BOTTLENECKS IN RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURE – DO THEY REALLY
EXIST? THE CORRIDOR ROTTERDAM-GENOA
Hansjörg Drewello
University of Applied Sciences Kehl (D)
Felix Günther
ETH Zurich (CH)
1. INTRODUCTION1
Even if freight transport is still growing rapidly in Europe, building new rail
infrastructure to further support modal shift becomes more and more difficult,
due to public budget restrictions, or opposition of the civil society about
environmental issues. Especially financial restrictions oblige public
administrations to guide the planning process of infrastructure policy more by
economic rules than by political influence and business interest of the
incumbent.
Frequently transport associations or other economic stakeholders use the
bottleneck argument to ask for new tracks. Parting from a local or national
point of view, investments are first asked to extend infrastructure where
bottlenecks are located. Presently representatives of Deutsche Bahn negate
the existence of bottlenecks along the German part of the corridor RotterdamGenoa. They mentioned that infrastructure manager DB Netz is able to satisfy
all demands for new freight or passenger paths on rail. This different view of
reality is probably due to a different concept of bottleneck.
This paper is an outcome of discussion and analysis within the EUINTERREG project Corridor Development Rotterdam-Genoa (Code24). It
starts by asking from an economic point of view what a bottleneck in railway
infrastructure is. Furthermore it presents different economic approaches to
analyse efficiency in the railway market and presents an overview of the
current situation on the corridor 24. On the other hand it shows a spatial
planning approach investigating inner reserves and limits of the actual
infrastructure in their broader context of spatial and environmental embedding.
The definition of bottlenecks cannot only be based on the analysis of
infrastructure, technical definitions, operational systems and demand
forecasts. The paper proposes a more accurate definition of bottleneck in rail
infrastructure that beyond capacity discussion also includes the economical,
spatial and social context. Based on economic theory a definition of a
bottleneck in rail infrastructure is developed which is different to those of a
bottleneck in road infrastructure. This is the missing theoretical link for
decision-making in financing new railway infrastructure.
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The paper first focuses on most important insights from microeconomic theory
and network economics to freight transport on rail. It includes the analysis of
market form, pricing and marginal costs. It shows the premises of excess
demand in railway infrastructure and their consequences. Compared to road
infrastructure, where bottlenecks or capacity shortage becomes evident to the
eye of the observer as traffic congestion, this obvious kind of congestion
phenomena cannot be observed by non-expert public in railway infrastructure.
In the second part of the paper the theoretical findings are used to analyse the
infrastructure situation on the EU-corridor 24 Rotterdam-Genoa. While theory
is dealing especially with the assumption of a homogeneous infrastructure
network, in reality railway networks are characterised by different national
technical and operational standards, which strongly influence the capacity
sizes of infrastructure capacity depending on the network section regarded.
So the theoretical background meets with the findings of the INTERREGproject Code 24 which explored the TEN Corridor 24 Rotterdam-Genoa. An
overview of the state of the art along the corridor shows a set of strategic
information about the corridor development, about the relevant spatial and
infrastructural issues, worked out with over 300 stakeholders in 12 workshops
along the corridor.
Three main aspects were especially revealed as important in this project.
Given the territorial scale of work, it became essential to find tools able to
manage information in response to the particular need to always operate at
different scales at the same time.
The involvement of stakeholders and experts turned out to be essential for
gathering information and knowledge and it highlighted the need to integrate
quantitative information with the qualitative aspects. Their presence at this
early stage also offers a guarantee for the development of the decision
making process in the long run. This transparent decision-making process is
needed to arrive at a common and collaborative definition of which
bottlenecks to overcome and at priorities for their insertion on the timeline.
2. BOTTLENECKS IN TRANSPORT MARKETS
2.1 Definition
In public debate it is sometimes unclear what is meant by a bottleneck in
transport infrastructure. In many of these political statements a lack of
capacity is specified, usually combined with the projection of increasing freight
transport.2 Holzhey determined capacity bottlenecks by calculating potential
maximum of freight train paths per day for a corridor and comparing it with
future needs (Holzhey, 2010a: 17, Holzhey, 2010b: 4-6).
In 1996 Rothengatter had already noticed, that technical capacity is not a
sufficient measure to identify major deficiencies in railway networks. For him,
insufficient levels of service of railway companies where at that time more
important than technical bottlenecks (Rothengatter, 1996: 1). Cipolina and
Ghiara distinguish four different categories of bottlenecks in freight
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transportation: infrastructural, organizational, technical and bureaucratic
category (Cipolina, Ghiara, 2010: 150).
One important target of the Code24-Project is to better understand
bottlenecks in logistics and its effects on the freight transport corridor
Rotterdam-Genoa. In order to do so, an international and interdisciplinary
expert group within the project (planers, architects, engineers, logisticians and
economists), developed a common definition in 2011 by a structured
brainstorming process (Metaplan):
Bottlenecks always represent additional costs to logistic services by hindering
them. They can be observed on a politico-legal, organisational or physical
level. Such a bottleneck can be national or transborder.
The politico-legal characteristic means that a bottleneck occurs if restrictions
coming from political decisions or legal frameworks hinder infrastructure
planning and logistic processes. This can be e.g. regulation of competition,
standards, regulation of noise protection, price and access regulation, taxes,
night time bans and so on.
A bottleneck also emerges from inefficiencies of operation inside the logistic
sector on the supply and/or on the demand side (organisational
characteristic). In this paper, efficiency has to be understood as the
application of rationality to situations of scarcity (Economic principle). That
means that given goals are realised with minimum costs or that output is
maximised for a given level of costs. Within the logistic process that means to
transport as much as possible under an existing physical and legal framework
or to transport a fixed amount of goods with minimum costs. A common
example for inefficiencies of operation is a lack of information, concerning e.g.
terminal services. The market structure can also lead to inefficiencies. Heavy
competition could hamper advantageous cooperation as well as a market
dominant position of one supplier (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim
Bundesministerium für Verkehr, 2003: 3).
