IB HL History
Mr. Blackmon
Getúlio Vargas and the Estado Novo
(The following handout is shamelessly stolen from a number of sources)
I.
Populism
A.
Vargas is a Populist and a Nationalist
B.
Definition of a Populist regime according to Guillermo O’Donnell: “While there
is considerable variation in the degree to which these systems are competitive and
democratic, they are clearly ‘incorporating.’ They are based on a multi-class
coalition of urban-industrial interests, including industrial elites and the urban
popular sector. Economic nationalism is a common feature of such systems. The
state promotes the initial phase of industrialization oriented around consumer
goods. It does so both directly thorugh support for domestic industry, and
indirectly through encouraging the expansion of the domestic market for
consumer goods by increasing the income of the popular sector.” (Collier “B-A
Model” 24)
C.
(From Lambert) Parties of the Populist Type
1.
“Since about 1930, . . . parties running on reform platforms but
opportunistic in their actual policy have been in the lead. They tend to
rally a heterogeneous backing around a prominent figure who has acquired
the reputation of defending the underdog but whose only ideology is
nationalism. . . . .Such parties, bearing the strong personal mark of a
political figure, are called populist parties.
2.
“The forerunner of this type of movement was Hipólito Irigoyen, who
assumed power in Argentina in 1916 with the Radical Civic Union. . . .
Irigoyen then renamed his party . . . Union Cívica Radical Personalista.
Irigoyen’s regime was characterized by a strong reaction against the
cosmopolitan outlook of the Argentine oligarchic regime, which had given
free rein to foreign, especially English, concerns. His Argentine
nationalism manifested itself first by his neutrality in World War I.
Another trait of the regime–a basic feature of populism–was ostentatious
sympathy for the little man and a show of contempt for the wealthy and the
powerful. . . . After Irigoyen, the Radical Civic Union became a middleclass party and the Peronists became demagogic populists in their place.”
(204-205
3.
“Like Irigoyen in 1916, Vargas in 1930 found a country dominated by the
oligarchy, and, also like Irigoyen, he appealed to nationalism and
presented himself as the advocate of the little man.” (205)
D.
Economic Role of Populist Regimes
1.
“Their most earnest and systematic efforts have been aimed at economic
emancipation by means of industrialization. . . . The oligarchic regime had
been cosmopolitan in its outlook, since the economic interests of the ruling
class depended entirely on the exportation of agricultural products, and its
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Notes on Vargas
II.
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culture was that of the European capitals. The populists governments
wished to alienate neither th entrepreneurs nor the workers, and especially
not the middle classes and the military. Nationalism was the one theme on
which all of them could agree. At that point in Latin America’s foreign
relations, nationalism, which primarily economic, meant above all
industrialization and nationalization of the large foreign enterprises.
Although this economic nationalism often inspired measures of demagogic
rather than economic value, populist governments undoubtedly started the
era of economic development. . . . . The populist regimes broadened the
Latin American body politic.” (207)
E.
Political and Social Role of the Populist Regimes
1.
“”The lack of any economic experience, particularly among military
dictatorships of populist inspiration, rendered the best meant programs
utterly ineffectual. . . . For instance, any social policy dictated by
opportunism consisted first in courting supporters by multiplying job
openings, particularly in occupations most easily controlled by the party
and the government: civil service, public utilities, nationalized industries. .
. . In order to bring about and justify the proliferation of posts and show
their social usefulness, the populist governments have given in to the
temptation to orient labor legislation in a direction that slows productivity.
. . . In order to maintain their popularity among workers and civil servants,
the governments have raised the minimum wages excessively, the result
being almost invariably an inflation that has cancelled the raise. These
regimes have promoted social progress through featherbedding rather than
through higher productivity and salaries. Even though party supporters
have been disappointed by the stagnation and in some case the
deterioration in living standards, the populist regimes have lost none of
their popularity. The people’s protectors had given evidence of their good
intentions, and they can always blame any failures on mysterious plots of
political foes and the evil scheming of international capitalism and the
United States government.” (208)
2.
“The greatest harm done by the populist regimes throughout Latin
America has been to widen the chasm between a chiefly urban advanced
society and a chiefly rural archaic one by carrying out reforms in only a
segment of each nation. Government by the upper class had preserved
archaic feudal structures in the rural areas until the end of the first third of
the twentieth century. The populist leader who have followed the
oligarchy have paid no attention whatsoever to rural society and have left
its feudal structure untouched, while their reforms have hastened changes
in the advanced urban society, thus broadening the gap between the two
societies instead of narrowing it.” (209)
Impact of the Great Depression on Brazil
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Notes on Vargas
A.
B.
C.
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Dominance of São Paulo
1.
“Under the Old Republic, Brazil enjoyed a virtual monopoly over the
world market, furnishing 70 percent of the coffee consumed. Coffee beans
accounted for about 70 percent of Brazil? s exports during the decade of
the 1920's. Clearly the well-being of the national economy depended on
the sale of that single export.” (Burns)
2.
“It is not surprising therefore, that the three major coffee-producing
states--Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro--came to dominate
all aspects of the national life. Well before the end of the empire, they
exercised economic control over the country; after the advent of the
republic, they assumed political direction as well.” (Burns)
3.
The coup of 1930 represented resentment of the other states over Paulista
dominance
Election of 1930
1.
Liberal Alliance formed around Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul,
naming Getúlio Vargas as candidate for president
a.
They represented the aspirations of regional elites outside of the
“coffee triangle.”
b.
A quarrel between the Paulistas and Minas Gerais provided the
wedge to fuse these disgruntled regional elites with one of the
coffee states.
c.
It represented a demand for purification of the electoral system and
weakening of rural clientalist structures (both ideas which
appealed to the urban population)
2.
Platform was
a.
Defense of personal freedom
b.
Amnesty (for the tenentes)
c.
political reform
3.
Vargas did not expect to win due to election fraud
4.
During the campaign, the Great Depression struck
World trade contracts
1.
Market for coffee collapses
a.
“Coffee prices plummeted from 22.5 cents a pound in 1929 to 8
cents in 1931. IN the 1920? s, Brazil shipped 805.8 million pounds
of coffee abroad, in the 1930? s, only 337 million pounds were
sold. By 1930, Sao Paulo? s warehouses groaned under the weight
of 26 million bags of coffee beans--more than the world consumed
in an entire year.” (Burns)
2.
