The Global Issue Network
A Global Governance Theory of the Norm Emergence of the Responsibility to Protect
Stefan Wermenbol
6391710
Master Thesis
International Relations, dept. of Political Science
Research Project: Global Politics at the Sub-State Level
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. J. Harrod
Reader: Prof. Dr. M. De Goede
July 3, 2012
123 pages – 45.000 words
Stefan Wermenbol – Master Thesis
July, 2012
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................... 5
List of Acronyms ........................................................................................................................................ 6
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 7
Figure 1: Contest of Sovereignty and Humanitarianism in State System. .............................. 11
1 Norm Emergence in the Third Debate ................................................................................................. 15
1.1 From Regime Theory to the Quantitive Constructivists: Regimes and Norms in the Global Sphere
............................................................................................................................................................. 16
1.1.1 Regime Theory ....................................................................................................................... 17
1.1.1a The Institutionalist Regime Theory: Krasner .................................................................... 18
1.1.1b Young and the Grotian Tradition ...................................................................................... 20
1.1.1c Haas's Constructivist Regime Thinking ............................................................................. 20
1.1.2 Constructivism ....................................................................................................................... 22
1.1.2a The Domestic Factor......................................................................................................... 23
1.1.2b Constitutive regard........................................................................................................... 24
Figure 2: Regimes and Constructivism .................................................................................... 25
1.1.2c Normativism ..................................................................................................................... 25
1.1.2d The Constructivists' Global Politics .................................................................................. 26
1.1.3 The Quantitative Constructivists ............................................................................................ 27
1.2 Students and Teachers: Norms, Identity and Information in the Global Sphere ........................... 30
1.2.1 The Global Structure .............................................................................................................. 30
1.2.2a Actors, Knowledge and Systems ....................................................................................... 30
1.2.2b Information and its Diffusion at the Global Level ............................................................ 34
1.2.2c Socialization and Compliance ........................................................................................... 36
1.2.2 Global Advocacy Networks and the Spiral Model .................................................................. 38
1.2.2a Transnational Advocacy Networks ................................................................................... 38
1.2.2b The Spiral Model .............................................................................................................. 40
Figure 3: The Boomerang Pattern ........................................................................................... 41
1.3 The Issue Network ......................................................................................................................... 43
1.3.1 Hugh Heclo’s Issue Network................................................................................................... 43
Figure 4. The Iron Triangle ...................................................................................................... 45
1.3.2 Noortje Marres's Issue Network ............................................................................................ 47
1.4 Law and Legitimacy in International Public Law ........................................................................... 50
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1.4.1 Legitimacy .............................................................................................................................. 50
1.4.1a Finnemore and Sikkink on Legitimacy ............................................................................. 51
Figure 5: Stages of Norm Emergence ...................................................................................... 52
1.4.2 Law ......................................................................................................................................... 54
1.4.2a Some Important Elements of International Law .............................................................. 54
1.4.2b Sovereignty, Humanitarian Law and Intervention ........................................................... 56
Toward a Holistic Theory of the Issue Network and Norm Emergence ............................................... 57
2. Responsibility to Protect Politics ......................................................................................................... 61
2.1 A Brief History of Responsibility to Protect ................................................................................... 61
2.2 Organizations and Players ............................................................................................................. 66
2.2.1 The UN.................................................................................................................................... 66
2.2.1a The Security Council ......................................................................................................... 67
2.2.1b The Secretary General ...................................................................................................... 68
2.2.1c The General Assembly ...................................................................................................... 69
2.2.2 Regions and States ................................................................................................................. 70
2.2.2a Africa ................................................................................................................................ 71
2.2.2b Asia ................................................................................................................................... 71
2.2.2c Europe .............................................................................................................................. 72
2.2.2d States and their Concerns ................................................................................................ 72
2.2.3 Responsibly to Protect’s Global Civil Society ......................................................................... 74
2.2.3a The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect ........................................................ 74
2.2.3b The World Federalist Movement ..................................................................................... 75
2.2.3c The International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect .......................................... 75
2.2.3d World Federation of United Nations Associations ........................................................... 76
2.3 Responibility to Protect Plans ........................................................................................................ 79
2.3.1 The Report of the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty .......... 79
2.3.2 The National Focal Points initiative ........................................................................................ 83
2.3.3 The Responsibility to Protect – Mobilizing Public and Political Will ...................................... 85
2.4 Critical Statements and Resolutions in the Development of RtoP ................................................. 88
2.4.1 Security Council Statement by the President of the Security Council ................................... 88
2.4.2 Security Council Statement by the President of the Security Council ................................... 89
2.4.3 Paragraph 138-139 of the World Summit Outcome Document 2005 ................................... 92
2.4.4 Security Council Resolution 1674 ........................................................................................... 93
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Annotations in Anticipation of Analysis... ........................................................................................... 95
3. Interview Reports ................................................................................................................................ 97
3.1 Interview with Guusje Korthals, Dutch RtoP Specialist ............................................................. 98
3.2 Interview with Political Affairs Officer (PAO) of the UN Office of the Special Advisor on the
Prevention of Genocide. ................................................................................................................. 99
3.3 Interview with Rachel Shapiro of the World Federalist Movement and the International
Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect. ................................................................................... 102
3.4 Interview with Sara Davies of the Global Responsibility to Protect Journal ........................... 103
4. Analysis.............................................................................................................................................. 107
4.1 The Responsibility to Protect Issue Network .......................................................................... 109
Figure 6: The RtoP Issue ........................................................................................................ 110
4.2 The Western Trajectory ........................................................................................................... 114
4.3 Responsibility to Protect and the Development of International Law.................................... 116
4.4 Responsibility to Protect and Cosmopolitanism ..................................................................... 118
4.5 The Top-Down Trajectory ........................................................................................................ 119
Figure 7: Top-down Trajectory and Legitimacy in Norm Emergence .................................... 120
Responsibility to Protect and Global Politics ..................................................................................... 122
5. Conclusion: Responsibility to Protect and Global Governance......................................................... 125
A Theory of the Global Issue Network ............................................................................................... 128
References ............................................................................................................................................. 130
Websites ............................................................................................................................................ 139
Appendices ............................................................................................................................................ 140
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Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank my family. I would not be doing this if it were not for their
support, help and love over the years. Secondly, I would like to thank professor Harrod for going above
and beyond the call of duty in supervising a project with a mind of its own. Third, I want to thank
professor M. De Goede for making herself available at such late notice. Finally I want to thank Romana
Michelon, who has a heart of a gold.
As I surreptitiously made my case for including regime theory in this thesis one day with professor
Harrod, I maintained “They must be paid deference!” I still believe this to be the case. Without E.B.
Haas, there would be no P.M. Haas.
I also want to thank my interviewees.

The Political Affairs Officer at the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention
of Genocide.

Dr. Davies from Global Responsibility to Protect and Griffith University

Ms. Korthals from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ms. Shapiro from the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect and the World
Federalist Movement.
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List of Acronyms
CSOs
Civil Society Organization
GA
General Assembly
GAN
Global Advocacy Network
GCRtoP
Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect
ICC
International Criminal Court
ICISS
International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty
ICRtoP
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect
ICTs
Information and Communication Technology
IDPs
Internally Displaced Persons
ILC
International Law Commission
ICJ
International Court of Justice
IOs
International Organizations
IPL
International Public Law
IR
International Relations
NGOs
Non-Governmental Organizations
PAO
Political Affairs Officer
RtoP
Responsibility to Protect
SC
Security Council (of the UN)
SG
Secretary General “
TAN
Transnational Advocacy Organization
UN
United Nations
UNAs
United Nations Association
UN Exec
United Nations Executive
WFM
World Federalist Movement
WFUNA
World Federation of United Nations Associations
WS 2005
World Summit of 2005
“
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Introduction
Defending President Clinton's most famous dalliance in January of 1999, Senator Dale Bumper said:
“When you hear somebody say, “This is not about money" – it's about money." And when you hear
somebody say, "This is not about sex" – it's about sex"1. In a similar vein, when the global elite say it is
not about sovereignty, it is about sovereignty. When they say it’s not Western or idealistic, it is
cosmopolitan. When they say it is universal, it is wholly centered in New York.
This thesis attempts to elucidate our understanding of norm emergence within the context of a
changing global political environment. Specifically, this thesis looks at the development of
humanitarian norms and the background contest between the Western ideology of cosmopolitanism 2
and the peripherally championed parochial and state-centric mode of thinking.
Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006) write that global governance includes an analysis of civil society,
the activities of international organizations, the changing regulative capacity of states, private
organization and transnational rule-making (ibid: 189). The research agenda recognizes a plethora of
actors, acting in various political spheres (ibid: 193). Moreover “The concept of governance captures
this plurality of mechanisms that horizontally link activities of various actors" (ibid). The global
governance research agenda therefore shows a particular interest in the questions: “What forms of
social regulations exist at the global level? Where do global norms, rules and standards come from?
How are they constructed, interpreted, implemented, and adjudicated? What relationship exists
between rule makers and rule takers? What are the consequences of global norms, rules and
1
See website: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films/clinton/
The Stanford Dictionary on Philosophy offers the following definition for cosmopolitanism: 'The word ‘cosmopolitan’,
which derives from the Greek word kosmopolitês (‘citizen of the world’), has been used to describe a wide variety of
important views in moral and socio-political philosophy. The nebulous core shared by all cosmopolitan views is the idea
2
The Stanford Dictionary on Philosophy offers the following definition for cosmopolitanism: 'The word ‘cosmopolitan’,
which derives from the Greek word kosmopolitês (‘citizen of the world’), has been used to describe a wide variety of
important views in moral and socio-political philosophy. The nebulous core shared by all cosmopolitan views is the idea
that all human beings, regardless of their political affiliation, do (or at least can) belong to a single community, and that
this community should be cultivated. Different versions of cosmopolitanism envision this community in different ways,
some focusing on political institutions, others on moral norms or relationships, and still others focusing on shared
markets or forms of cultural expression. The philosophical interest in cosmopolitanism lies in its challenge to
commonly recognized attachments to fellow-citizens, the local state, parochially shared cultures, and the like."
Critical thus, is the objection to parochial, group thinking. For further Western origins of cosmopolitanism see website:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/
2
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standards? Who benefits? Who loses?" (ibid). As will become apparent, this thesis and its theory
answer these questions better than other theories by introducing a new model and system of
governance to the research agenda: the global issue network. This mid-range theory is based on a
1970's domestic governance model as posited by Hugh Heclo. The issue network consists of the three
pillars: 1) an executive power; 2) a legislative power; 3) an issue civil society. What sets the issue
network apart from existing constructivist thinking on norm emergence, is that it works top-down,
meaning norms originate in the highest sphere and are implemented by intermediaries into the local
sphere.
Norm emergence is far from a novel topic and it pre-dates global governance by almost 20
years. Regime theory first introduced ideational power as an independent force to international
relations (IR) in the early 1980's. The constructivists took over the reins and expanded it considerably
by focusing on the interplay of agency, structure and identity. They also elaborated on the role of
information and the various methods of its diffusion. Critically, they showed an interest in norms and
norm proselytization. The political calculus of norm inculcation, socialization and compliance are
important research interests to constructivists. Furthermore, constructivists express a keen interest in
international organizations and they proffer compelling theory on epistemic communities – loosely
associated policy experts related by vocation, profession and normative interests (P.M. Haas, 1992: 3).
Notably Keck and Sikkink (1999) and Finnemore and Sikkink (1999) introduced global theory on
transnational advocacy networks (TANs) and the norm life cycle. The Global Advocacy Network (GAN),
introduced in this thesis, is modeled on the TAN concept, but supplants the transnational for the
global, as is more applicable to the subject matter of this thesis.
This theory cannot, however, satisfy our interest in norm emergence. Keck and Sikkink forget
that norm emergence is not only a result of the manipulations and blackmail of GANs: it is the
consequence of a network of connected individuals functioning cross-organizationally to promote a
norm. Moreover, some norms do travel top-down and are not solely developed domestically, as
myriad constructivists and Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) contend in their Boomerang pattern. Heclo,
Marres and their issue network theory improves our understanding of norm emergence a great deal.
Nevertheless, as from what can be deduced about Heclo from above, in its current form his domestic
theory lacks applicability to global norms. Marres cannot be applied directly because her theory is too
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general to say anything incisive about humanitarian norms and the case of RtoP. There is a need for
new theory which can help us understand the emergence of global ethical norms. This thesis, thus,
seeks to ameliorate existing theory on norm emergence and innovates where necessary.
E.B Haas (1982) writes that there are two types of regimes: regimes of common interest
(economic and security regimes), and regimes of common aversion (such as humanitarian norms). The
latter is the topic of this thesis. The humanitarian norm being studied here is that of Responsibility to
Protect (RtoP). RtoP was designed to protect individuals from the humanitarian prohibitions on ethnic
cleansing, crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. In his 2008 Berlin speech, Ban Ki-moon
(2008) defined three pillars of RtoP. The first pillar is the imperative to the state that its primary duty is
to protect its own citizens. Also, “(…) the responsibility to protect means not just the “responsibility to
react,” but the “responsibility to prevent” and the “responsibility to rebuild” as well” (Ki-moon, 2009:
17). Responsibility to prevent is Pillar II of RtoP, often referred to as capacity building (Luck, 2008: 1,
ICISS, 2001). The Third Pillar of RtoP is the coercive of the three, in which the international community
exacts a continuum of sanctions and intervenes if necessary (Deng, 2011: 450, WFUNA, 2009: 11) et
al). Pillars II and III therefore stipulate that a residual responsibility befalls the international
community. RtoP was accepted at the 2005 World Summit (WS) by state leaders, it is firmly embedded
in the United Nations and the prohibitions it seeks to impose fall under jus cogens - laws which allow
no derogation. In that regard, RtoP should be seen as a comprehensive, cosmopolitan global project to
protect the vulnerable. It must also be seen as a part of a larger humanitarian project, or what Cole
(2012) calls the humanitarian treaties regime.
As not all states are equally supportive of RtoP the norm also has a political dimension.
Generally speaking, states which know a more cosmopolitan domestic environment are more likely to
transpose these sentiments to their foreign policy (Maoz & Russett, 1993, Lumsdaine, 1993). Western
states are therefore more supportive of liberal norms (Rudolph, 2001). This could explain the Western
support for RtoP, evidenced in this thesis. Another political dimension to RtoP comes through the
network which advocates it. Identifiable global actors are responsible for the spread and acceptance
of the norm today. This network should be called the RtoP issue network. The RtoP issue network is a
consortium of global political forces: 1) the UN and particularly the UN Executive3 (UN Exec); 2) state
3
The UN consists of three pillars. The UN Secretary General (the SG), the UN Security Council (the SC) and the UN General
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apparatuses4; and 3) a global RtoP issue civil society. This civil society consists of 1) RtoP GANs - the
Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect (GCRtoP), the International Coalition for the
Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP) and their parent organization, the World Federalist Movement
(WFM); 2) an RtoP epistemic community. This network is mediated through discourse and information
flows and staffed by discernible heuristic groups of individuals which staff its individual pillars. Control
of these mediating forces is central to RtoP and the trajectory of its politics. Though not an exclusively
RtoP orientated GAN, the World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA) is considered the
fourth RtoP GAN in this thesis.
RtoP is however more than a political phenomenon, it is also a legal norm which means it must
satisfy both standards of legality and global legitimacy, or it cannot be maintained (ACIA, 2010: 17).
The main contender of RtoP (as encapsulated in the humanitarian treaties regime) is the sovereignty
regime – the primary organizational principle in international politics (Krasner, 1982). This thesis
bifurcates two approaches to sovereignty: sovereignty as a responsibility (as found in RtoP) and the
conservative, traditional variant of the principle, in which states accept no higher authority not
expressly agreed to (Obradovic, 2011: 13). Prima facie, no clash need exist between these views, but
in practice this is the case nonetheless. Since sovereignty is deeply embedded in the international
system there is also a legal dimension to the narrative of RtoP. In addition, RtoP should be seen as
stemming from a larger development in humanitarian law in which a holistic humanitarian approach,
involving different yet related projects to improve the lot of vulnerable people (especially in conflict
situations) has become more pronounced over the years. Central to the holistic humanitarian
approach is the concept of human security5 – an expression of cosmopolitan thinking. Figure 1 gives a
Assembly (the GA). I call the UN Secretary General's Office and everything which falls under his pillar of responsibility
the UN Exec. This thesis will show that Heclo’s executive shoe fits the SG.
4
Checkel (1999), Klotz (1995) and Legro (1997) focus on the policy elites within a country. Their theory may have been
informed by Axelrod, who has cogently argued that elites often are the authors of norms, because they stand to benefit
or lose the most from them (1986: 1108). With regard to the norm of RtoP, however, it is not necessary to differentiate
between states and policy elites for the argument in this thesis because both states and their policy elites are
dependent on the other two pillars of the RtoP issue network.
5
The ICISS Report reads: 'These considerations reinforce the Commission’s view that human security is indeed
indivisible. There is no longer such a thing as a humanitarian catastrophe occurring “in a faraway country of which we
know little.” On 11 September 2001 global terrorism, with its roots in complex conflicts in distant lands, struck the US
homeland: impregnable lines of continental defence proved an illusion even for the world’s most powerful state. At the
same time, around 40 per cent of the victims of the World Trade Center attacks were non-Americans, from some 80
countries. In an interdependent world, in which security depends on a framework of stable sovereign entities, the
existence of fragile states, failing states, states who through weakness or ill-will harbour those dangerous to others,
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simplified overview of how the background of the RtoP norm is seen in this thesis.
Figure 1: Contest of Sovereignty and
Humanitarianism in State System.
Returning to the principle of sovereignty and RtoP, there are some questions as with regards to the
legitimacy of the latter, as its support is not unanimous in international politics. One can speak of an
RtoP discord between strong states, which support the norm (Western), and weak states, who oppose
its implementation (most of Asia). Prolific argument has also been made that sovereignty and RtoP are
not at loggerhead (ICISS, 2001). This must be spoken to now to make room for the argument made in
the thesis. Use of an analogy of RtoP best suits this task.
Leaders, their states and the international community should be seen, respectively, as individuals,
households and community watches. The individual was free to keep his or her household in whatever
order (or disorder), he or she liked. Privacy was the norm (sovereignty – prohibition on intrusion
Charter chapter 1, art. 2 (7))i and especially the poorer households upheld it as they did not want the
rich, supposedly morally superior families who lived in the west side of town, intruding into their
or states that can only maintain internal order by means of gross human rights violations, can constitute a risk to
people everywhere (ICISS, 2001: 5). As is seen in Resolution 1674, human security involves facilitating education,
combating poverty and stimulating good governance.
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business (strong-weak discord). The individual may not beat his neighbour – then the community
watch steps in (Charter chapter VII)ii.
Laws which forbade violence in the household were around for quite some time, but there was
little resolve in the community watch to prevent it. The neighbors talked and looked their noses down,
but they never intervened for solely altruistic reason.6 As a result of some flagrant cases which
shocked the county (Rwanda, Srebrenica), the watch became much more involved. It developed RtoP,
which allowed it to enforce existing laws thereby stopping domestic violence. Crucially, the
mechanism set up protocols for preventing domestic abuse by encouraging community members to
council and lend assistance to problem households. RtoP also articulated a mechanism through which
it could stop those who beat their children, wife or husband by boycotting the household (sanctions)
or administering forceful intervention, where it deemed necessary. The rich families played a preeminent role in this decision-making process. Privacy waned as a result of RtoP.
The three-part, yet unitary thesis7 come to is:
The promotion of RtoP has occurred in part as a result of developments in global politics in
which the RtoP issue network and notably the RtoP civil society played a pronounced role.
The development of RtoP has been driven by pre-dominantly Western forces and should be seen
as a part of a deepening of humanitarian law in a larger humanitarian development in international
law.
Cosmopolitan thinking has been central to the RtoP project and RtoP has had a clear top-down
trajectory in global politics.
This thesis is inductive: instead of testing theory, it proffers one: the Global Issue Network. The
structural shape of this thesis is therefore conical: from very broad to continuously more tapered and
it concludes with the paragraph long general theory. This theory is an extrapolated version of the RtoP
6
Michael Walzer could not find a single case of selfless humanitarian intervention in his survey. See website:
http://them.polylog.org/5/awm-en.htm
7
One could also call this thesis three central (binary) claims. They are not hypothesises because they are not being tested;
they are the findings which will be argued in the thesis. It must be remembered that the objective is understanding and
not explaining, holism and not parsimony.
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issue network. It therefore has the same features as the ones seen in this three-part thesis.
The thesis is entirely holistic in scope as it seeks to tell the whole story of the emergence of the
RtoP norm. Metaphorically speaking, RtoP has six mono-chromic sides to it but in practice the colors
are mixed like an unsolved Rubik’s cube. Looking at RtoP, you see elements of top-down trajectory, an
RtoP issue network, cosmopolitanism, development in humanitarian law and Western origin and
promotion against a background of changing global politics8, all simultaneously. Because the subject
matter is indivisible, this thesis is certainly light on methodology in comparison to deductive research
on norm emergence as seen in De Ridder (2011). Though, it is interesting to apply a rationalist model
of analysis to interpretevist subject matter, as De Ridder does, this thesis uses a cheese knife to cut its
cheese. As is continuous with third debate philosophy this research is also descriptive hitherto, to
stimulate the verstehen of RtoP which is a highly complex political phenomenon. Though the thesis
proffers a conclusive theory in the end, the building process is more inclusive than exclusionary; the
thesis is a construction of existing underlying theory supplemented by distillations from the case study.
In chapter 1 an examination will be made of the development from regime theory to the
quantitative constructivists9 - researchers who have measured the validity of constructivist assertions.
Second, a look is taken at relevant sets of actors in the constructivist research agenda and their
methods in political activity. Third, the issue network as seen in Heclo and Marres is introduced.
Fourth, the mechanisms of international law and politics in norm emergence are explained. Therefore
much of chapter 1 gives an overview of what the third debate offers in terms of existing theory on
norm emergence. This sharpens our theoretical scope and establishes the foundations for the theory
and the above stated thesis.
Chapter 2 of this thesis introduces RtoP. First, an overview will be given of the history of RtoP.
Second, a look will be taken at the relevant actors in RtoP politics and its issue network. Hereafter,
some principle plans will be discussed in which the cosmopolitan, top-down trajectory, western and
issue network nature of RtoP will be underlined. Lastly, legal documents in the development of RtoP
8
The term global politics is used only in contrast to international politics, which describes the relations between states. In
the context of this thesis, global politics includes the relations of non-state actors such as the RtoP GANs and epistemic
community and the SG and with states. Thus, the understanding of global politics is consonant with Dingwerth’s and
Pattberg’s global governance approach.
9
I claim innovation of the term, not the research agenda of measuring constructivist premises. One such project is found at:
http://www.memetracker.org/index.html
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will evince that RtoP was not particularly new, for all intents in purposes, and should be seen only as a
deepening of humanitarian law within international law.
Chapter 3 is where the interviews are relayed in narrative; they buttress the thesis and its
research findings. Interviews were held with representatives of the Dutch foreign office, the UN, the
ICRtoP and the WFM in addition to a well-known scholar within the field of RtoP.
Chapter 4 of this thesis offers the analyses of RtoP through the prism of the discussed theory.
Here, the rise of RtoP and third debate theory is seen against the background of global changes since
the end of the Cold War. This background is the color white on the Rubik’s cube, because white is not
a color but the full reflection of light, like RtoP is a reflection of its time. First, an overview of the
contextual circumstances fostering RtoP is given, which is one aspect of the RtoP Rubik’s cube. This is
followed by arguments in which the five aspects of RtoP are explained. These aspects are 1) RtoP has a
global issue network; 2) RtoP is a Western project gone global; 3) RtoP is a pawn in the sovereignty vs.
humanitarian treaties regime conflict; 4) RtoP is a cosmopolitan project; and 5) RtoP is a top-down
functioning norm and mechanism.
This thesis concludes with a brief reiteration of the argument and the generalized global issue
network theory.
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1 Norm Emergence in the Third Debate
Having been preceded by an ontological debate (Realist-Idealist great debate) and an
epistemological debate (behaviouralism vs. realism), the 1980’s saw a buoyant third debate emerge
which advocated tolerance, diversity, inclusiveness and plurality in the field of theory (Lapid, 1989:
236). The debate offers inductive, interpretive and holistic approaches to quandaries in world politics
(ibid 246-247). Concepts of intellectual or scientific “progress” are necessarily problematized, and new
and old theory are applied interchangeably, depending on suitability to the research topic (ibid: 244 245). Different research agendas are conflated into inter-paradigmatic hybrids, thereby sometimes
navigating the third debate into the choppy waters of meta-theory (ibid: 241). The debate "(…) is
typically expected to facilitate trailblazing ideas about the nature and progression of knowledge in the
international relations field" (ibid: 239). Its concentration on innovation has led to hitherto dismissal
of conventional standards of research. As Rosenau remarks: "(…) this is not a time for nit-picking, for
finding fault with rogue definitions, imprecise formulations and skewed data" (Rosenau in ibid: 247).
The debate thinkers (also called perspectivists due to their interest in different dimensions to a topic)
warn against "(…) misplaced pursuits of epistemology and philosophy of science (…)" (ibid: 236). The
debate is an absorber and importer of ideas of theoretical innovations (ibid). Academic theoretical
self-reflection is also central to the third debate. As Rosenau argued about the beliefs in IR in the
1980’s: "(…) the anomaly would seem to be conceptual and not empirical so that its resolution can be
achieved through reconceptualization rather than research" (in ibid: 245). Third debate thinkers
therefore try and identify their presuppositions and assumptions for reasons of transparency vis-à-vis
their readers (ibid: 242). Moreover, third debate thinkers critically evaluate theories by taking the
contextual background in which they occurred into consideration (ibid: 250). As Lapid points out,
however, third debate theory is also a little narcissistic, as it is more pre-occupied with the celebration
of theory itself, rather than its application to resolve empirical quagmires (ibid: 247). In addition, the
debate denounces appeals to authority figures such as Marx or Weber, though it cannot be denied of
course that the young Turks of the third debate like Wendt are not routinely invoked today (ibid: 236).
De Ridder continuously refers to academics to the point that it is hard to discern nuance between her
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thought and those she cites. This thesis maintains that deference must be paid, but finds that it is to
those easily forgotten.
Though this thesis certainly aspires to the accolade of “trail blazing” ideas, by stricture of
formulaic conventions, it imposes upon itself a modicum of evidential rigor. Nevertheless, this chapter
attempts to embody what the third debate stands for by drawing on diverse (and sometimes mutually
contradicting) theory. While this thesis uses diverse paradigmatic scopes, no conscious effort is made
to proffer meta-theory not directly related to the subject-matter though the analysis of this thesis
does offer thoughts on the relation of empirical observations of global politics and the theory which
springs from it. New and old theory informs thinking here and the concept of intellectual “progress” is
eschewed. Notably, this thesis imports a domestic theory of governance, as discussed above.
