VoterParticipationwithRankedChoiceVotingintheUnitedStates
DavidC.Kimball
JosephAnthony
DepartmentofPoliticalScience
UniversityofMissouri‐St.Louis
St.Louis,MO63121
[email protected]
October2016
Abstract
AsmorejurisdictionsintheUnitedStatesconsideradoptingrankedchoicevoting(RCV)it
isimportanttoevaluateRCValongsidethepluralityvotingsystemsittypicallyreplaces.
Thisstudyexaminesthedegreetowhichvotersturnoutandproperlycasttheirvotes,
comparingrankedchoicevoting(RCV)topluralityvotingintheUnitedStates.Weusea
difference‐in‐differencesdesign,matchingcitiesusingRCVwithdemographicallysimilar
citiesusingpluralityvotingonthesamedate.WefindthatRCVhelpsreducethesubstantial
dropinvoterparticipationthatcommonlyoccursbetweenprimaryandrunoffelections.
OtherwiseRCVdoesnotappeartohaveastrongimpactonvoterturnoutandballot
completion.InacasestudyofMinneapoliswefindsimilarlevelsofsocioeconomicand
racialdisparitiesinvoterparticipationinpluralityandRCVelections.
TheresearchreportedhereissupportedbytheDemocracyFund.Theauthorsaresolely
responsiblefortheanalysisandinterpretationinthisstudy.
Thisstudyexaminesthedegreetowhichvotersturnoutandparticipateinlocal
elections,comparingrankedchoicevoting(RCV)topluralityvotingintheUnitedStates.An
increasingnumberofAmericanlocaljurisdictionsareadoptingpreferentialvotingsystems,
andRCVisthemostcommonofthesubstitutesforsingleseatelectionsintheUnitedStates.
RCVhasnowbeenadoptedbyatleasttencitiesintheUnitedStates,primarilyformayoral
orcitycouncilelections.Byallowingvoterstorankcandidatesforthesameoffice,RCV
contrastswiththedominantpluralityvotingmethodusedtoelectgovernmentofficialsin
theUnitedStates.
AsmoreAmericanjurisdictionsconsideradoptingRCVtherearemanyclaimsabout
themeritsanddemeritsofRCV.Todate,mostofthepublishedworksonRCVarecase
studiesthatexamineitsperformanceinasmallnumberoflocations.Indecidingwhether
RCVshouldreplacepluralityvotingitisimportanttoevaluateRCValongsidetheplurality
systemittypicallyreplacesintheUnitedStates.Ourstudydoesthatbycomparingvoter
participationinRCVandpluralityelectionsinAmericancities.Usingadifference‐in‐
differencesdesignwecompareamatchedsampleofcitiesusingRCVandpluralityvoting
rulesbeforeandaftertheadoptionofRCV.WefindthatRCVreducesthesubstantialdrop
invoterparticipationinlocalprimaryandrunoffelections.Beyondthat,however,RCV
doesnotappeartohaveastrongimpactonvoterturnoutandballotcompletionin
municipalelections.InacasestudyofMinneapoliselectionsbeforeandaftertheadoption
ofRCVwefindsimilarlevelsofsocioeconomicandracialdisparitiesinvoterparticipation
inpluralityandRCVelections.
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VoterParticipationwithRankedChoiceVoting
ThevastmajorityofAmericanelectionsareconductedundersomeversionof
plurality,orwinner‐take‐all,rules.Inelectionsforasingleoffice,likemayororacity
councilseat,voterscanexpressapreferenceforjustasinglecandidate,andthatvoteisnot
transferabletoothercandidates.However,overthepasttenyearsseveralAmericancities
haveadoptedrankedchoicevotingforsingleofficeelections.Incontrasttopluralityrules,
RCVasksvoterstorankcandidatesinorderofpreference,enablingvoterstoexpress
preferencesformultiplecandidatesinthesamecontest.UnderRCV,votescanbe
transferredtoothercandidates,forexample,ifavoter’sfirstchoiceiseliminatedfrom
contention.1
TherearecompetingargumentsabouthowRCVmightinfluencevoterparticipation.
Underthetraditionalcalculusofvoting,thedecisiontovoteisinfluencedbythecostsand
benefitsassociatedwithvoting,aswellastheprobabilitythatone’svotewilldeterminethe
outcome(Downs1957:chapter14).Thebenefitsrefertothepolicyorrepresentational
benefitsassociatedwithapreferredcandidatewinningtheelection.Thecostsofvoting
includetheeffortneededtobecomeinformedaboutthevotingrulesandthecontestson
theballot,aswellastheeffortneededtoovercomeadministrativeandotherbarriersto
registeringandcastingaballot.
1InmostAmericancitieswithRCVrulesvotersindicateapreferenceforuptothreecandidates.Asmall
numberofcitiesallowvoterstorankalargernumberofcandidates.Withoneexception,Americancities
usingRCVtransfervotesusingthealternativevotemethod.Thatis,whenavoter’smostpreferredcandidate
iseliminatedthenthevoter’ssecondchoicevoteisreallocatedtooneoftheremainingcandidates.The
exceptionisCambridge,Massachusetts,whichusesasingletransferrablevotesystem.
2
Ontheonehand,somearguethatRVCwillreinvigoratelocalelectionsbyfostering
moredeliberativecampaigns.RCVistheorizedtoalterthedynamicsofcampaignsand
electionsby:(1)encouragingcollaborationandcivilityamongcompetingcandidates;(2)
allowingvoterstoprovideamorecompletereportoftheircandidatepreferencesonthe
ballot;(3)reducingvoterconcernsabout“wastedvotes”forweakercandidates;and(4)by
providingincentivesformorecandidatestorunforoffice(Horowitz1985;Reilly2001;
Donovan,Tolbert,andGracey2016).Reducingoreliminatingwastedvoteconcernsmay
reducesomeoftheperceivedcostsassociatedwithvoting.IfRCVindeedattractsmore
candidatesthentheadditionalcampaignsmaymobilizemorevoterstoovercomethe
typicalcostsassociatedwithvoting.SomearguethatRCVencouragesmorecooperation
andbargainingamongrivalpoliticalelitesthanthezero‐sumcontextofpluralityelections
(Horowitz1985,1991;Reilly1997;2001).Thus,forexample,RCVmayhelpbridgeracial
andethnicdivisions(Guinier1994;Reilly1997,2002).Ifsomevotershavebeen
discouragedfromparticipatinginthenegativecampaignscommontopluralityelections,
thenRCVmayincreasevoterparticipation.