Huge drop in foreign earnings
3.
The coffee planters had already begun to rely on state subsidized profits
for coffee.
4.
Guaranteed profits led them to expand production by taking out high
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Notes on Vargas
III.
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interest loans
5.
The Depression caused a sharp drop in world coffee consumption.
6.
The collapse of prices could not therefore be made up from increased
sales.
7.
President Washington Luis held to “hard money” policies, to maintain the
convertibility of the mil reis into gold.
a.
The result of this is rapid exhaustion of gold reserves
8.
Government should have suspended convertibility
a.
Luis is influenced by his desire to satisfy foreign creditors in an
economy traditionally dependent upon exports
b.
Luis’ policies have no support from any segment of Brazilian
society
Military coup of 1930
A.
Getúlio Vargas put into power by the military
1.
The heart of the coup were young members of the Liberal Alliance and the
tenentes., who although they had been defeated in the 1920's, retained
quite a lot of prestige within the military
2.
This is not a revolution
3.
Vargas named provisional president.
4.
There was no legislature, so Vargas could rule by decree.
5.
Vargas had no clear cut ideology; he tends to be opportunistic
6.
There is a change in who holds power, however. From here on, the
traditional oligarches will be replaced by military men, technocrats, young
politicians and industrialists
B.
“A new type of state was born after 1930. It differed from the oligarchical state
not only owing to its centralization and its greater degree of autonomy, but also
because of other factors: (1) economic policy slowly turned toward the promotion
of industrialization; (2) social policy tended to provide some sort of protection for
urban workers, who were soon gathered into a working-class alliance supported
by the state; (3) the armed forces, in particular the army, were given a central role
in support of the creation of an industrial base and in maintaining internal order.”
(Fausto 196)
C.
Political Centralization
1.
Vargas replaced the governors of 19 of 20 states with his own men, called
“interventor”
2.
Many were former tenentes
3.
The Interventors Code restricted state power
a.
States could not contract a foreign loan without federal permission
b.
States could not spend more than 10 % of their budget on state
police
c.
State police could not be armed with heavy weapons
4.
This is a blow to the local oligarchies which had generally run Brazil
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Notes on Vargas
5.
D.
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The Electoral Code of 1932 provided for mandatory voting, secret ballot,
and suffrage for working women (illiterates, who were still a majority of
the population, could not vote)
6.
The press was strictly censored by the DIP
Economic Centralization
1.
Vargas did not abandon the coffee economy
2.
The National Department for Coffee (DNC) was created
a.
The government bought part of the unsold coffee stocks with
money from export taxes and destroyed it in order to reduce supply
and help prices. (Note the similarity to part of FDRs AAA)
b.
Between 1930 and 1944, Brazil destroyed the equivalent of three
years of the world’s consumption of coffee.
3.
He also sought bilateral agreements to sell coffee.
4.
Payments on foreign debts were suspended in 1931
5.
Labor policy
a.
Vargas is quite corporativist
b.
“One of the more coherent aspects of the Vargas administration
was its labor policy. . . . Its main objectives were to repress efforts
of the urban working class to organize outside the aegis of the state
and to incorporate the working class into the government’s array of
supporters.” (Fausto 200)
c.
The PCB (Brazilian Communist Party) was repressed.
d.
Coopting the unions
(1)
A Ministry of Labor, Industry and Commerce was
created
(2)
Bureaus of Reconciliation and Arbitration were created
to mediate disputes between workers and employers.
(3)
Decrees defined unions as consultative bodies which
worked with the bureaucracy.
(4)
One trade union was given exclusive jurisdiction over its
craft
(5)
A representative from the Ministry of Labor had to be
present at all union meetings, and ministry recognition was
necessary for the union to be legal.
6.
Centralization in Education
a.
One objective was to create a larger trained elite.
b.
A Ministry of Education and Health created in 1930
c.
The education system was authoritarian
(1)
Philosophies taught were hierarchical values and Catholic
conservatism
d.
Francisco Campos (Minister of Education from 1930-1932)
instituted the Campos Reform which provided a sequenced
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Notes on Vargas
E.
F.
G.
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curriculum and required both mandatory attendance and a high
school diploma to enter university
e.
New universities were founded to make them modern centers of
teaching and research
(1)
University of São Paulo 1934
(2)
University of the Federal District 1935
f.
Minister of War Eurico Dutra: “The principal objective of
education is to create a national consciousness,” (Burns)
The tenente movement
1.
Tenentismo arose in the 1920s among middle level officers who were
frustrated at the corruption of the traditional ruling oligarchy and who
were critical of senior officer’s complacency.
2.
There were revolts in 1922 and 1924, one led by Luíz Carlos Prestes, who
later converted to Marxism and led the Brazilian Communist Party
3.
Called for fair elections and honest government in late 1920s
4.
The tenentes lacked widespread public support and were suppressed by the
police, but their willingness to sacrifice for the sake of the nation brought
them prestige within the army
5.
The coup of 1930 brought the tenentes into the government.
6.
In order to achieve industrialization and improvements in communication
and transportation, the tenentes needed a stable and strong central
government.
Separatism: The São Paulo War
1.
The Vargas interventor in São Paulo, João Alberto, tenente, alienated the
Paulista elites (by advocating a 5% pay increase for workers), leading to
armed rebellion.
2.
Their defeat in 1932 helps discredit separatism
The Constitution of 1934
1.
More centrist but not radically different from previous Constitution
2.
Provisions were included for the nationalization of mines, mineral deposits
and waterfalls.
3.
Labor provisions
a.
Different pay for the same work (whether for age, sex, nationality,
or marital status) was prohibited
b.
Minimum wage
c.
Regulations on children’s and women’s labor
d.
Weekly days off
e.
Paid vacations
f.
Compensation for unjust firing
4.
Family, Education and Culture
a.
Free primary education
b.
Compulsory attendance
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Notes on Vargas
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c.
Religious education would be elective and open to all religions.
5.
National Security
a.
A High Council on National Security created
b.
Military service is made obligatory
6.