Methodology takes a backseat, as this thesis adheres to the belief that good concepts are worth much
more than good “science”. In addition, this thesis seeks to add on some substantive research, which
was found lacking in the 1980's. Where possible, this chapter relays the third debate's rich framework
of coterminous theory for purposes of later analysis and as an acknowledgement of its ontological
underpinnings to give full disclosure of its intellectual process.
In the first part of this chapter an overview of development in third debate thinking on global
norms is detailed and an introduction is made to constructivist thought on learning and teaching in
the global sphere. In part two, this chapter identifies three dimensions to international norm research.
First, it looks at the causal dimension of norm thinking by offering an overview and explanation of the
involved actors in norm politics, methods of norm mediation and control in a global social
environment. Second, the issue network, which models relational bonds between actors for
understanding (verstehen) norm development, is given. Finally, an overview of existing theory on
process in international norm emergence is given and a glance at international law is taken. Using this
approach, the hope to attain a semblance of inter-paradigmatism will be realized.
1.1 From Regime Theory to the Quantitative Constructivists: Regimes and Norms in the Global
Sphere
This section introduces conceptual tools such as regimes, norms, values, as well as consensual
knowledge, cognitive understanding and regenerative self-legitimating logic by giving an overview of
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existing norm theory. The normative dimension of the third debate research agenda is discussed here
which is central to cosmopolitanism and understanding humanitarian norms. An introduction is made
to the regime contest between sovereignty and humanitarianism in addition to an overview of
constructivist thought on the Western origins of humanitarianism. Importantly, thinking on the
trajectory of political control will be introduced.
This section details the theoretical entering of the “idea” as an independent variable into
international and global politics. Since regime theory was the first to recognize the importance of the
“idea”, part one of this section is devoted to its discussion as found in Cowhey and Long (1983),
Keohane (1992), Young (1982), Krasner, and most importantly E.B. Haas. As shall be evinced, E.B. Haas
is a good point of point of departure to move into constructivism. Part two of this section draws on a
much greater variety of thinkers. Florini (1996) , Checkel (1992), Klotz (1995-96), Price (1998), Legro
(1997), Lumsdaine (1993), Keck and Sikkink, Finnemore and Sikkink and Risse, Ropp and Sikkink are
synthesised into a general approach to norm emergence. Subsequently, we move to the quantitative
constructivists: Neumayer, Goodliffe and Hawkins and Cole whose research design was informed by
Cortell and Davis among others. Their work will be touched on briefly here to finalize the overview of
contemporary international norm study.
1.1.1 Regime Theory
There was a time when regime theory was the pre-dominant heuristic approach to IR (Checkel, 1999:
84). The primary interest of regime theory was theorising a(n) (imagined) global system and, more
importantly, its transformation over time (E.B. Haas, 1982: 210-211, P.M Haas, 1992: 1). Subsets of the
systems were regimes - rules of engagement for states in international conduct (E.B. Haas, 1982: 210211). Like rules, regimes can be written or unwritten with an organizational guardian (international
organisation) or without (Young, 1982: 277). Regimes can be designed to regulate cooperation, to
articulate ethical standards of international conduct, or to do both simultaneously (ibid, 280). Not only
do regimes articulate procedures for conduct, but also repercussions for an actor's failure to comply.
Sometimes regimes are also in conflict with other regimes (Cowhey & Long, 1983: 161). As a
consequence hereof, it is entirely possible that regimes disappear or emerge. Some scholars, notably
Cowhey and Long, point to the inception, maturation and eventual demise of certain regimes and
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speak of regime life-cycles (1983: 161). With regard to RtoP, we see the humanitarian treaties regime
coming of age, whereas its competitor is passing its golden years.
There are two types of realism according to Krasner: hegemonic realism and zero-sum realism.
Zero-sum realism, for all intents and purposes, excludes, the concept of ideational forces in
international politics (Krasner 2, 1982: 499). Keohane, an exponent of the hegemonic realist vein of
regime argument has pointed to the role of hegemons in creating, maintaining and reinforcing
structures of conduct (Cowhey & Long on Keohane, 1983: 160). In this hegemons use reward or
coercion to foster regime support (ibid). System hegemony can come at high costs in the form of
payments to others in the system whose support is needed (Keohane in Krasner 2, 1982: 499). An
alternative form of dominance may come in a consortium of states, which unite and share the
hegemony. We see this with regard to humanitarian regimes such as RtoP and their Western sponsors
following the Cold War (E.B. Haas, 1982: 213).
Our first interest here is in the Liberal position on regimes, with a pronounced continuum from
rationalist institutionalist thinking proffered by Krasner, to the Grotian tradition as seen in Young. Our
second interest here is in the writings of E.B. Haas, who should be seen as the fountainhead of
constructivist leaning regime thinking.
1.1.1a The Institutionalist Regime Theory: Krasner
Institutionalists emphasize the advantages of cooperation when selfish thinking is unhelpful or
downright damaging to those involved. Micro-economic Pareto optimum, great stag hunt and
prisoner's dilemma modes of thinking, which posit that cooperation is beneficial to rational actors is
constitutional to institutionalist thought. Krasner therefore refuses to accept any causal variables apart
from "(…) egoistic self-interest, usually economic, and political power” (Krasner 2, 1982: 505). As E.B.
Haas defines the position: “Regimes are man-made arrangements (social institutions) for managing
conflict in a setting of interdependence" (1982: 210). Interdependence of world actors (specifically
states) is a recurring theme, especially in constructivism. First, Krasner's conception of the
independent “idea” is discussed. Second, feedback mechanisms are discussed. Finally, Krasner's
thoughts on norms and knowledge are briefly noted. Regime thinking should be kept in mind with
regard to transitional modes of thinking, discussed at the start of the analysis.
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Krasner is one of the first to emphasise regime autonomy: "(…) once a regime is actually in
place, it may develop a dynamic of its own that can alter not only related behavior and outcomes but
also basic causal variables" (Krasner 2, 1982: 500). The period of regime survival is called a lag, and it
can occur when "(…) custom, usage, uncertainty and cognitive failing," retard the construction of a
new regime (ibid: 502). Standards of conduct, therefore, are quite capable of surviving independently,
a thought which the constructivists substantiate below and transpose to norms. With regard to
sovereignty, the concept of a lag is useful for later analysis. The autonomous dynamic of an “idea”
informs discourse and information diffusion, discussed below.
Independent regimes fundamentally affect what Krasner calls feedback mechanisms. A
feedback mechanism, Krasner lists “First, may alter actor's calculations of how to maximize their
interests. Second regimes may alter interests themselves. Third, regimes may become a source of
power to which actors can appeal. Fourth, regimes may alter the power capabilities of different actors,
including states" (ibid: 503). The first two of Krasner's “feedback mechanisms” should be taken note of
as they reoccur in the constructivist research agenda falling under the learning rubric. The third and
fourth are interesting with regards to the final section of chapter 1 on international law. Laws can be
appealed to for protection in the system while violations may cause a state to become an outcast,
damaging its geopolitical standing.
When it comes to the subject of norms, Krasner emphasizes that they work in both directions:
usage and custom may develop into a regime, and norms eventually converge into habits and
therefore internalize (Krasner 1: 203-204). Krasner also borrows heavily from E.B. Haas, for example, in
arguing for the inclusion of knowledge production in regime study (information reconstituting
interests) (Krasner 2, 1982: 505). In addition, “If regimes matter, then cognitive understanding can
matter as well”, meaning that an actor’s understanding of a situation determines its agency (ibid: 510).
Krasner therefore makes overtures to holistic, non-linear thinking. With regard to RtoP, cognitive
understanding is the causal variable GANs attempt to manipulate.
Krasner accepts a priori that interdependence is the defining feature of the global system.
Regimes can become independent regulators of cooperation and prescribe and proscribe conduct
between states. Regime feedback mechanisms have an impact on defining state interests and regimes
themselves can change the position of states in the international system. There is, however, no real
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normative dimension to Krasner's theory10. Young, on the other hand, refuses to exclude norms as an
impetus to regime formation.
1.1.1b Young and the Grotian Tradition
At the Grotian end of the spectrum more potential causal variables of conduct are included: “Interests,
power, diffuse norms, customs and knowledge may all play a role in regime formation. These causal
factors may be manifest through the behavior of individuals, particular bureaucracies, and
international organizations" (Krasner 1 on the Grotian Tradition, 1982: 204-205).11 This holistic mode
of thinking permeates the constructivist tradition too. Here, a look is taken at the negotiated regime,
as Young argues it.
Negotiated regimes are "(…) characterized by conscious efforts to agree on their major
provisions, explicit consent on the part of individual participants, and formal expression of the results"
(ibid: 283). Young argues that due to conflicts of interest in the international community "(…) it is to be
expected that negotiated orders will often exhibit a piecemeal quality, leaving many problems to be
worked out on the basis of practice and precedent" (ibid). This sounds a lot, as will be shown, like the
diluted form of RtoP accepted in 2005). Interestingly, Young also puts it that negotiated regimes occur
in periods when there are rapid social changes, which is what this thesis argues has occurred in the
period following the Cold War.
The concept of negotiated order is important with regard to envisaging the construction of the
current international political system and it will return in the analysis. E.B. Haas's interest is in cultural,
epistemic and political processes which can undergird such an order.
1.1.1c Haas's Constructivist Regime Thinking
E.B. Haas introduces the concept of the individual to regime thinking as a unit of analysis. He writes
that the cognitive understanding of self and the interplay with culture determines our actions (E.B.
10
Of course, one could argue that the regime in Krasner's theory is one of utilistic dimensions: what states intersubjectively determine to be desirable conduct becomes the guiding code of conduct for the good of all. Within the
context of this thesis, however, this is a little too far-fetched.
11
Krasner does not define the Grotian tradition and for the purposes that the term is used here, taking space constraints
into consideration, it is not necessary to do so either.
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Haas, 1982: 208). First, a look is taken at E.B. Haas's understanding of the mechanic – and organic
systems of thinking. Second, E.B. Haas's thoughts on cognitive understanding, constitutive regard,
consensual knowledge, teaching and learning will be discussed. Finally, the concept of information and
identity are spoken to.
The mechanic system is, in short, deterministic and thus articulates the realist standpoint (ibid:
239). The organic system describes the idealistic point of view (E.B. Haas, 1982: 218). E.B. Haas asserts
that each system lacks what the other has in abundance: the organic system lacks insight into politics
and economics, and the mechanical system lacks a concern in the future of mankind. He asks: “What
might a synthesis of the two attitudes do?" (ibid: 239). The constructivists take note of E.B. Haas's
standpoint and infuse rationalism and normativism, as is seen below. The synthesis of these systems
can also be seen in the pragmatism of RtoP, as will be argued in the analysis.
“The study of regimes," E.B. Haas argues “illustrates the range of past and future choices about
international collaboration in a context of changing self-understanding" (ibid). E.B. Haas also
introduces the concept of consensual knowledge and constitutive regard of the system: "(…) regimes
are supposed to solve problems but the problem is a function of how one regards the system" (ibid:
214). He defines consensual knowledge as “(…) a body of beliefs about cause-effect and ends-means
relationships among variables (activities, aspirations, values, demands) that is widely accepted by the
relevant actors, irrespective of the absolute or final “truth" of these beliefs” (ibid). E.B. Haas also
introduces the concept of learning: “The ability and willingness on the part of the relevant actors to
incorporate consensual knowledge into the definition of interests that motivate international
behavior” (ibid). Cognitive understanding, constitutive regard, consensual knowledge, teaching and
learning are analytical concepts which can explain action, identity and structure. They carry over into
constructivism and are its major tenets. In this thesis, they are also vital conceptual tools for
understanding how the actors in RtoP politics engage with each other, their instruments and methods
of communication and their environment.
In the study of regimes, E.B. Haas asserts that “What matters is process," by which he means
that the outcome of decisions is a product of the information and situation in which states are
involved (ibid: 241). E.B Haas argues that different perceptions of national interest, changeable in
response to new information or altered values, will result in "(…) different processes and in a variety of
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regimes that will be considered rational by the actors – at least for a while" (ibid). Critical in this, to E.B.
Haas, is the importance of information: “It follows that one of the most important functions of any
regime is to allow for the collection and dissemination of information" (ibid, 242). E.B Haas attributes
influence to diverse actors by arguing that organisations "(…) may autonomously feed the process of
change by the information and ideas they are able to mobilize" (ibid, 246). A politics of information is
also central to constructivist thought, this thesis and RtoP.
It should be deduced from the discussion above that regimes are inconcrete, yet prescribing and
proscribing inter-subjective codes of conduct within systems. They have life spans and compete with
other regimes. It should be observed that regimes are independent forces which facilitate cooperation
and may transform state identity, interests and positions of power. Young's contribution is the
observation that regimes may occur as a result of norms and that regime formation is a process in
which different actors and motives are involved. E.B. Haas points out that regimes are constructed by
idiosyncratic processes. These processes are fuelled by consensual knowledge, agent learning and
teaching, constitutive regard and cognitive understanding. Processes also yield reconfigured identities,
leading to new agency through which global structure is built. This is not a linear process, but has
continuous feedback mechanisms, as seen in Krasner. In regime theory, the feedback process is
strikingly under-theorized. The regime theorists and E.B. Haas specifically have thus inadvertently fed
into a new research agenda. For this thesis, regimes are important as they describe international
cooperation well. Since the state-system still defines global structure, its politics must be taken into
consideration if we are to understand global norm emergence.
1.1.2 Constructivism
In Finnemore and Sikkink's words “Norm shifts are to the ideational theorist what changes in the
balance of power are to the Realist" (1998: 893). Constructivists have been known to claim that IR has
ignored the importance of norms in constructing the international system (Klotz, 1995: 452,
Finnemore &Sikkink, 1998: 897). Their objective is to address this omission.
Like regime theorists, constructivists are interested in understanding and explaining the global
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system. Norms change over time, they compete and they “matter” (Axelrod, 1986: 1095; Legro, 1997:
31, Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 897 et al). As with regimes, norms are resilient and can become
entrenched, after which they become harder to change (Florini, 1996: 377). Norms too have life cycles,
but in constructivist thinking these are much more fleshed out as can be seen in Finnemore and
Skikkink's life cycle model (not discussed due to space restraints). To constructivists, norms: "(…)
describe collective expectations for the proper behaviours of actors with a given identity" (Katzenstein,
Finnemore and Klotz in Keck & Sikkink, 90: 1999). There are thus noticeable similarities between
constructivism and regime theory.
The most occurring criticism levied by constructivists against themselves is that they are lean
on empirical research and that their conclusions are drawn from correlations rather than a study of
process - a problem this thesis addresses (Checkel, 1999: 84;186, Legro, 1997: 57, Price, 1998, 615).
There are three broad themes that the constructivists touch on, which are important for the
refinement of chapter 1. Consecutively, the domestic factor, constitutive regard, normativism and
constructivist global politics are discussed.
1.1.2a The Domestic Factor
The first theme discussed here is what can be called the domestic factor. The domestic factor
maintains Checkel's finding that "(…) institutionalization occurs more readily and forcefully in the
domestic as opposed to the international arena; that, one would a priori expect that domestic norms
should exert a greater pull on agent behavior than systemic ones" (1999: 106). Unlike the regime
theorists, constructivists have pointed to the importance of a cultural fit between the experience,
norms, values and intentions in a domestic culture and the international norm being institutionalised
(Checkel, 1999, Legro, 1997 and Klotz, 1995 et al). When there is no such congruence between norm
and culture, norms fail to germinate. Especially Western humanitarian norms which do not find an
ideal domestic climate may fail. Florini has also noted that success of new norms within a community
is not solely dependent on domestic agency, but also requires a hospitable domestic normative
framework, in which the norm is fostered, as was the case with for example liberal cosmopolitan
norms in Europe and RtoP (1996: 374).
This bottom-up thinking informs this thesis in the sense that its effects are manifest in the
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Western promoters of RtoP. No description is made of domestic norm development, as it falls outside
the scope of this thesis.
1.1.2b Constitutive regard
A second vital theme in constructivism is that of the constitutive regard of norms and actor selfawareness in its social environment. Checkel argues that norms "(…) carry social meaning and are
often independent of power distributions" (1999: 84). Klotz has gone so far as to argue that this is the
only element missing from regime theory, and acknowledges the constitutive norm as an independent
variable, as illustrated in figure 2 (1995: 478). Klotz writes that international norms do not solely
regulate behavior since they also constitute identities and interests and define a range of legitimate
policy options (ibid: 461). Frederking agrees that "(…) the reproduction of norms is inseparable from
the construction of identity" (in Sjöstedt, 2007: 237). Sjöstedt puts it even stronger and speaks of a
political process in which "(…) structural factors interplay with agency in the creation of policy and
how certain policies are deemed necessary and made possible" (2007: 250). Social identity
constructions can provide an explanation as to why there is a sense of obligation to act and why a
certain type of behavior is seen as natural (ibid). When norms attain this level of embedding in an
identity, one can speak of values (ibid). Values and ideas, Sjöstedt argues, determine interest
conceptualisation and inform policy (ibid).
Constitutive regard therefore denotes the interplay between identities, ideas, information,
agency, structure and systems. Accepting this has normative implications.
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Figure 2: Regimes and Constructivism
Source: Klotz,
1995: 461
1.1.2c Normativism
The normative tradition in constructivism substantiates the importance of norms for the international
community (Price, 1998: 616). Norms imply “ought”, which means they bifurcate right from wrong
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 891). Lumsdaine is one principle normative thinker. In his Moral Vision of
International Politics he concludes that “Support for aid was a response to world poverty which arose
mainly from ethical and humane concern and, secondarily, from the belief that long-term peace and
prosperity was possible only in generous and just international order where all could prosper" (1993:
3). Lumsdaine argues that the aid regime changed as a result of shifting views in Western countries,
and thus moved from a regime designed to benefit the donor (imperialism), to one benefiting the
recipient (altruism). Moreover, Lumsdaine finds that countries in which charity and compassion were
institutionalised in extensive welfare programs played a stronger role in helping other states (ibid:
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1993). Herein, Lumsdaine has found evidential backing from notably, Maoz and Russet. Their 1993
article Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986 found that domestic ethical
norms are robust indicators of righteous state security conduct in international society. Lumsdaine
states that the aid regime was a result of global village thinking and thus was inherently cosmopolitan
(1993: 68).
Especially this global village, cosmopolitan strand of thinking is of importance in this thesis.
Here it is constructed from domestic preferences, but this thesis looks to how this thinking works topdown. Nevertheless, it is argued below that state and regional characters were important for the
development of RtoP.
1.1.2d The Constructivists' Global Politics
The final major theme discussed here is the constructivists' regard for international politics. Nadelman
and Lumsdaine have argued that states are evidently cosmopolitan internally, to their own population,
and that they seek to transpose their approach to the global level (1990: 483, 1993: 12). Nadelman
goes further in the cosmopolitan vein, arguing that respect for sovereignty and the norm of nonintrusion has been detrimental to universal justice by pointing to the success of global prohibitionary
regimes on transnational crimes (1990: 486; 481). The debate on sovereignty is complicated by its
detractor, cosmopolitanism which has a distinct Western air of imperialism (Keck & Sikkink, 1999: 100,
Nadelman, 1990: 484, Cortell & Davis, 2000: 87 et al). Risse, Ropp and Sikkink contend that human
rights (probably the most incontestable example of cosmopolitanism) are commonly accepted as
universal when they clearly trace their heritage to European ideology (1999: 2). Lyon and Dolan note
that with regard to intervention in enforcing humanitarian law, norms of non-intervention enshrined
in sovereignty have been noticeably relaxed since the end of the 1970's to protect human rights and
promote peace (2007: 52). This all being said, Lumsdaine and Nadelman's almost starry eyed
extrapolations from their own, narrow research are hard to reconcile with other notable theorists
discussed above, who argue that morality in state conduct is coterminous with individual and
separately defined state interests (Price, 1998: 614, Klotz, 1995: 472, Cortell & Davis, 2000: 78 et al).
There is thus some disagreement, but it should be noted that whereas regime thinkers refuse
to make ethical pronouncements, constructivists are less abashed. Constructivism is not only
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concerned with norms and values, it implicitly (or explicitly!) encourages normative political thinking.
The constructivist interest in the discussion of sovereignty and the Western slant on humanitarian
norms have informed the proffered theory and this thesis falls implicitly in line with their critical
approach to global politics.
Generally speaking, constructivists pick up where regime theory leaves off, notably by conceptually
developing elements already seen in E.B. Haas. To sum up, constructivists have argued that national
particularism is essential to understanding how norms emerge globally. Second, the constructivists
inherited the concept of constitutive regard from E.B. Haas which they then embraced and expanded.
Nevertheless, though constructivists embrace some analytical methods and concepts from regime
theory, they add a distinct normative dimension to their discussion of norms. Where regime theorists
remain aloof from the discussion of organizing principles in international politics, some constructivists
actively engage in it, decrying the global system's foundational institution of sovereignty.
As Checkel and Price have pointed out, however, much constructivist theory is postulated and
in this, the quantitative constructivists pick up where the constructivists leave off.
1.1.3 The Quantitative Constructivists
An important link to the quantitative constructivists is found in Cortell and Davis's Understanding the
Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda (2000). In this article, Cortell and Davis
pick up Price and Checkel's criticism that the constructivist research project lacks epistemological
buttressing and rigor (2000: 70). They borrow Checkel's domestic, cultural fit, Florini's environmental
fit and Finnemore and Sikkink's norm entrepreneur premise and sketch the contours for a research
project (ibid: 74 – 76). Three projects followed; all three quantitatively measuring the domestic impact
of international norms, focusing specifically on negative human rights (the imperative to refrain from).
The articles are discussed in order of publication date: Neumayer, Goodliffe and Hawkins and Cole.
In 2005, Neumayer designed a table which summed up the various ontological positions and
what their theoretically expected outcomes would be. In the table he includes TAN theory, liberalism
and realism among others, the first hardly being a peer ontology (if you can call it that) in the great
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debates. Neumayer found that there were indirect effects of human rights which "(…) signalled the
consensus of the international community, creating stigma for offenders, providing support for human
rights campaigners, and the like" (2005: 947). Neumayer also found proof for international peerpressure (discussed below), and the naming and shaming (stigma of offenders) instrument therein.
Goodliffe and Hawkins, a year later in 2006 test the salience of CAT (Convention Against
Torture). They use two premises of which one is Finnemore and Sikkink's peer pressure premise
(discussed below) that "(…) states are less likely not to commit to human rights standards when other
states have already committed and such commitment seems to be generally expected” (Goodliffe &
Hawkins, 2006: 359). The researchers' hypothesis is in line with Finnemore and Sikkink: “We expect
the higher the global and regional commitment level to CAT, the more likely a state is to commit to it
as well" (ibid: 361). They also adopt Checkel's cultural fit premise by arguing that when congruence
with the domestic culture is high, “costs” will be low, favoring implementation, which explains the
early and swift integration of RtoP in Western policy (ibid). Their conclusion is a resounding victory for
the power of norms: “The strong effects of norms in the face of a variety of different kinds of costs
suggests, in a more speculative vein, that perhaps norms play a role above and beyond the costs and
benefits they provide" (ibid: 371).
In his 2012 article Human Rights as Myth and Ceremony? Re-evaluating the Effectiveness of
Human Rights Treaties, 1981-2007, Cole finds proof for a mainstay of constructivist thinking: “The
effect of the interstate complaints provisions would therefore seem to flow from a “logic of
appropriateness” (quotation marks in original) suggesting that international human rights treaty
regimes operate as normative rather than regulative systems” (ibid: 1163). With this Cole means to
illuminate that these regimes subscribe to a different mode of thinking and logic than the trenchant
Pareto optimum institutionalist mode of thinking- they think holistically and normatively. This finding
is central to this thesis, which connects this mode of thinking to the time following the Cold War in
which RtoP sentiment gestated.
It should therefore be deduced that the quantitative constructivists not only answered to
Cortell and Davis's research agenda, they also found evidence for what constructivists had been
arguing all along. Their exclusive interest in humanitarian law subjects speaks to the logical connection
between international law and constructivism, discussed in the final section of chapter 1.
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This section has outlined the theoretical introduction of the “idea” as an independent variable into
international and global politics. Regime theory taught the constructivists to recognize the importance
of the “idea” as a force. The constructivists problematized the narrow scope and conditions under
which a regime could emerge – only in cases of collective interests and between rational actors, of
which only states were really theorized. They borrowed from E.B. Haas and used his theory to their
advantage, combining elements of rationalist thinking found in regime theory, a normative dimension
and a holistic, constitutive, process oriented scope. Self-critically, they called for a wider undergirding
of their premises which was answered by the quantitative constructivists. The quantitative
constructivists found ample proof for the constructivist premises they used. This leaves us with the
question unaddressed in this section, of how exactly constructivists envisage norm emergence? In
what way was E.B. Haas's theory fleshed out?
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1.2 Students and Teachers: Norms, Identity and Information in the Global Sphere
The four constructivist themes of the domestic factor, constitutive regard, normativism and the
constructivist viewpoints on international politics as well as the regime thinkers form principle
foundations for what will be discussed here. The interest of this section is in how constructivists see
causality in the interplay of information, agency and structure in global politics. This section also
delivers some of the most pertinent conceptual tools for understanding RtoP, as well as introducing
the types of actors involved in its politics. The first part of this section looks at authoritative
constructivist theorists’ work on norms, teaching and learning. The second part of this section is the
preamble of section 1.3, where the theoretical scope of the thesis narrows.
1.2.1 The Global Structure
The holistic worldview embodies the concept of construction. To constructivists this is an epistemic
process. Global structure exists of many teachers and students. In the learning process, discourse, the
diffusion of information and the importance of norm entrepreneurs are of paramount importance.
These topics are discussed here, respectively. Finally, the first part touches on how norms connect to
actors and actor compliance.
1.2.2a Actors, Knowledge and Systems
There are four groups of actors which have received notable attention in the constructivist research
project: individuals, states, IOs and epistemic communities. Their significance is argued respectively. In
addition to this mention is made of the role regimes can play in teaching.
Florini argues that norms are like genes in an organism: “(…) like genes, norms are instructional units”
(1996: 364). In addition, norms affect the conduct of their “host organism” (ibid). Florini states that
“International norm change depends upon changes in the percentage of a population of states holding
a given norm (…)” (ibid: 370). Lyon and Dolan find proof for this contention, when they argue for the
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importance of public opinion in shaping American policy with regard to humanitarian intervention
(2007: 64). With regard to the emergence of RtoP, first image thinking on the importance of the ideas
and charisma of a single individual, in this case the SG, should not be understated.