SomepreviousresearchoffersreasonstobeoptimisticabouttheimpactofRCVon
voterparticipation.Across‐nationalstudyfindsthatvotersincountrieswithahigher
degreeofpreferentialvotingreportmoresatisfactionwiththefairnessofelection
outcomes(FarrellandMcAlister2006).ArecentstudyofRCVintheUnitedStatesfinds
thatvotersincitiesusingRCVreportlessnegativecampaigningandmoresatisfactionwith
thelocalelectionthanvotersincitiesusingpluralityvoting(Donovan,Tolbert,andGracey
2016).CandidatesalsonoteamorepositivecampaignexperienceinRCVcities(Donovan
2014).Whilethereisnoclearevidencethatnegativecampaigningdepressesturnout(Lau,
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Sigelman,andRovner207),votersmaybemorewillingtoparticipateinelectionswhen
theyaremoresatisfiedwiththeelectoralsystem.
Furthermore,inastudyoflocaljurisdictionsintheUnitedStates,Bowlerand
colleagues(2003)findthatcumulativevotinggeneratesmorevigorousvoteroutreach
efforts,andthusboostsvoterturnoutinlocalelections.Whilecumulativevotingprovides
candidatesandcampaignsadifferentmixofincentivesforvotermobilizationthanRCV,
bothsystemsarevariantsofpreferentialvotingandthusonemightexpectRCVtoproduce
similarvoterturnoutimprovements.Finally,exitpollsinAmericancommunitiesusingRCV
tendtorevealhighlevelsofunderstandingandsatisfactionwiththevotingsystem(e.g.,
Neelyetal.2005;2006;Mauter2014).
Ontheotherhand,somearguethatthetaskofrankingcandidatesinRCVelections
maybeconfusingforvoters,particularlyforAmericanvoterswhohavebeensocializedin
pluralityvoting.Newvotingruleswillimposecostsonvoterstounderstandandproperly
followthenewrules.Downs(1957)theorizesthatvotingcostsdisproportionately
disenfranchiselow‐incomevotersandotherslackinginresources.Thereisevidencein
Americanelectionsthatconfusingvotingequipmentorballotdesignsproducemorevoting
errors,andtheimpactofpoordesignfallsdisproportionatelyonlowincomeandminority
voters(Herrnsonetal.2008;KropfandKimball2012).Otherrecentelectionreformsinthe
UnitedStates,suchasexpandedearlyvoting,mayhaveworsenedsocioeconomicbiasesin
turnout(Berinsky2005).Somecriticssimilarlyarguethatthenovelandcomplexnatureof
RCV,includingthewayballotsarecounted,mayexacerbatesocioeconomicdisparitiesin
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voterparticipation(JacobsandMiller2013,2014).Ifvotershavedifficultyunderstanding
howRCVworks,theymaybediscouragedfromparticipatinginRCVelections.
ThereissomeevidencethatvoterparticipationinRCVelectionsmaynotbeashigh
asexpected.Onestudyfindsafairamountof“ballotexhaustion”inCaliforniaelections
usingRCV(BurnettandKogan2015).Thatis,ifsomevotersdonotmarkthefullarrayof
rankedpreferencesaffordedbytheballotoriftheyonlypreferrelativelyweakcandidates,
thentheirvotesmaynotfactorintothefinaldeterminationofthewinner.Intheelections
theyanalyze,thewinningcandidatetypicallydidnotreceiveamajorityofallballotscastin
theelection.McDaniel(2016)estimatesthatturnoutamongsomeracialgroupsinSan
FranciscodeclinedaftertheadoptionofRCV.Inaddition,ageandeducation‐related
turnoutdisparitiesaremorepronouncedinSanFranciscoaftertheadoptionofRCV
(McDaniel2016).Similarly,overvotesaremorecommoninminorityprecinctsinRCV
electionsinSanFrancisco(NeelyandMcDaniel2015).
Againstthesecompetinghypotheses,therearereasonstoexpectminimaleffectsof
RCVonvotingparticipation.Turnoutinlocalelectionstendstobeinfluencedbyfeatures
thatbearheavilyonthecost/benefitcalculusofvoting,suchastheelectionschedule,the
levelofcompetitioninlocalcampaigns,mobilizationefforts,andothercharacteristicsof
thelocalpoliticalcontext(Anzia2013;Oliver2012;Hajnal2010;GreenandGerber2015).
Incontrast,manyelectionreformsdonotfundamentallyalterthecostsandbenefitsof
voting.Priorreformstoutedasturnoutboosters,suchasthemotorvoterlaw(Hanmer
2012),theHelpAmericaVoteAct(KropfandKimball2012),votingbymail(Kousserand
Mullin2007),earlyvoting(Burdenetal.2014),andtermlimits(BowlerandDonovan
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2012)havehaddonelittletoincreasevoterparticipationintheUnitedStates(alsosee
Cain,Donovan,andTolbert2008).Berinsky(2005)classifieselectionreformsintotwo
groups:(1)thosethatstimulatenewvoters,and(2)thosethatretainexistingvoters.By
merelyallowingvoterstoindicateapreferenceformorethanonecandidateRCVmaynot
alterthebasiccalculusofvotingandthusmaynotstimulatemanynewvoters.
Ultimately,theimpactofRCVonvoterparticipationisaresearchablequestion.
However,muchoftheexistingresearchexaminesRCVelectionsinisolatedcasestudies.To
assesstherelativeadvantagesanddisadvantagesofnewvotingrules,itisimportantto
comparetheperformanceofthenewsystemtotheoldsystemitisreplacing.Thenext
sectiondescribesthedataandresearchdesignweusetoexaminetheparticipation
questionforRCVintheUnitedStates.
