America's Information Edge
Author(s): Joseph S. Nye Jr. and William A. Owens
Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 1996), pp. 20-36
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
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Information
America's
Edge
Joseph S.Nye, Jr., andWilliam A. Owens
THE
POWER
RESOURCE
OF THE
FUTURE
more
than ever before, is power. The one country that
Knowledge,
can best lead the information revolution will be more
powerful than any
other. For the foreseeable future, that country is the United States. Amer
ica has apparent strength inmilitary power and economic production. Yet
itsmore subtle comparative advantage is its ability to collect, process, act
information, an edge that will almost certainly
upon, and disseminate
invest
grow over the next decade. This advantage stems from Cold War
ments and America s open society, thanks to which it dominates
impor
tant communications
and information processing technologies?space
has
based surveillance, direct broadcasting, high-speed
computers?and
an
to integrate
complex information systems.
unparalleled ability
or defeat traditional
can
This
information
help deter
advantage
in which
the mean
threats at relatively low cost. In aworld
military
deterrence
the nuclear umbrella, and conventional
ing of containment,
can
have changed, the information advantage
strengthen the intellec
new
and
U.
S.
tual link between
military power and offer
foreign policy
ways of maintaining
leadership in alliances and ad hoc coalitions.
as a force
of
The information
multiplier
edge is equally important
attraction
of
"soft power"?the
American
diplomacy,
including
States can use its
American
democracy and free markets.1 The United
Joseph
Council
S. Nye,
Jr.,
and Assistant
in the Clinton
of Government
Owens
Clinton
former
Chairman
Secretary
administration,
at Harvard
of the National
of Defense
Intelligence
Affairs
for International
of the John F. Kennedy
Admiral
William
University.
isDean
School
A.
is former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the
administration.
[20]
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- Wir
m-mm?
%
willson/cartoonists
& writers
syndicate
outcomes
to achieve
is the
in international
desired
affairs
lUSoft power"
ability
or
to follow,
rather than coercion.
It works
others
attraction
get
by convincing
through
to agree
and institutions
the desired
Soft
them
that
behavior.
to, norms
ting
produce
can rest on the
or the
to set the
in
of
one's
ideas
that
ways
power
agenda
appeal
ability
in the percep
If a state can make
the
of others.
its power
shape
preferences
legitimate
or
and establish
international
institutions
that encourage
them to channel
tion of others
as many
to
itmay not need
of its costly
traditional
economic
limit their activities,
expend
or
resources.
to Lead:
Nature
See Joseph
S. Nye,
The
Jr., Bound
military
Changing
of
American
Power,
BasicBooks,
1990.
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
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[21]
and William A. Owens
Joseph S.NyeyJr.y
resources to engage China, Russia, and other
information
powerful
states in security dialogues to prevent them from becoming hostile. At
the same time, its information edge can help prevent states like Iran and
it can bolster
Iraq, already hostile, from becoming powerful. Moreover,
un
new democracies and communicate
directly with those living under
democratic regimes. This advantage is also important in efforts to pre
vent and resolve
with prominent post-Cold
regional conflicts and deal
War dangers, including international crime, terrorism, proliferation of
and damage to the global environment.
of mass destruction,
weapons
States from real
Yet two conceptual problems prevent the United
thinking clouds the ap
izing its potential. The first is that outmoded
measures
as power. Traditional
of military
preciation of information
force, gross national product, population,
energy, land, and minerals
to dominate
of the balance of power.
discussions
have continued
These power resources still matter, and American
leadership contin
on them as well as on the information
ues to
edge. But these
depend
measures failed to anticipate the demise of the Soviet Union,
and they
means
are an
of forecasting for the exercise of American
equally poor
next century.
leadership into the
In assessing power in the information age, the importance of tech
that
flexibility has risen, whereas
nology, education, and institutional
and raw materials has fallen. Japan adapted
of geography, population,
to these changes through growth in the 1980s far better than by pur
tra
information,
suing territorial conquest in the 1930s. In neglecting
ditional measures of the balance of power have failed to anticipate the
of the last decade: the Soviet Union s fall, Japan s
key developments
of the United
States.
rise, and the continuing prominence
a
to grasp the na
failure
The second conceptual problem has been
ture of information.
