The Chilean Foreign Policy and the Ideological PoliticalPartisanship Spectrum: A Study of the Chamber of
Deputies (2002-2006).
PEDRO FELIÚ. Caeni – University of São Paulo.
The influence of partisan politics in congressmen decisions is a much debated issue of political
science. With respect to foreign policy, usually considered above parties, the question appears even
more inconclusive, especially if we consider the lack of empirical works for the Latin-American
countries. This research analysis all roll-call foreign policy votes for the 2002-2006 Legislature of
the Chamber of Deputies of Chile. After constucting a spatial map of deputies’ preferences in
foreign policy through NOMINATE program, we conclude that the ideology of legislators’ political
parties constrains their votes in foreign policy. Our findings indicate that the presupposition that
Latin-American political parties’ preferences do not influence foreign policy does not have support
in the Chilean case.
Keywords: Foreign Policy, Political Parties, Ideology, the Chamber of Deputies of Chile,
NOMINATE.
The perception that foreign policy should be analysed from the perspective of the decision
makers regarding domestic politics has grown steadily in the recent academic scenario1.
The international factors, mainly the structure of the international system, are not able to
explain all the complexity involved in the interaction between countries, neither point the
variable determinants in the adoption of a certain foreign policy. Not even the formulation
of the national security policy, traditionally analysed from the structural theoretical
perspective2, may be fully comprehended while a result coming from a concentrated unit of
decision (National State) which does not generate incoherencies in the definition of its
interests. The formidable work of Fordham (1998) is a strong evidence of that. In it, the
author arguments that conflicting economical interests, mediated by political parties, have
helped shape the North-American national security policy in the beginning of the Cold
War. Nevertheless Senators whose states had the predominance of Third World Investors,
banks that operate in Ásia and import competition industries, tended to oppose to the costly
and ambitious policy of national security in the Truman’s administration. Otherwise,
Senators who came from states which were majoritarily formed by export-oriented
industries and banks operating in Europe tended to support the national security policy in
the above mentioned period (Fordham, 1998). The worries regarding national security
originated in the Cold War, contrary to what withstands the structuralism, have not
generated a unitary set of national preferences (Fordham, 1998). As of a broader
perspective, for any combination of material and structural conditions, there will be a
1
2
See, for example, NEACK, HEY and Haney (1995) and DOUGHERTY and PFALTZGRAFF (2004).
For a conceptualization of the structuralist theory of international relations see WALTZ, K. Theory of
International Politics, 1979.
significant variability in the results of the foreign policy (Hudson, 2005). Even if the
importance of the systemic variables in the formulation of the foreign policy is recognized,
this will be better comprehended as a result of a dispute of interests within the decisoin
making process.
Accounting the relevance of the preferences of the domestic decision makers in the
formulation of the foreign policy, the present article focuses in one of these domestic
agents: the National Congress3. More specifically, we intend to analyse the roll-call voting
of the Chilean deputies in foreign policies during the 2002-2006 legislature. This article is
oriented by the idea that parties, ideology and institutions matter not only domestically, but
also regarding the formulation of the foreign policy. Recent studies re-stated the influence
of partisanship in the domestic policy orientation. (Figueiredo and Limongi, 1999; Poole
and Rosenthal, 1997; Cox and McCubbins, 1991; Aldrich 1995; Leoni, 2000; Hager and
Talbert, 2000). However, the study of the foreign policy, traditionally considered above
political parties, still lacks of more systematic empiric work over the influence of the
National Congress and political parties, mainly considering Latin-American countries.4.
The central argumentation developed in the present study is the recognition of the
correlation between the positioning of the Chilean political parties in the left-right
ideological continuum and the votes of the deputies in foreign policy themes. We argue that
the political ideology of the party of the Chilean deputy is an excellente predictor of his or
her votes in foreign policy.