States, Lyon and Dolan argue, view policy decision-making processes through a prism of domestic
political factors and historical milieu (ibid: 46). Also with regard to RtoP do we see that states view
decision-making through a contextual prism. State interests are not, however, preconceived, and as
Florini argues "(...) preferences emerge from social construction and that states must learn what they
want" (Florini, 1996: 367). With regard to RtoP, this means that someone, in this case the GANs or the
UN must teach them. As Klotz points out, the learning process is real time and occurs when a state is
actively engaged in a situation. A state is thus in constant need of up-to-date, reliable information to
make good decisions (1995: 477).
IOs are some of the principle teachers and learners in the global sphere. First, the relation of IOs to
information production is discussed. Second, the role of IOs as political actors will be examined. Finally,
a note is made on how IOs may be used by powerful states.
Abbott and Snidal argue that “Information created or verified by an independent, neutral IO is
more reliable than that provided by states because it is free of national biases” (1998: 20). Due to the
complexity of the international system, which states may not always fully understand, nonbinding
recommendations of IOs “(...) can become de facto coordination equilibria, relied on by states and
other international actors” (ibid: 20). Thus, IOs have some influence in affecting international norms
and state behavior, as is certainly the case with RtoP (Luck, 2010: 124)
In addition, “(…) the roles of IOs extend even further to include the development of common
norms and practices that help define, or refine, states themselves” (ibid: 29). IOs can thus play central
roles in norm diffusion, as is seen with regard to the UN Exec and RtoP. Abbott and Snidal observe with
regard to compliance (discussed below) “Emerging compliance problems due to changing
circumstances can be managed by IO political and judicial organs with authority to interpret and adapt
agreements and elaborate norms” (ibid: 26). We clearly see this with regard to the role of the UN in
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the prevention and punishment of jus cogens crimes.
Abbott and Snidal’s also accept that often enough, IOs serve as vehicles for specific state
interests or values. They show “(…) how states structure and use formal organizations to create and
implement community values and norms and to assist in the enforcement of international
commitments” (ibid: 23). This is seen in the Western trajectory on RtoP.
Here it should therefore be deduced that IOs play important roles in shaping the international
order as teachers (not so much as learners). This role should not be confused with that of legitimator,
discussed below: to legitimate by association is passive, the act of teaching is active.
If the previously discussed actors were students and teachers, epistemic communities are professors.
The epistemic community consists of “(…) professionals with recognized expertise and competence in
a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or
issue-area” (P.M Haas, 1992: 3). First a look is taken at epistemic communities and consensual
knowledge. Second, the normative dimension to the group is remarked. Third, it is discussed how
these communities teach. This area is concluded with a note on the inter-relation of the epistemic
community and states.
P.M. Haas proffers some strong theory on the topic of epistemic communities and its policy
experts. His work continues where E.B. Haas's leaves off, as he argues “(...) that control over
knowledge and information is an important dimension of power and that the diffusion of new ideas
and information can lead to new patterns of behavior and prove to be an important determinant of
international policy coordination” (ibid: 3). P.M Haas theorizes that the scientific and vocational
background of experts have instilled in them “(…) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their
analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which
then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and
desired outcomes” (ibid). With regard to RtoP we see, for example, the shared causal belief (or
consensual knowledge) that domestic institution building will lead to stronger states in which jus
cogens crimes are less likely to occur.
P. M. Haas also draws attention to the normative dimension of the community. The community
has “(…) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for
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the social action of community members” (ibid). When it comes to informing policy, the epistemic
community employs similar instruments to address “(…) a set of problems to which their professional
competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a
consequence” (ibid). Importantly, P.M. Haas concedes, that though the epistemic community is
altruistic in in its beliefs, its ontology is biased (ibid). Some RtoP policy experts are engaged in the
norm for idealistic reasons, as one interviewee will attest to.
P.M. Haas notes “(…) the role (that) networks of knowledge-based experts - (epistemic
communities) – play in articulating the cause-and-effect relations of complex problems as helping
states identify their interests, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and
identifying salient points for negotiation” (ibid: 18). In the interdependent world, the epistemic
community is likely to be very effective: “Because of its larger diffusion network, a transnational
community’s influence is likely to be much more sustained and intense than that of a national
community” (ibid). These communities are ideally placed to inform states as to which policies are
pursued best and in the case of RtoP, there are examples of these epistemic communities taking place
at policy making tables.
Importantly, P.M. Haas adds herein, “(…) the range of impact that we might expect of epistemic
and epistemic-like communities remains conditioned and bounded by international and national
structural realities,” by which he means that the epistemic community does not supplant, but
complements the existing framework of global actors (ibid: 7). As is seen above with IOs and will be
turned to in the analysis, the complexity of the international system has “(…) led policymakers to turn
to new and different channels of advice, often with the result that international policy coordination is
enhanced” (ibid: 12). Like Price, P.M. Haas believes that ideas of a transnational community may take
root in an international organization or in various state bodies, after which they are diffused to other
states via the decision makers who have been influenced by the ideas (ibid: 18). The mediating
mechanism for this would be inter-governmental dialogue, as one interviewee speaks about below.
Thus, states can be converted by policy experts and turn to proselytization of a norm themselves. In
sum, epistemic communities, though hardly a tangible group, can play influential roles in global norm
diffusion. It is thus included as one of two heuristic groups in the RtoP civil society pillar.
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As Chayes and Chayes argue, the existence of a system of rules implies that when a rule is made, it is
followed (1993: 179). Writing about global cooperation, Lumsdaine finds: “Understanding cooperation
narrowly conceived of as cooperation among rational egoists is not alternative but complementary to
moral factors, because practices of cooperation once begun have an inherent logic that may lead
states in self-interested cooperative arrangements toward broader cooperative values" (1993: 29).
Generally speaking, therefore, if a logic is inherent in a certain mode of thinking, and a mode of
thinking is by definition embedded in a regime, then the constituted regime also espouses a logic
which instructs those it governs. For RtoP this means, as being a part of the humanitarian treaties
regime and adhering to the cosmopolitan mode of thinking, that both RtoP's inception and the path it
will pave for future humanitarian norms is a result of a logic of appropriateness in the humanitarian
treaties regime, which Cole talks about above. The regime is therefore self re-enforcing and
regenerative as we can tell from looking at RtoP in the greater trajectory of humanitarian
development.
There are thus a multitude of actors involved in constructing the global system. Regimes also have a
way of educating those whom they govern. Particularly for later analysis, we should remember the
heurist group of policy experts. The question which logically follows is: through which mediating
elements do actors learn?
1.2.2b Information and its Diffusion at the Global Level
Now that we have deduced that the epistemic community and IOs are the principle information
providers, we must establish what forms information comes in and how it is trafficked. Therefore,
drawing on E.B. Haas’s insertion of consensual knowledge in the debate, we now turn to its preceding
conceptual cousin, the concept of discourse. Second, we will look at methods of diffusion and norm
entrepreneurs are discussed last.
Sjöstedt is one of the principal thinkers on this topic. Whereas consensual knowledge is a
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socially constructed set of beliefs of cause and effect, discourse: “(…) stems from a system of
signification – that is showing how the context is constructed and organized – which gives meaning
and value to the social world” (Sjöstedt, 2007: 237). Sjöstedt writes that discourse has the capability
to “(…) create a “common sense” in society” (ibid). What follows is a process of construction of "(…) preferences and interests and also sets the path for a public acceptance of a certain course of action"
(ibid). There is an interplay between discourse and actors, Sjöstedt argues, as “(…) discourse are
created through the language and practices of the latter” (ibid). Language, however, also informs
agency. Central to Sjöstedt's argument is a discussion of hegemonic discourses, (dominant modes of
thinking on a certain topic) which, she argues, greatly shapes agency (ibid: 238). Keck and Sikkink
argue that one important global discourse is that of human rights (1999: 100). Concerning human
rights they contend "(...) human rights is a very disciplining discourse" (ibid). With regard to RtoP,
Knight and Matsukuma have pointed out that those who argue against it are sometimes denounced as
anti-humanitarian, which exemplifies the hegemony of humanitarian discourse at the global stage,
especially within the UN (2011: 8, 2005: 4). Discourse is thus a powerful element in the affecting of
normative change and it can also be used to coax dissidents to capitulate and accede a norm. Control
of a discourse is therefore extremely empowering as we will see with the RtoP GANs.
Checkel engages expansively in the concept of information diffusion. He argues that diffusion is
best understood as a “(…) transfer or transmission of objects, processes, ideas and information from
one population or region to another" (1999: 85). As Price and Klotz have pointed out, information
diffusion was key to galvanizing support for, respectively, the prohibition on mines and the antiapartheid regime (1998: 618, 1995: 463). Often, however, societies are not current on international
affairs and require information to be translated into a cultural and societal vernacular, which is called
framing. A good definition of framing is "(...) conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion
shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action"
(McAdam et al in Keck & Sikkink: 1999: 90). With regard to RtoP, most regions have a history with
genocide. Drawing attention to this in addressing the regions has been central to both UN and GAN
policy.
Another, more commonly seen method of information diffusion is through proselytization.
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Finnemore and Sikkink argue that a norm entrepreneur can play a key role in such a process. Norm
entrepreneurs come in the form of individuals, states or organizations which “(…) are extremely
rational and, indeed, very sophisticated in something we would call “strategic social construction”:
these actors are making means-ends calculations to maximize not their utilities, but the utilities they
want to maximize involve changing the other players' utility function in ways that reflect the
normative commitments of the norm entrepreneurs” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 910). Nadelman
asserts that powerful states use their position of power (or hegemony) to impose prohibitionary
instruments on states which do not require them (1990: 482). He also notes that when it comes to
prohibitionary regimes, Northern American and European countries tend to be the norm
entrepreneurs, as we of course also see with RtoP (ibid: 525).
Political discourse is constructed through political processes and diffused by certain actors,
notably norm entrepreneurs. Information should thus be seen as something that is used to effect
political objectives. Discourse may be initiated by norm entrepreneurs, or manipulated by actors as
seen with the ICBL. It can also become an independent force, as evinced by the human rights
discourse. It seems logical too, that if regimes instruct, they do this through mediation of discourse.
Now we must answer Checkel's question of how global norms "(...) in a cognitive sense, connect to
such agents" (1999: 88).
1.2.2c Socialization and Compliance
Central to the concept of socialization and compliance is perceiving the world as an increasingly more
interdependent, social environment in which states are deeply entrenched (Legro, 1997: 57, Florini,
1996: 379, Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 902 et al). The process of socialization will be discussed and
hereafter we will look at compliance.
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink define socialization as a process “(...) by which international norms are
internalized and implemented domestically (…)” (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink, 1999: 5). Finnemore and
Sikkink ask: “What are the motives that induce states opposed to the norm to adhere and adhere
quickly?” (1998: 902). Answers to this question include peer pressure, conformity, self-regard (or good
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global citizenship), emulation and prestige (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 902-910, Lyon & Dolan, 2007:
54, Price, 1998: 616, Klotz, 1996: 181 et al).12 What must be taken from this knowledge is that states in
general do adhere to social pressure.
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink delve much deeper into the theoretical analysis of socialization in the
global environment, which they describe as a: “1) processes of adaptation and strategic bargaining; 2)
processes of moral consciousness-raising, “shaming,” argumentation, dialogue, and persuasion; 3)
processes of institutionalization and habitualization” (1999: 11). With regard to RtoP, stage one and
two seem to be in the process of completion (Luck, 2010: 112). The first stage may come in various
forms, but generally speaking consists of the political maneuvering of a state vis-à-vis its exterior and
its domestic population, by bargaining for an agreement which does not run too far afoul of its
national interests (ibid: 12). This is interesting with regard to the P-5 position in RtoP bargaining and
their original positions on RtoP in 2005. The concept of shaming the authors define as a process in
which “Norm-violating states are denounced as pariah states which do not belong to the community
of civilized nations (…)” (ibid).
Chayes and Chayes argue that “The strongest circumstantial evidence for the sense of an
obligation to comply with treaties is the care that states take in negotiating and entering them”, as the
arduous 2005 negotiations around RtoP is a good example of (1993: 186). Cases of non-compliance
rarely involve the "(...) willful flouting of legal obligations" (ibid, 188). Instead, the most important
reason for non-compliance is a domestic management problem (ibid, 194, Nadelman, 1990: 525,
Gilligan, 2006: 339 et al). Chayes and Chayes explain: “Although there are surely differences among
developing countries, the characteristic situation is a severe dearth of the requisite scientific, technical,
bureaucratic, and financial wherewithal to build effective domestic enforcement systems”, a problem
12
Peer pressure has already mostly been discussed above. Conformity, Finnemore and Sikkink argue, occurs in a situation
of cognitive disonance which means that when your actions are evoking oppositon actors either change their actions or
their attitude (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 903). Self-regard or good citizenship have various implications at various
levels. It can mean that a leader wants to be held in high regard by his colleagues in other countries, or that a state
wants to appear moral, liberal and cooperative, as would a good national citizen (Lyon & Dolan, 2007: 54, Lumsdaine,
1993: 17, ibid, 1998: 904 et al). This follows into reputational considerations for the country, mostly to positively affect
future transactions (Keohane, 1992: 177, ibid et al). As Florini has pointed out, due to the complexity of international
society, it is sometimes efficient and wise to emulate those who are successful, including adopting their norms (Florini,
379: 1996). Finally, as Lumsdaine argues, there are some states that see norms and adherence to norms as conferring
an element of prestige. He notes that this prestige should be seen as separate from national interest (1993: 65).
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which pillar II of RtoP speaks to (1993: 194). Non-compliers however, may be taught a punitive lesson
and one such punishments is through sanctions (Klotz, 1996: 176). The importance of sanctions is
central to pillar III of RtoP, and they are further discussed below.
Socialization therefore is a process by which identity is reformed through external pressure. The result
of this pressure may manifest itself in acceding an agreement or accepting a norm. From there on, the
actor is obliged to comply and keep its word, or face the consequences.
1.2.2 Global Advocacy Networks and the Spiral Model
Part two of this section is dedicated to relaying the seminal work of Keck and Sikkink on TANs (to be
applied as GANs). First, some relevant points on TANs will be made. There is some overlap between
TAN theory found in Keck and Sikkink, and P.M. Haas's epistemic community, as will become clear. The
spiral model will be discussed hereafter. Therefore, this theory is one point of departure for the RtoP
issue network. The Boomerang pattern, explained in the spiral model must be kept in mind with
regard to later analysis.
1.2.2a Transnational Advocacy Networks
Network theory has a distinct purpose, Keck and Sikkink argue, as "(...) it can provide an explanation
for transnational change, a model that is not just of “diffusion” of liberal institutions and practices, but
one through which the preferences and identities of actors engaged in transnational society are
sometimes mutually transformed through their interactions with each other" (1999: 100). Central to
this theory are the TANs. “We call them advocacy networks," Keck and Sikkink write, “(...) because
advocates plead the causes of others or defend a cause or proposition; they are standing for persons
or ideas" (ibid). Keck and Sikkink define networks as "(...) communicative structures, which influence
discourse, procedure, and policy" (ibid: 90). Here, it will first be noted which actors are involved in
TANs. Second, the TAN approach to advocacy is discussed. Third, four commonly used advocacy
instruments will be explained. Finally, a note of criticism is made.
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Major actors involved in such networks may include international and domestic NGOs, research
and advocacy organizations, local social movements, the media, foundations, churches, intellectuals,
regional and intergovernmental organizations (ibid: 91-92). TANs are often seen near international
fora and conventions, as is also the case with the RtoP GANs (ibid: 98).
TANs are equipped political forces, Keck and Sikkink argue: “Organizations and individuals
within advocacy networks are political entrepreneurs, mobilize resources like information and
membership, and show a sophisticated awareness of the political opportunity structure with which
they operate" (ibid: 91). Their ability to produce good information and deploy it accurately and
effectively is their strongest faculty and it is central to their identity (ibid: 92). Through this faculty
TANs also have a significant impact on "(...) discursive positions of states and regional organizations”
(ibid: 98). Moreover, they influence institutional procedures, but also affect policy change in “target
actors” (ibid). In this thesis, flagrant instances of this are discussed as well as noting the RtoP GAN
developed discourse.
Four tactics are used by TAN's to attain leverage: information politics, symbolic politics,
leverage politics and accountability politics (ibid: 96). Information politics entails using information
quickly and effectively to achieve a desirable outcome. Critical herein may be enlisting the help of the
media. In some cases, “Sympathetic journalists may become part of the network (...)”, like in the case
of the GCRtoP, who have an in-house journalist (ibid: 96). TANs engaging in symbolic politics use
stories, symbols or actions to frame discourse in a way which puts pressure on the “target” (ibid: 96).
Those employing leverage politics court the support of stronger allies to attain an advantageous
position vis-a-vis their opponent as is seen in the ICRtoP's engagement of regions. The pressuring of
powerful actors to deliver on their commitments is called accountability politics (ibid: 97). An
important element here is the mobilization of shame, central to the RtoP project (ibid).
In their analyses, Keck and Sikkink also include parliamentary branches of governments as
potential elements of the network, but nowhere go into the interrelation between civil society and
government executive or legislative. Keck and Sikkink also depart from P.M. Haas's concept of
epistemic community without giving an explanation (ibid: 89). These elements are included in this
thesis.
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In summary, TANs (and thus GANs) are united by discursive elements and instruments. They
are a part of an open networks in which other actors, notably states and IOs also function. It is the
objective of GANs to coax states and organizations to act or refrain from taking certain action. They
therefor attempt to alter the positions of powerful actors and there is a normative dimension to the
work they do. Though a plausible theory all and all, there are shortcomings in Keck and Sikkink's
theory which will be spoken to in the next section.
1.2.2b The Spiral Model
The spiral model is discussed in both Keck and Sikkink and in Risse, Ropp and Sikkink. The latter proffer
a more systematic, expansive account of its content. The authors argue that the spiral model consists
of five stages. Since the theoretical scope of this thesis is limited to the global sphere, it is only
necessary to note the direction of the mechanism in stage one; it occurs when societal opposition
translates into issue activism by a domestic civil society (ibid: 18). When the government frustrates
these efforts, the domestic activists link into a transnational network to leverage their government
vicariously through friendly TANs (ibid). This process is called the Boomerang pattern and can be seen
in figure 3. A side-note must be made that Risse, Ropp and Sikkink also include Western powers as a
static variable.
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Figure 3: The Boomerang Pattern
Source: Risse,
Ropp and Sikkink, 1999: 12
Section two has started by discussing the principle actors involved in norm learning and teaching:
individuals, states, IOs and epistemic communities. GANs are important players in norm emergence
politics. Central features of information, discourse and methods of diffusion have also been discussed
here. These concepts are important for understanding the currency of control, used in global politics.
Control here is manifested through top-down pressure (socialization) and through TAN pressure on
states. A description of the concept of compliance and its political reality has deepened our
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understanding of the social dimension to global politics. A closer look at TANs has given us an
understanding of how instruments of control are applied and the centrality of information as a tool of
leverage in their operating procedure. A brief look at Risse, Ropp and Sikkink's Boomerang pattern has
concluded this section. The conceptual parameters of identity, agency and knowledge, as explained
here, need to be remembered to better understand the complexity of RtoP politics, discussed in the
next chapter.
This section has taught us the importance and influence that can be purchased with
information. Especially the theory on the involved actors and the states is important for understanding
the model of governance discussed in the next section and the RtoP issue network in the analysis.
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1.3 The Issue Network
In the last section we learned which actors are relevant in global politics with regard to norm
emergence and how they interact. We also learned about control through information. In this section
the conceptual framework narrows and the isssue network will be presented. Issue network theory
has not yet been applied to humanitarian norm emergence, let alone to RtoP. Though Marres and
Heclo cannot answer some important questions regarding the interplay of government and civil
society in the global sphere, a discussion of their work is necessary so that we may discern what is
missing to ameliorate the existing theory.
This section is split in two parts: a discussion of Heclo’s theory will be presented and an
examination of Marres’s work will follow.
1.3.1 Hugh Heclo’s Issue Network
Heclo’s Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment appeared in 1978 to explain a transition in
political modes of operation. First, the rise of issue civil society in Heclo’s theory is explained. Second
the structural changes in American politics as can be analogized to world politics will follow. Here, an
interesting parallel between regime thinking and iron triangle thinking on the one hand, and issue
network and TAN type theory on the other hand will surface. Heclo’s theory helps sharpen this thesis's
analytical framework in its commentary on changing modes of politics and the expansion of the role of
the executive and civil society in the 1970's. Third, following the introduction of the policy experts, the
final two heuristic groups of staff, political executives and issue politicians, will be introduced here.
This section concludes with a consideration of legitimacy in the issue network.
After acknowledging that continued relevance of power in politics, Heclo raises the more pertinent
subject: “Looking for the few who are powerful, we tend to overlook the many whose webs of
influence provoke and guide the exercise of power. These webs are what I will call issue networks (…)”
(Heclo, 1978: 448). Heclo's definition of the network can be seen as somewhat precocious with regard
to E.B. Haas. It states: “An issue network is a shared-knowledge group having to do with some aspect
(or, as defined by the network, some problem) of public policy” (ibid). In the case of RtoP, the issue is
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an aspect of the public policy of humanitarianism and the network consists of the types of actors
introduced in the previous section.
Heclo also argues that any direct material interest is often secondary to intellectual or
emotional commitments (ibid: 449). Issue civil societies include hosts of different types of actors,
ranging from interest group lobbyists, to professionals and academics (ibid). The true experts in the
networks are those who are issue-skilled (ibid). These experts are "(...) policy activists who know each
other through the issues’, like the RtoP community noted by the PAO below (ibid). The leaders in an
issue are called “(…) policy politicians – experts in using experts, victuallers of knowledge in a world
hungry for right decisions” (ibid). These politicians share consensual knowledge and a common
discourse: “(…) policy politicians in the knowledge networks may not agree; but they understand each
other’s way of looking at the world and arguing about policy choices” (ibid: 452). The difference here
is in the name. Keck and Sikkink call these individuals political entrepreneurs, whereas Heclo uses the
term policy politician. We will use the term issue politician.13 It is important to note the above
characteristics of the issue politicians, because they are easily recognizable in the upper-management
of the RtoP GANs. One refinement of the issue network might be found in a “(…) shared-action group
(creating a coalition)”, though Heclo does not expand on this (ibid). So far nothing said here is really
foreign to what Keck and Sikkink argue; but our interest in Heclo lies deeper.
Heclo notes how a transition in political structure has taken place which has led to new modes of
analysis - from the iron triangle thinking to the issue networks. Iron triangles (seen in the issue
network) link “(…) executive bureaus, congressional committees, and interest group clienteles with a
stake in particular programs” (ibid: 448). They “(…) suggest a stable set of participants coalesced to
control fairly narrow public programs which are in the direct economic interest of each party to the
alliance” (ibid). Critical here, is the exclusion of the President and the executive branch of government:
“A president or presidential appointee may occasionally try to muscle in, but few people doubt the
capacity of these governments to thwart outsiders in the long run” (ibid). The iron triangle model
therefore knows a centralized mode of governance without leadership, as seen in regime theory, and
it is quite the opposite from the issue network model.
13
This term better speaks to the issue-specific profile of those engaged in GANs and it is easier to tell the term apart from
political executive, introduced below.
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Figure 4. The Iron Triangle
Source: University of
Texas at Austin14
Nevertheless, politics expanded and changed in the 1970s. Heclo discerned a “(…) peculiar, loosejointed play of influence that is accompanying this growth” (ibid: 449). These developments lead to a
disintegration of organized politics and a politicizing of organizational life causing a greater
involvement of civil society in politics (ibid). Moreover, this led to increased importance of the
American presidency within the trias politica (ibid). Heclo also remarks that these developments lead
to contradictory policy: “Actions relevant to one policy goal can frequently be shown to be
inconsistent with others” (ibid: 453).
14
See website: http://www.laits.utexas.edu/txp_media/html/bur/features/0403_01/iron.html
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As discussed above, today we see that states still have primacy in the international system but
that their power is mitigated by their shortage of knowledge, enabling the rise of IOs, GANs and the
epistemic community as information providers. Therefore, the inclusive and porous global issue
network causes a conflict of policy as can be seen between sovereignty and humanitarianism - this in
contrast to the highly centralized and exclusive mode of decision-making in the regime theory era,
anchored within the institution of the sovereign state. Moreover, in an issue network, “(…) no one, as
far as one can tell, is in control of the policies and issues. Issues are generally articulated abstractly and
so is the subsequent policy" (ibid: 454). With regard to RtoP, evidence below will show that true
control of RtoP is illusory. Analogously to that of the President, the part of the SG in RtoP seems to be
becoming more accentuated.
Heclo argues that the informalization, proliferation and complexification of national politics lead to
new types of individuals staffing the halls of power in the 1970’s (ibid: 451). The offices of Capitol Hill
and the White House, once staffed by the beneficiaries of party patronage, were replaced by political
executives in the 1970’s: “(…) today’s political executive is a person knowledgeable about the
substance of particular issues and adept at moving among the networks of people who are intensely
concerned about them” (ibid). Nevertheless, Heclo remarks that political parties became unequipped
to address the proliferation and complexity of politics, and were compelled to enlist the help of civil
society to inform their policy (ibid). In addition, “(…) it is useful to draw in upon the experts and policy
specialists for the public management of these programs” (ibid). We see political executives today
staffing both the UN and state foreign office posts, as in the case of the issue network. Former SC
Special Advisor on RtoP Edward Luck, Guusje Korthals and the UN PAO (discussed below) are good
examples of political executives in RtoP.
The problem with the civil service, however, is that it lacks direct democratic legitimacy (ibid:
455). Moreover: “Given the President’s problems and Congress’s own burgeoning bureaucracy of
policy specialists, the prospects for a democratically responsible executive establishment are poor at
best” (ibid: 452) None of the actors engaged in RtoP have a direct public mandate either. Moreover, in
the 1970’s the progressively complexifying debates left the ordinary citizen with little understanding of
politics and this translated into a general societal disengagement, Heclo argues (ibid: 453). A lack of
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democratic legitimacy at the global level is also a problem, especially if relatively little is known about
the political issue due to its complexity, as is the case with RtoP.
What should be noted first is that there is an interesting parallel which can be deduced here in terms
of intellectual development: 1) the iron-triangle thinking and regime theory; 2) the issue network and
the holistic TAN type theory. What should be noted second is that the change in governance from the
iron triangle method to the de-centralized mode of governance has gone hand in hand with
contradictory policies. In addition, Heclo’s ideas help improve our understanding of the interplay
between government and civil society leaders. Heclo also raises the problem of democratic legitimacy,
which Keck and Sikkink do not satisfactorily address. One problem with extrapolating Heclo’s theory to
the rest of the world is that there is no global government. In addition, even Keck and Sikkink are
reticent to overextend their concept of transnational civil society to global civil society, as Warkentin
(quoted below) more easily does (Keck & Sikkink, 1999: 213). This thesis will have to make that plunge
on its own; Marres, however, can lower the diving board.
