Journal of Current
Southeast Asian Affairs
Renshaw, Catherine Shanahan (2013), Democratic Transformation and Regional
Institutions: The Case of Myanmar and ASEAN, in: Journal of Current Southeast
Asian Affairs, 32, 1, 29–54.
ISSN: 1868-4882 (online), ISSN: 1868-1034 (print)
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„„„
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 1/2013: 29–54
„„„
Democratic Transformation and Regional
Institutions: The Case of Myanmar and ASEAN
Catherine Shanahan Renshaw
Abstract: The focus of this article is Myanmar’s transition to democracy, which
is taking place after almost half a century of military rule. The former military
rulers are themselves the architects of transition. This article notes that one of
the key challenges faced by military regimes during this kind of transition is the
problem of “credible commitments”. In short, the issue is this: a transition will
only be successful if it has the support of the political opposition and the public
at large. But why should these groups believe in the promises of former tyrants?
Problems of credibility and low expectations about the intention and capacity of
the military to effect reform can cause destabilisation and undermine prospects
for a successful transition. In worst case scenarios, instability leads to a resurgence of authoritarianism, or to a(nother) military coup. This article highlights
the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in assisting the
transition and stabilisation of Myanmar’s fledgling democracy. The argument is
that ASEAN provides a means whereby Myanmar’s leaders can make credible
commitments about their intentions in relation to liberalisation and democratisation, lending support to Myanmar’s reformist government at a crucial time in
the transition to democracy. The article concludes that under certain circumstances, even regional organisations such as ASEAN, which are not comprised
of a majority of democratic states, can (to a degree) influence perceptions about
a democratising regime’s commitment to reform.
„ Manuscript received 30 March 2013; accepted 8 July 2013
Keywords: Myanmar, Burma, Indonesia, ASEAN, democratisation, credible
commitments, regionalism
Catherine Renshaw, BA (Hons) (Syd), LLB (UNSW), LLM (Syd), is an Associate of the Sydney Centre for International Law at the University of Sydney.
She researches, writes about and teaches human rights and democracy in Southeast Asia. She serves on the editorial board of the Journal of South Asian Studies
and between 2008 and 2010 was Director of an Australian Research Council
project on NHRIs in the Asia Pacific region. She is the author of numerous
journal articles and book chapters, the most recent being “Law, legitimacy and
the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights”, Thammasat
University Law Review (2012); “NHRIs in the Asia Pacific region: Internalizing
Human Rights in Asia”, in: Ryan Goodman and Thomas Pegram (eds), National
Human Rights Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
E-mail: <[email protected]>
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Catherine Shanahan Renshaw
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Introduction
After almost fifty years of military rule, Myanmar is embarked upon an uncertain transition to democracy. 1 One of the few points of agreement
amongst analysts is that reforms are the result of indigenous top–down
change (Hlaing 2009; Jagan 2011, Jagan 2012(a); Kurlantzick 2012; Taylor
2012). Reforms are not the result of pressure applied in the form of sanctions and trade embargoes by the United States or the European Union; nor
are they the result of the inconstant “moral pressure” applied by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); nor are they the result of a
popular uprising against the military government; nor are they the result of
the efforts of the political opposition. It is reasonably clear that Myanmar’s
government-led, tightly managed process of liberalisation and democratisation is “liberation from above” or “regime-initiated liberalisation”. In Samuel Huntington’s taxonomy of democratisation, this is called a “transformation” (Huntington 1991).
The success of transformation from military rule depends on whether
or not satisfactory bargains can be struck between the military and opposition forces (Barkey 1990). These bargains must fulfil two conditions. First,
they must meet the military’s imperative of preserving national unity, security and stability. Second, the reform process must be perceived by the opposition (and by the public at large) as genuine. The primary problem with the
second condition is the absence of trust. Why should the promises of former tyrants be believed? The problem of “credible commitments” is one of
the key impediments to successful transitions from military dictatorship to
democracy (Pevehouse 2002).
This article2 draws attention to the role of ASEAN (the regional association of which Myanmar is a member) in encouraging the institutionalisation
and consolidation of Myanmar’s fledgling democracy. The central argument
is that ASEAN provides a means whereby Myanmar’s leaders can make
credible commitments about their intentions in relation to liberalisation and
democratisation. I point specifically to ASEAN’s decision to allow Myanmar
to take the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014, which provided Myanmar’s
reformist government with credibility at a crucial time in the country’s transition to democracy. I also argue that Indonesia, as ASEAN’s most powerful
1
2
In 1988, the government of Myanmar changed the English-language name of the
country from “Burma” to “Myanmar”. Throughout this chapter, I use “Burma”
when referring to events before 1988 and “Myanmar” for the post-1988 period.
According to Nardi (2010), this usage reflects accepted academic practice in Burmese Studies.
I am grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful criticisms.
„„„
The Case of Myanmar and ASEAN
31 „ „ „
member and a leading democracy, provides Myanmar’s leaders with a plausible precedent for Myanmar’s own transition to democracy. I suggest that
Myanmar’s leaders identify the commonalities that exist between Indonesia
and Myanmar (e.g. shared histories of colonialism, post-war struggles for
independence, cultures of authoritarianism and military dominance, similarly
diverse ethnic communities) and employ these commonalities in public
discourse to suggest (to the people of Myanmar, to those sceptical of reform,
to Western critics) that Myanmar can follow the path of limited democratic
reform (and rapid economic development) embarked upon by Indonesia’s
President Suharto in 1971.
My conclusion is that under certain circumstances, even non-democratic regional organisations such as ASEAN can exert a significant influence on perceptions about the credibility of a democratising regime’s commitment to reform. ASEAN’s influence will be important and ongoing in
Myanmar’s case, as the latter struggles to consolidate democracy in the face
of economic underdevelopment, ongoing ethnic conflict and a pervasive
and powerful military.