In the first section of the article we will present the review of the literature regarding the
participation of the National Congress in the formulation of foreign policy, as well as the
influence of the political parties in its determination. In the second section, we are going to
present methodology used here, notedly the use of the statistic program NOMINATE,
developed by Poole and Rosenthal for the analysis of the roll-call voting in the legislative
branch. In the third section we are going to focus on the presentation of empiric data in the
article. The fourth section will be dedicated to the analysis of the results, revealing the
ideological dimension as a structuring factor of the votes of Chilean deputies in foreign
policy. The fifth and last section will conclude the study, pointing out possibilities and
challenges present in the expansion of this research agenda in Latin America.
3
According to Shugart and Carey (1992), the most appropriate term to refer to the parliament in
presidentialist regimes is the Congress. Thus, the utilization of the term Congress implies the reference to
presidentialist systems. In addition, due to the fact that the majority of the presidentialist systems are located
in Latin America and in the United States, (Shugart and Carey, 1992), the term Congress also implies in a
geographic circumscription.
4
Regarding the North-American case, there is a significant production related to the role of the National
Congress and the political parties in the formulation of the foreign policy of the USA (see section 1)
1. State of Art.
The 90’s have pointed out resurgent, in North-American literature, of political parties as the
main actors of political process and public policy formulation.5 Factors such as party
discipline, political parties ideology, party cohesion and party government emerge while
explanations and conclusions which come from the analysis of roll-call voting of the NorthAmerican National Congress (see, for example, Poole and Daniels, 1985; Cox and
McCubbins, 1991; Rohde, 1991, 1994; Aldrich, 1995; Poole and Rosenthal, 1991, 1997;
Gerring, 1997; Aldrich and Rohde, 2000, Hager and Talbert, 2000; Cox and Poole, 2002).
In the event of literature which approaches Latin-American countries as subject of study,
we may mention the works of Figueiredo and Limongi (1999) and Londregan (2000) such
as examples of this trend. In these studies, the finding of party discipline and ideological
influence of political parties in roll-call votes of the Chamber of Deputies in Brazil6 and the
Chilean Senate lead them to a very similar direction to the cited North American literature.
Besides the resurgent of political parties, the 90’s have also brought another significant
resurgent in North-American literature: the National Congress as an important decisive
arena in foreign policy themes and national defense7. As a whole, it is possible to identify
two major argumentative perspectives in literature regarding the National Congress role in
foreign policy: the first advocates the preponderance of Executive Power facing a very little
or basically non-assertive Congress, while the second positions the Congress as operating
in foreign policy as in domestic one.
One of the central arguments of the first perspective is the perception that the President will
always obtain a greater field of action in international subjects if compared to domestic
ones8. Accordingly, ideology and political parties would influence in a quite determinant
manner only the domestic circumscripted policies. (Wildavsky, 1969; Edwards, 1989; Bond
and Fleisher, 1990; Ragsdale, 1995). Furthermore, some classic studies pointed out a
relative harmony between Executive and Legislative Powers in the formulation of foreign
policy derived from the constant support of the Congress to the President’s policies9 (Dahl,
1950; Clausen, 1973 apud McCormick and Wittkopf, 1992). To this constant support
literature named bipartisanship10. In this sense, the difficulty of a congressman, active in
5
For an excellent methodological critique and, consequently, for the results found by this cited literature, see
Krehbiel (2000).
6
For an analysis of the influence of Brazilian political parties’ ideology in the vote of federal deputies, also
see Leoni (2002).
7
See RIPLEY, Randall and LINDSAY, James (ed.). Congress resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on
Capitol Hill.The University of Michigan Press, 1993.
8
This postulate has become known as two presidents’ thesis (Lindsay and Ripley, 1992).
9
Kegley and Wittkopf (1995) assert the post World War II period was remarked by a significant consensus
between the Congress and the Executive Power in delineating a foreign policy spotted by internationalism and
contention of communism and The Soviet Union in North-American foreign policy.