It is easy to trace and forecast the growth of ca
to process
information
The
information.
and exchange
pabilities
revolution, for example, clearly is in its formative
stages, but one can
of key tech
foresee that the next step will involve the convergence
such as digitization,
televisions,
computers,
telephones,
nologies,
of
But to capture the implications
and precise global positioning.
the interactions
information
capabilities,
particularly
growing
power is also hard to
among them, is far more difficult. Information
cuts across all other military,
economic,
social,
categorize because it
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Americas
Information Edge
in some cases diminishing
and political
their
resources,
power
it.
strength, in others multiplying
must
The United
States
adjust its defense and foreign policy strat
to
its
re
reflect
egy
growing comparative
advantage in information
sources. Part of this
adjustment will entail purging conceptual vestiges.
Some of the lingeringColdWar inhibitions on sharing intelligence, for
new
Some
example, keep the United States from seizing
opportunities.
of the adjustment will require innovation
in existing institutions.
In
formation
relics, as some in
agencies need not remain Cold War
describe them, but should be used as instruments that can be
Congress
more
powerful, cost effective, and flexible than ever before. Likewise,
the artificially sharp distinction
between military
and political assets
has kept the United
States from suppressing hate propaganda
that has
incited ethnic
conflicts.
MILITARY
The
more
CAPABILITY AND
INFORMATION
character
of U.S. military forces is changing,
perhaps much
rapidly than most appreciate, for, driven by the information rev
inmilitary affairs is at hand. This American-led
olution, a revolution
stems from advances
revolution
in several technologies
and, more
important, from the ability to tie these developments
together and
build the doctrines,
and tactics that take
of
strategies,
advantage
their technical potential.
isr is the acronym for
intelligence collection, surveillance, and recon
naissance. Advanced
C41 refers to technologies and systems that provide
and computer processing. Perhaps
command, control, communications,
the best-known
advance is precision force, thanks to the
videotapes of
munitions
used in Operation Desert Storm. The lat
precision-guided
ter is a broader
concept than some imagine, for it refers to a general abil
use
ity to
deadly violence with greater speed, range, and precision.
In part because of past investments,
in part serendipitously,
the
United
States leads other nations in each of these areas, and its rate of
improvement will increase dramatically over the next decade. Sensors,
for example, will give real-time continuous
surveillance in all types of
areas.
weather over large geographical
informa
Fusing and processing
sense of the vast amount of data that can be
tion?making
gathered?
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[23]
Joseph S.NyeyJr.y and William A. Owens
will give U.S. forces what is called dominant
a
battlespace knowledge,
wide asymmetry between what Americans
and opponents know. With
that, the United States will be able to prevail militarily, whether the arena
commensurate
Without
risk, the United States
will be able to thwart
any military
action.
is a triple-canopy jungle, an urban area, or sim
ilar to Desert
in com
Storm. Improvements
mand-and-control
systems and in other com
munications
and entering service?posit
leaps in the ability
to transfer information,
imagery, and other
to
data
operating forces in forms that are im
mediatelv
is integrating
The emerging
funded
technologies?already
usable.
In short, the United
States
the technical advances of isr, C41, and precision force.
result is a system of systems that represents a
qualitative
change inU.S. military capabilities.
These
the ability to gather, sort, process,
technologies
provide
about highly complex events that
transfer, and display information
occur in wide
areas. However,
this is important for more
geographic
than fighting wars. In a rapidly changing world,
information
about
a central
is occurring becomes
re
what
of international
commodity
as
use
the threat and
of military force was seen as the cen
lations, just
an
resource
in
tral power
international
system overshadowed
by the
clash of superpowers.
potential
There has been an explosion
of information. Yet some kinds of
sort?are
information?the
accurate,
timely, and comprehensible
more
than others. Graphic
valuable
video
images of Rwandan
refugees fleeing the horror of tribal hatreds may generate worldwide
for action. But precise knowledge
of how
sympathy and demands
are
is
many refugees
moving where, how, and under what conditions
critical for effective action.
on the
information
Military
disposition,
activity, and capabilities
of military forces still ranks high in importance because military
is still perceived
concerns
the point,
in what
prominently
force
as the final arbiter of
disagreements.
that military
force may be used
states do.