What We Know about Transitions from Military
Rule
In his study of worldwide democratisation, Huntington (1991) found that
the most common form of transition from military regime to democracy
was transformation, which occurs when the military regime itself initiates the
transition to democratic rule. Transformations from military regimes, compared to transitions from one-party rule or from personal dictatorship, are
often rapid and peaceful. However there is a catch: they are also often impermanent. The military retain the capacity to reacquire power by nondemocratic means and having done so once, stand capable of doing so again
(Diamond 2000).
The explanation for why military rulers are prepared to relinquish power and embark upon processes of liberalisation and democratisation lies in
the nature of the military as an institution and the character of those who
become military leaders. In most cases, military leaders never define themselves as the permanent rulers of the country. Instead, they claim, as did
Myanmar’s generals, that they are merely temporarily assuming power to
save the country from disaster (e.g. civil war, anarchy, or the misrule of
other leaders). The claim is that when these dangers have been safely averted,
the military will “return to the barracks” and to their normal military functions. For military rulers, the return to civilian rule is always a political possibility: the question is when this should occur. On this point, there are often
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differences of opinion within the military itself, and democratisation usually
occurs after a change in the top leadership of the military regime. Three
factors seem to hasten the military’s decision to withdraw from power: (i)
the cooperation of the opposition in the timing and mode of transition, (ii) a
guarantee that there will be no prosecution of military officers for acts they
committed while they were in power, and (iii) guarantees about the preservation of the autonomy and role of the military (Huntington 1991).
The democratisation process itself is shaped by interactions between
three groups of actors: (i) reformers within government, (ii) those who resist
reform, and (iii) members of the opposition. Within these groups, there are
usually diverse opinions about possibilities and prospects for reform. The
constitution of these groups often shifts as reforms get underway, and the
dynamics of relationships between various actors change as opinions about
prospects for reform evolve. For example, those within the military who
oppose reform may come to accept democracy if it transpires that moves
towards democracy do not produce the dangers that they feared. Members
of opposition groups initially opposed to government-led reforms may
come to accept opportunities to participate in government if it appears to
them that reformers within the military government are genuine. The conflictual or cooperative character of interactions between the three central
groups of actors colours the democratisation process.
What We Know about Myanmar’s Transition from
Military Rule
Myanmar’s transition from military rule accords closely with Huntington’s
theory on how military regimes democratise. First, it seems clear that decisions about the timing and pace of democratisation were made solely by the
ruling military junta. Military leaders, most importantly long-time ruler General Than Shwe, were resolved on effecting an orderly transition from power.
A number of plausible explanations have been offered to explain Than
Shwe’s decision to relinquish power. Some analysts point to the likelihood
of self-interested motives, such as the increased security of a controlled
transition to power-sharing managed by someone trusted (such as General
Thein Sein), rather than the insecurity (and the occasionally dire consequences) of less certain transitions (such as revolution, or internal coup
d’état) (Kurlantzick 2012). Other analysts attribute change to the frustration
of Myanmar’s leaders with Chinese dominance of their economy and infrastructure, which has been described as an encroachment on Myanmar’s
sovereignty. Myanmar’s leaders are reportedly galled by the description of
their country as a Chinese “economic colony”, or as the unofficial twenty-
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The Case of Myanmar and ASEAN
33 „ „ „
third province of China (John 2012). The argument is that in order to lessen
dependence on China, Myanmar’s military leaders embarked on a programme of reform sufficient to generate rapprochement with the West and
to encourage Western interest in economic re-engagement. A final set of
reasons attribute to Thein Sein and like-minded reformers a genuine wish to
guide the political and economic reform of the country towards a system
that betters the lives of Myanmar’s citizens (Maung Thann 2012).3
Second, Thein Sein and fellow reformers seem to have engaged in a
conscious process of reassuring the military about the army’s continuing
independence and power. The terms written into the 2008 Myanmar Constitution regarding the continuing importance and centrality of the armed forces in the new life of the country, and the provisions relating to the nonprosecution of army officers, are a central part of this. On 4 January 2012,
Myanmar Independence Day, President Thein Sein delivered a speech that
was directed squarely at reassuring the military of their continuing importance (New Light of Myanmar 2012). The speech reiterated the central role
of the Tatmadaw (armed forces) in the life of the nation. Thein Sein reminded the people that it was the Tatmadaw that had delivered independence to
the nation in 1948, the Tatmadaw that had rebuilt the nation after the 1988
uprisings, and the Tatmadaw that had laid down the seven-step road-map to
democracy that had resulted in the new “people’s government” after the
2010 elections. Thein Sein stated that without the Tatmadaw, the nation
would disintegrate “and again fall under foreign subjugation” (New Light of
Myanmar 2012). It seems likely that for as long as the commitment of the
senior military to full-blown democratisation remains uncertain, government
reforms will be punctuated by substantial acts of reassurance to the military.
Third, Myanmar’s period of “moderate liberalisation”, or uncertainty
about whether the early glimmerings of reform would translate into fullblown liberalisation, was relatively short-lived. By the time of Myanmar’s
second parliamentary sittings in August 2011, the balance of public opinion
about the genuineness of government efforts to reform had shifted – from
cynicism about the 2010 elections (Wade 2011; Mathieson 2011; Kinnock
2011; Aung Zaw 2011a; Lintner 2011) to a palpable sense of inevitability of
further reform and optimism about prospects for democracy (Larkin 2012).
This change seems to have come about less as a result of the roll-back of
3
This is the explanation offered by Aung San Suu Kyi when she is asked by foreign
media to explain the change in the military leader’s attitude. In an interview with
foreign media on the occasion of her being awarded an honorary doctorate by Carleton University in Canada, 2 March 2012, Suu Kyi claimed that “it was not China,
not the US” who was responsible for change in Myanmar, but Thein Sein “and the
will of the people of Myanmar”.
