THE CHARACTERISATION OF THE INTERLOCUTORS IN HORACE,
SATIRES 2.3
R.P. BOND
INTRODUCTION
The structure of this, the longest of Horace's Satires,
is quite simple.
The introductory conversation between
Horace and Damasippus and the final altercation between them
are passages of a similar length and provide a clearly
recognisable frame for the diatribe of Stertinius.(1) This
diatribe, reported by Damasippus and expounding the Stoic
doctrine hoti pas aphron mainetai, (all fools are mad),(2)
comprises the occasionally indigestible bulk of the poem, in
terms both of simple length and moral earnestness.
It is
obviously necessary to assess the relationship between the
paradoxical diatribe and its frame to achieve a full
understanding of the poem’s quality and purpose.
For the
tone of the frame naturally affects the reader’s attitude to
the diatribe itself.
The tone of the frame is largely
established by the characterisation of the interlocutors
within it, namely Horace and Damasippus,(3) while the
letter's
attitude to his mentor Stertinius,(4)
whose
diatribe he reports, will also affect the attitude of the
reader to the diatribe and to the satire which contains it.
Accordingly, in this paper, I shall discuss the characteri­
sation of Damasippus and Horace in the satire's frame,
comment on the impression given of Stertinuis and discuss
the purpose of the poem as a whole in the light of this
discussion and comment.
GAMBITS, vv. 1-31
Initially there are two decisions which the reader of
this satire is called upon to make: (a) what is the setting
of the poem and what effect does this have on Horace's
attitude to Damasippus?
and (b) how seriously should we
take Damasippus' attack upon the alleged literary desidia
(idleness) of Horace?
To tackle the question of location firsti
Horace
constantly states that while in Rome he lacks independence,
is not his own man.(5) Although naturally proud of his
association with Maecenas,(6) the association is not a
source of unalloyed pleasure to him, a poet who has
Epicurean leanings towards a life of rustic withdrawal.(7)
It is clear that Horace's Sabine farm was a haven away from
the fumum et opes strepitumque Romae,
(Odes 3.29.12), (the
smoke and wealth and din of Rome . . . ) where Horace could,
as one of the ruris amatores (lovers of the country)(8)
recharge his spiritual and artistic batteries.
If, therefore, the Sabine farm is the setting of Satires
2.3, which is the likely implication of ipsis Saturnalibus
huc fugisti (vv. 4-5), ('you took refuge here on the
Saturnalia holiday'), and of
atqui vultus erat multa et praeclara minantis,
si vacuum tepido cepisset villula tecto,
quorsum pertinuit stipare Platona Menandro,
R.P.
2
BOND
Eupolin, Archilochum, comites educere tantos?
(vv. 9-12)
(And yet you had the look of a man threatening
much fine work, if only your little villa could
have welcomed you at leisure beneath its temperate
roof. What was the point of packing your Plato
with Menander, of bringing out such great compan­
ions as Eupolis and Archilochus?)
Horace's immediate hostility towards Damasippus' irruption
is
the more comprehensible.
One would expect such an
intruder to receive very short shrift indeed.
Also·,
Horace's picture of the intruder, whether the poem is
describing an actual event or a dreaded eventuality, will be
coloured by his inevitable irritation inspired by the
shattering of his rural calm, of his ataraxia. The setting
of Satires 2.3, therefore, may be thought to contribute to
the characterisation of Horace as being somewhat celerem
irasci (easily provoked)(9) and of the Stoic Damasippus as
an unwanted and gauche intruder.
The question of the charge of desidia is more complex,
perhaps even more important.
For, whatever conclusion the
reader
comes to about the validity or otherwise
of
Damasippus' opening accusation, that conclusion will affect
his or her response to the poem as a whole and to those
charges of extravagance, ambition and sexual licence against
Horace with which it closes.(10)
A plausible case can be made that in this poem, Horace
utilises Damasippus as the manifestation of his own guilty
conscience. One of Horace's favourite ploys is to point the
moral of his ethical advice by animadversion to his own
person and experience.
This is true of some of the more
didactic of the Odes, where confessions of past fallibility
on the part of the poet serve to disarm ill-feeling on the
part of the addressee and, accordingly, render the advice
more effective.(11) The same technique is extensively used
in the Epistles also,(12) while in the Satires too, Horace
is seldom averse to making disparaging comments at his own
expense,
if by so doing he can serve his immediate
purpose.(13)
In short,
Horace exploits selected and
appropriate aspects of his own personality and life to give
extra point to his moral strictures.
The fact that Damasippus is a kind of Stoic substantiates
the view that we should take the criticisms put into his
mouth by Horace quite seriously as part of the poet's exam­
ination of self.
Not only were the Stoics among the first
to lay emphasis upon the concept of a personal conscience in
ancient
philosophical
literature,(14) but in
Satires
1.4.133-139, Horace himself tells us that he sets down in
his verses the fruits of silent, internal debates with
himself, with his conscience.(15) Further, some of 'the
poems of the Stoic satirist Persius, an ardent admirer and
imitator of Horace, are best understood as the expressions
of feelings caused by a troubled personal conscience.(16)
On
the
other hand,
what we may have is an
example
of
THE INTERLOCUTORS IN HORACE,
SAT. 2.3
3
Horatian irony. After all, Horace makes Damasippus take him
to task for idleness at the start of what is to be the
longest by far of all the Satires of Horace. The Stoic's
comments in vv. 7-8 show a lack of sympathy with the
inevitable agonies and frustrations of poiesis.
Horace was
himself painfully aware of the demands of his art.(17)
A
muddy fluency was one of the charges he laid against the
otherwise revered figure of Lucilius.
At Satires 1.4.1318(18), he tells us that he rejected a challenge from the
copious Stoic scribbler Crispinus.
Horace comments on the
verbosity of Crispinus and of another Stoic, Fabius, in
Satires 1.1.(19) We should not, therefore, take Damasippus'
attack on the literary desidia of Horace, alleged desidia
that is, as an accurate reflection of Horace's concern about
his own slothfulness.
Rather, Horace is undermining the
credibility of Damasippus from the outset by indicating the
shallowness of the new Stoic's understanding of the creative
process in poetry and its demands, an area of prime concern
to Horace.
If the ignorance of Damasippus is profound in
this area such that, for example, he interprets a virtue,
scriptorun quaeque retexens (taking each of your works to
pieces) (v.2 ) as a vice, then what credence should be given
to his other opinions?
It may even be that part of the
humour of Satires 2.3 as a whole is that Horace purports to
consider the length of Stertinius' diatribe within this very
poem, to be excessive. In short, while it may be true that
Damasippus' description of the symptoms is accurate, never­
theless, his diagnosis of the disease is mistaken, despite
his much vaunted interest in the concerns of others--of
which more later.