10
Bipartisanship is a kind of mechanism characterized by the joint action of Congress and Executive
searching common objectives, even if occasionally there are some conflicts of interest. Thus, bipartisanship
foreign policy topics seeking reelection, as well as the greater technical and operational
capacity which the Executive Power and its agencies have to conduct the complex foreign
relations of the United States are some of the explanations given for the predominance of
the president in the theme (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1995).
Yet under the same perspective but now focusing in Latin-American literature, Lima e
Santos (2001) have elaborated a study regarding the Brazilian case whose main
argumentation is the abdication of the Congress authority for the Executive in the decisive
process of Brazilian foreign policy. The authors, through a unidimensional model, argue
that the President’s position of policy initiator and the Congress of endorser ex post facto
generate a lack of balance in which the medium legislator is forced to obey the policies
negotiated by the Executive in international forums due to political cost calculation of
rejecting them. This would be the case of the policy of commercial opening which occurred
in Brazil in the beginning of the 90’s. Generically speaking, even though there is a lack of
empiric studies in the area, the Latin-American literature specialized in the topic tends to
evaluate as mere the participation of the Congress in international matters (Stuhldreher,
2003).
The main reason for the low assertiveness of Latin-American Congresses in the formulation
of foreign policy pointed out by the literature are the high concentration of power over the
President, the lack of institutional articulations and expertise tools, as well as the low
electoral outcome (Lima e Santos, 2001; Santos, 2006; Oliveira, 2003, 2005).
The abhorring repercussion of Vietnam War facing the American public opinion was
pointed out as a landmark for the strengthening of the direct participation channels of the
National Congress in leading foreign policy11 (Meernik, 1993; Ripley and Lindsay, 1993;
Lindsay, 1994, 2003). This is the starting point from most literature which we name as
second perspective. Besides the negative side effect of Vietnam War, in the beginning of
the 90’s, the end of Cold War lessened the incentives for the maintenance of an apparent
unity in the conduction of the American foreign policy, diluting the traditional difference
between the foreign and domestic policies (Conley, 1999). According to Lindsay (1994),
three factors lead to this post Cold War trend: the diminishing of electoral costs which go
against the President’s foreign policy, the global interdependence diluted the line which
separated domestic from foreign policies and the drifting between the extense NorthAmerican commitments abroad and the crescent shortage of available resources.
The ascertaining of a much more active Congress in the beginning of the 90’s has produced
a significative impact on the specialized literature. Several empirical studies proved the
influence of partisanship, ideology and special economic interests on the congressmen
has essentially two elements: unity in foreign subjects, or better, political support by the majority of the two
North-American political parties and practices and procedures executed with the intention of reaching the
desired unity (McCormick and Wittkopf, 1990).
11
It is mandatory to highlight that some studious show a relevant participation of the National Congress and
political parties since the beginning of the Cold War (see, for example, McCormick and Wittkopf, 1990 and
Fordham, 1998).
decisions in foreign policy, prevailing those which focus on trade policy12 (McCormick and
Wittkopf, 1992; O’Halloran, 1993; Epstein and O’Halloran, 1996; Kahane, 1996; Wink,
Livingston and Garand, 1996; McGillivray, 1997; Fordham, 1998; Gartzke and Wrighton,
1998; Conley, 1999; Baldwin and Magee, 2000; Bardwell, 2000; Fordham and McKeown,
2003; Xie, 2004; Delaet and Scott, 2006). Therefore, contradicting the first argumentative
perspective, ideology of the legislator, constituency, partisanship and organized economic
interests become important explanatory variables of the North-American foreign policy.
From the comparative politics point of view, overcoming the North-American case
boundaries, we perceive an interesting empirical production that correlates party ideology
and legislators’ preferences in foreign policy, fitting in what we have called the second
argumentative perspective (see Thérien and Noel, 2000; Marks, Hooghe, Nelson and
Edwards, 2006). For example, Milner and Judkins (2004) examine the position of political
parties in trade policy for 25 developed countries (mostly from OECD) between 1945 and
1998. The main argument developed in this study is the existence of a strong impact among
the position of political parties in a unidimensional left-right ideological scale and the
positions taken by the legislators in trade policy. In addition, they show that leftist parties
tended to support free trade meanwhile rightist parties tended to oppose it (Milner and
Judkins, 2004).