Vargas elected to a 4 year term
Vargas: To the Estado Novo
A.
Growth of Integralism (the AIB or Brazilian Integralist Movement)
1.
Founded in 1932 by Plínio Salgado
2.
Influenced by Fascism
3.
Dogma was Christian, nationalist, and traditionalist: “God, Fatherland,
and Family”
4.
Identified liberalism, socialism, Masons and international finance
capitalism (which they believed was controlled by Jews) as their enemies.
5.
Paramilitary style (the Greenshirts) with the Greek sigma (E) as a symbol
6.
Drawn mostly from middle class
7.
Had support from some officers, especially in the navy
B.
National Liberation Alliance (ANL)
1.
Popular Front organization coordinated by the Comintern to organize
leftist opposition to Vargas and the Integralists
a.
Moscow had ordered the Comintern to order Communist parties
around the world to cooperate with other groups in opposition to
Fascists
2.
Luíz Carlos Prestes was one of the leaders
3.
Program was nationalist
a.
Suspension of payment on foreign debts
b.
Nationalization of foreign businesses
c.
Agrarian reform
d.
Guarantees on individual rights
e.
A “democratic” government
C.
The Authoritarian alternative
1.
The Integralists and ANL began fighting in the streets in a way similar to
Nazis and KPD in Germany
2.
In response, authoritarian rule seemed to hold attractions.
3.
“Authoritarianism was and is a trait of Brazil’s political culture. . . . The
authoritarian current took on . . . the point of view known as ‘conservative
modernization.’ That is, authoritarians believed that in a loosely knit
country such as Brazil, the state had the responsibility to organize the
nation and to promote an orderly economic development and general
well-being. In the course of events, the authoritarian state would put an
end to social conflict, partisan politics, and excess freedom of
expression–all of which weakened the country.
4.
“There were traits common to the authoritarian current and to totalitarian
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Integralism, but they were not the same. Integralism sought its objectives
through a party that would mobilize the disgruntled masses and storm the
state. The authoritarian current put its money not on the party, but on the
state. It did not believe in large-scale social mobilizations; it believed in
the clairvoyance of a few men.” (Fausto 210 emphasis added)
D.
Conflict between Integralists and ANL
1.
1935 the government cracked down on the ANL
2.
The Law of National Security banned strikes by civil servants and
outlawed organizations attempting to subvert the social and political order
by illegal means.
3.
ANL fomented a barracks revolt in Rio Grande do Norte, Rio and Recife,
which was crushed.
E.
Vargas declared a “state of siege”
1.
ANL leaders arrested, tortured, and summarily tried
2.
It might be noted that Moscow had sent some foreign cadres to assist in
the coup
F.
The National Commission for Stopping Communism is formed in 1935
G.
The National Security Tribunal was created to investigate individuals.
1.
Remains in place throughout the Estado Novo
H.
The Integralists expected to win the election of 1938
The Estado Novo (1937-1945)
A.
1937 Vargas cancelled the election, and tore up the old constitution and imposed a
new one
1.
The Estado Novo was modeled after Salazar’s Portugal and Mussolini’s
Italy
2.
Authoritarian, not totalitarian, with no attempt to mobilize mass support
B.
Integralist coup
1.
The government banned all paramilitary organizations in 1938
2.
The Integralists responded with an inept coup at the presidential palace
3.
The government crushed them, and Salgado went into exile.
4.
Vargas no longer faced organized internal opposition
C.
“Socioeconomically, the Estado Novo reflected an alliance between the civilian
and military bureaucracy and the industrial bourgeoisie. Their immediate
common objective was to promote Brazil’s industrialization without causing large
social upheavals.” (Fausto 217)
D.
Vargas “introduced, for the first time in Latin America, mass propaganda and
indoctrination of the style recently invented by European fascist states. . . . [T]hey
aimed to create a central state powerful enough to carry out integrating functions
at which the oligarchical republic had so egregiously failed.” (Donghi 233)
E.
The growth of (state censored) newspapers and of the radio industry helped him
communicate with the country and helped generate a national consciousness.
F.
The Depression highlighted Brazil’s economic vulnerability so long as the
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Notes on Vargas
G.
H.
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economy was dominated by a single product.
1.
The solutions were
a.
Diversify the economy
b.
Accelerate industrialization
c.
The two were complementary and would require government
participation.
Economic Nationalism: “The nationalists insisted that only through economic
development could Brazil become truly independent. . . . The nationalists
realized that Brazil in fact still retained its colonial status, that colonial economic
institutions and patterns survived. A rural oligarchy, in alliance with foreign
capital, perpetuated the mercantilist system, and the vestiges of colonialism
arrested the nation? s development. Beginning in the 1930? s, therefore, Brazilian
nationalism, like that flourishing in the rest of Latin America and in other
underdeveloped areas, became increasingly characterized by resentment of
foreign capital and foreign personnel, suspicion of private enterprise, a growing
preference for state ownership, emphasis on industrialization, encouragement of
domestic production, and a desire to create or nationalize certain key industries
such as oil, steel, power, and transportation.” (Burns, emphasis added)
Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI) program begun in earnest in 1937
1.
The Great Depression stimulated industrialization in Brazil because if she
could not manufacture many consumer products herself, she would have to
do without.
2.
World War II further strengthened this trend because traditional suppliers
of consumer goods were devoting their industry to war time production.
3.
Methods used to foster ISI were “through exchange controls, import
quotas, tax incentives, lowered duties on imported machinery and raw
materials, and long-term loans at low interest rates. “ (Keen)
4.
In 1940, the government produced a Five Year Plan to expand heavy
industry, generate hydroelectric power, and expand the rail system.
5.
State sponsored companies
a.
National Oil Company 1938
b.
National Council of Hydraulic and Electrical Energy 1939
c.
National Steel Company 1941 to exploit the “iron mountain” of
Itabira
d.
National Motor Company 1946
6.
