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11-1993
Regional Subcultures of the United States
Joel A. Lieske
Cleveland State University, [email protected]
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Copyright 1993 Cambridge University Press. Available on publisher's site at
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Original Citation
Lieske, Joel. 1993. "Regional Subcultures of the United States." Journal of Politics 55:888-913.
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Lieske, Joel A., "Regional Subcultures of the United States" (1993). Political Science Faculty Publications. 11.
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RegionalSubcultures
of the UnitedStates
Joel Lieske
ClevelandState University
This study develops the case, theory, and statisticalmethodologyfor a new measureof American
regionalsubcultures.Using principalcomponentand cluster analysison some 45 measuresof racial
origin, ethnic ancestry,religiousaffiliation,and social structure,I show how the entire populationof
U.S. counties can be partitionedinto 10 distinctive,regionalsubculturesthat are relativelyhomogeneous and contiguous. Next, I identify the culturalcharacteristicsof each subcultureand relate my
new classificationscheme to the work of Elazar,Gastil, Garreau,and Fischer. Finally, I comparethe
relativeutility of this new measurewith Elazar'stypology in explainingthe variationin a numberof
social,political,and policy indicators.
More work, in our view, needs to be done, to ascertain whether the cultural clusters that
Elazar designates do indeed exist (either at the mass or elite level). This step, it seems to
us, should precede attempts to link public policy outputs with political cultures. Unfortunately most workhas startedwith the second step and assumedthe first. (Thompson, Ellis, and
Wildavsky1990, 245)
]wenty-seven years ago, Elazar(1984) advanceda revolutionarynew theory of
American regional subcultures.This new theory was designed to help explain
variationsin the politicalprocesses,institutionalstructures,politicalbehavior,and
policies and programsof state and local government.In short, Elazararguedthat
subculturaldifferencescould help us understand:(1) what state and local governments do, (2) how they are organized,(3) what political rules they observe, and
(4) who participatesin the politicalprocess(Pressand VerBurg1983).
To expedite this task, Elazardeveloped a geopoliticalmapping of the United
States that classifiesstates and local regions into one or a combinationof three
political subcultures:individualistic,moralistic,and traditionalistic.In Elazar's
typology, there are a total of nine differentsubculturalclassificationsthat represent dominantand subordinatecombinationsof his three "core"subcultures.His
mappingincludessome 50 stateand 224 substatedesignations.
Since Elazaradvancedhis theory,other scholarshave developedtheir own cultural classificationschemes and produced their own cultural mappings of the
This study owes a heavy intellectualdebt to Dan Elazar,AaronWildavsky,and my departedfriend
and colleague,Tom Flinn. None of these individuals,of course,bearsany responsibilityfor any errors
of analysisor interpretation.I also wish to thank Elazar,the Center for the Study of Federalismat
Temple University,and ClevelandState Universityfor their financialsupportof my research.
Vol. 55, No. 4, November 1993,Pp. 888-913
C 1993by the Universityof Texas Press
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS,
RegionalSubculturesof the United States
889
United States (Luttbeg 1971;Zelinsky 1973;Gastil 1975; Garreau1981;Morgan
and England 1987).However,Luttbeg's(1971) and Morganand England's(1987)
classificationschemesare the only mappingsbasedon replicable,statisticalprocedures. And Elazar's(1984) typology is the only one that has been subjected to
extensiveempiricaltests.
In reviewingthis literature,Kincaidand I (1991)identifyapproximately100 studies that have subjectedElazar'sthesis or a subculturalvariationto empiricaltests
(e.g., Sharkansky1969; Weber and Shaffer 1972; Johnson 1976; Joslyn 1980;
Lowery and Sigelman 1982; Herzik 1985; Fitzpatrickand Hero 1988; Nardulli
1990;Morganand Watson 1991;Dran, Albritton,and Wyckoff 1991). But as we
note, one of the most frequentcriticismsmade of this developingliteratureconcerns the difficultiesof measuringpoliticalculture. It is well-knownthat Elazar's
derivationof the three politicalsubculturesis not basedon any rigorousstatistical
procedures.Neither are his geopoliticaldesignationsbased on any empiricaldata,
other than historicalmigrationpatterns, personalfield observations,interviews,
and scholarlystudies of America'sregions2_sections,and ethnoreligiousgroups.
Moreover, Elazarhas not adjustedhis mapping of the three subculturesfor the
pervasivecultural changes that have occurred in Americansociety. Indeed, his
conceptof "culturalgeology"allowsfor overlayand change.But his stateand substateclassificationsare the same todayas they were 27 yearsago.
Yet anothercriticism of Elazar'sclassificationscheme is the crudeness of his
state and regionaldesignations.Accordingto Elazar(1970, 236), politicalculture
can be definedas the persistent,generationalpatternsof politicalattitudes,values,
beliefs, and behaviorthat characterizea group of people who live in geographical
proximity.But what constitutes distinctivesubculturesis often a very subjective
judgment.And when the geographicalboundariesof a subcultureinclude entire
states or large substate regions, there is not a great deal of empiricalprecision.
Since the county is the basic unit of state government,it would seem desirableto
develop measures that differentiateAmericansubculturesat least down to the
county level.
A final criticism of many culturalclassificationschemes, including Elazar's,is
their circularity.Thus, it is often alleged that Elazar'stypology relies, in part, on
informationabout past politicalbehaviorto predictcurrentor future politicalbehavior. To get around this difficulty, Kincaid and I (1991) have proposed the
developmentof new subculturalmeasuresexclusively based on what Elazarhas
called the "sources"of political culture such as racial origin, ethnic ancestry,
religious affiliation, and social structure. This focus would exclude from the
and "effects"of
derivationof any new measuresthe confounding"manifestations"
culture,i.e., politicalbehaviorand institutionalarrangements.
The purposeof this study is to developand analyzea new measureof American
subculturethat has these properties:
1. It is derivablefrom an explicit and replicableset of mathematicaland statistical
algorithms.
Joel Lieske
890
2. It reflectscurrentculturalconditions.
3. It distinguishessubculturaldifferencesdown to the countylevel.
4. It is basedentirelyon "nonpolitical"measuresof Americanculture.
To achievethese objectives,I will firstdiscuss the theoreticallogic thatundergirds
my new measure.Next I will present the statisticalmethodologyon which it is
based. After this, I will discuss the distinguishing characteristicsof each subculture and relate my classificationscheme to the work of Elazar(1984), Gastil
(1975), Garreau(1981), and Fischer (1989). Finally, since Elazar'stypologyis the
only one that has been subjectedto extensiveempiricalanalysis,I will test the empiricalutility of my new measurerelativeto his. This will be done by comparing
their relativeability to explain the variationin a number of social, political, and
policy indicators.
