GOVERNMENTAL COERCIVENESS
AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY
An Exploratory Study of
Cross-National Patterns
GREGORY B. MARKUS
BETTY A. NESVOLD
California State University, San Diego
0
nly within the past few years has there been any attempt made by
social scientists to analyze the nature of political conflict on a
national level through the use of quantitative cross-national data. Using a
number of theories to guide their research, investigators have formulated
hypotheses and put them t o empirical tests.' The explanatory power of
some of the hypotheses studied in this way is encouraging, and a
refinement of the techniques that have already been employed may soon
lead to the point where accurate forecasts of the political stability-or
instability-of political regimes are possible. The effect that such a
development could have on both social scientists and governmental
decision makers is self-evident.
Foreign policy decisions are often predicated upon assumptions
regarding political stability. A policy may be advocated, for
example, because a set of forces is seen as implying the eventual
stabilization of an existing order.. . .Especially in the case of the
emerging nations, specific policies-such as whether to lend capital in
support of particular programs or to grant military aid-are weighed
in terms of their probable effect upon the political stability of the
recipient government [Feierabend et al., 1963: I ] .
The use of aggregate data in a broad, cross-national framework has a
number of limitations. The detail and depth of analysis which can be
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[ 2321 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1972
achieved with the case study method is largely lost. The advantage of a
broader method, however, lies in its scope and its ability to “reveal
patterns that may go unnoticed, or that may be obscured, in the unique
circumstances of a specific case” [Feierabend et a!., 1969: 606).
The focus of the present exploratory study is the association between
the level of government coercion and subsequent levels of instability. We
will attempt to see whether fluctuations in the intensity of governmental
coercion can be associated with fluctuations in the level of instability
within nations.
-
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A recent development in empirical cross-national research has been the
use of psychological theories to explain the behavior of nations. The logic
behind such an approach is that a nation can be viewed as being, among
other things, an aggregate of individuals. If many individuals within a
nation experience “certain psychological tensions, then we may anticipate
that they will engage in behavior which will be observable and measurable
for the aggregated group” (Feierabend et al., 1967: 1-2).
Although the frustration-aggression theory has undergone some basic
revisions since its original formulation, it remains a valuable framework for
the systematic study of aggressive behavior. A basic postulate of this
theory maintains that “aggression is always the consequence of frustration’’ (Dollard et al., 1939: 1). Aggression is defied as any act “the goal
response of which is the injury of the person toward whom it is directed”
(Dollard et al., 1939: 9), and frustration is “an interference with the
occurrence of an instigated goal-response at its proper time in the behavior
sequence”(Dollard et al., 1939: 7).
In the original work, Dollard et al. (1939: 1) hypothesized that “the
occurrence of aggressive behavior presupposes the existence of frustration
and, contrariwise, the existence of frustration always leads to some form
of aggression.” This sweeping generalization was soon modified, however,
when it became clear that the statement was being widely misunderstood.
Miller (1941: 338) rephrased the second half of the hypothesis thusly:
“Frustration produces instigations to a number of different types of
response one of which is an instigation to some form of aggression.” It is
clear, then, that the authors did not mean to imply that frustration will
uhvuys lead to direct, overt aggressive behavior; frustration under certain
conditions may lead to constructive solutions, withdrawal on the part of
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hfarkus, Nesvold / GOVERNhlENTAL COERCIVENESS [ 2333
the individual, displacement, scapegoating, and the like. Rather, the
hypothesis states that when aggressive behavior does occur, it is the result
of frustration.
Plmisfznzetzt.The concept of punishment, or retaliation, is important to
the frustration-aggression theory and is central to this study. Dollard et al.
(1939: 40) hypothesized that “the strength of inhibition of any act of
aggression varies positively with the amount of punishment anticipated to
be a consequence of that act.” Buss (1961: 58) elaborated upon this idea
by noting that the immediate effect of punishment may be to incite an
aggressive response.
Punishment will elicit aggression only if it is sufficiently intense. If
the punishment is too weak, it will not breach the threshold of the
attacking response. On the other hand, if the punishment is too
strong, it will elicit anxiety and flight rather than anger and
aggression. Punishment must be in the middle range of intensity in
order to maintain an aggression-punishment-aggression sequence, the
relationship between intensity of punishment for preceding aggressive response and the occurrence of a subsequent aggressive response
being curvilinear.
