Unsung Heroes
Japanese Invasion of Burma —
The Early Days
By John Mealin and Gladys Hamilton (Maddox)
Truck convoy on Burma Road enroute to Kunming
Prelude to war in Burma
Sino-Japanese War
In July 1937 open war broke out between
Japan and China. Japan immediately began to occupy China’s sea ports, cutting
off vital supplies from the outside.
In response China contracted 200,000 Chinese and Burmese labourers to build a
717 mile narrow, gravel road from Lashio
in north-eastern Burma through the mountains to Kunming (Yunnan Province) in
south west China.
to a terminal in Lashio. A convoy of trucks
then transported the goods along the winding Burma Road to Kunming in south-west
China. This allowed China to evade the
Japanese blockade.
In July 1940, the Japanese put pressure
on the British to close the Burma Road for
at least 3 months. Britain did not want another potential war front, as it was too preoccupied with defending itself in the Battle
of Britain. It gave in, shutting down the
Burma Road and isolating China.
Called the Burma Road, it became notorious for its “cowboy drivers” who raced its
treacherous length day and night. They
were totally oblivious to the safety of pedestrians, other drivers and animals. Fatalities were common. Many a truck never
reached his destination. Many an animal
was squashed in an untimely death.
Goods destined for China were shipped to
the port in Rangoon and from there via rail
27jan15 / Copyright
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Shwedagon Pagoda, Rangoon
Britain reopened the Burma Road in October 1940. It became the only supply line
into China.
By late 1941, the US was shipping lendlease munitions and other goods into Rangoon. By keeping China amply supplied,
the US ensured that Japan was forced to
maintain a considerable ground force in
China, preventing them from being deployed elsewhere.
Concerned about the Japanese war in
China and its imperialistic expansion, in
July 1941, the Americans, British and
Dutch froze all Japanese assets and imposed an embargo on oil exports to Japan.
AVG and RAF activity
Around the same time, an American Volunteer Group (AVG – Flying Tigers) consisting of US volunteer pilots began operating from a British airfield in Toungoo, approximately 136 miles north-east of Rangoon. The AVG squadron’s mission was
to protect the Burma Road. By November
1941, the AVG had grown to three operational squadrons, two based in Kunming in
China and the third at Mingaladon airfield
outside Rangoon.
The Royal Air Force (RAF) strength in
Burma in late 1941 was negligible. Daily
operational strength of British 67 Fighter
Squadron (based at Mingaladon) was 16
Brewster Buffalo aircraft. And that was
when they were all mechanically sound
and flyable.
The four principal airfields at that time between Mingaladon (Rangoon) and Singapore were Moulmein, Tavoy, Mergui and
Victoria Point. These were strategically
important refueling points for aircraft flying
east to Malaya, Singapore and Dutch East
Indies. Unfortunately, these airfields were
susceptible to being occupied easily by the
Japanese, as was proven later.
Wireless communications between the airfields was deplorable. Sadly, only one radio-direction finder was available. A “lost
pilot” seeking a “RDF steer” (navigational
direction) to a destination could be placed
in a life-threatening situation, if the RDF
facility was unavailable.
The Burma Observation Corps had no
wireless. They had to resort to a telephone or telegraph system, assuming the
lines were functional. This left the AVG
and RAF susceptible to attack by the Japanese Air Force (JAF) without prior warning.
The weather in Burma could make flying
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All weather operations
extremely hazardous, especially during the
Monsoons. Given Lord Mountbatten’s decree that “we will fly through the Monsoon”
and the rudimentary navigational equipment on board the aircraft, it is unimaginable the risks that AVG and RAF pilots
took flying blind through the thick clouds,
violent thunderstorms and turbulence.
Sometimes pilots had no other choice but
to resort to “dead reckoning”, using a map,
watch and compass to navigate through
the soup. The accuracy of some maps
were questionable, especially when using
a small scale (1:1,000,000).