A MODELOF AMERICANREGIONALSUBCULTURES
As Kincaid and I (1991) argue elsewhere,1the peoples who settled the United
States came with distinctive ethnoreligiousidentities, cultural preferences,and
ways of life (Fischer 1989). In most cases, these traditions shaped both their
choices of and responsesto the environment.Generally,groupssettled in clusters,
not as randomlydispersedindividuals.And as they pushed inland,as in the westward migrationof British-Americansacross the entire continent, they took with
them and transmittedto future generationsthe values, beliefs, attitudes, and
behaviorof their forebears(Holbrook 1950). Moreover, given the pervasiveness
of local self-goverment that constituted the Americandemocraticexperiment,
groups could give significantsocial and politicalexpressionto their culturalpreferenceswithin geographicallydefinedpoliticaljurisdictions,namely,towns, townships, cities, and counties (Kincaid 1982). This gave an advantageto the early
settlers who founded the first local and state governments(Zelinsky 1973; Gastil
1975). Unless they could numericallyoverwhelmthese earlysettlers,laterarrivals
had to contend with and adapt themselves to existing social and political power
structures.
Based on this historicalrecord,Americansubculturesshould be dispersed,but
not balkanized,acrossthe countryin explicablepatternsor mosaicsthat are rooted
in political jurisdictions.In addition, single subculturesor distinctive multicultural blends should be found in most local jurisdictionsbecausemost states were
settled and developedby diversegroupsthat clusteredgeographicallywithin substate regions. Finally, the continuityand persistenceof these local subculturesis
predicatedon two characteristicfeaturesof Americansocial and politicalculture:
ethnoreligioussocializationand federaldemocracy.
For most Americans,socializationoccurs within the ethnoreligiouskinshipand
neighborhoodties of small and medium-size jurisdictions.Even in large cities,
' This section drawson the ideasand contributionsof John Kincaidto this paper.
RegionalSubculturesof the United States
891
ethnoreligiousgroups tend to cluster in neighborhoodsand ethnic enclaves, the
so-called "turfs"of urban society, if not also in precincts, wards, and legislative
districts. Thus, unless the mix of ethnoreligiousgroups changes or a dominant
group is displaced,the prevailingsubcultureis containedwithin a bounded set of
economic and social relationshipsthat can be communicatedacross generations
(Kincaid1980;Lieske 1990).
Federaldemocracy,in turn, has long entailedsubstantiallocal self-government
and therefore has served, until recently, to bolster local autonomyand control.
This has enabled jurisdictionallybased subculturesto institutionalizetheir cultural preferences,as reflectedin local control of law enforcementpracticesand
state controlof social welfareservices.Currenttrendsin the federalsystem, however, both constrainand expand the abilityof state and local governmentsto give
expressionto their culturalpreferencesin public institutionsand policies. On the
one hand, there has been an unprecedentedincreasesince the 1960sin the federal
preemptionof state and local powersand federalmandatingof stateand local policies (Kincaid 1990). On the other hand, the federal governmenthas restored,or
continued to allow, state and local discretionin a number of areas,such as "the
new judicialfederalism."Under this doctrinestate courts may rely on their state
constitutionsto grantbroaderprotectionsin the culturallysensitiveareaof rights
than the U.S. Supreme Court is willing to grant under the federalConstitution
(Collins,Galie, and Kincaid 1986).
In sum, patternsof settlement and local self-governancein the United States
have nurtured the evolution and developmentof jurisdictionallybased subcultures. Thus, differentethnoreligiousgroups,interactingwith their environments,
have been able to translatetheir cultural preferencesinto relativelystable social
relationships within substantiallyself-governing jurisdictions. These relationships, in turn, reinforcethe dominantculturalpreferencesin an areaand provide
bounded nests for enduringpatternsof socialization,communication,and action.
At the same time, migration, pluralism, Americanization,and diverse frontier
conditions created different culturalmixes and responses, thereby giving rise to
subculturesrather than to the very distinct, territorial-basedcultures found in
countriessuch as India and Yugoslavia.Regionalsubcultures,then, are the products of historicalinteractionsbetween the culturalpreferencesof differentethnoreligious settler groups and the nationallycentripetaland regionallycentrifugal
demands of their environments.Therefore, they representthe historicalextensions of earliersettlementpatternsand the continuingadvantagesof the first effective settler groups (i.e., the founding groups) over later arrivals(i.e., newer
groups)who are placedin the culturallysubordinateposition of challengingsocial
conventionsand tradition.
Following Wildavsky's (1987) concept of "general"culture, as opposed to
Elazar's(1970) concept of "political"culture,I view a subcultureas a "wayof life"
and system of sharedvalues that legitimatea preferredset of social relationships.
Conceptually, cultural preferences are derived from the learning that occurs
892
Joel Lieske
within the web of socialrelationshipsin which people are embeddedand on which
they are especiallydependentduring their formativeyears.Accordingto Dreitzel
(1977) and Wildavsky(1987), a culture shapes preferencesby answeringthree
fundamentalquestions:(1) Who am I? (2) How should I behave?and (3) What is
legitimate?Thus, culture provides individuals with their basic social identities
(the identity function), norms for socially acceptablebehavior (the boundarymaintenancefunction),and standardsfor judgingsocialinstitutions(the legitimating function).Presumably,these functionsare realizedprimarilythroughpeople's
racialand ethnic kinshipties, religiousor secularvaluesystems,and social waysof
life and life-styles. Conceptually,these socializingagents define the culturalcontext, or subculture,that shapesindividualpreferencesand behavior.
In figure 1, I present a causal frameworkdepicting these assumptions.In this
model, racial-ethnicancestriesand religiousaffiliationsare assumedto be the primarycarriersof subculturaldifferences(Elazar1970). Throughouthistory, social
differenceshave been defined largelyby differencesin racial-ethnicand religious
background.Raceand ethnicityrepresentthe accumulatedlearningor historyof a
people who share a common ancestralidentity and usually a languageor dialect.
FIGURE 1
A SUBCULTURAL MODEL OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
Social
Structure
Race-Ethnic
Ancestry\
Social and
Political
Behavior
Religious
Affiliation
Regional
Subculture
RegionalSubculturesof the United States
893
Religion is a formalbelief system that endeavorsto organizesocial relationships
accordingto its tenets.
Social structures,in turn, serve to define alternativeways of life or social lifestyles. They representthe institutionalizedsocial preferencesof different racialethnic and religious groups. However, they also reflect the influence of certain
environmentalconstraints,such as geography,climate, and the local economy.
Thus, the work of many cultural theorists (Elazar 1970; Kleppner 1970; Gastil
1975;Garreau1981;Fischer 1989;Leege, Lieske, and Wald 1991) and behavioral
researchers(Lazarsfeld,Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Laswell and Kaplan 1950;
Campbell,Converse,Miller, and Stokes 1960) suggests that many differencesin
social life-style result from a mix of ethnoreligious,environmental,and economic
conditions.These include: (1) the advanceof urbanizationand industrialization,
(2) the persistenceof agrariantraditions,(3) populationmobility,(4) social status,
(5) socialinequality,(6) familystructure,(7) life cycle, and (8) culturalhomogeneity.
