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graphs, and maps. I noticed only one factual error, which placed Whitney
Pier, home of the heroic Private Alphonse Hickey, in New Brunswick
instead of Cape Breton.
BRIAN TENNYSON University College of Cape Breton
A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea. WILLIAM
JOHNSTON.
Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003. Pp. xx, 426, illus. $45.00
The Korean War isfinallyreceiving the scholarly attention it deserves, as
historians reassess the so-called forgotten war and publishers capitalize
on newfound interest in the conflict. So often it has been the American
experience that has received the more intensive examination, with the
'other' United Nations participants, mainly Commonwealth and Turkish
forces, providing the focus for an article here and a monograph there.
Moreover, the Korean War frequently gets cursory treatment as an
appendix to the early Cold War. Contextually, this has some merit, but
even this is changing, as more historians are examining the conflict on
its own merits at both the macro and micro levels. William Strueck's
Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History
(Princeton University Press, 2002) and William Earl Hamburger's
Leadership in the Crucible: The Korean War Battles of Twin Tunnels and
Chipyong-Ni (Texas A&M University Press, 2003) are respectively representative of the broad strategic focus versus the narrow tactical study.
What has been missing from this recent scholarship, however, is a book
that provides the singular combination of strategic context and tactical
detail that dissects a national experience in this war to a degree that
offers fresh interpretation and clear lessons in readable prose.
William Johnston, a historian with the Directorate of History and
Heritage at the Canadian Department of National Defence, has written
just such a book. Despite its somewhat misleading title, which leads one
to think the book is solely about Canadian small unit tactics, Johnston
has produced a work of breadth and depth that describes the Canadian
experience in Korea. Johnston skilfully and lucidly guides the reader in
and out of deep mineshafts of detail while always maintaining a solid
safety line to the broad, contextual surface. His purpose is to tell the
Canadian experience in the Korean War and to correct what he sees as
mistakes in previous interpretations of this experience. For Canada, the
war was so different from its Second World War experience, yet veterans
of that conflict had an invaluable impact on how Canada fought in Korea.
Johnston's thesis is that there were three distinct periods of experience
8o6 The Canadian Historical Review
for Canadian forces in Korea, each fashioned by the three commanders
and the three forces sent to Korea. The main punch of this thesis is that
leadership and tactical differences influenced this experience, and thus
shaped Canada's role in Korea.
The Canadian response to the North Korean invasion south of the
38th parallel was at first tentative, but a sense of obligation to the young
United Nations and public opinion that demanded action on this obligation convinced Canada to send a brigade to Korea. The first brigade to
go over was a volunteer force drawn from a large pool containing many
veterans of the Second World War. Called the Canadian Army Special
Force, 25th Brigade's 2nd battalions were commanded by the dynamic,
courageous, and tactically insightful Brigadier John M. Rockingham. A
very successful Second World War combat leader, Rockingham utilized
officer and NCO experience to train Special Force for combat in Korea.
Although they were considered by some historians as a mob of unruly
and undisciplined adventurers, Johnston maintains that nothing could
be farther from the truth. He suggests, rather, that Rockingham's unit
may have been one of the best prepared forces Canada has ever sent into
the field. Special Force was a highly trained, highly skilled unit that
served well in the unique circumstances of Korea. Basically fighting a
holding action, Rockingham used active and aggressive patrols to limit
Chinese activity in the Canadian sector. Special Force knew the terrain,
had good reconnaissance, and was thus able to effectively counter many
Chinese raids and conduct equally effecfive raids on their own. The
success of this tactic came in relatively low casualty rates, considering the
numerous Chinese attacks thrown against them, and was in large part
successful because of Rockingham's emphasis on training and experience, as well as the combat leadership of Special Force's officers and
NCOS.
Unlike the 2nd battalions' eager-for-action volunteers, the men of the
ist battalions who replaced them in April 1952 were professional soldiers
who had signed up for the peacetime Canadian army. Under the command of Brigadier Mortimer Patrick Bogert, the troops of the ist battalions came to Korea with preconceived notions of the combat they would
encounter and the rowdy volunteers they would replace. Bogert seemed
more interested in 'spit and polish,' proper dress for formal mess, and
making certain that salutes were given according to regulation rather
than learning from the valuable experience Rockingham's forces had
gained and seemed willing to share. Using what Johnston calls 'inactive
defence' versus the active patrolling of Rockingham, Bogert's large
'fighting patrols' ventured forth into unknown terrain, running into
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unexpected mine fields, man-made and natural obstacles, and, of course,
the Chinese. As a result, Bogert's command suffered needless casualties
from more frequent and intense Chinese raids. Without active patrols
and the valuable reconnaissance they produced, Bogert had poor intelligence and less motivated troops, which in turn fed already poor leadership at almost every level.
The men of the ist battalions were replaced in May 1953 by the inexperienced troops of the 3rd battalions under the command of Second
World War combat commander Brigadier Jean V. Allard. Allard quickly
realized that his weakly trained force needed to shape up or be caught in
the same predicament that Bogert had allowed his men to sink into.
Allard set his subordinates immediately to work on repairing neglected
entrenchments, improving communication lines, and reordering fields
of fire to better defend the static line. Most importantly, however, he
reinstituted active recce patrols. Since Bogert took over the previous
spring, the Chinese had controlled the no man's land between the lines.
Allard stepped up the use of small fighting patrols to regain control of
the no man's land, and was thus able to keep morale up and casualties
low. Knowing the terrain is valuable knowledge, indeed.
Throughout the massively detailed yet very readable description of
each command's time in country, Johnston uses many examples to
highlight these distinct experiences, such as the effectiveness of Rockingham's active patrols versus the ineffectiveness of Bogert's passive
defence. Patrols and other engagements are described in vivid clarity,
and numerous maps help the unfamiliar reader grasp the complexity
and detail necessary to describe such operations.
Some might find Johnston's positive treatment of Special Force too
generous and his negative examination of Bogert's command too harsh.
Overall, however, the criticism of both commands is fair and warranted.
Additionally, Johnston consistently keeps the reader abreast of the broader context of the war and its distinct stages, and of the role of Canadian
forces in the Commonwealth division and the problems that arose in the
first United Nations-commanded military action. This context, combined with the narrower, more detailed focus on battlefield operations
and tactics, makes for a good read, a solid piece of scholarship, and a
worthy contribution to the understanding of Canadian forces in Korea. A
War of Patrols should be added to the required reading list for cadets and
infantry officers, and William Johnston should be applauded for this fine
and important book.
WILLIAM ALLISON Weber State University