Fmsz’rationizggressiotz theory and aggregate befzavior. The attempts to
use psychological theories t o explain group behavior have been criticized
by a number of writers (International Sociological Association, 1957).
They argue that the activities of most functioning groups are not
determined by the motivations of each member in equal proportion to
others in his group. A group cannot simply be regarded as the additive sum
of its individual members; power is not distributed equally among the
members. What the group does in many situations is often a function of its
leaders and not of the rank and file.
Granting dl this, “individualistic considerations in the field of group
relations” are important (Berkowitz, 1962: 167):
Dealings *between groups ultimately become problems for the
psychology of the individual. Individuals decide to go to war; battles
are fought by individuals; and peace is established by individuals. It
is the individual who adopts the beliefs prevailing in his society, even
though the extent to which these opinions are shared by many
people is a factor governing his readiness to adopt them, and he then
transmits these views to other individuals. . .Theoretical principles
can be formulated referring to the group as a unit and these c m be
very helpful in understanding hostility between groups. But such
.
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[ 23.11 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES /JULY 1972
abstractions refer to collections of people and are made possible by
interindividud uniformities in behavior.
Dollard et
(1939: 86) similarly recognized the applicability of the
frustration-aggression Ilypothesis to the study of political turmoil: “Within
any given state internal Ilostility to the symbols of authority is a common
feature of social life. It is manifested alike by labor leaders and capitalists
well as by g o u p s which hope for revolutionary change.”
Consistent with this line of thought, the Feierabends have introduced
the concept of systemic frustration. They define systemic frustration in
reference to three criteria: (1) as frustration interfering with the
attainment and maintenance of social goals, aspirations, and values; (2) as
frustration simultaneously experienced by members of social aggregates
and, hence, complex social systems; and (3) as frustration or strain that is
produced within the structures and processes of social systems.’
Guided by this definition, it is possible to restate the frustrationaggression hypothesis with reference to social systems: Political instability
within nations is instigated by systemic frustration. Political instability is
defined as aggression directed by civilian individuals or groups within the
political system against other groups or against the complex of officeholders and individuals and groups associated with them (compare
Feierabend and Feierabend, 19663: 250).
One source of systemic frustration is the gap between the aspirations
and expectations of groups within a nation and the actual achievements of
these groups thus far (Feierabend et al., 1969). For example, if the citizens
of a nation expect to have jobs so that they might purchase goods they
desire, and if, for various reasons, there is mass unemployment, this
situation will be frustrating to many individuals. Similarly, if a group
aspires to equal treatment under the laws yet is systematically discriminated against (by the government, by other groups, or both), then this
group will incur an instigation to aggression. The greater the discrepancy
between the aspirations and expectations of a group and their actual
achievements, the greater the subsequent systemic frustration.
Cantril (1965: 17) commented upon frustrations in encounters with
“real world” situations:
An individual’s assumptions about the nature and property of
objects may turn out to be misleading; his experience may show him
that people do not react the way he had thought they would; he
may discover that the events he thought would follow as sequences
to other events do not proceed as he had expected; the action he
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hlarkus, Nesvold / GOVERNMENTAL COERCIVENESS [ 2351
.
takes to reach a particular goal. . may turn out to be inadequate or
inappropriate; or the goal he thought was going to bring satisfaction
may, when achieved, turn out to be an empty one. Whenever this
lack of correspondence occurs, the result is some hitch, some
obstacle that frustrates him in the achievements of his purpose.
Frustrationaggression theory has also been employed by Kornhauser
(1959) in his discussion of extremist voting, by Huntington (1968) in his
work on developing nations, and by Lerner (1958), who based much of his
theory of modernization on the concept of deprivation felt by the masses.
Similar recognition of the frustration-aggression theory of political
instability can be found in the works of Apter (1965), Deutsch (1961),
Russett (1964), Davies (1962), and Midlarsky and Tanter (1967).
A second source of frustration-one with which we are most concerned
in this paper-can be determined with reference to the frustration-aggression theory. Governmental coerciveness can be viewed as being analogous
to the concept of punishment employed in psychological theories (Walters,
1966). The relationship between coerciveness and political instability has
been the subject of a number of investigations.