DataandMethods
InassessingtheimpactofRCVonvoterparticipationthisstudyusesaresearch
designsimilartothatemployedbyBowler,Donovan,andBrockington(2003)intheirstudy
ofcumulativevoting.Thebasicapproachistocomparea“treatment”groupofcitiesthat
haveadoptedRCVtoa“control”groupofcitiesusingpluralityvoting.Thecomparison
citiesinthecontrolgrouparesimilartotheRCVcitiesintermsofpopulation,region,
income,poverty,anddemographicdiversity.WecompareasimilarsetofRCVandmatched
pluralitycitiesasDonovanetal.(2016,Table1)andKropf(2015,Table1).
Inaddition,weusea“difference‐in‐differences”(DID)designtocomparetheRCV
andpluralitycities.Thisinvolvesgatheringdataonvoterparticipationinbothsetsofcities
fromelectionsheldbeforeandafterRCVwasadopted.Thereasonforthisapproachisthat
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thecitiesthathaveadoptedRCVtendtohaveastrongreputationforprogressivepolitics.
Assuch,theRCVcitiesmayhavecivicculturesandpriorpoliciesthatreducebarriersto
votingandpromotewidespreadvoterparticipation.Thus,itispossiblethatdifferentrates
ofparticipationexistedinthematchedRCVandpluralitycitiesevenbeforeadoptionof
RCV.TheDIDdesignassessestheimpactofRCVbymeasuringhowmuchthedifferencein
participationratesbetweenthetwogroupsofcitieschangesaftertheadoptionofRCV.In
ordinaryleastsquaresregressionanalysis,thetreatmenteffectisestimatedbyan
interactionbetweenatreatmentvariable(indicatingwhetheracityisinthetreatmentor
controlgroup)andatimevariable(indicatingwhetherthetimeperiodisbeforeorafter
adoptionofRCV).ForasummaryofthestatisticaltreatmentofDIDmethods,see
Wooldridge(2013,chapter13)orBailey(2016,chapter8).
Forbothsetsofcities,weexaminetherecentelectionsthroughthe2015cycleas
wellasthelastelectionortwopriortotheadoptionofRCV.Weleaveoutthecitiesthat
heldRCVelectionsin2012andotheryearsthatcoincidewithapresidentialcontest.Voter
participationinpresidentialyearsisstronglyshapedbythepresidentialcampaignandis
muchhigherthanturnoutinlocalelectionsinotheryears.Thus,wedonotexpectRCVto
haveasmuchofanimpactonturnoutinthoseelections.Furthermore,sinceCambridge,
MassachusettsadoptedRCVinthe1940s,wehavenotincludedvoterparticipationdatafor
CambridgeanditsmatchingpluralitycitiesbeforetheadoptionofRCV.Westillexamine
bothsetsofcitiesforthe2009,2013,and2015elections.Similarly,Portland,Maine
adoptedRCVin2011atthesametimethatitresumedelectingamayor.Priorto2011,
Portlandhadnotelectedamayorsincethe1920s.Therefore,wedonotincludedatafor
Portlandanditsmatchingcitiespriorto2011.Westillexaminebothsetsofcitiesforthe
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2011and2015elections.Table1liststhecitiesandelectionsthatarepartofthisstudy.
Oursampleincludesatotalof96elections,including19electionsusingRCV.
[Table1abouthere]
WegathereddatafromeachcityandelectionlistedinTable1tocreateseveral
measuresofvoterparticipation.Voterturnoutisacommoncommunity‐widemeasureof
participation.Wemeasurevoterturnoutasthepercentageofeligiblevoterswhocasta
ballotintheelection.Wecollectdataonthenumberofballotscastfromcityandcounty
electionoffices.Wemeasurethenumberofeligiblevotersineachcitybasedonestimates
ofthecitizenvotingagepopulation(CVAP)reportedintheCensusBureau’sAmerican
CommunitySurvey(ACS).TheACSreleasesfive‐yearaveragepopulationestimatesfor
Americanmunicipalities.Weusethemostrecentlyreleasedestimateforthecitizenvoting
agepopulationin2013,2014and2015.Forearlieryearsweusethefive‐yearaverage
centeredontheyeartheelectionwasheld.
Weexamineturnoutinlocalprimary,general,andrunoffelections.Incitieswitha
pluralitysystemtherearetypicallytwoelectionsheldtochooselocalofficials:(1)a
primaryelectionanda(2)runoffelection.Thetopcandidateswhoreceivethemostvotes
intheprimaryelection(usuallythetoptwo)advancetotherunoffelection.Thewinnerof
therunoffelectionthenwinstheoffice.Insomecases,ifacandidatewinsatleast50
percentofthevoteintheprimary,thenshewinstheseatwithouttheneedforarunoff
election.Also,insomecitiestheprimaryoccursinthespringorsummerandtherunoff
takesplaceonthegeneralelectiondateinearlyNovember.Inothercitiestheprimary
occursinNovemberandtherunoffelectiontakesplaceamonthorsolater.Turnouttends
8
tobehigherintheNovembergeneralelectionthaninsummerprimariesorwinterrunoff
electionsbecausetheNovemberelectionoftensharestheballotwithotherstatewideor
federalconteststhattendtoattractmorevoters.
InRCVsystems,wherevotersrankcandidatesinorderofpreference,justone
electionisheldtoselectgovernmentofficials.RCVisthusdesignedtocombinetheprimary
(firstchoiceselections)andrunoff(re‐allocationofvotesforlosingcandidatestothe
voter’ssecondorthirdchoice)inoneelection,whichiswhyRCVissometimescalled
“instantrunoffvoting.”TheRCVelectionsinoursamplealltakeplaceinNovember.Asa
result,wemakeseparatecomparisonsofturnoutinRCVelectionstoturnoutingeneral
electionsaswellasinprimaryorrunoffelectionsinpluralitycities.Similarly,wecompare
thedropinvoterparticipationfromthefirstroundtothelastroundofvotetabulationin
RCVcitiestothedropinvotesbetweenthefirstround(primaryelection)andthelast
round(runoffelection)inpluralitycities.2Inoursample,45ofthe77cityelectionswith
pluralityrulesheldaseparateprimaryorrunoffinadditiontotheNovembergeneral
election.