ANTICIPATORY CHARACTERISATION
Horace does not mention the name of Damasippus until
v.16.
He does not, in fact, have chance to draw breath for
an interjection until that time, swamped as he is by a
veritable Thrasymachean showerbath of words.
Nor is there
any explicit mention of Damasippus' philosophical persuasion
until the name of Stertinius appears at v.33 and he is by no
means as readily recognisable as a Stoic as is the famous
Chrysippus, whose name is dropped at v.44i
quem mala stultitia et quemcumque inscitia veri
caecum egit, insanum Chrysippi porticus et grex
autumat. (vv.4 3-4 5)
(Any man who is driven blindly on by evil
foolishness and ignorance of the truth is dubbed
insane by the Stoic school of Chrysippus.)
However, I would suggest that the Stoicism of Damasippus
is implied long before v.44 or v.33.
Horace prepares his
readers
with
some care and subtlety,
so that
the
identification of Damasippus comes as no surprise.
Rather,
the reader is self-congratulatory at having picked up the
available clues. These clues are contained in the terms and
phrases of Stoic connotation with which the introductory
R.P. BOND
4
conversation is sprinkled. Horace arouses our expectations,
precisely so that he can satisfy them by his positive
identification of Damasippus as a Stoic. For examplei
(i) nil dignum sermone canas (v.4),
(ii) dic aliquid dignum promissis (v.6).
These two clauses are open to various interpretations:
(a) The phrase dignum sermone is the equivalent of logou
axion and means 'worth mention'; although there are many
examples of the Greek phrase,(20) there is little to suggest
that dignus and serno were commonly linked in this way,
although Damasippus may be being ridiculed for using Greek
patterns of speech in Latin.(21) Also, sermo is usually
used of conversation and is not simply a synonym for verbum.
On the other hand, dignum sermone may mean 'worthy of
comment in a conversation'.
(b) The meaning may be 'worthy of sermo or Satire'.
However, as Lejay points out,
'C’est supposer au sermo une
dignite a laquelle ne songe pas Horace.(22)
(c) Related to (b) is the interpretation which would lead
to the translation 'worthy of one of your satires'.
The
fact that sermo is not found in the singular with this
meaning
does
not
necessarily
preclude
such
an
interpretation.
(d) The meaning may be 'worthy of your talk', i.e.
'worthy of what you said you would do*--when, presumably,
the environment matched the mood.(23) Support is given to
this interpretation by dignum promissis in v.6 , since the
repetition of dignum becomes rhetorically emphatic.
This
would be in tune with Damasippus' succession of rhetorical
questions and also anticipates the style of the diatribe
itself.(24)
Horace is thought of by Damasippus as being angry and
frustrated (iratus, v.3) because his life of relaxation,
vini somnique benignus (v.3) has not produced any poetry
'worthy of his talk'.
He is accordingly instructed by
Damasippus to sober up (sobrius, v.5) and produce something
'worthy of the promises he has made'--dic aliquid dignum
promissis (v.6 ).
Of these choices, (b) is the least likely; it would
require an awkward awareness on the part of Damasippus that
he is a figure in an actual Horatian satire.
Each of the
other choices is possible.
However, the repetition of
dignum in v.3 and v .6 provides the key to the puzzle.
For
dignum as the Latin translation of the Stoic term axion is a
technical
term,
or potentially so,
itself.(25)
Its
repetition may well characterise Damasippus as the eager
Stoic neophyte with the jargon of his new persuasion leaping
almost unbidden to his lips.
It is also in tune with Damasippus' Stoic enthusiasm that
he deplores the waste, as he mistakenly sees it, of Horace's
poetical talent. The Stoics believed it was part of a man's
duty to choose his vocation and to pursue it vigorously, in
accordance with his particular genius or skill, that is 'in
accord with his particular nature', secundum naturam.(26)
THE INTERLOCUTORS IN HORACE, SAT. 2.3
5
Accordingly, the supposed desidia of Horace would be seen by
Damasippus as a dereliction of duty (officium), which he
owed to his own talents (ingenio suo).
Damasippus makes
this point towards the end of his opening speech at Horace:
quorsum pertinuit stipare Platona Menandro,
Eupolin, Archilochum, comites educere tantos?
invidiam placare paras virtute relicta? (vv.11-13)
(What was the point of packing Plato with Menander
and taking great Eupolis and Archilochus as compan­
ions? Are you planning to counter dislike . . . ?);
where it is crucial, if difficult, to pin down the precise
meaning of virtute relicta:
(a) It may be that virtute relicta means 'the examination
of moral virtue being abandoned': i.e. Horace believes that,
by abandoning the composition of morally edifying satire, he
will ease the odium which he has already aroused.
Support
for this view can be found in Satires 2.1.1-2:
sunt quibus in satira videar nimis acer et ultra
legem tendere opus,
(There are those to whom I seem excessively
harsh in my satires, who think I go beyond
proper bounds in my work.)
where Horace professes concern that his satire has aroused
considerable ill-feeling.
Damasippus' point is, then, that
if Horace does abandon satire, virtute relicta, he will be
despised as a moral coward, contemnere miser (v.14), as well
as hated.
(b) It may be that Damasippus' tone in virtute relicta is
ironical or sarcastic in that,
even though a direct
translation of the line would read, 'Do you think to assuage
the ill-feeling you have aroused in others by leaving alone
their virtue?' the implication would be that Horace is
actually leaving alone their vices, which, incidentally, are
in the majority.
These two interpretations are closely related and clearly
possible, although to translate virtus as the 'examination
of virtue' does seem to be an uncomfortable extension of its
meaning.
The two alternatives also seem to lack comic
punch, vis comica.
We are soon to discover that Damasippus is a devotee of
what was originally a Greek philosophical system. He uses
the phrase virtute relicta immediately after a list of Greek
authors, one of whom is almost certainly the most famous of
the Greek philosophers, namely Plato, philosophus rather
than comicus.(27) Accordingly, we ought to be sensitive to
the possible philosophical and Greek connotations of virtus
in v.13, especially after the parallel between dignum
sermone and axion logou in v.4 and dignum promissis in v.6 .
The Greek equivalent of virtus is arete, the meaning of
which in Plato's dialogues was frequently 'excellence' in a
particular skill or techne, both in a moral and in a
R.P. BOND
6
banausic sense.(28)
The Stoics also recognised the close
relationship between arete and techne in a moral, banausic
and artistic sense.(29) In short, virtue in v.13 is akin to
arete in the specific sense of Horace's excellence at his
own
particular
techne,
the composition
of
poetry,
especially," in this context, satirical poetry. Damasippus
declares, blinded to the real nature of Horace's slow rate
of production, because of an unthinking devotion to and
misguided application of Stoic ethical ideas, that Horace
will become an object of contempt because, as the Stoic sees
it, of social insecurity and the booze.