To the extent social relationshipsembody the institutionalizedsocial preferences
of differentracial-ethnicand religiousgroups,they constitutea culture'spreferred
way of life. Finally,a regionalsubculturecan be conceptualizedas a weightedsum
of the racial-ethnicidentifications,religious attachments,and social relationships
thatcharacterizea groupof individualswho live in geographicalproximity.
Data andMethod
The sampleconsists of all 3,164 U.S. counties. The data were drawnfrom the
1980census and the 1980 Glenmary(1982) surveyof Americanchurchbodies. To
representthe variablesin the culturalmodel, I selected 5 indicatorsof racialorigin, 11 indicatorsof ethnic ancestry,14 indicatorsof religiousaffiliation,and 15 indicators of social structure. The racial and ethnic indicatorscontain the major
groups tabulatedin the 1980 census; while the religious indicatorsembracethe
13 largestChristiandenominationsin the United States plus conservativeand reform Judaism. About 99 million Americans,or 43.7% of the total populationin
1980, are affiliatedwith these churchbodies. Accordingto estimatesdevelopedby
Wald (1987), this figure represents85.8% of all church membersin the United
States. Finally, the structuralindicatorswere selected to measure differencesin
the factorshypothesizedto have the greatestinfluencein defining social ways of
life and life-styles.
The five racialindicatorsinclude:(1) percent white, (2) percentblack, (3) perThe
cent Asian, (4) percentNative American,and (5) percent Spanish-speaking.2
11 ethnic indicatorsinclude: (1) percent British, (2) percent German,(3) percent
Irish, (4) percentFrench, (5) percentItalian,(6) percentSlavic, (7) percentScandinavian,(8) percent Russian, (9) percent Hungarian,(10) percent Portuguese,
and (11) percentGreek.The 14 religiousindicatorsinclude:(1) percent Catholic,
2Strictly speaking, Spanish-speakingis not a racial but a linguistic designation, since Spanishspeakingcan be of any group. However, most Spanish-speakingAmericansare thought to be mestizo,
i.e., of mixed Europeanand Native Americanancestry.
894
Joel Lieske
(2) percent Southern Baptist, (3) percent United Methodist, (4) percent United
Presbyterian,(5) percent Lutheran Church of America, (6) percent Episcopal,
(7) percent Mormon (The Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints),
(8) percent Missouri-SynodLutheran,(9) percent AmericanLutheran,(10) percent United Churchof Christ, (11) percentAmericanBaptist,(12) percentChristian (Disciples of Christ), (13) percent Southern Presbyterian,and (14) percent
conservativeor reformJudaism.
The 15 structuralindicatorsinclude:three measuresof urbanizationand industrialization(total population,percent urbanpopulation,and percent of the labor
force in manufacturingjobs); two indicatorsof agrarianism(percentof the labor
force in agrarianoccupationsand percentof the laborforcein naturalresourceoccupations);one indicatorof populationmobility(percentliving in the same house
in 1975);three indicatorsof socialstatus(percentof all people 25 and older with a
collegedegree,percentof the laborforcein managerialoccupations,and percentof
the laborforcein professionaloccupations);one indicatorof incomeinequality(the
index of dissimilarity,on a scale from0 to 1, in the distributionof income);two indicatorsof family structure(the percent of all families that are traditionaltwoparentand the percentof all femalesin the laborforce);two indicatorsof life cycle
(the percentof the populationaged 18-29 and the percentof the populationaged
65 and over);and one indicator(Lieske 1988)of culturalhomogeneity(an index of
homogeneity,on a scale from 0 to 1, in the distributionof the majorracialgroups
tabulatedin the 1980census-whites, blacks,Asians,and Native Americans).3
To classify the universeof counties on the basis of these 45 selected indicators,
I consideredseveralstatisticaltechniques.Perhapsthe two most commonlyused
approacheshave been the applicationof Q-factorand R-factoranalysisto selected
cultural measures (Luttbeg 1971; Savage 1973; Monroe 1977; Morgan and England 1987). In Q-factoranalysis,the datahaveto be transposedbeforecalculating
the correlationmatrix.The correlationsmeasurethe extent to which each pair of
units share common culturaltraits.The usual algorithmis to assign a unit to the
factor on which it has the highest absolutefactorloading. This technique, however, is indeterminant(i.e., not workable)when the numberof geographicalunits
that need to be classified(3,164) exceeds the number of indicatorsavailablefor
analysis(45).
Similarly, R-factor analysis is good for analyzing variablerelationshipsand
for purposes of data reduction. But by itself, it does not provide an objective
algorithmfor classifyingindividualunits. In R-factoranalysis,it is customaryto
classifyindividualunits on the basisof factorscores.However,this often turnsout
to be a very subjectiveexercisewhen counties have high absolutescores on more
than one factor. So how does one proceed?Since the concept of regional subcultureconnotes the idea of subculturalhomogeneity(basedon sharedvaluesand
3The indicatorof racialhomogeneityis included to measurethe relativeracialhomogeneityversus
heterogeneityof the population;while the five racialindicatorsare intendedto measurethe relativesize
or numericaldominanceof each racialgroup.
RegionalSubculturesof the United States
895
ways of life), one might try to group counties on the basis of common cultural
characteristics.
One well-knowntechnique for accomplishingthis objectiveis cluster analysis.
While there are a large numberof clusteringalgorithms,perhapsthe most useful
for largedatasets (from 100 to 100,000units) is a variationof a method developed
by Anderberg(1973). This method, called FASTCLUS, employs a techniqueof
classifyingor sortingunits on the basis of their spatialor Euclideandistanceto the
nearestclustercentroid.4First, a set of points called"clusterseeds"is selectedas a
first approximationto the means of the clusters.Next, each unit is assignedto the
nearestseed to form temporaryclusters. The means of these temporaryclusters
are then used to replacethe cluster seeds, and the process is repeatediteratively.
The iterationsstop when the conditionsset by the researcherare met and no further changesoccur in the clusters. These conditionsconcernsuch mattersas the
maximumnumberof clustersthat are allowed,the minimumnumberof units that
are permittedto define a separatecluster, and the convergencecriteriathat stop
the iterativeprocess(SAS 1985, 377-79).
Thus, FASTCLUS greatlyfacilitatesthe-executionof a disjointclusteranalysis
on the basis of Euclideandistancescomputedfrom one or more quantitativevariables. Unfortunately,the clustersare often difficultto interpret.And if thereare a
largenumberof groupingvariables,the clusteringprocessdoes not alwaysproduce
parsimonioussolutions.To circumventthese difficulties,I firstemployedprincipal
componentanalysiswith varimaxrotation.Like other factoranalytictechniques,
principalcomponentanalysiscan transformthe variationin a largenumberof indicatorsto a reducedset of factorswhosemeaningscan be easilyinferredfromthe indicatorswith the largestloadingcoefficients.An addedadvantageof this technique
is that the reducedset of factorsare unique and orthogonalto each other. Then I
used the derived factors(actuallyfactor scores) as input variablesto the cluster
analysis.The output fromthe clusteranalysisconsistsof countygroupingsor clusters (generallyfewerin numberthan the input factors)that sharecommoncultural
characteristics.To interpretand labelthese clusters(i.e., relatethem to the derived
factors),I first createddummy variablesfor each cluster. Thus, a county was assigneda valueof one if it belongedto a given cluster,zero otherwise.Then I correlated each of the clusterdummieswith the input factors.In this way, it is possible
to matchor associateeachclusterwith its definingfactor(s).
