International African Institute
Redrawing the Map of the Horn: The Politics of Difference
Author(s): Günther Schlee
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Source: Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 73, No. 3 (2003), pp. 343368
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Africa 73 (3), 2003
REDRAWING THE MAP OF THE HORN:
THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE
Gu*ntherSchlee
In December 1986, just after I took up a new position at a faculty of
sociology, some new colleagues tried to find out about possible
cooperation and asked me about my research interests. I told them I
was interested in boundaries. They looked disappointed. They had
heard of Luhmann's boundaries of systems and were possibly
acquainted with other rather metaphorical and theoretical uses of the
term. Apparentlythese concepts did not appeal to them. I then assured
them that I was thinking of the actual red lines on the map. They liked
that a little better, but even then they did not look enthusiastic and it
took me some time to persuade them that those red lines are of some
sociological interest.
Much has been written about (social and cognitive and other) 'maps'
and 'boundaries'and both concepts have become theoreticallychargedin
various ways. It might thereforebe appropriatefor me to renew my vow
and insist that I really mean those red lines on the map and the ways in
which they have been redrawn.At least at the start I use the terms 'map'
and 'boundary'in as literala sense as possible. LaterI will investigatehow
the shapes of territories are linked to social identities and legitimising
discourses. These legitimising discourses comprise some scholarly
writings. The history of these writings reflects the sudden changes of
the political map and the ups and downs in internationalrelationships.
Some writings from the mid-1990s about Eritrea and Ethiopia appear
ages old by 1998. To analyse what happens in the field of social
identifications, one has to bring the historical events together with the
discourses about them. If this paper reads like a collage of a historical
summarywith a couple of book reviewsand press cuttings, I might have to
admit that it is just that. But this mix is not just motivated by a postmodem delight in crossing the boundaries of genres; I think that these
things need to be juxtaposed in order to understand the changes in
identification going along with the redrawingof maps.
The other day' Donald Donham showed me his draft introduction to
a collected volume entitled RemappingEthiopia. In this introduction
Donald expresses some ideas which are dear also to me, pointing out
that in the case of Ethiopia '[t]he very shape of the country-the iconic
outline that symbolises the nation2-has changed as Eritreahas become
1
When preparing an earlier version of this paper for our panel at the VAD (Vereinigung von
Afrikanisten in Deutschland [German African Studies Association]) conference at Leipzig, 31
March 2000.
2 I have used the term 'emblem' in much the same sense as Donham's 'icon': 'Due to
modem cartography, printing techniques and the electronic mass media, the shapes of the
territories of nation states have become handy, transportable emblems of identity, just like
flags or heraldic arms' (Schlee, 1992: 125).
344
REMAPPING THE HORN
its own country.' The present contribution will have a yet clearer
geographical focus than that planned volume (since published as James
et al., 2002) in which the term 'mapping' is taken up sometimes literally
but also in various metaphorical senses.
Of course I am aware of the difference between the surface of the
earth and a map. And also a boundary is not a simple given but a mental
German/German one
construct. Some boundaries are visible-the
consisted of a fence and other fortifications, and the Kenyan/Ethiopian
one is a straight cut-line, which undulates like a white ribbon across the
hilltops. But most boundaries are not visible in most places and in social
reality might amount more to a transitional zone than to well-defined
lines. But apart from this necessary caution I want to speak about maps
and boundaries at the lowest possible level of abstraction.
The shape of a national territory can never be seen. From a spacecraft
we see continents and mountain ranges but no boundaries, and if we
come close enough to see cut-lines or other boundary markers, we can
no longer see a surface large enough to cover the whole territory.
Nevertheless from weather forecast maps, advertisements and other
forms of visual representations, we are all so familiar with the territorial
shape of the nation-state we live in-and those of many other such
these shapes have come to stand as emblems for the
units-that
respective national identities.
The perspective adopted by these images is called the 'bird's-eye
view', as if there were birds flying high enough to enjoy such views. In
this sense I am also going to adopt a bird-like perspective as a general
overview. I am going to deal with large social aggregates and large
territorial divisions: provinces, states and supra-state regions. This may
appear strange for an anthropologist who normally deals with social
identities and their spatial correlates on a micro-level, close to the
individual actors and their motivations. I have not turned my back on
that anthropological perspective. Only here, for a change, I want to
explore a more macroscopic dimension. I hope to find some interesting
paradoxes as well.
The first such paradox is that the term 'Horn of Africa' sounds like a
geographical term because it alludes to the shape of a north-eastern
protrusion of that one-homed continent. But in fact it is not a
geographical term; it is a political term. An example of a proper
geographical term would be 'Sahel'. The Sahel comprises parts of many
different countries, which fit a geographical description. The 'Horn of
Africa' only comprises entire countries. The north-east of Kenya forms
a wedge between Ethiopia and southern Somalia and is inhabited by
people who speak Somali or Oromo, the largest language of Ethiopia.
But in none of the rival definitions of the Horn of Africa have I found
the north of Kenya or any part of any other country included. The Horn
of Africa is always defined by an enumeration of entire states, it is a
supra-state region composed of states. That is why it is a political
concept and not a geographical one.
There is a narrower such definition which comprises Djibouti,
Eritrea, Ethiopia and the various fragments of Somalia, and a wider
REMAPPING THE HORN
345
one, much less accepted, which also includes the Sudan-again, the
whole of Sudan, all the way to Darfur. Let me discuss briefly the Sudan
in this context, before I turn to the Horn in the narrower sense.
THE SUDAN AND THE HORN
In December 1993 I had the privilege of attending a conference on the
Horn of Africa at the University of Khartoum. Many papers, especially
by our Sudanese friends and colleagues, actually aimed at demonstrating that the host country itself, Sudan, also belonged to the Horn of
Africa (in Arabic: qarn al-Ifriqiyya). One geographer spoke of the
geographical unity which should be reflected by closer political
integration. The Horn of Africa, we learned, formed a unit of the
Ethiopian Highlands and the surrounding lowlands. Imagine the
beautiful imperial fantasies we could all engage in if we defined central
highlands and surrounding lowlands in this sense in other parts of the
world. Where exactly do 'surrounding lowlands' end? Historians and
archaeologists dwelt on old links connecting various parts of the Horn
of Africa with each other and with the centres of the Islamic world:
possibly the earliest forms of the Arabic script were found along the
Nile ratherthan on the Arab peninsula; the first hijraof followers of the
Prophet from Mecca to the court of the Negus of Ethiopia was the topic
of several papers; the presence of Islam in the Horn of Africa predates
the conquest of Mecca and even the Medinese period.
Some of these papers were quite interesting and might have rested on
solid scholarlyfoundations; I have to leave this latter point to historians
and archaeologists. But of course there are also historical connections,
even much more obvious and more frequently used ones, which link
Sudan to Egypt down the Nile or to West Africa across the savannahs.
Why were the links to the eastern neighbours stressed to construct a
Horn of Africa which comprises the Sudan? The headlines about the
Horn of Africa had been persistently negative for decades. So why
should anyone identify with the Horn of Africa if he or she is not
obliged to do so? Haven't we all learned in our professional careersthat
we have to get our names associated with the 'oh' words and not with
the 'boo' words?
There are several possible explanations for this apparent paradox.
The Sudan desperately needed to overcome its international isolation
which had started with the Islamist coup of 1989 and been aggravated
by its support for Iraq in the second Gulf War. Its only major allies
world wide were Iran and China. Later, in November 1997, the US
even resorted to proclaiming a total boycott against Sudan. All trade
had to cease except in gum arabic, the resin of a tree which is
indispensablefor the production of a famous brand of brown lemonade.