Oil (and a look ahead to his second administration: “But the symbol of
economic nationalism, for Brazilians as well as for all Latin Americans,
was petroleum. The nationalists believed that the discovery of oil was not
only economically desirable but would guarantee Brazil? s achievement of
world power status. At first, Vargas understood the importance of
petroleum purely as an economic matter. He established the National
Petroleum Council to coordinate and intensify the search for oil, and in
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1939, the first successful well was drilled: oil gushed forth from the
Brazilian soil. The nationalists-who were unwilling to see the oil, or the
profits from its exploitation, siphoned off to foreign countries-then called
for the creation of a national oil industry. Oil soon came to dominate their
thoughts, and in the words of one contemporary nationalist, it became “the
backbone of nationalism.” In time, Vargas came to see the emotional
significance of oil to the nationalists, and he duly paid homage to the
symbol. “Whoever hands over the petroleum to foreigners threatens our
own independence,”he remarked.
7.
“During his second administration (1951-54), Vargas exploited that
symbol in a bid for wider support. In 1951, he proposed the creation of
Petrobras, a state monopoly on all activities connected with the
exploration and development of petroleum resources. Its creation, in
1953, followed a national campaign in which the cry “O petroleo e
nosso!”(“The Oil is Ours!”) echoed throughout the land. The
establishment of Petrobas was a victory for the nationalists. They had
triumphed over those who argued that it would be more economical for
experienced foreign companies to drill for oil and pay Brazil a royalty on
whatever was pumped out. The nationalists would have none of that
argument. At any rate, the question was an emotional, not economic, one.
In the words of one nationalist, “the Brazilian people . . . struggled for the
creation of a state monopoly because they believed that in that struggle
they were defending national sovereignty.” The confessed goal of
Petrobas was to contribute to the economic independence of Brazil:
Vargas’ own phrase was “to create national liberty.” The nationalists
succeeded in convincing the masses that a national oil industry represented
sovereignty, independence, power, and well-being. For the first time, they
stirred up popular support for a nationalist cause. Petrobas remains the
major single permanent achievement of the nationalists. The emotions
aroused by its creation recall the dramatic nationalization of the oil
industry in Mexico, in 1938.” (Burns)
8.
“During the years 1934-37, Brazil operated under a barter agreement with
Germany. Locomotives, iron, coal, dyes, and chemicals were exchanged
for Brazilian coffee, cotton, tobacco, and oils. By 1937 Germany was
selling twice as much as Brazil as was Great Britain, half as much as the
United States. After 1937 German trade fell off and the American
increased.” (SHerring)
The Labor Charter 1937 codified the labor provisions already in place
1.
Imposed a union tax to finance the union bosses
2.
Labor Court is established
3.
Broader legislation with Consolidation of Labor Laws
4.
Vargas used radio to portray himself as the father of the people (“O
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Notes on Vargas
VI.
VII.
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Paizinho do Povo”)
J.
The Department of Press and Propaganda (DIP) censored the press
K.
“The Estado Novo persecuted, arrested, tortured, and forced politicians and
intellectuals into exile.” (Fausto 225)
L.
Administrative Department of Public Service reformed the bureaucracy by making
promotion based on merit.
The Estado Novo and World War II
A.
Vargas’ sympathies when World War II broke out were not clear. Many of the old
tenentes admired the Germans, the Estado Novo certainly had aspects of a fascist
state. However, many Brazilians clearly saw the Allies as the side to support.
1.
The DIP enforced a pro-Axis view. A popular saying became: “Don’t
speak; Getulio will do it for you--don’t think; the DIP will do it for you.”
(SHerring)
2.
All of this worried Washington considerably
3.
Foreign Minister Aranha however was very pro-Allies, and the US
Ambassador to Brazil, Jefferson Caffery an able negotiator.
B.
Vargas aligned Brazil to gain maximum benefit from World War II
1.
“Vargas adroitly exploited Great Power rivalries to secure financial and
technical assistance from the United States for the construction of the huge
state-owned integrated iron and steel plant at Volta Redonda. U.S.
companies and government agencies were notably cool to requests for aid
for establishing heavy industry in Latin America. But Vargas? hints that
he might have to turn for help to Germany removed all obstacles. A series
of loans from the Export Import Bank made possible the completion of the
Volta Redonda plant by 1946. By 1955 it was producing 646,000 tons of
steel, a major contribution to Brazil? s industrial growth. Volta Redonda
was a great victory for the Vargas policies of economic nationalism and
state intervention in economic life. In return for American assistance,
Vargas allowed the United States to lease air bases in northern Brazil even
before it entered the war against the Axis. In August 1942, after German
submarines had sunk a number of Brazilian merchantmen, Brazil declared
war on Germany and Italy. A Brazilian expeditionary force of some
twenty-five thousand men participated in the Allied invasion of Italy in
1944 and suffered relatively heavy losses in the fighting.” (Keen)
C.
At the Rio Conference in 1942, Brazil came out solidly on the Allied side (while
Argentina still balked.
D.
A Department of Coordination of Economic Mobilization was created in 1942 to
run the economy.
E.
During the war, there was major growth in textiles, chemicals, and paper.
F.
Brazil also exported foodstuffs
The End of the Estado Novo
A.
(A sympathetic view): Simon Collier,ed.,et al - The Cambridge Encyclopedia of
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Latin America and the Caribbean, 270-272
1.
“The end of the Estado Novo was brought about by external
events--notably the entry of the United States into the Second World War.
Brazil, as usual, followed the North American lead, and benefitted from
large amounts of aid; in return Brazil patrolled the South Atlantic and sent
an expeditionary force to Italy. But it was obviously incongruous for an
authoritarian regime to be fighting for democracy, and Vargas began (with
his usual pragmatism) to propose a return to constitutional government.
From 1942 he began to encourage the organization of the new skilled
working class into government-run trade unions, which provided benefits
for their members and some degree of protection (although independent
workers? action was deterred). This was supplemented by more
traditional patronage in the form of gifts to the unorganized poor and the
promotion of a cult of Vargas among the unsophisticated. In 1945 the
president announced elections for a constituent assembly, and began
to build a new political machine. This consisted of two political parties
appealing to different bases of support. The Social Democrat Party
(PSD) belied its name; it was a conservative coalition of pro-Vargas
landowners, who still controlled the rural vote, and businessmen who had
benefitted from the expansion of the Estado Novo. The electorate now
included a large block of skilled urban workers; Vargas appealed to them
through the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), based on his trade unions.