RESULTS
The results of first performinga principalcomponent analysison the 45 cultural indicators discussed earlier and then rotating them using the varimax method are presentedin table 1.5 The tabulateddata show that the selected
40ne majoradvantageof the FASTCLUS procedureis that its initializationprocessmakesit sensitive to outliers.
5Inspectionof a scree plot of the eigenvaluesand their associatedcumulativeexplainedvariances
suggestedsetting a minimumeigenvalueof 0.98.
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Joel Lieske
indicatorsreduce to 13 orthogonalfactors,which explain 71% of the cumulative
variance.The cell entries consist of the computed factor loadings on each indicator. The enclosed boxes, which indicate all loadings more than .5 in absolute
value,identifythose indicatorsthat have the greatesteffect on each factor.
The firstrotatedfactoris labeledas a "Rurban"factorsince it loads stronglyon
those characteristicsthat Elazar(1984) has associatedwith the emergent"rurbancybernetics"frontier,namely, rural-urbanhabitats,high levels of education,professionaland managerialoccupations,workingwomen, populationmobility, and
youngerpopulations.This culturalstreamis generallyfound in pastoralacademic
settingsand in the less populatedstateswest of the Mississippi.
The second factor, labeled "Ethnic,"representsa diverse polyglot of ethnic
groupsthat are concentratedin the largestand most urbanizedmetropolitanareas
of the United States. Includedin this streamare groupswho claim Italian,Slavic,
Russian, Hungarian,and Greek ancestryas well as religious affiliationwith the
reformand conservativetraditionsof Judaism.
For reasons which will become more evident, the third factor is labeled as a
"Border"stream. This factor loads strongly on counties that are predominantly
white; include significantconcentrationsof residentswhose ancestorscame from
the "border"regions of Great Britain,such as the (Scotch)-Irish(Fischer 1989);
are egalitarianin social structure;and favortraditionalfamily-orientedlife-styles.
The fourth factoris labeled"Agrarian"becauseof its high positive loadingson
the relative sizes of the work force engaged in agricultureand the extractionof
naturalresources. Since these economic sectors are generallycharacterizedby a
high degree of economicconcentrationand a low division of labor,this factoralso
loadshighly on the indicatorof incomeinequality.
The fifth factor, a "Nordic"stream, is typified by high densities of residents
who claim Scandinavianancestry and who belong to the American Lutheran
Church, the church body that united a number of small Lutheran synods with
former ties to the old state churches of Scandinavia.Similarly,the "Germanic"
stream is associated with residents of German ancestry, many of whom claim
membershipin the Missouri-SynodLutheranChurchand the United Churchof
Christ. The formerchurchbody used to be called the GermanLutheranChurch;
while the latter representsthe mergerof the New England-basedCongregational
Church with the largelymidwestern-basedEvangelicaland ReformedChurch,a
Calvinistbody formed by Germanand Dutch immigrantsto Pennsylvania(Cassels 1965, 114-15).
In like manner,the sixth factormay be interpretedas a "Hispanic"streamsince
it loads stronglyon the relativesize of Spanish-speakingresidents,many of whom
are affiliatedwith the CatholicChurch.On the other hand, the "Mormon"stream
can be identifiedon the basis of a single tag, namely,membershipin The Church
of Jesus Christ of the Latter-DaySaints. Similarly,French ancestryserves as an
identifying markerfor the "Anglo-French"factor, but this stream is also associatedwith Americanswho claimBritishancestry.
RegionalSubculturesof the United States
899
TABLE2
GOODNESSOF FIT DIAGNOSTICS
ClusterSummary
Cluster
Germanic
Ethnic
Heartland
Hispanic
Nordic
Mormon
Border
Blackbelt
Rurban
Anglo-French
Freq.
RMS Std. Dev.
Max. Seed
Distance
Nearest
Cluster
Centroid
Distance
340
101
438
128
133
52
855
479
464
145
1.02
1.00
0.69
0.75
0.76
0.70
0.53
0.68
0.89
1.11
23.1
9.2
12.6
6.7
6.5
6.0
4.8
10.9
16.0
21.0
Border
Border
Border
Border
Border
Rurban
Rurban
Border
Border
Border
2.8
4.8
2.4
4.2
4.2
6.2
2.4
2.5
2.4
3.8
R2=.41
F9,3125=Z46.1 p <.001
Because of their historicalconfinementto reservations,Native Americansappear as a separate"Native"stream.Again for reasonsthat will become more evident, the "Heartland"factoris largelydefinedby the followersof severalmainline
Protestant denominations,most notably the American Baptist Church, whose
forebearssettled the central heartlandof the United States and sided with the
North during the Civil War. Although the twelfth factorloads on both the Asian
and Portugueseindicators,it has been labeledas an "Asian"streambecauseof the
numericaldominanceof this group.
Finally, the "Blackbelt"factor is distinguishablenot only by the significant
numbers of residents who claim membershipin the Southern Presbyterianand
Episcopalchurches,but also as the only one that has a significant,though small,
positiveloadingon the blackracialindicator.
The resultsof using these rotatedfactorsas input variablesto the clusteranalysis are presented in table 2.6 Table 3 presents the intercorrelationsbetween
dummy measures of the derived clusters and the rotated factors. These intercorrelationswere used, along with a color-codedmap of the continentalUnited
States pinpointingthe geographicallocationof each county, to interpretand label
the clusters(see figure2).7
Table 2 shows that some 3,000 U.S. countiescan be classifiedinto 10 relatively
homogeneousclusters or subcultures.Moreover,two goodness-of-fitdiagnostics,
6In this analysis,the maximumnumberof clusterswas set at 20; the minimumclustersize was set at
15;the convergenceparameterwas set at .01; and the maximumnumberof iterationswas set at 100.
'I wish to thankLida Allen for setting up the computerprogramsthat madethe constructionof this
map possible.
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RegionalSubculturesof the United States
901
the overall explainedvarianceand the pseudo F-statistic, show that the clusters
are relativelywell-defined(SAS 1985, 386). Figure 2 shows that, with the exception of the "Rurban"subculture,the derived clusters of counties are fairly contiguous and regionally concentrated.Based on the highest intercorrelationsin
table 3 (enclosed in boxes), I have labeled the clusters respectivelyas: (1) Germanic, (2) Ethnic, (3) Heartland,(4) Hispanic, (5) Nordic, (6) Mormon, (7) Border, (8) Blackbelt,(9) Rurban,and (10) Anglo-French.8
The cluster with the largestnumber of counties, 855, is the "Border"subculture (see table 2). With the lowest maximumseed distance(4.8) and the smallest
root mean squarestandarddeviation(0.53), it is also the most culturallyuniform.