According to the press,3 by this time a certain Osama bin Laden had
acquired a virtual export monopoly of gum arabic in Sudan. In the light
3
Der Spiegel, no. 39, 24 September 2001, 'Vielk6pfige Hydra', p. 115.
346
REMAPPING THE HORN
of later events it looks ironical that, if this report is correct, the US was
to have instituted a total boycott of the Sudan with the exceptionof
Osama bin Laden, who was exempted for the sake of Coca Cola.
The rivalrywith a pronouncedly secularistnewly independent Eritrea
was developing and in other countries there were Islamist movements
with which Sudanese Government circles might sympathise: these
features of the situation at that time might have harmonised well with a
historical background picture which stresses old Islamic links crisscrossing the Horn of Africa.
Both with regardto the question of whether or not Sudan belongs to
the Horn, and with respect to other facets of identity in the Horn,
we can observe religious affiliation being defined and accentuated in
different ways in different configurations and periods-just like
nationality and ethnicity.
THE 'HORN' IN THE NARROWER SENSE:
DJIBOUTI,ERITREA,ETHIOPIA,SOMALIA
Political ideology can select what it needs from a wide range of cultural
features and historical circumstances, some more 'real' in the sense of
accepted by critical scholarship, others less so. The great variation in
this selection of cultural featuresand historicalfacts for the definition of
a common identity even in a relativelynarrow geographical setting can
be illustrated very well by a glance at Ethiopia and her neighbours,
Eritrea and Somalia.
By the referendum in April 1993, Eritrea formally gained its
independence from Ethiopia, which it had factually enjoyed already
since the fall of the Mengistu regime in May 1991 (AfricaConfidential,
1993: no. 9; 1992: nos. 6, 9, 14, 15). The dominant voice in Eritrea,
the EPLF, described the new entity as secular and modernist, in sharp
contrast to what 'Africa' stands for in their eyes.4 The ethnicity factor,
as well as Islam and Christianity, are all present in the political power
play but given no role in the official self-image. The constituting
differencewhich marks off Eritreaas a separateentity is its colonial fate
as an Italian colony; and communality is appealed to by pointing to the
decades of struggle for independence from Ethiopia.
The remainder of Ethiopia since the demise of the Mengistu regime
in 1991 has been restructuredalong quite different principles. Regions
have been shaped to fit what are perceived as ethnic boundaries. Among
other things a language survey from 1984 was taken as a guideline for
this (Africa Confidential, 1991: no. 22). In the rhetoric which
accompanied the often violent struggles about where exactly to draw
the new boundaries, reference was made to linguistic classificationsby
European scholars, classificationswhich the people concerned were not
aware of and to which no communal feelings had previously been
4 Thomas Dassel, personal communication, 1992.
REMAPPING THE HORN
347
attached, e.g. 'Cushites' (Schlee and Shongolo, 1995). The largest of
these units is Oromia which-because of the multiple religious and
genealogical affiliations-puts a high stress on linguistic unity and the
potential of the Oromo language as a medium for written communication (e.g. Mekuria Bulcha, 1993; Tilahun Gamta, 1993; cf. also
Zitelmann, 1991). As there are numerous Oromo-speaking groups
which have not (or have not always) perceived themselves as Oromo (or
some earlier names of that entity or its constituent parts) but claim
shared genealogies with non-Oromo, e.g. Somali, the top position of
language in the list of criteriaof ethnicity is not unchallenged. There are
Oromo speakerswho regard their linguistic affiliationas secondary and
attributeprime importance to their Somali genealogy and Islam as their
religion. (In wide areas of the Horn there is so close a connection
between being Somali and being a Muslim that Oromo converts to
Islam may be asked, 'Have you become a Somali?' ('Ya safarte?').This
has led to a counteraction among Oromo in certain areas who now
stress their 'traditional'5religion6 associated with the gada (generation
set) system as a part of their collective identity. This makes life for
Oromo Muslims in such places difficult (Schlee and Shongolo, 1995).
In this context of generalised struggle and unclear loyalties it would
be easy for Somali forces comparable to those of 1978 (the Ogadeen
war) to incorporateinto Somalia the areas of Ethiopia claimed by them
on ethnic grounds, but, of course, Somalia no longer exists as an entity
which is in a position to make any such claims, or which anyone who is
not inescapably inside would like to join. What has happened to
Somalia?
Somalia-apart from its unsatisfied claims on Somali territories
outside it-once was celebrated as the only true nation-statein Africa,
because of its linguistic and cultural homogeneity, while the rest of the
continent was perceived as being ridden by 'tribalism' which resulted
from the incongruence of ethnic units with states. Cultural similarity
has never prevented Somali from fighting each other; on the contrary,
their shared preferences for water and grazing resources led to
competition for these resources which was expressed violently by
those who could afford it. Peaceful settlement (for which there were
also established customary procedures) was often only grudgingly
accepted because the reputation of weakness was feared. Larger
internally peaceful territorial integration of Somali was achieved by
colonial powers and later maintained through assistance to central
governments by rival superpowers who flooded the Horn with arms.
Now that these centripetal forces no longer exist, the old centrifugal
forces have re-established the normal state of disunity among the
Somali. The most important differencebetween the present situation of
5 In contexts where modem institutions like the presidency or the army are given old names
derived from their equivalents in the gada system, 'traditional' is better written in inverted
commas.
6 The concept 'religion' in Oromo is borrowed and expressed by Arabic loanwords (Schlee,
1994).
348
REMAPPING THE HORN
the Somali and the pre-colonial one is that the modern arms are still
there. The conflicts may be of the old type7 but due to the level of
armament they are on a new scale.
The Somali example shows that even the complete absence of
differentiation, i.e. cultural homogeneity and shared descent,8 is no
guarantee against segmentation and violent conflict between the
resulting segments.
Northern Somalia-which does not dominate the media because it is
relatively calm9-has reconstituted itself in the contours of former
British Somaliland. The Isaaq are the largest clan, but a degree of
stability has been achieved by power-sharingwith other clans, and the
boundaries are drawn along those of an earlierpolitical map, not along
clan distinctions. Clan overlap with the Herti-dominated neighbouring
'Puntland' (north-east Somalia) has led to territorial claims by
Puntland and armed violence in the Sool and Sanag regions of
Somaliland.
Just as Eritrea and Ethiopia are based on two different logics of
identification-the former following the shape of a colonial territory,
the latter being a meta-ethnic state, combining different ethnic
territories-so too are Somaliland and the remainder of Somalia
based on incompatible reasons for being. Somaliland, like Eritrea,
appeals to a separate colonial history, while the remainder of the
country is a mosaic of clan territories, as also the warlords, though far
from representing clan interests, have to follow the logic of clans and
inter-clan alliances in the recruitment of their forces. If the resulting
units ever come to share common statehood, it will be a federal state,
which is made up of clan-based units.
These two different logics already collide in the Sool and Sanag
regions of eastern Somaliland. These regions are partly inhabited by
members of the Herti group of clans who also form the clan base of
neighbouring Puntland, one of the products of the splits running
through the former Italian Somalia. Fighting has occurred there
because Puntland, pointing to these clan affiliations, claims these
regions.
BEING AND BECOMING OROMO
If the Oromo are a nation and if the Kurds are one as well, then the
7 The present alliances among the warring Somali about the modern state-or what is left of
it-are strongly reminiscent of the patterns of solidarity described by I. M. Lewis (1961) for
Somali pastoralists. Lewis describes how numerically weak groups according to the patrilineal
principle of filiation (tol) supplement their forces by formal contracts (xeer [in the modem
transcription]) with groups to whom they are remotely related even against groups who in
patrilineal reckoning are closer to them: a deviation from what the classical segmentary lineage
model would lead to expect. For these patterns of inter-clan alliances, cf. Schlee (2002).
s That some of the most violent conflicts are between subclans of the same clan implies that
long pieces of the remembered genealogies of the contestants are shared (whatever their
historical 'reality').