Horace continues his characterisation of Damasippus as a
Stoic, of sorts, as the introductory conversation proceeds
and suggests that he has already identified the source of
Damasippus' missionary zeal:
di te, Damasippe, deaeque
verum ob consilium donent tonsore. ( w. 16-17)
(Damasippus, may the gods and goddesses
grant you a haircut— for your good advice.)
These lines, which poke fun at Damasippus' beard, identify
him as a philosopher and, given the tone of his comments, as
a Stoic.(30) The Stoic provenance of Damasippus' comments
is made even clearer by his answer to Horace's rather
indignant:
sed unde tam bene me nosti? (vv.l7f.) (But how
come you know me so well?).
For Damasippus' answer is in
terms of that philanthropic humanism which was one of the
more attractive aspects of Stoic doctrine.(31)
However,
Horace achieves great irony in this section and on two
levels. Firstly, Damasippus’ answer:
postquam omnis res mea lanum
ad medium fracta est, aliena negotia curo,
excussus propriis. (vv.18-20)
(After my entire business enterprise fell in
ruins on the exchange, I began to take care
of other people's business, being excluded
from my own.)
Although Socrates and Diogenes were the original and selfproclaimed citizens of the world, it was the Stoics who gav.e
a basis in physics to the belief in the brotherhood of man.
From
the
point of view of Stoic humanitas
(humane
behaviour), Damasippus proclaims an interest in Horace's
affairs because in a real and technical sense they are
brothers.
However,
Horace
implies
ironically
that
Damasippus is actually interested in Horace's affairs only
because of his own financial ruin.
A more generous view
might suggest that Damasippus' financial crash has caused
him, prompted by the advice of Stertinius, to reassess his
ethical priorities, but Horace, in the ruptured calm of his
Epicurean garden, is not of a mind to be generous to an
unskilled Stoic.
This cynical response of Horace is
reminiscent, perhaps consciously so, of Menedemus' exchange
with Chremes at the start of Terence's Heautontimoroumenos:
THE INTERLOCUTORS IN HORACE. SAT. 2.3
ME.
CH.
7
Chreme, tantumne ab re tuast oti tibi
aliena ut cures ea quae nil ad te attinent?
homo sum»
humani nil a me alienum puto.
(vv.75-7)
(ME.
Chremes, do you have so much leisure from
your own business that you can attend to the
business of others, which has nothing to do
with you at all?
CH. I am human. I take an interest in any human
being.)
where the subsequently ridiculous Chremes professes an
altruistic humanitas, but is given a brusque brush-off,
initially, by Menedemus.
While I would not push too strongly that aliena negotia
curo, / excussus propriis (vv.19-20) has, in isolation, a
certain Stoic reference--any more than dignum sermone (v.4),
dignum promissis (v.6 ), virtute relicta (v.13) and verum ob
consilium
donent
tonsore (v.17) could have
such
a
reference--taken together with them the likelihood becomes
very strong.
However, it is possible to clinch the case for aliena
negotia curo, / excussus propriis.
In Diogenes Laertius
(7.181), Hecato of Rhodes is talking about Chrysippus (the
original author of Stertinius’ diatribe in Horace, Satires
2.3). He saysi
'Hecato says he (Chrysippus) came to philosophy
when the ancestral property he had inherited was
confiscated by the State.'
The
'conversion' of Damasippus is being sarcastically
paralleled to the coming to philosophy of one of the
greatest Stoic practitioners.
Whether or not Hecato's
comments on Chrysippus were flattering, unflattering or
neither, there is a deal of irony in Horace's spiteful
exploitation of the tradition as he portrays the Stoic
hopeful, Damasippus.
The irony continues in vv.26-31:
novi
et miror morbi purgatum te illius. "atqui
emovit veterem mire novus, ut solet, in cor
traiecto lateris miseri capitisve dolore;
ut lethargicus hic cum fit pugil et medicum urget."
dum ne quid simile huic, esto ut libet.
(I know and am amazed that you are purged of
that disease. "Indeed the new affliction has
removed the old one in remarkable fashion, just
like when a side-ache or wretched headache is
transferred to the chest— or like when the poor
invalid becomes full of fight and falls upon
the doctor." So long as you don't do that,
do what you like))
If we attribute vv.27-30,
from atqui to
urget,
to
Damasippus, then there is considerable humour in Damasippus
R.P. BOND
8
implying that his diseased obsession for antiques has been
replaced by an equally consuming obsession for philosophy.
Rudd's translation attributes the whole passage to Horace.
Whichever choice is made, what is significant is the
metaphorical use of morbus as a disease of the mind.
The
metaphor was not of course confined to philosophers, let
alone to Stoics; it was, however, the Stoics who made it
peculiarly their own.(32) Moreover, a parallel use is to be
found in Stertinius' diatribe at v. 120s
nimirum insanus paucis videatur, eo quod
maxima pars hominum morbo iactatur eodem.
(In actual fact only a few will think him
insane, in that the greatest part of mankind
is afflicted with the same disease.)
To confirm that Horace expected his audience to pick up
references of this sort, one should consider also at this
stage, if briefly, v.82i
danda est ellebori multo pars
maxima avarls, (Much the greatest share of hellebore by far
should be given to the avaricious) and v.166:
naviget
Anticyram (let him take ship for Anticyra), whence helle­
bore, a cure for insanity, was exported.
For in Lucian,
Vera Historia 18, we have a reference to Chrysippus, who is
the authoritative source for Stertinius* diatribe, needing
to be dosed with hellebore:
'None of the Stoics were present. For they were
still climbing the steep hill to virtue. We also
heard about Chrysippus that he wasn't allowed on
the island until he'd dosed himself four times
with hellebore.'
There is surely an intentional irony in Horace making play
with a mention of hellebore in a diatribe 'that all fools
are mad', the source of which was claimed by the satirist
Lucian to have needed the cure himself.
Of course, Lucian
writes much later than Horace, but I would argue that both
are reflecting the same tradition, which is quite compatible
with some of the polemics used against each other by rival
philosophical schools.
There is a similar reference to
Chrysippus and hellebore in Petronius, Satyricon 88.4, while
Carneades also was reputed to have used the drug.