More
to
still figure
of the world does not necessarily es
growing interdependence
tablish greater harmony. It does, however, make military force amat
ter of interest to audiences outside the local theater. The direct use of
The
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AFFAIRS
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America's Information Edge
nu
military force no longer calls up the specter of escalation to global
a
clear holocaust,
but it remains
activity. The
costly and dangerous
Gulf War
raised the price of oil worldwide.
Russian military opera
tions in Chechnya
the political actions of Muslims
have influenced
from North Africa to Indonesia. The armed conflict in Bosnia colors
and future of nato
and the United Nations. Military
force tears the fabric of new interrelationships
and conditions
the po
litical and economic behavior of nearly all nations. These
considera
tions suggest a general framework within which the emerging
military
the character
capabilities of theUnited States can be linked to its foreign policy.
The
of deterrence
the emerging American
undergirding
a
to
system of systems envisions
strong enough
military
military
a
thwart any foreign military action without
commensurate
incurring
or cost. Those who
a
risk
military
contemplate
military clash with the
United
States will have to face the prospect that itwill be able to halt
and reverse any hostile action, with low risk to U.S. forces.
concept
not necessarily
be able to deter or coerce
and coercion depend on an imbalance
every adversary. Deterrence
of will as well as capabilities,
and when a conflict involves interests
to an
to the United
States,
absolutely vital
adversary but peripheral
an opponent may not
a
short
of
American
yield
complete
victory in
battle. Still, the relationship
between willpower
and capabilities
is
awareness cannot reduce the risk of
reciprocal. Superior battlefield
The United
States will
to zero, but it can
keep that risk low enough to maintain
the American
support for the use of force. The ability to
publics
costs in the early phases of a conflict can un
inflict high military
dermine an adversary's will, unity, and hope that it can prevail. Be
cause the United
States will be able to dominate
in battle, it has to
casualties
be prepared for efforts to test or undermine
its resolve off the bat
tlefield with terror and propaganda.
But military
force can deter the
use of those instruments
as well.
THE
INFORMATION
UMBRELLA
information
s
technologies
driving America
emerging mili
classic
to
deterrence
tary capabilities may change
theory. Threatening
use
will do automatically
military force is not something Americans
The
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
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[25]
Joseph S.NyeyJr.y and William A. Owens
or
some undesirable
side effects. In an era in
easily and has always had
which
soft power increasingly
influences international
affairs, threats
and the image of arrogance and belligerence
that tends to go with
them undercut an image of reason, democracy,
and open dialogue.
Americas
those that
emerging military
capabilities?particularly
more
real-time understanding
is taking place
of what
provide much
a
area?can
in large geographical
help blunt this paradox. They offer,
If the United
for example, far greater pre-crisis
States
transparency.
to share this transparency,
iswilling
itwill be better able to build op
posing coalitions before aggression has occurred. But the effect may
be more general, for all nations now operate in an ambiguous world,
or
a context that is not
entirely benign
soothing.
In this setting, the emerging U.S.
suggest leverage
capabilities
once
with
friends
similar to what
extended
nuclear deterrence
umbrella provided a cooperative
structure, link
States in amutually
beneficial way to awide range of
ing the United
It was a logical response to the
friends, allies, and neutral nations.
relations?the
threat of Soviet aggres
central issue of international
offered. The
nuclear
the central issue is ambiguity about the type and degree of
is the capacity to clarify and cut
and
the basis for cooperation
threats,
through that ambiguity.