9 Apart from the havoc done by millions of mines left by M. Siad Barre's forces.
REMAPPING THE HORN
349
Oromo stand a good chance of replacing the Kurds in the minds of
political observers as 'the largest nation without a state of their own'.
are the product of-the demographically
They have undergone-or
most important ethnic-linguistic expansion which has taken place in
Africa in the past 1,000 years. (The Ful6e expansion covers a wider
geographical area but has involved a smaller number of people.) In the
course of this expansion non-Oromo have become Oromo, and even if
we discount all cases of double or doubtful affiliation-such as clan
groups which are Oromo by linguistic, and Somali by genealogical,
criteria-they are, with 20 to 30 million people, a sizeable group by any
standards. Since the concept of nationhood differs from similar
constructs-such
as 'a people' or 'an ethnic group'-by implying a
claim to a separate state, one can expect any discussion of the genesis of
an Oromo identity to be politically controversial. Any emphasis on the
national cohesion of the Oromo, its long-standing and historical depth,
will be interpreted as separatism; any scepticism which questions these
assumptions and stresses the historicity (the having come into being in
certain circumstances), the recent character of the Oromo identity, and
the efforts devoted to propagating it, will meet with the hostility of the
nationalists and the suspicion of having Abyssinian imperialist or proSomali inclinations.
The tensions between these two positions-the analysis of nationalism, which always implies elements of deconstruction, versus the
affirmation of nationalism-can also be sensed from the book Being and
Becoming Oromo (Baxter et al., 1996) which is based on a conference in
Gothenburg. The differences become quite clear in the introduction by
the editors, although these-as editors usually do-stress the coherence
of the book and elements of harmony. They depict their own point of
departure, shared by the other 'Euro-American scholars' (here in the
sense of Europeans and Americans) as a Barthian perspective,
according to which cultural material, enclosed by an ethnic boundary,
is used selectively at this boundary in the interaction with other
identities and thereby marks and reproduces these boundaries. This
cultural material, the editors explain (p. 8), also serves to give everyday
life a moral sense. 'We sought to identify some of the features of
"Oromoness" which give Oromo a real [emphasis in the original] sense
of group identity which links the members of "we" because it
emphasizes their differences from "them"' (Hobsbawm cited in Baxter
et al., 1996: 8). Some of the contributors have a very different view of
this. For them 'Oromoness' is a real given, something with a being of its
own, they have an essentialist perception of this identity rather than
it as a
attributing reality-and thereby historical effectiveness-to
subjective construct (the 'real sense of group identity', as it is correctly
termed in the introduction [my emphasis]). The editors do not conceal
these differences. About the position of the Oromo participants, all of
whom are said to be nationalists, they explain: 'The existence of a
distinct, culturally homogenous and autonomous Oromo nation with its
own distinctive culture is assumed as an unquestioned given' (p. 9).
But, regrettably or not, scholarship only starts where such givens are
350
REMAPPING THE HORN
questioned. As citizens of the world, in the face of violent repression,we
must defend the right of our colleagues to state their positions, but as
scholars we are entitled to criticise and might even be obliged to reject
these very positions. And they, if they enter the arena of scholarly
discourse, must be prepared to meet such criticism.
To the degree that the position attributed to the 'nationalists' can
really be found, one has to state that two different discourses are here
combined in one volume: a scholarly one and a nationalist one. No
measure of understanding, which is put forward here in a liberal and
somewhat relativist tone ('They all carry scars from the past' [p. 9]),
changes this. Differences of perspective are adduced in order to evoke
sympathywith nationalistpositions which the editors themselves do not
share: 'We [the 'Euro-American scholars'] revel in the cultural and
historical diversity of the Oromo whereas the Oromo contributors,
while themselves actuallyliving out those variations, stress the common
features which have sustained them in exile.'
This may be an elegant formula of compromise, but it obscures the
real issue. Is it only a question of stress, of different emphasis?Certain
findings like the recent character of 'Oromo' identity in many places
(see H. Lewis in the same volume), or the cases of identity change like
Oromo-Amhara or Oromo-Somali and back, as well as the frequent
observation of double or situational identification, have to be taken into
account by social scientists; a convinced nationalistwill be compelled to
ignore them, deny them or play them down for the sake of the nation.
Situationally or opportunistically used identities are, from the sociological point of view, an intelligent form of adaptationto a changing and
dangerous world, while for nationalists the same phenomena are the
stuff which attacks the aspired national unity from the fringes and
smack of treason and lack of character. This difference cannot be
politely explained away as a shift in emphasis. But maybe the position of
the Oromo participantsis not quite as monolithically essentialist as it is
made to seem by contrasting it to that of the 'Euro-Americans'.
MerkuriaBulcha's paper, 'The survivaland reconstruction of Oromo
national identity', which contains many interesting historical observations, apparently cannot dispense with the nationalist patterns of
interpretationsuch as the claim of factuality and extrapolationinto the
past: '...
the paper focuses
on the passage taken by Oromo
intellectuals back to an identity which many of them nearly dropped
in the process of assimilating into Amhara culture and language'
(p. 48). Is that really a journey 'back'? Is the identity, now 're'constructed by Oromo nationalists, the same as the one of the rural
Oromo-speaking populations (Leqa, Guji, Arsi, etc.) before the
Amharisation of the developing dependent elites? A common Oromo
identity is constantly, even in narrow local frameworks,projected back
into the past; it is claimed to be objectively given and pre-existent (i.e.
not constituted by the identity discourse itself), and its non-recognition
in certain cases is said to be faulty. About the Somali Abo Liberation
Front (SALF), a movement which comprised Oromo speakers who
claimed Somali origins, Mekuria explains: 'As the name of this
REMAPPING THE HORN
351
movement indicates, its traditional leaders were not able to articulate
Oromo ethnic identity, let alone Oromo national grievances and
aspirations'(p. 49). That these people referredto themselves as Somali
and not as Oromo is thus attributed to their articulatory inability.
According to this view they found their way 'back' to their 'true'
identity when they renamed themselves as 'Oromo Abo Liberation
Front' after the failure of the Somali cause. Doubts remain.1'
The backgroundto this is that at the high tide of Somali nationalism
the groups in question accepted that they were Oromo-speaking
Somali, while after the decline of Somalia, the Oromo nationalist
discourse became dominant among them (Schlee and Shongolo, 1995:
10; Zitelmann, 1999: 311).
On the other hand Mekuria subscribes to 'the non-essentialist
characterof Oromo ethnic identity'. By this he means that this identity
is not racially or biologically determined but that collective adoptions
have taken place on a large scale. But he does not discuss the possibility
that, by these changes in composition in terms of population groups
and by the shifting outer boundary, this identity itself may have
changed. On the contrary he assumes traceless assimilation to the
unaltered Oromo identity. He stresses the constant elements of this
identity, which also comprise the name. This is contradicted by the
findings of other authors. Contraryto his self-descriptionthus Mekuria
may be said to adhere to a sort of essentialism, although a comparatively
moderate and enlightened one. His essentialist language is contradicted
by some of his own very perceptive observations,which rathersuggest a
situational-reactive framework of interpretation. For example, he
describes how in an earlier phase the educational elite of the Oromo
were inspired by an Ethiopian developmental optimism and nationalism. This loyalty was then frustratedby the exclusionist strategiesof the
Amhara. The Oromo responded by a particularisticOromo nationalism.
Mekuria rightfully objects to the thesis that the history and the
identity of the Oromo is an 'invention ... out of nothing'. Of course,
there are limits to the freedom of invention in the shape of the demand
for plausibility. 'Construction', like the building trade from which the
metaphor derives, does not operate with nothing but with building
materials, preferably locally available ones. But does Mekuria's
opposition to arbitraryinvention need to go to the point of projecting
today's political frontlines back into the remotest past? The term
Oromumma('Oromoness') employed by him obviously is a neologism.