Focusing on the influence of Latin-American political parties and congresses in foreign
policy decision making process, we note the absence of quantitative and empirical works
that conduct us to precise conclusions. However, there is a perception in the LatinAmerican specialized literature that the commercial opening process began in the 90’s,
common to most of the countries of the sub-continent, creates a tendency toward the
increase on the Legislative participation in foreign policy (Onuki and Oliveira, 2006). The
internationalization of the domestic agenda and the uneven distribution of the costs and
benefits of the commercial opening (distribuitve consequences) among society are the key
explanations of this perception (Lima, 2000). The Mexican (Mena, 2004), Argentinean
(Stuhldreher, 2003) and Brazilian (Santos, 2006) cases are examples of this tendency.
An important aspect to be highlighted is that independently of the increase in participation
of Latin-American congresses in foreign policy, the power to ratify international treaties
and agreements, present in most of Legislatives of the continent (Alcântara, 2001), is a
sufficient element to identify these as veto players13 of the decision making process in
foreign policy. In this sense, it is extremely important to develop empirical studies that help
us construct a model capable of explaining legislators’ votes in foreign policy.
12
For a discussion that minimizes the impact of constituency and congressmen ideoloy in the North-American
trade policy, see Biglaiser, Jackson and Peake (2004).
13
According to George Tsebelis, “a veto player is an individual or collective actor whose agreement (by the
majority rule in the case of collective actors) is required to the decision of changing a policy” (Tsebelis, 1997:
p. 15). Yet according to the same author, two kinds of veto players can be described: the institutional veto
players and the party veto players. The first ones are characterized for being specified by the constitution,
having a veto power formally granted. The second are distinguished by being the parties of a government
coalition (Tsebelis, 1997).
The analysis of empirical studies reveals the predominance of three central hypotheses
about how North-American congressmen vote: 1- The influence of party ideology; 2- The
influence of constitutiency; 3- The influence of special economic interests. In the present
article, we intend to explore the first hypothesis cited for the Chamber of Deputies of Chile
in foreign policy themes. Therefore, the question to be answered is: Is there a correlation
between the position of the political parties of the Chilean deputies in the ideological
spectrum and their respective votes in foreign policy? In the next section we will discuss
the methodology used to answer the question above.
2. Methodology.
The use of spatial models is an important tool in the analysis of roll-call voting. In these
models, each legilator is represented by a point and each roll-call is represented by two
points, one for “yes” and the other for “no”. In each roll-call the legislator votes for the
closest result to his or her most preferred point, at least probabilistically. These points
conform a spatial map that summarizes the roll calls (Poole, 2005).
Keith Poole e Howard Rosenthal have developed the statistical program NOMINATE
(Nominal Three-Step Estimation) that estimates the ideal point of legislators for a given
legislature, producting a spatial map. Because this roll call method of analysis is metric, it
allows the estimation of multidimensional positions for legislators and policies. (Leoni,
2000). The parameters are constrained by a unit hypersphera (Poole, 2005: 107).
Admitting that votes are subjected to error, the NOMINATE procedure employs a
probabilistic model that viabilise the use of error patterns to recover the coordinates of the
political results, presupposing that some errors are more likely than others, independent and
equally distributed among the legislators and policies (Rosenthal and Voeten, 2001).
NOMINATE includes a signal-to-noise ratio that deduces how strong the spatial
component related to the factors that cause errors is (Leoni, 2000: 24-25).