Toassesspotentialconfusionamongvoterswemeasuretheresidualvoterate
(AnsolabehereandStewart2005)inthetoplocalcontestontheballot(usuallyamayoral
race).Theresidualvoterateisthedifferencebetweenthetotalballotscastandthenumber
ofvalidvotesrecordedforthecontestinquestion(asapercentageoftotalballotscast).
Residualvotescanoccurbytwomechanisms:(1)overvotes(whenavoterselectstoomany
candidatesinacolumn),or(2)undervotes(whenavotermakesnoselectioninacolumn).
2ThankstoRobertMontjoyforaconversationaboutthiscomparison.
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Overvotesarealmostalwaysanindicationofvotererror,whileundervotesmaybedue
votererrorortheymaybeintendedbyavoterwhowantstoskipaparticularconteston
theballot.Theresidualvoteratemeasureisnotperfectsinceitcombinesboth
mechanisms.Unfortunately,mostjurisdictions,includingmostcitiesinthisstudy,donot
reportovervotesandundervotesseparately.Nevertheless,previousstudiesindicatethat
theresidualvoterateisavalidmeasureofpoorlydesignedballotsandvotingequipment
(AnsolabehereandStewart2005;seeKropfandKimball2012forareview).Inpresidential
elections,aresidualvoteratesubstantiallyabove1%isusuallyasignofsometypeof
problemwiththeballotorvotingmachinery(KnackandKropf2003).
ThereisanadditionaldecisioninhowtoapplytheresidualvotemeasuretoRCV
elections.Inpluralityelections,wherethevoterhasjustonevote,theresidualvote
calculationisstraightforward.InRCVelections,wherethevoterhasmultiplechoices(and
hencemultiplevotes),thereareseveralpossiblewaystocomputethemeasure.Shouldit
bebasedonallofthevotesavailabletothevoter?Itappearsthatthevastmajorityof
votersinRCVsystemsrecordafirstorsecondchoice,butmanymaypurposefullyabstain
fromathirdorfourthchoice.Itmaynotmakesensetointerpretthoseabstentionsasasign
ofvoterconfusion.Toallowforascloseacomparisonaspossibletopluralityelections,we
computetheresidualvoterateinRCVelectionsjustbasedonthefirstchoicevotes.Ina
casestudyofvotinginMinneapolis,weusesomeadditionalmeasuresofvoterconfusion
andballotcompletionthatwedescribebelow.
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TurnoutResults
Asimpleversionofthedifference‐in‐differencemethodcanbeillustratedwitha
graph.Startingwiththebroadermeasureofparticipation,Figure1plotsthemeanturnout
rateforNovemberelectionsinRCVandpluralitycitiesbeforeandaftertheadoptionof
RCV.IntheelectionspriortoRCVadoption,turnoutintheRCVcities(40.1%)isalmost
elevenpointshigherthanmeanturnoutinthepluralitycities(29.3%).Thissupportsour
suspicionthatthecitiesadoptingRCValreadyhadhigherturnoutratesbeforeadoption.In
electionsaftertheadoptionofRCV,thedifferenceinmeanvoterturnoutinRCVcities
(34.1%)andpluralitycities(28.4%)isroughly6points.Asthegraphindicates,the
differenceinturnoutbetweenthetwogroupsissmalleraftertheadoptionofRCV,
suggestingthatRCVreducesgeneralelectionturnout.
[Figure1abouthere]
AmorerigorousimplementationoftheDIDmethodusesregressionanalysisto
controlforotherfactorsthatinfluencevoterturnout.Weincludecontrolsforthetimingof
theelection,thenumberofcontestsontheballot,andthelevelofcompetitioninthe
mayoralcampaign.Thebasichypothesisisthatturnoutishigherwhentherearemore
contestsontheballotandwhenthecampaignsaremorecompetitive.Electionsineven‐
numberedyearsareexpectedtoproducehigherturnoutbecauseotherstateandfederal
contestsareontheballotineven‐numberedyears.Thecompetitivenatureofthecontest
formayorismeasuredwithadummyvariableindicatingwhetherthemayoralelectionis
anopenseatcontestortheoutcomeiscloserthana60‐40marginofvictoryforthewinner.
[Table2abouthere]
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Themodelresultsforturnoutingeneral(November)electionsarereportedinTable
2.Theestimatesindicatethataveragevoterturnoutwasroughly9percentagepoints
higherinRCVcitiesthanincontrolcitiesbeforetheadoptionofRCV.Thetestoftheimpact
ofRCVisthecoefficientfortheinteractionterm(RCVCity*AfterAdoption).Inthiscase,
thecoefficientisnegativebutbarelylargerinmagnitudethanitsstandarderror,suggesting
thatRCVisnotassociatedwithastatisticallysignificantchangeinvoterturnoutin
Novemberelections.Theothermodelestimatesindicatethatturnoutis,onaverage,almost
9pointshigherwhentherearemorethanthreecontestsontheballot.Inthissample,the
additionalcontestsareoftenstatewideracesorballotmeasureswhichareboundto
includemoreintensivevotermobilizationcampaigns.Furthermore,turnoutisalmost10
pointshigherineven‐numberedyears,andacompetitivemayoralcontestbooststurnout
byroughly5points,onaverage.
ForthesecondparticipationanalysiswecompareRCVturnouttoprimaryorrunoff
electionturnoutinpluralitycities.Weexclude22pluralityelectionswhereaprimaryor
runoffelectionwasnotheld,leavingasampleof64elections.Figure2plotsthemean
turnoutrateforprimaryorrunoffelectionsinRCVandpluralitycitiesbeforeandafterthe
adoptionofRCV.ThefigureagainshowsthatprimaryorrunoffturnoutwashigherinRCV
citiesthaninpluralitycities.IntheelectionspriortoRCVadoption,turnoutintheRCV
cities(22.3%)isapproximately7pointshigherthanmeanturnoutinthepluralitycities
(14.8%).InelectionsaftertheadoptionofRCV,thedifferenceinmeanvoterturnoutinRCV
cities(31.7%)andpluralitycities(16.9%)is14.6points.Thedifferenceinturnoutbetween
twosetsofcitiesislargeraftertheadoptionofRCV,suggestingthatRCVincreasesturnout
whencomparedtopluralityrunofforprimaryelections.