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„„„
repressive laws, or the speeches of political leaders about their democratic
intentions, than from the easing of bureaucratic restrictions on free communication and political discourse – much of which occurred without prior
announcement and without requiring legislative reform. Until 2011, for
example, the government blocked the websites of the exile media. Without
fanfare, these sites were made accessible in 2011. On Democracy Day, 15
September 2011, the government unblocked many previously censored
international news sites, including the BBC, Democratic Voice of Burma
(DVB), and Burmese language broadcasts of Radio Free Asia and Voice of
America.4 These moves followed an earlier relaxation of blocks on Skype,
Yahoo! and YouTube. In 2011, it was possible to display and sell pictures of
Aung San Suu Kyi, an activity that would have risked a jail sentence a short
time beforehand. The effect was something of a collective political sigh of
relief (Khin Zaw Win 2011), where people
talk more freely; they no longer lower their voices when discussing
politics; and one hears alarm-bell words – democracy, elections, dictatorship – bandied about with an uncharacteristic ease (Larkin 2012).
Fourth, Thein Sein is a credible reformer. Within Myanmar, in general, he
carries the reputation of being someone “less corrupt than most of the former junta leaders and a good listener” (Aung Zaw 2011b) – that is, someone
who might conceivably carry some credibility with Myanmar’s people (and
with the outside world) as a spearhead of reform. Yet Thein Sein also served
as prime minister for the junta, and proved himself a loyal officer to Than
Shwe. In other words, he was “someone unlikely to turn against Than Shwe
and his family” (Aung Zaw 2011b). Reassuringly for Than Shwe and for the
military, Thein Sein is a leader near retirement, at the end of his career –
thus, one presumes, a leader unlikely to embark upon an extreme path of
reform that delegitimises the work of his own generation of rulers. As Geddes writes, military officers known for “correctness, adherence to rules,
fairness, lack of personal ambition, and low charisma” are often seen (by the
military) as excellent choices to lead governments, because they are less
likely than their more ambitious and aggressive colleagues to consolidate
personal power or personalise the regime (Geddes 1999: 123).
Fifth, the National League for Democracy (NLD) and its key leader
Aung San Suu Kyi made the critical decision to soften its stance towards the
4
These had been systematically blocked for more than two decades. This move
followed on an earlier relaxation of media censorship, including allowing access to
Skype, Yahoo and YouTube. Local editors and journalists in Burma acknowledge
that censorship has been virtually lifted, except in a few politically sensitive areas
(Jagan 2012).
„„„
The Case of Myanmar and ASEAN
35 „ „ „
regime and to accept the government’s overtures to work together towards
the goal of multiparty democracy. The new government’s strongest claim to
credibility – both internally and externally – was Aung San Suu Kyi’s endorsement of the government’s path of reform. As opposition leader and
former political prisoner Cho Cho Kyaw Nyein said: “When I talk to Aung
San Suu Kyi, she says, ‘Forget the past.’ She says, ‘Have faith in Thein Sein.’
If she says that, we must have faith in him” (Myers 2011).
Suu Kyi’s endorsement of a path of gradual reform, without insisting
on accountability for the acts of the former military rulers, indicated to the
military that the opposition will behave “responsibly” in the transition towards democracy. In the past, Suu Kyi has openly defied the government by
orchestrating unlawful gatherings and rallies and organising campaigns of
civil disobedience (Kreager 1991). If the military held the view that “Burma’s Gandhi” intended to return to these tactics, then the potential for derailment – a return to power by hardliners – would substantially increase.
The NLD appears to have been aware of this; it has adopted policies of
moderation and co-operation with the government, agreeing to be involved
as a junior partner in the process of democratic reform. For example, in
2011, the NLD ended its twenty-year-old demand for the reinstatement of
the 1990 election results. Instead, it made demands which aligned with the
government’s own interests and which the government is able to fulfil without fundamentally weakening its grip on power, such as pressuring the military to end ethnic conflict and calling for the release of political prisoners. In
adopting this strategy, the NLD managed to contain the demands of its own
hardliners, the radical elements of the opposition who consistently argued
against any collaboration with the government. At the end of 2012, the result was an intricate dialectical relationship between Thein Sein’s government and the National League for Democracy.
Finally, reformers gambled on the political, economic and diplomatic
achievements of the new government being enough to convince waverers
that support for reform would place them on the winning side of history.
One analyst credits the president’s courage in persisting with liberalisation in
the face of resistance to the success of peace talks with the ethnic minorities
(Jagan 2012b). Around such successes, momentum for further reform gathered, and moves towards liberalisation drew yet more support, increasing the
sense of inevitability about the process towards democratisation. Within
Myanmar, the government media has presented a narrative of inexorable
reform. Political changes have been described as “irreversible”, “incremental,
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Catherine Shanahan Renshaw
„„„
systematic and dynamic.”5 Myanmar has been described by President Thein
Sein as being “on the right track” where democracy “can only move forward”
without “any intention to draw back,” so that democracy can give “a brighter future for our people” (quoted in Weymouth 2012). On 4 January 2012,
the New Light of Myanmar claimed that Myanmar’s reforms were “inevitable
in light of the mainstream of international politics” where “about 60 per
cent of world nations are democracies that have chosen their governments
through elections.” The paper’s editorial contrasted the “violent conflicts,
protests and bloodshed” that have marked other country’s transitions to
democracy, with Myanmar’s “rapid, peaceful transition with mutual understanding and trust and negotiations as directed by its former rulers.” The
editorial asked:
Can there be a more efficient, correct way? Hence, the Myanmar government can daringly disclose that there is no way to deviate from its
democratic transition. The President and other responsible leaders
have reassured the international community that they will never turn
back from the country’s changes and reforms (New Light of Myanmar
2012).
International approbation for the president’s reform programme also played
a part in emboldening reformers to undertake further measures in the face
of opposition. The state-run media reported prominently on visits to Myanmar by US secretary of state Hillary Clinton, former US presidential candidate John McCain, former US vice-presidential candidate Joe Lieberman,
US Senate minority leader Mitch McConnell, French foreign minister Alain
Juppe and British foreign secretary William Hague. Myanmar’s politicians
referred frequently to world leaders’ cautious expressions of optimism about
the prospects for political reform (Janowski and Sani 2012).