Although
the implication in Petronius is that it was a mark of
strength of mind that Chrysippus was able to make use of the
drug, it is likely that satirists, such as Horace and
Lucian, would enjoy the irony of a renowned Stoic teacher
using a drug more notorious as a cure for insanity.(33)
Damasippus now details the manner of his conversion,
introduces the paradox 'that all fools are mad* in v.32 and
mentions the name of Stertinius, who encouraged him to
cultivate the wise man's beard. In fact, at last Damasippus
identifies himself as a Stoic, although we have long
suspected this because of Horace's choice of words, phrases
and concepts within the introductory conversation which have
Stoic overtones.
We also suspect Damasippus has swallowed
the Stoicism of Stertinius too readily, too uncritically.
THE INTERLOCUTORS IN HORACE. SAT. 2.3
9
The
result has been an
acute attack of Ideological
indigestion and verbal diarrhoea.
Our disenchantment with
Damasippus matches that of Horace and matured with the poem,
so that by v.46 our attitude, an unsympathetic one, towards
Damasippus and Stertinius has been formed.
A BRIDGE PASSAGE vv.31-46
The diatribe of Stertinius is anticipated by a tightly
constructed passage (vv.31-46),(34) which
serves as a
bridge between the initial conversation and the core of the
poem, the diatribe itself. A statement of the paradox opens
and closes this linking passage.
On the first occasion
Damasippus responds to Horace's provocation with
o
frustrere, insanis et tu stultique prope omnes
si quid Stertinius veri crepat . . . (vv.31-3)
(My dear fellow, to put you in the picture, you
too are insane and pretty well everybody else,
if there's any truth in Stertinius' line . . . )
On the second occasion, seeking to give the paradox more
than his own doubtful authority, he quotes the formulation
of Stertinius:
quem mala stultitia et quemcumque inscitia veri
caecum agit, insanum Chrysippi porticus et grex
autumat, haec populos, haec magnos formula reges,
excepto sapiente, tenet. (vv.43-6)
(Any man who is driven blindly on by evil fool­
ishness and ignorance of the truth is dubbed
insane by the Stoic school of Chrysippus. This
rule applies to ordinary people and to great
kings--only the wise man is an exception.)
Here Stertinius too gives his source and authority, namely
Chrysippus,
before launching into the diatribe which,
Damasippus declares, was instrumental in saving him from
suicidal despair and in converting him to Stoicism and, we
may assume, in filling him with a kind of missionary zeal.
However, the major point I want to make is that the deft
characterisation of Damasippus so far in the poem and the
tightness of the structure of this 'bridge passage' suggest
forcibly that Horace is very much in control of the progress
of the satire at v.46.
The changes of speaker and their
changing moods,
along with what they say, match the
progression of the poem in such a way that form and content
complement each other quite beautifully. One should assume
therefore that, on the introduction of Stertinius into the
poem, Horace is still in control of his material. In fact,
Horace's
attitude to Stertinius is not
made
clear
immediately.
Nor does Horace give any explicit indication
of whether or not, as the diatribe progresses, we are
intended to forget that the poet is speaking through a
persona other than his own.
My assumption is that there is
no ambiguity on the part of the poet. This is surely better
R.B. BOND
10
than to agree with Rudd that Horace's artistry has deserted
him.
For, although Rudd admits that Horace and Damasippus
are potentially an ideally contrasted pair,
he
then
complainsi
'Unfortunately the picture becomes blurred at a
number of points. Damasippus' remarks about
minding other people's business after wrecking
his own . . . might be just inadvertence, but he
ought not to use the disrespectful 'spiel*
(crepat) in connexion with the teacher's
sermon, and he ought not to refer so flippantly
to his own beard, which was the symbol of his
belief. All these are Horace's jokes and should
not be put in Damasippus' mouth.'(35)
There is an appropriate counter to this» the forceful
first impression we have of Damasippus is one of excessive
zeal coupled to a considerable naivety.
Like some bornagain charismatic with his foot thrust firmly into Horace's
doorway, Damasippus' intention is to give his victim the
'good news'.
What may be valuable in his message will be
marred by the means of communication, and the means of
communication by his manner. Little if any excuse is needed
to mount a favourite hobby horse, which explains the
abruptness of both the poem's opening and also· o bone, ne
te frustrere, insanus et tu stultique prope omnes. (vv.312 ).
The jargon of the new persuasion springs unbidden to his
lips.
The manner and attitudes, however, of the but lately
abandoned world of commerce linger on. They are somewhat at
odds with the newly adopted role of charismatic Stoic. This
is why some, at least, of Rudd's reservations are not
necessary.
Damasippus' gratitude, even his conversion, may
be genuine, but so also are the habits of speech acquired
when he earned the nickname Mercuriale(25).
Horace's gift
for comic characterisation and.the matching of vocabulary to
persona is being exploited to the full.
We perceive
Damasippus to be a new-come Stoic, but also we perceive him
to be a product of the rough and tumble world of the
marketplace.
Damasippus is presented as having in large
degree the narrow dogmatism and fundamentally insensitive
inhumanity that might be associated with a proselytising
neophyte— of any persuasion,
or of a second-hand car
salesman. Would you buy a used chariot from this man?
Accordingly, it seems strange that Rudd should take
exception to crepat in v.33.
It is not, in fact, necessary
that the word should have a derogatory sense.
Rudd's own
translation 'spiel' is much more pointed than the Latin and,
incidentally,
introduces
interesting commercial
over­
tones. (36)
Orelli simply says that crepat means 'et alta
quidem voce, docere aolet' (and habitually preaches at the
top of his voice),(37) without any sense of disrespect:
Lejay that the word almost always does have an ironical or
unfavourable ' sense,
but
that
the
irony
here
is
unconscious.(38)
Lejay
is correct.
The
irony
is
THE INTERLOCUTORS IN HORACE, SAT. 2.3
11
unconscious on the part of Damasippus but not, of course, on
the part of Horace, who characterises the new convert by
having him employ language appropriate to his former, rather
than his present, calling. Horace deftly places another
brush stroke onto his portrait of Damasippus, who is not
merely raw and enthusiastic, but stupid, insensitive and
uncritical.
'The picture' does not become 'blurred'; rather
the developing characterisation is amusing, consistent and
sharp.
Further, the reference which Damasippus makes to his
beard is not necessarily to be taken, with Rudd, as
flippant.
The comment of Damasippus is triggered by
Horace's ironical wish in vv.16-17.
In reply
Damasippus
explains, perhaps with rather heavy sarcasm, provoked by
Horace's own tone, how he came to be a philosopher. He is
nettled by the patronising tone adopted by Horace and
provoked into a premature use of the dialectical 'skills'
furnished by Stertinius.