There were also opposition parties, the most important being the National
Democratic Union (UDN), a “liberal” coalition of anti-Vargas
landowners and middle-class people who believed in human rights and
honest government and saw Vargas as a dictatorial demagogue.
2.
“The PSD PTB coalition won the 1945 elections but, ironically, it did not
help Vargas; he was at this point overthrown by the army, whose
commanders suspected that he intended to keep himself in power yet
again; they also feared his appeal to the masses. Nonetheless the election
showed the huge changes which had occurred in Brazil since 1930. Then
the electorate had been 2 million; now it was 7.5 million. Then most of
the electors had voted at the command of the landowners; now there were
national political parties (at least in name), and the opposition got 40 per
cent of the vote. Large areas of the interior remained politically and
economically backward, but leadership had passed to the cities, with their
European-style middle and working classes. Like Peter the Great in
Russia, Vargas had not totally modernized his country, but he had
given it a decisive push forward.
3.
“Brazil? s experiment with modern democracy lasted eighteen years, and
was stormy as well as short. Only two presidents, Dutra (1946-1951) and
Kubitschek (1956-1961) completed their terms at the appointed time:
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4.
5.
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Vargas (1951-1954) ended his second term by committing suicide, Café
Filho (1954-5) and Quadros (1961) resigned, and Goulart (1961-4) was
deposed. The reason for this, apart from the incompetence of the
incumbents, was that the Brazilian political system had become less
controllable. In the first republic the quarrels of the state elites had
brought about the revolution of 1930; the landowners were still a powerful
force, and they had been joined by the middle classes and the skilled urban
working classes. By the 1960s the unskilled urban workers and the
peasants, hitherto voiceless, were also making demands on the system. In
a society that ran on patronage the presidency could only hope to satisfy so
many demands when the economy was booming; when resources were
scarce the flimsy facade of constitutional government was torn to pieces
by the conflicting demands of the different interest groups.
“The presidency of Eurico Gaspar Dutra, a conservative general
(1946-1951), was relatively quiet; the political system had not fully
developed and Brazil was prosperous as the result of the Second World
War. The two main developments were the banning of the Communist
Party, which had shown surprising strength by gaining 9 percent of the
votes in 1946, and the consequent growth of the PTB under Vargas, who
began to campaign for a second term in office in 1948. Vargas appealed to
the electorate on the social achievements of his last years in office, and
won the 1950 presidential elections by effective use of public relations for
the first time in Brazil. . . .
“Vargas? s second presidency was a failure. The complexity of political
life had vastly increased since 1945; the post-war boom was over; the
president himself was nearly seventy and his political grip was weakening.
Vargas made two major mistakes; he alienated everyone by his
mismanagement of the economy (inflationary wage increased followed by
a stabilization plan), and he angered his political supporters by his
promotion of his protege Joao Goulart, who he made Labor Minister and
put in charge of the trade unions with all their opportunities for patronage.
But Vargas? s final downfall was due to his resentment of opposition. In
August 1954 an assassination attempt was made on a muckraking
journalist, Carlos Lacerda; violence at national level broke the unwritten
rules of Brazilian politics, and the armed forces were also angered, since
an Air Force major had been killed trying to protect Lacerda.
Investigations showed that the killing had been ordered by the president? s
chief bodyguard; senior officers demanded the president? s resignation,
and Vargas responded by committing suicide. His death, and the wills
issued in his name, created a “Vargas legend”; he was supposed to have
dies as a “sacrifice” protecting the “poor and humble.” At any rate he had
taken vital steps towards modernization and created both a middle class
IB HL History
Notes on Vargas
B.
Mr. Blackmon
Page 14
and a skilled proletariat.
6.
“. . . Vargas’ political machine showed its durability by winning the 1955
elections, with Juscelino Kubitschek of the PSD gaining the presidency
and Goulart of the PTB the vice presidency, but the armed forces had to
intervene again to prevent any anti-Vargas factions from staging a coup.
The running of Brazil was becoming increasingly dependent on the
military. “ [all emphasis added]
(A sympathetic, anti-American view) Benjamin Keen - A Short History of Latin
America, 448-356
1.
“The paradox of Brazil? s participation in an antifacist war under an
authoritarian regime was not lost on Brazilians; the demands for an end to
the Estado Novo grew stronger as the defeat of the Axis drew near. Ever
sensitive to changes in the political climate and the balance of forces.
Vargas responded by promising a new postwar era of liberty. In January
1945,, he announced an amnesty for political prisoners, promulgated a law
allowing political parties to function openly, and set December 2 as the
date for presidential and congressional elections.
2.
“A number of new parties were formed to fight the coming elections. Two
were created by Vargas himself. They were the Partido Social
Democratico (Social Democratic Party, of PSD) and the Partido
Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party, or PTB). The PSD, the
largest of the new parties, united pro-Vargas industrialists and rural
machines, above all. The PTB had its base in the government-controlled
trade unions and appealed to workers with a populist rhetoric proclaiming
Vargas the “Father of the Poor.” The Uniao Democratica Nacional
(National Democratic Party, or UDN) was the most conservative and
chiefly represented neocolonial agrarian and commercial interests; it was
strongly pro-American. Its position with respect to economic policy was
that “it is necessary to call on foreign capital for the exploitation of our
idle natural resources, assure it just treatment, and allow it to repatriate its
proceeds.” Of the other national parties, the most important was the
Communist party, led by Prestes, which emerged from the under ground
with considerable prestige and strength.
3.
“Vargas announced that he would not run for president but set the stage for
a well-organized campaign by his supporters, called queremistas (from the
Portuguese verb querer, “to want”), who wanted Vargas to declare himself
a candidate in the forthcoming election. Soon after issuing the decrees
restoring political freedom, Vargas moved to the left in economic policy.
In June he authorized the expropriation of an organization whose practices
were harmful to the national interest; the decree specifically named
H national or foreign enterprises known to be connected with associations,
trusts, or cartels.F
IB HL History
Notes on Vargas
4.
5.
6.
7.
Mr. Blackmon
Page 15
“The authorization decree, which was aimed at keeping down the cost of
living, inspired alarm in conservative foreign and domestic circles. The
American ambassador, Adolph A. Berle, Jr., made no effort to conceal his
suspicion of Vargas’ aims. Senior military officers also regarded Vargas’s
political maneuvers and leftward move with growing uneasiness. The
wartime alliance with the United States had accentuated their inherent
conservatism and made them ready to accept the gospel of free enterprise
and American leadership in the cold war against the Soviet Union and
world communism.