The set of fuzzy guidelines
the Cold War once pro
and meanings
vided has been replaced by a deeper ambiguity regarding international
events. Because
the international
system
nearly all nations viewed
same
War
much
Cold
shared
the
lenses, they
through
understanding.
the world,
the character and complexities
of a
To nations throughout
civil war in the Balkans would have been far less important than the
there because the event itself could have triggered a
fact of disruption
nato and theWarsaw
Pact. Details on
military confrontation between
and Soviet border guards did not really
the clashes between Chinese
counted was that a split had appeared in one of the
matter; what
world s great coalitions. Now the details of events seem to count more.
sion. Now
framework of the Cold War gone, the implica
the organizing
to know more
and all nations want
tions are harder to categorize,
it
and why to help them decide how much
about what is happening
matters and what they should do about it. Coalition
leadership for the
future will proceed less from the military capacity to crush
foreseeable
With
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Americas
Information Edge
and more from the ability quickly to reduce the ambi
any opponent
to
to use force, where
respond flexibly, and
guity of violent situations,
necessary, with precision and accuracy.
core of these
knowl
situational
The
capabilities?dominant
can
The
United
States
share
all or
edge?is
fungible and divisible.
it chooses. Sharing would em
part of its knowledge with whomever
to make better decisions
in a less-than-benign
power recipients
world, and should they decide to fight, they could achieve the same
as the United
States.
kind of military dominance
to what might be called an information
These
capabilities point
nuclear deterrence,
umbrella. Like extended
they could form the
foundation
for amutually
beneficial
States
relationship. The United
would provide situational awareness, particularly
regarding military
matters
of interest to other nations. Other
nations, because
they
could share this information
about an event or crisis, would be more
inclined
to work with
the United
States.
a
were born
such
of
relationship already exist. They
beginnings
in the Falklands conflict and are being developed today in the Balkans.
At present, the United States provides the bulk of the situational aware
ness available to the
Force, the U.N. Protection Force,
Implementation
nato members,
and other nations involved in or concerned with the
conflict there. It is possible to envision a similar central information role
for the United
States in other crises or potential military
confronta
in the Spratly Islands to cutting
tions, from clarifying developments
oper
through the ambiguity and confusion surrounding humanitarian
ations in Cambodia
and Rwanda. Accurate,
situational
real-time,
awareness is the
to
on what
key
reaching agreement within coalitions
to do and is essential to the effective use of
military forces, whatever
their roles and missions. As its capacity to provide this kind of infor
mation
increases, America will increasingly be viewed as the natural
coalition leader, not just because it happens to be the strongest but be
cause it can
most
important input for good decisions and
provide the
effective action for other coalition members. Just as nuclear dominance
The
was
the key to coalition leadership in the old era, information domi
nance will be the
key in the information age.
All this implies selectively sharing U.S. dominant
battlespace knowl
edge, advanced C41, and precision force. Old-era
thinking might recoil
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[27]
Joseph S.NyeyJr.y
from such a prospect,
and William A. Owens
and itwould
have to overcome
long-established
and
with
what
generous
open
prejudices against being
might broadly be
called intelligence. In the past, two presumptions
supported this reluc
too much of the best information risked dis
tance: first, that
providing
even
sources and methods
used in ob
closing and perhaps
losing the
taining it, and second, that sharing information would disclose what the
United States did not know and reduce its status as a superpower.
are now even more
than before.
These
assumptions
questionable
States is no longer in a zero-sum
The United
game that makes any
a potential
of capabilities
disclosure
loss for itself and a gain for an
If itdoes not share its
information lead, the
United States will
implacable opponent. The character of this
one
growing prowess is different. For
thing,
the disparity between
the United
States and
is quite marked. U.S.
invest
in isr?particularly
the high-leverage
aspects of this set of systems?
space-based
exceeds that of all other nations combined,
encourage
competitors.
and America
leads by a considerable margin
in C41 and precision force as well. It has al
to assemble the new system of systems
ready begun, systematically,
and iswell down the revolutionary path, while most nations have not
in military
affairs is under way.
yet even realized a revolution
Some other nations could match what the United States will achieve,
available
albeit not as early. The revolution is driven by technologies
other
nations
ment
worldwide.
computer processing, precise global position
Digitization,
on which the rest
and
systems integration?the
technological bases
ing,
available to any nation with the
of the new capabilities depend?are
to improve military ca
money and the will to use them systematically
these technologies can be expensive. But more im
pabilities. Exploiting
no
to seek the sys
portant, there is
particular incentive for those nations
as
tem of systems the United
States is building?so
long
they believe
na
are not threatened
by it.This is the emerging symbiosis among
they
another nation decides to make a race out of the in
tions, for whether
revolution depends on how the United States uses its lead. If
itwill add incentives to match it.