In addition,it is also the closest, i.e., most similar,to eight of the nine other clusters in my typology.The only exceptionis the "Mormon"clusterwhich is closest
to the "Rurban"cluster. Finally, as can be seen from figure2, the "Border"cluster, alongwith the "Rurban"cluster,is one of the most regionallydispersed.
TheGenealogyandMorphologyof theSubcultures
One of the most insightfulhistoricalstudies on the genealogyof Americanculture is Fischer'sAlbion'sSeed (1989). Adoptingwhat is basicallya "germ"theory,
Fischer contends that American culture was largely established by four great
migrationsof English-speakingimmigrantsfrom the British Isles. These immigrants, he argues, carriedacross the Atlantic four different ways of life that becamethe basisof regionalculturesin the New World.
The first wave was the exodus of Puritansfrom East Anglia to Massachusetts
from 1629 to 1640. The second was the transplantationof a small Royalist elite
and largenumbersof indenturedservantsfrom the South of Englandto Virginia
between 1642 and 1675. The third was a migrationfrom the North Midlands of
England and Wales to the Delaware River Valley from 1675 to 1725. And the
fourth was a numericallylarge streamof English-speakingpeople from the borders of England and northern Ireland to the Appalachianbackcountrybetween
1718 and 1775. Generallyspeaking,the first three waves correspondrespectively
to Elazar's moralistic, traditionalistic,and individualistic "core" subcultures.
However, the fourth representsa new and distinctive subculturethat Elazarattempts to representas an Appalachianblend of his moralisticand traditionalistic
streams.9
81t might be noted that three of the rotated factors do not appear as distinctive clusters. The
"Native"stream,which has a weakcorrelationwith the "Rurban"cluster, sharesseveralculturalcommonalitieswith the "Rurban"streamincluding the representationof groupswho tend to live in institutionalsettings,spatiallydecentralizedhabitats,or west of the MississippiRiver. The "Agrarian"and
"Asian"streamsare too smallto be separatelyidentifiable.
9The culturalsimilaritiesbetweenFischer'sfirstthree wavesand Elazar's"core"culturesare clearly
evident from Fischer's(1989, 785-86) summarydescriptions.He describesthe first,a Puritanwave,as
"a very special culture with unique patternsof speech and architecture,distinctive ideas about marriageand the family,nucleatedsettlements,congregationalchurches,town meetings,and a traditionof
902
Joel Lieske
The extensions of Fischer's four "core" cultures are evident respectively in
my Anglo-French, Blackbelt,Heartland,and Border subcultures(see figure 2).
The Anglo-Frenchsubculture,of course, representsthe extension of the Puritan
stream into greaterNew England and the Upper Midwest as well as the transplantedFrench-Acadianstreamin Louisianaand the influx of French-Canadians
into the Northeast. To obtain more detailed informationon these four subcultures, as well as the six other subculturesidentifiedin this study, I computedthe
respectivecluster means for each of the 45 culturalindicators.As expected, the
tabulatedresults (not reportedhere for reasonsof space) reveala number of distinctiveculturaltraitsfor each subculture.
Thus, the Anglo-Frenchsubcultureis a predominantlywhite, ethnicallydiverse
regionthat representsa uniqueblend of the two largestethnic groups-British and
French-which are roughly the same size. The high concentrationof non-Anglo
Europeans, especially the French ethnics, also makes it one of the strongest
Catholic regions in the country. On average,more than 35% of the population
claim membershipin the Catholic Church, placing it second after the Hispanic
subculturein catholicity.Althoughthe New Englandregionis renownfor its fine
colleges,this subculture,overall,is not particularlydistinctivein the proportionsof
collegegraduates,professionals,and managersin its workforce.
The Blackbeltsubcultureincludesmost of what Gastil (1975) has labeledas the
Lowland and Upland South. The Lowland South is predominantlyan agricultural region of dispersed settlements that was originallybased on a plantation
economy and slavery. Known for its rich black soil and high concentrationsof
blackresidents,this original"Blackbelt"stretchesfrom the tip of the Del-Mar-Va
peninsulasouth through the eastern shore of Maryland,tidewaterVirginia,and
the easternCarolinas,then west throughthe Gulf region and up the Mississippi
Delta past Memphis. Gastil's Upland South representsthe rolling Piedmontsections of the Old Confederacyand containsmost of the manufacturingcenters that
were establishedat the fall lines of majorrivers.The blendingof the two regions
into a single consolidated Blackbelt subculture may be the result of cultural
orderedliberty."He argues that the second, a Cavalierwave, "was characterizedby scatteredsettlements, extremehierarchiesof rank,strong oligarchies,Anglicanchurches,a highly developedsense of
honor and an idea of hegemonicliberty."He contends that the third, a North Midlands wave, "was
foundedon a Christianidea of spiritualequality,a workethic of unusualintensity,a suspicionof social
hierarchy,and an austeritywhich Max Weber called 'worldlyasceticism.'s'Moreover,he argues that
the third wave "preservedmany elements of North Midland speech, architecture,dress, and food
ways" and that "it deliberatelycreateda pluralisticsystem of reciprocalliberty in the DelawareValley." Finally, while the emigrantsfrom his fourth, or "border"wave, were of differentethnic stocks,
Fischer maintainsthat they "shareda common borderculture which was unique in its speech, architecture, family ways and child-rearingcustoms."He also arguesthat the materialculture of the "border" wave "was markedby extreme inequalitiesof condition, and its public life was dominatedby a
distinctiveideal of naturalliberty."
RegionalSubculturesof the United States
903
accretion,broughton by the increasingmechanizationof southernagriculture,the
forces of industrializationand urbanization,and the consequent movement of
blacksfromthe rurallowlandto the urbanupland.
The most distinctivefeatureof the Blackbelt,of course,is its racialcomposition
(Key 1949).Blackresidentsaveragemore than 36% of the population.The largest
Europeangroup consists of people who claim British ancestry,with an averageof
27% of the population.Consistentwith its Bible Belt reputation,this subculture
also contains an unusuallyhigh concentrationof Baptists. An averageof almost
25% of the populationare membersof the SouthernBaptist Convention.As expected, there is also a high proportionof residents employed in manufacturing
jobs (many of them at low wages), the highest concentrationof any region, including the more industrializedEthnic subculture (Luttbeg 1971; Pierce and
Hagstrom1984).Becausethere is so much povertyin the region,especiallyamong
blacks,this subculturealso has the highest levels of incomeinequality.
The Heartlandsubculture,by comparison,largelycoincides with what Elazar
includes in his individualisticculture and_Gastillabels as the CentralMidwest. It
extendsfrom the upperreachesof the MohawkRiverValleyand the northernAppalachianswestward in a broad swath across Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois into
southernIowa, Nebraska,Kansas,and easternColorado.Its midwesternsections
tend to follow the westwardmovement of the U.S. populationcentroid and encompasssome of the richest and most productiveagriculturalland in the nation's
breadbasket.10
Although a few isolated counties can be found further west, its
western terminus appearsto be the beginning of the Rockies, i.e., the boundary
between Garreau's(1981) Breadbasketand Empty Quarter.Culturally,this is the
most raciallywhite and homogeneousof all the regions.Moreover,relativelyfew
"whiteethnics" are to be found, since on averagemore than 84% of the population claimeitherBritish,German,or (Scotch)-Irishancestry.