Gurr tested the hypothesis that “the likelihood and magnitude of civil
violence tend to vary curvilinearly with the amount of retribution
anticipated as a consequence of participation in it” (Gurr with Ruttenberg,
1967: 11). He obtained results that were generally consistent with the
hypothesis (see also Gurr, 1968). LeVine (1959) made an early test of the
curvilinear relationship between coerciveness and aggression. Among
African colonial systems, he found that consistently repressive and
consistently permissive colonial systems experienced less an ti-European
violence than did mid-level colonial systems.
This hypothesis was also examined as part of the continuing study of
political turmoil being conducted by Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold.
Eighty-four nations were ranked according to the permissiveness or
coerciveness of their regimes. A country was rated according to such
criteria as: (1) the degree t o which civil rights are present and protected;
(2) the extent to which political opposition is tolerated and effective; (3)
the democratic level of the polity (Feierabend and Feierabend, 1971;
Walton, 1965). When this was done, a curvilinear relationship was found to
exist between a nation’s ranking and the degree of political instability
experienced. A subsequent investigation employing similar ratings of
coerciveness substantiated this result (Feierabend et al., 1970: Bwy,
1971).
A second way in wluch governmental coercion can be operationalized is
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[ 2361 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES /JULY 1972
to study manifestations of coercion-actual coercive events. Coercive
events are defined as those punitive acts initiated by government agencies
and officeholders and directed toward individuals and groups within the
larger society. Examples of coercive events are arrests, fines, martial law,
and executions.
Few analyses of the relationship between acts of instability and acts of
coerciveness have been conducted thus far. One previous investigation
found a strong linear, rather than curvilinear, relationship between
political instability and governmental coercion (hlarkus, 1970: 28-30).
This result may have been due to the cross-sectional method of analysis
employed. Unless the relationship between instability and coerciveness is
studied diachronically, the true picture is likely to be obscured. Time-lag
studies may yield new information about the complex covariation of the
civilian and governmental components of political unrest.
Using the frustration-aggression theory and its political applications as
guides, one might construct a developmental theory of political unrest
which considers not only the frustrations perceived by civilians, but the
blocked goal-responses of the government as well. (1) Due to a discrepancy
between goals and actual achievements, individuals engage in some form of
instability behavior-perhaps violence. (2) Such behavior, inasmuch as it is
an affront to the governmental goal of maintaining tranquility (and
thereby remaining unchallenged as the legitimate political power), can be
considered frustrating to the government. The intensity of the governmental response will covary with the strength of the frustration. (3) The
success of the governmental measures in stemming future instability will,
of course, depend to some extent upon the intensity of the coercion.
Assuming that the cause of the original frustration has not been altered,
the intensity of further instability will vary curvilinearly with the intensity
of the coerciveness applied.
I t goes without saying that this relatively simple theory cannot explain
all instability behavior. Nevertheless, we believe that two hypotheses
derived from the theory warrant a test.
Specifically, these hypotheses are:
There is a linear relationship between the level of instability in a
given time period and the level of coerciveness in the same time
period. The higher (lower) the level of instability, the higher (lower)
the level of coerciveness in the same time period.
There is a curvilinear relationship between the level of coercive
events in a given time period and the level of instability at some later
period in time. hlid-level coerciveness is likely to be associated with
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hfarkus, Nesvold / GOVERNMENTAL COERCIVENESS [ 2373
high-level instability at some subsequent period in time; low- and
high-level coerciveness are likely to be associated with lower levels of
instability at some subsequent period in time.
METHODS
This study employs data collected as part of the continuing research on
political turmoil being conducted by Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L.
Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold at San Diego State C ~ l l e g e .The
~ data
on instability and coercive events were compiled from daily issues of the
New York Times. Although the completed data bank will contain
information on virtually every nation for the years 1955-1964, at present
only a limited amount of information is available for analysis. In this
investigation, ten countries were examined for the three-year period
1959-1961. These countries were: Argentina, Haiti, Italy, Japan, Laos,
Mexico, Poland, South Korea, Spain, and the Union [Republic] of South
Africa. These nations were selected to avoid any particular geographical
bias and because of the relatively large amount of information available on
them.