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[Figure2abouthere]
TheregressionestimatescomparingturnoutinRCVcitiestoprimaryorrunoff
turnoutinpluralityelectionsarereportedinTable3.AsinFigure2,theestimatesindicate
thataveragevoterturnoutwasroughly5percentagepointshigherinRCVcitiesthanin
controlcitiesbeforetheadoptionofRCV.Inthiscasethecoefficientfortheinteraction
termispositiveandstatisticallysignificant.ThissuggeststhattheadoptionofRCVis
associatedwithan8percentagepointincreaseinturnoutoverwhatwasobservedin
primaryorrunoffpluralityelections.Theothermodelestimatesindicatethatturnoutis
alsohigherineven‐numberedyears,whentherearemorethanthreecontestsontheballot,
andwhenthereisacompetitivemayoralcontest.
Theseresultsareconsistentwithotherstudieswhichconcludethatthescheduling
oflocalelectionshasamajorimpactonvoterturnoutandpoliticalrepresentation(Hajnal
2010;Anzia2013).LocalelectionsheldinNovember(particularlyineven‐numberedyears
tocoincidewithstatewideandfederalcontests)generatehighervoterturnoutthanlocal
electionsscheduledduringoff‐cycleperiods(e.g.,outsideofNovember).Thus,theturnout
effectofRCVreportedinFigure2andTable3maybeduetotheelectionschedulerather
thantheRCVvotingrules,perse.
[Table3abouthere]
ResidualVoteResults
Turningtoameasureofvoterconfusion,Figure3plotsthemeanresidualvoterate
inRCVandpluralitycitiesforthetoplocalcontestontheballotbeforeandafterthe
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adoptionofRCV.3InelectionspriortoRCVadoption,theresidualvoterateintheRCVcities
(7.5%)isslightlylowerthanthemeanresidualvoterateinthepluralitycities(8.0%).In
electionsaftertheadoptionofRCV,thedifferenceinthemeanresidualvoterateinRCV
cities(4.8%)andpluralitycities(6.9%)isabout2points.Thus,itappearsthatresidual
votesdeclinedaftertheadoptionofRCV.
[Figure3abouthere]
TheregressionresultsinTable4indicatethatthechangeinthedifferencebetween
groupmeansisnotstatisticallysignificant.Thus,theadoptionofRCVdoesnotappeartobe
associatedwithanoticeablechangeintheresidualvoterateforthetopcontestonthe
ballotintheselocalelections.Meanwhile,acompetitivemayoralcontestdoesappearto
reducetheresidualvoteratebyroughly3.7percentagepoints,onaverage.Residualvote
ratesalsotendtobehigherinlocalelectionsheldineven‐numberedyears,whenstateand
federalcontestslikelydrawattentionawayfromthelocalelection.
[Table4abouthere]
VoteDrop‐off
Ourfinalcomparisonexaminesthedrop‐offinvotesbetweenthefirstandlast
roundsofvotesineachsystem.Inelectionswithmultipleroundsofvotingortabulatinga
fundamentalquestioninvolveshowmanyvotesstillcountwhencandidatesareeliminated
ateachstage.Somehavehighlightedhighratesof“ballotexhaustion”asashortcomingof
3Therearethreeelectionsinoursampleexcludedfromthisanalysis.TwoelectionsfromLowell,
Massachusettsaredroppedbecausetherewerenomayoralcontestsineitherelection,andthecityusesanat‐
largesystemforelectingthecitycouncil.At‐largeelectionsdonotproduceacomparableresidualvote
measure.WealsoexcludetheTulsaelectionof2005becausetherewasnomayoralraceinthatelection.
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RCVvotingrules.Thus,thevotesforthewinningcandidateinthefinalroundoftabulation
foranRCVelectionmaynotcompriseamajorityofallballotscastintheelection(Burnett
andKogan2015).However,asimilarcritiqueappliestothemorefamiliarprimaryelection
withpluralityrulesandlaterrunoffelectionforthetopprimaryfinishers.Intheelections
usingthefamiliarpluralityrulesthenumberofvotescastintheprimaryorrunoffelections
tendtobesubstantiallysmallerthanthevotescastinthegeneralelection.Acommonclaim
ofRCVproponentsisthatreplacingtwoelections(primaryandrunoff)withoneRCV
electionyieldsgreatercontinuityinvoterparticipationbetweenthefirstandlastroundsof
voting.DoesballotexhaustioninRCVelectionsunderminethisclaim?
ForRCVelections,wecomputevoterdrop‐offasthedifferencebetweenthetotal
ballotscastintheelectionandthenumberofvalidvotescountedinthefinalroundofRCV
tabulation(aspercentageoftotalballotscast).Thus,thevotesthatdropoffinRCV
electionsincludeblankballots,overvotes,andexhaustedballots.Forpluralityelections,we
computevoterdrop‐offasthedifferencebetweenthetotalballotscastinthegeneral
electionandthevalidvotesforthetoplocalcontestintheprimaryorrunoff(againasa
percentageoftotalballotscast).Thus,thedrop‐offincludespeoplewhovoteinthegeneral
electionbutnotintheprimaryorrunoffelection.Weexclude22pluralityelectionswherea
primaryorrunoffelectionwasnotheld.Weexcludetwoadditionalpluralityelections
whereaprimaryorrunoffwasonlyheldforonecouncildistrict,ratherthanfortheentire
city.4Thisleavesasampleof62elections.Figure4plotsthemeanvotedrop‐offinRCVand
pluralitycitiesbeforeandaftertheadoptionofRCV.Asthefigureshows,thedropinvoting
participationbetweenprimaryandrunoffelectionsisverysubstantialincitiesusing
4TheseelectionsoccurredinDesMoines(2013)andWorcester(2013).
