Document #1
29 January 2010
CONTINGENCY MEDIA TALKING POINTS
Background (NOT FOR MEDIA RELEASE)
Media reported on 18 January that an Afghan community leader in Australia
claimed that a boat carrying 105 Afghan persons seeking to enter Australia had
left Indonesia on 2 October 2009 and had not arrived. Several of the media
reports carried the comment that Australian Government agencies had no
knowledge of such a boat.
All media enquiries on this topic should be referred to Customs and Border
Protection.
Talking Points
•
People smuggling operations place vulnerable people in unsafe vessels
for a long and hazardous journey to Australia.
•
Working with other agencies, Border Protection Command detects
reports and responds to threats in the offshore maritime area – including
people smuggling.
When did you find out about the vessel?
Customs and Border Protection was monitoring a number of potential vessel
departures from Indonesia to Australia in late September – early October 2009.
Information received on 3 October suggested that a maritime-based people
smuggling vessel may have left Indonesia on 2 October and experienced some
difficulties the following day. Subsequent credible information received later
that day indicated that these difficulties had been resolved.
What steps did you take on receiving this information?
Upon receiving the reports of a vessel in distress, Customs and Border
Protection provided the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) with all
relevant information. AMSA is the agency responsible for coordinating search
and rescue operations in Australia’s Search and Rescue Zone.
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The Australian Government also communicated this information with the
Indonesian Government as the vessel was reportedly in Indonesia’s Search and
Rescue Zone.
Surveillance activities that day by Border Protection Command did not detect a
vessel in distress
What was the result of this action?
On 3 October, actions by the Indonesian authorities and Border Protection
Command surveillance did not detect a vessel in distress.
There has been no confirmation of the alleged vessel’s current location.
What are you doing to resolve this?
Customs and Border Protection will continue to seek information that may shed
light on the fate of the alleged vessel and its passengers.
Starting in November, Australian agencies received reports of people who may
have departed Indonesia on a vessel in October 2009 and have not arrived in
Australia.
If pressed:
Are the two incidents- missing boat and missing persons- related?
The missing vessel reported in the media on 18 January and the information
received and acted upon regarding a vessel in difficulty on 3 October may be
related, but not with certainty.
Prepared by Customs and Border Protection Communication and Media
Date 29 January 2010
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Drafted
Drafted by:
Name
Belinda Cole
Appointment
Media Manager
DATE
29/01/10
CLEARANCE
Drafted
Drafted by:
Clearance
Customs and Border
Protection
Customs and Border
Protection
Border Protection
Command
Name
Appointment
Michael Pezzullo
Appointment
DATE
Chief Operating Officer 29 Jan 2010
Marion Grant
Andrew Hudson
DATE
DCEO Border
Enforcement
A/G Director Policy,
Engagement and
Administration
29 Jan 2010
Appointment
DATE
29 Jan 2010
CONSULTED AGENCIES
Clearance
PMC
DIAC
DFAT
AFP
DEFENCE
AGs
For information:
Minister’s Office for
Home Affairs
Name
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s37(2)(b)
s33(a)
s37(2)(b)
s33(a)
s37(1)(b)
s33(a)
s37(1)(b)
s33(a)
s33(a)
s33(a)
s33(a)
s37(2)(b)
s37(2)(b)
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s47F
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s47F
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
rccaus@arnsa gov au
Saturday, 3 October 2009 15 51
Border Protection Operations
VESSEL IN DISTRESS
Importance:
I ow
R 030548Z OCT 2009
FM RCC AUSTRALIA
TO BASARNAS EX (EMAIL: BASARNAS@INDO NET ID) BASARNAS EX (FAX 0011622134832884) BASARNAS
EX (FAX. 001162215501513) INFO COASTWATCH (AMSOC) CANBERRA (EMAIL:
[email protected] ) EXEC MANAGERS AMSA (EMAIL [email protected] AU) AUSSAR RCC
CHIEFS (EMAIL AUSSARCHIEFS@MAIL AMSA GOV AU) BT
SUBJ. VESSEL IN DISTRESS
AUSSAR 2009/6890
MARABAHAYA
RCC AUSTRALIA HAS RECEIVED A DISTRESS MESSAGE FROM AN UNKNOWN VESSEL:
NAME
CALLSIGN
MMSI
406 MHZ DISTRESS BEACON
INMARSAT NUMBER
UNKNOWN
UNKNOWN
UNKNOWN
UNKNOWN
UNKNOWN
IN POSITION 06 55S 104 58E AT 030210UTC (NEAR SUNDA STRAIT, 15NMS OFFSHORE JAVA)
AS THIS POSITION IS WITHIN THE INDONESIAN SEARCH AND RESCUE REGION. REQUEST BASARNAS
JAKARTA ASSUME COORDINATION FOR THIS INCIDENT
REQUEST HARDCOPY CONFIRMATION FROM BASARNAS JAKARTA THAT COORDINATION IS WITH
BASARNAS JAKARTA. PLEASE RESPOND IN ENGLISH.