Finally, the Border subculture represents the geographic extension of the
largest, by far, of the four British migratorystreams. Beginning in the AppalachianMountains,Gastil's(1975) MountainSouth, it extends in a southwesterly
direction across the Border South states-Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and
Oklahoma-and includessubstantialsectionsof Arkansasand Texas. This stream
is not only the largestin areaof the four streamsbut also the most geographically
mobile and restless, as evidenced by its extensions into Florida, Michigan, and
more recentlythe far West.11These extensionsappearto reflecta continuinglove
of the British borderpeople for the backcountryand out-of-doors(Fischer 1989).
In terms of cultural characteristics,this region is very similar to the Heartland
'?This midcontinentregion is typifiedby states such as Ohio, whose motto is: "The heartof it all."
Other remindersof this heartlandpsychology can be seen in the naming of business establishments
such as the HeartlandMotel chainin centralIowa.
"Its recent inroadsinto the far West can be seen in the growingnumberof counties with sizeable
concentrationsof residentswho claim membershipin the SouthernBaptistConvention.
904
Joel Lieske
region. The majordifferencesthat seem to distinguishthe two are the somewhat
greater representationof blacks in the Border region, which is reflected in a
greaterheterogeneityof the population,and the pronouncedrole of the Southern
BaptistConventionin the Borderway of life.
In terms of historicalsettlement,the Hispanicsubculturerepresentsthe oldest,
and now perhaps the most territoriallyand culturally aggressive non-British
stream.With a "core"in northernNew Mexico establishedby the Spanish conquistadors,it extends into southern Coloradoto the north; southeast along the
Texas border to the Houston metropolitanarea; westwardacross the southern
partsof New Mexico, Arizona,and California;and then finallyup into the Central
Valley. Geographically,this subculturebears a strikingresemblanceto Garreau's
(1981) MexAmericaregion. Not surprisingly,an averageof more than 45% of the
populationin this region consider themselves Spanish-speaking.Notwithstanding, approximately90%, on average, consider themselves white rather than a
memberof some other racialgroup such as mestizo. The still culturallydominant
"Anglo"groupsin this regionare those of British, German,and (Scotch)-Irishancestry. Comparedto other subculturesthis is a religiouslydevout region, with an
averageof 60% of the populationclaimingmembershipin just three dominantreligious bodies-Catholic, SouthernBaptist,and United Methodist.
Closely borderingand often interspersedthroughoutthe Heartlandsubculture
is the Germanic subculture. This stream originatedin Philadelphiaduring the
1630s but extended its influence westward during subsequent waves emanating
out of New York into Ohio, northern Indianaand Illinois, much of Wisconsin,
into the upper Mississippi and Minnesota River Valleys, across northern Iowa,
and then into the Dakotasand Nebraska.While one small streamout of New Orleans headed for the hill country of Texas (Jordan 1966), most German immigrantswho embarkedfrom this port headed north to the St. Louis areaand then
up the Missouri River Valley. Like the settlementpatternsof the Bordersubculture, the Germanicsubcultureexemplifiesan unusuallove of country,and like the
Heartlandsubcultureit encompassessome of the richest and most fertile land in
the United States today.
Similar to the Heartlandregion, the Germanic subcultureis overwhelmingly
white and culturallyhomogeneous.It is also only one of two subcultureswhere
the dominantethnic group, Germans,also constitutea clearmajorityof the population. Although an average of more than one in every five residents claim
membershipin the Catholic Church, they are still significantlyoutnumberedby
adherentsof mainlineProtestantdenominations,particularlyin the more agricultural subregions.Economically,this region has perhaps the healthiest and most
diversifiedeconomic base, with almost 60% of the population,on average,engagedin manufacturing,agriculture,or naturalresources.
The Nordic subcultureconstitutesanotherborderculturethat is closely related
to the Germanicby language,religion, social customs, and life-style. But there
RegionalSubculturesof the United States
905
are enough cultural differencesto distinguish it from the latter even though on
averageGermanethnics outnumberScandinavianethnics by more than a two-toone ratio. Also overwhelminglywhite and raciallyhomogeneous, it is perhaps
dominantin only two states-Minnesota and North Dakota-but its progressive
influencealso extends into the states of Wisconsin, South Dakota, and Montana
(Nye 1951). Insulatedby the Germanicsubcultureand situatedoff the majoreastwest migratoryroutes, the Nordic culture has enjoyed a high degree of cultural
autonomythat is reinforcedby an economicbase of agriculture,naturalresources,
and high-tech industries.
Anotherrelativelyinsulatedsubcultureis the Mormon region.But its isolation
is more one of design than accident.Beset by religiouspersecutionand economic
resentment, the Mormons finally found, after an exodus that criss-crossedthe
Heartland subculture, a sanctuaryin the semi-arid region of the Great Basin,
where it thrives today (O'Dea 1957; Mullen 1966; Lieske 1984). Since Mormonism is a uniquely AmericanHeartlandreligion that grew out of the Second
Great Awakeningof the 1820s, its converts for the most part were drawn from
people of Britishancestry.12Their descendantshelp makethis subculturethe only
other subculture(besidesthe Germanic)in which the dominantethnic group and
religion still constitute a majorityof the population.Despite the lack of natural
resourcesand industrialwealth, this subculturehas produceda very civilized way
of life that is distinguishedby the stabilityof family life and an unusuallywelleducatedand highly skilledworkforce (Lieske 1984).
The finaltwo subculturesare the largest,with some 67 million residentsapiece,
and also the most inclusive, pluralistic,and spatiallydispersed.The Ethnic subculture is an ethnic polyglot of metropolitanareaslocatedprimarilyin the northeasternand midwesternindustrialcorridors.With the exceptionof the Miami and
Los Angeles areas, this subcultureis being eclipsed in growth by metropolitan
and "rurban"areas somewhatbetter equipped to compete in an emerging postindustrialand cyberneticseconomy (Elazar 1984). While both subcultureshave
highly educatedand skilled work forces, the Rurbansubcultureis less dependent
on the manufacturingsector. The emergenceof this new Rurbansubculturecan
be seen not only in the nucleatedmetropolitanareasspawnedby large state universitiesbut also in the more prosperousand growingregionsof the sunbelt.
TheSocial andPoliticalManifestations
of theSubcultures
The value of any theory, of course, lies in its ability to explain social and political behavior. A comprehensivetest to assess the utility of my new cultural
typologyis beyond the scope of this paper.However,a more restrictedtest can be
obtainedby comparingthe predictivepowerof my new measurewith Elazar'son a
2This religionoriginatedin Palmyra,NY, which lies just within the northeasternboundaryof my
Heartlandsubculture.