In the data collection, every reported coercive and instability event was
coded, and each event was scaled in terms of an intensity weighting which
assigns values on a seven-point scale ranging from point zero (lack of
instability or coerciveness) to point six (extreme instability or coerciveness). In assigning scale values to events, the criteria taken into account
were: the amount of violence accompanying the event, its duration, the
political significance of the persons involved in the event, and an estimate
of the political repercussions of the event upon the society as a whole.
Typical scale positions for selected instability events are: peaceful
demonstration, 0; dismissal of a cabinet official, 1 ; demonstration with
some injuries, 2; riot with accompanying injuries and property destruction,
3; large-scale sabotage, 4; revolt with violence and deaths, 5; full-scale clash
involving planes, artillery, and so on, 6. Examples of values assigned to
coercive events are: arrest of few, insignificant persons, 1; curfew, 2;
imprisonment of few, significant persons for a long time, 3; total
censorship of all media, 4 ; mass executions, 5; military punitive action
involving mass deaths, 6.
The seven-point intensity scale possesses both construct and consensual
validity. T o test the construct validity of the scale, data collected on 82
countries for the years 19481961 were subjected to a Guttman scaling
exercise-a statistical technique for ordering data. Violent instability
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[ 2381 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES /
JULY 1972
events were grouped into four classes denoting increasing amounts of
violence. Using the Guttman technique, it was found that the violent
events of nations are truly scalable, the coefficient of reproducibility
ranging from .94 to .97 according to the length of the time segments into
which the data were divided (Nesvold, 1969: 172-180).
Consensual validation was determined by another process. A list of
events was given to graduate students at the Inter-university Consortium
for Political Research in 1966. The students were asked to place the events
on a scale ranging from zero to 100. The summed scores for the 82 nations
thus devised by the graduate students were then intercorrelated with the
summed scores for these nations as determined by using the Guttman
technique and a separate intuitive scale. The scores based on the students’
scale were found to correlate highly with the scores based on the Guttman
scale and the intuitive scale? Thus the consensual validity of the present
scale was established.
There are a number of methods that can be employed to determine the
coercive and instability ratings of a nation for a given period o f time. One
method is simply to sum the scores of the instability and coercive events
occurring in the time period under study and then rank the countries
according to the magnitude of these summations. In using this method,
however, there may be some tendency for the scores of certain nations to
be artificially inflated by the “overreporting” of small events that would
normally go unreported in other countries. To compensate for this
possibility; in this study the individual event scores were first squared
before summing. The results of such a method is to give relatively more
weight to the more intense events.
After appropriate cutting-points were determined, each country received a coerciveness and instability rating for each month in the
three-year period under study. Therefore, to analyze the relationship
between government coerciveness and subsequent instability, the level of
coerciveness for each month is compared with the level of instability x
number of months later. Various time lags can be tested to determine the
optimum lag.
This method is not as refined as it might be. Summing scores occurring
within the course of each month, for example, does not permit the
investigator to know exactly when any particular event occurred.
Therefore, any time lags employed are only approximations of the actual
distance in time between events. For example, events occurring on January
31 and February 1 are considered as being one month apart, as are events
occurring on January 1 and February 28. However, we were looking for
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Markus, Nesvold / GOVERNMENTAL COERCIVENESS [ 2391
broad patterning in this exploratory analysis. For this purpose, the method
seemed adequate.
FINDINGS
Table 1 lends support to the first hypothesis. This table illustrates the
association between the levels of coerciveness for each of the 36 months
under study in each of the ten countries and their corresponding levels of
instability; hence, the total equals 360, or 36 x 10. It indicates, for
example, that in the ten nations there was a total of 157 months in which
the levels of both instability and coerciveness were low. The linear
relationship between the two variables is apparent.
A second method of analysis lends additional support. Figure 1 plots
the mean coercive event score of the months at each of the three levels of
coerciveness against the corresponding mean instability event score for the
months. Again, the linear relationship is demonstrated.
T o examine the second hypothesis, computer analysis was employed to
determine the optimum time lag for our data. That time lag was found to
be a period of one month. Therefore, to test the hypothesis in each
country, the coerciveness level of each month is compared with the
instability level of the month immediately following it. The result is shown
in Table 2. The table shows, for example, that of the 208 months rated
low on the level of coercive acts, 136 were followed by a month rated low
in instability.