“On October 29, 1945, Generals Goes Monteiro and Eurico Dutra staged a
coup, forced Vargas to resign, and entrusted the government to Jose
Linhares, chief justice of the Supreme Court, until after the election. The
new government promptly indicated its tendency by repealing Vargas? s
antitrust decree and launching a suppression of the Communist party.
Ostensibly, the military had acted to defend democracy by preventing
Vargas from seizing power as he had done in 1937. But its democratic
credentials were more than dubious; Goes Monteiro and Dutra were, after
Vargas, the chief architects of Estado Novo and had supported Vargas? s
most repressive measures. Vargas, says Richard Bourne, “was right to
suspect that behind the concern for democracy there was also a hostility to
state economic intervention of the sort that was building the Volta
Redonda steel plant and a lack of sympathy for his labor and welfare
policies.”
“The military coup insured that Brazil would return to the parliamentary
system under conservative auspices, with two generals as the major
presidential candidates, Eurico Dutra for PSD and Eduardo Gomez for the
UDN. Dutra won, while Vargas had the satisfaction of winning election as
senator from two states and congressman from six states and the Federal
District. The newly elected Congress, sitting as a constituent assembly,
framed a new constitution that retained both the federal system and
guaranteed civil liberties and free elections, but it still denied the vote to
illiterates and enlisted men in the armed forces--more than half the adult
population.
“Under the mediocre, colorless President Eurico Dutra (1946-1951),
neocolonial interests regained much of the influence they had lost under
Vargas. In his foreign and domestic policies, Dutra displayed a blind
loyalty to the anticommunist creed propounded by Washington. Vargas,
wishing to broaden Brazil’s economic and diplomatic contacts, had
resumed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union; Dutra found a pretext
for severing those relations. Alarmed by the growing electoral strength of
the Communist party, Dutra outlawed the party, and Congress followed his
lead by expelling the party’s elected representatives, seventeen
IB HL History
Notes on Vargas
8.
9.
10.
Mr. Blackmon
Page 16
congressmen and one senator. Dutra exploited the resulting witch hunt to
smash the independent, left-led labor movement; the Workers’ Federation,
organized in 1946, was declared illegal, and the government intervened in
a large number of unions to eliminate “extremist elements.” The
imposition of a wage freeze and the failure to raise the officially decreed
minimum wage caused the real income of workers to drop sharply.
“With respect to economic development, Dutra pursued a laissez faire
policy that meant the virtual abandonment of the Vargas strategy of a
state-directed movement toward economic independence. Dutra? s
finance minister, Correia e Castro, openly declared the government? s bias
in favor of the neocolonial relationship when he described Brazil as
“essentially an agrarian country,’ adding the “the essence of the Latin
American economy, and Brazil is an integral part of this area, is a certain
concentration of effort in the export of primary products and foodstuffs, as
well as in the import of a wide variety of manufactured goods and
processed foodstuffs.” In conformity with this point of view, the Dutra
government removed all import and exchange controls and allowed
the large foreign exchange reserves accumulated during the
war--reserves that Vargas had proposed to use for reequipping
Brazilian industry--to be dissipated on imported consumer goods,
luxury goods in large part.
“Attracted by the new economic climate, foreign capital flowed into
Brazil. Direct investments by the United States rose from $323 million in
1946 to $803 million in 1951. Meanwhile, seeking to curb inflation
according to the prescription of American advisers, the government
pursued a restrictive credit policy harmful to the Brazilian entrepreneurs
and industrial growth. In 1947, after the negative results of these policies
had become apparent and the foreign exchange reserves had almost
disappeared, the Dutra government set up a new system of import
licensing, with a scale of import priorities according to need, and adopted
an easier credit policy. Thanks to these measures, the last two years of the
Dutra regime saw a revival of economic growth.
“In 1950, having assured himself of the neutrality of the armed forces,
Vargas ran for president with the support of the PTB and a broad coalition
of workers, industrialists, and members of the urban middle class. His
campaign concentrated on the need to accelerate industrialization and
expand and strengthen welfare legislation. Defending his past record,
Vargas affirmed that his whole effort had been to “transform into an
industrial nation” a country “paralyzed by the myopia of rulers wedded to
the existing monoculture and to the simple extraction of primary
materials.” Riding a wave of discontent with the economic and social
policies of the Dutra regime, Vargas easily defeated his two opponents.
IB HL History
Notes on Vargas
11.
12.
13.
Mr. Blackmon
Page 17
“Vargas inherited a difficult economic situation. After a brief boom in
coffee exports and prices in 1949-1951, the balance of trade again turned
unfavorable, and the inflation rate increased. In the absence of other
major sources of financing for his developmental program, Vargas
had to rely largely on the massive increase in the money supply, with
all its inevitable social consequences. Meanwhile, his national program
of state-directed industrialization, using state corporations as its major
instrument, encountered increasing hostility from neocolonial interests at
home and abroad. In the United States, the Eisenhower administration
decided that the Vargas government had not created the proper climate for
private investment and terminated the Joint United States-Brazilian
Economic Commission. Within Brazil, despite his sweeping victory in the
election of 1950, Vargas’ program faced sabotage at the hands of the rural
forces that continued to dominate the majority of the state governments
and Congress. This hardening of attitudes signified that Vargas’ options
and his capacity for maneuvering between different social groups were
greatly reduced.
“In December, 1951, Vargas asked Congress to approve a bill creating a
mixed public-private petroleum corporation to be called Petrobras, which
would give the state a monopoly on the drilling of oil and new refineries.
Petrobras illustrated Vargas? belief that the state must own the
commanding heights of the economy, it also represented an attempt to
reduce the balance of payments deficit be substituting domestic sources of
oil for imported oil. Vargas sought to appease domestic and foreign
opponents by leaving the distribution of oil in private hands and allowing
existing refineries to remain privately owned, but almost two years passed
before Congress, under great popular pressure passed the law creating
Petrobras in October 1953. However, Vargas? proposal to create a similar
agency for electric power to be called Electrobras, which would
supplement the power production of foreign-owned public utilities,
remained bottled up in Congress. The depth of nationalist feeling aroused
by the debate over Petrobras and Electrobras convinced foreign and
domestic conservatives that Vargas was traveling a dangerous road.