The tone of Damasippus is not
flippant, unless it reflects the ineradicable flippancy of
the smooth commercial entrepreneur inviting a purchase
through the use of carefully calculated self-denigration, a
technique not unknown to Horace himself.
However, I prefer
to believe the tone is one of injured pride, as he springs
to his beard's defence with an account of his conversion.
These, then, are not 'Horace's jokes' which 'should not be
put in Damasippus' mouth'.
They are prime examples of
Horace's wit and skill in characterisation.
RUDD ON DAMASIPPUS' STATE OF MIND
Even
more
serious is what I take to be
Rudd's
misunderstanding of Damasippus’ alleged confusion about his
own state of mind. Rudd writes·
'Damasippus remains oddly ambiguous about his
present condition. Is he insane or not? Clearly
we are meant to suppose that after his conversion
he is in some sense wiser than before. Yet when
Horace begs him not to become violent his only
reply is "You too are insane’ (v.32). Later,
after recounting Stertinius' teaching he says
"These were the weapons which Stertinius gave me,
so that I could hit back if anyone called me
names. Whoever says I am mad will be told as
much in reply" (vv.296-8). This seems to imply
a lack of certainty in Damasippus' own mind and
it weakens the effect of the final gibe in which
he is addressed as insane' (v.326).(39)
Of course, such an uncertainty, even if it existed, would
be perfectly compatible with Horace's carefully constructed
portrait of the philosophically naive and rather
raw
proficiens (probationer).
However, I believe that Rudd is
mistaken here and that the root of his error lies in the
sentence,
’Clearly we are meant to suppose that after his
conversion he is in some sense wiser than before'.
For the
fact is that, so far as the doctrinaire Stoic is concerned—
R.P. BOND
12
and who can deny that Damasippus is such?— there are no
gradations of wisdom, or of ignorance.
All men are fools
and equally so, until such time as one or more achieve the
status of sapiens (fully-fledged philosopher). The nature,
but not the degree of their individual insanities may
differ, which is the subject of Stertinius' diatribe.
The
only possible sense in which Damasippus may be thought of as
being 'wiser' after his conversion, is in the limited
Socratic sense of being aware of his own ignorance.
Even
this non-technical sense is incompatible with the Stoic view
described by Cicero at De Finibus 3.48:
'For just as a drowning man is no more able to
breathe if he be not far from the surface of
the water, so that he might at any moment
emerge, than if he were at the bottom already,
and just as a puppy on the point of opening its
eyes is no less blind than one just born, simi­
larly a man that has made some progress towards
the state of virtue is none the less in misery
than he that has made no progress at all.'
(Trans. H. Rackham)(40)
So far as the Stoics were concerned,
therefore, and
certainly in the context of this poem, which deals with the
paradox all fools are mad, Damasippus was no wiser after
the conversion to Stoicism than he had been before.
Damasippus is consistent with his new faith when he says
to Horace insanus et tu at v.32, where the et associates
Damasippus with Horace in the universal madness indicated by
the remainder of the same line.
Damasippus recognises that
he shares the common lot of humanity, namely madness. This
is a source of comfort to him and it was the ability of
Stertinius convincingly to present this belief to Damasippus
which saved him from suicide and despair. Further, the gibe
insane at v.326 loses none of its force.
At the close of
the poem, Horace calls into question the validity of the
paradox which was Damasippus' alleged salvation.
Horace
does this by declaring in the final line, v.326, and there­
fore not allowing any right of reply, that there are indeed
degrees of insanity . . . o maior tandem parcas insane,
minori! (O greater one, I ask you, spare the lesser madman),
where the two comparatives, which open and close the final
line of the poem and which refer to greater and lesser
degrees of insanity, speak volumes for Horace's attitude to
the Stoic paradox. On the one hand, Horace accepts the fact
of his own insanity, as in Satires 1.4.129-131 he accepted
the fact of his own mediocre viciousness, and concedes a
minor point to gain the major one, that Damasippus is more
insane.
Also, ironically, at Ars Poetica 295-301 Horace
associates the writing of poetry with madness,(41) as does
Damasippus 'in this satire at vv.321-2.(42)
So Horace may
well be mad, but not so mad as the enthusiasm for Stoicism
has made Damasippus, whose intellect Horace has been at
pains to show is no match for his own, even in the grasp of
philosophical doctrines.
THE INTERLOCUTORS IN HORACE, SAT. 2.3
13
To return to Stertinius and his conversion of Damasippus:
initially it may appear strange that Stertinius dissuades
the
bankrupt antique dealer from suicide,
when
the
rationalis excessus e vita (suicide based on philosophy)
was, as it were, a near notorious part of the Stoic ethical
doctrine.
However, to speak in Tacitean terms. Stoic
suicide did not become fashionable at Rome until well into
the first century A.D., despite the example set by the
younger Cato.
For the fact was that it was only in certain
circumstances that the Stoics advocated suicide.
It had to
be
the
only viable
and
intellectually
justifiable
alternative to a life of irredeemable misery.
Neither was
it ever fitting, according to the Stoic doctrine of the
strictest kind, for anybody but the sapiens to take his own
life.
Only the sapiens could ever have the necessary
knowledge and judgement to make an accurate assessment of
the balance of the advantages and disadvantages of staying
alive
at any given time,
or in any given set
of
circumstances.(43)
Damasippus, therefore, was not in any
position to take his own life at the time of his meeting on
the bridge with Stertinius, who follows the teachings of
Chrysippus, in dissuading him from a desire for suicide
prompted by a mistaken sense of shame, pudor . . . mains
(v.39). This sense of shame was inspired by fear of the
opinions of others, a false and unfounded fear, again
according to the Stoics, of others who were equally foolish,
equally insane.
This should finally dispose of the idea that there is any
fuzziness in Horace's depiction of Damasippus' mental state,
or in the distinctions which Horace makes between the
various
speakers
in the poem and
their
abilities.
Damasippus is a fool, in anybody's language and especially
in that of Horace, who is by turns irritated, amused, bored,
cynical and frankly angry.
Stertinius is more difficult to
pin down, because he appears through the distorting lens of
Damasippus' memory.
However, his concern for Damasippus'
welfare seems genuine and Damasippus treats him with as much
respect--note the docilis at v.34— as one could expect him
to muster, imitating his manner, appearance and speech (note
the beard and the use of indignum at v.39) and ultimately,
if with characteristic hyperbole, ranking him with the seven
sages of antiquity, haec mihi Stertinius, sapientum octavus,
amico / arma dedit (these are the weapons my friend
Stertinius, that eighth sage, equipped me with) (vv.296-7).
How then do these reasonably derived pictures of the
interlocutors in Satires 2.3 affect our reading of the whole
poem and, in particular, our attitude to its moral centre?