Meanwhile, in Japan the military strategists
recognized their predicament. They concluded that Burma needed to be invaded.
Strategically, it would allow Japan to cut
the supply line and gain complete control
of China. That would let some of the Japanese armed forces be released for deployment to other areas. It would permit them
to protect their flank against a retaliatory
British attack from India. Also, they would
have full access to the abundant natural
resources in Burma, something Japan
dearly needed.
Early days of war
A war in Burma! Nothing could be further
from everyone’s mind.
It was almost
Christmas --- a time for last minute shopping, house decorations, merriment and
meeting friends. War in Europe and other
parts of South East Asia seemed a world
away. Few could envision the grief, destruction and horror soon to be unleashed.
The British Civil Government in Burma
would not accept the fact that war could
come to its doorstep. They believed that
Burma was secure and impregnable.
They totally underestimated Japanese fanaticism and its faith in seishin, the
strength of will and spirit over the material
superiority of its enemies. The western
world could not comprehend such intangible beliefs. Yet the Japanese soldiers’
faith in seishin led to many astounding
feats on the battlefield.
The British ridiculed the idea that Japan
wielded a serious fighting force. However,
those who had witnessed the Japanese
forces in action knew that they were formidable.
A Colonel Simpson of the Royal Scots,
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Rangoon after bombing by JAF
who had been the military attaché in Tokyo, reported that the Japanese Army
was “the toughest war machine in the
world”. Naturally, Colonel Simpson was
ridiculed and ignored. The British in
Burma were totally unprepared for the
rapid invasion and the violent storm about
to be let loose on them.
Contrary to popular belief, the Japanese
soldiers were not trained for jungle warfare. Japan had no place to conduct such
training. They acquired their fighting skills
in Manchuria and China. It gave them the
experience to operate in varied terrain
and climatic conditions.
They also developed a natural ability to
understand the conditions of operational
areas and how to adapt swiftly. Their key
tactical disciplines focused on attack, surprise, rapid movement and logistics.
Japanese commanders operated well forward with relatively simple plans. The
Japanese soldier was capable and unwavering, unafraid of death.
British opinion of the JAF followed a similar
tone. They thought it inconceivable that
the JAF could match the RAF capability in
Burma. This misguided perception was a
flaw of dismal British intelligence. When
Japan went to war with China in 1937, British intelligence failed to grasp what was
clearly evident --- the JAF air combat and
bombing run capabilities were formidable.
A classic example of this serious oversight
was demonstrated in the aerial dogfights,
when the British Brewster Buffalo (US
manufactured) came up against the Japanese Mitsubishi Zero. The Buffalo was
outclassed in every aspect by the Zero. It
suffered severe losses in air combat
against the JAF in South East Asia.
How could the British “top brass” have underrated Japan’s ability so badly? A probable answer is that they were blinded by
their own arrogance. They had no inkling
what they were up against.
Attack from the sky
Bombed Rangoon Docks
In preparation for the invasion of Burma,
the JAF first bombed Rangoon on the
morning of 23 December 1941. It was part
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Land invasion
JAF sketch of Mingaladon airfield in 1941
of its “softening up” process.
Easily visible from 40 miles or more away,
the 325 foot high, shimmering, golden
Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon was the
ideal navigational beacon to home in on.
80 twin engine bombers and 30 single engine fighter bombers, taking off from airfields in Thailand and Indochina, sped like
arrows to their selected targets --- Mingaladon airfield (where AVG and RAF fighter
squadrons were based), the downtown districts and Rangoon’s river port on the Irrawaddy.
Around 10 a.m. that morning, the AVG and
RAF were scrambled, taking to the air to
engage the Japanese aircraft. Despite
their heroic efforts, they were severely outnumbered and powerless to prevent the
Capture of Rangoon in March 1942
JAF from bombing and strafing their selected targets.