1.3.2 Noortje Marres's Issue Network
Marres dedicates a little over a page to discussing Heclo’s theory and applies many of his concepts
throughout her article. Like Heclo, she has a particular interest in legitimacy (Marres, 2006: 5). She
also discusses the work of Keck and Sikkink, whose analytical scope she criticizes as being too narrow
(ibid: 20). Here Marres’s conception of the importance of technology is discussed. Finally, this section
examines Marres's view of coalitions, formatting and antagonism in issue politics.
Marres’s interest is mostly in the facilitation of issue networks through modern information and
communication technology (ICT’s). She writes “CSOs share information and form partnerships; ICTs—
the Internet, but also telephony and old fashioned mail systems—represent technical networks that
provide a forum for such organizational networking” (ibid: 14). Moreover, “(…) because the Internet’s
inherent characteristics and transnational reach parallel (or correspond to) those of global civil society,
the medium serves as both a logical and an effective tool for establishing and maintaining social
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connections that can contribute to global civil society” (Wakentin in ibid: 14). The importance of
technology in RtoP GANs is paramount.
Marres’s conception of issue networks: “(…) directs our attention to antagonistic
configurations of actors from the governmental, non-governmental and for-profit sectors, and the
contestation over issue framings that occurs in them” (ibid: 18). In this, Marres re-purposes the issue
network term in three areas. First she notes that coalitions can attract “CSOs that have arisen and
operate in radically different social contexts,” but nevertheless “develop common projects” (ibid: 5).
She argues that “(…) establishing and fostering “contacts” and spreading information are now
ubiquitous activities of these entities, regardless of their institutional or rather less “institutional”
status, geographical location, and the issues they work with" (ibid: 2). Marres's thinking on this
accurately describes the structure of the ICRtoP and its broad members base.
Her second concept is that of formatting, which should be conceptually linked to framing, seen
in Klotz but is also related to the technological presentation of issues. One effect this has manifested is
in the creation of online fora for debate and collaborative database building projects “(…) in which
only actors willing to let collectives tinker with their data will participate” (ibid: 16). Therefore “(…)
we must approach ICTs (information and communication technologies) as active mediators of civil
society practices” (italics in original) (ibid: 15). This is highly recognizable in the operating procedures
of the WFUNA plan, discussed below.
Marres's third point, is marked by a sagacity on topics of global contentiousness: “(…) the
extended configurations of actors and issues that are marked by antagonism” (ibid: 6). By this Marres
means that CSOs and NGOs sometimes are markedly critical of the established order and therefore act
on the fringe of politics and not as Heclo argues, at its centre (ibid: 7). She concludes: “Defined as an
antagonistic configuration, the perspective of the issue network allows us to appreciate that actors
that come together in such a network may do so precisely because they disagree over the issues in
which they are jointly implicated, and the ways in which these are to be addressed” (ibid: 8).
Nevertheless, it must be noted that though plausible, this feature of the issue network does not apply
to RtoP. It will be argued that this speaks more to the particular case of RtoP, than short-sightedness
on Marres's part.
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Thus, Marres offers a compelling account of global issue networks; though nowhere calls it that
herself. Marres adds the element of coalitions, formatting and the dimension of technology, not
sufficiently seen in Heclo or Keck and Sikkink. While criticizing Keck and Sikkink’s narrow perception of
the issue network, Marres’s work also lacks a compelling argument of when and how governments
and civil societies cooperate and more importantly, influence each other.
From Heclo and Marres a three pillar model of governance can be distilled: 1) an executive power; 2) a
legislative power; and 3) an issue civil society. Central to issue network politics is the shortage of
information in the executive and the legislative. As seen in strategic social construction, issue
politicians strategically format information to realize their objectives. Issue politicians staff issue civil
society; the executive power and the legislative power are staffed by political executives. Legitimacy is
problematic in the issue network. In conclusion, it must be remembered that there is a parallel
between regime thinking and TAN type theory on the one hand, and iron triangle and issue network
thinking on the other. Conflicting policy is endemic to the new issue network mode of politics, not
unlike the contest seen between sovereignty and humanitarianism in the politics of RtoP. Prevalent
modes of thinking and political operation, from the present day to the US in the 1970's seem easily
analogized.
What is missing therefore is a model for a global issue network. This should include applicable
actors for the three pillar variables. In addition, the civil society should include an epistemic
community. Crucially, this model should explain the increased importance of an executive leadership,
which in the preceding model of governance (the iron triangle/regime model) was markedly less
important. It will also be important that we can apply the theoretical nomenclature of issue politicians,
political executives and the epistemic community policy experts to the staffs functioning within their
pillars. The model should also be able to explain the rise of coalitions and the loose-jointedness of
advocacy network influences. This will be turned to in the analysis.
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1.4 Law and Legitimacy in International Public Law
In the last section a model of governance was introduced which defines the political forces behind
norm emergence. This section serves as a relevant and alternative perspective on how norms develop
in global politics and the mechanisms of international law. Since RtoP is a feature of both, ligaments of
these fields must be understood to conceptually progress.
The three complicating factors for the existence of international peace and order are: 1) the
absence of an ultimate authority; 2) a lack of democratic legitimacy; and 3) power asymmetry
between states (Obradovic: 1). The first and last are a given - the second is attainable through global
norm acceptance. Prima facie, this process is a political one as it requires a consensus of political
actors – state consensus. However, this section will show that law and politics in the global sphere are
not only conceptually related, but also mutually re-enforcing.
One significant form in which international norms have manifested themselves in the
international sphere is in International Public Law (IPL) (ibid). Finnemore and Sikkink decry, however,
the lack of attention paid to international law in IR, and write: “(…) international law is norms, and
empirical research in IR is, again, demonstrating that legal norms have powerful behavioral effects”
(italics in original) (1998: 916). Finnemore and Sikkink offer a conceptual framework for a research
agenda: “Understanding which norms will become law (“soft” law as well as “hard” law) and how,
exactly, compliance with those laws comes about would seem, again, to be a crucial topic of inquiry
that lies at the nexus of law and IR (ibid). Therefore, in order to complete the conceptual prism of
norm emergence, we should look at the transmission of norms to law and establish how international
law is constructed.
First, the political process leading to legitimation will be discussed. Second, a closer look will
be taken at the mechanisms of international law vis-à-vis legitimacy.
1.4.1 Legitimacy
In terms of global norm diffusion processes, socialization (as discussed above) and legitimacy are
mutually re-enforcing. The potential for a norm’s socialization is higher if it is perceived as legitimate
and when many states have internalized a norm, it bolsters the norm’s legitimacy to those states that
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have not yet done so (Goodliffe & Hawkins, 2006: 361). There are different measures for the
legitimacy of a norm, varying in quality and methodological scope, answering to different areas of
interest - from the global to the domestic sphere15. For purposes of analysis and brevity, only
Finnemore and Sikkink will be discussed on the subject of legitimacy. Two indicators of analysis shall
be introduced here which will carry over into chapter 4.
1.4.1a Finnemore and Sikkink on Legitimacy
Like in Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, Finnemore and Sikkink’s life cycle model knows three stages,
illustrated in figure 4 below. The second stage, called the cascade stage commences with states, IOs
and networks actively socializing and advocating the norm thereby affecting global consensus
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 898). Finnemore and Sikkink include in stage 2 the concept of legitimacy
as a motivating factor (ibid). Thus, we will first discuss the concept of path dependence, which speaks
to the embedding of norms. Third, the logic of appropriateness, which can be used to explain norm
contest, as seen between sovereignty and the humanitarian treaties regime, will be discussed. Finally,
the importance of the UN as a legitimating institution is noted.
15
Legro's interest in norm specificity, durability and concordance in the domestic sphere or Cronin's discourse analysis of
the United Nations, including a study of process and procedure are two examples. The measures are tested in Porter
(2012).
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Figure 5: Stages of Norm Emergence
Source: Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 898
The degree to which existing norms can serve as undergirding foundations for new norms is what
Finnemore and Sikkink call adjacency claims or path dependence (ibid: 908). They argue, “(…) legal
arguments are persuasive when they are grounded in precedent, and thus are complex rules about the
creation of precedent” (ibid: 915). This is especially visible in the development of humanitarian law,
which is one important aspect to the RtoP narrative. Without the existing humanitarian norms RtoP
would not have progressed as far as it has, which we will see in the following chapter. In short,
Finnemore and Sikkink argue that consensuses for legal norms are created by global political
processes.
One element Finnemore and Sikkink invoke to explain legitimacy is the logic of appropriateness.
Appropriateness may be defined by the international community in the form of regimes, as discussed
above, but is also informed by domestic standards. The very concept that international public opinion
is important can be a domestically-held belief which may significantly affect state behavior (ibid: 912).
Appropriateness is always pre-defined by the existing norms. Thus new norms have to compete with
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or attempt to supplant norms which used to be the standards of appropriateness (ibid: 897). Contests
like that between humanitarianism and sovereignty are therefore common, according to Finnemore
and Sikkink (ibid).
Finnemore and Sikkink also note the key role played in the legitimation of international norms
by the United Nations. On legitimacy, they quote one scholar arguing that IOs are the "(…) custodians
of the seals of international approval and disapproval" (Claude in ibid: 903). Finnemore and Sikkink
also argue that “The expansion of IOs (especially with the UN) is contributing to this acceleration
process by providing more opportunities to address and negotiate on a broad range of normative
issues” (ibid: 909). Interestingly, Finnemore and Sikkink argue that “The UN, similarly, has distinctive
structural features that influence the kinds of norms it promulgates about such matters as
decolonization, sovereignty, and humanitarian relief” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 899). Thus, the
UN’s projects not only realize the UN’s mission, they re-enforce the UN’s purpose. Therefore, if
regimes can create a lingua franca logic which regenerates a mode of thinking, re-enforcing its
purpose then so can powerful organizations such as the UN (ibid: 899). Through its experience in
humanitarian norm entrepreneurship and the absence of a global government the UN seems the
institution best suited to serve as the executive pillar in the issue network model.
To sum up, we must remember the concept of path dependence as it is central to RtoP in a
larger development of international law. 16 In addition, actor preferences, through the logic of
appropriateness, play an important role in determining what course of policy to pursue. We see the
logic of appropriateness in states and regions, but we also see it at the global level in the form of norm
contestation. Both logics offer an astute commentary on RtoP politics, as can be seen in the analysis of
this thesis. Finally, the UN manufactured norms may play a key role in legitimating certain norms. UN
projects reinforce the UN’s purpose and translate into a salient job for the UN as an independent norm
promoter. It must also be noted that the UN in many ways fits the role of the executive in Heclo's issue
network. Moreover, the RtoP issue re-enforces the UN's purpose it will be argued below.
16
Porter asses RtoP using the measures of norm contest, path dependence and domestic salience. Though her application to
RtoP is novel, the terms she distills from Legro and Finnemore and Sikkink are not. She tests this theory, whereas here
the terms are used to inform a theory. Other than a use of the same terms and subject matter, there are no similarities
between what Porter argues and what is argued here.
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1.4.2 Law
IPL speaks to the protection of Human Rights, the establishment of liability and the maintenance of
international peace and security among other things (Obradovic, 2011: 3). IPL also regulates the
exercise of public authority, confers powers upon eligible entities such as states and IOs and delimits
the boundaries of such authority (ibid). It is with regard to human rights and sovereignty that IPL is
somewhat ambiguous. Understanding this contest is central to the global politics of RtoP and the
development of humanitarian law.
First, some important aspects of the creation of international law (opinio juris) are discussed in
addition to explaining the implications of the principle treaties of humanitarian law (jus cogens).
Following this, the relevant legal institutions of IPL will be introduced. Second, a description is made of
sovereignty and its conflict with humanitarian law.
1.4.2a Some Important Elements of International Law
With regard to humanitarian law, much has already been codified into treaty, especially the most
flagrant crimes (Obradovic, 2011: 29). In the case of RtoP, the WS declaration is not a formal treaty,
but an agreement to collectively enforce existing treaties. This agreement may become
institutionalized by custom. International Customary Law consists of two components: material fact
and opinio juris. The latter is of interest here and entails the recognition of state practice and a belief
that virtually universal acceptance exists as to the legitimacy of such practice. A discussion of the
importance of the UN in IPL is offered last.
The GA has only the limited power to make recommendations and proffer opinions: there can
be no immediate legal consequences from its opinions (ibid: 4). Nevertheless, a good example of the
development of opinio juris is the GA Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970, which recognized the
declarations of IOs as international law. From that moment on the GA’s recommendation became
embedded in international conduct. Therefore, in 1986 the International Court of Justice found that
the GA’s recognition had attained opinion juris status (ibid). Informal political deliberation (as was the
2005 WS) and inter-subjective perception should therefore be included as influential forces of
international law. Moreover, the GA has limited institutional space to play a role of importance, but it
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can do so if it chooses to apply itself.
Some laws fall under the jus cogens denominator, which are obligatio ergo omnus, meaning,
respectively, peremptory rules of international customary law which all must abide (ibid: 3). Most jus
cogens international humanitarian law are laid down in the four Geneva Red Cross Conventions of
1949 and 1977 and its two additional protocols, the Genocide Convention of 1948 and the ILC Draft
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (ACIA, 2010: 11). When these jus cogens
laws are breached, the tenets of liability dictate that states and IOs have a responsibility to work
together to redress these violations (ibid: 14). Evidence for this can be found in the GA’s acceptance of
the ILC’s Draft Code on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts which stipulates
in article 40 that “A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by
the responsible State to fulfil the obligation” (A/Res/56/83). Article 41 states that in the event of such a
breach: “States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach within the
meaning of article 40” (ibid). There is thus recourse to stop and punish violators of jus cogens crimes,
moreover, there is a positive duty to do so. The question of duty is central to the definition of RtoP.
One way states can cooperate to rectify violations of international law is through petitioning
the SC to authorize action. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the SC is the only institution endowed
with the right of making binding resolutions regarding the use of force (Obradovic, 2011: 3). Chapter
VII permits the SC to take sanctions and to determine “(…) what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions,” to rectify the situation (UNTS XVI see
appendices ii). In addition, article 39 of Chapter VII has allowed states to interpret domestic
disturbances with looming humanitarian danger to be treated as threats to international peace and
security (ACIA, 2010: 14). The GA has the right to deal with a threat or breach of peace or act of
aggression if the SC fails to act, but may not authorize force (Obradovic, 2011: 24). The Charter thus
bestows a legal monopoly of violence on the SC which explains the limelight role for the SC in pillar III
of RtoP.
It has been argued here that there is not only a multilateral positive duty to enforce
humanitarian law, but that there also is an institutional framework to do so. First, the manufacture of
customary law has been discussed, which is the institutionalized corollary of legitimacy construction.
Second, jus cogens, which is very important for future reference, has been explained. The importance
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of existing institutions in enforcing IPL was touched on last. If IPL seemed straight-forward, the
following discussion will eclipse this appearance.
1.4.2b Sovereignty, Humanitarian Law and Intervention
The UN Charter Chapter 1 Art. 2(1) states that the “Organization is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members” (UNTS XVI). Nevertheless, the principle of the conservative
variant of sovereignty is not as strong as it once was. First, an element of confusion in the Charter is
discussed. Second, global institutionalization of jus cogens will be discussed. Finally, it will be argued
that sovereignty has not yet passed its expiry date and is a contentious and divisive issue in
international politics.
With regard to sovereignty, a prohibition on non-intervention into state domestic affairs exists
(UNTS XVI: art. 2(7)). In addition, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (UNTS XVI Art. 2(4)). Since the
Charter makes explicit reference to the promotion of human rights under Charter articles 1(3), 13 and
55 as being inherent to the UN project, it begs the question of whether an intervention consistent with
the Charter is still illegal (ACIA, 2010: 21). In any case, the sovereignty principle “(…) shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII”, thereby sanctioning SC
intervention where it deems necessary (ibid). Needless to say, an element of selectivity might occur
here, as further argued below.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was created in 1998 by the Rome statute and came into
force in 2002. The Rome Statute recognizes three “core crimes”: 1) war crimes, 2) crimes against
humanity, and 3) genocide (Obradovic, 2011: 11). Furthermore, jus cogens laws know universal
jurisdiction which means any country may prosecute an individual accused of breaching them (ibid:
20). The creation of the ICC further demonstrates the institutionalization of world justice vis-à-vis jus
cogens crimes. Universal justice is a part of the deepening of humanitarian law and it is also an
important aspect of RtoP, as will be discussed below.
There is some political anxiety as to the increased frequency of intervention occurring to weak
states by strong ones and to the detriment of the former (ACIA, 2010: 23). The UN after all, is a
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political institution and may be used as a transmission belt through which the strong impose their will
and ideas on the weak (ibid: 24). This anxiety is the latent hangover of humanitarian intervention,
which is forbidden under international law due to the prohibition on unilateral use of force (Obradovic,
2011: 32, ibid: 23). The political preference for the conservative variant of sovereignty by some
complicates the position of legitimacy for proponents of cosmopolitan governance and boundary
transcending humanitarian norms. This strong-weak discord is also visible in the global politics of RtoP.
As a result of this, there is an element of confusion with regard to the legitimacy of
intervention, the non-intrusion norm and humanitarian principles, even without the insertion of jus
cogens precepts. The role of universal jurisdiction forms a futher challenge to sovereignty and lends
an air of legitimacy to the univerality of law as a mode of governance. This being said, sovereignty is
still an important principle to weaker states. As seen in the following chapter, RtoP has given rise to a
different interpretation of sovereignty.
This section has elucidated our understanding of how norms emerge and become law. The measure of
norm contestation can be used as an analytical device to gauge the legitimacy of sovereignty vis-à-vis
RtoP’s humanitarian host. Path dependence of a new humanitarian norm, assessing the possibilities of
embedding it into the existing humanitarian framework, is interesting in light of the inception of RtoP.
The UN has been presented as a good candidate to fill the executive leadership variable in the issue
network model. The powers of the GA and the SC have also been introduced, as well as the legal terms
of jus cogens and opinio juris explained. Sovereignty as a concept was problematized which showed
the leakiness of the principle. These elements will return in chapter 4.
It has also been argued that when it comes to law and legitimacy in norm development,
politics and law cannot be de-coupled. One important note that must again be taken from this section
is the force of construction. This cognition should be kept at the forefront of our minds for the section
on RtoP.
Toward a Holistic Theory of the Issue Network and Norm Emergence
This chapter has discussed the theoretical entering of the “idea” into global politics and has looked at
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three dimensions of global norm emergence. While this thesis has made use of household names in
regime and norm research such as Krasner and Keck and Sikkink, it has also re-introduced Heclo and
referenced Marres, not well known thinkers who now form the backbone of this thesis. The objective
of this chapter was to provide a polychromatic (Rubik’s cube) theoretical prism through which to
capture the narrative of RtoP. To stay close to home, this chapter has discussed humanitarian norms
and theory origins throughout, so that the conceptual earth has been ploughed for RtoP. Remaining
mindful of the connection of theory and empirical observations as well as giving disclosure of the
ontological underpinnings of this thesis, a degree of reflexivity is sought. Even though the presented
scope is broad and virtually borderless, some notes should be made to keep in mind with regard to the
rest of the thesis.
Through consensual knowledge, common discursive elements and a regenerative selflegitimating logic, regimes are independent forces in world politics. They are based on aggregated
norms which have the ability to regulate conduct. Actor identity and perception in the form of
cognitive understanding, constitutive regard and consensual knowledge as well as domestic factors are
central to actor agency considerations. Looking at regime theory, constructivism and the quantitative
constructivists, we have been able to deduce that these theories are more coterminous and
complementary than qualitatively more sophisticated: they look at different things but also overlap.
Regime theory is mostly interested in international cooperation whereas the constructivists have an
interest in norm creation. As RtoP speaks both to international cooperation and global norm
emergence, both must be kept in mind for analysis in chapter 4 since the theories can speak to the
greater complexity of the phenomenon of RtoP and its environmental context. For purposes of
analysis this chapter has made us acutely aware of the constructivist perceived Western bent in
humanitarian norms and their normative (cosmopolitan) perspective on global politics undergirded by
the quantitative constructivists. Following in the critical, cosmopolitan interested third debate
tradition, this section expands on these topics in the next chapter.
From the constructivists we accept the premise that the world is a social environment in which
sates generally comply with social norms. Studying methods of learning and teaching in the global
sphere has improved our knowledge of different global actors, how they see their identity, their
circumstances and how they come to certain decisions. The concepts of discourse and information
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illuminate how actor identity (particularly in the case of states) may be changed, notably through the
work of GANs, IOs and epistemic communities. Control of these elements is therefore a powerful tool
of leverage. Identity may also be altered as a result of international pressure called socialization. Risse
Ropp and Sikkink's Boomerang pattern holds that socialization is a transnational development,
originating in the domestic sphere, which will be considered in chapter 4. Therefore, this chapter has
provided a scope through which causality in norm emergence can be understood. Since identity
formation of states as jus cogens observers is central to the RtoP project, the theoretical observations
made here form a valuable commentary on methods of socialization and social engineering in RtoP.
The top-down trajectory aspect to RtoP hinges on these two conceptual tools.
In section 3, the issue network model was presented as a model of governance. The network
knows three pillars: the executive power, the legislative power and civil society. In addition, this
section has drawn our attention to the importance of contextual backgrounds which inform modes of
thinking. This is important for our reflective position and our interest in the circumstantial climate in
which RtoP arose. Since the network has not yet been satisfactorily applied to the global sphere, we
will tailor our issue network theory to RtoP and its environment. Thus, when extrapolated, this model
can help us understand (verstehen) how norm emergence occurs in the global sphere. In any case, the
UN seems the candidate best suited to fill in the role of the executive in this global model. This
chapter was also the last to introduce the three heuristic groups of staff.
Finally, the legal/legitimacy scopes were applied to further buttress our understanding of the
rise of norms in international law. We have deduced here that these two paradigms of analyses are
really complementary and mostly overlap. This section has also yielded two standards by which to
assess the progress of RtoP: path dependence and norm contestation - and an understanding of the
UN as an institution which is reinforced by the norms it promulgates. We must also deduce that RtoP
should be seen in a much larger context of the development of international law and the clash of the
principle of sovereignty and humanitarianism therein. As argued above, humanitarianism seems to
have the upper hand in this development and RtoP should therefore have seen smooth sailing.
Therefore, apart from offering conceptual tools and defining the theoretical scope, this chapter
has given rise to consideration of the RtoP Rubik’s cube aspects (the five sides to RtoP plus its
environmental context). These parameters of RtoP will be further fleshed out in the following chapter
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on RtoP.
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2. Responsibility to Protect Politics
The instruments discussed in the previous chapter for the understanding of norm emergence (learning
and teaching), governance systems (issue network) and processes leading to legality (opinio juris)
should be kept in mind in this chapter. The parameters of this thesis, such as the Western and topdown trajectory of humanitarian norms, the conflict between sovereignty and the humanitarian
treaties regime and the salience of cosmopolitan thought in the constructivist research paradigm
permeate this chapter and will be revisited in chapter 4.
Some have argued that RtoP is an emerging principle of international law, but this does not
mean that an extensive global political process has not complicated its emergence (ACIA, 2010: 16).
An overview of RtoP history will afford us the conclusion that the emergence of RtoP has been
contingent on the realities of transitory global politics. Second, we must familiarize ourselves with the
actors and organizations engaged in RtoP while taking note of their position within global politics. In
the third section of this chapter, three plans will show which role is envisaged for the UN and civil
society in the development of RtoP. Finally, key UN documents detailing the development of
humanitarian thought and the development of the UN will be discussed.
2.1 A Brief History of Responsibility to Protect
One can discern three periods in the development of RtoP. The first period knew conceptual
development and refinement - from humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping missions to the
commonly perceived watershed moment of the 2005 WS Outcome Document (Serrano, 2011:429,
Welsh, 2002: 514, Bannon, 2006: 1158 et al). This period following the Cold War is best described as
one of great social change in the global political climate, not unlike the one in the US of the 1970's.
The second period took place during the lull in RtoP development in 2006-2007, which provided Kimoon with the opportunity to take on a leading role in resuscitating the norm. In the third period
almost unanimous acceptance of the residual responsibility to stop large scale violations of jus cogens
crimes took place. This led the SG to write cogent plans for the norm’s implementation (IPI, 2009: 18
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et al).
First, a note will be made on the environment in which RtoP developed. Second, the
development of RtoP in 2005 will be discussed. Hereafter, the lull and re-emergence of RtoP is
touched on. Finally, a note on the current status of RtoP is made.
Some argue that the genesis of RtoP lay in a changing international conflict milieu, state failure and an
erosion of sovereignty (Shawki, 2011: 184, Freeman & Day, 2005: 139-140, Homan, 2011: 21 et al).
Kaldor also argues that there has been a change in war and warfare after the Cold War. Since the end
of the 20th century, conflict has occurred within the context of the disintegration of the nation state
(Kaldor, 2007: 96). A lack of a centralized taxation apparatuses means that continuous loot and pillage
itself is necessary to finance war, which has disastrous consequences for conflict areas (ibid: 108).
Collateral damage is also much more common in the late 20th century (ibid: 105). Moreover, civilians
are frequently targeted, as is the case with ethnic cleansing (ibid). Thus, today's modern wars and
warfare are far more taxing on civilian populations which have spurred the argument that something
must be done to protect them.
Others contend that RtoP's history lies in the political philosophy tradition of just war theory
(Gärtner, 2011: 3). Gärtner writes: “R2P uses the criteria of the just war theory, which has been
debated by peace researchers for decades" (ibid). These criteria set standards by which war is
permitted, including humanitarian intervention. The just war RtoP criteria introduced by the ICISS
Report and wholly supported by European countries were, however, dropped in 2005 (Bellamy, 2006:
148). Just war is ostensibly Western in origin and universal in scope.17
The end of the Cold War also brought hope, especially for a stronger and more pro-active UN.