America does not share its knowledge,
not only the route of coali
Selectively sharing these abilities is therefore
tion leadership but the key to maintaining U.S. military superiority.
formation
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America's Information Edge
THE
SOFT
SIDE
OF
INFORMATION
POWER
information
not
affairs
age has revolutionized
only military
to
of soft power and the opportunities
but the instruments
apply
them. One of the ironies of the twentieth century is thatMarxist
the
orists, as well as their critics, such as George Orwell,
correctly noted
can
that technological
developments
profoundly
shape societies and
The
but both groups misconstrued
how. Technological
and
governments,
economic
change have for the most part proved to be pluralizing
forces conducive to the formation of free markets rather than repres
sive forces enhancing
centralized power.
One of the driving factors in the remarkable change in the Soviet
Union was that Mikhail
Gorbachev
and other Soviet leaders un
that the Soviet economy
derstood
could not advance from the ex
tensive, or industrial, to the intensive, or postindustrial,
stage of de
on
unless
loosened
constraints
from
velopment
they
everything
xerox
to
can
that
also
dissemi
computers
machines?technologies
nate diverse
to
ideas.
China
tried
resist
this
tide, attempt
political
use of fax machines
to
limit
the
after
the
1989 Tiananmen
ing
were a
means
in which
of communica
Square massacre,
they
key
tion between protesters
and the outside world, but the effort failed.
Now not only fax machines
but satellite dishes have proliferated
in
and the government
itself has begun wiring
Internet con
China,
nections
and plans to install the equivalent of an entire Baby Bell's
worth of telephone
lines each year.
This new political and technological
for
landscape is ready-made
the United
States to capitalize on its formidable
tools of soft power,
to project the
of
its
ideals, ideology, culture, economic model,
appeal
and social and political
and to take advantage of its in
institutions,
ternational
business
and telecommunications
networks. American
its libertarian and egalitarian currents, domi
popular culture, with
nates film, television,
and electronic
communications.
American
some 450,000
higher education draws
foreign students each year. Not
are
all aspects of American
culture
attractive, of course, particularly
to conservative Muslims.
American
in the
Nonetheless,
leadership
information
revolution has generally
increased global awareness of
to American
and openness
ideas and values.
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[29]
Joseph S.Nyeyjr.y
and William A. Owens
for four
those responsible
In this information-rich
environment,
vital tasks can draw on Americas
comparative advantage in informa
tran
tion and soft power resources. These tasks are aiding democratic
and authoritarian
sitions in the remaining communist
states, prevent
new and
in
and
preempting
fragile democracies,
ing backsliding
in
resolving regional conflicts, and addressing the threats of terrorism,
of mass destruction,
of weapons
and
ternational crime, proliferation
of
damage to the global environment. Each requires close coordination
the military
and diplomatic
components
of Americas
foreign policy.
States and Aiding Democratic Transitions
Engaging Undemocratic
undemocratic
Numerous
regimes survived the Cold War,
including
states such as China and Cuba but a variety of
not only communist
formed by authori
unelected
governments
tarians or dominant
social, ethnic, religious,
The new landscape waits
some of these
or familial groups.
Ominously,
for theUnited States to governments have attempted to acquire nu
them Libya,
clear weapons,
Iran,
among
project its ideals, culture,
Korea.
toward
U.S.
and
North
policies
Iraq,
and institutions.
these countries are tailored to their respective
circumstances
and
international
behavior.
to engage those states,
com
the international
States should continue selectively
The United
as
that show promise of joining
such
China,
to contain those regimes, like Iraq's, that offer
munity, while working
or isolate undemocratic
no such
seeking to engage
hope. Whether
case the United
States should engage the people,
regimes, in every
on world events and helping them prepare to
keeping them informed
arises.
build democratic market societies when the opportunity
are
as
vital to the
the U.S. Information Agency
such
Organizations
is instructive.