When the air raid sirens went off, instead
of running for cover, many of the civilians
rushed out to the streets to watch the fascinating aerial circus. The silver flashes in
the sky mesmerized them. The dogfights
were spectacular, especially when the
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Japanese flag from WW2 in Burma
AVG and RAF squadrons shot down the
Japanese bombers and fighters.
The civilians did not comprehend their imminent danger, until the horror of the exploding Japanese bombs brought terror,
injury and death to them.
The damage to Rangoon was significant.
No protective trenches had been dug.
Ground shelters were inadequate. Casualties were high, the buildings on fire and the
docks paralyzed. The civil defense, rescue and medical services fell apart as
most of the staff fled the city. Rangoon
was at a standstill and the public shocked
into panic.
The raid triggered off a mass exodus of
refugees into the jungles and to the north.
Unfortunately, the civilian flight included
the Indian dock labourers. Now no one
was available to unload the stores, vehicles and equipment. (Some 15,000 of the
Indian labourers were later persuaded to
return to Rangoon to help out.)
Know thy enemy
The Japanese raid was successful, almost
surgical. They hit their targets. That precise targeting information could only have
come from Japanese spies and Burmese
fifth columnists. They had amassed intelligence about land and sea objectives, troop
strengths and dispositions and the layout
of ports and airfields.
This was the work of the Japanese
“tokumu kikan” (Special Service Organizations). Apparently, two weeks before the
war began in the Far East, the Japanese
community including doctors, dentists and
photographers disappeared from Rangoon.
By then the maps of the jungles, trails and
footpaths had been handed to the Japanese army. It allowed them to advance
with bewildering speed. Much of this intelligence came from the Burmese who were
obsessed with the belief that the Japanese
would liberate colonial Burma from the
British. They were influenced by the unrest in India, where the dissidents were
fanatic about “self-government”.
Move swiftly where not expected
The British Army in Burma believed that
the Japanese invasion would likely originate from the north east (via Kengtung in
the Shan States). Consequently, it based
the bulk of its defending forces there. It
was the wrong call. The invaders attacked
from the south-east.
On 20 January 1942, the 33rd and 55th divisions of the Japanese Fifteenth Army,
fresh from their victories in China, Malaya
and Singapore swept into Burma, the 55th
Division driving across the Thai / Burmese
border at the 5500 foot high Kawkareik
Pass.
Tavoy airport had already been bombed
and strafed by Japanese fighter bombers
on 11 December. Japanese forces had
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Stamps issued by Japanese during occupation of Burma
invaded Victoria Point (the southern most
point in Burma) on 13 December.
The initial Japanese target was Moulmein,
at the mouth of the Salween River. It fell
on 31 January, despite a valiant effort by
the British forces to fend off the invaders.
An incident occurred at the Sittang Bridge
which caused significant controversy.
Concerned about a possible Japanese
parachute drop and attack from behind,
the bridge was blown, stranding the main
Gurkha force on the wrong (east) side of
the river.
The fit survivors, under enemy fire, made
their way to safety across the river by
swimming or on improvised rafts; however,
the wounded were left behind to the mercy
of the enemy. The British also abandoned
much of their arms and supplies on the
east bank.
Deception and surprise
Besides being a superior force, the Japanese developed a tactic that frequently
surprised their opponents during battle.
They would advance along the village and
forest paths usually at night and block the
roads behind the British positions. The
British forces would be thrown into confusion when they found their enemy also to
their rear, impeding any possible pullback.
By 7 March, the British evacuated Rangoon. The last of the ships had left for
Calcutta. The last Burma Railway train
had headed north.
A scorched earth policy was implemented
to avoid leaving anything of strategic value
to the invaders. Rangoon was left burning.
The docks, workshops and factories were
destroyed. Oil pumps, pumping stations
and storage tanks in the refinery across
the river in Syriam were set on fire. Oil
rigs were cut up to prevent further use.
