5
The Background to the
1967 Conflict
The origins of the war of J u n e 1967 go back to broken
undertakings that had been made to Israel after the 1956
Sinai campaign. The 1956 war came about as a result of the
illegal Arab maritime blockade of the Gulf of Akaba, the
denial of passage to Israeli ships through the Suez Canal, the
enormous Soviet-Egyptian arms deal entered into in 1955,
and the subsequent formation of a ring of Arab military
alliances against Israel with Arab leaders openly announcing
their intention of invading Israel. On t o p of this were the
continued Arab terrorist raids into Israel which were
organized and directed by Egypt and cost the lives of over
1500 Israeli citizens between 1948 and 1956. It is pertinent
to emphasise that in terms of the United States population
this figure would be equivalent to 20,000 Americans killed
every year.
Israel withdrew from her positions on the Suez Canal and
in Sinai in 1957, after obtaining guarantees for freedom of
passage through the Straits of Tiran by the United States.
These guarantees were supported by other maritime powers
such as Great Britain and France. The United States, together
with the United Nations — with Soviet agreement, also
guaranteed that Egyptian armed forces would n o t return to
the Gaza Strip. This was the purpose of the establishment of
the United Nations Emergency Force, with Israeli forces only
withdrawing from Sharm El Sheikh and the Sinai frontier
when they were physically replaced by U.N.E.F. troops. On
March 1, 1957, these undertakings were outlined by the then
Foreign Minister for Israel, Mrs. Golda Meir:
On 11 February 1957 the Secretary of State of the United States of
America handed to the Ambassador of Israel in Washington a
55
THE BARRICADES IN TEL-AVIV
(Syrian Army organ Al-Juni Al-Arabi, June 6, 1967)
HOW TO USE THE STAR OF DAVID . . .
(Iraqi daily Al-Manor, June 8, 1967)
THE BOTTLENECK
The Straits of Tiran dead end.
(Roz-el-Yussef,
May 29, 1967)
RING OF ENCIRCLEMENT
Israel is surrounded again:
"The pincer arms — Egypt and Syria"
( Lebanese weekly 'Al-Siad, May 25, 1967)
58
The Case for Israel
Memorandum on the subject of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of
Tiran. This statement discusses the rights of nations in the Gulf of
Aqaba, declares the readiness of the United States to exercise these
rights on its own behalf, and to join with others in securing general
recognition of these rights. My Government has subsequently learned
with gratification that other leading maritime Powers are prepared to
subscribe to the doctrine set out in the United States' Memorandum of
11 February, and have a similar intention to exercise rights of free and
innocent passage in the Gulf and the Straits.
The General Assembly Resolution of 2 February 1957 contemplates
that units of the United Nations Emergency Force will move into the
Straits of Tiran area on Israel's withdrawal. It is generally recognized
that the function of the UNEF in the Straits of Tiran includes the
prevention of belligerent acts.
My Government has noted the assurances embodied in the
Secretary-General's Report of 26 February 1957 that any proposal for
the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from the Gulf
of Aqaba area would first come to the Advisory Committee, which
represents the General Assembly for the implementation of its
Resolution of 2 November 1956. This procedure will give the General
Assembly an opportunity to ensure that no precipitate changes are
made which would have the effect of increasing the possibility of
belligerent acts . . .
In the light of these doctrines, policies and arrangments by the
United Nations and the maritime Powers, my Government is confident
that free and innocent passage for international and Israel shipping will
continue to be fully maintained after Israel's withdrawal.
Interference by armed force with ships of the Israel flag exercising
free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits
of Tiran will be regarded by Israel as an attack entitling it to exercise its
inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter and to
take all such measures as are necessary to ensure the free and innocent
passage of its ships in the Gulf and in the Straits.
On the same day, March 1, 1957, Mr. Lodge, the United
States Representative at the United Nations, stated:
Once Israel has completed its withdrawal in accordance with the
resolutions of the General Assembly, and in view of the measures taken
by the United Nations to deal with the situation, there is no basis for
either party to the Armistice Agreement to exert or exercise any
belligerent rights.
Some of these undertakings, such as the non-return of
Egyptian troops to Gaza, were breached immediately after
Israel's withdrawal. The insistence that there was no basis for
either party to exercise belligerent rights was repudiated by
The Background to the 1967 Conflict
59
Nasser and Israel was still denied freedom of access through
the Suez Canal.
The situation continued to deteriorate and ten years later,
in 1966, Israel was complaining regularly to the Security
Council because of sharply increasing Syrian terrorist attacks
into Israel and Syrian Army shelling of Israeli villages from
the Golan Heights. The Soviet veto was continuously
employed to nullify the Israeli protests.
On April 7, 1967 Israeli Air Force units destroyed six
Syrian MIG's in an aerial dogfight. On May 16, goaded by the
Russians, the Arabs alleged that Israel was about to launch a
pre-emptive strike against Syria and insisted that nineteen
Israeli battalions were massing for an invasion on the borders
of Syria. General Odd Bull, the United Nations observer,
checked and repudiated these claims and on May 19, U.N.
Secretary-General U-Thant reported that there was no basis
for such rumours. The Soviet Ambassador in Israel was
invited to visit the borders and see for himself, but he
refused.
On May 17, Cairo Radio, "Voice of the Arabs", stated:
All Egypt is now prepared to plunge into total war which will put an
end to Israel.
On May 18, U.A.R. troops occupied Sharm el Sheikh, the
strategic point on the Straits of Tiran, and Nasser demanded
that U-Thant withdraw all United Nations troops in t h a t area
and in Gaza. Israel had withdrawn from these territories
following the Suez war in 1957 on the firm undertaking that
United Nations forces would remain to prevent a renewal of
terrorism and keep the Straits of Tiran open to Israeli
shipping.
