced assimilation, some suggest a „balanced‟ dichotomy of physical
and spiritual parts of our life, without assimilating either one or the other. Let us now
consider this interpretation.
Liu Xiaogan (1987: 205-217) suggests that in Zhuangzi there are two disjoined worlds:
the spiritual world and the physical world. While „freedom‟ is present in the spiritual
world, „constraint‟ is the characteristic of the physical world. These two worlds are
independent from each other, and the only answer of Zhuangzi‟s philosophy is to
know that these two worlds are disjoined. For in this way, though one cannot be free
from the constraints in the physical world, one can still enjoy freedom in the spiritual
world.
However, this approach owes us an account of how these two worlds, being disjoined,
can both be said to be part of reality, i.e. part of the real world, and can have one and
the same individual living in them. If freedom belongs to the spiritual world alone and
the spiritual world is disjoined from the physical world, it would be an illusion to
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expect freedom in our ordinary, mundane, physical lives, and also to try to avoid the
constraints of fate in our spiritual and mental practices. One single person is therefore
cleaved as two—one lives in the physical world, and the other lives in the spiritual
world.
The failure of the disjunctivist approach is its overgeneralization of the distinction
between freedom and constraint. This may be illustrated by the following example.
Imagine a special-designed sofa which looks square form one side but round from the
other. The observer would then tend to conclude that it is a square sofa if he is
standing by one side without being able to look at it from the other side. He would
also tend to conclude that it is a round sofa by the other side. But both conclusions are
mere overgeneralization of the differences in viewpoints. Without being in a position
to see both sides of the thing, the observer is forced to choose between
pseudo-alternatives. If we are in a position to see the whole picture, we could come to
realize that the seeming contradiction, between „round‟ and „square‟ for example, is
only an illusion—„round‟ and „square‟ can both be presented in one sofa.
III. Compatibilist Approach
Angus C. Graham (1989: 190) provides us with a different perspective. The key idea
is Zhuangzi‟s emphasis on the interdependence of tien (天) and ren (人), which hints
us that freedom and constraint may also be interdependent without any genuine
contradiction. Graham unified the disjoined parts by the concept of the inevitable
(budeyi, 不 得 已 ): Everything is inevitable, so the best strategy is to stop the
decision-making process. Our mind can speculate the world in a transparent way. We
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can change our way of reacting to the world according to different contexts. There is
no sense in choosing one of the two as the only answer for all situations. The Daoist
concludes that the sage or the perfect man can find his way out. The sage can dwell in
freedom and constraint without contradiction. But still, this interpretation leaves some
room for the ungrounded mysticism and it seems that Graham still shares the
tendency of assimilating constraint into freedom. Yearley (1983: 125-139), quite
similarly, declares a radical Zhuangzi with a new perspective seeing the world, but
still, a mysticist perspective.
Even though Graham and Yearley indicate that the sage can find his way out to
resolve the contradiction, this radical and mystical interpretation of Zhuangzi is
unacceptable. A suitable interpretation of Zhuangzi must rely upon a unique
transforming process of the individual„s own mind. Here we may pay attention to the
sage‟s transforming process in which a crucial role is played by the concept of wang
(oblivion, 忘). Wang is not just a matter of forgetting; it is rather a process of
transforming, through which we get into an exceptional state of self-awareness. Wang
also makes one supersede his common sense in ordinary life and enter a transparent
understanding of the world. Allinson (1989: 143-144) says something quite similar,
but he misunderstands Zhuangzi‟s concept of xin (心) and considers it as a proper
transforming subject. As I see it, the genuine transforming subject is xing (性) rather
than xin (心). I will develop this in the rest of this essay.
IV. A Dynamic Picture of Xing’s Transformation
There are two related concepts in Zhuangzi—de (德) and xing (性). Both of them
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figure a dynamic picture of transformation of human nature. In Inner Chapters
Zhuangzi talks only about de rather than xing, primarily in order to, as I see it, follow
the method developed in Laozi which approaches xing by de. Nevertheless, in Outer
and Miscellaneous Chapters of Zhuangzi, xing is literally used in the discussion of the
true form of xing-ming, which represents Zhuangzi‟s conception of xing.
Double Connotation of De (德)
In Inner Chapters de has a double connotation: de as the original nature and de as a
self-cultivated virtue. My view is that de as a self-cultivated virtue helps us to see
clearly that it is the transforming subject, while de as the original nature hints us that
this genuine subject of transformation is no more and no less than the human nature.
De as the original nature is a conception rooted in Laozi. According to Wang-Bi‟s
interpretation of „Dao gives birth to it, virtue [i.e. de] rears it‟ (Chapter 51, Laozi), de
is received from dao, and thus de as the original nature is simply dao. This
connotation can be seen in Inner Chapters, such as the following: „Here is this man
who by nature is lacking in virtue‟ (Watson 1970: 62, Renjianshi), where the „virtue‟
(de) simply means the original nature received from dao.
Nevertheless, if we regard the passages like „Virtue is the establishment of perfect
harmony‟ (Watson 1970: 74, Dechongfu), we see a different connotation of de—de as
a virtue resulted from self-cultivation. In Renjianshi ( 人 間 世 ), the sage is
characterized by „In your actions it is best to follow along with him, and in your mind
it is best to harmonize with him‟ (Watson 1970: 62, Renjianshi). In other words, you
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must acquire the sage‟s virtues (de) by „following along with him‟ and „harmonizing
with him‟, i.e. by a process of cultivation. As a result, de provides us with a dynamic
picture of human nature which is in a process of transformation by self-cultivation.