Concluding his RtoP sentimented Agenda for Peace, former SG Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote “The
nations and peoples of the United Nations are fortunate in a way that those of the League of Nations
were not. We have been given a second chance to create the world of our Charter that they were
17
The Stanford Dictionary of Philosophy writes: ' If we have to “name names”, the founders of just war theory are probably
the triad of Aristotle, Cicero and Augustine. Many of the rules developed by the just war tradition have since been
codified into contemporary international laws governing armed conflict, such as The United Nations Charter and The
Hague and Geneva Conventions. The tradition has thus been doubly influential, dominating both moral and legal
discourse surrounding war. It sets the tone, and the parameters, for the great debate." see
website:http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/#2
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denied. With the Cold War ended we have drawn back from the brink of a confrontation that
threatened the world and, too often, paralysed our Organization" (1992). Nevertheless, the defining
moments for RtoP in the 1990’s were the failures to act by the international community in Rwanda
(1994) and Srebrenica (1995) (Luck, 2008: 2). Critical questions were raised about political will and UN
capacity, which fostered new thoughts on humanitarian intervention (ibid). Humanitarian intervention,
as a right to intervene, had found considerable support in the Western world in the 1980’s, when it
had been extensively advocated by French foreign minister Bernard Kouchener (Luck, 2010: 111). Like
RtoP, it raised questions of the primacy of sovereignty over humanitarian law. Outside the Western
world, opposition to humanitarian intervention was deeply rooted and a conceptual development and
refinement in plans to prevent atrocities, boasting a universal appeal, was therefore an absolute
necessity (ibid). This came from the hand of Francis Deng and his associates at the Brooking's
Institution, a progressive epistemic community bastion and well known Washington D.C. based and
Western government and foundation financed international think tank18. Their interest was mostly in
addressing the problem of internally displaced persons (IDPs), which since the civil wars in Africa had
been an issue plaguing the continent (ibid). This concept found considerable support among
internationalists, prominent politicians, UN officials and state diplomats (Luck, 2008: 9). In the year
2000, this culminated in the announcement that the Canadian government would establish the ICISS
Commission (discussed below). The Commission was asked to answer Annan's Millenium speech
question "(…) if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights
that offend every precept of our common humanity?" (ICISS, 2001: 2). The 2001 Commission Report
was received with mixed feelings despite its emphasis on the value of sovereignty (Bellamy, 2006: 150).
This would come to the fore in 2005, at the WS in 2005.
The 2005 WS was the largest gathering of the world leaders to date and RtoP’s endorsement paid the
norm legitimacy (Shawki, 2011: 188). Negotiations around the inclusion of the norm were “(...) intense,
prolonged and contentious, literally concluding in the final hour (Luck, 2008: 3). The support of non-
18
See website: http://www.brookings.edu/about/supportbrookings/~/media/About/Content/annualreport/2011%20annual%20report.pdf
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Western states such as Argentina, Chilli, Mexico, Rwanda and South-Africa proved to be of critical
importance (ACIA, 2010: 8). On key points, the norm was diluted to facilitate support, or at least
undercut the opposition of cautious countries (discussed below) (Bellamy, 2006: 155). Many have
therefore argued that the outcome of the WS was a kind of “RtoP-lite”, as it had too many caveats and
too few commitments (Luck, 2008: 112, Shawki, 2011: 184). This tepid norm demonstrated how
divided the world still was on the topic (Strauss, 2009: 295). Those eager to gloss over the dilution and
highlight the consensus forget that the outcome document was not voted on; there was no global
consensus (ibid, 301, Serrano, 2011:434). On the other hand, Luck asserts that, yes, RtoP was diluted,
but also that it is absurd to expect that the same facile consensus can be achieved between all the
states of the world as one which emerged from a blue ribbon panel of internationalists (Luck, 2008:
118). The norm accepted in 2005 must therefore be regarded as a negotiated regime, seeing as it
emerged out of a process of compromise.
According to Shawki, The Economist" May 2008 article To Protect Sovereignty or to Protect Lives,
epitomized the zeitgeist of period two. It concluded that “Responsibility to Protect is not yet dead, but
it is fragile” (in Shwaki, 2011: 172). Enthusiasm for the implementation of RtoP dwindled after the WS
to a point which necessitated a determined group of advocates and states to pick it up and agitate for
the norm’s place back on the international policy agenda (Luck, 2008: 108). They found that there was
no case of so-called “buyer’s remorse” and that the world still supported RtoP in principle (ibid: 3).
The Korean Conflict born Ki-moon has been widely credited for picking up the RtoP gauntlet in
his Berlin speech in 2008. In the speech he stated that his "(…) personal commitment (to RtoP) is deep
and enduring" (Ki-moon, 2008). He followed his commitment up with the 2009, January 30th report
called Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, commonly regarded as the first comprehensive UN
document on the implementation of RtoP (Luck in IPI, 2010: 61, Ki-moon, 2010: 1 et al). Ki-moon
presented the report to the GA, which considered it a week later at the Plenary Meetings of the 63d
Session. There it found only lukewarm support, but the concept of residual responsibility was quite
solidly reaffirmed (A/RES/63/308). Despite this setback, the SG wrote a second report called Early
Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect in 2010, in which he elaborated his plans for
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implementation further. With these plans, the SG engages states in a kind of vertical socialization19.
Therefore, the SG has played an important role in promoting a vision for RtoP as would be
commensurate with his leadership role as the executive in the issue network.
Today, RtoP's public profile has found considerable exposure, not least due to its implementation in
Libya (Orford, 2011: 11, Homan, 2011: 23 et al). Before the attack the UN Libya sanction committee
levied a weapons embargo and a travel ban against 16 members of the Libyan government.
Meanwhile, it stressed the necessity for aid relief to the Libyan people and humanitarian assistance,
which is interesting with regard to holistic humanitarian thinking on sanctions and RtoP, discussed
below (Homan, 2011: 24). On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that Resolution 1973 occurred
against a background of acrimonious international debate (Serrano, 2011: 434). RtoP has also not yet
been fully realized in the sense that it is an institutionalized global mechanism with its own logic, as is
crucial to the institutionalization of a norm (Strauss, 2011: 313). Luck is hopeful however: “Though not
for the impatient, this is the only sure route to translating the promise of RtoP into effective and
sustainable practice” (Luck, 2008: 9).
It should therefore be deduced here that RtoP grew out of a conceptual adoption to a change in
international warfare and conflict. The origins of RtoP clearly lie in Western thinking. As a side-note it
must be remarked that this is interesting with regard to Finnemore and Sikkink, who note that
Western norms are commonly perceived as legitimate due to their universalistic claims (Finnemore &
Sikkink, 1998: 907). Though the norm may have been inspired by Africa, it was thought out in a
Western think tank. In addition, the impetus to RtoP thinking was not the protection of sovereignty,
but the promotion of humanitarianism. Notable voices have acknowledged the tepidness of the WS
RtoP, but recognize its importance as a milestone. The fact that it is not purely Western and a
negotiated regime speaks in its favor with regard to considerations of legitimacy. Ki-moon played a
prominent role in the development of RtoP after the WS which confirms his candidacy as the
executive in the RtoP issue network, as will be further argued below. In addition, his plans for RtoP
19
It is vertical because the SG is technically above the states though he is not their superior.
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implementation should be seen as one form of top-down norm inculcation. Finally, it should be
observed that RtoP is finding implementation despite its instrumental shortcomings thus far.
2.2 Organizations and Players
In the last section we have looked at the development of RtoP as a feature of Western thinking, its
amorphization into a universal norm at the WS and the importance of Ki-moon in the process. This
section continues to undergird the salience of the UN Exec and describes the position of the GA and
the SC with regard to RtoP. It also introduces other members of the RtoP issue network: states and the
RtoP GANs. States are obvious stand-ins at the global level for representatives at the domestic level:
they represent their constituency and are the only global political force which can legislate through
treaties. This being said, RtoP politics is multi-terraced and a look must also be taken at regions in
order to better understand RtoP politics.
Feeding in to our theoretical framework, the SG concludes one report “The political dialogue
on how best to implement the responsibility to protect is off to a good start, although a number of
critical implementation issues will require a continuing conversation among the member states, the
UN system and civil society organizations" (Ki-moon, 2010: 6). In the first part of this section, a closer
look will be taken at the UN. In the second part, this section will examine the role of regions and states
in the development of RtoP. Finally, the RtoP GANs the ICRtoP, the GCRtoP and the WFM are discussed.
2.2.1 The UN
Some say that RtoP defines what the UN stands for (IPI, 2009: 22). Pope Benedict XVI, for example,
recognized that RtoP is “(…) already present implicitly at the origins of the United Nations, and is now
increasingly characteristic of its activity” (in Luck, 2008: 4). Luck writes: “The political sustainability of
the responsibility to protect at the world body is not a given, but the active engagement of three
principal organs - the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Secretariat (Luck , 2011: 392).
First, a closer look is taken at the role of the P-5. Second and third the roles of the SG and the GA are
described. It must be kept in mind that the GA and the SC should be analogized to Heclo's
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congressional committees and executive bureaus, whereas the UN Exec is best seen as a part of the
issue network executive.20
2.2.1a The Security Council
Article 27 of the UN Charter stipulates that the P- 5 members enjoy the right to veto any decision,
without justification.iii The SC has proven to be notoriously fickle and agreement in contentious cases
is highly unlikely (Luck, 2008: 2). In the case of RtoP, the P-5 has acted cautiously, but has not
stonewalled the process. In the buildup to the WS, the P-5 had been highly sceptical of the norm for
different reasons (Bellamy, 2006: 151). The position of the US, articulated by UN envoy John R. Bolton
was that it would "(…) not accept that either the UN as a whole, or the Security Council, or individual
states, have an obligation to intervene under international law" (Bolton in Porter, 2012: 25). China and
Russia saw RtoP as a wolf in sheep's clothing, and argued that there was no support for humanitarian
intervention in international law (Thakur & Weiss: 34). The P-5 therefore blocked some important
aspects of the ICISS proposed RtoP plan (ibid). First, interventions without P-5 approval were ruled out.
Second, P-5 activism was restricted by adding criteria for intervention. Third, and most importantly,
the idea that the use of veto be limited was dropped. Finally, the just war criteria in the ICISS plan
were removed and notably the responsibility to rebuild was dropped (ibid). Needless to say, RtoP has
hereby at least rhetorically strengthened the SC's position in global politics. This bargained RtoP paved
the way for a milder P-5. This is signified by the Outcome Document's reaffirmation in SC Resolution
1674 in early 2006 (discussed below) and in incorporation of RtoP reasoning in SC Resolution 1706,
with regard to Sudan: “The resolution adopted today sent a clear message from the Council regarding
the need for a well-equipped third party to ensure the protection of civilians. (…) the Government of
the Sudan, which bore the primary responsibility to protect its own citizens. (…) The Council wished
to help the Sudan, not to threaten it; to assist, and not undermine the country” (SC/8821). Despite
this and notably the Libyan intervention some argue that the sword of Damockles always hangs over
20
In the RtoP issue network, all states fall under in the state pillar of the issue network, including the members of the SC
and the GA. These states are also in a supplicant position vis-a-vis the RtoP civil society and the UN Exec, as they are
dependent on information from these sources. This being said, the UN as an institution of international policy is also
one pillar of the network. Therefore, the aggregated version of the UN, is one pillar; in the disaggregated version of the
UN, the SC and the GA fall under states. This is illustrated in figure 5, in the analysis.
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the P-5's head – that if it fails to act in a major crisis like Rwanda again, this will signify institutional
brokenness (Bannon, 1160, Strauss, 2011: 318 et al.). Therefore, the P-5 role in the development of
RtoP has been a capricious one and the future must tell where the P-5 stands. Nevertheless, RtoP has
at the very least accentuated the role of the SC.
2.2.1b The Secretary General
Ki-moon and the two SG's before him have been stalwart supporters of RtoP (Luck, 2010: 112). Some
of this can be related to African experimentation with the norm and Boutros-Ghali’s and Annan's
experiences therein (ibid). In 2005, it was Annan’s High-Level Panel’s report In Larger Freedom, which
informed the 2005 WS leaders (Bellamy, 2006: 156). About Ki-moon, Luck writes: “Clearly the
secretary-general is an enthusiast for RtoP, perhaps its strongest advocate within the house” (Luck,
2008: 9). In Ki-moon's Early Warning, Assesment and the Responsibility to Protect plan, the SG details
how “Substantial progress has been made over the past decade in enhancing United Nations early
warning capacities” (Ki-moon, 2010: 4). He proposes, however, that much more integration of the UN
Exec is necessary, arguing that a host of mechanisms and protocols are required to expedite UN
decision-making (ibid). These changes are being implemented today, as one interviewee pointed out.
Luck himself played an important role as the SG's Special Advisor on RtoP. Initially, his post was
integrated into the Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocides for purposes of
streamlining and efficiency, following the SG’s proposal to do so in Implementing the Responsibility to
Protect (Ki-moon, 2010: 7). The GA initially refused, however, to fund this initiative as it disagreed with
the SG as to the desirability of the position (ACIA, 2010: 9). The funding for the position was raised in
the SG's budget internally until December of 2009 the Fifth Committee (budgetary committee in the
UN) finally agreed to fund three additional posts at the Office of the Special Adviser for the Prevention
of Genocide, including a post focusing on RtoP (ICRtoP, 2012). Luck brought considerable expertise to
the job with his academic background as the director of the Center of International Organization and
UN Studies at Columbia University. As of June 16th, 2012, however, Luck has left his position to return
to academia (Passblue, 2012).
Deng's Genocide Office is charged with the duty of "(…) collecting relevant information and
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acting “as a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-General, and through the Security Council,
by bringing to their attention situations which could potentially result in genocide" (Ki-moon, 2010: 6).
In addition, Deng's Office is expected to "(…) mobilize the United Nations system and other key
partners to take into account the urgency of a situation and conducts advocacy missions to countries
where his involvement is considered to be of particular value” (ibid). The P-5 relies on the SG and his
subsidiaries to inform its policy with their reports (Ki-moon, 2010: 3). The ICISS Commission wrote
that "(…) particularly through its (the SG's) reports and recommendations to the Security Council, a
major contribution to shaping the deliberations and determining the range of options considered" is
made (ICISS, 2001: 20). As a result, Orford (2010) points out, the UN Exec, particularly through the
Office of the SG, has been able to influence policy considerably over the years. Therefore, it should be
noted that the SG is both a vocal RtoP supporter and that his subsidiary is expanding as a result of the
RtoP norm. This development conforms to the process of the increasingly prominent role for the
executive as seen in Heclo.
2.2.1c The General Assembly
The GA plays a significant role in that it is the crucible of international consensus; it reflects the
opinions of the entire world (Weiss & Thakur, 2009: 40). Its support for RtoP is of importance, as it
raises the political costs of blocking action by the P-5 in the case of humanitarian disasters and can of
course create opinio juris (Luck, 2008: 9). At the 2009 Plenary Meeting, the GA’s President D’Escoto
Brockmann concluded “I think we can agree that this dialogue must continue here in the GA and that
“(…) it would be fair to say that we are far from reaching consensus on how to move the principle of
R2P from theory to operation, much less make it part of international law” (GA A/63/PV.96–101: 19).
He added, however, “Keeping these concerns regarding military intervention and sovereignty in mind,
we are unified in our conviction that the international community can no longer remain silent in the
face of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity” (ibid: 20) Thus, like the P5, the GA reaffirmed the principle and decided “(…) to continue its consideration of the responsibility
to protect” (GA A/RES/63/308). Thus, while accepting the RtoP residual responsibility, the GA is not
fully committed to RtoP implementation, nor has it played a role of importance in the limited space of
political influence available to it.
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In general, the position of the UN seems to have been accentuated by the RtoP norm. As theorized by
Finnemore and Sikkink, the UN's purpose is reinforced by the norm. It should be deduced here that
the P-5 has played a prominent role in the promotion of RtoP. This may be caused by the fact that its
political position has been strengthened by the norm. This being said, the GA and P-5 have responded
in a lukewarm fashion to the development of the norm. A cause of this seems to be the political
dissension which exists as to the implementation of the norm and the unwillingness of the P-5 to
commit to the automatization of the norm, which would rob them of their liberty to withhold
commitment. Nevertheless, the UN Exec clearly seems to profit from the norm in the sense that its
role has expanded. The SG's personal goals of spreading peace are coupled with the norm; its success
is Ki-moon's achievement.
2.2.2 Regions and States
In his 1992 An Agenda for Peace Boutros-Ghali argues that while the “(…) Security Council has and will
continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but regional
action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could
not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs”. Moreover, regional action with UN authorization
can lend credence and legitimacy to both the UN and the regional organization as appropriate agents
of peace and security (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Thus, the ICISS proposed: “(…) that increased resources
be made available to support regional and sub-regional conflict prevention initiatives, as well as capacity building aimed at improving the effectiveness of regional and sub-regional organizations in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and intervention operations” (2001: 22). Regions and their organizations
still play a very important role in RtoP politics today, because “(…) RtoP may be a global standard, but
the politics of forwarding it tends to be regional” (Luck, 2010: 122). Nevertheless, as Haugevik cogently argues, even if the regional organizations had the will to function as the UN’s strategic partners,
they generally lack the political and financial wherewithal to do so (Haugevik, 2009: 362). Naturally,
states with their domestic factors have played their own idiosyncratic roles in the development of RtoP.
Africa, Asia, and Europe will be discussed here respectively. Hereafter a brief look will be taken
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at the reaction of the global community of states to RtoP. America as a continent is not discussed here
due to space restraints and general disinterest in the norm in the Southern half of the continent
(Stanley Foundation, 2011: 9). As continuous with constructivist theory, the domestic and regional
positions on human rights and sovereignty resonate in the regional positions on RtoP.
2.2.2a Africa
Africa was the first continent to formally address the limitations of international law by indicating that
human security should rank above the prerogative of state sovereignty (Haugevik, 2009: 358, IPI, 2009:
21). The 2002 Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted one year after the ICISS Report
publication, is steeped in RtoP reasoning and language (ibid). Article 4 paragraph h reads that the
Union affords itself the right "(…) to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity”.21 Only collective action is permitted, as paragraph g imposes "(…) non-interference by any
Member State in the internal affairs of another" (ibid). On the face of it, it would appear that Africa is
the RtoP torchbearer in this regard, but that is not the case. As Bellamy has pointed out, the OAU has
since defanged 4(h) through the Ezulwini Consesus Protocol, which insists that national sovereignty,
territorial integrity and independence may under no condition be undermined (Bellamy, 2006: 161). iv
Even if Africa asserted mastership of its own house, it still lacks the capacities and sometimes the will
to keep it, as evinced by the mismanagement of the Darfur crisis (Haugevik, 2009: 361). Echoing the
strong-weak discord, at the 2005 WS only two African countries publicly endorsed the concept of the
ICISS, the reason being that Africa opposed council activism (Bellamy, 2006: 162). Africa's role may
therefore not be overstated with regard to RtoP.
2.2.2b Asia
ASEAN is the largest regional organization in Asia which also concerns itself with non-economic issues.
The ASEAN Charter and Political-Security Blueprint acknowledges the centrality of human rights but
does not mention a mechanism for intervention when countries fail to protect their citizens (Stanley
Foundation, 2011: 6). Its Human Rights Commission is under- funded and even preventative diplomacy
21
See website: http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm
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smacks of too much intrusion to the ASEAN countries (ibid). A highly statist region in the world, Asia
was believed to be the naysayer in the lead up to the 2009 GA debates (Luck, 2010: 122). Unlike Africa,
Asia lacks any form of human rights recourse, prevention or oversight committees. Plans to enact early
warning systems and regional risk reduction centers in conjunction with the UN are only just being
considered (Stanley Foundation, 2011: 3). Overall awareness in Asia on RtoP, however, is very low (ibid:
15). Though skeptical in 2005, most Asian countries supported RtoP in 2009 (Luck, 2010: 122). As one
interviewee noted below, Asia's disinterest in RtoP stems in part from its conservative stance on
sovereignty.
2.2.2c Europe
Europe’s organization for peace and security is the OSCE. The OSCE lacks the mandate or the ability to
intervene in RtoP situations, but NATO and the EU have a broad set of protection tools available to it,
should this be necessary (Haugevik, 2009: 359). The EU has played an especially prominent role in
institutionalizing many recommendations of the ICISS Report as early as 2001, through the EU
Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict. This project boasts an early warning mechanism and
fact finding missions (ACIA, 2010: 42). Moreover, the cosmopolitan mission of the program
acknowledges that "(…) the international community has a political and moral responsibility to act to
avoid the human suffering and the destruction of resources caused by violent conflict” (ibid). Support
for RtoP is highest in Western Europe. The only five countries which have included RtoP in policy plans
and white papers are all Western European, with the exception of the United States.v
2.2.2d States and their Concerns
Three observations must be made about states and RtoP. First, as Orford has pointed out, states
fearing candidacy for intrusion or intervention generally opposed RtoP (2010: 40). In the Plenary
Meetings of the 63d UN Session, Venezuela, Cuba, Syria, Bolivia, Sudan, Iran and North Korea were the
only ones who voiced their objection to the potential misuse of RtoP (ACIA, 2010: 10). Second, states
which have experienced genocide themselves or in their vicinity, are much more receptive to RtoP
(Bellamy, 2006: 160, Luck, 2010: 120, Serrano, 2011: 432). For example, as Bellamy points out, Africans
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were keen to tie the world into African affairs to oversee the security of the continent (2006: 14). Third,
Western countries are without exception supportive of RtoP. Canada, Germany, the UK and France
were its strongest advocates in 2005 (Bellamy, 2006: 151). The US itself is more supportive of
humanitarian intervention (Lyon & Dolan, 2007). Thus, to the US RtoP is a constraint, not a license
(Bellamy, 2006: 151). The support of Western states will be further evinced below. These last two
observations are further evinced by the list of participants in the Focal Points initiative, spoken to in
appendices V.
The UN naysayers in 2005 were China, Russia and members of the Non- Aligned Movement
(NAM) (ibid 151-152, Thakur & Weiss: 34). China, however, does not oppose RtoP in principle, but is
simply wary of Western intrusion into its own affairs (Pang, 2009: 240). According to Pang, China’s
non-committal approach to RtoP is best explained by the geo-political tightrope it walks: on the one
hand China is dependent on Western support if it is to function as a global leader, on the other, its
non-interference stance is broadly supported by developing countries (ibid: 247).
The developing world saw the RtoP discussion through a dependista prism – that RtoP would
serve as an excuse for the strong to exploit the weak (Luck, 2010: 115). Some even argued, notably
Mohammed Ayoob, that RtoP was a form of neocolonialism (Ayoob in Welsh, 2002: 509, Thakur &
Weiss, 2009: 40; the Canadian Council of Churches: 9). These countries generally considered RtoP to
be no more than a guise for humanitarian intervention (Bellamy, 2006: 151-152). The recent invasion
of Iraq in 2003 fueled their criticism (ibid). To them RtoP was mainly perceived as a Western interest of
Japan, Europe and Canada (Strauss, 2011: 295).
It should therefore be concluded here that the RtoP politics at the state level is not as straightforward as can be expected in the sense that different actors are engaged in it for different reasons.
The logic of appropriateness can serve an interesting commentary on this at a later stage.
In summary, it should be observed that RtoP variation is not only regional but also state
specific. The Western origins of RtoP are palpable but seeing as only the most blatant human rights
violators still opposed the norm at the GA in 2009, one can say that the RtoP defined residual
responsibility has universal appeal. Though scholars have often pointed to Africa and its Charter as an
example of RtoP being a third world principle (too), RtoP's legal position in Africa is weak, as well as its
likelihood of enforcement. There is no such thing as a monopoly on RtoP, but Europe and Northern
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America are by and large the biggest market shareholders.
2.2.3 Responsibly to Protect’s Global Civil Society
The most important RtoP organizations are found in New York (WFUNA, 2009: 23). Nevertheless,
organizations concerned with RtoP come from a variety of backgrounds. WFUNA maintains that “The
civil society community currently engaged in RtoP is relatively small yet well networked” (ibid: 21).
Here, the backgrounds of the foremost RtoP GANs are described: the GCRtoP, the WFM, the ICRtoP
and WFUNA.
2.2.3a The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
The GCRtoP was established by a sub-unit within the WFM’s Office in New York and launched at the
UN in 2008 (Weiss & Thakur, 2009: 52). The website reads that the GCRtoP was founded by leading
figures in government and academia, as well as by the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch,
Oxfam International, Refugees International the WFM-Institute for Global Policy.22 The GCRtoP was
based at The City University of New York (CUNY) Graduate Centre’s Ralph Bunche Institute. The
Institute has an ostensibly cosmopolitan orientation, focussing on contemporary global problemsolving, multilateralism and international institutions.vi In a comparable vain, the GCRtoP’s mission is
“(…) to help transform the principle of the responsibility to protect into a practical guide for action in
the face of mass atrocities”. The organization is headed up by the South-African issue politician Simon
Adams, educated in South-Africa, Australia and the US. The staff of GCRtoP share a common Western
educational background and a pronounced interest in humanitarian or humanitarian related issues. vii
The GCRtoP have enlisted the support of James Traub a well-known journalist who writes for the New
York Times. The GCRtoP is funded by grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation,
Open Society Institute and Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Mexico, The Netherlands,
Norway, Rwanda, Sweden and The United Kingdom. Political executives from the UN and state
diplomacy as well as the RtoP epistemic community are regularly seen guests at the GCRtoP through
for example their Focal Points initiative .
22
See website for section: http://globalr2p.org/
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2.2.3b The World Federalist Movement
The WFM was set up over 80 years ago and was a response to the failure of the League of Nations. Its
principle objective is the building of international peace and stability. viii The member organizations of
the World Federalist Movement dedicate themselves to spreading the ideas of global federalism. The
WFM states: “World federalism now faces the challenge of showing that it is capable of taking the lead
in transitioning toward world government” 23 . On sovereignty they write: “In respecting the
sovereignty and political integrity of states, WFM promotes the principle of international democracy
by calling for rule of law and equal representation as well as transparency and accountability”24. The
organization also has consultative status with the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The
WFM is located in The Hague and in New York and is head up William Pace. Pace and his executive
committee are predominantly Western.ix The WFM is funded by the European Centre for Conflict
Prevention, the European Union, the Ford Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation, the Oak Foundation, the Open Society Institute as well as by the governments of Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and
Switzerland, and a number of individual donors. In 2003, the WFM started the Responsibility to
Protect-Engaging Civil Society (R2PCS) project. Its goals were 1) awareness raising and building civil
society advocacy capacity, 2) strengthening the acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect norm, and
3) promoting the implementation of R2P by UN, regional and national actors. It is important to keep
these in mind with regard to later analysis.