Bottlenecks with physical characteristic emerge when demand for freight
transport exceeds available capacity of infrastructure. Railway infrastructure
includes tracks, junctions, signalling systems, terminals, and so on.
There are some specific relations between these three levels. Whereas
political decision and legal framework influences the operational and physical
level, the reverse is not the case. Furthermore the economic impact of a
physical bottleneck depends on the efficiency of the logistic market. Imagine
that the capacity utilisation of freight trains is not efficient (not fully loaded
wagons or short trains). This can be the case if the level of concurrence is low
in the market. In this situation railway operators must ask for more freight
tracks in a corridor, in order to transport the same volume of cargo. The limit
of infrastructure capacity will be reached by a lower volume of cargo.
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Figure 1: Dependencies of bottleneck characteristics in railway
infrastructure
This consideration gives a first advice of how to deal with bottlenecks. If a
physical bottleneck has been detected before eliminating it, the potential
influence of politico-legal and of organisational bottlenecks to the physical
bottleneck has to be analysed. This concept of bottleneck has to be clearly
distinguished from the concept of monopolistic bottleneck (see chapter 3.1).
2.2 Bottlenecks to logistic companies on the Corridor 24
In May and April 2012 an internet survey gave logistic companies working on
the corridor 24 the opportunity to indicate bottlenecks hindering their business
activity. The questionnaire was open to all modes of transport. 178 companies
took part, 138 (77,5 %) located a total of 165 bottlenecks to their activity.
The respondent companies suffer mostly from bottlenecks in infrastructure, 27
% of the mentioned hindrances. Furthermore respondents refer to 9 %
physical bottlenecks in terminals. High traffic volumes which indicate again a
lack of infrastructure capacity in comparison were mentioned 30 times which
correspond to 18 % of all bottlenecks. 38 bottlenecks (23%) from logistic
services (included terminals) hinder logistic companies in their activities. The
derogation from legal hindrances (problems in cross-border freight transport
and diverse) is quantified by 22 bottlenecks (14%).
Bottleneck
Quantity
Per cent
bottlenecks in infrastructure (not terminals)
45
27,4
high traffic volume
30
18,3
lack of logistic services (not terminals)
30
18,3
problems in cross-border freight transport
16
9,8
physical bottlenecks in terminals
15
9,1
lack of terminal services
8
4,9
diverse legal hindrances
7
4,3
Others
14
8,5
Total
165
100
Table 1: Bottlenecks for logistic activity
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The transfer from this analysis to the pattern of bottleneck characteristics
shows the importance of physical bottlenecks to logistic activity along the
corridor Rotterdam – Genoa. More than the half of all mentioned bottlenecks
were physical (56,7%). Organisational (30,5%) and legal bottlenecks
obviously plays a less important role.
Bottleneck
Quantity
Per cent
Legal
22
13,4
Organizational
50
30,5
Physical
93
56,7
Total
165
100,0
Table 2: Bottlenecks ordered by categories
The bottlenecks mentioned by the logistic companies were identified from a
business perspective. In order to reach efficiency of transport processes this
business perspective is an important indicator to public intervention because
they show where the problems appear. People working every day on the
corridor may have a much better view on problems in logistics than civil
servants in transport ministry or administrators in planning units. But individual
perspective and interest may distort reality. In fact only an economic view on
bottlenecks can enlighten the question about government intervention.
3. ECONOMIC THEORY AND RAILWAY INDUSTRY
3.1 The concepts of market failure, monopolistic bottleneck and
government failure
In order to estimate the necessity of regulation, economists have developed
since the late 18th century the concept of market failure which describes a
situation in free markets, where allocation of goods and services is not
efficient (Medema 2007: 355). That is, there exists a social welfare optimum
(Pareto-Optimum) which cannot be reached by the market. Common market
failures are externalities (e.g. from noise or pollution), information
asymmetries (principal agent problems between a network operator and the
regulation authority) or natural monopoly (Bator, 1958: 358 ff., Leonard, 2008:
301).
Market failure is a precondition for government regulation to
economists. Railway industry is concerned as well. It is especially suggested
to be a natural monopoly, a market which is most efficient for production to be
concentrated in a single firm because of economies of scale or scope.
Therefore these national markets were the object of rigid regulatory practices
in the past all over Europe. Baumol et al. (1982) gave more space to
deregulation with their theory of contestable markets where the main features
are (1) no entry or exit barriers, (2) no sunk costs and (3) access to the same
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level of technology to incumbent firms and new entrants. This concept is a
generalisation from markets of perfect competition and applies even to
oligopoly and monopoly. The ambition was to formulate conditions for every
market form which guarantee the same efficiency properties as perfect
competition.
Deregulation of network economies typically includes the problem that it is
insufficient to eliminate all market barriers. The theory of monopolistic
bottleneck (Knieps, 1996) is of particular relevance to this issue. It defines
characteristics of a market, which lend stable market power to the incumbent.
The characteristics of a monopolistic bottleneck are met when:
(1) A facility is necessary for reaching customers because no active substitute
is available. This is the case if the relevant market is characterized by a
natural monopoly situation, and one provider can offer this facility at lower
cost than several providers (natural monopoly); and
(2) At the same time, the facility cannot be economically feasible duplicated
and thereby no potential substitute is available. This holds if the costs of the
facility are irreversible (Knieps 1997: 327).
Table 3 illustrates this theory. Therefore Knieps concludes that “sectorspecific ex ante regulatory intervention in order to discipline market power can
only be justified in non-contestable networks (monopolistic bottleneck areas)“
(Knieps, 2002: 3).