10
A usual form of address, roughly corresponding to 'Hey, man!', is 'Wariya' in Somali and
'Abo' in Oromo. A 'Somali wariya' would therefore be a Somali who speaks the Somali
language, while a 'Somali abo' would be a Somali who speaks the Oromo language. An
'Oromo abo' would, by this logic, be an Oromo-speaking Oromo, a pleonasm since the
Oromo, having linguistically assimilated others rather than having been assimilated, can be
assumed to speak the Oromo language. This at least applies to the field of Oromo-Somali
interaction. In the case of the Amharic language things might be different.
352
REMAPPINGTHE HORN
The presentauthorhas workedamongOromofor yearsand speaksat
least the southernvariantof this languagefluently,but he firstcame
acrossthis wordin this book.Is it not a terminologicalanachronismto
ascribe'a sharedsense of Oromumma'
to the Oromo of the sixteenth
century?
The statementin the introductionthat for the Oromo authorsthe
Oromo identityis an 'unquestionedgiven' can hardlybe appliedto
MohammadHassanandhis contribution,'The developmentof Oromo
nationalism'.He is a historianwho is fully up to the methodological
standardsof his discipline,and, of course,he also analysesthe Oromo
identityas somethingwhich has come abouthistorically,especiallyin
response to colonial oppression, and which is neither given nor
unquestionable(p. 68).
At the other extreme we find Gemetchu Megerssa with his
unhistoricaland contrafactualnationalist exhortation 'Oromumma:
tradition,consciousnessand identity'. 'We cannot think of Oromo
independentlyof Oromumma.In otherwords,in Oromo,as opposedto
other cultural and religious groups, the cultural boundaries of
personhoodand religion are so coextensivethat they are rendered
practicallyinterchangeable'(p. 93). To postulatein the case of the
Oromo-of all cases-a congruenceof the areas of distributionof
differentmarkersof identityis a sheerabsurdity.On the contrary,it is
the divergenceof the boundariesmarkedby thesefeatures,the plurality
of religiousaffiliationsandformsof politicalself-localisations
whichare
of the Oromoandwhichinspirethe rest of the book and
characteristic
most of the recentliteratureaboutthe Oromo.Flatlyto denyall this in
the face of ubiquitousevidenceto the contraryshows how little the
authorcaresaboutempiricalfindings.He also seems to be completely
unawareof the methods of source criticism,as can be seen from
statementslike:'The oral tradition. . . constitutes. . . the primordial
root of Oromo culture' (p. 94). One is tempted to recommendto
Gemetchua basicmethodologicaltext likeVansina(1985). Thereone
canfinda moreseriousdiscussionof how oraltraditionscome about,of
the forceswhichtransformthem, and of the possibilitiesof usingthem
cautiouslyas historicalsources rather than mere images produced
today,by takingthesesforcesinto account.Whicheverway we look at
them, however,thereis nothingprimordialaboutthem.
WhereGemetchuis headingwithhis deeperessenceand uniqueness
of Oromo identity is clear from the following: '. . . the simplest
definitionof an Oromo would be that he/she is born of an Oromo
father'. He is heading towardsa biologicallyself-reproducingsocial
unit. Here the thin line between nationalismand racism has been
crossed.
RacismrepresentsthatwhichStolcke(1995:4) in her analysisof new
right-wingideologies in Europe refers to as an older type of exclusionist
ideology. The newer type is a discourse based on 'culture'. The two
ideologies should not be confused with each other. The demand for
cultural unity and the exclusion of the cultural 'other' leaves to the
latter the option of assimilation, while racialist exclusion leads with a
REMAPPING THE HORN
353
certain logic to the actual removal of people or interference with their
physical reproduction (expulsion, genocide, sterilisation).
Another difference is that racism, with its pseudo-biological diction,
is or was easy to identify as a right-wing ideology. Liberal academics
and people with leftist inclinations could develop a quick immunity
reaction against it (no apologies for the biological metaphor) by
abhorring all biological terms and metaphors, even the most inspiring
ones, and branding them as 'biologisms'.
The new type of cultural exclusionism, on the other hand, sounds
deceptively similar to cultural relativist ideas cherished by liberal
academics.1 This does not apply only to very recent variants of the
right-wing discourse: already the more elaborate versions of the
apartheiddiscourse of the 70s in large parts read just like the European
Left's multiculturalismof the 80s and 90s. It is also high time to rethink
the whole issue of cultures as distinct units, not only in globalisation
contexts, where they are believed to get blurred, but from the outset.
Some early diffusionists already had more refined ideas about cultural
dynamics than later relativistswho put people in separateboxes marked
by 'incommensurable' cultures.
Now let us address, according to the ethnic macro-categories of the
editors, some 'Euro-Americans'. That a general cultural unity in
principle terms pervades the diversity of the Oromo is a theme
underlying several contributions. In Gudrun Dahl's chapter on
'Sources of life and identity', this basic unity is constituted by a shared
world of ideas. 'The traditionalcosmology of the Oromo is built around
a "quasi-platonic"division between the real world and the world of
ideas and principles' (p. 167). Dahl dedicates her attention especially to
the Boran variety of this world of ideas. Its central elements are
representationsof a ritual order which secures the flow of life from God
through Plant and Animal to Man. First-borns and holders of ritual
offices are more important to this ritual order and incorporate the idea
of being Boran to a higher degree than other Boran. Thus, Boran
identity is not organised in a binary fashion by belonging or not
belonging to it. (Dahl calls this the container principle: as with a
container you are either inside or outside.) Rather, it follows the
principle of centre and periphery: one can approach the ideal of
'Boranity' gradually. The present author cannot tell whether Dahl is
right with this description. He has, among Oromo and their neighbours,
frequently encountered categorical systems which follow the 'either-or'
principle, but he cannot exclude the possibility that there are Boran
who see this differentlyand who have a different idea-say a centripetal
one with a focal point-of their Boran identity.
A comparison with western modernity may help in illustrating the
difference between the two models of belonging. Our legal concept of
citizenship works according to the 'either-or' principle:you either have
11
For some of the problems of cultural relativism, see Jarvie (1986).
354
REMAPPING THE HORN
a certain citizenship or you do not. If you do have it, you have it
entirely. If, in exceptional cases, you have two, you have both of them
entirely. You are not accorded rights of citizenship partly or to a lesser
degree. The normative, centripetal, nationalist concept of identity,
however, works quite differently.According to it, it is not a question of
being a Swede but of being a good Swede. People of mixed descent or
double affiliation do not fit this image so easily. However, when we
replace the relativelyharmless 'good Swede' in this example with 'good
German', we should notice that we are stepping here into an ideological
minefield. If the identity concept 'Boran' of the Boran is described
wrongly by Dahl, she should rethink it. If it is described correctly, the
Boran should rethink it.
Other contributions stress the heterogeneity of the Oromo subgroups, internal lines of conflict and incompatible loyalties. In 'The
becoming of place: a Tulama-Oromo region of Northern Shoa', Odd
Eirik Arnesen examines the processes of overlay between linguistic and
religious identification in the emergence of local identities which today,
from a pan-Oromo perspective, appear as sub-identities. He describes a
mosaic of small parts formatted by combinations of Amharic or Oromo
speech and Christianityor Islam among the Oromo of this region. One
finds here interesting components for a wider comparativestudy about
'Oromo identity and Islam'. Such a study would be rewardingbecause
of the enormous variations found on this theme; while parts of the
Oromo discourse-like the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) symbolism
using gada terms like raaba for the military wing and abba gada for
'president'-appeal to a non-Islamic heritage12under which Muslims
often had to suffer, in other places, such as Jimma, being Oromo is
linked inseparably to being a Muslim (Popp, 2001). Also Hector
Blackhurst (1994, 1996) would have to be consulted for such a
comparison.