Leoni (2000) describes in a succinct manner these procedures of estimating legislators’
preferences:
“Sendo s o número de dimensões indexadas por k=1,...,s; p o número de
legisladores (i=1,...,p); q o número de votações (j=1,...,q). O ponto ideal
do legislador i é xi. Cada votação é representada por zjy e zjn onde y e n
são as conseqüências políticas dos resultados “Sim” e “Não”,
respectivamente. zmj é o ponto médio e dj é a distância entre os resultados
políticos e o ponto médio dj=( zjy-zjn)/2 ). zjy = zmj - dj e zjn = zmj + dj .
a) parte-se de uma configuração inicial dos legisladores e da
razão sinal para barulho (β)16;
b) estimar o ponto médio e a distância das políticas (zmj e dj);
c) estimar β;
d) estimar os legisladores, mantendo β , zmj e dj fixos;
e) repetir b-c-d (o que corresponde a uma iteração global) até a
estabilidade, normalmente de três a quatro iterações globais.
Após a convergência na primeira dimensão, as posições são mantidas
fixas e estimam-se os parâmetros da dimensão seguinte”. (Leoni, 2000:
25).
From the analysis of three legislatures during the Fourth French Republic, Rosenthal and
Voeten (2001) argue that the use of NOMINATE may not be apropriate to analyse
legislatives characterized by a great variation of party discipline among parties, low party
cohesion and the existence of institutional incentives for strategic voting. If some
legislators are submitted to stronger party pressures, for example, the presupposition that
errors are independent and equally distributed will be certainly violated (Rosenthal and
Voeten, 2001). The Chilean legislative does not fit in these characterization that turns it
unviable to the use of NOMINATE procedure. It is observed in the Chilean Congress high
levels of party discipline and cohesion among the major political parties (Saéz, 2003 and
Nolte, 2003). Therefore, the Chamber of Deputies of Chile is a proper study subject to the
use of NOMINATE program.
3. The Data.
Our research has one dependent variable, the roll call votes of Chilean deputies in foreign
policy themes, and one independent variable, the position of political parties in the leftright ideological spectrum.
Regarding the dependent variable, all the roll-call votes of the 2002-2006 legislature about
foreign policy were included, totalizing 157 roll-calls14. The roll-calls that the minority side
did not reach 2% were excluded15, just as those deputies that did not vote in at least 10 roll
calls (cutoff criterium). Follows Table 1 with the respectives values.
Table 1. Total of Roll Call Votes and Deputies included in the analysis.
Legislature Deputies Included Deputies Roll-Call Votes Included Roll-Call Votes
2002-2006
120
118
157
3616
Source: elaborated by the author.
It has been considered as foreign policy those roll-calls related to international cooperation
treaties and agreements signed with foreign countries and international organizations
(41,5%), trade policy (17,8%), direct actions in foreign affairs (14,6%), measures about the
14
These roll calls were obtained in the Chamber of Deputies web site (www.camara.cl).
15
It is mandatory to explicit that NOMINATE only considers the “yea” and “no” votes, taking abstentions as
“not voting”.
16
This low number is due to the fact the majority of the votes regarding the concession of citizenship and
international cooperation agreements and treaties offer low or no-cost to its approval.
function of the Foreign Affair Ministery (MRE) and its diplomatic representations (9,5%),
solicitations to the Executive Power that involves international issues (7,6%), extraordinay
concessions of Chilean citizenship (5%) and bilateral agreements to protect investiments
and avoid double taxation (4%). Table 2 summarizes these data mentioned above.
Table 2. Themes of roll call foreign policy votes in the Chamber of Deputies
(2002-2006).
Themes in Foreign Policy
Number of roll-calls
% of the Total
International Cooperation
Treaties and Agreements
65
41,5%
Trade Policy
28
17,8%
Direct Actions
23
14,6%
Mesuares related to the
MRE
15
9,5%
Solicitations to the
Executive Power
12
7,6%
Citzenship concessions
8
5%
Reciprocal Protection of
Investiments and Duble
Taxation
6
4%
Total
157
100%
Source: Data elaborated by the author.