Network area
with sunk costs
without sunk costs
natural monopoly
Monopolistic bottleneck
potential
competition
(contestable market)
no natural monopoly
active competition
active competition
Table 3: Network areas (Knieps, 2002: 4)
The existence of monopolistic bottlenecks produces twofold problems. First,
the lack of competition will probably lead to market inefficiency, e.g. by high
tariffs and monopoly rents. Secondly, market power doesn‟t distort only the
efficiency of the bottleneck market but the efficiency of complementary
markets too. This is the case when a vertical integrated railway company
refuses or hampers access to its own infrastructure (Weiß 2010: 7).
A more general view to limits of government regulation comes from welfare
theory. Market failure is the classical precondition to regulation but doesn‟t
lead automatically to its application. Only if total benefits from public regulation
exceed total costs of government intervention and therefore lead to
improvement of allocation, regulation is appropriate (Donges, Freytag 2001:
189). This corresponds to the Comparative Institution Approach which
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pretends to compare in case of market failure between the status quo of the
inefficient market and the cost of regulation (Watrin, 1986).
Finally government intervention is not without failure. Government failure
occurs when a regulation causes more inefficient allocation of goods and
resources than would occur without that regulation. It represents systemic
problems which prevent an efficient government intervention to raise market
allocation. Public Choice Theory explains much of these phenomena. Rational
behaviour of politicians, civil servants and voters explains much of systematic
inefficient public policy (Donges, Freitag 2001: 191-213)
3.2 The disaggregated regulatory framework applied to railway
industry
Knieps disaggregates the railway market in three separate markets (Knieps
1996, Knieps, Weiß, 2009):

Service of transportation (in our context especially freight)

Service of traffic and safety control

railway infrastructure
The market of transportation service contains logistic services, product
development, pricing, marketing etc. supplied by railway companies. The
market of railway control offers safety of traffic and transport as well as real
time control of traffic flows and maintenance of new and existing
infrastructure, like tracks and terminals. The market of railway infrastructure
provides planning and development. (Weiß, 2010: 4).
Railway infrastructure, unlike service of railway transportation and railway
traffic and safety control, represents a bottleneck or essential facility (Areeda,
1990; Lipsky, Sidak, 1999). The track operator holds a natural monopoly and
the building of railway infrastructure represents irreversible costs (Knieps,
2002: 5). According to the monopolistic bottleneck approach this market is the
only one which comes into consideration for regulation.
3.3
Disaggregated markets in rail freight transport on the Corridor 24
The market “Service of Transportation” is supposed to allow competition
between transport and logistics companies using railway infrastructure. A precondition for efficient competition in rail transport markets is the existence of
non-discriminatory access to infrastructure for all active and potential transport
service providers (Knieps, 2009: 4). Before 1991 in most European countries
the former public railway companies were vertically integrated organisations
and had virtual or total monopolies. The European deregulation process
started with the EU Directive 91/440 with the purpose to make it a legal
requirement for independent companies to be able to apply for nondiscriminatory track access on a European Union country's track. This
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directive was clarified and
(Monopolkommission, 2007: 18).
extended
by
further
EU
directives
The IBM study Rail Liberalisation Index tries to describe the progress of the
liberalisation process in rail transportation in 27 European countries, including
the seven countries of the TEN Corridor 24. Concerning freight transport,
Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland and Italy were qualified as
„advanced‟ in relation to the target of liberalisation, France and Luxemburg
were qualified as „on schedule‟. The study considers that the liberalisation
process in the rail freight transport market has made considerable progress
(IBM and Kirchner, 2011: 66).
Nevertheless in the separate country reports, the study shows several
weaknesses of the market. For example EU infringement proceedings are
taking place against Germany, because the European Commission is
concerned about the inadequate independence of the infrastructure manager
from Deutsche Bahn transportation services (IBM and Kirchner, 2011: 99). In
Italy, external rail companies complain about hindrances to market access to
essential facilities, the restriction of cabotage services or reports of
irregularities in train path allocation (ibidem: 152). In every country of the TEN24 Corridor the former public railway undertaking had still in minimum more
than the half of market share in freight transport (see table below).
Country
% market share
Netherlands
45
Belgium
10
Luxembourg
0
Germany
20
France
16,6
Switzerland
32
Italy
20
Table 4: Market share of external freight companies
kilometres) (IBM and Kirchner C., 2011)
(in
tonne-
We have to recognise that the importance of several bottlenecks is different to
companies‟ business activity. Especially small and medium sized companies
are frequently hindered more e.g. from complexity of European Railway
Safety Directive 2004/14/EC or cross-border transports. The latter still needs
cooperation between railway companies. The concentration process in this
market and cooperation especially between the incumbents seems to
complicate cross-border transports for smaller competitors (Berschin et al.,
2011: 104 ff.).
External railway freight companies which have entered the national market
after liberalisation have still a minor market position. Especially in Belgium,
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Luxembourg, Germany, France and Italy one can still consider a dominant
market position of the former public monopolist. We have to note that market
conditions are partly not being sufficiently precise (European Commission,
2010: 6ff.) which will lead to inefficiency on the market.
The market of traffic and safety control is supposed not to be a
monopolistic bottleneck. Even if this market is a natural monopoly, there are
no irreversible costs. Knieps and Zenhäusern mentioned that potential
competition can be reached in form of a competitive bidding procedure
(Knieps, Zenhäusern, 2011, p. 9). This idea follows the theory of contestable
markets.
The current situation in countries along the TEN-24 Corridor is not very
auspicious. There is no competition at all in this sector. In no country is traffic
control in railway networks outsourced by a bidding procedure. Only in France
and The Netherlands is this service independent from transport service of the
incumbent, even if it is still part of the infrastructure manager‟s task. In the
other five countries the task of railway control is part of an infrastructure
manager‟s task, which is under the umbrella of the incumbent‟s vertical
holding. Again we have to consider network related market power and
potential market failure.