During the British Army retreat to India,
they set on fire or destroyed oil fields and
facilities at Yenangyaung and Chauk.
Mines were blown, some unsuccessfully.
On 8 March, the Japanese occupied Rangoon. Two additional divisions, the 18th
and the 56th landed, reinforcing the 33rd
and 55th divisions in their onward drive into
central and northern Burma.
Chiang Kai-Shek, then President of China,
agreed to provide Chinese forces under
the command of US General Stillwell to
defend Burma and the Burma Road. But
this gesture was hopeless.
The Chinese forces were inadequately
trained, poorly armed and out-matched.
The seasoned Japanese soldiers swiftly
overwhelmed them and forced the Chinese
to retreat to China.
Although several other attempts were
made to drive back the invaders, the British forces in Burma were not prepared for
jungle warfare, under-equipped and
achieved limited success.
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A gallant defense
Preoccupied with the European war theatre, neither the British nor the US were
ready to commit forces necessary to save
Burma. It was not a priority. Consequently, the British forces (comprised of
British, Burmese and Indians) quickly fell
into disarray and began a retreat towards
the Indian border in March 1942.
On 12 May, the monsoon broke in Burma,
impeding the Allied retreat. Life for the
refugees trekking out to India became
even more miserable.
By 20 May, the Japanese had completed
their conquest of Burma.
Japanese liberation of colonial Burma a
fantasy
When the Japanese invaded South East
Asia, many of the natives considered the
Japanese as liberators. This was particularly true in Burma. The Burmese were
lulled into a false sense of assurance that
the Japanese were there to “liberate” them
from the British and give them selfdetermination and independence.
Living under an oppressive Japanese occupation soon changed this perception,
although some ethnic groups continued to
support them.
Strategic value of Burma to Japanese
The Japanese had several good reasons
to occupy Burma, including the following.
The supply line from Burma to China
would be cut off:
The US was helping keep China supplied during the long Sino-Japanese war. Lend-Lease
supplies, including goods, trucks and munitions, were being landed in Rangoon and
moved by rail to Lashio. From there the supplies were driven via the Burma Road over the
Chinese border to Kunming.
Burma would be used as a buffer zone
shielding Japanese conquests in SE Asia:
Japan wanted to protect the countries to the
east of Burma that it had invaded and held.
These included Thailand, Hong Kong, Malaya
and Singapore, some of them abundant in
natural resources.
Burma was abundant in natural resources
that Japan wanted:
Burma was the most prolific rice producer in
the Far East. It was abundant in natural resources including oil, rubber, tungsten, wolfram, tin, lead, silver, teak and precious gems.
Japan had few natural resources. It needed
access to the natural resources available from
the countries it invaded and now held.
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Japanese soldiers enter Tavoy
Burma was an ideal springboard to overrun India:
The occupation of Burma would provide a staging area for the planned Japanese invasion of
India. The Japanese intended to coordinate
their invasion with the revolutionary Indian independence movement (“Quit India” launched
by Congress Party).
We got run out of Burma, and it is humiliating as hell. I think we ought to
find out what caused it, go back and
retake it.”
An Indian National Army (INA) was formed of
Indian soldiers previously in the British Army
and now Japanese prisoners-of-war in several
SE Asian countries. It subsequently drew other
volunteers. Subhas Chandra Bose (previously
member of the Indian Congress Party) fled India to pursue a relationship with Germany and
Japan.
The Japanese appointed him leader of the INA
that fought along side the Japanese troops
throughout the war. However, with the decline
of Japanese power in SE Asia, many of the
INA soldiers were captured and repatriated to
India.
After WW2 ended, it was noted that the INA did
have an impact on British policy in India and
helped influence the end of the “British Raj”.
Planning for the return
Following his trek out of Burma into India
in 1942, US General Joseph Stilwell remarked:
AVG pilots scrambled during an enemy air raid
“I claim we got a hell of a beating.
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