Although the curvilinear relationship can be readily determined by
observation, there is a more precise way to evaluate the strength of the
TABLE
1
Relationship Between Monthly Leyels of Coerciveness and
Instability for Ten Countries, 1959-1961
Coerciveness Level
~
~~
~~
Low
Medium
Instability
Level
%
Low
Medium
High
73
23
4
( 50)
Total
100
Gamma = .62; Z = 7.64; p
n
(157)
%
n
( 24)
(123)
100
( 50)
( 49)
9)
(216)
100
<.01.
%
10
33
57
40
40
20
(
High
Total
n
( 2)
%
n
(12)
58
29
13
(209)
(106)
( 45)
(21)
100
(360)
( 7)
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[ 2401 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES /JULY 1972
Mean
Instability
Score
40
30
20
X
10
0
0
20
10
40
30
50
Mean Coerciveness Score
Figure 1: Mean Coerciveness Score versus Mean Instability Score for Months a t the
Three Levels of Coerciveness
association. The gamma, a measure of linear association, computed for
Table 2 indicates only a moderate tendency toward linearity (gamma =
-31). However, if the table is transformed by interchanging the last two
columns, the computed gamma is relatively high (.65), thus indicating that
the relationship between the two variables is a curvilinear one. Months
which were rated at the mid-level of cocrciveness were most likely to be
followed by months in which there was high instability.
TABLE 2
Relationship Between the Level of Coerciveness for Each
Month and the Level of Instability for the Following
Month, Ten Countries, 1959-1961
Coarcivenes Level
Hi&
Medium
Low
Instability
Level
%
Low
Medium
High
65
30
5
(136)
( 62)
( 10)
46
34
20
Total
100
(208)
100
n
Total
n
%
56)
41)
24)
62
29
10
(13)
(121) 100
(21)
%
(
(
(
n
( 6)
( 2)
%
59
31
10
100
Gamma = .31; Gamma (Low-High-Medium) = 55;2 = 3.79;p <.Ol.
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n
(205)
(109)
( 36)
(350)
Marlrus, NesvoM / GOVERNMENTAL COERCIVENESS [ 2411
Mean
instability
Score
50-
40302010 -
0-
I
10
20
30
40
50
Mean Cwrciveness Score
Fiwm 2: M g n C
m Scolh vanus Mean Imt&ility Scan f a Month at the
Thres L d s of Coacirmsrr (Time Lag of OM MonUt)
Figure 2 also supports the hypothesis. i n this f i r e , the mean coercive
event scores of the months at the three levels of coerciveness are plotted
along the horizontal axis. The mean instability scores of the corresponding months (one-month time lag) are plotted along the vertical axis. The
curvilinear relationship is apparent.
CONCLUSIONS
We have presented the initial findings of our investigation of political
conflict within nations. i t is clear that much additional research is
necessary before the precise nature of the diachronic relationship between
instability and coercion is understood. Yet this brief research has yielded
two insights which merit further exploration. Tests of the first hypothesis,
coupled with the results of previous research, indicate that there is a linear
association between the level of instability events in a given time period
and the intensity of coercive events in that same period. A test of the
second hypothesis suggests a curvilinear relationship between the level of
coerciveness in one month and the intensity of instability in the
subsequent month. This is consistent with the work of Gum, the
Feierabends, and Bwy.
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I2421 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES /JULY 1972
Mid-level coercion (such as executions, censorship, and mass arrests)
which acts as an additional agent of frustration, leads t o a later response of
intense instability (large riots, terrorism, sabotage, and the like). Lowlevel
coercion evokes little response in the form of acts of instability, and
high-level coercion is likely to be a sufficient inhibitor of subsequent acts
of instability.
-
NOTES
1. Some selected studies employing quantitative cross-national data t o analyze
mlitical turmoil are listed in the references.
2. Feierabend et al. (1969: 608-609); the use of this concept closely follows
Surr’s (1968) employment of relative deprivation.
3. A few of the works that have stemmed from their study are Feierabend and
Feierabend (1966a), Nesvold (1969). Hoole (1964), Duty (1969), and Roth (1970).
4. Nesvold (1969: 173-175). The correlation between the summed scores for
countries obtained by using the students’ scale and those obtained by using the
Guttman scale was .940. The correlation between the summed scores based on the
students’ s a l e and the summed scores based on the intuitive scale was .986.
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