China
transitions. Again
task of aiding democratic
has in the
arm, the Voice of America,
broadcasting
last few years become the primary news source for 60 percent of the
to communi
educated Chinese. Americas
increasing technical ability
over the heads of
cate with the public in foreign countries,
literally
to foster democ
their rulers via satellite, provides a great opportunity
to dismantle us?a
racy. It is ironic to find Congress
debating whether
is greatly expanding.
its potential
just when
us?a s international
[30]
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AFFAIRS
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Americas
Information Edge
Protecting New Democracies
Soviet bloc
states have emerged from the communist
Democratic
as
Latin America,
and authoritarian
regimes in other regions, such
where for the first time every country but Cuba has an elected gov
their re
States is preventing
ernment. A major task for the United
the commu
and enlarging
version to authoritarianism.
Protecting
serves U.S.
and
democracies
security, political,
nity of market
are better
democracies
interests. Capitalist
economic
trading part
one another.
ners and
rarely fight
Edu
important program here is the International Military
in the 1950s, imet has trained
cation and Training
program. Begun
more
than half a million
foreign officers in American
high-level
the
relations. With
and democratic
civil-military
military methods
An
the program has been expanded to deal with
end of the Cold War,
to
and emphasizes
the needs of new democracies
training civilians
an annual
oversee
and budgets. With
budget
organizations
military
imet is
similar
Defense
Two
cost-effective.
less than $50 million,
quite
are theMarshall
inGarmisch,
Center
efforts
Germany,
Department
in
Studies
for
Center
and the Asia-Pacific
Hawaii, which
Security
train both
military
and
among the parliaments,
new democracies.
civilian
students
executives,
and promote
and military
contacts
organizations
of
and Resolving Regional Conflicts
Preventing
Communal
ethnic, religious, or
conflicts, or conflicts over competing
national identities, often escalate as a result of propaganda
campaigns
want to divert attention
who
those
leaders,
particularly
by demagogic
from their own failings, establish their nationalist credentials, or seize
television, and other
countries, telephones,
power. Yet in developing
an open
are
forms of telecommunication
creating
rapidly growing,
to under
us?a and other
agencies
campaigns by
ing for information
resolve and unity created by ethno-nationalist
pro
to
be
U.S.
used
At
times,
suppress
military
technology may
paganda.
can
or
us?a
incite
while
that
broadcasts
violence,
jam
provide unbi
ased reportage and expose false reports. U.S. air strikes on Serb com
munications
facilities, for example, had the added benefit of making
of Serbian propaganda more difficult.
the transmission
mine
the artificial
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
March/April 1996
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
[31]
Joseph S.Nyeyjr.y
and William A. Owens
The
of the Bosnian peace agreement at Dayton, Ohio,
negotiation
last fall illustrated a diplomatic
dimension
of information power. The
an agreement where
in getting
United
States succeeded
for years
other negotiating
parties had failed in part because of its superior in
assets. The
to monitor
formation
the actions of all parties in
ability
the field helped provide confidence
that the agreement
could be
verified, while detailed maps of Bosnia reduced potential misunder
three-dimensional
virtual reality
standings. The American-designed
also undoubtedly
the negotiating
maps
helped
parties in drawing
cease-fire lines and resolving whether vehicles traveling various roads
could be targeted with direct-fire weapons,
and generally
demon
strated the capacity of U.S. troops to understand
in
the terrain
Bosnia
as well as or better than any of the local
military groups.
to
Information
in the
earlier
expose propaganda
campaigns
Rwandan
conflict might
have mitigated
the tragedy. Rwanda
has
some 500,000
radios. A few simple mea
only 14,000 phones but
extremist Hutu
radio broadcasts
that
sures, such as suppressing
called for attacks on civilians, or broadcasting
Voice of America
(voa) reports that exposed the true actions and goals of those who
to
and incite genocide, might
have
sought
hijack the government
contained or averted the killing.