A series of warnings announcing the impending
annihilation of Israel were made by all Arab leaders and the
Arab press. The following are a mere cross-section of these
statements:
Cairo Radio, "Voice of the Arabs" stated: (May 18, 1967):
As of today there no longer exists any international emergency
force to protect Israel. We shall exercise patience no more. We shall
not complain to the United Nations about Israel. The sole method
The Case for Israel
60
we will apply against Israel is a total war which will result in the
final extermination of Zionist existence.
Syrian Defence Minister, Hafez Asad, stated (May 20, 1967):
Our forces are now entirely ready not only to repulse the aggression,
but to initiate the work of liberation itself and to exploit the Zionist
presence in the Arab homeland. The Syrian Army with its finger on
the trigger is united. I, as a military man, believe that the time has
come to enter into the battle of annihilation.
Nasser told the Egyptian Army in Sinai (May 22, 1967):
The Israeli flag shall not go through the Gulf of Aqaba. Our
sovereignty over the entrance to the Gulf cannot be disputed. If
Israel wishes to threaten war we will tell her 'You are welcome.'
Ahmed Shukairy, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization
(May 26, 1967):
D-Day is approaching. The Arabs have waited nineteen years for this
and will not flinch from the war of liberation.
Nasser (May 27, 1967):
Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab
people want to fight . . . The meaning of Sharm el Sheikh is a
confrontation with Israel. Adopting this measure obligates us to be
ready to embark on a general war with Israel.
Nasser (May 28, 1967):
We will not accept. . . co-existence with Israel. . . Today the issue is
not the establishment of peace between the Arab states and
Israel . . . The war with Israel is in effect since 1948.
Cairo Radio (May 30, 1967):
With the closing of the Gulf of Akaba, Israel is faced with two
alternatives either of which will destroy it; it will either be strangled
to death by the Arab military and economic boycott, or it will
perish by the fire of the Arab forces encompassing it from the South
from the North and from the East.
Nasser (May 30, 1967):
The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on the
borders of Israel. . . to face the challenge, while standing behind us
are the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan, and the whole Arab
nation. This act will astound the world. Today they will know that
the Arabs are arranged for battle, the critical hour has arrived. We
have reached the stage of serious action and not of mere
declarations.
The Background to the 1967 Conflict
61
Cairo daily, Al Akhbar (May 3 1 , 1967):
Under terms of the military agreement signed with Jordan,
Jordanian artillery co-ordinated with the forces of Egypt and Syria
is in a position to cut Israeli in two at Kalkilya, where Israeli
territory between the Jordan armistice line and the Mediterranean
Sea is only twelve kilometres wide . . .
President Aref of Iraq (May 3 1 , 1967):
The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. This is
our opportunity to wipe out the ignomity which has been with us
since 1948. Our goal is clear — to wipe Israel off the map.
Ahmed Shukairy, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization
(June 1, 1967):
This is a fight for the homeland — it is either us or the Israelis There
is no middle road. The Jews of Palestine will have to leave. We will
facilitate their departure to their former homes. Any of the old
Palestine Jewish population who survive may stay, but it is my
impression that none of them will survive.
Hussein in the newspaper, Al Hayat (June 2, 1967):
Our increased co-operation with Egypt and other Arab states both
in the east and in the west will enable us to march along the right
road which will lead us to the erasure of the shame and the
liberation of Palestine.
Radio Amman (June 5, 1967):
The hoped for moment has arrived! The hour which you longed for
is here! Forward to arms, to battle, to new pages of glory!
These, and hundreds of similar statements, were paralleled
by an enormous build-up of U.A.R. forces on the borders of
Israel, and the signing of a joint military command between
the Egyptians and the Jordanians.
Israel
endeavoured
unsuccessfully
to
bring
about
intervention by the major world powers to end the illegal
U.A.R. blockade of the Straits of Tiran. On J u n e 5, 1967,
war broke out and within six days Israel had successfully
defeated the combined armies of the U.A.R., Jordan and
Syria.
In recent years the Arabs have tried to rewrite history by
claiming that the 1967 war was a result of aggressive Israeli
expansionism. Apart from the public record of statements by
Arab leaders which make such claims ludicrous, the incredible
graveyard of military equipment scattered for hundreds of
miles in the Sinai Desert up to the Suez Canal, and on the
DEPLOYMENT
OF
ARAB
FORCES
AGAINST
ISRAEL,
JUNE 4, 1967
(Reproduced
by
permission of
CARTA
publications
Tel Aviv
Israel)
Nasser (May 30, 1967):
The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria
and Lebanon are massed on the
borders of Israel. .. today the
world shall know that the Arabs are
girded for battle, as the fateful hour
approaches.
Abba Eban, Israeli Foreign Minister
(November 9, 1967):
We are determined never to return
to the danger and vulnerability
from which we have emerged; this
determination overrides every other
consideration.
64
The Case for Israel
Heights of Golan in Syria, provides irrefutable evidence of
the enormous offensive planned by the Arabs for the publicly
stated intention of annihilating Israel. The suggestion that
King Hussein was an innocent victim of the war is also false,
as the Jordanians need not have become involved. Israeli
Premier Eshkol pleaded with them n o t to participate in
hostilities against Israel. However, as Hussein himself
subsequently admitted in his book My War with Israel, he
was convinced that Israel was about to be overwhelmed and,
not wishing to miss out, ordered the Jordanian Army to
initiate hostilities. The Israeli section of Jerusalem was
bombed and Jordanians attempted to storm the Israeli
positions.