The market of infrastructure is usually characterised by a monopolistic
bottleneck, which means natural monopoly and irreversible costs. The notion
of natural monopoly is based on the existence of economies of scale, that is, a
single firm serving the entire market has a lower average cost than any other
smaller rival. Hence, it would be inefficient to have more than one firm
operating in the relevant market if the lowest possible average cost is to be
achieved. Such scale economies are typically taken to mean that competition
might lead to greatly inefficient outcomes. However, the single company
would have market power to raise prices and therefore there is a need for
regulation by the government if irreversible costs appear as well. Investment
of railway infrastructure is typically extremely costly, earth bounded and
therefore irreversible.
Therefore competition on the market of infrastructure along the Corridor 24
seems to be impossible. Especially problematic is in fact that infrastructure
managers on the corridor 24 are mostly part of the vertically integrated
national incumbent holding. Market power can be transferred to potentially
competitive markets and used for discrimination of competitors. The attempt
to avoid discrimination by installation of a public regulation body risks to fail
because of asymmetrical information between the incumbent and the
regulator.
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4. THE INTERPRETATION OF BOTTLENECKS BY ECONOMIC THEORY
As considered above different stakeholders frequently use the bottleneck
argument to claim for regulation or public investment in railway infrastructure.
But market failure is a necessary precondition for government intervention.
The analysis of the disaggregated markets of rail freight transport along the
Corridor 24 shows still a large regulation of the disaggregated railway
markets. We can assume that national governments have recognised market
failures and regulated and respectively deregulated the markets.
According to economic theory politico-legal and organisational bottlenecks
which refer especially to the markets of “transport service” and “traffic and
safety control” has to be understood as part of the burden of regulation or
deregulation of these markets. Additional costs to the logistic companies are
not a proof but an indicator for government failure even if the two mentioned
markets are characterised as competitive or potentially competitive by the
disaggregated market approach.
On the other hand it can be the objective of government regulation to burden
the companies by pigovian taxes or legislation, in order to internalise negative
externalities, e.g. from pollution (Gravelle, Rees, 2004: 321-323). If regulation
takes place on the markets of “transport service” and “traffic and safety
control” for market failures other than natural monopoly, this can potentially be
efficient. If government will prevent failure of its regulation, each government
regulation has to be evaluated by an in-depth cost-benefit-analysis (Donges,
Freytag, 2001: 189).
Physical bottlenecks refer to the railway infrastructure market which is a
monopolistic bottleneck. The monopolist has to decide whether he to invest in
new infrastructure or not. Behind this decision there has to be a planning
process which depends on the public or private status of the monopolist.
Bottleneck characteristic
affected market
Competition
politico-legal
“transport service”
“traffic and safety control”
competitive or potentially
competitive
organisational
“transport service”
Competitive
physical
“railway infrastructure”
non competitive
Table 5: Bottlenecks and affected markets
A private network manager will seek commercial profit. Monopolistic theory
tells us that this behaviour causes market failure whereas the price is too high
and/or the output too small.
In order to avoid this loss of welfare, government regulates the market with
ex-ante and/or ex-post regulation. The relation between the regulator and the
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regulated is a typical principal-agent problem. The two parties have different
interests and asymmetric information whereas the network manager (the
agent) has more information. Thus the government (principal) cannot directly
ensure that the network manager will always acts in its best interests. This
occurs particularly when activities that are useful to the society are costly to
the network manager. One has to take into consideration, that most of the
network managers along the Corridor 24 are still vertically integrated in a
holding.
Concerning the planning process, the transport ministry has the problem that
it doesn‟t have full information about infrastructure bottlenecks. To make
matters worse the infrastructure of the network and even along the Corridor
24 is characterised by inhomogeneous capacity.
Compared to road infrastructure, where bottlenecks or capacity shortage
becomes evident to the eye of the observer as traffic congestion, this obvious
kind of congestion phenomena cannot be observed by the non-expert public
in railway infrastructure.
Imagine for example growing demand for freight transport paths on a railway
corridor. If the price for train paths is unchanged, this may lead to excess
demand. A bottleneck appears where demand exceeds supply (capacity).
Regulatory responses to the excess demand in the short run could be to do
nothing but accept the bottleneck or to increase the price of slots in order to
create new market equilibrium. There are close substitutes to railway freight
transport, specifically road or barge. Both regulatory options will therefore lead
to a substitution effect. Containers which could not be transported on rail will
be transported especially on road. This effect is contrary to the manifested
transport policy of European Union and Switzerland.
Conclusion: Transport policy using common policy tools seems not to be
able to solve efficiency problems emerging on the Corridor 24 (see Chapter
3.3). Meanwhile opposition appears on several parts of the corridor on the
local level against new infrastructure planning. Inefficiencies caused by
externalities and lack of information are recognised more and more by the
citizen which is not willing to suffer from not comprehensible global planning
results.
Below we will present a large scale infrastructure planning approach which will
include participative planning on the local and regional level. The objective of
such an approach is to break the monopolistic power of the infrastructure
manager, to induce positive effects to the other railway markets in terms of
competition, to better internalise externalities and last but not least to higher
acceptance for infrastructure projects on the local and regional level.
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5. A SPATIAL PLANNING POINT OF VIEW
A look at bottlenecks from an economic point of view has shown that we
cannot act by only following the economic models of deregulation in a
monopolistic market. As the presented insights suggest governmental
interventions is indicated to follow the interdisciplinary trails of spatial
planning. The main formulation of the problem used by most stakeholders is:
"The development of the corridor is limited by bottlenecks" facing the two
central issues of our paper.