Despite these internal and external indicators of confidence in Myanmar’s democratic future, great uncertainty remained in the period 2010–
2012. Any failure on the part of the government would inevitably have emboldened those resistant to change. As civil society leader Nay Win Maung
maintained in 2011, “Thein Sein means change, but it’s just as likely the
situation ends in a military coup” (Larkin 2011).
5
For example, foreign minister Wunna Maung Lwin said in a speech (“Myanmar: A
Country in Democratic Transition”) to foreign media in Delhi that “the reform
process that we have started is irreversible. There will be no turning back or derailment in the road to democracy” (Pradhan and Ten Kate 2011).
„„„
The Case of Myanmar and ASEAN
37 „ „ „
ASEAN and Myanmar’s Transition to Democracy
The influence of ASEAN was negligible in encouraging Myanmar’s transition to democracy (Haacke 2006; Jones 2008; Haacke 2010). Between 1990
and 1997, ASEAN employed a strategy of “constructive engagement” in
relation to Myanmar – that is, a mode of dialogue and persuasion as well as
the pursuit of strategic and economic interests, with concomitant encouragement of “moderate”’ reform along the lines of liberal democracy
(McCarthy 2008). Constructive engagement meant access for Thai, Malaysian, Singaporean and Indonesian businesses to Myanmar’s raw materials and
markets. The “constructive” aspect of engagement was intended to be twopronged: (i) the socialisation of Myanmar’s elite towards good governance
and gradual liberal reform and (ii) financial investment, which would hopefully lead to socio-economic development and the creation of a democratically disposed middle class. Constructive engagement stood in marked contrast to the outright disapprobation, threats and sanctions employed by the
United States and the European Union (Kraft 2000).
From the perspective of Myanmar’s ruling elite, constructive engagement was perfectly suited to achieving the goals of increasing regional investment in the country, while deflecting criticism from its internal politics
(Jones 2008). Myanmar’s generals did not accept that the goal of constructive engagement was to change Myanmar. According to Ohn Gyaw, Myanmar’s foreign minister, constructive engagement meant that “ASEAN would
see Myanmar as an equal” (Kraft 2000). Myanmar saw the primary benefit of
engagement with ASEAN as the broadening of its economic relationships, a
means of lessening its uneven dependence on China (Haacke 2008).
Myanmar became a member of ASEAN in 1997. Most of ASEAN’s
original members held the view that constructive engagement would be
enhanced if Myanmar was a member of the association. Malaysia’s prime
minister, Mahathir Mohamad, a particularly strong proponent of Myanmar’s
inclusion in ASEAN, viewed membership as a way of “hav[ing] a very positive effect on them”, exposing them to “how Malaysia manages its free market and its system of democracy,” which would make them less “afraid of
the democratic process” and “over time, they will tend to give more voice to
the people. […] [T]hey become a member first, then put their house in order”
(The Irrawaddy 1997). Mahathir argued that foreign investment and economic
development would change the generals’ “attitude and perception” regarding democratic transformation (Burma Today 2002). Indonesia, under President Suharto, largely shared Malaysia’s view in this regard. Not all ASEAN
members were as supportive of Myanmar’s admission as Malaysia, which
together with Singapore had pushed domestic firms to invest in Myanmar in
the hope that “ASEAN capital would lift the country up” (Jones 2008: 274).
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Catherine Shanahan Renshaw
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In October 1996, for example, Thailand’s foreign minister suggested that
Myanmar should become a democracy before it became a member of
ASEAN (Jones 2008).
ASEAN faced strong pressure from the United States and the European Union to refuse Myanmar’s admission to the association until the regime
had fulfilled certain conditions towards the restoration of democracy (Wah
1997). Outwardly, ASEAN’s existing members strongly rejected external
attempts to steer the course of ASEAN policy. It is indeed possible that
these attempts, and the desire of Southeast Asian leaders to be seen to resist
them, in fact encouraged ASEAN’s admission of Myanmar (Katanyuu 2006).
In his opening keynote address to the Annual Ministerial Meeting in 1997,
welcoming new ASEAN members Myanmar and Laos, Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia referred directly to the pressure which had been put on
ASEAN by the United States and the European Union to “pass judgement,
deny membership and apply pressure on a potential candidate so as to force
that country to remain poor and therefore unstable” (ASEAN 1997a). He
said that “ASEAN must resist and reject such attempts at coercion” which
are “not a part of the ASEAN way” and that “no one, but no one, should
assume that only they know the solutions to all problems. They have failed
far too often for us to be convinced that only they know what is right and
what is wrong” (ASEAN 1997a). Responding to Mahathir’s speech, Myanmar’s minister for foreign affairs, Ohn Gyaw, emphasised Myanmar’s commitment to “the principles and objectives of the Association” and Myanmar’s national goal of achieving a “peaceful, prosperous, modern and developed Myanmar” via “harmony in political development, social cohesiveness
and economic growth” (ASEAN 1997b).
After Myanmar became a member of ASEAN, ASEAN’s policy of
constructive engagement gave way to “flexible engagement” and “enhanced
interaction.” The purpose of flexible engagement was to permit states to
comment on and discuss the behaviour of individual ASEAN member states
which has, or could potentially have, regional implications (Haacke 1999).
Yet even after the introduction of flexible engagement, it is difficult to discern – apart from the Association’s outburst of opprobrium after the suppression of the “Saffron Revolution” in 2007 – any real moral condemnation by ASEAN of Myanmar’s generals (Katanyuu 2006; McCarthy 2008).