906
Joel Lieske
limited numberof social, political,and policy indicators."3
Since Elazar'scultural
map providesdesignationsfor only 224 substateareas,I extendedhis schemato all
U.S. counties by painstakinglyinterpolatinghis classifications,county by county,
in one of three ways. First, I attemptedto classifyeach county on the basis of its
geographicalproximityto one of his designatedareas.If this was not possible, I
tried to classify it on the basis of the westwardstreamshe delineates.Finally, if
both of these methods failedto providea clearclassification,I used the subcultural
divisions providedby other culturalscholarswho have built on his research,particularlyGastil (1975) and Garreau(1981), to determineborderlinecases.14
While Elazar'stheorywas not intendedto explaindifferencesin socialbehavior
per se, many other subculturaltheories, including the one developed here, have
been advancedwith this objectivein mind (Banfield 1968; Gastil 1975; Garreau
1981; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). In addition, there is a growing
empiricalliteraturethat is beginningto documentthe effects of culture and subculture, including Elazar'stypology, on a number of social pathologiesand life
qualitymeasures(Gastil 1975;Bayley 1976;Kincaid 1980;Lieske 1990). So it is in
this vein that the resultsin table4 arepresented.
This table comparesthe utility of using my typology and Elazar'sto explain
the variationin a number of social problemsthat concern Americanvoters and
that have become recurrentissues in recent presidentialcampaigns.The analysisof-variance(ANOVA) results show that while the two typologies are essentially
equivalentin predictingthe incidenceof povertyand teen-agepregnancy,my new
typology is clearlysuperiorin explainingother social pathologies.These include
the incidence of family breakdown,welfare dependency, and violent as well as
propertycrime.15
Similarly, table 5 and table 6 present the ANOVA results for 10 selected indicators of political behavior. They include two measures of turnout in presidential elections, three measuresof party registration,and five measuresof the
presidential vote. The results in table 5 show that my cultural typology and
Elazar'sdo about equally well in explainingturnout in the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections and Republicanregistrationin 1982. However, Elazar'sclassification does significantlybetter in accountingfor Democratic and independent
registration.
13Unfortunately,space constraintsprecludea discussionof the hypothesizedrelationshipsbetween
my new measure,as well as Elazar's,and these indicators.Data for most of the indicatorsthat areanalyzed here were drawnfrom the U.S. Bureauof the Census' County StatisticsFile 3. I wish to thank
BarbaraGroethe for her help and assistance.Data on party registrationwere generouslyprovidedby
the RepublicanNational Committee.Presidentialvoting data were obtainedfrom the Interuniversity
Consortiumfor Politicaland SocialResearch.
141wish to thankDaniel Prugarfor assistingme in this task.
-'5As might be expected, the two most urbanizedsubcultures,the Ethnic and Rurban,are also most
proneto the attendantsocialproblemsof urbanization,includingfamilybreakdown,violent crime,and
propertycrime.
C,)
(1
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to
.
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TABLE
4
VARIATION IN SOCIAL PROBLEMS BY REGIONAL SUBCULTURE
Regional
Subculture
Broken
Homesa
Germanic
Ethnic
Heartland
Hispanic
Nordic
Mormon
Border
Blackbelt
Rurban
Anglo-French
N
R2
R2(Elazar)
Poor
Familiesb
SocialProblems
Teen-age
AFDC
Mothersc
Recipientsd
Violent
Crimee
Property
Crime'
4.5
8.9
6.3
7.0
3.9
5.5
7.0
8.7
9.0
7.5
10.7
7.7
9.6
17.9
11.7
10.5
14.0
18.0
9.2
10.2
12.3
12.5
16.2
20.1
11.8
12.8
20.7
22.8
14.3
14.7
2.1
4.7
2.6
3.5
2.4
1.7
3.0
6.0
3.0
4.5
91.8
519.0
125.4
334.2
55.3
220.2
190.3
347.9
400.0
240.0
2,135.7
4,816.4
2,451.8
3,163.8
2,221.0
3,337.4
2,314.7
2,744.6
5,184.9
3,738.6
3,135
40.6%
14.1%
3,135
26.5%
27.3%
3,116
40.9%
42.8%
3,135
20.8%
13.3%
3,037
20.3%
4.6%
3,037
23.7%
4.9%
aPercentageof all women 15 yearsand older who are separatedor divorced.
bPercentageof all familiesbelow the povertylevel.
cPercentageof all birthsto mothersunderage 20.
dPercentageof populationreceivingAFDC assistance.
eNumberof homicides,forciblerapes,robberies,and aggravatedassaultsper 10,000population.
fNumberof grandlarcenies,burglaries,and auto thefts per 10,000population.
TABLE
5
VARIATION IN TURNOUT AND PARTY REGISTRATION
BY REGIONAL SUBCULTURE
Regional
Subculture
Turnouta
1980
1984
Germanic
Ethnic
Heartland
Hispanic
Nordic
Mormon
Border
Blackbelt
Rurban
Anglo-French
65.6
54.8
59.7
52.4
72.2
73.4
55.5
49.1
51.9
62.6
3,135
28.6%
29.4%
N
R2
R2
1982Dem.
PartyRegistrationb
1982 Ind.
1982Rep.
64.2
58.5
59.8
55.9
69.4
74.3
57,9
52.6
56.3
64.6
34.3
45.7
37.4
64.9
40.3
46.2
67.4
81.8
48.2
50.0
18.1
25.4
20.3
8.6
11.8
11.3
5.5
3.4
16.8
22.4
47.6
28.9
42.3
26.5
47.9
42.5
27.1
14.8
35.0
27.6
3,135
17.2%
19.1%
1,395
38.9%
55.7%
1,395
20.5%
33.0%
1,395
26.8%
25.4%
aPercentageof all adults 18 yearsand older who voted.
bPercentageof all registeredvoters.
908
Joel Lieske
TABLE
6
VARIATION IN PRESIDENTIAL VOTE BY REGIONAL SUBCULTURE
Regional
Subculture
Germanic
Ethnic
Heartland
Hispanic
Nordic
Mormon
Border
Blackbelt
Rurban
Anglo-French
N
R2
R2(Elazar)
1980 Dem.
1980 Ind.
PresidentialVotea
1980 Rep.
1984Dem.
1984Rep.
30.6
42.0
34.9
43.0
36.3
20.6
44.8
53.7
35.4
41.1
5.5
7.6
4.9
2.5
6.4
3.0
2.3
1.6
7.1
8.2
62.5
48.8
58.9
53.5
55.7
74.7
51.8
43.6
55.4
49.0
32.0
44.3
33.9
39.8
41.3
21.7
36.6
42.7
35.1
38.9
67.2
55.2
65.4
59.6
57.8
77.5
62.8
56.7
64.0
60.4
3,111
36.6%
37.3%
3,111
44.8%
50.7%
3,111
28.7%
20.8%
3,113
15.1%
6.6%
3,113
28.9%
6.2%
aPercentageof the total presidentialvote.