This paper is proposing a different approach to large scale infrastructure
planning. The approach does not differ from the invisible hand of free markets
between service providers, but point the reader‟s mind on the fragile relation
between regional cooperation and global competition. This is a major
antagonism regions connected by major infrastructures deal with. So our
starting point is not to provide as much infrastructure as to meet a potential
demand. Our assumption is that a common understanding of what each
region is ready to offer, taking into account its economic interests and the
other tasks that each has to fulfil is a good base for infrastructure
development.
Problems are found at different levels: local, regional, national and
international interests are in conflict. The objective is to find a common
denominator. This approach assumes that today‟s infrastructure projects,
which are touching spatial development, may not be investigated just on a
single territorial scale, as planning competences are located at different levels.
The classical planning approach sees the national level plan and implement
infrastructure of national interest. The regions may have a right to be heard.
Talking about spatial strategies, we see that the national level is relatively
weak in most European countries. In TEN Corridor 24, a strong national
planning tradition can just be found in the Netherlands (actually with rapidly
shrinking powers). Germany, Switzerland and Italy‟s national planners,
however, can just formulate non-binding concepts. The design of spatial
development strategies is usually based at a regional (or cantonal) level, while
at the local level the binding land use plans were implemented.
On today‟s rail infrastructure different transport modes operate in parallel.
There are just a few pure high-speed lines. Most tracks are used in mixed
traffic, to guarantee an intense use of the very important investments. Not only
the national traffic but also regional and even local traffic is accepted on the
Trans European Network TEN. To attract the use of these tracks, stations
need an economically vital environment, which also offers spaces to live and
work to their customers. In the same way, goods must be transferred to rail,
not in countless small logistics access points, but also in intermodal hubs,
where there is a direct access to other modes of transport.
As the financial resources are limited in most states of the European Union,
local and regional levels are asked to define and finance their transport offers.
Thus, as they were asked to co-finance operations they want to take
advantage of and to align their spatial strategies on these investments and
their operational modes. Inner development around train stations thus is the
© Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012
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corresponding spatial strategy. It is a matter of fairness to also involve in the
decision process for new infrastructures, those who are asked to pay for the
operation of the future infrastructure. Even more important is that in common
decision processes local acceptance of future infrastructures may rise if
negative external effects to the infrastructure neighbours can be reduced.
As many regional interests are involved, infrastructure planning processes
lack real participation and currently meet strong resistance. The opposition
against new lines and projects is growing in various parts of Europe: the upper
Rhine Valley, the No TAV movement in the Val di Susa or Stuttgart 21.
How to organize a common planning process? What to plan and how to act on
a European level? This was a set of questions we had to answer, as we had
turned our interest to the development of Corridor 24 in 2008. We had no
interest in designing a new overall plan for European infrastructure. We
wanted to understand the real planning problems of local, regional, national or
even pan-European interests arising along the corridor. After the identification
of problems, the main task became to understand on which planning level
these problems were in the right hands. To cope with this question, we had to
set up a group of partners from all fields related to spatial development and to
work together to create a first overview about what goes on in the corridor. So
a characteristic of the Code 24 partnership resides in the variety and diversity
of the involved partners. Adherents refer to 5 Countries (Netherlands,
Germany, France, Switzerland and Italy). There are regional and provincial
authorities, port authorities, municipalities and city governments,
representatives of chambers of commerce, research institutes and
universities, private companies as well as local associations. The project also
leaves room for the presence of observers, such as the port of Antwerp, the
managing authority of the Corridor A, and representatives of the railways and
logistics operators.
5.1 Sharing information as needed basis for a common strategy
From our point of view, access to information as a strategic component of the
project represents an important pillar of a participative infrastructure planning
process. Several databases, printings and publications already exist regarding
Corridor 24 development but an overview of the current stage of proceedings, major
projects and scenarios concerning the corridor are not currently available. From the
logistics operator‟s point of view a lot of information, such as data on traffic
flows and goods are considered strategic.
Information on noise emission data are considered politically sensitive and
difficult to find. We have undertaken to build a dynamic Atlas that collects all
this information, and relates it to spatial dimension. At the base there is a job
of searching (at times comparable to secret service activities) and data
processing. This information is then made available to all partners of the
project (and experts concerned on request) and becomes a shared source of
knowledge and a basis for discussion of future actions and interventions.
One of the core aims of the project is to provide the CODE24 partners with a
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set of strategic information about the corridor development. This activity is
focused on boosting the discussion among the involved partners and the
regional and national stakeholders. Access to information is facilitated by
processing schemas and map overviews of all relevant topics or spatial and
infrastructure development that affects the decision-making process in the
regions touched by the project.
At the heart of this process is the Corridor Info System (CIS), a web-based
tool to support the sharing of strategic information. As is common in the case
of complex processes of planning, the basis of information relating to the
corridor is in many aspects incomplete and not always reliable. The purpose
of the CIS is to provide a tool to support complex planning activities through a
platform that is able to involve local and regional stakeholders in planning, and
for different groups of individuals and organizations from various disciplines to
participate in collaborative planning processes. The variety of endogenous
and exogenous dynamics and interconnections that could affect the results of
the discussed actions can be easily displayed by the CIS. The system
provides an overview of on-going development processes and highlights
problems which are immediately viewable by the interested parties through
the use of Web-GIS tools.
Prerequisite of the CIS is that the collection and systemizing or cataloguing of
data concerning the corridor, in its different aspects, cannot be delegated to a
single entity. The area in question is too big and no single project or group is
able to find and select the relevant information on such a large scale and
variety of topics. With the CIS system, interested stakeholders can have an indepth knowledge base about their regions, infrastructures, projects and
actions on the corridor. A specialty of the system is also, that in case of
inaccurate or incomplete information the entities may update and correct the
information themselves in real time. In this way, the information provided by
CIS evolves, deepens and enriches through the direct involvement of the
various entities themselves.