All ASEAN countries have at various times struggled to resolve issues of
authoritarianism, to manage the role of the military within the state, to secure reconciliation with restless ethnic minorities, and to manage the sometimes competing demands of development and democracy (Chalermpalanupap 1999). The lesson learnt by ASEAN nations was that the source of
liberalisation and democratisation was indigenous, and that external pressure
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The Case of Myanmar and ASEAN
39 „ „ „
was at best irrelevant and at worst counterproductive. Thus until 2010,
ASEAN was largely a bystander to Myanmar’s democratic transition.
Regionalism and the Consolidation of Democratic
Transformation
Regionalism can influence the democratisation of authoritarian states in two
possible ways. The first is when a state is located within a geographic zone
which is experiencing rapid revolutionary political change, and the state
becomes swept up in the “contagion” effect of democracy (Leeson and
Dean 2009; Doorenspleet 2004; Elkins and Simmons 2005). The second is
where, as in the case of Europe and to a lesser extent the Americas, the
region possesses organisations which set democracy as a condition of membership, and the desirability for membership provides an incentive for reform (Pevehouse 2005).
Neither of these cases applies in relation to ASEAN and Myanmar.
First, while theories of democratic contagion have helped to explain the
temporal and spatial clustering of third-wave democratic transitions in postcommunist Eastern Europe (1989–2003) or fourth wave uprisings in the
“Arab Spring” (2008–), there has been no strong evidence of a similar pattern of democratic diffusion amongst Myanmar’s neighbours (Slater 2008).
Second, ASEAN has never set “democracy” as a condition of membership.
The association numbers amongst its members Laos and Vietnam (communist states) and Brunei Darussalam (an absolute sultanate).
How then could ASEAN be said to have assisted Myanmar’s prospects
of a successful transition from military rule to democracy? The answer lies in
the problem of transitioning regimes and credible commitments.
Newly installed democratic institutions are extremely fragile, and not all
new democracies take root. Reversions to authoritarianism are common
(Mainwaring 1992). Indeed, Power and Gasiorowski (1997) estimate that
one-third of all new democracies fail within the first five years of their establishment. In some cases, newly elected democratic leaders exploit their power at the expense of democratic institutions (as in the case of the democratically elected Suharto in Indonesia) (Pabottingi 1995). In other cases, those
left out of power seek to regain control by attempting to destroy the new
institutions (as has the military in Thailand on multiple occasions)
(Sukapitan 1995). Uncertainties (how power will be shared, and who the
players are) exacerbate threats to democracy.
Where the transitioning regime is a former military dictatorship, as in
the case of Myanmar, the military stands as the most obvious potential
spoiler of a nascent democracy (Aguero 1995). Pevehouse describes two
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dynamics that can induce the military to reassert itself in the wake of democratic transition. The first is where the military feels that the new democracy’s leaders and institutions are too weak or disorganised to protect the state
and steps in to protect the stability and unity of the nation. The second is
where attempts to establish civilian supremacy threaten the military, either
by decreasing the military budget or by prosecuting members of the military
for crimes committed during past periods of military rule (Pevehouse 2005).
Pevehouse writes that a “delicate balance” is required, between “controlling
a post-authoritarian military force while simultaneously holding their loyalty
to the new regime” (Pevehouse 2005: 31).
This balance is extremely difficult to achieve because the new government must simultaneously convince “the people” that it is genuinely committed to reform in order to consolidate the democracy. All new governments suffer to an extent from problems of credibility and low expectations
about their intention and capacity to effect reform. But this is especially the
case where the new government is composed largely of officers of the old
order, and where the old order has a track record of making limited moves
towards liberalisation, which are then followed by roll-backs. Actions which
reassure the military – such as maintaining the military’s budget and desisting from prosecution for offences under the old regime – are actions unlikely to convince the masses that the new government is genuine about reform.
Negative perceptions undermine prospects for successful transition. They
“perpetuate the condition of fragility” by decreasing the level of trust between political sectors and reducing the motivation for full democratisation
(Whitehead 1989). According to Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros (1995),
this kind of dynamic explains why so many leaders in new democracies turn
quickly to authoritarianism. It is not because of preferences or greed, but
because of the instability that results from inability to make credible commitments to democracy in the consolidation phase.
In the period 2010–2012, ASEAN played a limited but discernible role
in assisting Myanmar to make credible commitments to democracy. ASEAN
exercised its influence at a critical time in the transition period, increasing
the confidence of two key groups (i.e. the public and the opposition) about
the prospects of successful democratic consolidation.
First, under duress from the United States and the European Union, in
2006, ASEAN reluctantly denied Myanmar the chairmanship of the association because of the anti-democratic and oppressive practices of Myanmar’s
government. Five years later, in 2011, ASEAN awarded Myanmar the 2014
chairmanship of the Association, on the basis of ASEAN’s confidence in
Myanmar’s programme of reform. The prestige attached to the chairmanship significantly increased the costs for Myanmar of backtracking on re-
„„„
The Case of Myanmar and ASEAN
41 „ „ „
form. Because of this, the promises made by Myanmar’s leaders regarding
reform were more credible.
Second, ASEAN represents a group of states of proximity, which share
geography, histories of colonialism, conflict and difficult (in some cases,
incomplete) transitions to democracy. ASEAN, and particularly its leading
democracy, Indonesia, is the primary “reference group” to which Myanmar’s
leaders turn when seeking models for new democratic institutions. Below I
consider these two ideas in detail.
Did ASEAN Contribute to Successful Democratic
Transition in Myanmar?
The Chairmanship of ASEAN
The chairmanship of ASEAN is allocated to states on a rotating basis and
according to the alphabetical order of the English names of member states.
