The Brexit and Britain`s Grand Strategy

(DAN KITWOOD/GETTY IMAGES)
The Brexit and
Britain’s Grand
Strategy
A Geopolitical Take on
the Roots That Led to
the Referendum
1 • STRATFOR
B
ritons will vote in an historic
referendum June 23 to determine
whether the United Kingdom will
remain part of the European Union.
Britain is the first, though likely not the
last, country to call for such a vote, whether
binding or not. And it is easy to see why
the United Kingdom -- which has always
exhibited a degree of ambivalence about
the Continental bloc -- would lead the way,
particularly with intertwined economic
weakness, migration crisis and rising nationalist sentiment redefining the political
landscape of the Continent.
THE BREXIT REFERENDUM AND BRITAIN’S GRAND STRATEGY
But it should be remembered
that Prime Minister David
Cameron signaled his intentions
for such a referendum in early
2013, well before migration
flows from Middle Eastern
conflict zones surged to epic
proportions and before many of
the EU’s nationalist and anti-establishment parties commanded
the sizable voter base they claim
today. The “Brexit” referendum
is more properly viewed as an
outgrowth of Britain’s long-term
geopolitical survival strategy
-- a carefully thought-out stance
that allows it to pivot as needed between the United States
and Europe to secure its own
strategic interests.
This survival strategy owes
much to Winston Churchill and
Britain’s post-World War II realities, but its roots can be traced
back even further.
EU Member States
FINLAND
SWEDEN
ESTONIA
LITHUANIA
NETHERLANDS
IRELAND
UNITED
KINGDOM
LUXEMBOURG
BELGIUM
FRANCE
POLAND
GERMANY
CZECH
REPUBLIC
AUSTRIA
SLOVAKIA
HUNGARY
SLOVENIA
ROMANIA
CROATIA
ITALY
BULGARIA
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
The Rise of Britain
As an empire on whose “dominions the sun never
sets,” the British could think with a certain degree of
gratitude of Napoleon, who had eliminated European
navies that might have challenged Britain’s own prior
to the Battle of Trafalgar. And with Napoleon’s ultimate defeat at Waterloo, Britain claimed dominance
over the North Atlantic -- the key to global power in
the 19th century that gave control over trade routes
into the Indian and Pacific oceans.
This opportunity aligned with economic imperatives.
Not only was Britain the dominant political and
2 • STRATFOR
LATVIA
DENMARK
GREECE
CYPRUS
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military power, it also was emerging as the leader in
the Industrial Revolution then underway in Europe.
Napoleon's devastation of continental Europe, the
collapse of French power and the underdevelopment of
the United States at that time gave Britain an advantage and an opportunity.
As a manufacturer, it needed raw materials available
only abroad, markets to absorb British production and
trade routes supported by strategically located supply
stations. The British Empire was foremost a trading
bloc. Britain resisted encroachment by integrating
potential adversaries into trade relationships with the
empire that it viewed as beneficial. In addition, the
colonies, which saw the benefits of increased trade,
would reinforce the defense of the empire.
THE BREXIT REFERENDUM AND BRITAIN’S GRAND STRATEGY
For most of the 19th century, Britain was not under
military pressure. But two major shifts toward the end
of the century began to change this reality.
The German and
U.S. Challenges
The first was the unification of Germany, in 1871.
Once unified, Germany became the most dynamic
economy in Europe. Britain had not had to compete
for economic primacy since Waterloo, but Germany
pressed Britain heavily, underselling British goods with
its more efficient production.
The second challenge came from the United States,
which also was industrializing at a dramatic pace — a
process ironically underwritten by investors from Britain
seeking higher returns than they could get at home. The
U.S. industrial base created a navy that surpassed the
British navy in size early in the 20th century. The window of opportunity that had opened with the defeat of
Napoleon was closing as Germany and the United States
pressed Britain, even if in an uncoordinated fashion.
The German challenge culminated in World War I,
a catastrophe for Britain and for the rest of Europe.
Apart from decimating a generation of men, the
cost of the war undermined Britain's economic base,
subtly shifting London's relationship with its empire.
Moreover, British power no longer seemed inevitable, raising the question among those who had not
benefitted from British imperialism as to whether the
empire could be broken. Britain became more dependent on its empire, somewhat shifting the mutuality of
relations. And the cost of policing the empire became
prohibitive relative to the benefits. Additionally, the
United States was emerging as a potential alternative
partner for the components of the empire — and the
German question was not closed.
World War II, the second round of the German war,
broke Britain's power. It was during this war that
3 • STRATFOR
the balance of power between the United States and
Britain shifted completely. Britain emerged from the
war vastly weaker economically and militarily than the
United States. Though it retained its empire, its ability
to hold it depended on the United States. Britain no
longer could hold it unilaterally.
In the postwar era, Britain was absorbed with developing strategies to cope with the transient nature of
its imperial power. In time, Britain came to define its
place in the world as a pivotal point between continental Europe and the United States in particular.
The Lieutenant Strategy
Recognizing the United States’ economic and military
primacy, Britain aligned itself with the U.S.-dominated
alliance system and the postwar financial arrangements
lumped together under the Bretton Woods system. The
British, however, added a dimension to this: Unable
to match the United States militarily, they outstripped
other American allies both in the quantity of their
military resources and in their willingness to use them
at the behest of the Americans.
We might call this the "lieutenant strategy." Britain
could not be America's equal. However, it could in
effect be America's lieutenant, wielding a military force
that outstripped in number — and technical sophistication — the forces deployed by other European countries. The British maintained a "full-spectrum" military
force, smaller than the U.S. military but more capable
across the board than militaries of other U.S. allies.