Of great importance is the interactive process generated by the involvement of
the entities. This allows not only refining information but it helps to find a
necessary agreement on the definition of the common problem at the same
time. This is a pre-condition for the development of a shared strategy with an
economic, social and political feasibility directed to improve the functionality
and prepare to play the role of engine of regional development throughout the
corridor 24. The primary information has been collected through a variety of
methods: data available from public sources, workshops, focus group
interviews and the description by the project partners of the different local
situations for example such as those related to railway infrastructure, the
different operation concepts, rolling stock, logistic hubs and major projects of
spatial development linked to the development of transport infrastructure.
Still, work is not finished simply by the publishing of the Info System on the
Internet. The above list is constantly updated by the partners according to
their needs and questions that arise during the project. The system is a first
step towards a common strategy on the Corridor 24; it provides an overview of
© Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012
14
the activities taking place, sharing a platform for communication and
information.
The Corridor Info System can be consulted at: http://code24.ethz.ch
Figure 2: The Corridor Info System,
Source: Screenshot www.code24.ethz.ch 2012
The initiative CODE24 aims to be open and inclusive to all the institutions and
citizens interested in the Corridor. Therefore the communication and
stakeholder involvement are key components of the project management
strategy. For this purpose the initiators of the project have decided to activate
a strategic network of decision-makers and stakeholders and launch a series
of events focused on the presentation of the project objectives and activities
and at the same time meeting the expectations and interests of participants.
Between July and December 2010, 9 regional workshops have been
promoted along the corridor, focused on creating widespread awareness of
the problems affecting the various spatial entities and on strengthening the
discussion on the strategic choices needed to support integrated development
at both local and European level.
To collect the data displayed in the CIS workshops were held in 9 cities:
Rotterdam (NL), Antwerp (BE), Essen (DE), Frankfurt (DE), Mannheim (DE),
Karlsruhe (DE), Zurich (CH), Milano (IT) and Genoa (IT). All in all about 300
people from regional planning authorities, public transport operators,
entrepreneurs of logistics and transport, research institutes and experts, local
and multinational companies, associations of citizens, port authorities and
policy makers have actively participated in the workshops. Through these
meetings it was possible, on the one hand, to produce together a framework
of the state of the art and to detect the expectations and opportunities for
further action and initiatives. The positive feedback and information collection
© Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012
15
have allowed the Code24 team to assemble a dynamic overview of the
ongoing and future development and transformation processes along the
Corridor.
This knowledge is essential to support and guide future Code24 activities. In
particular, a strong need for interregional coordination and planning has
emerged from the discussions, along with the need for more effective
management methods of decision-making with regard to the actual function of
the corridor and its sub-lines. The information collected in the corridor was
integrated into the Info System.
Figure 3: Sample Code 24, Workshop, Source: ETH Zürich 2010 Mannheim
5.2 Important aspects of collaboration
Superior infrastructure planning moves always in a mutual social context, and
must deal with questions based on the insecure grounds of forecasts. Spatial
planning considers itself to be able to deal with forecasts that look 15 years
into the future. Significantly longer periods of time are needed to build a transnational rail infrastructure. These periods usually exceed planning periods and
therefore undermine their efficiency to some extent.
We would like to illustrate some main aspects of the processes turning to the
main question of the bottlenecks and observing this example using the three
old cultural techniques involved in communication and argumentation: word,
graph and number. Language, which is at the base of communication and
reasoning, the pictorial representation that supports the consecutive language
to represent complex issues with its capacity of simultaneous representation,
and as third element the number, which is especially important for
comparability.
I will speak of these as different tools. Representation mechanisms help a
partnership such as ours to get a common overview. The common use of the
three simple cultural techniques of Word, image and number can help to
integrate the different approaches in cooperation and foster collaboration over
© Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012
16
large areas. To produce an overview it is necessary to take advantage of
these three cultural techniques to reveal complex information. Each of these
techniques has its strengths and weaknesses to be recognized and known.
An overview treats knowledge. However, as we know since Habermas the
worth of knowledge is limited by the validity of our statements that our
partners are ready to accept in a dialogue (Habermas 1981). Knowledge can
be achieved therefore only as a joint understanding about a subject. A traffic
model can be yet so well elaborated and be said to have delivered the best
results in the past. If our interlocutor challenges its basic parameters, the
results cannot serve in an argumentation. A public meeting, and there is our
workplace in future, has to be convinced with arguments if we want to bring
along a project in our interdependent world.
The quality of argumentation is therefore decisive for the outcome of a
process. We can part here from the classic scheme elaborated by Toulmin to
illuminate the question of argumentation in spatial planning (Toulmin 1958) as
it treats the case of the argumentative support of statements, appearing
mostly in spatial planning. This means that acquiring knowledge is strongly
related to argumentation. This is a proceeding which closely matches the
process chosen by Code24. Our workshop fosters an occasion for
argumentation where common data is used to elaborate common rules to
sustain our statements. We have moved therewith into decision processes
involving mutual recognition of claims. To decide rationally in complex
situations we need to use the three cultural techniques of word, graph and
number to make use of our intellective skills and our capabilities as an
interdisciplinary and transnational partnership.
There is not enough space here to discuss the questions of semiotics. We will
restrict the discussion to the aspects of the language that helps to create a
joint base of the dialogue. This area is certainly the best illuminated of the
mentioned cultural techniques. Yet Rorty (1967) already in the sixties has
stated linguistic turn. A turn that has moved in recent years more towards
images and also opening to numbers in most recent years as diagrammatic
turn. But all these definitions miss the main point: It is not important which
technique prevails but how these techniques can join their forces to support
our complex planning processes.