CONCLUSIONS
Horace states elsewhere in the Satires that the aim of
satire is in part moral and didactic;(44) in this he follows
the lead of Lucilius, anticipates also the moral earnestness
of Persius and, on occasion, the vigour of Juvenal.
With
these writers he establishes the moral tone of Roman satire.
R.P. BOND
14
which led Dr. Johnson, ultimately, to define satire in terms
of poetry and moral didacticism. In Satires 2.3, therefore,
we may assume that part of his intention is the expression,
explicitly or implicitly, of certain moral ideas and, in
pursuit of that intent, he will attack and ridicule the
various follies of mankind.
This he does in this poem,
where those follies express themselves in behaviour which is
avaricious,
ambitious,
luxurious,
sensual and super­
stitious .(45) In fact, he casts his net pretty wide.
However, as well as satirising mankind in general, Horace
has a second and more specific target in his sights.
He
wishes to attack those who set themselves up as the moral
mentors of mankind:
philosophical gurus.
These were the
types which Horace's father had taught him to treat with
suspicion(46) and which had long been the subject of comic
ridicule for their general irrelevance and
hypocrisy.
Horace chooses Damasippus and Stertinius— one sympathetic,
one not— as representatives of this class of men in much the
same way that Aristophanes pilloried Socrates in the Clouds
as if he were a sophist or natural scientist.
That
Damasippus and Stertinius are Stoics involves
further
ramifications,
the
nature of which will soon become
apparent:
suffice to say now that Horace objects to the
gross enthusiasm of the novice Damasippus and to his
uncritical acceptance of the extreme doctrines of the
Stoics; he also objects to the extreme presentation of those
doctrines, which is characteristic of the diatribe of
Stertinius.
If the first two reasons, which can be adduced for
Horace's composition of this, for him, marathon poem can be
described as 'moral' and 'satiric', then a third reason, no
less important, can be described as 'literary'. Horace was
apparently fascinated by the diatribe form as it was
exploited by the popular and proselytising philosophers of
his day.
It was an effective instrument of persuasion.
Cicero had attempted to give polished literary expression in
prose to the diatribe in the Paradoxa Stoicorum.
A.G. Lee
writes: 'From what Cicero says in his preface to Brutus
it is clear that his interest was aroused not so
much by their (the paradoxes') substantial truth
or their Socratic ancestry as by the artistic
problem which an attempt to cast them into a
popular and persuasive form would present.'(47)
The desire to overcome a challenging technical problem
may also have been part of Horace's motivation when he
composed this poem.
Accordingly, it could be considered to
be an attempt— and a substantial one at that— to give a
reputable form in Latin poetry to what at first sight seemed
to be relatively intractable material, despite its obvious
attractions to the moral satirist.
We know that Horace considered himself to be an important
innovator in Latin poetry from his comments, for example, in
Odes 3.30, especially vv.12-14. It seems likely, also,
that
the
Epistles were the first verse letters
of
THE INTERLOCUTORS IN HORACE, SAT. 2.3
15
antiquity.(48) Despite the derivative nature of most Latin
poetry, with its respect for tradition, there was, neverthe­
less, always great kudos to be had from achieving the status
of an inovator, and not only in the field of literature
according, for example, to Virgil.(49)
However, one mark of the possible lack of success of
Horace's transformation of the paradox from prose diatribe
into poetic satire could be that 'blurring of distinctions'
between the speakers within the dialogue, which is alleged
by Rudd.
Especially important would be the distinction
between the more or less fictitious figures, such as
Damasippus,
and the poet himself who, after all, is
constantly manipulating his puppets— including the projected
figure of himself--in order that they may serve his various
purposes.
I believe, though, that one should talk rather
of
the conscious existence or non-existence of
such
blurring, rather than ascribe incompetence to such a master
craftsman as Horace, unless no other explanation of the
phenomena presents itself.
For, if such 'blurring' does
occur, it should be thought of as a conscious ploy on the
part of the poeti
that is,
Horace recognises
and
acknowledges the validity of a good deal of Stoic ethical
doctrine.
Accordingly, after the initial conversation in
Satires 2.3, in which great care is taken clearly to
individuate
Damasippus,
Stertinius--and even the poet
himself— such that Horace and the Stoics become excellent
foils for each other, the sharp distinctions are allowed to
disappear until the vigorous altercation between Damasippus
and Horace at the poem's close.
The result is that the
reader accepts the voice at the poem's moral centre as that
of the poet himself.
Horace's argument with Damasippus,
about the poet's particular brand of insanity, shatters this
illusion and achieves a satisfactorily comic ending, which
complements in tone the opening of the poem, without under­
mining or compromising the validity of the criticisms
levelled at human behaviour.
In fact, the moral message of
the satire remains in the reader's consciousness, despite
the comic flourish of the poem's close.
Such an interpretation is quite plausible, but doe? not
pay sufficient justice,
I believe, to the complexity of the
medium.
It seems inconceivable that the tone of the frame,
which is overtly comic, should be intended to have such a
small
effect on its contents,
Stertinius'
diatribe.
Further, the characterisation of Damasippus depends, to a
large extent, on the discerning reader picking up Stoic
references in his vocabulary and even in his behaviour and
appearance.
If the body of the poem is read with a
continuing awareness of the distinctively Stoic nature of
the diatribe of Stertinius in terms of its subject matter,
the paradox, peculiarly Stoic, 'that all fools are mad', its
technical vocabulary, again Stoici and also in terms of the
techniques of persuasion described by Fronto as character­
istic of Chrysippus, who is mentioned twice within the poem
at the start and finish of the diatribe, then it is
R.P. BOND
16
difficult to understand how any reader could come to believe
that he is listening directly to the voice of Horace in
vv.46-295, undistorted by the obvious Stoic mask through
which the poet's words are being filtered.
Horace has taken great pains to show, not only that
Damasippus was a Stoic reporting a Stoic, but also that he
himself, Horace, is out of sympathy with the philosophical
parvenu Damasippus, implying surely, thereby, that any
advice given by Damasippus, at first or second hand, should
be treated with suspicion.
This scepticism of Horace is
part of the important final impression, which one carries
away from the poem, after the altercation between Horace and
Damasippus.(50) It seems unlikely, therefore, on various
counts, that we are intended to think of the central portion
of this poem as belonging to anyone else than the Stoic,
Stertinius, whose words are being reported to Horace by
Damasippus.
Where does this lead us in our attempt to understand the
relationship between frame and diatribe--Horace's attitude
to the Stoa— to the purpose of Satires 2.3 as an artistic
whole?