2.2.3c The International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect
The ICRtoP was the result of the following statement made by the WFM, after the publication of the
ICISS Report:
WFM is working to increase awareness and deepen debate on the ICISS Report and other related
23
24
See website: http://www.wfm-igp.org/site/wfm/the-movement/about-world-federalism
See webiste: http://www.wfm-igp.org/site/wfm/international%2Bdemocracy/overview
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documents; to promote international norms around the obligations of governments, in particular
through the United Nations, to respond earlier and more effectively to emerging humanitarian crises;
to monitor the responses of the United Nations, the Security Council, regional bodies and
governments; and to strengthen civil society participation by facilitating the development of new
networks of organizations working on related issues25
The WFM concludes “We seek to form a global network in support of the responsibility to protect
principles. If you or your organization are interested in joining us in this endeavor, please contact us”
The R2PCS goals were later integrated into the ICRtoP mission, in 2009, upon the coalition’s
realization.26 The member list consists of some of the most notable NGO names in Civil Society
including the GCRtoP founding members Oxfam, Human Rights Watch and many more.x The ICRtoP
executive consists of exclusively Western educated individuals, from predominantly North-American
backgroundsxi. Pace heads up the organization himself. Like the WFM and the GCRtoP, the ICRtoP is
based in New York and “(…) works to facilitate communication and coordination among members,
promote information flows and also ensures that the activities of members are advancing the
Coalition’s overall goals”. The Coalition makes use of social media, and has designated a position
especially for the coordination hereof. The ICRtoP is funded in part by Sweden, the United Kingdom,
the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Oak Foundation, the Arsenault Family
Foundation and individual donations. The ICRtoP rubs elbows with political executives. At a recent 26
April meeting the ICRtoP jointly hosted the Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect: The
Challenges of the Third Pillar Approach workshop, in which it rubbed elbows with political executives
such as members of the European Parliament and Edward Luck.
2.2.3d World Federation of United Nations Associations
WFUNA was established in 1946 and is a member of the ICRtoP. WFUNA consists of the national
United Nations Associations (UNAs) of every country and it is located in New York (WFUNA, 2009: 5).
Over 100 UNAs exist and the WFUNA therefore has thousands of individual members (ibid). Like the
25
26
See website: http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/R2PSummary.pdf
See website: http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/
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WFM, WFUNA has consultative status at ECOSOC. WFUNA’s website also names the ICRtoP and the
WFM as its partners including the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, an affiliate
organization of the GCRtoP27. WFUNA’s secretariat is almost exclusively Western educated and its
Secretary-General, Bonian Golmohammadi, an issue politician pur sang, served previously as the
Swedish UNA Secretary-General for eight years.xii WFUNA's cosmopolitan goal is “(…) to build a better
world by strengthening and improving the United Nations, through the engagement of people who
share a global mindset and support international cooperation – global citizens” (ibid: 5). The
organization is supported by the Arthur Ross Foundation, the Packerd Foundation, the William and
Melinda van den Heuvel Foundation, Sweden, South Korea and Goldman Sachs (ibid: 22). One of its
projects, The Responsiblity to Protect – Mobilizing Public and Political Will, is discussed below.
According to its website “WFUNA leadership meets regularly with Ki-moon and his Executive Office
and collaborates on specific issues” (ibid).
This section has looked at RtoP politics and the actors involved in it. The RtoP issue network players
have been discussed and we have further distilled the three pillars of the network: 1) the UN and
particularly the UN Exec; 2) states; 3) RtoP GANs. Ki-moon’s commitment to the norm is unmatched by
the rest of the UN and the Genocide Office has expanded considerably as a result of RtoP and the SG's
enthusiasm. States and regions support the norm for different reasons flowing form their domestic or
regional preferences. Europe and North America are clearly the strongest RtoP proponents and have
done the most to integrate the norm into policy.
What should be concluded from the overviews of the organizations is that they are funded
almost exclusively by Western states and Western civil society foundations. In addition, they are all
centered in New York and staffed by Western issue politicians. In terms of thinking, the missions of
these organizations underline a common faith in cosmopolitanism. The GCRtoP and the ICRtoP,
arguably the most important RtoP GANs in the world, are siblings. Marres is seen in the ICRtoP and its
global coalition of CSOs and NGOs with diverse backgrounds. These organizations have established
27
http://www.wfuna.org/
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lines to the UN, and those of the WFM and WFUNA are even formalized, as Keck and Sikkink theorized.
This section has not spoken to the existence of the RtoP epistemic community, which the next section
does a little more.
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2.3 Responsibility to Protect Plans
In the last section the main players in RtoP politics were discussed and four RtoP GANs were
introduced. Here, three plans for RtoP implementation are discussed; respectively the ICISS Report,
the Focal Points initiative and the WFUNA plan. The Western funded and facilitated ICISS Report seeks
to recast the international system by changing the way sovereignty is perceived and to foster a sense
of global community. The objective of the Focal Points initiative is only slightly less ambitious; to build
a transnational network of corresponding state officials to prevent crisis escalation by sharing sensitive
information freely (GCRtoP, 2011: 5). The WFUNA project seeks to socialize a number of civil societies
from the inside out, starting with that of Congo and Armenia. In discussing these plans, this section
finds evidence for the top-down trajectory of RtoP in the form of social engineering and its
cosmopolitan underpinnings in the holistic humanitarian approach. Specifically the role envisaged for
the UN is highlighted here. Questions of political will and the role of state norm entrepreneurial
activity therein are also noted here. This section will show that proselytization of the RtoP creed is
central to the implementation of the norm.
2.3.1 The Report of the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty
The Report was published in Ottowa in 2001 as a reaction to the salience of RtoP in international debate, which “With the end of the Cold War, became a live issue as never before" (ICISS, 2002, vii). The
Council was initiated by the Canadian government but was broadly informed by an epistemic community: “The meetings involved representatives from governments and intergovernmental organizations,
from nongovernmental organizations and civil society, and from universities, research institutes and
think tanks (…)" (ibid: IX). The research team was led by Thomas G. Weiss the Presidential Professor at
CUNY (ibid: 84). Financial support was a Western affair as the ICISS was funded by the Canadian Government, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the John
D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation (ibid: 85). In addition, the
ICISS "(…) is also indebted to the Governments of Switzerland and the United Kingdom for their generous financial and in-kind support to the work of the Commission” (ibid).
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Nowhere does the ICISS Report express the will to dismantle the state system or the organizing
principle of sovereignty. Instead, the ICISS acknowledges that “A condition of any one state’s sovereignty is a corresponding obligation to respect every other state’s sovereignty: the norm of nonintervention is enshrined in Article 2.7 of the UN Charter” (ibid, 12). Nevertheless, a responsibility
adjoining UN membership entails 1) “That the state authorities are responsible for the functions of
protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare”, 2) “It suggests that the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the international community
through the UN”, and 3) “It means that the agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to
say, they are accountable for their acts of commission and omission” (ibid: 13). Thus, the ICISS's view
of sovereignty reflects that of Deng and his associates – that sovereignty is more of a responsibility
than a license.
Here it will first be argued how the ICISS Report serves to advance universal justice. Second,
the methods of proposed RtoP implementation are discussed. Third, the envisaged role for the UN is
highlighted. In addition, the instruments available to it are identified. Finally, a note is made on the
conception of political will in the report.
The report proposes that states have a legal obligation to comply with myriad human rights
conventions, declarations, treaties and covenants in addition to the more recent prohibitions on
landmine and small arms (ibid: 14; 23). Moreover, these legal impositions have created benchmarks
for proper conduct, notably a transition from “(…) a culture of violence to a more enlightened culture
of peace” (ibid: 14). The report acknowledges the changed conflict milieu by stating that “When rape
is used as an instrument of war and ethnic cleansing, when thousands are killed by floods resulting
from a ravaged countryside and when citizens are killed by their own security forces, then it is just
insufficient to think of security in terms of national or territorial security alone”, hereby laying bare its
cosmopolitan underpinnings (ibid: 15). Moreover, “The concept of human security can and does
embrace such diverse circumstances” (ibid).
A host of actors should be involved in helping prevent atrocities: “States, the UN and its
specialized agencies, the international financial institutions, regional organizations, NGOs, religious
groups, the business community, the media” (ibid: 25-26). NGOs, in particular, have an “(…) ever
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increasing role, in turn, in contributing information, arguments and energy to influencing the
decision-making process” (ibid: 71). The report discusses many forms of preventative action and
makes mention of “(…) the promotion of civil society; and other types of similar initiatives that broadly
fit within the human security framework” - which we clearly see in the WFUNA plan (ibid: 23).
Capacity building in the Report involves “(…) encouraging necessary economic and structural reform;
and technical assistance for strengthening regulatory instruments and institutions” (ibid). Though the
report advocates “(…) providing support to local institutions and organizations working to advance
human rights”, the Commission also argues that international actors should strive to “do themselves
out of a job”, and to promote local ownership of the norm (ibid). The RtoP variant written up by the
ICISS should thus be seen as a form of social engineering, as it seeks to alter the domestic
environment of states, thereby changing state identity. This is important with regard to the top-down
trajectory of the RtoP norm, as is further underlined here.
In particular, the SG should play a role of legitimator: “(…) his routine activities and interaction
with the Security Council, and his international profile with governments and the media, give him a
unique opportunity to mobilize international support; an important further part of his multilateral
leadership role lies in constructing and maintaining the multinational coalitions which are an essential
element in the contemporary implementation of UN-authorized peace operations” (ibid: 72-73). The
report adds that the SG should make better use of his power under Article 99 (ibid: 21). The ICISS also
calls for the creation of an Early Warning Mechanism within the UN Exec, to prevent escalations in risk
areas (ibid: 22). The report further asserts that “(…) harnessing pre-existing governmental capacity is
an idea worth pursuing (…)”, thereby putting the Secretariat at the centre of a mechanism including
state apparatuses (ibid). When all options of preventative measures have been exhausted, and only in
cases where states manifestly have failed or are failing to protect their population from the “core”
crimes, is multilateral UN intervention sanctioned by the report (ibid: 31). To conclude here, however,
the ICISS Report nowhere excludes unilateral intervention: “The primary purpose of the intervention,
whatever other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right
intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and
the victims concerned" (ibid: xii). Therefore, though the UN and the SG are central to the RtoP project,
preventing or stopping human suffering has primacy - as is consonant with cosmopolitan thinking, to
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put people first.
In addition, the report advocates the use of targeted negative sanctions such as “(…) trade and
financial sanctions; withdrawal of investment; threats to withdraw IMF or World Bank support; and
the curtailment of aid and other assistance” (ibid: 24). Political and diplomatic sanctions include “(…)
diplomatic isolation, suspension of organization membership, travel and asset restrictions on targeted
persons, naming and shaming, and other such actions” (ibid). It is important to note that the
sanctions proposed here are targeted sanctions, as general sanctions are held in contempt as will
become apparent form the studied legal documents. Targeted sanctions further underline the
humanitarian nature of a process leading up to intervention, as they seek to avoid unnecessary
suffering of the population of the norm violator. Particularly the shaming and political pariahization is
a notable tool of RtoP inculcation, as some authors have pointed out (Luck, 2010: 122). Crucially, when
the conflict is over, the Report asks the international community to rebuild and to punish the culprits,
which is further proof of the holistic humanitarian approach in RtoP (ibid: 17, 42).
Political will to implement measures and changes is touted as being crucial to the
implementation of RtoP (ibid: 51). Moreover, its articulation of norm entrepreneurial activity sounds
almost like a type of evangelism: “To get the right words uttered, and to turn them into deeds,
requires – at international as at domestic level – the same kind of commitment and leadership, and
the same kind of constant campaigning” (ibid, 72). The report does not note a role of civil society in
this, but does stress that between the UN and civil society, much has already been achieved in state
human rights observance (ibid: 14). Thus, the element of international canvassing by RtoP’s advocates
is central to the promulgation of the norm.
It should therefore be deduced that the ICISS Report stands for a cosmopolitan reconfiguration of
world politics. An element of social engineering is also present. The UN and especially the SG have a
special role in the Commission’s plan. The Report advocates the use of economic or political tools to
socialize dissidents. Spreading the RtoP norm still requires entrepreneurial activity according to the
ICISS.
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2.3.2 The National Focal Points initiative
In September of 2010, the GCRtoP in collaboration with the governments of Denmark and Ghana
launched the Focal Points initiative in New York (GCRtoP, 2011: 1). This was done at the Annual
Meeting on RtoP, held during the opening of the GA session (ibid). The objective of the Initiative,
“Drawing on the existing consensus around R2P (…) is to identify relevant national, regional, and
international capacities and to consider ways to further the role of sub-regional and regional
arrangements in strategizing and concretizing R2P" (ibid). Like the ICISS Report, the Initiative was
broadly informed by an epistemic community of which twelve panellists from the world of academia
and diplomacy participated in the conversation. Civil society was further represented by four NGO
observers (ibid). First, a note on the cosmopolitan nature of the Initiative is made. Second, a closer
look will be taken at the organizational framework the plan envisages. The element of social
engineering is again discussed here. Third, the UN's role in the Initiative will be briefly evaluated.
Finally, a note will be made on political will in RtoP and its proselytization.
The Initiative is one manifestation of the acceptance of the international community’s new residual
responsibility: “(…) a major moral and political transformation; a movement from states” wilful
neglect of a national and international anti-mass atrocity preparedness” (ibid: 8). Thirty-one
countries attended and agreed that a focal point network would make “(...) a real difference in
facilitating protection of populations at risk" (ibid). In addition, the countries agreed that the GCRtoP
hosted meeting should serve “(…) as the first step in an iterative process, the participants viewed the
dialogue through the lens of a network creation stage” (ibid).
The Initiative states that three principal groups of actors are engaged in RtoP’s promotion: 1) the
states and their focal points; 2) civil society; and 3) the UN. In the capacity of a focal point, an official
would be involved in “(…) a) advocacy and socialization; b) institutionalization; c) mass atrocity
strategic planning and advice; and d) early warning and response coordination” (ibid: 5). In particular,
the official should foster and organize human rights education and training (ibid). Furthermore, the
participants agreed that focal points should “(…) organize R2P training and education sessions for
individuals in all levels of government and for leaders within civil society” (ibid: 4) The focal point
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should also work to reform domestic political institutions because “Just as lawyers, police, and military
personnel need education in human rights, the institutions within which they operate need further
reforms in order to operate with adequate respect for human rights and R2P norms” (ibid: 6).
Moreover, “The connections that civil society groups have among each other and with local
communities can aid focal points (…)” (ibid: 6). Like in the ICISS Report, therefore, information
dissemination and reform play an important role in the Initiative. Education clearly serves the purpose
of social engineering here, as it encourages institutional reform.
Special attention is focused on “(…) the role of the UN in the network of focal points; coordinating
national, regional, and global roles and responsibilities; national experiences; the role of national
human rights institutions; as well as efforts at strengthening regional and international capacities to
prevent and halt mass atrocities” (ibid: 2). Within the UN framework, the focal points could also
function as the “(…) connective tissue within regional organizations and the (UN) early warning
system" (ibid: 6). The Initiative is thus explicit on the role that the UN should play as the network hub,
though not on which UN branch should fulfil that role. This being said, given the plans for integration
of the SG as early as 2009 (and their subsequent implementation as can be seen in the interviews) we
already know which direction integration of atrocity prevention took in the UN and the states
gathered at the 2011 Initiative must have known that the Genocide Office would be this hub.
The Initiative places special emphasis on engagement with the first of the three pillars: “By
establishing national focal points, and creating an institutional basis for a particular and distinct
responsibility (RtoP), participating states can offer a valuable example for others in the policy-making
process” (ibid). As in the ICISS Report, the Initiative meeting participants assume states to be selfaware and to serve as models for emulation.
The problem of political was tersely noted in that “(…) not only are perpetrators too often in
denial, but so too may be the international actors expected to assist and/or intervene.” (ibid: 1). On
civil society, the report concludes that “One of the noted deficiencies of R2P at the local level was
insufficient societal knowledge of the principle, which for many states remains a term understood
only by individuals engaged with the UN system” (ibid: 6) It is therefore believed “(…) that if
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awareness and knowledge of R2P can be enhanced within civil society groups then they may prove a
very effective mechanism for spreading knowledge of the norm across communities”, meaning that
civil societies can be converted to a norm, after which they will proselytize it themselves (ibid). Thus,
awareness raising is a recurring theme in RtoP plans. A side-note should also be made here that the
Initiative members acknowledge that awareness on RtoP is low.
It should therefore be observed that there is a good deal of continuity in the RtoP project with regard
to cosmopolitan thinking and mandates for social engineering. In summary, the Initiative is
cosmopolitan in prescription and beliefs: it seeks to create a cross-boundary network of sate officials
which prevent mass atrocities. In addition, the plan envisages an important role for the SG at the
center of a global system of atrocity prevention. It also calls on states to engage in the norm
entrepreneurial activity of proselytizing the RtoP norm.
2.3.3 The Responsibility to Protect – Mobilizing Public and Political Will
Resonating the human security principle of the ICISS Report “This project follows this sentiment that
security, development and human rights are linked and interdependent” (ibid: 26). Today, “(…) conflict
continues to have a major impact on civilians, placing them in vulnerable situations, the urgency for
civilian protection has never been more pertinent than the present” (WFUNA, 2009: 4). Like the
Initiative, WFUNA also asserts that “(…) outreach to regional areas, particularly those impacted by
conflict, is necessary and vital to pushing the norm forward” (ibid: 23). First, some key features of the
plan are discussed. Second, it is shown that the Plan is centrally orchestrated. Third, the methods of
learning, teaching and information dissemination are discussed. Last, the element of proselytization
will be noted.
The objective of the project is a three year plan, which in the first year seeks to use WFUNA’s United
Nations Association (UNA) satellites to artificially build a RtoP minded civil society network in their
respective countries (ibid: 3). In this, the plan proposes to realize the civil society effect the Initiative
and the report argue for. UNA’s are perfect vessels for the program, because like the state appointed
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National Focal Points “UNAs are familiar with local actors and groups, and can effectively adapt to the
cultural and normative nuances unique to their country” – thereby framing RtoP (ibid: 23).
The Plan reads that “WFUNA has had a number of well established procedures in place for
many years which allows for effective and efficient information dissemination between WFUNA and
UNAs and amongst UNAs themselves” (ibid). The plan is strictly centrally organized: “The program will
be run by the WFUNA office at UN Headquarters in New York. The overall management, strategic
responsibility, monitoring and evaluation will be done at this location" (ibid: 25). WFUNA intends to
hire an international project manager and to oversee the hiring of UNA's national project managers
(ibid: 15). The project requires these managers to give feedback to New York on a weekly basis (ibid:
21). This plan therefor epitomizes the top-down trajectory of RtoP.
The WFUNA plan is the most flagrant case of RtoP social engineering studied in this thesis. In
six developing countries UNAs will be briefed, trained and mentored to engage three principal groups
in their societies: 1) the academic community; 2) journalists; and 3) politicians. These groups, the plan
argues "(…) can then exercise their influence on the general public" (ibid: 9). To help with the
politicians, WFUNA and ICRtoP will collaborate “(…) to develop a toolkit that UNAs can use to lobby
and inform domestic politicians, as well as materials that the politicians themselves can use as a
reference when communicating about R2P” (ibid). Workshops hosted by WFUNA for UNA members
will teach strategic social construction: targeted strategies for advocacy, methods of identifying and
understanding target audiences and their needs, how to implement effective communication
strategies, the role of social media in advocacy and awareness raising and how to use practical tools
for effective outreach to various target groups (ibid: 14). Marres’s conception of collaborative
databases in which collectives tinker with data is seen in that, “WFUNA will develop a digital platform
for the exchange of experiences and ideas regarding advocacy on R2P” (ibid).
While WFUNA is willing to fund this program at first, within the three year period “UNAs will
learn the importance of how publicizing the issue creates urgency and the need to contribute, how to
identify potential donors, and the skills on how to solicit resources” (WFUNA, 2009: 25). At the end
of the project “(…) UNAs will gain ownership not only over the material on R2P but the project itself”
(ibid: 26). Therefore, once both the UNAs and their civil societies are successfully converted, they are
expected to proselytize the norm: “(...) they will be able to act as ambassadors to continue to spread
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the word on the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities” (ibid: 27).
The WFUNA Plan should therefore be seen as a highly centralized project designed to reform
domestic spheres, and thereby implements Pillar I of RtoP. The norm is diffused through the
manufacturing of new institutions which can proselytize the norm.
Key conclusions can be drawn from the discussion of these three plans. We see that epistemic
communities are broadly informed as in the case of the ICISS and the Initiative. There is also a marked
cosmopolitan influence as seen in the interests for human security and the plans’ motivations. The
constituent element of social engineering can be discerned through the plans’ attempts to
endogenously affect state reform. This should be seen, in turn, as a feature of RtoPs top-down
trajectory. The best way to sum-up the various ways in which RtoP is envisaged to work top-down is by
looking at the center of the inceptions of the plans and their proposed geographical hub of operation:
New York. Moreover, the UN Exec plays a central role in the two first discussed plans, which speaks to
its enlarged involvement through RtoP. Finally, we also see that once actors have successfully been
converted to the RtoP norm, they are expected to themselves “(...) spread the norm across
communities”, as the Initiative states, like a kind of RtoP evangelism (GCRtoP, 2011: 1).
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2.4 Critical Statements and Resolutions in the Development of RtoP
In the last section three plans of RtoP were discussed which showed that RtoP thinking has a topdown trajectory and that it is cosmopolitan in orientation. This section certainly finds evidence for the
latter side to the RtoP narrative and sees it informing the documents discussed below.
It should be noted first that RtoP has received broad attention in UN fora and not all
documents can be reviewed due to space restraints. The most important ones, which illustrate the
continuity in RtoP's development within the UN and norm path dependence, have been selected here.
It is argued here that RtoP is not more than a crystallization point28 in the deepening of humanitarian
law - a process in which the welfare of people is becoming more important than that of states (ACIA,
2010:8). RtoP should thus be seen as a broader development in international law, as well as a part of a
holistic humanitarian approach to global problems. Like in the last section, our issue network model is
further informed here by the expanded role of the UN, its Exec and civil society, which can be deduced
from these documents.
First, it will be argued that one 1998 SC Presidential Statement formed the point of departure
in the development of RtoP in the UN. Second, a Presidential Statement a year later enlarged the UN's
scope on the implementation of humanitarian law. Third, the 2005 Outcome Document will be briefly
relayed and it will be evident how much in line it was with the 1999 SC Presidential Statement. Finally,
SC Resolution 1674 will be discussed.
2.4.1 Security Council Statement by the President of the Security Council
On June 29, 1998, the SC Statement formally reacted to the item Children and Armed Conflict. On
behalf of the President: “The Security Council expresses its grave concern at the harmful impact of
armed conflict on children” (S/PRST/1998/18: 1). The Statement notes that forced displacement, child
soldiering and sexual abuse, among other things must stop. In paragraph 4, the Statement calls for
compliance with the Geneva conventions of 1899 and 1907, and their Additional Protocols of 1949
and 1977 as well as for states to prosecute those who breach these and other international
28
A crystallization point occurs when cumulative fluid processes culminate in a singular, tangible, hard result.
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humanitarian laws. In paragraph 7, the Statement further pledges to make humanitarian assistance
readily available, especially to women and children. The Statement includes the SC’s resolve to tackle
the problem of mines in the same paragraph.
This Statement, therefore, articulates the SC’s will to protect those most vulnerable in conflict.
It includes a variety of conceptually linked topics which foster holistic humanitarian thinking. This
should be seen as the first formal step in the process of RtoP.
2.4.2 Security Council Statement by the President of the Security Council
In February of 1999, a half year after the SC accepted the role of international custodian of women
and children; it expanded its mandate to protect all citizens. First, a look will be taken at how this
Statement acknowledges its environmental context and the importance of human security thinking
therein. Second, some important similarities between the Statement and future plans for
implementation discussed above will be noted. Third and fourth divergence and discrepancies
between this Statement and future RtoP plans are explained.
Paragraph 2 of section 1 posits that “(…) hardly a day goes by where we are not presented with
evidence of the intimidation, brutalization, torture and killing of helpless civilians in situations of
armed conflict” (S/1999/957: 1). The problem of predatory states “(...) relying instead on terror as a
means of control over populations” is noted in paragraph 3 (ibid). Paragraph 8, notably, further opens
the door to RtoP, as it points to the changed international conflict milieu and “(...) the consequence of
the deliberate targeting of non-combatants” (ibid). It states that violence is frequently perpetrated by
“(...) non-state actors, including irregular forces and privately financed militias” (ibid: 2). In this we
recognize Kaldor as well as the cosmopolitan missions of the organizations and plans examined in the
previous two sections.
Critically the Statement embraces the concept of human security as of overarching importance
in its concluding remark: “Despite the precedence of law, norms and principles, physical security often
needs to be assured before legal protection” (ibid: 24). Like the previous statement, it invokes the
Conventions in addition to the problem of IDPs in paragraph 11 and 12 of section A-C in part 2. Section
D and E of part 2, respectively stress the “Specific problems faced by children” and the “Specific
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problems faced by women”. In section H, the problem of mines mentioned in the first Statement is
reiterated, this time including a discussion of small arms. Sections F and G touch on the denial of
humanitarian aid and the targeting of peacekeeping personnel. The final sections of part 2 discuss the
adverse impact that general sanctions have on populations. There is thus a good deal of continuity in
subject matter with the previously discussed plans seen clearly in the continued holistic humanitarian
approach.
In some of the prescriptions in part four, the President pre-empts the ICISS. For example, the President
recommends the use of targeted sanctions in Recommendation 22. In paragraph 67: “In situations the
Security Council should be prepared to intervene under Chapter VII of the Charter (ibid: 21). Like in
the ICISS’s articulation this may occur only in cases of last resort: “The exhaustion of peaceful or
consent-based efforts to address the situation (...)” (ibid: 24). The Statement argues that it is now
generally recognized that “(…) the maintenance of international peace and security requires action by
the Security Council at all stages of a conflict” (ibid). The Statement goes on to show that the Council
commits itself to preventing disputes from escalating into violence and to play a role in peace building
after conflict is over, including "(...) the administration of justice to those who have violated
international humanitarian or human rights law" (ibid: 7). In this regard, the anointing of the
international community with a residual RtoP, as done in the ICISS Report, seems less progressive.
Not only is this Statement consistent on its terms with future plans; it is also similar in its
thinking. Almost in prophetic pre-emption of RtoP criticism, the SC President recommends in
paragraph 40 to “(…) enhance confidence in their [undertaken actions] legitimacy and deter
perceptions of selectivity or bias toward one region or another”, thereby demonstrating an awareness
of the strong-weak state discord which would flow from RtoP (ibid: 22). It should, thus be observed
here that this Statement is in some ways sibylline, lending credence to the assertion that there was no
great transition in humanitarian thinking. If there had been, a prediction of future hurdles would have
been almost impossible to make.
Divergence in some cases is caused by the Statement going further than the ICISS Report, for
example by calling for “Rapidly deployable units of military and police are also required”, when the
ICISS simply laments the fact that the UN has no force of its own (ibid: 18, ICISS, 2001: 52). Also, the
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Statement is more insightful than the ICISS Report in some areas as evinced by Recommendation 34,
which asks the SC to “Confirm that regional organizations have the capacity to carry out an operation
according to international norms and standards before authorizing their deployment, and put in place
mechanisms whereby the Council can effectively monitor such operations,” because as Haugevik has
pointed out (referenced in section 2.2), regional organizations lack the capacity to function as full
partners of the UN in security planning (ibid, 20). Generally, it must be deduced here that formal
thoughts on implementation of RtoP type sentiment existed as early as the last century.