With regardto the often invoked egalitarianethos among the Oromo,
Alessandro Triulzi's contribution ('United and divided: Boorana and
Gabaro among the Macha Oromo in Western Ethiopia') raises some
doubts. As a result of the Oromo expansion of the sixteenth century,
here stratifications have come into being which reproduce ritual
differentiation and economic discrimination. During recent research
along the Blue Nile in the Sudan the present author has repeatedly
observed that Oromo migrants who have remained there only weakly
identify with the Oromo cause and are quick to admit that they are not
'good Oromo' but members of dominated groups. Triulzi's contribution helps to understand this attitude. Also the existence of Dahl-type
centripetal identifications is hereby confirmed ex negativo,since a selfidentification as 'no good Oromo' presupposes the existence of 'good
Oromo'.
12 For the lyrical expression of this
position, see the contributions of Shongolo to the same
volume and to Hayward and Lewis (1996).
REMAPPING THE HORN
355
May this suffice as a discussion of the stimulating work edited by
Baxter, Hultin and Triulzi, so rich in internal contradictions, partly to
be read as an analysis of nationalist ideology, partly as an example of its
production. Inspired by Triulzi's findings about the social differentiation among the Oromo of Wollega, I now turn to the question of why
Oromo nationalists so uniformly depict Oromo, nay, the Oromo-by
implication all Oromo with the exceptions of a few 'Gobanas' or
traitors-as victims of the conquest by Menelik and of Amhara
oppression, exemplified by the gabar system of tributes and services
to naftanya, military settlers of Amhara extraction.
A closer look at Ethiopian history reveals that Ras Gobana, the most
powerful commander in the expanding Ethiopian empire after Menelik,
who conquered many parts of southern and south-western Ethiopia in
the late nineteenth century, was not an individual Oromo traitor who
had changed sides and joined the Amhara, but an Oromo lord and
commander of an Oromo force. Abba Jifar of Jimma was another
Oromo ruler who submitted to Menelik and remained a king under the
king of kings. In Wollega the Oromo leaders Moroda Bakare from
Naqamte and Joote Tullu of Saayo (Dambi Dolo) struck deals with
Menelik, or more directly with Ras Gobana, a fellow Oromo, and
became feudal lords in their own right. As Hultin points out in this
collection of papers: 'In western Wollega ...
the ethnic situation
differed from Arssi and other Oromo-speaking regions of the South in
that both the landlords and the sharecropperswere Macha Oromo.' In
the south, by the way, the naftanya were not invariablyAmhara, but
often Oromo from other parts of the country. The Wollega Oromo, far
from being victims of the Amhara, were lords and conquerors in their
own right. The son and successor of Moroda Bakare,Dejazmach Gabra
EgziabherMoroda, once bought a large assignment of Mao, the original
inhabitants of large areas of western Wollega, from Sheikh Khojale of
Beni Shangul. On another occasion he sold a large estate to a certain
Qanyazmach Konno Faro, another Oromo, for the price of 120 to 150
Gumuz families whom he used for the production of limestone blocks
in the Didessa valley for the bridges and palaces he constructed (Ezekiel
Gebissa, 1983: 13, 15). The Gumuz are Nilo-Saharan speakers of dark
pigmentation from western Gojjam. The history of Oromo slave
hunters and slave traders in much of the Ethiopian south and west
remains to be written (Tadesse Wolde, oral communication).
Oromo are an inseparable part of the ruling layers of the Ethiopian
empire. Was Imam Ali, later Ras Mikael of Wollo, the son-in-law of
Menelik, not an Oromo?Under his son, Lij Yasu, Menelik's successor,
Ethiopian history might have taken an entirely different course, had the
British not so thoroughly dismantled him by their propagandaand their
intrigues (Marcus, 1998). The image of Lij Yasu is now undergoing a
revision by historians (Gebre-Igziabiher Elyas and Molvaer, 1994).
Today the chances of a better integration of the Oromo element and the
Muslim element into the Ethiopian identity, which were missed under
Haile Sellassie, attach themselves to the name of Lij Yasu.
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REMAPPING THE HORN
I know of only one Oromo author, namely Merara Gudina (1994),
who draws a differentiatedpicture and speaks of Oromo also as a part of
the empire, not just as its victims. Apart from him, Oromo nationalist
writers invariably identify with the Oromo who were the victims of
oppression-of whom there were more than enough and whose
suffering I wish by no means to belittle. There seems to be a strong
moral benefit to be gained from identifying with the losers, the victims.
What these Oromo victimologists should worry about is how long their
audiences will wish to hear themselves being described as poor and
oppressed victims and whether this is not sickening in the long run,
especially since this identification is not inescapable and history
provides enough counter-examples of strong and mighty Oromo with
whom their modem descendants might also wish to identify.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
Immediately after the independence of Eritrea there appears to have
been a phase of euphoria in the relationship between Eritrea and
Ethiopia rather than the bitterness which might have been expected
afterthirty years of war. The ruling elites of both places were personally
acquainted and, for a part of their multiplex struggles, had fought side
by side against the Mengistu regime. In 1994 a volume appearedunder
the title Eritrea and Ethiopia: from conflict to cooperation (Amare Tekle,
1994), which was based on a set of papers which dated from the 1989
African Studies Association conference in Atlanta, Georgia, but which
had been rewritten in the light of subsequent events, mainly the
independence of Eritrea. The contributions reflected a general
optimism. Eritrean-Ethiopiancooperation and even political reintegration were discussed at a time when the two states had hardly split from
each other.
Tekie Fessehatzion (1994) in his contribution to that volume
enumerates the advantages of economic cooperation between Eritrea
and its neighbours in the fields of transportationand communication,
aviation, ports, food production, and industrialisation. The starting
position of Eritrea and Ethiopia is even better than that of the western
European nations when they formed their economic community,
because in their case the removal of tariff barriers is superfluous. As
the two have formerly been one state, there have never been such
barriers.
Tekie's plans for a federation of the Horn also include the Sudan.
Little did he know-or anyone foresee at the time-that a few years
later the relationshipbetween Eritreaand Sudan would be one of deep
mistrust and that between Eritreaand Ethiopia there would be a bitter
war.
Integration of the Horn as an almost natural outcome of Eritrea's
coming into existence was also the theme of Hussein M. Adam's
contribution. 'Eritrea will never be able to extricate itself from the Horn
given its people's various origins, all have links with other societies
across Eritrean borders' (Hussein M. Adam, 1994: 141). Things which
REMAPPING THE HORN
357
have been and things which could have been are evoked to construct
links between Eritrea and Somalia. Like many who speculate about
alternative courses which Ethiopian history might have taken, Adam
remembers Lij Yasu, the young emperor deposed by Ras Tafari (later
Haile Sellassie), who had pro-Muslim inclinations and in 1913 'tried to
forge a Horn of Africa (Muslim based) anti-colonial movement as he
entered into political relations with Sayyid Muhammad ['Abdille
Hassan, the leader of a Somalijihad]'(ibid.).
As well as the anti-colonials, even the colonials are invoked to
construct a common heritage. Unity existed between the greaterpart of
Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritreaunder Italian rule from 1936-41 and the
shared culturalheritage between Eritreaand Somalia can be traced to a
much longer period of Italian rule (Hussein M. Adam, 1994: 142).
With the exception of right-wingItalians, few people have ever talked of
the expansionism of fascist Italy with such positive connotations. This,
of course, stands in sharp contrast to Ethiopia and 'Ras Tafari' as
symbols of anti-colonialism and the fight against the Italians.