I believe Horace utilises a Stoic mouthpiece and a
Stoic doctrine in order to achieve the fulfilment of a
tripartite aim with the maximum of
economy.
Horace
satirises human folly in general and simultaneously attacks
those aspects of 'Stoics' and Stoicism, which he found
particularly offensive, their missionary invasivism and the
extremism of their doctrines and techniques of persuasion.
Horace also attempts, successfully 1 think, to give lively
expression in an acceptable verse form to the popular
diatribe of the street-corner zealot.
It may be objected that the simultaneous attack upon
human folly and the actual medium of that attack undercuts
the effect of the moral satire.
This is not the case· the
extremism of doctrine, to which Horace the man takes
exception, and the extremism of expression, which offends
the sensibilities of the poet, were both well suited to the
composition of moral satire, which often exploits polemic
and hyperbole.
Horace's recognition of this fact enables
him to kill several birds with one stone, while he smiles a
smile of Socratic irony.
Horace does satirise, to good effect, the foibles of his
fellow men; he does satirise, to good effect, the energetic
and tedious enthusiasm of the Stoic— and the extremism of
his ethical doctrines and their expressions he does conduct
a successful experiment in a sub-genre of Latin literature.
Also, and not merely incidentally, Horace distances himself
from the criticisms which are made of society by his use of
the Stoic masks of Damasippus and Stertinius.
He distances
himself from his victims, who had been both ruffled and
vocal in the past.
In short, while in the act of writing
satire, he lessens the natural hostility felt towards anyone
who appears to set himself up as something more virtuous
than his neighbours, like himself, and redirects it onto
more worthy recipients, Damasippus and Stertinius.(51)
NOTES TO HORACE. SATIRES 2.3
( 1) For a useful formulation,
1911), 356.
see P.
Lejay,
Horace,
Satires (Paris,
( 2) This is the fourth of the Paradox Stoicorum expounded by Cicero,
where it serves a purpose peculiar to the author,
being
'largely an
invective against Cicero's personal and political enemy Publius Clodius
Pulcher',
A.G.
Lee,
Paradoxa Stoicorum (London, 1953) p. 59) clearly,
the form of the paradox and diatribe lent itself to opportunistic use,
as in Horace, Sat. 2.3.
( 3) 'Damasippus'
perhaps takes his prototype from the wealthy art
dealer of the same name mentioned by Cicero,
Att. 12.33.1 and Fam.
7.23.2 and 3, and who was still alive in 45 B.C.;
see N.
Rudd,
The
Satires of Horace (Cambridge, 1966), 137 and 292, n.10.
( 4) In the age of Augustus,
Stertinius was a prolific Stoic writer who
turned Stoic tenets into Latin verse and wrote some 220 books (Aero, Ad
Hor. Epist.
1.12.20).
Possibly the diatribe ascribed to him here is
Horace's parody of his verse style.
His name— Snorer— is a happy
accident for Horace.
( 5) This is the clear implication of Sat. 1.9 and also the description
of Horace's urban toils in Sat. 2.6; cf. also, the whole of Ep. 1.14 and
especially!
me constare mihi scis et discedere tristem,
quandocumque trahunt invisa negotia Romam,
(vv.16-7)
'You know that I am consistent and depart in gloom,
whenever hateful business drags me to Rome.'
( 6) Sat. 2.6.30-2} cf. also. Sat. 1.6.56-64 and, indeed, passim.
( 7) See Horace's not altogether flippant comment at Ep. 1.4.15-16, also
Ep.
1.7,
passim,
esp.
vv.
46-98 where the story of Philippus and
Vulteius Mena is a cautionary tale advising against ill-considered
interference in the affairs of others.
Philippus' error was to settle
Vulteius in the country,
Maecenas' to bring Horace into town.
The
structural role of this story parallels that of the two mice in Sat.
..
2 6
( 8) Ep. 1.10.2.
( 9) Ep. 1.20.25
(10) Sat. 2.3.307-25.
(11) E.g., Odes 1.5.13-16.
(12) In Ep. 1.18, Horace uses his own experience as a client
basis of his advice to Lollius.
as
the
(13) E.g.,
Sat. 1.5.82-5 and 2.7.22-35,
where the slave Davus accuses
his master of faultfinding (mempaimoiria).
NOTES TO HORACE, SATIRES 2.3
18
(14) 'The general feeling of the school seems to have been that the
approval of others is too uncertain to be a fitting aim;
its place is
taken by the approval of "conscience".
This term, which originally
expressed the burden of a guilty secret,
became in the Roman period
modified in meaning,
and could thus express the approval awarded to a
man by his inner and personal consciousness,
even when all the world
disapproved his acts*
this self-approval is closely akin to peace of
mind.' E.V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism (London, 1911), 320.
On reputation as an 'indifferent',
see Cicero,
Pin. 3.57*
on the
concept of conscience,
see Cicero,
Fin. 2.53, where the Stoics dismiss
conscience as a deterrent from crime as trumpeted by the Epicureans, and
at Tusc- 2.64,
esp. sed tamen nullum theatrum virtuti conscientia maius
est,
'but all the same there is no audience for virtue of higher
authority than the approval of conscience'.
(15)
neque enim, cum lectulus aut me
porticus excepit, desum mlhii ·rectius hoc estt
hoc faciens vivam melius t sic dulcis amicis
occurram: hoc quidam non belle; numquid ego illi
imprudens olim faciam simile?" haec ego mecum
compressis agito labris» ubi quid datur oti
illudo chartie.
'For even when I lie down or take a walk, I am constantly
on at myself, "This course is better*
if I do this my life
will be more virtuous:
in this way I shall please my friendsi
what so and so did wasn't nicer
surely I couldn't inadvertently
do anything of that kind?" This is the sort of inner
conversation I carry on beneath my breath. When 1 have free
time I mess about on paper.*
(16) Esp. Pers., Sat. 3.
(17) See Sat. 1.10.64-74.
(18)
ecce
Crispinue minimo me provocat»
'accipe, si vis,
accipe iam tabulas; detur nobis locus, hora,
custodes; videamus uter plus scribere possit·'
di bene fecerunt inopis me quodque pusilli
finxerunt animi, raro et perpauca loquentia.
'See— Crispinus offers me a challenge at long oddst
"If you
are willing take, take the tablets now; we'll set a place,
a time and scrutineers» let's see which of the two of us
can write the more copiously." Thank the gods they gave me
a meagre and weak intellect, which writes only rarely and
sparingly.'
(19) See Sat. 1.1.13-14 (Fabius) and 120-1 (Crispinus).
(20) E.g., Hdt. 1.133 and Thuc. 1.73.