For comparative purposes, the disposition of the Chilean political parties in ideological leftright continuum used in this article is the one produced by Manuel Alcántara Saéz (2003),
in an article named La ideología de los partidos políticos chilenos, 1994-2002: Rasgos
constantes y peculiaridades.
In this study, Saéz performs a series of interviews with the Chilean Deputies in three
legislatures (1994-1998, 1998-2002 and 2002-2006) whose objective is to delineate
ideological values for the Chilean parties. For that, four themes have been selected: the
position of the party regarding democracy, the role of the armed forces, the degree of
priority of social and economic public politicies and the aspects of internal organization of
the parties themselves.
From the results obtained from such surveys, the author has come up with values to
determine the position of political parties in the left-right ideological continuum. Please
find below the table which carries the cited values17.
Table 3. Ideological Values of Chilean Parties.
PS
PPD
PDC
RN
UDI
Chamber
1994
2,93
4,36
4,40
6,36
6,80
Chamber
1998
2,50
4,00
4,83
6,76
8,18
Chamber
2002
2,56
3,85
5,28
6,80
7,08
Source: PELA (Programa de Estúdios Latinoamericanos de la Universidad de Salamanca).
The values attributed range from 1 to 10, where 1 is left and 10 is right. In Table 2, thus, the
leftist party is PS, in the center we find PDC and the rightist is UDI. It is worth mentioning
that Londregan (2000) also estimates the positioning of Chilean political parties in the
ideological continuum, differing in the applied method and in the subject of study (the
commissions of Chilean Senate in the first legislature post-Pinochet). The disposition
elaborated by Londregan is very similar to Saéz’s (2003).
Having as a reference the distribution of the ideological values18 of the Chilean political
parties in Table 3, we may test the existance or not of a correlation between the political
parties ideology in foreign policy (estimated by Nominate) and domestic policy (estimated
by Saéz, 2003).
Chilean political system, as well as many others in Latin America, operates under the aigis
of a multiparty system, which turns the election of a president who has only the support of
his own party extremely unlikely, as well as holding most of the seats in the Congress
(Nolte, 2003). Then, the scarce possibility of only one party winning the presidency and the
majority in Congress demands a governmental coalition to guarantee the political system
stability (Nolte, 2003). Besides that, the Chilean political system has specificities that favor
the formation of coalitions such as the legislative binominal electoral system; the existence
of a compensation system through governmental positions; the fact that coalitions are not
only constituted by an electoral calculation, but also by a consensual governmental program
(Nolte 2003: p.10-11). We may observe in Chile the formation of a center-left
17
PS (Partido Socialista), PPD (Partido por la Democracia), PRSD (Partido Radical Social Democrata), PDC
(Partido Demócrata Cristiano), UDI (Unión Demócrata Independiente), RN (Renovación Nacional).
18
Just for illustrative purposes, according to Saéz (2003) the Chilean parties, if compared with other LatinAmerican parties, are those which better fit in the left-right ideological continuum.
governmental party coalition called Concertación19, formed by PS, PPD, PRSD and PDC.
In opposition, we have Alianza por Chile, a right coalition, formed by UDI and RN.
Follows below, in Table 4, the partisan composition of the Chamber of Deputies in 20022006 Legislature.
Table 4. Partisan Distribution in the Chilean Chamber of Deputies (2002-2006).
Coalitions
Parties
Number of deputies
%
60
50%
PDC
24
20%
PS
10
8,3%
PPD
20
16,6%
PRSD
06
5%
47
39,1%
UDI
30
25%
RN
17
14,1%
IND**
13
10,8%
120
100%
Concertación
Alianza por Chile
Total
Source: elaborated by the author from data avaible in the Chilean Chamber of Deputies web site.
** The independent deputies were not considered in the coalitons calculus because they do not belong to any
party, even those who opted for one of the coalitions.