In 1998, a contested border area-an issue involving old maps and a
few square kilometres-escalated to a full-scale war between Eritrea
and Ethiopia. In the course of this conflict the diction of the Ethiopian
Government completed the change to the centralist and unionist,
invoking 3,000 years of (Semitic, North-Ethiopian) history.13Having
started out in 1991 as the Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front, when they
suddenly found themselves in the possession of the capital, the EPRDF
(Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) embarked on a
dual course. On the one hand, a new administrative order based on
ethnic units-or the perception of such ethnic units-was created and a
constitution adopted which gave these units even the right to secede; on
the other hand, only parties which supported the central government
were tolerated. These were the parties whose acronyms end in -PDO,
such as the OPDO, the Oromo People's Democratic Organisation.All
real opposition was violently oppressed. There were mass imprisonments of OLF supportersor suspected supporters.Thus the regionalist
ideology was not implemented; the actual politics of the government
were centralist.VolkerJanssen (1991) has described this centralismas a
transcontinuity of Ethiopian politics, i.e. as a feature which survives
revolutionarychanges (cf. Heyer, 1997; Schlee, 2002). In the course of
the renewed war with Eritrea, the discourse of the EPRDF also now
changed to centralism and unity, a discourse familiarfrom the imperial
and Derg periods. The TPLF/EPRDF by 1999 was recycling precisely
those old symbols which it had been busy deconstructing for the
preceding eight years: Menelik's victory against the Italians at Adawa
and the Emperor Tewodros.
The new situation demanded that now one had to be Ethiopian or
Eritrean. Hitherto that had not been the case to such a degree. There
13
Dereje Feyissa, personal communication.
358
REMAPPING THE HORN
are numerousidentitiescross-cuttingthe dividebetweenEthiopiaand
Eritrea. Tigrinya is spoken in both countries and the Afar and
numerousother ethnic groups straddlethe boundary.In addition,
therearethe largeurbanpopulationswho adheredto modernistworldviewsand for whomthe importanceof ethnicityhad been decliningfor
generations.Therewas the longperiodwhenEritreaandEthiopiawere
administeredas one country,and even beforethat, urbanpeople had
been seekingtheirfortunesfrom one end of one countryto the other
end of the other. Now there was officialharassment,extortionsand
expulsions.'Ethiopians'were expelled from Eritrea and 'Eritreans'
fromEthiopia.
To see what this meantto hundredsof thousandsof people on the
ground, let us abandonour bird's-eyeview for a moment and dive
downto ArbaMinch,to havea look at justone casehistory.It is easyto
locate in the Rift Valley of southernEthiopianear the land bridge,
whichseparatesLakeAbayafromLakeChamo.
A young prostituteof about seventeenyears once came here from
Eritrea,whichwas then administeredas a partof Ethiopia.She made
goodmoneyandinvestedit in a restaurant,whichbecameverypopular.
She got marriedandhad a son anda daughter.Whenthe warbrokeout
she was arrestedand was going to be deportedbut there was public
protest sufficientto enforceher release.Later she was called to the
capitalof the regionalstate,Awasa.Therewas nobodyto interveneon
her behalf in that place and she simply disappeared.Her young
daughtercould not managethe restaurantalone,gave up the business
and is now simply looking after the premises(Tadesse Wolde, oral
communication).Her brotherhangsaroundin Awasaas a touristguide
pretendingto speakFrenchand Spanish(own observation).The OLF
because of intimidation and arrests of election candidates was
preventedfrom pursuingits aims within democraticinstitutionsand
resumedfighting.In the BlueNile areaof Sudan,aroundSennar,where
I did field researchin 1996 and 1998, manyEthiopianrefugeesfrom
the Mengisturegimehad left afterthe fall of that regimein 1991 and
gone back to Ethiopia,mostly in organisedtransports.The areahas
now startedto fill again with defeated OLF fightersfrom Wollega,
mostly single males who work and live in shelters on the banana
plantationsby the river.Therewere signs of mistreatmentof prisoners
by Ethiopianforces.One manhad hardlyanyteeth left becausehe had
beenfixedby an ironringthroughthe mouthto the centralpost against
whichhe had to lean in the mud hut wherehe was kept.
Also in the south,the OLF did not manageto keep any areasunder
theircontrol.They had to withdrawinto the MoyaleDistrictof Kenya
(thenstilla partof MarsabitDistrict)in 1991.14 Fromthereforthe first
time they launched an attack into Ethiopia on 16 January1999.
14
The following paragraphs are partly based on materials collected by Abdullahi Shongolo.
REMAPPING THE HORN
359
Accordingto local sources15the OLF attackedan Ethiopianmilitary
post at Idilolaandanotherone at Tuqa, justoppositeSololo.They also
plantedlandmineson the roadsleadingto these places,presumablyto
inflictdamageon otherforceswhichtheyexpectedto rushto the rescue
of these two posts from Boku Lubooma,a biggermilitarybase. The
EthiopiansunderattackkilledfourOLF fightersand then pursuedthe
remainderinto Kenyanterritory.The OLF, who carriedsome injured,
wentto DambalaFachana,the nearestvillageon the Kenyansideof the
border.There the Ethiopianforcesthat followedthem got involvedin
an exchangeof fire also with local 'home guards'(policereserve).The
samenightsome of the landmines,whichhadbeen plantedby the OLF
on the Ethiopiaside, blew up and killedabouttwentypeople.16
Such incidents led to complaintsby Ethiopianauthoritiesabout
attacksby Kenyansor from Kenyan soil and by Kenyan authorities
aboutborderviolationsby Ethiopianforces.Ethiopianauthoritiesdown
to the DistrictCommissioner,Moyale,had so farignoredor deniedthe
presenceof OLF on the Kenyanside of the border.
The following account of what happened in northern Kenya and
southern Ethiopia during the Ethio-Eritrean war does not abandon the
bird's-eye perspective but I fly a bit lower. The discussion remains on
the level of interaction between larger aggregates of people and the
public media; it does not reach down to the micro level. Yet I shall use
more detail than in the preceding parts of the paper. One reason is that
this area has not been discussed in this context and little of what I
present here is known beyond the immediate region. The other reason
is that my research experience since 1974 and my on-going research
with Abdullahi Shongolo makes me more knowledgeable here than
elsewhere.
Cross-border incursions and unresolved murder cases were frequent
in this period. Under the headline 'Leaders tell of fear', the Sunday
Nation, 4 February 1999, explains:
Top politicians from Isiolo, Marsabit and Moyale districts have expressed
fear for their lives. This follows accusations by the Ethiopian government
that they were supporting activities of an Ethiopian rebel group ...
politicians linked to the activitiesof the Oromo LiberationFront rebel group
include three assistant ministers from Moyale, Marsabit, a Minister and a
senior army officer from the Boran community.
15 The press reports (e.g. The People, Monday, 18 January 1999) are full of distortions and
exaggerations.
16 The OLF made no secret of using landmines. In a 'Military Communique' on the
internet (www.oromoliberationfront/_militarycom), dated 4 February 1999, one reads:
'OLA's [Oromo Liberation Army] engineering unit planted a mine at a place called Borbor
in Boran administrative zone on the road between Megga and Moyale town ... This number
[123] of enemy casualties includes those killed when four enemy vehicles hit landmines
planted by our fighters at places called Ejersa, Miyo, Funyan Diimaa and Filal.' The numbers
of casualties mentioned in this statement could not be confirmed by other sources.
360
REMAPPING THE HORN
The article reports strong verbal reactions by a Kenyan minister about
the violation of Kenyan sovereignty and the killing of innocent Kenyans
by Ethiopian soldiers. It also shows how inconsistent Kenyan
authorities were in their position towards the OLF:
In August last year, Eastern Deputy PC David Chelongoi gave members of
the Oromo rebel group an ultimatum to leave Kenya. However, the
government has denied the group's presence in the country.