“Vargas’ labor policy became another political battleground. Under
Vargas, labor regained much of the freedom of action that it had lost
during the Dutra years. In December 1951, the government decreed a new
minimum wage that only compensated for the most recent price rises. In
1953, three hundred thousand workers went on strike for higher wages and
other benefits. In June of that year, Vargas appointed a young protege,
Joao Goulart, minister of labor. Goulart, a populist in the Vargas
tradition, was sympathetic with labor’s demands. In January 1954,
observing that “it is not wages which raise the cost of living; on the
IB HL History
Notes on Vargas
C.
Mr. Blackmon
Page 18
contrary it is the cost of living which require higher wages,” Goulart
recommended to Vargas a doubling of the minimum wage. This
recommendation evoked a violent “manifesto of the colonels,” in which a
group of officers charged that the government was penetrated by
communism and corruption, that the armed forces were being neglected,
and that the recommended new minimum wage would demoralize the
badly underpaid officer class. Under military pressure, Vargas dismissed
Goulart, but in a May Day speech to workers he announced that the
increased minimum wage would be enacted and even praised the fallen
minister of labor.
14.
“The battle lines between Vargas and his foes were being drawn ever more
sharply. In speeches to Congress, Vargas attacked foreign investors for
aggravating Brazil’s balance of payments problem by their massive
remittances of profits and claimed that invoicing frauds had cost Brazil at
least $250 million over eighteen-month period. Meanwhile, attacks on
him by the conservative dominated press and radio grew even more bitter;
especially vituperative were the editorials of Carlos Lacerda, editor of the
ultraconservative Tribuna da Imprensa.
15.
“An effort to silence Lacerda presented Vargas’ enemies with a golden
opportunity to destroy him. Unknown to Vargas, the chief of the
president? s personal guard arranged for a gunman to assassinate Lacerda.
The plot miscarried, for Lacerda was only slightly wounded, but one of his
bodyguards, an air force major, was killed. The resulting investigation
revealed the complicity of palace officials and uncovered the existence of
large-scale corruption in the presidential staff. The chorus of demands for
Vargas? resignation was joined by the military, which informed him on
August 24 that he must resign or be deposed. Isolated, betrayed by the
men he had trusted, the seventy-two-year-old Vargas found the way out of
his dilemma by suicide. But he left a message that was also his political
testament. It ended with the words:
16.
“”I fought against the looting of Brazil. I fought against the looting of the
people. I have fought bare-breasted. Hatred, infamy, and calumny did
not beat down my spirit. I gave you my life. Now I offer my death.
Nothing remains. Serenely I take the first step on the road to eternity and
I leave life to enter history.”
(A less anti-American view) Hubert Herring - A History of Latin America,
759-768. The Dictatorship of Getulio Vargas, 1930-45
1.
“By the first days of 1945, there were clear signs of discontent with the
dictatorship. Many politicians, generals, and professional people began to
show their hands. For some, the stand reflected prudence; they knew that
a dictator-bossed Brazil would have scant welcome at the peace tables.
For others, it was simply a personal play for power. For many, it was a
IB HL History
Notes on Vargas
2.
3.
4.
Mr. Blackmon
Page 19
deeply rooted desire for democratic rule. In February came the
“democratic break through.” Two newspapers suddenly began to talk of
the election Vargas had promised, of the need for free discussion, and in
favor of the candidacy of Air Brigadier Eduardo Gomes. The DIP did not
silence them; the inference was that Vargas had decided to loose his hold.
The news papers, such as were not owned by the government or the
Communists, published vigorous discussions of Brazil’s future.
“National political parties took form. The National Democratic Union
nominated Gomes, it had the support of most moderate Liberals, many
Conservatives, and others intent upon striking at Vargas. The Social
Democratic Party, backing Eurico Dutra, Vargas’ minister of war, made its
chief appeal to those of the extreme right--with Vargas’ blessing, they
thought. The Communists, led by Luiz Carlos Prestes, finally released
from prison, entered the contest. As the year wore on, it became clear that
Vargas was not to be easily deposed. A mysterious movement sprang up
with the slogan “Queremos Getulio,” “We want Getulio”; Brazil was
plastered with the slogan on billboards, in the press, in pamphlets. It was
then revealed that the promoter of this ostensibly spontaneous outburst
was paying his printing bills from a loan of $14,000,000 granted by the
national Banco do Brasil (that is, Vargas).
“Meanwhile, elections were scheduled for December 2. By September
political prophets knew that Vargas had no intention of quitting. Rumors
spread that a military coup was planned, that prisons were readied. Now
the American ambassador, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., took a hand. Berle had
come to Brazil in January, 1945, and had made friends of those in power
and in the opposition. Berle now decided to speak and on September 29
held a press conference for Brazilian reporters; he spoke eloquently of the
long friendship between Brazil and the United States, and said that “the
pledge of free Brazilian elections, set for a definite date, by a government
whose word the United States has found inviolable, has been hailed with
as much satisfaction in the United States as in Brazil itself.” His point was
clear; he hailed the election, knowing full well that Vargas proposed to
continue himself in power. Berle’s speech has been cited as another
instance of American intervention in Latin Americas internal affairs--if so,
it was gentle and effective.
“In October Vargas dismissed the capital? s chief of police and installed
his brother, Benjamin Vargas (nicknamed O Beijo, “The Kiss”), who was
notorious for his pilferings and exploitation of prostitution and gambling.
This affront to the dignity of the nation offended the generals, who
demanded Vargas’ resignation. Forthwith, tanks, funs, and troops
surrounded public buildings. On October 29 Vargas resigned and flew to
his farm in Rio Grande do Sul. Chief Justice Linhares of the Supreme
IB HL History
Notes on Vargas
D.
Mr. Blackmon
Page 20
Court, who became provisional president, appointed an able cabinet. The
political campaign continued. The queremistas were noisy, Vargas now
ordered them to support Dutra. The election was held on schedule on
December 2. Dutra won, two to one, over Gomez. The Communists
polled 10 percent of the votes.”