(21) Cf. Sat. 1.10.20-35, on Lucilius.
NOTES TO HORACE, SATIRES 2.3
19
(22) Lejay, op. cit. n. ad loc.
(23) The environment of the Sabine farm, cf. Ep. 1.10.49-50.
(24) The style of the diatribe is based upon that prescribed by
Chrysippus,
as is appropriate in this satire (vv.
44-5 and 286-7), and
described as such by Fronto,
Bp. ad N. Anton, de Eloqu. 1.146t
it may
also be a parody of Stertinius' alleged versification of Stoic doctrine.
On the diatribe,
see especially A. Oltramare,
Lee Origines de la
Diatribe Ronaine (Lausanne, 1926).
(25) See Cic. Pin. 3.50-51.
(26) See Cic. Off.
1.110 and 115f Horace uses natura to mean
individual's nature, temperament or personality at Sat. 2.7.74.
the
(27) Without wishing to become embroiled in the discussion about the
identity of Platona, whether comicus or philosophus, in v. 11, a discus­
sion dealt with by Lejay,
n. ad loc. and by Rudd,
Horaces Satires and
Epistles - Persius*
Satires (Harmondsworth,
1981),
251 f.,
I would
nevertheless suggest that the philosopher is intended.
The Satires are
often dialogues!
the arrangement of the four names with the sequence
philosopher,
comedian - comedian,
satirist is more satisfying than
comedian x 3 - satirist.
Also,
the emphasis on virtus and moral
philosophy throughout the poem demands that one of Horace's 'companions'
be Plato the philosopher,
whose immeasurably greater fame points to the
same conclusion.
(28) E.g., Plato, Protagoras 322d.
(29) E.g., S.V.P. 3.49.4-8, esp. 8λου γάρ xott βίου έστί τέχνη f) dperfj ίν
ώ καί αΐ σόμπασαι. πράξε«.ς,
(Excellence (arete) is a skill pertaining
to the whole of life, in which all actions also belong.)
(30) On the significance of the beard to the Stoics,
see A.C.
van
Geytenbaek,
Musonius Rufus and the Greek Diatribe Eng.
tr.
by B.L.
Hijmans (Utrecht. 1936), 119 ff.
(31) For a discussion of humanitas,
see D. Gagliardi,
'II Concetto di
Humanitas da Terenzio a Cicerone', La Parola et L'ldee vol. 7 (1965) pp.
1-12; also Cic. Fin. 3.64| M. Aurelius, Med. 4.4 and Seneca, Ep. 95.53.
(32) Chrysippus seems
to
have been fond of the parallel between
physical and moral ailments)
see Cic. Tusc.
4.23,
'nimium operae
consumitur a Stoicis, maxume a Chrysippo, dum morbis corporum comparatur
morborum animi similitudo,
'far too much attention is devoted by the
Stoics,
particularly Chrysippus,
to drawing an analogy between the
diseases of the soul and diseases of the body.*
(33) For a useful discussion of hellebore,
see C.O.Brink,
Horace on
Poetry vol.
2 (Cambridge,
1971),
331-3,
n. on v. 300 of Ars Poetica.
Brink also comments that,
according to Dahlmann and Merkelbach, Studien
zu t Textgesch. und Textkritik (1959), 71-2,
there may be a reference to
NOTES TO HORACE, SATIRES 2.3
20
'Chrysippus* cure’ in Λ.P. 300.
(34) These fifteen lines are structured as follows*
Damasippus states the paradox.
(a) 31-32i
Damasippus gives his source.
(b) 33-34)
Damasippus describes under what conditions
<c> 34-36)
Stertinius preached to him.
Damasippus exlains his despair.
<d) 37-38)
<e> 38-42) Stertinius dissuades Damasippus from
suicide, hints at paradox.
<f) 43-46) Stertinius states paradox and its ultimate
source, Chrysippus.
If A *
'statement of paradox',
B » 'source of paradox',
and C
'narrative or explanatory text',
then the structure of the passage may
be represented as follows;
A B C C C B A, which indicates a clearly
defined ring structure, parallel to the overall structure of the satire.
(35) Rudd, The Satires of Horace (Cambridge,
1966), 174-5.
(36) Rudd,
Horaces
Satires
and
Epistles*
Persius»
(Harmondsworth, 1981) p. 95, translates crepat with 'guff'.
(37) Orelli-Baiter, Q. Horatius Flaccus,
Satires
editio tertia, n. ad loc.
(38) Lejay,
n. ad loc.,
p.396* cf. also his comments, p.386t
one may
note the use of crepo at Odes 1.18.5 where, although colloquial, the use
is not ironic.
(39) Rudd, The Satires of Horace,
175.
(40) Cf.
also Seneca,
Ep. 75.8, where the strict doctrine is modified,
perhaps in the light of such criticisms as those implied by Horace in
Sat. 2.3.
(41) E.g., A.P. 299-301*
nanciscetur enim pretium nomenque poetae,
si tribus Anticyris caput insanabile numquam
tonsori Licino commiserit.
'For he will gain the prize and reputation of a poet, he
thinks, only if he never entrusts to the barber Licinus a
head incurable even by a threefold treatment with hellebore.'
(42)
adde poemata nunc, hoc est, oleum adde camino,
quae si quis sanus fecit sanus facie et tu.
'Add your poems now, that is to say, add oil to the furnace;
you are as sane as any man who composes poetry.'
(43) For a full discussion of Stoic suicide,
see J.M.
Rist,
Stoic
Philosophy (Cambridge,
1969) ch.
13»
in the primary sources, see esp.
Cic.
Fin. 3.60-61, also Seneca, Ep. 24, 30, 54, 70 and 71 (esp. 12-28),
Ad Narciam 19-25.
NOTES TO HORACE, SATIRES 2.3
21
(44) E.g., Sat. 1.4.1-7 and 1.10.3-4 and 14-15.
(45) Horace, through Stertinius, through Damasippus, attacks·
(a) avarice - vw. 82-167
(b) ambition - vv. 187-223
(c) luxury - vv. 224-46
(d) depravity - vv. 247-80
(e) superstition - vv. 281-95
with which one should compare the contents of Juvenal, Sat. 10.
(46) Sat. 1.4.115-120.
(47) A.G. Lee, op. cit. xxv f.
(48) The literary epistle was well established in prose by Ciceroj
the
Eplatlea of Horace were a new genre or, at least, a sub-genre of satire.
(49) Aeneld 6.663-4.
(50) Vv. 300-26.
(51) I would like to acknowledge the help and encouragement given by
friends and colleagues in the Department of Classics and Ancient History
at the University of Queensland during my leave there in 1983.