RCC AUSTRALIA TELAH MENERIMA (SINYAL BAHAYA (DARURAT)/PERMINTAAN UNTUK BANTUAN) DARI
(KAPAUPESAWAT TERBANG) DENGAN IDENTITAS
NAMA
NAMA PANGGILAN (CALLSIGN)
MMSI
406 MHZ SINYAL (RAMBU) DARURAT (DISTRESS BEACON)
INMARSAT NOMOR
UNKNOWN
UNKNOWN
UNKNOWN
UNKNOWN
UNKNOWN
LETAKNYA GARIS LINTANG 06 55S, GARIS BUJUR 104 58E AT PADA 030210UTC (NEAR SUNDA STRAIT,
15NMS OFFSHORE JAVA)
KARENA LETAKNYA KAPAUPESAWAT TERBANG TSB ADA DI DALAM KAWASAN SRR INDONESIA KAMI
MINTA SUPAYA BASARNAS JAKARTA MENGAMBIL ALIH TANGGUNG JAWAB UNTUK MENOKOORDINASIKAN
KEOIATAN SAR
KAMI MINTA KETERANGAN SECARA TERTULIS DARI BASARNAS JAKARTA YANG MENKONFORMASIKAN
BAHWA BASARNAS JAKARTA TELAH MENGAMBIL ALIH TANGGUN JAWAB.
TOLONG BALAS SURAT INI DENGAN MEMAKAI BAHASA iNGGERIS
REGARDS
RCC AUSTRALIA
BT
If you have received this transmission in error please note that that error does not constitute waiver of any
confidentiality. privil ege or copyright in respect of information in the e-mail or attachments and any use of this material
RELEASED
UNDER
THEall FOI
ACT
1982 and attachments Page 1
is prohibited. Please notify
the sender by return
email and delete
copies of
this transmission
Document #5
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Document #6
s47F
s47F
s47F
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;
= P'.4 W. : 02174 r.732P4
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200:: j$ :
P:
INDONESIAN SAR AGENCY
RADAN SAR NASIONAL
3' FLOOR, JL MEDAPi MERDEKA T1MUR 5
JAKARTA PUSAT 10110 - INDONESIA
TO
ATTN
PHONE
FAX
L
I FROM
: RCC AUSTRALIA
: DUTY OFFICER
: +61 2 6230 6811
: +61 2 6230 6868
i PHONE
I FAX
: BASARNAS
: 62-21 34832901
:
62-21 34832884
,
J DATE: OKT 03, 2,009
NUMBER OF PAGE : 1 (ONE)
SUBJECT : SMUGGLING VESSEL
NO.
2243 SAR/ 0909
MESSAGE
AAA REFERING YOUR MESSAGES DATED 03 OKT, 2009 0309 UTC,
JAKARTA SAR OFFICE HAS BEEN COORDINATING WITH
INDONESIAN NAVY AND THE COASTAL RADIO STATION THERE
IS NO ACCIDENT AT THAT POSITION.
BBB THANK YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND COORDINATION.
REGDS,
PU
Duty Officer
348329 01
62- 21- 343328 79
EMERGENCY 62 21 352 1111
TELEPHONE :
FAX
: 62-21-3483 2884
EMAIL : bmgirua$ indo..nctid
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Australian Government
Auserellas Oreisees Service
Bonier Protection Comiread
TELEPHON. MESSAGE
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Client Response
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CC Border Protection ON CC Border Protection BR
0 CC EOC
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0 CC AFMA
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s47F
s47F
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Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
Key Issue
9
Missing Suspected Irregular Entry Vessel
Issues
Media reported on 18 January that an Afghan community leader in Australia claimed that a boat
carrying 105 Afghan persons seeking to enter Australia had left Indonesia on 2 October 2009 and
had not arrived. Several of the media reports carried the comment that Australian Government
agencies had no knowledge of such a boat.
Talking points
• I am aware of media reports on 18 January that an Afghan community leader in Australia
claimed that a boat carrying 105 Afghan persons seeking to enter Australia had left Indonesia
on 2 October 2009 and had not arrived.
• I note that several of the media reports carried the comment that Australian Government
agencies had no knowledge of such a boat.