On the other hand there are some noticeable discrepancies which speak to the political development
of RtoP. One recommendation the Statement makes is that states could bring disputes and make
recommendations to the SC. In the Focal Points initiative on the other hand, state apparatuses are
encouraged to become a part of the UN Exec’s Early Warning Mechanism. This can be associated with
the shift in conflict prevention management leadership from the SC to the UN Exec. The President
concludes - similarly to Resolution 1674’s call for what would become Ki-moon’s 2009 Implementing
the Responsibility to Protect - that “(...) it will be important to establish an agreed mechanism and
timetable for follow-up and review” (ibid). In addition, the President pledges, “I stand ready to report
regularly to the Council on progress achieved,” not unlike Ki-moon, a decade later (ibid). The
Statement further stresses the importance of neutral information production, but does not name civil
society as a partner. A far less extensive role than the one witnessed today is awarded civil society in
the President's recommendation of Confidence Building: efforts to reintegrate combatants and former
enemies in once hostile societies. Footwork in comparison to the GCRtoP organizing the Focal Points
initiative , not a decade later. The President also announces measures to combat hate media in
recommendation 16, whereas in the WFUNA Plan, media is not silenced but applied to affect a
favorable result.
In short, the Presidential Statement embraces the concept of human security, and in taking a holistic
humanitarian approach shares notable similarities in other areas with future plans and the
aforementioned 1998 Statement. Areas of divergence sometimes stem from precocious and astute
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reasoning on RtoP related topics. Discrepancies on the other hand can be related to the development
of RtoP and its expansion and accentuation of certain actor roles, notably that of civil society and the
UN Exec. Furthermore, one can certainly speak of path dependence, especially with regard to
continuity in RtoP sentiment.
2.4.3 Paragraph 138-139 of the World Summit Outcome Document 2005
Defined as a watershed moment, the Outcome Document should be regarded as a congealed version
of the ICISS Report in some key respects. First, it recognizes pillar I of RtoP – that the state has the
duty to protect its own citizens. In addition though, the international community pledges to uphold
pillar II of RtoP by “(…) helping states build capacity” and to assist "(…) those which are under stress
before crises and conflicts break out” (A/60/L.1: Par 138). The Outcome Document concretizes the
mass atrocities mentioned in the ICISS Report by incorporating the core crimes of the Rome Statute:
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, plus ethnic cleansing (ibid). Prevention of these
crimes should be affected, non-committaly “(…) through appropriate and necessary means” (ibid). The
signatories of the Document also pledge to “(…) help States to exercise this responsibility and support
the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability” (ibid). In the following paragraph, 139,
the international community takes note of the peaceful tools which it has at its disposal, to prevent
these crimes. Similarly to the 1999 Statement Presidential commitment, the Paragraph states that the
international community is “(...) prepared to take collective action in a timely and decisive manner,
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case
basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means
be inadequate (…)” (ibid). The Document asks the GA to consider the matter further, as it is still doing.
In short therefore, the WS Outcome Document is certainly not more than a crystallization point.
There is marked continuity between it and the 1999 Statement of the SC, which takes a pro-active
approach to preventing atrocities by proposing plans. It must not be forgotten, however, that the
Outcome Document represents the entire world; it is thus necessarily tapered, not so much to please
all, but to prevent trespassing of individual interests. The focus is therefore on the major provisions of
RtoP and rather than offering an institutionalized legal mechanism it leaves the resolution of cases to
be worked out through precedent and practice, thereby making it wholly recognizable as a negotiated
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regime.
2.4.4 Security Council Resolution 1674
The Resolution is the third to address the protection of citizens in armed combat. It reaffirms the
important Geneva Conventions and their Protocols. In paragraph 2.9, it calls on all states to ratify
humanitarian treaties. Also, it reaffirms the earlier adopted resolutions on the protection of civilians
1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000), as well as Resolution 1631, which stipulates the SC’s intention to
maintain peace and security in cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations, as per the
recommendations of the ICISS and as stated in the Outcome Document. The SC “Reaffirms the
provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity" (S/RES/1674: 1). It will be argued that the Resolution and its holistic humanitarian approach
is a part of a larger process in the development of RtoP and that it underlines the principle of human
security. A look will be also be taken at how the Resolution understands the role of the UN and the SG
in the process.
The sixth paragraph of the Resolution notes the effect of small arms and their trafficking on conflict
areas. The SC also reiterates its previous objection to the targeting of aid workers in combat. Children
and the prevention of child soldiering, human trafficking and sexual slavery are the subjects of the
eighth paragraph. The prohibition on the forced displacement of civilians is a recurring theme
throughout. Finally, the SC also calls for ending impunity of crimes committed in war and it asks states
to practice their prerogative of universal jurisdiction with regard to these crimes. Though in the
greater scheme of things and less important than fundamental security issues, the report still calls all
parties to make arrangements for “(...) the facilitation of early access to education and training”, in
paragraph 2.11 (ibid: 3). The importance of a comprehensive approach for cooperation between
member states, as later argued for in the Focal Points initiative is stressed here first. The Resolution
also calls for reform and development, as the WFUNA Plan does: “(…) promoting economic growth,
poverty eradication, sustainable development, national reconciliation, good governance, democracy,
the rule of law, and respect for, and protection of, human rights” (ibid: 2).
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In the third paragraph, the Resolution accepts “(…) in this regard that development, peace and
security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing,” hereby accepting the premise of
human security, broadly invoked in the ICISS Report (ibid: 1). Furthermore, it acknowledges the
changed international conflict milieu in the fifth paragraph, by “Expressing its deep regret that civilians
account for the vast majority of casualties in situations of armed conflict” (ibid).
In its final acknowledgement, the SC points again to its responsibility to maintain peace and security
“(…) and underlining the importance of taking measures aimed at conflict prevention and resolution”
(all italics in original) (ibid: 2). The SC also asks the SG to continue his referral of information and
analyses on issues he deems important, in addition to “(…) continue consultations and take concrete
steps to enhance the capacity of the United Nations in this regard” (ibid: 5). The SG’s position is also
underlined in paragraph 2.15, as the SC “(…) invites the Secretary-General to fully associate him from
the earliest stages of the planning of United Nations peacekeeping and other relevant mission”, even
though military planning is solely within the purview of the SC (ibid: 3). The UN Exec’s expansion is
given a nod of approval in that the SC "(…) underlines the importance of a coherent, comprehensive
and coordinated approach by the principal organs of the United Nations, cooperating with one
another and within their respective mandates" (ibid: 2). The Resolution thus opens the door for UN
specialization on the topic of RtoP in which the SG is invited to play a role of importance.
Looking at the four documents discussed here, it should be emphasized that the development of RtoP
should be seen in the light of a holistic humanitarian approach in which certain themes reoccur.
Human security and the humanitarian and human rights norms enshrined therein are omnipresent in
these documents, underlining the cosmopolitan mode of thinking therein. In this, we can certainly say
that a process involving path dependence has taken place with regard to RtoP. Central is the role of the
UN, which accepts an important part for itself in seeing the realization of RtoP. It cannot go unnoticed
that whereas these plans were written by the SC President in 1998 and 1999, now they are written by
the SG. Judging from the plans and the documents together, the role of the SG can seen to be
expanding. A significant role for civil society is noticeably absent in these plans, when we now know
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that the RtoP civil society was and is vital to the emergence of the norm. This too invites tentative
referral to the primacy of the executive and civil society in the issue network.
Annotations in Anticipation of Analysis...
This chapter has served to give an overview of RtoP politics - from emergence of its sentiment in
international legal documents to its implementation by identifiable actors. Crucially for this thesis, this
chapter has filled in the variables of the issue network governance model.
This chapter started by looking at the contextual circumstances under which RtoP emerged as
well as the role played by certain individuals and organizations therein. Section two of this chapter
discussed the importance of 1) the UN; 2) states and regions; 3) civil society. In section three we
looked at the representation of RtoP in the ICISS, the Focal Points initiative and the WFUNA plan.
Finally, this chapter has looked at the development of RtoP in international law using two SC
Presidential statements, the WS Outcome Document and Resolution 1674.
This chapter has started by looking at the global social climate through which RtoP emerged.
The connection of the norm to changing forms of warfare is a running theme throughout the
discussed plans and documents as well. Some other important conclusions must also be drawn from
this chapter. First, it must be noted that RtoP has a decidedly Western orientation. This is categorically
recognizable not only in its origins in just war theory, but also the civil society organizations which
back the norm. The commissioning of RtoP GANs by Western governments and foundations further
underlines the occidentality of the norm. RtoP became universal as more states recognized themselves
or their neighbors in RtoP scenarios and acceded what became the negotiated RtoP regime.
Nevertheless RtoP politics remain ostensibly regional. Second, it must be noted that RtoP is clearly
cosmopolitan, as human security thinking is central in both the plans and documents studied here.
The holistic humanitarian approach in humanitarian law development, including RtoP sentiment,
clearly pre-dates the 2005 RtoP acceptance. RtoP is therefore no more than a crystallization point. The
third point is that RtoP has a decidedly top-down trajectory, as is illustrated by the centrality of RtoP
decision-making in New York. RtoP politics clearly coalesces here as seen in the location of the GANs
and the UN. One can also discern that states seem to be routinely pressured from above, by the
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vertical socialization of the UN Exec, and from below, by the GAN socially engineered civil society. The
most salient note which must be made here is that a sound basis exists for evaluating RtoP using the
heuristic device of the issue network. The increased prominence of the UN Exec, the width and depth
of the civil society and their connection to states reflect an integrated network community. Also, we
can clearly recognize the profile of issue politicians in the biographies of the RtoP GAN staff. There can
be no doubt as to who is composing the metaphorical music and who is made to dance to its tunes, as
the interviews below will further evidence.
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3. Interview Reports
In the last chapter the cosmopolitan, top-down trajectory, Western and issue network nature of RtoP
was recognized. Analyzing official UN documents, the additional conclusion was drawn that RtoP was a
part of a larger transition in IPL. Phone interviews were held with four individuals from the three
heuristic staff groups to corroborate these findings. The interviews are relayed entirely in free-flowing
narrative, as this is the only form which captures the informal method in which these semi-structured,
respondent tailored interviews were conducted.
For the longest time, it was not clear any interviews would take place. Many outward bound
emails explaining the purpose of participation (corroboration of research results) were sent, but only
very few were returned, most of them offering instead to answer an email with questions or
suggesting some “good” articles on RtoP which had about as much depth as newspaper articles. This
being said, only the cream of the heuristic groups’ crop was approached. Reiterating the desire to
speak about contentious RtoP subjects such as Western imperialism and legitimacy deficits, replies
were rarely received. Finally, these four interviewees came in through snow-ball leads. The conducted
interviews lasted for about an hour and with great time differences. The one with the PAO was held on
two separate occasions.
Due to the complex theoretical framework, questions were hard to formulate ad lib. Therefore,
a list of questions was sent in advance to identify my interest areas but also for the interviewee to
prepare answers in advance. This was done with the thought born in mind that the first answer to an
ambush question may not necessarily be the right one by dint of its surprise effect and that it might be
found distasteful to ask such direct and difficult questions immediately without any form of rapport.
The question list was therefore built up from general and innocuous, to challenging and antagonistic.
Questions did not feign neutrality: interviewees were asked what their reaction was to the contentious
research results.
Follow-up questions were crucial in the interviews. As became apparent from the answering,
the complexity of the questions required the explanation of some of their central terms after which
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the question had to be re-administered or re-phrased. To interpret the answers correctly, the
interviewer summarized what was said and asked if he had understood it as the interviewee had
meant it.
All in all, it was quite clear that the given answers were sincere. Nevertheless, answers
diverging from the research results might be explained by the vantage point of the actors and their
place in the narrative of RtoP. This is underlined by the contrast between the first three and the last
interviewee, the only career academic, who is markedly more critical.
3.1 Interview with Guusje Korthals, Dutch RtoP Specialist
The political executive Ms. Korthals has been the RtoP specialist on the Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Affairs UN desk since 2010. Her position pre-dates her by a few years, and before it carried the RtoP
epithet, spoke to “the prevention of the four major crimes”. Ms. Korthals has an employment history
in humanitarian related issues, having worked for the Dutch government in the area of peacekeeping
missions and European development aid. Ms. Korthals does not identify herself with the RtoP norm,
nor was she interested in the norm prior to the job offer. Nevertheless, today she believes that RtoP is
important and good. We may therefore deduce that idealism is not the only prerequisite to
involvement with RtoP.
To the question of whether RtoP is a crystallization point in RtoP, she answers that it is, but that
there are many others which are equally as important. The Netherlands, she acknowledges, have
played a salient role in the advocacy of the norm as a principle of international law. The Dutch
government initiates intergovernmental dialogue on, for example, the domestic codification of
international humanitarian laws as laid down in the Rome Statute. It also advocates state accession to
the ICC treaty itself. Prevention of conflict is a central Dutch objective, according to Ms. Korthals. The
Netherlands also play an important role in capacity building, she said, which she illustrated with the
examples of such projects in Kunduz and Burundi. We may therefore speak of Dutch norm
entrepreneurial activity and its participation in horizontal socialization.
On the topic of the UN, NGOs and CSOs, Ms. Korthals agrees that communication and
interaction is consistent and intensive mostly between the Dutch UN Permanent Representation, the
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GCRtoP and the UN. Ms. Korthals freely admits that the Dutch government is informed by information
provided by the GCRtoP and that the Dutch government is cognizant of the fact that this information
has a certain ontological trajectory. She argues that the Ministry does not unquestioningly accept this
information, but that it is the duty of the government to review all relevant information. She also
notes that much important information is still internally sourced. Nevertheless, the Dutch government
values the information produced by the GCRtoP, which is why it donates money to the Centre. Apart
from its independent role as an information provider, Ms. Korthals also points to the role of the
GCRtoP as a neutral mediator endowed with the ability to bring states together. As to the organizing
role played by the GCRtoP in the Focal Points initiative, Ms. Korthals is keen to point out that it is a
multilateral initiative in which the GCRtoP's role does not far surpass that of a forum facilitator. She
acknowledges, however, that the GCRtoP is a voice at the Focal Points initiative table, and that in the
agenda setting at the event, the GCRtoP had the ability to proffer points of discussion, as much as the
two other organizing states.
On the topic of a Western RtoP design bias, Ms. Korthals demurs. Instead she offers that
Western initiatives are more visible due to the financial resources available in Western countries. She
points to Africa as the most important example of the popularity of RtoP outside of the Western World.
On the other hand, one reason why Asia was markedly less enthusiastic about RtoP, she noted, was
due to its conceptualization of RtoP as an “ultimate”, whereas in Europe, she argued, we see
sovereignty as a responsibility.
3.2 Interview with Political Affairs Officer (PAO) of the UN Office of the Special Advisor on the
Prevention of Genocide.
The PAO’s responsibilities include liaising with the UN, making recommendations to the SG,
monitoring national situations, implementing the Early Warning Mechanism and generating
information on RtoP. The PAO has background in human rights through his work as an election
observer in Pakistan for the EU and as a research associate at the Carter Center, which in partnership
with Emory University works to advance human rights and alleviate human suffering. Before this, he
worked in research at Harvard JFK School of Government. The Office he works in is small (only ten
people), but it consists of individuals who have considerable expertise on the topic of RtoP. In the case
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of the PAO and his colleagues at the Genocide Office, we may speak of political executives.
Personally, the PAO does not consider himself to be a part of a global community of RtoP
idealists. Instead, he argued that RtoP is a good thing, but not a solution to the world’s woes.
Nevertheless, he elaborated that RtoP´s development is a remarkable one. There is no derogation
from Ms. Korthals's position here.
To his knowledge, the PAO observes that there are some system-wide problems with regard to
the implementation of the RtoP Early Warning Mechanism as well as other UN projects. One reason
for this is that states are unwilling to share sensitive information or intelligence with the UN. However,
he notes that there is a three-way problem at play here. The UN cannot always share information with
states either, nor can CSOs always inform the UN of what they know. This problem is most thorny
when it comes to conflict prevention. On the other hand, there are many cases of successful
cooperation between the UN and states. One example is the Latin American Network for Genocide
and Mass Atrocity Prevention, which the UN helped construct in collaboration with the Auschwitz
Institute for Peace and Reconciliation and the government of Argentina. The PAO also notes that the
UN plays a key role in training individuals to lead such initiatives. Notably, the PAO points to the Focal
Point initiative as an example of issue network engagement. Therefore, it can be deduced here that
the incorporation of state apparatuses in a global UN monitoring system is evoking some opposition.
Successful cooperation of the Issue network is hitherto quite pronounced. The UN also plays a role of
teacher here.
The PAO acknowledges that the UN Office on Genocide Prevention often consults members of
the epistemic community. With regard to the early warning mechanism, military specialists are often
invited into the office to give their views on plans, or to advise on certain procedures. The epistemic
community is also asked to contribute their thoughts on capacity building in phase two of RtoP. Again,
the PAO points to the Focal Points initiative as a plan in which the epistemic community policy experts
were tapped to inform government and UN policy. In the PAO's opinion, power and influence were not
relevant forces to CSO and NGO engagement in the RtoP Issue. He further rejected the concept of
advocacy network leveraging states or the UN as he considered the concept of leverage foreign to the
RtoP project. He accepted, however, that there was no doubt that information produced by these
organizations informed UN policy. Moreover, he agreed that there was a network which corresponded,
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consulted, collaborated and cooperated when it comes to RtoP. On the other hand, he said that the
existence of a collective decision-making process was negligible, as the decision-making power in the
UN is reserved entirely to states. Nevertheless, he conceded that states certainly allow their policy to
be circumscribed by the process of mutual consultation. The PAO also resisted the term “network”, as
he said that not all elements were consistently, formally or structurally connected. He preferred to
speak of an RtoP community. Nevertheless, as is theorized, the issue network defines itself by its
informality and influence rather than its power – the PAO defined the network as it is posited in this
thesis.
To the PAO, the UN is the logical place for the development of RtoP. The role of the UN, the
PAO agreed, has been accentuated in the process of RtoP development. We have seen a greater
integration of offices and centralization of information production within the UN, he surmised. The SG
has played a role in terms of defining the UN´s vision. Moreover, he has engaged member states in
dialogue to accede the norm directly. In his understanding, the PAO also thinks that the Office of the
Prevention of Genocide has become more important too. Since RtoP has become “mainstream”, the
Office is implicated in more general UN projects; he and his colleagues are often called in for
consultation and they provide singularly important information to relevant decision makers, not least
of course the SC and states through the GA. Therefore, we may conclude here that the role of the UN
Exec is expanding as a result of the development of RtoP. Clearly, this expansion is related to its
position as an independent information provider, in which we of course see Abbott and Snidely.
To the question of “who elected the good guys” and RtoP’s lacking democratic legitimacy, the
PAO pointed to the broader political problem of bureaucracies. Nevertheless, he accepted that a lack
of legitimacy is a political reality which cannot be escaped. Competence, he says, is more important
than democratic process here, which is hardly attainable given the globality of the issue. That being
said, the SG goes to lengths to consult member states about his appointments. A legitimacy deficit is
therefore the name of the game.
The PAO first refused to accept that RtoP is Western by design. He pointed to African
experimentations with RtoP and cogent efforts on that continent to prevent conflict. He agreed that
this often had to do with their experience with the four crimes. He said he understood why the
question was asked, but did not address RtoP’s origins in just war. He also accepted that Asia in
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general was not as receptive to the norm as Western countries, but advocated a holistic, particularistic
approach to the international RtoP politics which he understood as a universal concept. As to why
Western countries were such strong supporters of RtoP and were keener to delegate authority to the
UN Exec, he could not answer. He acknowledged, however, that it was a good question. As with Ms.
Korthals, the PAO's acceptance of the universality of RtoP may speak more to the prevalent discourse
on RtoP than whether or not RtoP is in fact universal.
3.3 Interview with Rachel Shapiro of the World Federalist Movement and the International Coalition
for the Responsibility to Protect.
Ms. Shapiro's interest in RtoP budded while learning about the prevention of mass atrocities. She
entered the ICRtoP as an intern in 2009, and became a program associate in August, 2011. Her
responsibilities include the preparation and compilation of educational tools to promote “the norm of
RtoP” awareness and consensus. For the diffusion of these tools, she makes frequent, almost exclusive
use of the internet. Ms. Shapiro felt compelled to refrain from commenting hitherto.
As to whether Ms. Shapiro considered herself an idealist, she opted not to answer. On the
other hand, she did not necessarily take exception to the concept that international law was in a
transitory process from the protection of state sovereignty to a focus on the individual. When probed,
she explained that RtoP was a new political norm, but that she did not want to invite a discussion as to
the legitimacy of cosmopolitanism. It should not necessarily be assumed here that Ms. Shapiro hid
anything other than perhaps her idealism; her reluctance to speak may be a result of the desire to
eschew critical, ridiculing voices on RtoP.
With regard to the role of the epistemic community in RtoP, Ms. Shapiro offered that there was
a sizeable group of people with differing professional backgrounds within the coalition itself. She
noted that academics and professionals were at the centre of this epistemic community on RtoP. She
noted that the coalition also included African law associations working on strengthening domestic rule
of law. In addition, she argued that there was significant overlap within the diverse coalition, as RtoP
was a broad subject, incorporating many diverging NGO subject areas.
On the topic of whether information was used as leverage to coax, she stressed that the ICRtoP
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does not engage in nation specific advocacy. On the other hand, she noted that the organization
would engage regions by setting up meetings and tailoring information and consultations to the
regional structural design (the presence of early warning mechanisms, judicial bodies) - in a word:
framing. The overarching goal therein is always the achievement of consensus. In addition, Ms.
Shapiro said that her organization engaged both the UN, state governments and spoke to officials and
diplomats. In this “effective cooperation is key”. Governments, the UN and the ICRtoP co-author
reports, organize events and workshops. Especially the structures of NGOs allow intensive
collaborations. An example she noted was the General Assembly Dialogue Initiative, for which the
Coalition has devised tools to educate countries on the RtoP Pillars. The Initiative brings the states
together before the start of the Assembly, to initiate dialogue early and make the Assembly meeting
as profitable as possible. This one pure form of policy circumscribing, noted by P.M. Haas.
Ms. Shapiro chose not to speak on the subject of the connection between RtoP and federalism.
She rejected the proposition that RtoP was Western by design, her counterplea being that RtoP was a
global initiative.
3.4 Interview with Sara Davies of the Global Responsibility to Protect Journal
Dr. Davies is the founding co-editor of the quarterly issued Global Responsibility to Protect (GRTOP)
which is the only journal on the topic of RtoP. The GRtoP is highly authoritive and broadly recognized,
as the most important thinkers on the issue of RtoP have published in it; among others its architects
Deng, Luck and the ICISS Commissioners. Through her position as the editor of GrtoP, Dr. Davies is at
the nexus of the academic and practitioners’ world and thus ideally placed to make thorough
observations on RtoP, its development and the people involved in the RtoP community, as the PAO
named it. She became interested in RtoP following her research in refugee law, and RtoP's permeance
into that subject area in the early 2000's. Dr. Davies (together with Alex Bellamy) has also been
awarded a research grant to design an early warning and prevention atrocities model which predicts
the likelihood of genocide. She is therefore a clear example of a policy specialist of the RtoP epistemic
community. In terms of idealism, she sees herself more as an observer. Nevertheless, she
acknowledges that the GRtoP has certainly contributed to an idealistic RtoP movement. Dr. Davies is
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thus more comfortable with the term of idealism than the previous interviewees.
Technology has been crucial to elucidate areas of contention caused by ignorance, Dr. Davies
said. For example, she notes that the Asia-Pacific Centre regularly used monthly policy reports in the
early years to ensure that R2P was conceptually separated from humanitarian intervention. Also, the
Centre used their website to establish track records of states and regions supporting international
efforts to prevent the four crimes linked to R2P. Dr. Davies concluded that the internet has been great
for sharing information, but that direct interaction is still important. Therefore, it may be noted here
that while technology can facilitate communication and plays an important role in leverage politics,
RtoP is personal. It should also be side-noted how the internet is used as a naming and shaming
mechanism
As to whether the RtoP advocacy environment has been hospitable to academics, Dr. Davies
says that yes, many academics are engaged in RtoP promotion. She bifurcates between two types of
academics, however. There are the political academics who work with the diluted WS norm accepted
by states and there are the normative academics. The normative academics cannot disengage
themselves from the non-diluted RtoP norm as proffered prior to the 2005 WS. They still call for the
engagement criteria and SC veto-moderation as proposed in the ICISS Report. Political academics like
Luck, (and the PAO discussed above) work with what they have, Dr. Davies says. This speaks to the
importance of the epistemic community in RtoP, which has contributed some of its own to official
ranks.
On the topic of discourse, Dr. Davies thinks that there is a political, consensual discourse which
has been created by the RtoP issue network. This discourse has inhibited some state action, for
example in quelling uprisings. Sovereignty, as responsibility, she argues, is becoming an embedded
norm in international society. She also notes that the issue network can vanquish opposition through
its ability to expose non-complying actors. She thinks that today, there is a consensus that R2P is not a
legally binding instrument or principle; it simply provides a framework for understanding the
significance of existing legal instruments that states have agreed to. Continued consolidation of
sovereignty as a responsibility will pose a big challenge for sovereigns, she predicts. Currently,
however, physical (state) boundaries still inhibit Network reach. Therefore, Dr. Davies agrees that
there is something of a hegemonic discourse when it comes to RtoP, which can punish dissention with
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political neutralization and can shape domestic conduct.
Resoundingly, Dr. Davies declared the idea that only Western democratic states care about
RtoP issues false. She acknowledges that this may have been the case immediately after the Cold War.
In this she actually affirms the question on the origins of RtoP, which suggests that RtoP is Western by
design, but has become universal.
Finally, Dr Davies acknowledged that the ICRtoP and the GCRtoP are the largest organizations
working on RtoP. She notes that these organizations have been very conscientious of the need to be
broadly representative and to engage actors across regions and issues. She remarks, however, that
their time might be coming to an end as they are becoming victims of their own success. Many of the
initial goals have been achieved and some never will, in addition to money being a big problem. Also,
the UN Joint office for Genocide Mass Atrocities and R2P is now doing a lot of civil society’s work in
many respects. Dr. Davies points out, however, that the GANs were best placed in the beginning to call
upon states to fulfil their duties to protect their populations. As Ms. Korthals pointed out, the very fact
that the WFM was impartial may have been the reason states listened to the organization. It should
therefore be deduced here that Dr. Davies is pointing to the possible end of the RtoP issue life cycle.