The goal was to accept a subordinate position without
being simply another U.S. ally. The British used that
relationship to extract special concessions and considerations other allies did not receive. Through this
“special relationship,” they also were able to influence
U.S. policy in ways others couldn't. The United States
was not motivated to go along merely out of sentiment
based on shared history, although that played a part.
Rather, like all great powers, the United States wanted
THE BREXIT REFERENDUM AND BRITAIN’S GRAND STRATEGY
to engage in coalition warfare and near-warfare along
with burden-sharing. Britain was prepared to play this
role more effectively than other countries, thereby
maintaining a global influence based on its ability to
prompt the use of U.S. forces in its interest.
There were two dangers for the British in this relationship. The first was the cost of maintaining the force relative to the benefits. In extremis, the potential benefits
were great. In normal times, the case easily could be
made that the cost outstripped the benefit. The second
was the danger of being drawn so deeply into the U.S.
orbit that Britain would lose its own freedom of action, effectively becoming, as some warned, the
51st state.
Iraq war, Britain participated in it. At the same time,
when the French wanted to intervene in Libya and the
Americans were extremely reluctant, the British joined
with the French and helped draw in the Americans.
An ‘Open Options’
Policy and a Referendum
Britain has positioned itself superbly for a strategy of
waiting, watching and retaining options regardless of
what happens. If the European Union fails and the European nation-states re-emerge as primary institutions,
Britain’s position would
allow it to exploit the
fragmentation of Europe
to its own economic and
Britain modified its strategy from
political advantage and
Britain therefore modmaintaining the balance of power
have the United States
ified its strategy from
available to support its
on the Continent to maintaining
maintaining the balance
strategy. If the United
of power on the Cona balance of power between the
States stumbles and
tinent to maintaining
United States and Europe.
Europe emerges more
a balance between
prominent, Britain can
the United States and
modulate its relationship
Europe. This allowed it
with Europe at will and serve as the Europeans' interto follow its U.S. strategy while maintaining leverage
face with a weakened United States. If both Europe
in that relationship beyond a wholesale willingness to
and the United States weaken, Britain is in a position
support U.S. policies and wars.
to chart whatever independent course it must.
As European unity increased, Britain decided to join
the European project in 1973. By the early 1970s,
Britain had lost its empire and needed to reassess its
international priorities and trade relationships. London saw membership in the European Community as
an opportunity to influence the process of continental
integration while preserving some degree of autonomy. This explains its support for the common market
but its refusal to join the eurozone. The United States
remains Britain's largest customer for exports if Europe is viewed as individual countries, but Europe as
a whole is a bigger customer. Where others in Europe,
particularly the Germans and French, opposed the
4 • STRATFOR
The British strategy represents a classic case of a nation
accepting reversal, retaining autonomy, and accommodating itself to its environment while manipulating it.
All the while Britain has waited, holding its options
open, to see how the game plays out and positioning itself to take maximum advantage of its shifts in
the environment.
Now comes the “Brexit” referendum. London has
negotiated exemptions from some EU policies in the
past, even gaining some concessions from Brussels in
the process. But with the June 23 vote, it is trying to
become less integrated with the bloc altogether.
THE BREXIT REFERENDUM AND BRITAIN’S GRAND STRATEGY
Three years ago, when he announced plans for the
referendum, Prime Minister David Cameron signaled
that he does not want Britain to quit the EU outright;
rather, he wants to repatriate from Brussels as many
powers as possible. Cameron believes the United
Kingdom still needs direct access to Europe's common
market but that London should regain power regarding such issues as employment legislation, immigration
and social and judicial affairs.
On the whole, the government in London feels the
United Kingdom has surrendered too much of its
national sovereignty to supranational EU institutions.
The United Kingdom is a net contributor to the
European Union, and London feels that the costs of
membership exceed the benefits. The Common Agricultural Policy, which subsidizes agricultural sectors
in continental Europe, does not really benefit the
United Kingdom, and the Common Fisheries Policy
has forced the United Kingdom to share its fishing
waters with other EU member states. Moreover, some
sectors of the political establishment are concerned
that Britain receives too many immigrants from
other EU states.
Yet the United Kingdom is a strong defender of the
single market. Roughly half of its exports end up in
the European Union, and half of its imports come
from the European Union. While the United States is
the United Kingdom's single most important export
destination, two of its top five export destinations
are eurozone countries: Germany and France. Ger-
5 • STRATFOR
many is also the source of about 15 percent of all
British imports.
Some supporters of Britain’s withdrawal from the EU
suggest that the United Kingdom could leave the European Union but remain a part of the European Economic Area, the trade agreement that includes non-EU
members, such as Iceland and Norway. However,
the country would still be required to make financial
contributions to continental Europe and adapt its legal
order to EU standards, but it would not have a vote in
EU decisions. Others suggest that the UK should look
for a free trade agreement with the EU, but negotiations could take years. According to Cameron, the
United Kingdom must be part of the common market
and have a say in policymaking.
Here again, we see Britain’s grand strategy pronounced. Despite its alliance with the United States,
the United Kingdom is essentially a European power,
and it cannot afford to be excluded from Continental affairs. Throughout history, London's foremost
concern has been the emergence of a single European
power that could threaten the British Isles politically,
economically or militarily. Maintaining the balance
of power in the Continent — especially one in which
London has some degree of influence — is a strategic
imperative for the United Kingdom. And even if the
United Kingdom chooses to move away from mainland Europe, its political and economic influence will
continue to be felt in the Continent. n
THE BREXIT REFERENDUM AND BRITAIN’S GRAND STRATEGY
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