• At the time of the reported incident Australian Government agencies were working with
overseas partners to monitor a number of Potential Irregular Immigrant ventures to Australia.
The information available on these ventures did not definitively indicate points of departure or
arrival for vessels, nor potential departure or arrival times.
• Nevertheless, Australian agencies acted on information received on 3 October that indicated a
boat, possibly en route to Christmas Island, was in distress. Although the location of this
vessel was unclear, it appeared to be in the Indonesian Search and Rescue Region.
• Australian agencies passed this information on to their Indonesian partners. The relevant
Indonesian authority (BASARNAS) advised on 3 October that it was unable to identify a
vessel in distress in the relevant area. Subsequent surveillance activities that day by Border
Protection Command did not detect a vessel in distress.
• Following further information that the vessel was no longer in distress late on 3 October,
Border Protection Command assets continued to monitor the Christmas Island approaches.
They did not detect a vessel fitting that description in the subsequent days and Australian
Government agencies received no further information on the vessel in October.
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• In November, Australian agencies began receiving reports of people who had allegedly
departed Indonesia in October, on a vessel that had not arrived in Australia. Checks on
Christmas Island and with international organisations overseas have failed to identify these
individuals.
• We do not know for certain the fate of the vessel that was potentially targeting Christmas
Island. We hope that it turned back to Indonesia.
• The circumstances of this case demonstrate clearly that the Government must continue its
efforts to deter, disrupt and detect maritime people smuggling ventures – ventures that often
see vulnerable people put on unsafe vessels for the long and hazardous journey to Australia.
IF NEEDED
• Once the likely location of the vessel was determined, Australian authorities requested that
the Indonesian search and rescue authorities assume responsibility for coordinating actions as
the location was in their Search and Rescue Region.
• The Indonesian authorities accepted responsibility and advised later on 3 October that no
search and rescue situation existed in the advised location.
IF ASKED (Response to community concerns)
• A framework is in place to ensure that community concerns regarding possible missing
vessels, believed to be linked to people smuggling, are dealt with responsively.
• All information received by agencies regarding possible missing vessels is communicated to a
central point within Customs and Border Protection. This in turn enables whole-ofgovernment consideration and informs the government's response to that information.
• Customs and Border Protection, including Border Protection Command, have long standing
arrangements with Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA). Where there is
information to suggest that a venture may possibly be in distress, such information is referred
to AMSA as the competent agency to undertake search and rescue activities as AMSA
consider appropriate.
• With regards to the possible missing vessel of 02 October 2009, I am advised the Department
of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) has interviewed community members that contacted
the agency regarding the vessel. I understand DIAC subsequently made inquiries to determine
whether their relatives were already in Australia.
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• I further understand DIAC advised the members of the community that their relatives were
not in Australia and have implemented a mechanism so, should relatives arrive in Australia,
the relatives will be advised that a community member holds concerns for their safety. I refer
you to DIAC should you seek further detail on activity undertaken by that agency.
• Customs and Border Protection has received an enquiry from a concerned community
member. In its response, Customs and Border Protection requested that if the community
member receives more information that may help us to locate the possible missing vessel or
those on board to provide it via the Customs and Border Protection Hotline as soon as
possible.
Cleared by: Jeff Buckpitt, National Director, Intelligence and Targeting Division
Action officer: s47F
s47F
Work:
6275 6750
Work:
s47F
s47F
Home:
Home:
s47F
Mobile: s47F
Mobile:
05 February 2010
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Background
At the time of the reported disappearance of the boat in October 2009, Australian agencies were
working with Indonesian partners to identify and disrupt several Potential Irregular Immigrant
ventures. This included the venture that has become known as the Merak boat – the vessel carrying
255 Sri Lankans intercepted by Indonesia authorities in early October 2009.
Intelligence reporting on potential ventures at the time came from multiple sources, but was limited
in nature, often incomplete and with little corroboration of the pieces of information available. The
reporting was not often definitive on points of departure or arrival for vessels, nor on potential
departure or arrival times.
Consequently, agencies had a quite confused picture of potential ventures being mounted from
Indonesia. It was in this context that reports were received of a vessel in distress. The nature of the
information received did not allow agencies to form a definitive view of where the distress situation
may have been. At one point there were three potential locations reported where the vessel may
have been in distress, in difficulty or had simply lost its way.
One piece of information on 3 October indicated a boat in distress which appeared to have
Christmas Island as its intended arrival point. The location of this vessel was unclear, however, it
appeared to be in the Indonesian Search and Rescue Region.