Myanmar had been scheduled to take the 2006–07 chairmanship of ASEAN,
following Malaysia. The chairmanship involves hosting not just the annual
ASEAN Summit, but also scores of ASEAN ministerial meetings, the Post
Ministerial Conference (ASEAN PMC), meetings with the ASEAN Dialogue Partners, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the East Asian
Summit (EAS) – the latter of which includes Australia, China, India, Japan,
New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United States and Russia. Undoubtedly, General Than Shwe’s government would have enjoyed the prestige and legitimacy which flowed from hosting such important diplomatic
events used the chairmanship to improve the domestic legitimacy of the
government. Indeed, by the time of the July 2005 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, construction work had already commenced in Yangon and Naypidaw to
prepare the city for the hundreds of government representatives, dignitaries
and journalists who would inevitably flock to the city.
ASEAN states faced intense pressure from two quarters to prevent
Myanmar from assuming the chairmanship. The first was the ASEAN InterParliamentary Caucus on Myanmar (AIPMC), a body formed in 2004 and
based in Malaysia. The second was the European Union and the United
States, who made clear that they would boycott a Burma-chaired ASEAN in
2014. Although Laos and Cambodia provided some muted support for
Myanmar, all ASEAN states were largely in agreement that irrevocable damage would be done to the prestige and credibility of ASEAN if Myanmar
took the chair in 2006–2007. ASEAN leaders made these views clear to
Myanmar in the lead-up to and at the 2005 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meet-
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Catherine Shanahan Renshaw
„„„
ing in Vientiane, Laos. Although Myanmar’s leaders strongly resisted early
calls from the United States and the European Union to give up the chairmanship (Agence France-Presse 2005b), they were eventually convinced to do
so.
The official statement issued by ASEAN announced that Myanmar had
decided to relinquish the chair of ASEAN in 2006 because it wanted to
focus its attention, in what was a critical year for the country, on the ongoing national reconciliation and democratisation process. ASEAN’s statement
expressed the association’s “sincere appreciation” to Myanmar’s government
“for not allowing its national preoccupation to affect ASEAN’s solidarity
and cohesiveness” and assured Myanmar that once it was ready to assume
the ASEAN chair, it could do so (ASEAN 2005). When the announcement
of Myanmar’s “decision” to forgo the chairmanship was finally made, there
was a week-long blackout of the news in Myanmar (Ungphakorn 2005).
Rudolf Severino, former secretary general of ASEAN, has posited that
Myanmar would have been brought more quickly to the path of reform if it
had assumed the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2006. He argues that the regime would in likelihood have taken measures of reform sufficient to enable
it to fulfil its duties as host of important diplomatic events such as the Post
Ministerial Conference and the ASEAN Regional Forum – events usually
attended by representatives from the United States (Severino 2006). Severino is not alone in this view. In 2005, there were reports that Myanmar’s
foreign diplomatic community was disappointed that Myanmar had not
taken the ASEAN chair in 2006. One diplomat was quoted as saying that
the result was “a hollow victory”, “not serving the causes of democratization”
and another as saying that “perhaps, it was a lost opportunity” (Agence
France-Presse 2005b). These sentiments have been echoed by scholars such as
Kyaw Yin Hlaing (2008), who argues that Myanmar’s relinquishment of the
ASEAN chair in 2006 did not accelerate reform inside Myanmar, rather it
lessened whatever leverage ASEAN might have had over the state. Despite
these views, ASEAN was justifiably concerned that Myanmar’s chairmanship would jeopardise ASEAN’s relations with the United States and the
European Union.
The end result was that, in 2005, Myanmar was publicly and humiliatingly deemed unready to assume the chairmanship of ASEAN because of
the nation’s domestic problems (e.g. lack of reconciliation with ethnic minorities and the imprisonment of democratic leaders). Myanmar’s forced
renunciation of the chair in 2005 was an admission, to domestic and international audiences, of the nation’s political problems. Being constructively
denied the chairmanship in 2006 was a source of embarrassment to the
generals and a vindication for Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League
„„„
The Case of Myanmar and ASEAN
43 „ „ „
for Democracy, both of whom had lobbied ASEAN parliamentarians, the
United States and the European Union to pressure ASEAN into refusing
Myanmar the chair.
In 2011, ASEAN announced that Myanmar would assume the chairmanship in 2014. Indonesia’s foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, said that
“it’s not about the past, it’s about the future, what leaders are doing now.
We’re trying to ensure the process of change continues” (BBC News Asia
2011). ASEAN’s reversal of opinion on Myanmar’s assumption of the chair
indicated a belief on the part of ASEAN that reforms were genuine and
irrevocable, and that Myanmar’s government was no longer an impediment
to good relations between ASEAN and the West. In 2011, Myanmar’s apparent readiness to assume the chair and the enthusiastic support for this
plan by its ASEAN neighbours (and the lack of significant opposition from
the United States and the European Union) was a strong sign of confidence
in the new regime’s intentions for political, social and economic reform and
peace-building.
Any backtracking on reforms – particularly, for example, the reintroduction of censorship or the re-arrest of pro-democracy activists – could
mean that Myanmar will again be forced to surrender the chairmanship,
which would result in high political and diplomatic costs for country’s leaders. These costs were one of the reasons why those in power were encouraged to press ahead with reforms, because they stood to benefit from the
prestige of having secured the chair. The “cost” issue, so important to those
in power, was also relevant to those resistant to reform. It was one of the
reasons why those who might have stood in the way of reforms, were discouraged from doing so: they had no wish to be blamed for the national
humiliation of again being deprived of the chairmanship of ASEAN. The
net effect of Myanmar being awarded the 2014 chairmanship was to bolster
the credibility of reform policies domestically and to encourage confidence
in the new regime amongst the population – because people saw that an
organisation that had once shunned their nation, was now embracing it. This
lent a degree of legitimacy to the regime at a crucial time in the process of
consolidation.