4. Results.
Before analysing the results generated by NOMINATE, it is convenient to
highlight that this program was developed to test the ideological constraint
hypothesis for legislators’s votes (Leoni, 2000). The number of necessary
dimensions to represent the ideal points of legislators is usually small, given that
legislators frequently decide their votes based on basic dimensions (Poole, 2005).
In the North-American Congress, for example, the liberal-conservative dimension
is capable of predicting the great majority of congressmen’s votes, being a
structuring factor of roll-call votes (Poole, 2005). Analogically, in the Chamber of
19
It is worth to note that since the Chilean redemocratization the Concertación coalition has always been
victorious in the presidental elections. Evidently that this coalition has not always been formed by the same
parties. Notwithstanding, PS, PPD and PDC have always figured in Concertación coalition.
Deputies in Brazil the left-center-right20 ideological dimension is also capable of
predicting a great majority of the votes of federal deputies (Leoni, 2002). As it can
be noticed in Maps 1 below, the ideological dimension (first dimension) is equally
qualified to predict the Chilean deputies’ votes in foreign policy21.
Map 1. Ideal Points of Deputies per Ideology.
20
The meaning of left, center and right certainly depends on the cultural and historical context, being only
necessary that a significant part of the actors shares this same meaning (Leoni, 2000).
21
Primeira e Segunda dimensões means respectively first and second dimensions. Esquerda, Centro and
Direita means respectively left, center and right.
Map 2. Ideal Points of Deputies per party.
In Map 1, it is quite clear the observation of the ideological constrain in the votes
of Chilean deputies in foreign policy roll-calls. The legislators of the center-left
coalition are located in one half of the first dimension (from -1 to 0) meanwhile
the rightist legislators are located in the opposed half (from 0 to 1). It is interesting
to note that the low incidence of legislators in the center of the ideological
political espectrum (first dimension) shows the considerable level of partisanship
polarization in the deputies’ decisions in foreign policy. Furthermore, the results
obatined in Map 2 coincide with the arguments of Nolte (2003) that the coalition
formation in Chile is ruled by a consensual governmental program, not only an
electoral calculation. Certainly foreign policy is part of this consensual
governmental program, demonstrating the similarity of the preferences of the
deputies of Concertación in its conduction (see Table 4 for the composition of
Chilean coalitions).
Yet according to Map 2, we can perceive the similarity between the ideological
values estimated by Saéz (2003) for the 2002-2006 Legislature and the spatial
disposition of Chilean political parties in the ideological dimension (see Table 3).
Map 3 below favors the visualization of deputies’ ideal points per party.
Map 3. Ideal Points of Deputies per Party.
The aleatory dispotition of independent legislators’ ideal points, present in the map named
IND, gives us a nice parameter of the ideological partisanship constraining in the deputies’
votes. From the ideal points per party we are able to infer the localization of the main
Chilean political parties in the ideological dimension considering their preferences in
foreign policy.
PS
Left
PPD
PDC
RN
UDI
Right
The similarity of the distribution presented above with the values elaborated by Saéz (2003)
is a strong indication that the Chilean foreign policy is not above parties, but under the
influence of factors supervened from the political process common to the public policies in
general. The factor here explored is the predictive capability of the ideological position of
the political parties regarding foreign policy decisions.
Just to illustrate some differences between left and rigth parties voting in foreign policy, we
will present graphically four polarized roll-calls. In the graphics, 1 means favorable votes
(yes), 2 contrary votes (no), 3 abstentions and 9 not voting. In the vertical line there is the
quantity of votes and in the horizontal line the ideology of political parties.