Numbers can help us to establish comparability in a large and transnational
area. Key figures help to classify the phenomena we meet in different regions
and compare and link them to our own experience. As the basis for decisions
the European Union has set up ESPON agency to elaborate on a set of basic
planning information. A huge amount of interesting data can be found as in a
treasure trove. To search for data becomes a discovery tour, where one can
find much worth reading. The procedure remembers Humboldt as he is
described in the bestseller “Measuring the World” (Kehlmann 2005). He
measures everything he encounters, simply because knowledge about it
might become important. What the data are needed for is not yet known for
the time being. But changing points of view are undermining these founding
data as we will show with the example of bottlenecks. Problems and
© Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012
17
difficulties arise, when specific data is needed for a task that has to remain
comparable across administrative limits, or even national borders.
Images are able to help the processing of large amounts of information, as
they permit simultaneous cognition, not only sequential as in language.
However, new questions arise, as the interpretation of an image is not an
established conclusion. Communication is only necessary in areas of
knowledge that is not shared. To convey this knowledge, the help of images
can only be limited, but its strengths in simultaneous deployment of
information can foster communication processes. To exemplify this area
between cultural techniques, between word and image the Bottlenecks
metaphor can help us. Its analysis can tell us many aspects of its character.
Metaphors have, as images, an evocative function because they help to
quickly take up new issues and help to classify them, addressing already
made experiences (Lakoff, 2001).
The Bottleneck is a metaphor, which is typical for the use of images. It can
serve here as an example, for how a metaphor is used in common language.
A Bottleneck is actually nothing negative. It is a regulator of the effluent,
intended to regulate and dose a liquid so that the absorbing glass is able to
contain the escaping amount, without anything being spilled. Elimination of
bottlenecks happens usually as a negative event. When the bottleneck
breaks, shards get into the liquid. This is no longer enjoyable because the risk
is too big for getting splinters in the digestive system. A pinch of
aggressiveness clouds in the image. Deliberately cutting off the bottleneck is
read as converting a bottle into a weapon which can inflict strong injuries.
And still the elimination of bottlenecks is often heard in the discussion of
infrastructure. This demand let us have an insight in the world of reference the
challenger uses. It is about maximizing the flow rate, regardless of what
amount the glass can handle, whether the liquid makes the glass overflow or
squirts on the tablecloth. Thus, we have also touched on the usual arguments
of opponents of infrastructure development. The fear of externalities, flooding
of existing infrastructure, or just new bottlenecks nearer to home. It becomes
clear here what force images have. But the question also arises whether we
use the correct images. Does the bottleneck metaphor help to solve our
problem? The bottleneck metaphor leaves us alone with the question of which
is the bottle and which is the glass along the corridor, for the different regional
viewpoints. Here it becomes evident that the metaphor is oriented. It's
incomparably much easier to carry a liquid from the bottle into the glass as the
other way round.
Other metaphors are also possible, such as the corridor as a tube metaphor.
This is probably an image that still prevails in many places, the corridor as a
vein that transports the flows in a uniform manner over the distances. So the
corridor as a work of a plumber, who organizes flows in a network which is
organized in a tree shape with regulated branches and uniform pressure. This
is a picture of an ordered world that corresponds to the development concepts
of the 1960s (Cristaller 1954). The metaphor of the corridor as part of a
network would be the fancy version of today. This is the metaphor, the
European Union uses for the TEN-T projects. It is the metaphor of the
© Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012
18
Internet, a network of flexible connectors and nodes, stressing redundancy.
Depending on which of these images we part from, we adjust and fix the
perimeter for the search for options and solutions accordingly. Using the
bottleneck metaphor we care about capacity of single sections. In the tube
metaphor we rather think about the line capacity and in the network metaphor
the main point of observation are the nodes and their connectors. To build an
overview means to create a common image. To set up a common overview
means also to communicate about different images to explore the limits of
one‟s own image.
5.3
Towards a common strategy
The Code24 project aims to build up a strong partnership configured as a
group of interest, in an integrated and inter-sectorial way active on issues
concerning the corridor. The project has aimed within the framework of the
different actions at involving as many stakeholders as possible through the
organization of seminars, conferences, focus groups and workshops, with the
intent to engage in the discussion a significant group of entities. From the
survey of expectations and the diverse territorial situations which mainly
occupied the first year of work the need to further discuss the cross-border
dimension of many topics has emerged. The project aims to deepen these
issues through a process of accompaniment and facilitation of the discussion,
identifying priorities specific to each local scope. From these a "package" of
priority initiatives is built and submitted to the attention of decision makers at
national and European level. The decision to take a shared position by the
partnership project with regard to the most relevant issues concerning the
future development of the corridor, about issues on both local and regional
scale, presents a great challenge to the team both in terms of content and of
working methods.
This phase of the so-called Collaborative assessment, currently in work, is
based on the application of a set of tools and on the outcomes of various
actions already implemented:

The Corridor Info System,

Qualitative information (point of view of the entities), collected through
regional workshops

The results of the assessment of regional economic areas and the
potential impacts.
A tool for viewing scenarios developed by the Istituto Superiore sui Sistemi
Territoriali per l'Innovazione (Siti 2012) is providing optimal support for the
discussion, making the various overlapping issues visible and showing the
perimeters of the necessary decision-making processes. Alternative scenarios
on infrastructures and the development of the territory are presented and
discussed. An evaluation of the different options is then attempted, according
to the different set of priorities and criteria discussed and selected by the
stakeholders. Aim of this activity is to define the key elements of a possible
common strategy based on a thorough discussion of the opportunities, risks
© Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012
19
and the feasibility of the measures. To achieve a widely accepted and
consolidated result, the process consists of several stages and is based on
applying different tools:

A strategic assessment of the situation including the comparison
between potentials to improve the supply of transport solutions and
spatial development,

Using simulations designed to locate where infrastructure development
could create opportunities or problems to regional development;

Assess how and where changes in concepts of operating rail could
affect regional development;

Assessing the areas in which territorial changes may cause variations
in the demand for transport;
These simulations are combined with a series of selected tools (morphological
methods, logic models, swot analysis, ...) to consolidate the selection criteria
and to prepare intermediate results to be discussed in 3 stages. A method of
evaluating strategic qualitative and Analytic Network Process (ANP), is used
in parallel in order to verify preferences from different points of view towards
different scenarios.