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pluralityrules.Onaverage,thedrop‐offisequivalenttoroughlyhalfofthevotersinthe
generalelection.IntheelectionspriortoRCVadoption,drop‐offintheRCVcities(50.3%)
isonly3pointslowerthanmeandrop‐offinthepluralitycities(56.8%).Inelectionsheld
aftertheadoptionofRCV,thedifferenceinmeanvoterdrop‐offinRCVcities(13.1%)and
pluralitycities(45.8%)is32.7points.Thedifferenceinvotedrop‐offbetweenthetwosets
ofcitiesismuchlargeraftertheadoptionofRCV,suggestingthatRCVsubstantiallyreduces
thedropinvotesbetweenthefirstandlastrounds.
[Figure4abouthere]
Theregressionestimatescomparingvotedrop‐offinRCVcitiestopluralitycitiesare
reportedinTable5.AsinFigure4,theestimatesindicatethataveragevotedrop‐offwas
roughlythesameinRCVandpluralitycitiesbeforetheadoptionofRCV.Inthiscasethe
coefficientfortheinteractiontermisnegativeandstatisticallysignificant.Thissuggests
thattheadoptionofRCVisassociatedwitharoughly24percentagepointreductionin
voterdrop‐offcomparedtowhatisobservedinpluralityelections.Theothermodel
estimatesindicatethatacompetitivemayoralcontestalsoreducesvotedrop‐off,by
roughly11points.Thus,theevidenceonvotedrop‐offsupportsaparticularclaimmadeby
RCVproponentsaboutcontinuityinvoterparticipation.Again,thisseemstobean
advantageofholdingoneNovemberelectioninplaceoftwoelectionsheldonseparate
dates.Overall,withtheexceptionofimprovedturnoutcomparedtopluralityprimaryand
runoffelections,voterparticipationseemstobeinfluencedmorebythestimulusofa
competitivelocalorstatewidecampaignratherthanbytheadoptionofRCVrules.
[Table5abouthere]
16
ResultsfromMinneapolis:SocioeconomicBiasinVoterParticipation
Whiletheevidencethusfarindicatesanimprovementinoverallratesofvoter
participationduetotheadoptionofRCV,somehaveexpressedconcernsthatRCVfailsto
amelioratesocioeconomicbiasesinparticipation(JacobsandMiller2013,2014;Neelyand
McDaniel2015;McDaniel2016).ForAmericanvoterswhohavegrownaccustomedto
pluralityvoting,properlycastinganRCVballotmaytakesomelearningandskill,which
mayconferaparticipatoryadvantageonvoterswithmoreresources(i.e.,wealth,
education,andcivicskills).Inarecentpaper,JacobsandMiller(2014)reportonthe2013
Minneapoliselection,notinghigherratesofvoterparticipationinwhiteandhigh‐income
wardsthaninwardswithhighconcentrationsofracialandethnicminoritiesandlow‐
incomevoters.However,JacobsandMillerdonotprovideevidencetoindicatehowthe
disparitiesinvoterparticipationobservedin2013comparetopatternsinprevious
elections.IstheevidencefromMinneapolisin2013worsethanusual?Socioeconomic
biasesinvoterparticipationarehardyperennialsinAmericanelections(Leighleyand
Nagler2013;Schlozman,Brady,andVerba2012),particularlyinlocalelections(Hajnaland
Lewis2003;Oliver2012;Anzia2013).Thus,RCVelectionsneedtobecomparedto
similarlysituatedpluralityelections.Wetrytoprovideonesuchcomparisonbelowforthe
caseofMinneapolis.
[Figure5abouthere]
JacobsandMillerpresentevidenceshowingthatinthe2013Minneapoliselection
turnoutwasconsiderablyhigherinthethreewealthiestwards(11,12,and13)thaninthe
threeleastaffluentwards(2,3,and5).Theymeasureturnoutasapercentageofregistered
17
votersineachward.WeusethesamedatafromMinneapoliselectionstoreplicatethis
findingandgeneratethesameturnoutmeasuresfromthesamewardsinthe2005election
(thelastlocalelectioninMinneapolisusingpluralityvoting).Bothelectionsincluded
contestsformayorandcitycouncil.5Ouranalysisincludestherestofthecity’s13wards,
labeled“Middleincomewards.”Voterturnoutwasslightlyhigherin2013(29%)thanin
2005(26%).AsFigure5indicates,thesame14percentagepointgapinturnoutbetween
lowandhighincomewardsinthe2013RCVelectionwaspresentinthe2005plurality
election.6TheincomedisparityinvoterturnoutisnotuniquetoRCVelectionsin
Minneapolis,butasJacobsandMillernote,thatdisparitydidnotgetsmallerinthe2013
RCVelection.
JacobsandMilleralsoexaminemeasuresofvoterconfusion.Onesuchmeasureis
thefrequencyofspoiledballots(asapercentageoftotalballotscast).Thespoiledballot
rateisnotspecifictoaparticularcontestontheballotbutreflectstheoverallvoting
experience.Thegoodnewsaboutspoiledballotsisthattheypreservetherighttovote.Ifa
mistakeisrecognizedbyavoterorthevotingequipment,thevotercanreturntheballotin
exchangeforanewone.Theballotwiththemistakeis“spoiled”andisnotcounted.The
votercompletesanewballot,whichiscounted.Nevertheless,spoiledballotscandiagnose
voterdifficultyincompletingtheballot.Inthe2013election,JacobsandMillerobservea
higherrateofspoiledballotsinlowincomewardsthaninhighincomewards.Figure6
comparesthespoiledballotrateinhighandlowincomewardsinthe2005and2013
5ThisisnotanidenticalgeographiccomparisonsinceMinneapoliswardboundarieschangedsomewhat
between2005and2013.Smallergeographicunits,suchasprecincts,arepreferableforinferencesaboutthe
relationshipbetweenincome,race,andvoterparticipation,butprecinctboundariesalsotendtochangewhen
wardsareredrawn.
6Thesamepattern,notshownhere,holdswhencomparingthewardswiththehighestshareofwhitevoters
towardswiththesmallestshareofwhitevoters.
18
Minneapoliselections.Thecitywidespoiledballotrateincreasedfrom1%in2005to4%in
2013,andtherateincreasedinbothlowincomeandhighincomewards.Moreover,as
Figure6shows,thegapinthespoiledballotratebetweenhighandlowincomewards
increasedonlyslightlyinthe2013RCVelection.