(A more judicious view) Bradford Burns, Nationalism in Brazil: A Historical
Survey, 72-89 Getulio Vargas and Economic Nationalism
1.
“The Brazilians sardonically noted that they supported the Allied effort to
eliminate dictatorship in Europe while living under their own dictator at
home. By late 1944, their desire to return to a democratic system was
unmistakably clear. Vargas, acceding to the mounting pressure, agreed to
hold elections in December, 1945. The government relaxed its political
controls, and a variety of political parties emerged. Three of them
achieved national importance and, despite their weaknesses, can be
regarded as the first nationwide democratic parties in Brazilian history.
The Partido Social Democratico (Social Democratic Party, of PSD),
founded by Vargas himself, represented urban, moderate, middle-class
interests. The Uniao Democratica Nacional (National Democratic
Union, or UDN), founded by the opposition to Vargas, tended to support
conservative doctrines and to favor the interests of the traditional
oligarchy. The Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party,
or PTB), also founded by Vargas, appealed to the workers and expressed a
leftist ideology. The leadership of the PTB was predominately
middle-class in origin and was vociferously nationalistic. The three parties
were to contribute significantly to the growth of Brazilian democracy.
2.
“As the date for the elections approached, Vargas hinted that he might like
to continue in office. Rumors spread that the President was once again
going to cancel an election. In late October, 1945, the military intervened
to depose the President and guarantee the elections. The candidate of the
PSD and the PTB, General Eurico Dutra, was elected and took office in
1946 for a five-year term. Dutra proved to be not unsympathetic to
Vargas, who at the last moment had given the General his endorsement,
and his administration continued many of the Vargas policies. Dutra? s
proposed five-year development plan also pleased the nationalists, who
saw their hopes for an industrialized Brazil beginning to be realized.
3.
“In the elections of 1950, Vargas was returned to office as democratically
elected president. If anything, he was more nationalistic in both his
pronouncements and his actions during his second administration than in
his first. As we have seen, it was during this administration that he created
Petrobras and attempted to extend government control over energy and
power resources; he also inaugurated his own five-year plan for
industrialization.
IB HL History
Notes on Vargas
4.
5.
6.
7.
Mr. Blackmon
Page 21
“Ironically, much of Brazil? s remarkable industrial progress during
these years was due to the mounting investment of foreign capitalists,
whom the nationalists, as always, suspected of a variety of evil
motives. Vargas became even more outspoken in his criticism of foreign
ownership of industry, and he launched a bitter attack against foreign
investors, accusing them of H bleeding Brazil.F The nationalists cheered
each pronouncement. Yet funds continued to flow in from abroad, and
industrialization expanded at a rapid pace.
“Clearly, Vargas had mastered the rhetoric of the nationalists and adapted
it to his own purposes. He relied upon the popular appeal of nationalism
more than he had in the past, and these nationalist feelings strengthened
his second administration which was less stabley anchored than his first.
“Yet after two years in office, the aging President found himself in grave
difficulties. The increasingly complex social and economic problems
facing Brazil puzzled him. He had also lost some of his flexibility and
adroitness. Showing an inability to govern within the framework of
the democratic system, he resorted to some of his former strong-arm
tactics. Corruption surrounded the presidency, although Vargas
himself was apparently an honest man. When the attempted assassination
of a persistent critic was traced to Vargas’ personal bodyguard, the army
stepped in once again and demanded his resignation. Vargas replied by
committing suicide, on August 25, 1954. He left behind suicide note
(over which there has been speculation as to its authenticity), which
echoed his nationalist sentiments. He wrote of “years of domination and
looting by international economic and financial groups” and of “a
subterranean campaign of international groups joined with the national
groups revolting against the regime of workers’ guarantees,” and boasted:
“I fought against the looting of Brazil.” The note has become a
nationalistic document, and nationalists have not hesitated to use it in
attacking their enemies both at home and abroad.
“An era ended with the death of Getulio Vargas. For nearly a generation,
he had guided, directly or indirectly, the course of Brazilian development.
During those years Brazilian nationalism began to follow a more
economically oriented course, its leadership passed from the hands of the
intellectuals to the government, and its base of support expanded. In the
meantime, an entirely new school of nationalists, imbued with the
ideology of economic development and accustomed to the government? s
role in fostering and directing nationalism, had emerged. “
IB HL History
Notes on Vargas
Mr. Blackmon
Page 22
Works Cited
Burns, Bradford, Nationalism in Brazil: A Historical Survey, 72-89 Getulio Vargas and Econo
mic
Nation
alism..
Compi
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Daniel
W.
Black
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CDRom.
Septem
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2002.
Coral
Gables
, FL:
Coral
Gables
Sr.,
2002.
Burns, E. Bradford. A History of Brazil. 2nd Edition. NY: Columbia University Press, 1980.
Collier, David. “Overview of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model.” The New Authoritariani
sm in Latin
America. Ed.
David Collier.
Princeton:
New Jersey:
Princton
University
Press, 1979.
Pp. 19-33.
Collier, Simon, ed.,et al. The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Latin America and the Caribbean,
Compiler Daniel W. Blackmon. CD-Rom. September 2002. Coral Gables, FL: Coral
Gables Sr., 2002.
IB HL History
Notes on Vargas
Mr. Blackmon
Page 23
Donghi, Tulio Halperin. The Contemporary History of Latin America. Edited and Translated
John Charles Chasteen. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993.
Fausto, Boris. A Concise History of Brazil. Translated by Arthur Brakel. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Hubert Herring - A History of Latin America, 759-768 The Dictatorship of Getulio Vargas,
1930-45. Compiler Daniel W. Blackmon. CD-Rom. September 2002. Coral Gables, FL:
Coral Gables Sr., 2002.
Keen, Benjamin. A Short History of Latin America. Compiler Daniel W. Blackmon. CD-Rom.
September 2002. Coral Gables, FL: Coral Gables Sr., 2002.
Lambert, Jacques. Latin America: Social Structure and Political Institutions. Translated Helen
Katel. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
Skidmore, Thomas and Smith, Peter H. Modern Latin America. 4th Edition. NY: Oxford
University Press, 1997.