The True Form of Xing-Ming (性命之情)
The dynamic picture of human nature is also suggested by the concept of xing in the
discussion of the true form of xing-ming. Xing, as de, though given as one‟s original
nature by fate (ming), may be developed and may be lost.
Zhuangzi says „He who holds to True Rightness does not lose the original form of his
inborn nature‟ (Watson 1970: 99, Pianmu). In this passage we see that it is at least
possible that one might lose his inborn nature (xing). But, if one wants to do
something so as to become a better man, it should be something to the form of his
inborn nature (xing). As Zhuangzi puts it,
From the Three Dynasties on down, there has been nothing but bustle and fuss,
all over this matter of rewards and punishments. How could people have any
leisure to [keep (安, translation mine)] in the true form of their inborn nature and
fate! (Watson 1970: 115, Zaiyou)
That is to say, in order to avoid moral corruption, what one should do to his inborn
nature (xing) is to „keep‟ it and develop it.
Xing, as „nature‟, may undergo change and development, and one of the causes of its
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change is ming. As Zhuangzi says,
Confucious said, “what do you mean by saying that you began with what you
were used to, grew up with your nature, and let things come to completion with
fate?” “I was born on the dry land and felt safe on the dry land—that was what I
was used to. I grew up with the water and [kept (安, translation mine)] in the
water—that was my nature. I don‟t know why I do what I do—that‟s fate.”
(Watson 1970: 205, Dasheng)
Notice that xing here is described as the inborn nature with which one grows up but
have to „keep‟ and develop even under his fate to do the things he does not know why
he does. Human nature is not something unchangeable which is given from his birth
to his death. One may lose it and should try his best to keep it and develop it. The
sage is our paradigm for keeping and developing his xing best with the consummate
virtue.
V.
Solution to the Contradiction—
Consummate Virtue (至德) and Genuine illumination (真知)
Graham has already concluded there is no contradiction between freedom and
constraint for sage. However, how can the sage do this? In what follows, I shall
complete this picture of the sage as the solution to the contradiction by pointing out
two themes. The first one is that the reason for the sage‟s special insight is based on
using genuine illumination, and the second, genuine illumination comes from being a
sage.
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Seeing Through Contradiction with Genuine Illumination
Now, we may reconsider the inevitable constraint—„to understand what you can do
nothing about and to be content with it as with fate—this is the perfection of virtue‟
(Watson 1970: 60, Renjianshi). Fate as what one can do nothing about might not be
the natural inevitability, but could also be the inevitable haplessness in his life. This,
as we have seen, is fate because Zhuangzi treats it as. Now, Zhuangzi says that to
understand what one can do nothing about and treat it as fate is the perfection of
virtue. What does this mean?
For Zhuangzi, to understand what one can do nothing about and choose to treat it as
fate is certainly an action; it is an action presenting the consummate virtue of the sage.
This is what the sage would do when facing the contradiction—to „understand it‟ with
Genuine Illumination. As Zhuangzi explains, „The True Man of ancient times knew
nothing of loving life, knew nothing of hating death. He emerged without delight; he
went back in without a fuss. He came briskly, he went briskly, and that was all‟
(Watson 1970: 78, Dazongshi).
It is now clear, how the sage can resolve the contradiction is by understanding and
seeing through things from his perfect perspective based on Genuine Illumination.
There is no contradiction between freedom and constraint from his perfect
perspective.
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Developing Xing with Consummate Virtue
It is important to note that Genuine Illumination is not something mystically emerging
from one‟s contemplation at a moment dispatching himself from the empirical
physical world. Zhuangzi is not a mystic. There is a process of development with
which the sage achieve it—a development of xing.
Where does Genuine Illumination come from? Clearly it does not come from religious
contemplation, but from some sage in his development of virtue. As Zhuangzi says,
„There must first be a True Man before there can be true knowledge‟ (Watson
1970:77, Dazongshi). That is to say, Genuine Illumination, or the „true knowledge‟ as
Watson translates, comes from the sage (the True Man) with his Consummate Virtue.
Consummate Virtue is a process which eventually leads to Genuine Illumination.
So, in a word, the sage with his Consummate Virtue develops his nature (xing) so as
to achieve Genuine Illumination. With Genuine Illumination, the sage can see through
the contradiction between freedom and constraint. The contradiction is, as the sage
sees it from his perfect perspective, an illusion.
VI. Conclusion
Human nature is deeply associated with human perspective. It takes time and effort
for us to transform into a sage. But concentrating on the transformation of our own
nature, we do have the potential capacity of achieving Genuine Illumination. The
mind of the sage is an example for the status of „seeing through‟ the illusory
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contradiction between freedom and constraint, and resolves the contradiction in his
deep „in-sight‟ of seeing it through. Freedom and constraint are simply two
„per-spec-tives‟ (points of view) of one Genuine Illumination.
This explains why each individual may „wander through the boundless‟. For „wander‟
is also a perspective stemming from our genuine knowledge of ourselves and the
world. Xin-you (心遊, the wander of the mind) is what Zhuangzi uses to describe this
perspective of the sage. Zhuangzi says, „Just go along with things and let your mind
move freely. Resign yourself to what cannot be avoided and nourish what is within
you—this is best‟ (Watson 1970: 61, Renjianshi). This is the final stage in our
liberating from the earthly limitations.
I conclude this essay with two statements. First, the contradiction between freedom
and constraint is resolved in the state of Genuine Illumination. We do not need to
overgeneralize the distinction so as to distort our interpretation of Zhuangzi. Second,
Genuine Illumination is achievable through the process of development of xing.
With the process of development of xing, the sage sees no contradiction between
freedom and constraint. The contradiction is simply an illusion.
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