In sum, the decision on the 2014 chairmanship was a victory for Thein
Sein’s middle way of reform and reinforced a view (for those inside and
outside Myanmar) that history was on the side of those operating under the
2008 constitution. ASEAN’s wholehearted support for Myanmar taking the
chair in 2014, in light of its earlier unwillingness, was a powerful sign of the
regional association’s confidence in Myanmar’s reforms. Of course, it was
also relevant that ASEAN members (and others) rushed with alacrity to
support Myanmar’s economic reforms and development plans, offering out
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Catherine Shanahan Renshaw
„„„
substantial “bribes” in the form of aid and investment for Myanmar to continue along the path of democratisation. Nonetheless, ASEAN’s decision to
allow Myanmar to assume the chair of ASEAN in 2014 played a part in
stabilising politics during a critical period of Myanmar’s uncertain posttransition period and helped to lock in democratic reform.
Myanmar and Indonesia
Because of historical parallels between Myanmar and Indonesia, the path of
Indonesia’s democratisation provides Myanmar with a plausible precedent
for its own democratisation. Myanmar’s leaders are able to use the Indonesian example as evidence for their nation’s potential to achieve successful
reform, thus convincing sceptics that the government’s goals in relation to
development and democratisation are achievable.
Historians have drawn parallels between Indonesia and Myanmar since
colonial times. In Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and
Netherlands India, J. S. Furnivall (1948) argued that Burma and Netherlands
India (as Indonesia was then known), shared the character of a “plural society”. For Furnivall, the plural society was one of the by-products of colonialism, which had imposed laissez-faire capitalism upon traditional societies
with devastating results. Furnivall argued that in both Burma and Netherlands India, capitalism increased the nation’s wealth, but contributed to the
people’s poverty and powerlessness. In his view, the effects of colonialism
were more devastating for Burma than for Netherlands India because, in
Burma, the British retained (or gave to immigrant Indians) the bulk of
commercial and administrative power and imposed alien institutions upon
an unwilling race. The Dutch, by contrast, “tried to conserve and adapt to
modern use the tropical principles of custom and authority [through indirect
rule]” (Furnivall 1948: 10). For Furnivall, the prescription for the plural
society was self-government and autonomy, geared to a nationalistic form of
socialism that would reintegrate post-colonial societies (see also: Taylor
1995).
In different ways, both Burma and Netherlands India adhered to Furnivall’s prescription. After the Second World War, both nations freed themselves from the shackles of colonialism and cleaved to extreme forms of
nationalism. Both nations adopted variants of socialism at different stages of
their development (Van der Kroef 1962; Taylor 1987). Furnivall did not,
however, account for the historical consequences of the central role played
by the army in the (difficult and bloody) liberations from colonialism and
the formation of the modern states of Burma and Indonesia. In both nations, the army became key actors in the fields of politics, administration and
the economy. In both nations, early efforts to establish parliamentary de-
„„„
The Case of Myanmar and ASEAN
45 „ „ „
mocracy collapsed in the face of rebellion in outlying ethnic areas, and martial law was introduced and re-introduced (Crouch 1979). In both nations,
opposition movements coalesced around the daughters of the heroes of the
post–World War Two independence movements: Megawati Sukarnoputri in
Indonesia (daughter of President Sukarno) and Aung San Su Kyi in Myanmar (daughter of General Aung San).
For thirty-two years under President Suharto, the Indonesian military
continued to exert significant authority within domestic politics. Throughout
the 1990’s, when Indonesia achieved rapid economic growth, President
Suharto’s New Order provided a reassuring political reference point for
Myanmar’s State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which ruled
Myanmar from 1988 to 1997 (Rüland 2001). The SLORC approved of the
dual function as both defender of the state and political actor that was ascribed to the military under President Suharto (Harsono 1997; Tun 2011).
The Indonesian national ideology of Pancasila, which provided a spiritual
foundation for a strong and unified state, became a model (of sorts) for the
SLORC’s attempt to garner political legitimacy by welding its governance to
the philosophy of Buddhism (Steinberg 2007). On many occasions, The New
Light of Myanmar praised economic and political developments in Indonesia
and declared that Indonesia and Burma were “two nations with common
identity” (The Irrawaddy 1998). It was not until 1997 that Suharto’s New
Order finally crumbled, under the pressure of the Asian financial crisis.
Suharto resigned in May 1998. The New Light of Myanmar, however, published almost nothing about the tumultuous overthrow of President Suharto
or his resignation in 1998.
Myanmar’s leaders are able to point to several similarities between Myanmar and Indonesia, which helps to build a perception that Myanmar
might be able to follow a path similar to Indonesia’s early move towards a
controlled democracy. The 2008 Myanmar Constitution is structured in a
very similar way to the 1945 Indonesian Constitution. The Indonesian Constitution was drafted in just twenty days, following the surrender of Japan
and Indonesia’s declaration of independence (Indrayana 2008). Although it
was intended to be merely an interim constitution, it nonetheless survived –
though it was substantially amended in a series of post-Suharto reforms in
1999 (Smith 2001; Benesch 2007). The original 1945 Constitution guaranteed seats for the military in the parliamentary bodies and placed no limit on
the number of terms a president could serve. In the 1990s, the Indonesian
Constitution was published in Burmese, and Myanmar’s generals asked delegates to the National Convention on the drafting of Myanmar’s Constitution
to learn from the Indonesian example (Harsono 1997). Members of the
SLORC visited Jakarta on many occasions for briefings about the Indone-
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Catherine Shanahan Renshaw
„„„
sian constitutional order. In September 1995, The New Light of Myanmar
stated:
In this new Constitution, the military wish to follow the Indonesian
Constitutional model [...]. While there has been little global, public
outcry about Indonesia’s system, no doubt Myanmar’s current military
government will continue to be bashed for their temerity in thinking
that they too should continue to be involved in their country’s government.
Like the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, Myanmar’s Constitution allocates
twenty-five per cent of seats in parliament to unelected military representatives. It also incorporates some of the post-Suharto reforms, establishing the
Constitutional Tribunal (similar to Indonesia’s Constitutional Court). Myanmar has also established the National Human Rights Institution, similar to
the one set up by Indonesia (and the other three “most progressive”
ASEAN states: the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand).