After killing the imam of the mosque of Moyale, Kenya,'7 for allegedly
supporting the OLF and being once more accused of killing Kenyans,
the Ethiopian local authorities retorted that the man had been an Arsi
and therefore an Ethiopian by origin. To kill one's own citizens, inside
or outside one's country, appears to have become acceptable by
habitualisation.
There were also murders of prominent Boran elders on the Kenyan
side who had withdrawn their support from the OLF fearing Ethiopian
reprisals and the newly alerted Kenyan authorities. These killings were
attributed to the OLF by the local population.
Some headlines from this period include: 'Kenyan security men kill
three Ethiopians' (Daily Nation, 11 March 1999), when fifty armed
men in uniforms from Ethiopia were reported to have attacked
Waiyegoda village near Sololo; 'Moyale tense as families flee fearing
another raid' (East African Standard, 12 March 1999), when 4,500
people were camped at a church compound in Sololo; 'Addis to blame
for raids, rebels claim' (East African Standard, 15 March 1999), when
the OLF and another front, the ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation
Front from the [Somali] Region 5 of Ethiopia) issued a joint fax
statement 'that Ethiopia is sending squads of assassins to sovereign
neighbouring countries including Kenya and Somalia to eliminate
members of opposition organisations ... It is the killers who boastfully
narrate how they entered Kenya's territory under the pretext of
pursuing rebels and killed Kenyans'.18
17 In this article, I spell the Ethiopian part of the town 'Moiale'.
18
Apparently in the same statement (www.oromoliberationfront.org/_press9 from 9 March
1999) the two Fronts deny being engaged in terrorism. 'We believe that waging armed struggle
for national liberation is not terrorism.' Atrocities are exclusively found on the other side. 'It is
beyond one's comprehension to see Oromos, Ogadenis and oppressed peoples of other
nationalities being used as human wave to clear heavily mined fields.' Der Spiegel also reports
that Oromo soldiers were made to run across minefields to make the mines explode (No. 24,
14 June 1999: 'Verdun in der Wiiste').
The text persistently mentions 'Oromos and Ogadenis' in a parallel fashion as
'nationalities'. This does not reflect the fact that the Oromo are a vast conglomerate of
peoples speaking dialects of the Oromo language, while the Ogadeen are just one of many
Somali clans. To whom are 'Ogadeni' 'nationality' rights going to extend if the ONLF is
successful? To anybody inhabiting the Ogadeen region? To all those inhabiting the (Somali)
Region 5 of Ethiopia, which is much larger? Or just to members of the Ogadeen clan of the
Darood?
REMAPPING THE HORN
361
In response to numerous violent incidents there were calls to expel
the Ethiopian envoy amid hostility in northern Kenya, as the Marsabit
correspondent of the Daily Nation, Said Wabera, reports on 18 March
1999: 'Led by the MP for Moyale, Dr Guracha Galgallo, the leaders
... urged the residents to arm themselves since the government had
failed to protect them from external aggression ...
The deputy
Parliamentary Chief Whip, Mr Mohamed Shiddiye, blamed the
escalating insecurity on laxity by the provincial administration, saying
that the area was now an "AK-47 region" [i.e. a kalashnikov land].'
On 22 March 1999, a 'Compensation and Confession Day' was held
at Moiale, Ethiopia. Top government officials led by Brig. General
Abba Duula'9 and Ato20 Gabre and two top 'traditionalleaders', Jillo
Boru representingthe Abba Gada of the Boran and the Guji Abba Gada
Aga T'ant'allo attended a function where victims of landmines at Tuqa
and Iddilola were compensated.21 The owners of the three vehicles,
which were destroyed by the landmines, were each given a new fivetonne Isuzu lorry. The wounded were given three thousand Ethiopian
birr and for each of those killed five thousand Ethiopian birr were paid
as compensation. The two gada leaders, at a ceremony attended by
people from both Kenya and Ethiopia, conducted the presentations.
This earned the government praise as it had shown concern for the
people of the area. Jilo Boru expressed gratitude for the government's
commitment to care for those attacked without any reason and
especially to General Abba Duula and Ato Gabre for their support of
the peace initiative in the region. Later at a separate function, about
fifteen OLF members who were either taken prisoner on the battlefield
or arrested in town were brought to narrate their activities. They
admitted participationin the recent attacks.
A meeting was held on 30 March at a hotel in (the Ethiopian part of)
Moiale. Ethiopian officials had been invited to discuss recent conflicts.
The Security Committee of Moyale, Kenya, and local leaders also
attended the meeting. But there had been threats against Kenyan
alleged OLF supporters and not all Kenyan dignitarieswho wished to
do so were allowed to attend the meeting.
The Ethiopian commander advised the Boran local leaders in strong
terms to support the two governments' effort to remove the OLF from
the region. The local leaders blamed the Kenyan District Security team
for showing laxity in taking action against the OLF although they, the
Boran leaders, had long ago given their consent to such action. The
leaders promised to launch a massive campaign to see that the OLF are
expelled from the area.
19 This name is
very descriptive for a general. Abba duula means 'father of war' and is the
title of a Boran war leader.
20 Ato is Amharic for 'Mr'.
21 For (mutual) instrumentalisations of
government and gada leaders under the previous
regime, cf. Shongolo (1994).
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REMAPPING THE HORN
Finally in June 1999, after their presence there had been denied for
years and action been taken against them only slowly and hesitantly,
military pressure on the OLF reached a level which made them leave
Kenya and move into Somalia.
Two Oromo Liberation Front rivals [=rebels] were killed and 13 others
captured during an operation by security forces in Moyale District. Moyale
DC Stephen Kipkebut said yesterday that the operation has also recovered
eight AK-47 [kalashnikov] rifles and five different types of guns, 4,037
rounds of ammunition, 362 militaryuniforms and 50 hand grenades. [Daily
Nation, 9 June 1999]
Of course, the confiscation of these meagre supplies by no means
depleted the resources of the OLF. A little later the OLF was reported
to have moved down through Somalia to the coast in orderly and wellarmed convoys of vehicles, clearing the way before them of the road
blocks set up by the numerous Somali petty militias. They were on their
way to the area controlled by a new ally, Hussein Aidid. Hussein Aidid
was believed to be receiving help from Eritrea to support his struggle
against the RRA, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army, which was
supported, even in the form of armed incursions into Somalia, by the
Ethiopian government. It was therefore logical that Aidid, the OLF and
Eritrea would find themselves in a form of coalition against Ethiopia.
The countries of North-East and East Africa have a long tradition of
supporting dissident movements against their neighbours. With peace
between Ethiopia and Eritrea the options open to players of this game
had become somewhat reduced in number, but with the outbreak of
renewed hostilities between the two countries the room for regrouping
into new configurations had widened again. One could find a new ally
in one of these countries if one supported it against its own dissidents or
if one gave support to the dissidents of the other.
At that time, in addition to the OLF, Hussein Aidid supported AlItihad al-Islamiyya, a movement in conflict with the Ethiopian
government in the (Somali) Region 5 of Ethiopia.22 This movement
later received some attention in the international media. In the
aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001, it was suspected to be
linked to Osama bin Laden and his al-Qa'ida organisation. Some of the
gratitude of the OLF towards Aidid might have found its expression in
the fervour with which they cleared the road to the coast of rival Somali
militias. The Kenyan media did not fail to notice this new configuration, as the following article (in spite of the slight distortions it contains)
shows:
KENYA, ETHIOPIA BLAME THIRD FORCE
ADDIS ABABA, Thursday
Kenya and Ethiopia today accused unnamed countries [which are named
22
Later he made a U-turn and based himself in Addis Ababa.