[Figure6abouthere]
Asomewhatsimilarpatternemergeswhenexaminingthemayoralcontests.The
residualvoterateishigherinlowincomewardsinbothyears,andthegapbetweenthe
twosetsofwardsincreasesslightlyfrom0.8percentagepointsinthepluralityelectionof
2005to1.7pointsintheRCVelectionof2013,astatisticallyinsignificantincrease.A
similarstudyofSanFranciscofoundthatresidualvotesdidnotincreaseaftertheadoption
ofRCV(NeelyandCook).In2013,theMinneapoliselectionsdepartmentbeganreporting
overvotesandundervotesforlocalelections.Theovervoterateinthemayoralcontestwas
low(0.2%ofballotscast),andtheratewasthesameatallincomelevels.Therefore,thegap
infirstchoiceresidualvotesbetweenlowandhighincomewardsin2013isduetoa
slightlyhigherundervoterateinlowincomewards.Voterscanrankuptothreecandidates
inRCVelectionsinMinneapolis.AsJacobsandMillernote,abitmorethan20%ofvoters
didnotrecordthreecandidatechoicesformayor.Whentabulatingundervotesacrossall
threechoicesformayorin2013theundervoterateissomewhathigherinlowincome
wards(24%)thanhighincomewards(21%).However,theundervoterateisevenhigher
19
(26%)inmiddleincomewards.7Overall,theundervoteandovervotedatadonotreveal
substantialincomedisparitiesinthe2013Minneapolismayoralelection.
Finally,itisworthexaminingcitycouncilelectionsinMinneapolis,whichalsoused
RCVinthe2013election.Councilseatsforall13citywardswereupforelectionin2005
and2013.Therefore,wecanmakeasimilarcomparisonbetweenapluralityelection
(2005)andanRCVelection(2013).RCVseemstohaveencouragedmorecandidatestorun
forcitycouncilinMinneapolis.Thenumberofcitycouncilcandidatesalmostdoubled,
increasingfrom25candidatesin2005to47in2013.In2005,nowardfeaturedacampaign
withmorethantwocitycouncilcandidates.In2013,tenofthethirteenwardsproduced
morethantwocandidatesrunningforacitycouncilseat.8
JacobsandMilleralsopresentevidenceshowingthatinthe2013Minneapolis
electionvoterparticipationinthemayoralcontestwashigherinthewardswiththehighest
shareofwhitevoters(10,11,12,and13)thaninwardswherethenon‐whiteshareofthe
populationisatleast50percent(4,5,6and9).Weusethesamedatatocomparethe
residualvoterateinthecitycouncilracesforthe2013RCVelectionandthe2005plurality
election.Weincludetherestofthecity’s13wards,labeled“Mixedwards.”Figure7
comparestheresidualvoterateinthe2005and2013Minneapoliscitycouncilelectionsby
racialcompositionofthewards.Thecitywideresidualvoterateforfirstchoicecitycouncil
votingincreasedfrom4%in2005to5.9%in2013,buttheincreasedisconfinedtoracially
mixedwards.Asthefigureshows,the2005pluralityelectionproducesthefamiliarpattern
7TheMinneapolisratesforovervotes,undervotes,andfailuretorankthreecandidatesaresubstantially
lowerthanthosereportedforRCVelectionsinSanFrancisco(NeelyandCook2008;NeelyandMcDaniel
2015).
8The2009election(thefirstinMinneapolisusingRCV)alsoproducedahighernumberofcitycouncil
candidates.
20
ofhigherresidualvoteratesinminoritywardsandlowerratesinwhitewards.However,
asFigure7shows,theresidualvoterateactuallydeclinedintheminoritywardsinthe
2013RCVelection.Thisisbecausetheminoritywardsfeaturedseveralcandidatesrunning
forcitycouncilseatsin2013.Theresidualvoterateincitycouncilcontestsissubstantially
lowerinwardswithmorecandidatesrunningforaseat.Furthermore,in2013overvote
andundervoteratesforcitycouncilcontestsappeartobeunrelatedtotheincomeorracial
compositionofMinneapoliswards.Overall,theMinneapolisevidenceindicatesthat
socioeconomicdisparitiesinvoterparticipationaresimilarinpluralityandRCVelections.
[Figure7abouthere]
Conclusion
SeveralAmericancitieshaveadoptedRCVrulesforlocalelections,andother
jurisdictionsmaybeconsideringRCVinthefuture.InassessingtheimpactofRCVvoting
rulesitisimportanttoevaluateRCValongsidethepluralitysystemsthatRCVreplaces.For
themostpart,wefindthatRCVelectionshaveminimaleffectsonratesofvoter
participation.Themainexceptioninvolvesthecomparisonwithprimaryandrunoff
electionsusingpluralityrules.Bycompressingthevotingandwinnowingofcandidates
intooneelectionscheduledinNovember,RCVelectionsincreasevoterparticipationwhen
comparedtopluralityprimaryandrunoffelectionsheldbeforeoraftertheNovember
generalelectiondate.Whencomparinggeneralelectionstogeneralelections,pluralityand
RCVelectionsgeneratesimilarturnoutrates.Wealsofindsimilarratesofresidualvotes,a
measureofvoterconfusion,inpluralityandRCVelections.
21
OurcasestudyofMinneapolisalsorevealscomparableratesofparticipationand
voterconfusioninpluralityandRCVelections.Themainexceptionisthatweobserve
higherratesofspoiledballotsintheRCVelectionthaninthepluralityelection.Wealso
observethatthesocioeconomicandracialdisparitiesinvoterparticipationaresimilarin
pluralityandRCVelectionsinMinneapolis.
Thesefindingsarebasedonarathersmallbutgrowingsampleofevidence.Some
cautionisrecommendedindrawingconclusionsfromthisevidenceabouttheimpactof
RCVonvoterparticipation.Nevertheless,theresearchdesigncanbeusedtocontinue
examiningtheeffectofRCVadoptiononvoters.AsmoreresultsfrompastelectionsinRCV
andcomparisoncitiesareincludedinthedata,andasmorecitiescontinuetoholdRCV
electionsinthefuture,theevidencewillgrowandsupportmoreconfidentconclusions
abouttheresponseofvoterstoRCVrulesintheUnitedStates.Itwillbeimportantto
continuetomonitormeasuresofvoterparticipationinRCVandpluralityelectionsinthe
UnitedStates.