As the information developed, it became clear that there may have been a safety of life at sea
(SOLAS) situation. The nearest Australian Government vessel was some 360 nautical miles from
the likely location. Once the Suspected Irregular Entry Vessel’s (SIEV) location was clearer,
Border Protection Command provided advice on the situation to the Australian Maritime Safety
Authority. This occurred within four hours of the initial report of distress.
The Australian Maritime Safety Authority immediately passed the likely location information to its
Indonesian counterpart BASARNAS requesting that it assume coordination for any search and
rescue.
BASARNAS reported back the same day that it had coordinated actions in the area with the
Indonesian navy and with the Indonesian Coastal Radio Station and that there was no distress
incident in the location provided.
Concurrently with the Indonesian action to mount a search and rescue response, Border Protection
Command deployed a surveillance aircraft to monitor maritime activity along the likely track of the
vessel. Despite indications late on 3 October that the vessel was again underway, the Border
Protection Command surveillance activities (both airborne and surface) did not detect a vessel of
interest that day – nor subsequent days.
Potentially relevant information received between 5 and 10 October was again inconclusive on the
status of the venture and the intended arrival point. However, the Australian Federal Police passed
information concerning the vessel to Indonesian partners to assist with locating it.
There was no further information received on the suspect vessel targeting Christmas Island in the
month of October. Agencies continued to watch for the suspect vessel until 29 October when the
decision was taken to cease active monitoring of it, as a period of over three weeks would have
been ample time for the vessel to make its way to Christmas Island.
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Starting in November and continuing into December, the Department of Immigration and
Citizenship was approached by individuals claiming to know persons who had been on a vessel that
had departed Indonesia in early October and had not arrived in Australia. The Department
undertook checks at Christmas Island and through Posts overseas to attempt to determine whether
the named individuals were being processed on Christmas Island or were still overseas. These
checks were not able to identify the named individuals.
In addition, the Australian Federal Police received information in early December suggesting that a
vessel had not arrived. Once again, checks to identify potential passengers who might already be on
Christmas Island were inconclusive.
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IN-CONFIDENCE
QUESTION TIME BRIEF
TAB ^No^
Missing Suspected Irregular Entry Vessel
Media reported on 18 January that an Afghan community leader in Australia claimed that a boat carrying
105 Afghan persons seeking to enter Australia had left Indonesia on 2 October 2009 and had not arrived.
Several of the media reports carried the comment that Australian Government agencies had no knowledge of
such a boat.
Key messages
•
A vessel may have departed Indonesia on 2 October and met with difficulties enroute to Christmas Island. That vessel did not arrive in Australia, though the exact
fate of the vessel remains unknown.
•
At the time of the reported incident, Australian government agencies were working with overseas
partners to monitor a number of Potential Irregular Immigrant ventures to Australia. The
information available on these ventures did not definitively indicate points of departure or arrival
for vessels, nor potential departure or arrival times.
•
Nevertheless, Australian agencies acted on a credible piece of information received on 3 October
that indicated a boat was in distress. This vessel appeared to have Christmas Island as its
intended arrival point. The location of this vessel was unclear. However, it appeared to be in the
Indonesian Search and Rescue Region.
•
Australian agencies passed this information on to their Indonesian partners. The relevant
Indonesian authority (BASARNAS) advised on 3 October that they were unable to identify a
vessel in distress in the relevant area. Subsequent surveillance activities that day by Border
Protection Command did not detect a vessel in distress.
•
Following further credible information that the vessel was no longer in distress late on 3 October,
Border Protection Command assets continued to monitor the Christmas Island approaches. They
did not detect a vessel fitting that description in the subsequent days and Australian Government
agencies received no further information on the vessel in October.
•
In November Australian agencies began receiving reports of people who had allegedly departed
Indonesia on a vessel in October that had not arrived in Australia. Checks on Christmas Island
and with international organisations overseas have failed to identify the individuals.
•
We do not know for certain the fate of this vessel that was potentially targeting Christmas
Island. We hope that it turned back to Indonesia.
•
The circumstances of this case demonstrate clearly that the Government must continue its
efforts to deter, disrupt and detect maritime people smuggling ventures– ventures that often see
vulnerable people put on unsafe vessels for the long and hazardous journey to Australia.
Cleared by:
Jeff Buckpitt, National Director, Intelligence and Targeting Division
28 January 2010
Work: 6275 6750
Mobile: s47F
Action Officer:
s47F
s47F
Date Created:
27 January 2010
Date Reviewed:
28 January 2009
Equivalent MOB ref number: ^MOB reference number^
IN-CONFIDENCE
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Page 1
Document #11
IN-CONFIDENCE
Background
At the time of the reported disappearance of the boat in October 2009, Australian agencies were working
with Indonesian partners to identify and disrupt several Potential Irregular Immigrant ventures. This
includes the venture that has become known as the Merak boat – the vessel carrying 255 Sri Lankans
intercepted by Indonesia authorities in early October 2009.