Such cases point to the need for closer coordination
between
the
us?a and the
of
in
Defense
Department
identifying hateful radio or
television transmissions
that are inciting violence and in taking steps
to suppress them and
In some instances
provide better information.
the United
States might
share intelligence with parties to a dispute to
reassure them that the other side is not
an offensive or cheat
preparing
on arms control or other agreements.
ing
and the Environment
Crimey Terrorism, Proliferation,
to
The fourth task is
information
focus U.S.
technology
tional
on interna
international
terrorism,
crime, drug smuggling,
proliferation
mass
of weapons
and the global environment. The di
of
destruction,
rector of the c?a, John M. Deutch,
has focused his agency's efforts on
new Office
the first four of these, while
the State Department's
of
issues. In
Global Affairs has taken the lead on global environmental
formation has always been the best means of preventing
and coun
[32]
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
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Americas
Information Edge
States can bring the same kind
tering terrorist attacks, and the United
to bear abroad that the fbi used
of information processing
capabilities
to capture and convict the terrorists who bombed
the
domestically
and drug smuggling,
the cia, fbi, Defense
various U.S.
including
agencies,
Intelligence
more
of
have
and
Defense,
begun working
Department
Agency,
one another and their
to pool their
foreign counterparts
closely with
information
and resources. Such efforts can help the United
States
defeat adversaries on and off the battlefield.
resources to uncover
States has used its information
The United
World
Center.
Trade
On
international
crime
a detailed
and negotiate
nuclear weapons
program
to discover Russian
for its dismantlement,
and Chinese
agreement
nuclear cooperation with Iran quickly and discourage
it, to bolster
en
to
U.N.
inspections of Iraqi nuclear facilities, and
help safeguard
the former Soviet republics.
riched uranium
supplies throughout
on
such as global
evidence
environmental
And mounting
dangers
and ozone depletion, much of it gathered and disseminated
warming
North
Korea's
scientists
by American
other states understand
the way to cost-effective
government
agencies, has helped
these problems
and can now begin to point
and U.S.
remedies.
THE MARKET WILL NOT SUFFICE
Many
of
in these four overarching
tasks have been ig
nored or disdained by some who have clung to narrow Cold War no
in pursu
tions of U.S.
security and of the roles of various agencies
to
it.
in
Some
for example,
have been reluctant
ing
Congress,
involve U.S.
that does not directly
support any defense
spending
combat troops and equipment. However,
defense by other means is rel
atively inexpensive. Programs like the Partnership for Peace, us?a, imet,
theMarshall
Center, the Asia-Pacific
Center, the military-to-military
dialogues
Ministerial
the efforts
and the Defense
sponsored by the U.S. unified command,
of the Americas
constitute only a tiny fraction of the de
fense budget. Although
it is impossible to quantify these programs'
we are convinced
in
contributions,
they are highly cost-effective
usia's
like
achievements,
serving U.S.
security needs.
Similarly,
imet
more
those of
and other instruments
of soft power, should be
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
<
March/April 1996
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[33]
Joseph S.NyeyJr.y and William A. Owens
appreciated,
usia's
seminal
contribution
of keeping
the idea of
the Cold War
could be a
alive in the Soviet bloc during
democracy
mere
prologue.
Some argue that the slow, diffuse, and subtle process of winning
news
hearts and minds can be met by nongovernmental
organizations.
aswell as the millions
These organizations,
of private individuals who
communicate with friends and colleagues abroad, have done much to
news and information
disseminate
globally. Yet the U.S. government
should not abdicate the agenda-setting
function to the media because
the market
InRwanda, Voice of
America could have
countered
Hutu
extremist
radio broadcasts.
leading
and private
individuals
cannot
fulfill all the information needs of American
for ex
foreign policy. The Voice of America,
in 48 languages and has an
ample, broadcasts
audience tens of millions
greater than cnn,
sta
only in English. The
tion's role in China illustrates the problem of
market
failure: one of the reasons it is the
which
broadcasts
source of news for educated Chinese
ended his broadcasting of the bbcWorld
is that Rupert Murdoch
Service Television News in
a commercial
concession
from the Chinese
China,
reportedly to win
In addition, voa can broadcast
communist government.
in languages
a
are
area too
such as Serbo-Croatian,
which
spoken in geographic
small to be more than a commercial niche market but crucial for for
current
cuts could force voa to
eign policy. Nonetheless,
budget
drop
as
as
20
in many
its broadcasting
languages.