In 1998, responding to popular pressure for reform, Indonesia began a
successful transition to constitutional democracy. The parliament elected in
1999 proceeded to enact a series of constitutional amendments, at the end
of which time “the Indonesian Constitution had all the features of a Western-style liberal constitutional democracy” (Harijanti and Lindsay 2006). By
2010, commentators were hailing Indonesia’s transition as “a story that can
provide inspiration and encouragement for constitutional projects elsewhere
in Asia” (Chen 2010). But it is worth remembering that in the early years of
Indonesia’s transition to democracy, there were few optimists (Malley 2000;
King 2003; Robison and Hadiz 2004). Indonesia’s reformers faced problems
of entrenched militarism, economic underdevelopment, endemic corruption,
ethnic and religious tensions, and demands for secession in Aceh and Papua.
Accordingly, Indonesia provides Myanmar’s new government with a useful
illustration of how a Southeast Asian state might evolve beyond its postcolonial authoritarian origins to a liberal democracy. Whether the Indonesian example is really apposite towards Myanmar is not the point: what is
important is that Myanmar’s leaders can use it to bolster their claims about
viable reform, and in so doing, address the issue of credible commitments.
Are there any deeper reasons why Indonesia might be significant to the
consolidation of Myanmar’s democracy? Is it possible, for example, to sustain an argument that Myanmar has been “socialised” into democratic
norms by Indonesia, its “elder brother” in ASEAN? (The Irrawaddy 1997).
From their different perspectives, historians, sociologists, international
relations theorists and international lawyers have observed a phenomenon
whereby decision makers align their country’s policies with those of geographically, historically, politically and culturally proximate nations (Good-
„„„
The Case of Myanmar and ASEAN
47 „ „ „
man and Jinks 2004). In the past decade, scholars have sought to specify the
precise processes through which this occurs. Some have attempted to translate the insights of individual-level social psychology to the state level, suggesting that socialisation (the process whereby identification with a reference
group generates varying degrees of cognitive and social pressures to conform) can occur in relations between states. Some scholars reason that the
behaviour of nations is influenced in the same way that the behaviour and
cognition of individual actors is influenced – by their social environment
(Goodman and Jinks 2004). They argue that actors are driven to conform to
important reference groups by both internal and social pressures. Internal
pressures include social-psychological costs of nonconformity, such as anxiety, regret, and guilt. Social pressures include the imposition of socialpsychological costs through shaming or shunning and the conferral of social-psychological benefits through “back-patting” and other displays of
public approval. In short, actors hoard social legitimacy and social status and
minimise social disapproval. One consequence is that actors seek out reliable
models of appropriate behaviour to “mimic” (Scott 1995; Petty 1997).
Goodman and Jinks (2004) describe these processes as “acculturation”.
Socialisation theories predict that states will adopt institutional models
that have authority and legitimacy within the states of their key reference
group. We know that Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt and high-ranking
SLORC members visited Indonesia frequently from 1993. SLORC chairman,
General Than Shwe, visited Jakarta in June 1995 and met with President
Suharto. Indonesian officials and high-profile businessmen, including foreign minister Ali Alatas and defence minister Edi Sudrajat, visited Yangon
throughout 1994 and 1995 (Harsono 1997). In 1997, the Indonesian ambassador to Myanmar claimed that “the SLORC would like to imitate the New
Order in three key areas: the Indonesian state ideology, Pancasila; the 1945
Constitution; and the dual function of the military” (Harsono 1997). Within
Myanmar, the state-sponsored media has often highlighted political similarities between the two countries. If one was seeking evidence of acculturation,
these indicia of interaction might seem significant. Indonesia is, for Myanmar and within ASEAN, a highly legitimated actor. Although, as I maintain,
the source of Myanmar’s democratic transition is indigenous, it is not farfetched to argue that the processes of democratic consolidation within Myanmar are modelled on those of its important Southeast Asian neighbour.
Conclusion
In the decade following Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN, the regional body
played no significant role in encouraging the country’s transition to democ-
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Catherine Shanahan Renshaw
„„„
racy. How could it? ASEAN lacked (and still lacks) the military and economic power to bribe and the moral stature to persuade recalcitrant members.
The impetus for Myanmar’s transition to democracy was almost entirely
indigenous. What this article has sought to demonstrate, however, is that the
dynamics of the post-transition period are different to the dynamics of transition. In the period 2010–2012, Myanmar existed in what Larry Diamond
describes as a “grey area” of democracy – that is, it had made some concessions to liberal reform and multiparty politics, but had not yet established a
popularly elected government. In the uncertain pre-dawn that precedes fullblown democratic consolidation, external actors are highly relevant. Because
of the issue of credible commitments in democratic consolidation, ASEAN
played (and will continue to play) a not insignificant role in Myanmar’s process of democratisation.
As has already been made clear, this article does not seek to argue that
ASEAN was a major factor in Myanmar’s process of democratisation. It
does argue, however, that ASEAN’s role was of some causal significance,
and that the primary explanation for this lies in the idea of credible commitments. I have sought to argue that by effectively withholding the
ASEAN chairmanship from Myanmar in 2006/2007 and then by later endorsing Myanmar’s claim to the chairmanship for 2014, ASEAN sent a
strong signal to internal and external audiences about its confidence in Myanmar’s process of democratisation. I have also argued that the example of
Indonesia, a newly democratised and economically successful nation within
the region, was important in enabling Myanmar’s elites to make credible
commitments about democratisation in Myanmar. This is largely because
Indonesia and Myanmar share similar experiences of colonialism, disunity,
authoritarianism and underdevelopment. Referencing Indonesia adds plausibility to the democratic commitments of Myanmar’s leaders in the eyes of
domestic and international audiences. These indicators of confidence are
crucial to Myanmar’s new government during the very early stages of democratisation, when the government is extremely vulnerable to destabilisation from those who object to reform altogether and those sections of the
opposition who either doubt the credibility of government-led reform or see
reform as not going far enough.
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