5.4 First results
On the basis of the information from the regional workshops, the partners of
the project consider in-depth investigations of the sections OberhausenEmmerich, Frankfurt-Mannheim, Freiburg North-West-Switzerland and TicinoLombardy as necessary. In the spring of 2011 the first test could be
completed with the idea for an integrated spatial development strategy for the
upgrade of the line Oberhausen Emmerich. Essential knowledge arisen from
this procedure was that the desired increase of the line capacity is possible to
achieve without the construction of the third track. To handle the additional
trains which are also compatible with the regional development strategies, the
inclusion of railway planning in the regional development strategy has proven
important. The innovative concepts proposed by the involved planning teams
have shown that the integration is feasible with little effort.
The focus of the ETH Zurich is on the development of new methods to deal
with the unresolved spatial issues. The in-depth examination of the section of
the line between the metropolitan areas of Frankfurt and Mannheim has
started with a first collaborative assessment at the ETH Zurich by the end of
March 2012. The representatives of the two regions have agreed to develop a
common strategy for coordinated spatial and infrastructure development.
Together with Siti Turin, ETH Zurich will accompany the further process.
The partners of the INTERREG project have decided at the bi-annual Code 24
meeting in April 2012 in Frankfurt to work out a common strategy for the entire
corridor. The ETH Zurich will coordinate this work. A first event will be held on
the occasion of the next meeting of the partnership from 19-21 September
© Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012
20
2012 in Genoa. A common strategy means to know where this continent will
stand respect to global developments. It also means to embed the solution
that respond to global questions with our local projects in an overall vision. To
remedy bottlenecks for the global economy has consequences on the different
regional spatial strategies. To think globally may help us prepare for global
flows of goods, as we have done this at the beginning of this paper. To assess
the chances and threats these global developments offer for our local quality
of life remains an important challenge to respond among different regions but
also in different disciplines and stakeholders.
6. INTEGRATED CONCLUSION
6.1 Conclusion for public regulation and planning on the Corridor 24
Inefficiencies occur in the three markets of railway freight transport,
subdivided by the concept of disaggregated economic network theory. On one
hand the full potentials of deregulation in the market of “Service of
transportation” and in the market of “traffic and safety control” is – after 20
years of deregulation in Europe – still not achieved yet. On the other hand,
necessary regulation of the market of infrastructure is too low, because
infrastructure management is under control of the incumbent holding in five
countries. As an outcome of this analysis we propose measures of
deregulation and regulation as well as an appropriate planning approach in
order to reach efficiency with respect to economic and spatial theory.
6.2 (De-)Regulation requirements
- After a long period of deregulation in European freight transport (the
transportation market on rail) is still characterized by a high share of
freight transport by the respective national incumbent. The
transportation market shall be further deregulated in order to guarantee
a higher degree of competition between the incumbent and other rail
freight operators. This can be reached e.g. by a continuous bidding
procedure of all train paths including cross-border rail corridors. The
realisation of this proposition depends much to the further organisation
of the infrastructure market.
-
The same applies to the market of traffic and safety control, as well as
for other vulnerable markets like the maintenance of infrastructure. As
discussed above, a bidding procedure enables potential competition
and so higher allocative efficiency of the market.
-
In order to guarantee free access from the railway companies to the
network and to avoid discrimination it is imperative to absolutely
separate the network management from the incumbent‟s railway
company. In this spirit network management includes especially access
regulation and price setting. Because of the Principle of Subsidiarity
these two challenges have to be assigned to a European level.
© Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012
21
6.3 Planning process requirements
A procedure must be embedded in the social and economic environment and
its context, to become successful. Code 24 brings together the major players
along the North-South axis in a steadily widening and long-term cooperation.
A European grouping for territorial cooperation organizes the regions and
major stakeholders along the axis. Participation of stakeholders in the
planning process is required by the Swiss Federal Government in its
agglomeration development policy. Joint sponsorships, participation of major
stakeholders and participation are typical practices, which tie the financing of
infrastructure to clear conditions of an integrated approach to spatial
development in Switzerland. Code 24 aims to also anchor this principle at
European level. The connecting Europe facility offers an occasion to start a
new way of thinking in infrastructure planning.
Code 24 proposes that the European Union together with involved nations
and regions initiate a coordinated spatial planning and realisation process to
support important trans-national infrastructure investments. To avoid and
overcome conflicts between involved entities and stakeholders and to
guarantee and improve the quality of life of the affected population,
infrastructure projects comply with the following minimum requirements:

Investments are based on a regional organising body

Procedures ensure participation during elaboration of plans

Projects are based on an integrated spatial development strategy
Code 24 EGTC as a trans-national organisational body is predestined to
implement these requirements and to coordinate projects in different regions
and timescales, guaranteeing minimum quality standards, increasing network
accessibility and efficiency and reducing the existing negative impacts on the
quality of life.
© Association for European Transport and Contributors 2012
22
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Notes
1
Thanks to Heinz Feldman and Ulrich Grubert for helpful comments
e.g. DB Schenker, Rail freight companies present their requirements for the most important
European Corridor: Rotterdam-Genua, Press release, 19.12.2011; Port of Rotterdam, Newsflash 2012,
February 2012, S. 4
2
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