The market will not find a private means to suppress radio broad
casts like those of the perpetrators
in Rwanda. There
of genocide
is
no economic
to jam
incentive for breaking
through foreign efforts
or
in
broadcasts
detailed
violence
reports on communal
compiling
the 30 or so ongoing
conflicts that rarely make the front page. Left
to itself, the market
is likely to continue to have a highly uneven pat
tern of access to the Internet. Of the 15,000 networks on the
global
and
Internet in early 1994, only 42 were inMuslim
29 of
countries,
In response, us?a and the U.S.
these were in Turkey and Indonesia.
Agency
global
for International
Development
access to the Internet.
[34]
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
have worked
VolumejsNo.2
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to improve
Americas
THE
premature
Information Edge
AMERICAN
COMING
CENTURY
Time magazine
founder Henry Luce
termed the American
century has been declared more than once by
21st century, not the twentieth, will
disciples of decline. In truth, the
turn out to be the period of America's greatest preeminence.
Informa
tion is the new coin of the international
and
the
United
States
realm,
The
end of what
is better positioned
than any other country to multiply
the potency of
its hard and soft power resources through information. This does not
mean that the United
States can act unilaterally, much less coercively,
as a
to achieve its international
goals. The beauty of information
it can enhance the effectiveness
of raw
power resource is that, while
societies. The communist
military power, it ineluctably democratizes
their centralized au
and authoritarian regimes that hoped tomaintain
thority while still reaping the economic and military benefits of infor
a Faustian
mation
discovered
they had signed
technologies
bargain.
The United
of its military
States can increase the effectiveness
safe for soft power, America's
inherent
a strategy based on America's
Yet
informa
comparative
advantage.
tion advantage
and soft power has some prerequisites.
The neces
and programs,
isr, C41, and precision
sary defense
technologies
force, must be adequately funded. This does not require a bigger de
fense budget, but it does mean
the Defense
is
which
Department,
to accelerate
inclined
and expand
these capabilities,
should be
forces
and make
the world
granted flexibility in setting funding priorities within
its budgetary
line. Congressional
of programs
imposition
by the
opposed
as
in
and civilian leaders
the Defense
military
Department?such
to buy more b-2 aircraft at a cost of billions of dol
the requirement
from that flexibility
and retard the military
lars?detract
leverage
that can be gained by completing
in military
the revolution
affairs.
new
to
Channels
into alliances and
parlay these
military
capabilities
coalitions must be supported: military-to-military
imet,
contacts,
and the Marshall
and Asia-Pacific
Centers.
is often a
Information
top
public
good,
but
it is not a free one. Constraints
system-of-systems
capabilities
and
the entire
gence,
imagery,
should be loosened.
pabilities
FOREIGN
on the
sharing of
and the selective transfer of intelli
isr ca
range of America's
growing
AFFAIRS
March/April 1996
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
[35]
Joseph S.Nyeyjr.y
and William A. Owens
and public broadcasting
channels through which
infor
Diplomatie
can be
resources and
must be maintained.
mation
advantages
applied
The us?a, voa and other information agencies need adequate funding.
the us?a, which has changed
The Cold War
legislation authorizing
little since the early 1950s, draws too sharp a line in barring us?a from
us?a
For example, while
information
domestically.
disseminating
to be
from targeting its programs at do
prohibited
mestic audiences, Congress has discouraged us?a even from advertising
as well as
sites in journals that reach domestic
its Internet
foreign
should instead actively support usia's efforts to
audiences. Congress
new
new Electronic Media
including the agency's
technologies,
exploit
to set upWorld Wide Web home pages on de
Team, which isworking
mocratization
and the creation and functioning of free markets.
is the preservation of
The final and most fundamental
requirement
soft power appeal.
the kind of nation that is at the heart of America's
In recent years this most valuable foreign policy asset has been endan
as a
society
gered by the growing international perception of America
riven by crime, violence, drug abuse, racial tension, family breakdown,
fiscal irresponsibility, political gridlock, and increasingly acrimonious
extreme points of view make the
in which
biggest
political discourse
are
and
domestic
headlines. America's
inextricably in
foreign
policies
tertwined. A healthy democracy at home, made accessible around the
should
continue
can foster the
communications,
enlargement of
is ultimately
of democracies, which
the best
the peaceful community
guarantee of a secure, free, and prosperous world.?
world
through modern
[36]
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
-Volume75N0.2
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