As the resultsof table 6 indicate,both typologiesdo quite well in explainingthe
subculturalvariationin the 1980 presidentialvote. The two are essentiallyequivalent in accountingfor the Cartervote. But Elazar'sis better able to explain the
vote for independentcandidateJohn Anderson;while mine is better able to predict the Reagan vote. However, my typology fares uniformly much better in
accountingfor the Mondaleand Reaganvotes in 1984.
Table 7 presentsthe ANOVA results of using the two classificationsto explain
the variationin seven selected measuresof public policy at the local level. These
indicatorsinclude local governmentrevenues, the local tax burden, educational
expenditures,the educationaltax burden, welfare expenditures,the welfare tax
burden, and local AFDC payments circa 1980. The results show that Elazar's
classificationdoes significantlybetter in accounting for AFDC payments, local
governmentrevenues,welfareexpenditures,and the welfaretax burden.The two
are aboutequalin explainingthe overalltax burdenand educationalexpenditures.
But mine is significantlybetter in accountingfor local differencesin the educationaltax burden.
In sum, my measureperformsmuch betterthan Elazar'sin predictinga number
of social pathologiesthat appearto be ethnoculturallyrelated.This is perhapsto
be expected since my typology is much more precise than Elazar'sin measuring
ethnoreligiousand social differences.On the other hand, the two typologies are
about equal in predictivepower for politicalbehaviorthat is habitualin character
(e.g., voting turnout)or reflectiveof ethnoculturaldivisionsin the Americanelectorate(e.g., candidatepreferencesin the 1980 and 1984elections).Finally,Elazar's
RegionalSubculturesof the United States
909
TABLE 7
VARIATION IN PUBLIC POLICY BY REGIONAL SUBCULTURE
Public Policy
Regional
Subculture
Germanic
Ethnic
Heartland
Hispanic
Nordic
Mormon
Border
Blackbelt
Rurban
Anglo-French
N
R2
R2 (Elazar)
Local
Rev.,
Tax
Education
Welfare
Burdenb Expend.c Burdend Expend.' Burdenf
444
507
411
394
521
317
276
289
343
411
5.5
5.0
4.7
6.5
4.8
4.5
3.2
3.0
4.5
5.5
526
522
505
670
585
636
422
415
561
501
6.3
4.9
6.0
9.1
7.3
8.2
5.7
6.2
5.8
6.1
31
79
30
31
77
4
9
13
29
41
.36
.76
.37
.39
.97
.05
.12
.17
.30
.51
3,130
23.9%
31.7%
3,098
7.1%
9.8%
3,130
6.2%
6.0%
3,098
9.1%
1.0%
3,130
3.3%
8.8%
3,098
12.4%
17.4%
AFDC9
253
279
236
141
271
271
169
137
233
273
3,135
33.5%
57.3%/o
"Percapitalocal governmentrevenuesin dollars.
bPercapitalocal governmenttaxesas a percentageof per capitapersonalincome.
cPercapitalocal governmentexpenditureson educationin dollars.
dPercapitalocal governmentexpendituresas a percentageof per capitapersonalincome.
ePercapitalocal governmentexpenditureson welfarein dollars.
fPer capitalocal governmentexpenditureson welfareas a percentageof per capitapersonalincome.
gAveragefamilymonthlypaymentin dollars.
typologyappearsto be superiorin explainingcertaintypes of politicalbehaviorthat
result from state-levelinfluences(e.g., policies that are primarilystate-funded)or
thatarepatternedalongstate-partylines (e.g., votingregistration).
Overall,my measureappearsto do about as well as Elazar's.At the same time,
it is a statisticallyrigorousmeasurethat avoids the problemof politicalcircularity
inherentin his measure.In addition,it remainsfaithfulto a key assumptionof his
theory, namely, that subculturaldifferencesare transmittedprimarilyby ethnic
and religiousgroups. Last but not least, my new measureoffers to researchersa
major refinement to his "core" British subcultures (four not three) that first
settled the United States, as well as a contemporaryaccountingof other ethnoculturalstreams-French, Germanic,Nordic, Hispanic,Mormon, Ethnic, and Rurban-that have left their subculturalimprint.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The primaryobjective of this study was to develop the case, theory, and statistical methodology for a new measure of American regional subcultures. A
910
Joel Lieske
secondaryobjectivewas to assess its utility in explainingdifferencesin social and
politicalbehavior.Overall,the resultssupporta numberof conclusions.
First, the combineduse of principalcomponentand cluster analysismay offer
cultural scholars a new and promising methodology for deriving rigorous subculturalmeasures.In using this methodology,however,researchersmust exercise
care in how they conceptualizecultureand the indicatorsthey select for analysis.
In short, the techniqueonly succeedsto the extent it is informedby theory.
Second, the results suggest that the entire populationof U.S. counties can be
partitionedinto 10 distinctive subculturesthat are relatively homogeneousand
contiguous. In addition, these subculturesappear to make theoreticalsense, as
evidencedby their close relationshipto those identifiedby other culturalscholars
such as Elazar(1984), Gastil (1975), Garreau(1981), and Fischer (1989).
Third, it is evident that my new typology compares very favorably with
Elazar'sin accounting for differencesin a variety of social and political indicators. Although my new measureis no more parsimoniousthan Elazar'stypology
(10 versus 9 categories),it is more precise and takes into account recent demographic changes, especially the United States' greater cultural diversity. And
while even better results might be obtained through the incorporationof some
"effect" and "manifestation"indicators, their inclusion would defeat my effort
to avoid the problem of circularity.For example, severalmeasuresof past political behaviorcould be included in the factor-clusteranalysisthat would enhance
the predictivepower of my typology. These might include, for instance, turnout
in the 1976 presidentialelection, partyregistrationlevels in 1980, and local government tax and spending figures circa 1970. Their inclusion might increase
significantlythe explanatorypower of my typology, but only at the cost of obscuringthe necessarytheoreticaldistinctionbetweencultural"causes"and political "effects."
Fourth, it would seem desirableto subjectmy new measureto furthertesting,
especially at the state level. This could be done, for instance, by aggregating
across counties and computing the respectiveproportionsof the total state-wide
populationthat are under the influenceof each subculture.In effect the political
culture of each state would be representedby a 10-dimensionalvector variable.
Presumably,this variablewould measurethe relativesizes of the contendingsubcultural constituencies within a state that vie for control of legislative districts
and the governorship.And like Sharkansky's(1969) cultural index it could be
used to predict differences among the states in political institutions and public
policies.
Finally, my new measuremay also proveuseful in contextualresearchthat conceptualizessubculturesas arenasof conflict (Schattschneider1960). For example,
it can be demonstratedthat the factorswhich structurepresidentialvoting behavior differ in their effects from one subcultureor culturalregion to another(Lieske
1989, 1991). To conclude,this study should help lay the theoreticaland empirical
RegionalSubculturesof the United States
911
bases for future studies that attemptto understandthe effects of regionalsubcultureson Americansocialand politicalbehavior.
Manuscriptsubmitted18 October1991
received18 March1993
Final manuscript
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Joel Lieske is associateprofessorof political science, ClevelandState University, Cleveland,OH 44115.