22
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25
Table 1
Cities and Elections for Voter Participation Comparisons
RCV City
Minneapolis, MN
San Francisco, CA
Matched Plurality Cities
Boston, MA; Cincinnati, OH;
Tulsa, OK; Seattle, WA
Cedar Rapids, IA; Des Moines,
IA; Madison, WI; Spokane,
WA
Ann Arbor, MI; Lowell, MA;
Stamford, CT; Worcester, MA
Alameda, CA
Anaheim, CA; Santa Ana, CA;
Santa Clara, CA; Stockton, CA;
Richmond, CA
San Jose, CA
Portland, ME
Lewiston, ME; Dover, NH
St. Paul, MN
Cambridge, MA
Berkeley, CA
Oakland, CA; San
Leandro, CA
Elections
Before RCV
2005
Elections
After RCV
2009, 2013
2009
2013, 2015
2002, 2006
2002, 2006
2009, 2013,
2015
2010, 2014
2010, 2014
2002
2006, 2010,
2014, 2015
2011, 2015
26
Table 2
Predictors of General Election Turnout in RCV and Plurality City Elections
Independent Variable
RCV City
After RCV Adoption
RCV City * After Adoption
Even-Numbered Year
More than 3 Contests
Contested Mayoral Contest
Constant
N
R2
Root MSE
Coefficient
(Std. Error)
9.1*
(3.2)
0.9
(2.0)
-4.1
(3.8)
9.6*
(2.1)
8.9*
(2.2)
5.5*
(2.0)
16.7*
(2.1)
96
.58
7.9
The dependent variable is voter turnout in city elections (ballots cast as a percentage of
the citizen voting age population). Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients
(standard errors in parentheses).
*p < .1, two-tailed
27
Table 3
Predictors of Turnout in RCV Cities and Primary/Runoff Elections in Plurality Cities
Independent Variable
RCV City
After RCV Adoption
RCV City * After Adoption
Even-Numbered Year
More than 3 Contests
Contested Mayoral Contest
Constant
N
R2
Root MSE
Coefficient
(Std. Error)
5.4
(3.4)
1.9
(2.5)
8.2*
(3.8)
4.8*
(2.4)
8.8*
(2.3)
6.4*
(2.1)
6.8*
(2.4)
64
.69
6.9
The dependent variable is voter turnout in city elections (ballots cast as a percentage of
the citizen voting age population). Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients
(standard errors in parentheses).
*p < .1, two-tailed
28
Table 4
Predictors of Residual Votes in Top Contest in RCV and Plurality City Elections
Independent Variable
RCV City
After RCV Adoption
RCV City * After Adoption
Even-Numbered Year
Contested Mayoral Contest
More than 3 Contests
Constant
N
R2
Root MSE
Coefficient
(Std. Error)
-2.7
(1.8)
0.2
(1.2)
-0.0
(2.2)
5.6*
(1.2)
-3.7*
(1.2)
1.1
(1.3)
5.0*
(1.3)
93
.40
4.6
The dependent variable is the residual vote rate (as a percentage of the number of ballots
cast). For RCV elections, the residual vote measure is based on the first choice votes.
Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).
*p < .1, two-tailed
29
Table 5
Predictors of Voter Drop-off between First and Last Rounds in RCV Cities and
Primary/Runoff Elections in Plurality Cities
Independent Variable
RCV City
After RCV Adoption
RCV City * After Adoption
Even-Numbered Year
More than 3 Contests
Contested Mayoral Contest
Constant
N
R2
Root MSE
Coefficient
(Std. Error)
-10.6
(9.8)
-8.7
(7.4)
-24.4*
(11.2)
4.5
(7.1)
-1.5
(6.8)
-11.3*
(6.2)
58.7*
(6.9)
62
.48
19.9
The dependent variable is voter drop-off between the first and last round of voting in city
elections (as a percentage of ballots cast). Cell entries are ordinary least squares
coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).
*p < .1, two-tailed
30
Figure 1
Mean Voter Turnout in RCV and Plurality City Elections:
General Elections
Mean Voter Turnout (Percent)
40
30
20
10
0
Plurality
RCV
Before Adoption
Plurality
RCV
After Adoption
31
Figure 2
Mean Voter Turnout in RCV and Plurality City Elections:
Primary/Runoff Elections
Mean Voter Turnout (Percent)
30
20
10
0
Plurality
RCV
Before Adoption
Plurality
RCV
After Adoption
32
Figure 3
Mean Residual Vote Rate in Top Contest in RCV and Plurality City Elections
Mean Residual Vote Rate (Percent)
8
6
4
2
0
Plurality
RCV
Before Adoption
Plurality
RCV
After Adoption
33
Figure 4
Mean Voter Drop-off Between First and Last Rounds in RCV and Plurality City Elections:
Primary/Runoff Elections
Mean Voter Drop-off (Percent)
60
40
20
0
Plurality
RCV
Before Adoption
Plurality
RCV
After Adoption
34
Figure 5
Voter Turnout by Ward Income:
2005 and 2013 Minneapolis Elections
41.7
Voter Turnout (Percent)
40
38.1
31.4
30
28.5
27.7
24
20
10
0
2005
Income Level
High income wards
Low income wards
2013
Middle income wards
35
Figure 6
Ballot Spoilage by Ward Income:
2005 and 2013 Minneapolis Elections
5.2
Spoiled Ballots (Percent)
5
4.3
4
3.5
3
1.8
2
1.2
1
.7
0
2005
Income Level
High income wards
Low income wards
2013
Middle income wards
36
Figure 7
Residual Vote for City Council (1st Choice) by Ward Race:
2005 and 2013 Minneapolis Elections
Residual Vote Rate (Percent)
10
9.4
8
5.5
6
4
3.4
3.9
3.9
3.8
2
0
2005
2013
Racial Composition of Wards
White wards
Mixed wards
Minority wards
37