REMAPPINGTHE HORN
363
three paragraphslater] in the Horn of Africa of trying to undermine their
peace and security.
In a statement published in Ethiopian state media, a joint committee of
officials responsible for border security between the two neighbours
'expressed concern over certain countries of the sub-region that are
sponsoring and encouraging the activities of terrorist groups, including the
OLF and Al-Itihad'.
Ethiopia and its smaller neighbour, Eritrea, have been involved in a
yearlongborder conflict that has spilled over into other countries in the Horn
of Africa. Eritreahas reportedlysent hundreds of OLF fighters into southern
Somalia from where they can move into northern Kenya and Ethiopia.
Ethiopia accuses Somali warlord Hussein Aideed of aiding Al Itihad.
The joint committee of border security officials met on Tuesday and
Wednesday in Moyale to discuss the deterioratingsecurity situation.
Kenyan police reported earlierthis week that securityforces had killed four
Ethiopian soldiers along the border. It was later reported that the four killed
were OLF fighters.
Meanwhile, reports from Somalia say that Ethiopian forces have been
heavily involved in fighting in and around the central town of Baidoa and by
Wednesday had arrivedin Dinsor, 250 kms south of he Ethiopian border.
Ethiopia has denied that any of its troops are in Somalia.
[Daily Nation, 11 June 1999]
The last three paragraphs have been quoted because the contradictions
they contain illustrate the uncertainty characteristic of the situation.
On 15 and 16 June 1999, the Moyale District Commissioner had
meetings with the local elders in different localities to stress the
maintenance of peace and order as the OLF was leaving the area. At a
meeting in Butiye, a neighbourhood of Moyale, he directed his speech
to OLF supporters saying, 'If you still long for them, please part with
them with a blessing, but never follow them to their destination. You
should also advise them to leave behind the children born to them
during their stay among you. The women, too, should not follow them.'
He asked the residents to report any members of the OLF left behind.
Almost a month later, on 8 July 1999, the East African Standard
reports:
Last week's ambush on a Kenya Army platoon by Somali militia [who had
taken several army lorries, apparentlywithout meeting resistance worth that
name] at Ammuma is a spill-over of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea
who are supporting different factions in the war-torn country, Minister of
State Julius Sunkuli told the House.
Sunkuli also admitted that Somali warlordMohamed Farah Aideed was in
the country [he must have meant his son Hussein, since Mohamed Farah
Aideed had died years before of bullet wounds received in Mogadishu], but
denied the Government was paying for his expenses adding that he was here
like any other Somali national ...
Sunkuli explained that the Ammuma incident occurred after Ethiopians
23
In fact, the meeting took place in Nazareth, Ethiopia.
364
REMAPPING THE HORN
who were incensed by the alleged support of Farah Aideed of the OLF,
Ogaden National LiberationFront (ONLF) and Al-itihad,... carriedout a
pre-emptive attack supported by other Somali factions.
'As a result Aideed and his allies, the Somali National Faction (SNF) [the
correct name is Somali National Front] of Maj. Gen. Omar Hajji
Mohammed 'Masale', moved southwards booting out Gen. Mohammed
Said Hersi 'Morgan's24 faction from Kismayu pushing them to the Kenya/
Somali border,' said Sunkuli.
The Government, the minister said, quickly dispatched the D-Company
platoon of 3 KAR stationed in Garissa to sort a group of 204 refugees
escaping the clashes, when 400 militiamen supported by eight technicals
[jeeps with machine guns mounted on top] who were pursuing SSD militia
of Gen. Morgan, bumped into them.
Some readers of the Standard could not hide their amusement about the
last paragraph:
The minister told the House that Kenya had strongly warned the warlords
that if a repeated incident happened the Kenya Army will act decisively and
punish them severely.
TO SUMMARISE
The map of the Horn of Africa is in a process of being constantly
redrawn. The criteria by which new political units are constituted differ
widely and often conflict with each other.
Old colonial shapes are revived and filled with new political life
(Eritrea, Somaliland). In the discourses legitimising these new political
units, cultural elements which can be traced to former colonial powers
are sometimes attributed positive value. This stands in sharp contrast
with the preceding period of decolonisation in which the former
colonial powers were depicted exclusively as oppressors.
Elsewhere, new political units are based on 'ethnicity', which is
defined by conflicting criteria in different hierarchies, often with
'language' being high up on the list (Schlee, 2001). As states which are
ethno-nationally defined share boundaries and overlap in their ethnic
composition with states based on quite different criteria of identification, ideological conflicts with territorial implications seem hard to
avoid.
No matter how much ethnicity is discussed in certain political
contexts, other examples show that the complete absence of ethnic
differences by any cultural criteria also does not prevent segmentation
and conflict.
24 A few obvious mistakes
concerning commas and quotation marks in this paragraphhave
been corrected.
REMAPPINGTHE HORN
365
Cultural differences are measurable (degree of linguistic closeness,
number and importance of shared features, etc.) but such measurements have little value for predicting how social identities are defined
and where conflicts are going to break out.
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ABSTRACT
The paperexaminesthe changingshapesof territoriesin the Horn of Africa
and the discourses which legitimise these different shapes. It starts with the
'Horn' itself, the different ways to delineate it, and the interests behind these.
Then Eritrea,Ethiopia, Somalia, and the defacto independent Somaliland are
discussed and their justifications for being examined. These justifications are
found not to follow the same pattern. The criteria for inclusion or exclusion of
populations or territories differ and form a rich reservoir for future conflict. On
a lower level, that of regional states comprised in a major unit, the Oromo of
Ethiopia, the largest ethnic group in the Horn of Africa, are discussed in some
detail. Accounts about how the Oromo have come to be and who is to be
regarded as an Oromo are found to be mutually conflicting. In the last part,
international and transnational relations in the Horn of Africa are looked at.
Major groupings cross-cutting state boundaries are formed by states forming
alliances with ethnic movements, opposition forces or warlords in neighbouring
states or ex-states, against other states or spheres of power. Publicity of such
alliances is kept low and few efforts seem to be made to give them an
ideological basis or historical justifications. The logic followed in these cases
seems to be simply that the enemy of an enemy is a potential friend.
RESUME
Cet article examine la morphologie changeante des territoires situes dans la
Corne de l'Afrique et les discours qui legitiment cette morphologie. Il
commence par la Come elle-meme, les differentes faions de la delimiter et
les interets qui sous-tendent celles-ci. Il aborde ensuite l'Erythr6e, l'Ethiopie, la
Somalie et le Somaliland independant de facto et etudie leurs raisons d'etre.
L'article constate que ces raisons ne suivent pas toutes le meme modele. Les
criteres d'inclusion ou d'exclusion des populations ou des territoires diffirent
et constituent un riche reservoir de conflits futurs. A plus petite echelle, celle
des etats regionaux compris dans une unite principale, I'article s'interesse aux
Oromo d'Ethiopie, qui constituent le principal groupe ethnique de la Come de
l'Afrique. II constate une contradiction entre ce que l'on rapporte comme les
origines des Oromo et les criteres selon lesquels on peut etre considere comme
Oromo. Dans la demiere partie, il traite des relations internationales et
transnationales dans la Corne de l'Afrique. A cheval sur les frontieres,
d'importants regroupements sont issus d'alliances entre les Etats et des
mouvements ethniques, des forces d'opposition ou des chefs de guerre d'Etats
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REMAPPING THE HORN
voisins ou d'anciens etats, contre d'autres Etats ou spheres de pouvoir. Ces
alliances se font dans la discretion et il semble que l'on ait peu tente de leur
donner une base ideologique ou des raisons historiques. La logique qui semble
suivie est celle selon laquelle tout ennemi d'un ennemi est un ami potentiel.