Intelligence reporting on potential ventures at the time came from multiple sources, but was limited in
nature, often incomplete and with little corroboration of the pieces of information available. The reporting
was not often definitive on points of departure or arrival for vessels, nor on potential departure or arrival
times.
Consequently, agencies had a quite confused picture of potential ventures being mounted from Indonesia. It
was in this context that reports were received of a vessel in distress. The nature of the information received
did not allow agencies to form a definitive view of where the distress situation may have been. At one point,
there were three potential locations reported where the vessel may have been in distress, in difficulty or had
simply lost its way
Nevertheless, Australian agencies acted on the most credible information that they received. One piece of
information on 3 October indicated a boat in distress which appeared to have Christmas Island as its
intended arrival point. The location of this vessel was unclear; however, it appeared to be in the Indonesian
Search and Rescue Region.
As the information developed, it became clear that there may have been a safety of life at sea situation. The
nearest Australian Government vessel was some 360 nautical miles from the likely location. Once the
Suspected Irregular Entry Vessel’s (SIEV) location was clearer, Border Protection Command provided
advice on the situation to the Australian Maritime Safety Authority. This occurred within four hours of the
initial report of distress.
The Australian Maritime Safety Authority immediately passed the likely location information to its
Indonesian counterpart BASARNAS requesting that it assume coordination for any search and rescue.
BASARNAS reported back the same day that it had coordinated actions in the area with the Indonesian navy
and with the Indonesian Coastal Radio Station and that there was no distress incident in the location
provided.
Concurrently with the Indonesian action to mount a search and rescue response, Border Protection
Command deployed a surveillance aircraft to monitor maritime activity along the likely track of the vessel.
Despite indications late on 3 October that the vessel was again underway, the Border Protection Command
surveillance activities (both airborne and surface) did not detect a vessel of interest that day – nor subsequent
days.
Potentially relevant information received between 5 and 10 October was again inconclusive on the status of
the venture and the intended arrival point. However, the Australian Federal Police passed information
concerning the vessel to Indonesian Partners to assist with locating it.
There was no further information received on the suspect vessel targeting Christmas Island in the month of
October. Agencies continued to watch for the suspect vessel until 29 October when the decision was taken
to cease active monitoring of it, as a period of over three weeks would have been ample time for the vessel
to make its way to Christmas Island.
Starting in November and continuing into December, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship was
approached by individuals claiming to know persons who had been on a vessel that had departed Indonesia
in early October and had not arrived in Australia. The Department undertook checks at Christmas Island and
IN-CONFIDENCE
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IN-CONFIDENCE
through Posts overseas to attempt to determine whether the named individuals were being processed on
Christmas Island or were still overseas. These checks were not able to identify the named individuals.
In addition, the Australian Federal Police received information in early December suggesting that a vessel
had not arrived. Once again, checks to identify potential passengers who might already be on Christmas
Island were inconclusive.
IN-CONFIDENCE
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s7(2A)
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s37(1)(b)&(c)
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s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)
s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)
s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)
s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)
s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)
s33(a)(i)
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s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)
s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)
s33(a)(i) & s33(b)
s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)
s37(1)(b)&(c)
s37(1)(b)&(c)
s7(2A)
s33(a)(i)
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s33(a)(i)
s33(a)(i)
s33(a)(i)
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s47B(a)&(b)
s7(2A)
s33(a)(i)
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s33(a)(i)
s7(2A)
s33(a)(i), s33(b) & s37(2)(b)
s37(1)(b)&(c)
s33(a)(i), s33(b), s37(1)(b)&(c) & 37(2)(b)
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s33(a)(i)
s33(a)(i), s33(b), s37(1)(b)&(c) & 37(2)(b)
s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)
s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)
s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)
s33(a)(i), s33(b), s37(1)(b)&(c) & s37(2)(b)
s37(1)(b)&(c)
s37(1)(b)&(c)
s37(1)(b)&(c)
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s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)
s33(a)(i), s37(1)(b)&(c) & s37(2)(b)
s37(1)(b)&(c)
s33(a)(i)
s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)
s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)
s33(a)(i) & s37(2)(b)
s33(a)(i)
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s33(a)(i)
s37(1)(b)&(c)
s37(1)(b)&(c)
s37(1)(b)&(c)
s37(1)(b)&(c)
s7(2A)
s7(2A)
s33(a)(i)
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