Graphic 1.Chile retreats the Economic Complementary Agreement with MERCOSUR
25
1
2
3
20
9
15
10
5
0
Independents
Left
Center
Right
Graphic 1 allows us to visualize a clear division between center and leftist parties, against
the Chilean retreat of the Economic Complementary Agreement with MERCOSUR, while
rightist parties were favorable. The Economic Complementary Agreement, signed with
Mercosur members in 1996, has the intention of creating a free trade zone between the
countries in 10 years, expanding and diversifying trade exchange and eliminating tariff and
non-tariff restrictions. This roll-call was voted in 2002, before the ratification of the Free
Tarde Agreement with the United States. Therefore, it is observed an initiative of the
rightist parties to retreat this agreement with the intention of isolate Mercosur, priorizing
the free trade agreement with the US (2003) and the project of constitution of AFTA
(America Free Trade Agreement). It is woth noticing that Mercosur is one of the biggest
obstacles to the creation of the North-American version of AFTA, supported by Chile and
Mexico. However, the center and leftist parties (majority) reject this proposition, revealing
their tendency to support South-American integration.
Graphic 2. Support to the participation of Chilean troops in the multinational force in
.
Haiti.
30
1
2
3
25
9
20
15
10
5
0
Independents
Left
Center
Right
Graphic 2 shows the influence of ideological partisanship in the results of the roll-call about
the Chilean participation in the UN peace force in Haiti. Meanwhile a great majority of
center-lefitist parties support the sending of Chilean troops to Haiti, conforming a gather
action with Brazil, the majority of deputies from rightist parties voted against it.
Graphic 3. Recomend to the Diplomatic Corp a line of action in the Security Council
25
1
2
3
20
9
15
10
5
0
Independents
Left
Center
Right
This roll-call, which ocurred in May 5, 2003 and is represented by graphic 3, referred to a
line of action recommendantion for Chile in the UN Security Council. The subject
discussed in the Council was the possibility of a militar multilateral intervention in Irak
under Saddam Hussein’s government. The recommendation of a line of action, proposed by
the Chilean rightist parties, was based in giving support to the North-American suggestion
of an intervention in Irak. The lefitist parties rejected this legislative peace, maintaining the
Chilean position in favor to the weapon inspection in Irak before any preciptated militar
intervention. We can notice a tendency of rightist parties to make an unconditional alliance
with the United States, ratifying their position in international organizations.
Graphic 4. Suit Legislation related to the Free Trade Agreement with the United
States
25
1
2
3
20
9
15
10
5
0
Independents
Left
Center
Right
Graphic 4 represents the roll-call referred to the suit of internal laws regarding the Free
Trade Agreement with the United States. This suit disposes about the customhouse tax that
befalls in the sale of phonographic and radiobroadcast services. In general, this is a suit that
imposes protectionist measures to the sector, revealing the favorable position of centerleftist parties and the opposition of rightist parties.
The ascertaining of a significant influence of political parties ideology in the deputies votes
is part of a first effort to comprehend the role of political parties, and the National Congress
in general, in the Chilean foreign policy. Evidently, it is necessary to include a larger
number of independent variables such as special economic interests, constituency, and
macroeconomic conditions of the electoral districts to construct a model capable of
comparing the level of influence of all possible variables.
5. Conclusion.
The perception that Latin-American Congresses have a weak participation in the
conduction of foreign policy, and the prevailence of a lack of interest of congressmen in
foreign policy, seem not to have support from the Chilean case. The ideological
polarization identifiyed in the foreign policy roll-calls spatial maps is a strong evidence of
that, approximating this study to the second argumentative perspective (see section 1). In
this sense, this article tries to contribute to the deepening of the empirical analysis
regarding the role of the National Congress in the foreign policy formulation and
conduction.
The understanding of Congress and political parties’ participation in Latin American
foreign policy requires a comparative approach. Although, the study of foreign policy rollcall votes in Latin-American Legislatives present some methodological challenges derived
from some characteristics of the data. For example, in Mexico only the Senate has the
attribution of legislating in foreign policy; in Brazil, a great amount of roll-calls are voted
inside the parliamentary comissions, not being voted on the floor. Another point is the lack
of on-line information about roll-calls in several Latin-American countries, turning much
more costly any research design. Besides these appointments, it seems promising
researching domestic factors that may influence the making-of the foreign policy in the
continent. I hope that the present article had helped in this effort.
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