In conclusion it must therefore be noted that these interviews have corroborated, challenged and
elucidated our theoretical framework and empirical material. In addition, it has proffered some new
insights, such as that the WFM and GCRtoP are seen as neutral mediators bringing states together. In
addition, this thesis has also not yet envisaged the end of the RtoP issue, as Dr. Davies does. The
interviews have also shown how conflicted RtoP is. On the one hand it is an expression of idealism as it
asserts a responsibility to do good (save lives) and on the other hand, its implementation is marked by
the realities of international politics, as the PAO noted. This is underlined by Dr. Davies, finding that
idealism was clearly seen in some engaged in the RtoP project, namely the normative academics, but
that it was the political academics like the PAO who worked with RtoP in its current form. It explains
why the PAO did not recognize the impetus of idealism in himself, despite his prolonged engagement
in normative politics. The possible exception might have been Ms. Shapiro, as the only issue politician
in the pool, but we will never know that for certain. Remembering the Senator, we must remain
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critical of what the political executives and the issue politician said, especially with regard to our own
research results. Elsewhere, the interviews have underlined the importance of information and its
control and diffusion in addition to the importance of technology therein. Much more importantly, the
interviews yield proof for the RtoP issue network and the circumscribing of state policy by the UN and
the RtoP civil society. Discourse is acknowledged as being of profound importance in the RtoP
socialization process and it is applied directly by the RtoP GANs to leverage states, Dr. Davies said. In
the case of the Netherlands, horizontal socialization takes place through inter-governmental dialogue.
Critically, the PAO accepted the symbioses of the RtoP issue, the UN and particularly the UN exec
therein. Both Ms. Korthals and Ms. Shapiro were receptive to the proposition that RtoP was a part of a
greater development of international law, but not very enthusiastically. The statement that RtoP was
originally European was challenged vehemently by all, but notably Dr. Davies accepted that after the
Cold War, this may have been the case. Legitimacy was noted as a problem by the PAO, which
transcended all forms of executive politics – from the domestic to the global, thereby definitively
inviting Heclo.
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4. Analysis
In the first chapter of this thesis, the conceptual tools for understanding RtoP were discussed. We
have looked at what the third debate could offer us in this regard, by enumerating relevant actors and
the methods through which they engage in global politics. The issue network model has been
introduced and processes of norm emergence in the global sphere have been viewed through a
constructivist prism of legitimacy as well as a legalistic one. RtoP’s history, actors and its
representation in plans and legal documents have also been spoken to. Here, sense is made of the
RtoP norm through the received knowledge prism of chapter 1. This chapter brings all the discussed
material together and its upshot will be that the posited thesis can be concluded and the generalized
issue network theory can be introduced.
First, an overview will be given of the climate in which RtoP emerged as this elucidates our
understanding of how theory is created. In addition, it answers to the reflective line this thesis tows.
Much more importantly, it helps us understand how the humanitarian norm of RtoP emerged.
Hereafter, the conceptual heart of this thesis follows by discussing the five aspects to the RtoP
narrative: 1) RtoP as a global issue network; 2) RtoP as a Western project; 3) RtoP as a deepening of
humanitarian law; 4) RtoP as a cosmopolitan project; and 5) RtoP as a top-down functioning norm and
mechanism.
The end of the Cold War saw the inclusion of more and different actors on the stage of global politics
in the face of the weakening institution of the nation state. Many of the constructivists also point to
the increased interdependence of world actors. Global politics therefore became more complex, as
underlined by P.M Haas and Abbott and Snidal. In this world, information developed as a valuable
commodity for which not all states could satisfy their own appetite independently. IOs, CSOs and
NGOs, with their excellent information providing skills became eminent figures in a loose-jointed play
of influence, to use Heclo's words. Especially NGOs and CSOs, the ICISS noted, started to shape
international policy recognizably.
We have also witnessed a change in theory with regard to the concept of governance. This is
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best seen by analogy in the juxtaposition of the iron-triangle and the issue network theory seen in the
1970's on the one hand, and regime theory and TAN type theory today on the other. In the 1970's this
change was caused by the informalization of political life and the politicizing of CSOs and NGOs.
Whereas in the period preceding and immediately following the Cold War the intstitutionalist, microeconomic regime thinking was dominant, in the last decade or so, a normative, holistic approach is
gaining ground as is for example exemplified by the cross-over of positivists (quantitative
constructivists), to the constructivist research agenda. But there is also a relation between theory,
empirical observations and the logic in those empirical observations: naturally research into a world
governed by security and economic contingencies will yield a theory which articulates that mode of
thinking; a study into a world of humanitarian integration will yield a theory continuous with that
world. The world today seems to know a more decentralized form of governance than the bi-polar
Cold War world, as control is flowing away from states and into the hands of the UN Exec and RtoP
civil society in their capacity of information providers, echoing Heclo. Moreover, as Heclo theorized,
this new mode of governance is causing a conflict policy, as argued below with regard to sovereignty
and humanitarianism.
The end of the Cold War also saw the ascendancy of the West. There was a Western
consortium hegemony which introduced (more) humanitarian norms to the world, as pointed out by
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink. The post-Cold War period saw failing states, a change in warfare and UN
institutional failure to act. This had disastrous consequences, as was the case in Srebrenica and
Rwanda. Therefore, RtoP did not enter the world on a bed of roses. In addition, the norm in existence
today is not the one proposed by the ICISS. It still lacks an autonomous logic and mechanism as is
central to powerful regimes, Strauss argues. But there are important areas in which RtoP discourse is
becoming hegemonic, as Davies pointed out, and support is being tried and tested with success as
seen in the case of Libya. Now we have what Young calls a negotiated RtoP regime - a piecemeal
construction of the diverse global positions on the norm. The norm has therefore become universal, as
the interviewees were so eager to point out.
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4.1 The Responsibility to Protect Issue Network
Understanding the role of the RtoP global issue network commences with an understanding of the
interplay of agency, identity and structure and the concept of learning and teaching. These concepts
are the tools and playing field of the students and teachers of the global sphere and we certainly see
their applicability with regard to the RtoP issue network. The network consists of three pillars: 1) the
UN, 2) Rtop issue civil society; and 3) states, as is schematically depicted in figure 5. First, a look is
taken at the general characteristics of the issue network. Hereafter, the pillars of the RtoP network are
discussed in consecutive order.
Great similarities exist between the observations in this thesis and Heclo’s theory. For example, there
is evidence for RtoP consensual knowledge in the combatting of poverty and the promotion of good
governance – the human security approach. In this shared-knowledge group no-one seems to be
exclusively in control of the issue. Those involved in the issue have at least an intellectual commitment
to RtoP. Though states are the only ones with political power, as the PAO pointed out, their lack of
knowledge on the subject makes them dependent on exogenous forces to coordinate and inform their
agency. This is illustrated by the Dutch government donating money to the GCRtoP for information.
There have been important manifestations of this network in the form of the ICISS project: it was
commissioned by a government, its panel consisted of GA members and it was funded, facilitated and
counseled by civil society. Another example, the PAO noted, is the Latin American Network for
Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention. Contrary to Marres’s belief that issue networks function
antagonistically of the established order, the RtoP issue civil society functions at the core of
international politics in New York, impacting it before it has even occurred, such as in the ICRtoP’s
General Assembly Dialogue. This speaks to the centrality of RtoP in global politics in the 21 st century.
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The RtoP Issue
Network
State
Apparatuses
Global Civil
Society
Epistemic
community
WFM
GANs
ICRtoP
The UN
(particularly
Westen
states)
The UN Exec/
SG
GCRtoP
Genocide
Office
(WFUNA)
RtoP Discourse
information
Figure 6: The RtoP Issue
Network
As Finnemore and Sikkink have pointed out, the UN’s distinct structural features and role as an
impartial arbiter and legitimater have lent the norms it promotes an air of credibility. The ICISS
underlines that this has certainly been the case for RtoP. The SC showed an early interest in some of
the major themes of RtoP, but then bargained an RtoP which did not encroach on their individual
preferences too much, as is common in negotiated regimes. The GA has limited power, but it has some
influence in effecting opinio juris. As of yet it has not used this influence with regard to RtoP, since it
could not agree on the terms of RtoP implementation. The UN Exec has shown a demonstrable
interest in RtoP since Annan’s Millennium speech, which gave impetus to the ICISS commission,
though RtoP sentiment in the SG can be traced back to Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace. Ki-Moon has
not only been responsible for articulating an RtoP vision, but also for taking measures to implement
the norm. It should also be noted that the SG has become more prominent over the course of the
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years, seen clearly in a comparison of the documents to his role today. Whereas in 1999 it was the
President of the SC writing plans and recommendations smacking of RtoP sentiment, since 2008 it has
been the SG who writes plans for the implementation of RtoP. The ICISS invites the SG to step up his
involvement under Charter Article 99 and posits that the logical point of RtoP delegation would be the
SG's office, even speaking of a leadership role for the SG. Resolution 1674 invites the SG to take on this
role of leadership by offering him to take part in military planning. Ki-moon’s subsidiary, the Genocide
Office, has become increasingly more prominent and weighs in on important UN decision-making, the
PAO pointed out. The Office is now the hub for the implementation of the Early Warning Mechanism.
It is small, but filled with expertise according to the PAO. Also looking at the PAO’s background, one
can speak of RtoP political executives with regard to the Genocide Office. The original plan of
harnessing existing state apparatuses to resource intelligence is proving hard to bring into practice.
That the UN Exec's role has expanded noticeably as a result of RtoP is entirely in line with an
extrapolation of Heclo's theory to the global sphere and Orford’s belief that the UN Exec has played a
central role in influencing international policy, despite its extremely limited political power.
Critical to the RtoP issue network is the RtoP issue civil society, its role having expanded significantly as
can be deduced by comparison of the above documents to its role today. In the 1999 Presidential
Statement, no role of importance was allocated to CSOs. Today, the issue network co-authors reports
and organizes workshops and events together. A new role for issue civil society seems to be emerging,
as both Dr. Davies and Ms. Korthals underlined, in which CSOs such as the WFM and the GCRtoP are
valued as neutral mediators between countries.
The RtoP issue civil society consists of two principle groups: the RtoP epistemic community and
the RtoP GANs. The two groups overlap but they are not synonymous. As P.M. Haas notes, the
epistemic community complements the existing framework of state authority but does not supplant it.
This can be deduced from the make-up of the Focal Points initiative meeting in which 14 policy
specialists sat in for the states to consult. The RtoP epistemic community has a background in
academia and their presence is desired to elucidate complex issues. One way in which the epistemic
community has made its mark on RtoP is by inventing it. Deng's conceptual work at the Brooking's
Institution laid the foundation for RtoP thinking on sovereignty later seen in the ICISS. To this day the
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UN consults the epistemic community extensively on RtoP, the PAO agreed. This is in line with Heclo's
theory that due to the complexity of politics, civil society would be tapped for input. Dr. Davies is also
a member of the RtoP epistemic community. Through her research grant and her background in
subjects relating to humanitarianism, Dr. Davies should be seen as an RtoP epistemic community policy
specialist. Though Dr. Davies sees herself as an observer, she notes that there is indeed an idealistic
movement in the RtoP epistemic community.
The biggest RtoP GANs, Dr. Davies agreed, are the WFM, the GCRtoP, the ICRtoP and a number
of smaller, yet significant groups. GAN advocates such as Rachel Shapiro have a background in global
ethical subjects. As is evinced by the bibliographies of the staff at the RtoP GANs, one can certainly
speak of issue politicians with regard to the ICRtoP. These politicians know RtoP well; they are wellconnected and effectual in seeing RtoP's realization. Moreover, they are also bridge builders. As
Marres noted, patch-work coalitions of various organizations can be very effectual in the realization of
policy goals for GANs. The ICRtoP exemplifies this. Deeply differential NGOs, CSOs and individuals
therein recognize in the ICRtoP the solution to at least some of their plights. Sophisticated methods of
communication facilitate RtoP civil society practices, as Marres theorized. Database building, Marres
notes, plays an important role in this. The ICRtoP has an in-house social media coordinator and Ms.
Shapiro uses the internet to broadcast the ICRtoP’s message and to coordinate activity within the
Coalition. The WFUNA digital platform allows it to control educational tools, projects and information
from afar.
With regard to information politics, as discussed in Keck and Sikkink, the ICRtoP, WFUNA and
the GCRtoP are particularly committed to raising awareness – or what can also be called strategic
social construction. The WFUNA plan even states the desire to create educational tools for politicians
to use in the persuasion of their colleagues, thereby changing states from the inside out. Moreover,
the GCRtoP and the WFUNA plan make use of the media to inculcate society with certain messages. In
this, information is framed to regions and states, as Ms. Shapiro underlined. In addition, there is also
some evidence as to accountability politics, namely that the ICRtoP's mission goal states that it
commits itself to reminding the international community of its obligations to enforce jus cogens
crimes. On the other hand, there is little evidence of symbol politics, as extensive, noticeable
reference to Srebrenica or Rwanda could evince and is seen elsewhere in “RtoP histories”. Leverage
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politics is discussed below.
The Dutch government accepts that the GCRtoP is biased, but is open to its information
nonetheless. This is one form in which state policy is circumscribed by the RtoP GANs. This process of
consultation is standard operating procedure in the RtoP issue network, according to the PAO.
Moreover, the RtoP engaged GANs have also in part been responsible for the creation of an RtoP
discourse which Dr. Davies recognizes as constraining state agency in certain areas. In that regard, RtoP
is no different from the more general humanitarian discourse, which Matsukuma and Knight have
noted as playing a similarly disciplining role. Central to information politics is therefore a type of
conversion to the norm.
The third set of agents in RtoP are state officials and diplomats. Ms. Korthals is a political executive as
she is well versed in the theory of RtoP and is connected to some of the major organizations in RtoP
politics. On the other hand, extensive contact with the UN and the RtoP GANs is reserved for Dutch
UN permanent representation in, again, New York. The independence of the Dutch decision-making
procedure should not be questioned so much as the information and process of consultation by which
it comes to a deliberation. On a diet of the WFM governed GCRtoP information, a state's cognitive
understanding of its national interest and its constitutive regard of the system changes, as argued by
E.B. Haas. The word federalism is not in the WFM’s name for nothing.
This section has discussed in what ways the issue society has manifested itself with regard to RtoP. It
notes the centrality of the RtoP issue and its network is in global politics, despite Marres. The
importance of the UN Exec within the network was highlighted by reiterating its expansion as a result
of RtoP. The increased relevance of the RtoP issue civil society was also underlined and a note was
made on the strategic social construction GANs engage in. The importance of technology and
coalitions was stressed and the players in the RtoP network were identified as issue politicians, policy
experts and political executives. Finally, the RtoP discourse created by the GANs was touched on. The
section concluded by discussing the suplicance of states in the issue network. The argument here was
that through their dependence on information, states’ understanding of the situation and the system
could be easily manipulated, affecting their identity and actions. In short, Heclo and Marres were
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readily recognizable in discerning the RtoP issue network.
4.2 The Western Trajectory
The domestic and international logics of appropriateness, as found in, respectively, Finnemore and
Sikkink and Cole, play an important role in the development of (inter)national policy. It is at the
surface in Western states, where liberalism is woven into the fabric of society. This is expressed in
strong democratic beliefs, domestic altruism and an active civil society, as Neumayer notes (2005: 950).
These Western values are congruent with just war theory, as illustrated by the historical support for
humanitarian intervention in the West. Today, these values have expressed themselves in a Western
entrepreneurial role for RtoP. This section underlines the importance of the West in the promotion of
RtoP by looking first at the RtoP experience in the West, Africa and Asia. Second, the Western
orientation of the RtoP civil society is argued and a note is made on the legitimacy of RtoP.
As the domestic logic of appropriateness dictates, the very belief that international law is important
shapes agency and identity vis-à-vis the construction of a global legal order. Part of Dutch RtoP
activism is explained by article 90 of the Dutch constitution, which commits the state to the expansion
of the international legal order (ACIA, 2010: 61). Since the only way to expand international legal order
is to convince other states to subscribe to the program, the Dutch state is inherently norm
entrepreneurial. Moreover, the intergovernmental dialogue engaged in by the Dutch government,
noted by Ms. Korthals, is one pure form of peer pressure. The Dutch do not stand on their own as their
article 90 is recognizable in the mission of EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict.
Western states are the only ones to have incorporated RtoP in their policy and they were the first to
support RtoP in 2005. Within Europe, a rich network of RtoP prevention mechanisms are in place. This
being said, as Nadelman argues, there is nothing new under the sun in Western support - and in the
past downright imposition - of humanitarian norms. Naturally the humanitarian treaties regime is
consonant with the regions logic of appropriateness.
Africa’s role in RtoP has been an indeterminate one and not that of its harbinger, as Bellamy
points out. It is quickly forgotten that only two African countries openly supported RtoP in 2005, how
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badly Sudan was handled in 2008 and how opportunistically Africa ties in the rest of the world today
to solve the problems it cannot. Remembering Pattberg and Dingwerth, we may say that Africa is a
part of the RtoP norm framework, but as a rule taker and not as rule maker - a role which we can
ascribe to the West.
A stark contrast to the West on RtoP is seen in Asia, where the logic of appropriateness also
applies. China is a good example of the dynamic of the domestic logic of appropriateness. China sees
itself as a leader and its geopolitical position within international politics as the conveyer of the plight
of developing countries. However, this complicates its courting of a global leadership role, for which it
needs a receptive ear in the West. In addition, as Ms. Korthals pointed out, the Western world accepts
that RtoP is a responsibility, whereas in Asia the norm of non-intrusion is still deeply embedded in the
regional mentality. There, the traditional sovereignty regime informs the regions standards of
appropriateness. Needless to say, the region may pay lip-service to RtoP, but there is no real contest
between the non-intrusion norm and the RtoP norm here.
In addition, even though the RtoP issue civil society may be working toward what they perceive as an
altruistic goal, the fact that they are almost exclusively exponents of Western academia does not
speak to their impartiality as interlocutors in universal norm discourse, especially if we remember
Florini’s argument that identity is shaped by the nutrition of ideas. In addition, the fact that these
organizations are almost exclusively funded by Western governments and foundations further detracts
from the universality of the RtoP program. Moreover, it is hard to imagine that Burundi and
Afghanistan will be capacity building in the Netherlands any time soon, or that Yerevan and Kinshasa
based CSOs will orchestrate civil society programs in the US.
The discussion should also be regarded through the historical-situational prism argued by Lyon and
Dolan: the West is trying to promote a boundary eschewing norm in areas it once colonized. This is
also why the general strong-weak discord presented in chapter 1, in terms of substance is no different
from the RtoP strong-weak discord presented in chapter 2. The argument seen in Mohammed Ayoob’s
critique, that RtoP is thereby a form of moral neo-colonialism, may not necessarily be true, but RtoP's
Western origins cannot be hid. On the other hand we must not forget that it is also some of the most
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oppressive, norm-violating regimes in the world who still voiced their opposition to RtoP in 2009,
whereas other states accept the RtoP defined residual responsibility.
If Africa’s role is overstated, the Western orientation of the RtoP civil society cannot be understated.
The two lagics of appropriateness help us understand why RtoP norms were espoused by the West
and why they are less important in Asia in which the underpinnings of RtoP do not mesh with the
states’ profile or the conception of appropriateness in the region
4.3 Responsibility to Protect and the Development of International Law
As Cowhey and Long point out, regimes can be in contest with each other. As seen in the case of the
humanitarian treaties regime and the sovereignty regime. The latter is the primary ordering principle
in world politics and the UN was founded on its imperative. Today, global order is characterized by an
erosion of sovereignty, Dr. Davies underlined. This section argues the development of RtoP in
humanitarian law by focusing first on the state of sovereignty and second noting RtoP’s part as a spoke
in the wheel of humanitarian norm development.
Sovereignty was a conflicted principle in international law from the start. For example, the Charter
forbids intrusion into domestic affairs in a manner inconsistent with the UN Charter, whereas it can be
argued that the Charter sanctions intervention to safeguard the people within a state when it is
consistent with the Charter. A more formalized mechanism exists under Chapter VII, which allows the
SC to determine “threats to international peace and security”. As the Dutch Advisory Council on
International Affairs (ACIA) noted, this is a legal grey area since some domestic upheaval has also been
interpreted as such. The study of sovereignty here indicated that its conservative variant might be
approaching a lag.29
As argued above, states have an obligation to enforce jus cogens crimes under the ILC’s
29
On the other hand, we must not forget that in IPE, notable authors such as Geoffrey Garret (1998) have convincingly
challenged the assertion that sovereignty is receding with regard to global markets. The erosion of sovereignty may
therefore only be sectorial, as is argued here, in IPL. Nevertheless, the debate on sovereignty between these disciplines
exceeds the scope of this thesis.
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Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. This argument is underlined by the ICISS,
who argue the international communities’ residual responsibility to protect civilians. This entails that
when a state violates these standards, sovereignty loses its relevance.
RtoP is one of many milestones in the development of humanitarian law, Ms. Korthals noted, and it
was clearly preceded by a general RtoP sentiment. The trajectory of this development is upward –
toward more global humanitarian integration. This process started after the Cold War and there is
some formal evidence of holistic humanitarian thinking as early as the end of the last century in the SC
Presidential Statements of 1998 and 1999. The same themes keep returning: mines, protection of
women and children, access to humanitarian aid, protection of those who deliver it and invocation of
the Geneva Conventions. Notably, these documents evince an interest in resolving the problems of
IDPs - the same issue which would lead Deng to RtoP. Whereas the 1998 Presidential Statement starts
only with the protection of children, the 1999 statement already speaks to the protection of all
civilians. In addition, we trace the development in humanitarian thinking on sanctions from the grave
consequences of general sanctions noted in 1999, to the articulation of sophisticated, targeted
sanctions in the ICISS plan, resulting in the sparing of civilians in for example Libya. Like the RtoP
articulated in 2005 the 1999 SC Statement includes the acceptance of UN involvement in the
prevention of conflict. In addition, the wording of the residual responsibility to protect as accepted by
the SC in 1999 reads like the one accepted in 2005. It would be wholly accurate to speak of RtoP's path
dependence in a larger development of international law.
Dr. Davies pointed out that RtoP is nothing more than a mechanism to enforce existing legal
provisions, namely jus cogens laws. Some institutions for this were already in place, but under-utilized.
One example is the principle of universal jurisdiction for violators of jus cogens crimes. The 1999
Statement and Resolution 1674 continue to ask states to redress impunity where possible. In addition,
the ICISS notes that it is an integral part of the rebuilding process in an RtoP situation. The
consolidation of universal justice should therefore be seen as a part of the same development of
humanitarian law as RtoP, which is why it is a reoccurring subject in the legal documents speaking to
RtoP as well.
Thus, the humanitarian treaties regime is growing in significance in global politics. Some of this
Stefan Wermenbol – Master Thesis
July, 2012
may be attributable to the regenerative, self re-enforcing power of humanitarian modes of thinking
which affects the constitutive regards of states. If this is the case, we can expect greater consolidation
of humanitarianism in world politics in the future.
It has been argued here that irrespective of the RtoP challenge to sovereignty, the holes in this
principle were already in place rendering it leaky. Great continuity exists in RtoP and the larger, holistic
humanitarian development in international law as is seen in the discussed material.
4.4 Responsibility to Protect and Cosmopolitanism
Cosmopolitanism should be seen as the ontological purveyor of humanitarian law. It is holistic in scope,
eschewing boundaries for the greater good. In this world, cosmopolitanism is synonymous with
idealism because as P.M Haas wrote and Dr. Davies underlined, structural boundaries are central to
the current international system. This section details the centrality of cosmopolitan thinking in the
mission of RtoP and the confluence of idealism and practicality. This conflictedness is first spoken to.
Hereafter human security and global village thinking in the discussed work is looked at. In conclusion,
a note is made on the importance of the UN in cosmopolitan thinking.
According to Dr. Davies, RtoP also has an idealistic dimension. Therefore, the political academics,
Davies noted, have accepted the limitations of the WS diluted RtoP and they embody the synthesis of
the organic and the mechanic systems E.B. Haas talks about. RtoP is Janus-faced by necessity: it
accepts sovereignty because this is still a deeply entrenched principle of international politics, but it is
easy to tell that those engaged in RtoP wish for something better. The WFM’s call for global
government and its understanding of sovereignty, as stated above, should be regarded as
contradictory. In a confederacy, states can remain completely sovereign – only accepting rules
expressly agreed to. Federalism implies that a higher authority is centrally institutionalized and that
sovereignty is shared with states. For the federalists, RtoP in its unreserved acceptance of sovereignty
is therefore a compromise of ideals. Nevertheless, it is clearly a step in the right direction as it further
challenges sovereignty by encouraging its reconceptualization as a responsibility and not a license.
Stefan Wermenbol – Master Thesis
July, 2012
Not all states can comply with international standards due to management ineptitude, Chayes
and Chayes argue. Strictly speaking, the Dutch government does not owe Burundi a thing, especially
when it is in the midst of an economic recession. Capacity building is one such feature of global
altruism Lumsdaine describes, in what he calls the global village thinking, or what can be called the
human security approach. This is seen in the plans above or the discussed legal documents. Many also
stress the importance of educating and training individuals in RtoP norms, as Resolution 1674 is a
good example of. Envisagement of a global network of focal points, communicating, consulting and
preventing atrocities is inherently cosmopolitan, as it forms a direct challenge to parochial thinking.
Goodliffe and Hawkins point out that, normative thinking in humanitarian treaties outweigh
considerations of costs and benefits. In the words of the PAO, RtoP and the cosmopolitan modes of
thinking have become mainstream.
The UN plays a central role in this cosmopolitan effort. Its position as an IO pays it the
credibility of legitimater, neutral information provider and arbiter. Its name alone eschews the concept
of borders: the United Nations – the united peoples. It has also been argued that it is norms such as
RtoP which reinforce the UN's purpose. This is recognized in the PAO's agreeing that the UN has
expanded as a result of RtoP.
It follows that RtoP has meant a synthesis of idealism and practicality which can only be defined as
pragmatism. RtoP related projects are clearly cosmopolitan in both intent and scope. In conclusion, a
note must be made on the mutualistic symbiosis of the UN and RtoP.
4.5 The Top-Down Trajectory
This section is interested in control and legitimacy in global social relations. It starts by discussing the
importance of RtoP discourse. The process of socialization and social engineering are also touched on
here. This section concludes by drawing attention to the shortcomings of the spiral model, while
making a note on the problem of legitimacy in RtoP. Figure 6 offers a simplified illustration of how
states are pinched between RtoP socialization and social engineering.
Stefan Wermenbol – Master Thesis
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Control in RtoP does not emerge organically; it is administered top-down, in part through discourse.
One feature of this form of social control is naming and shaming. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink see this
process as being common to humanitarian norms. As underlined by the ICISS and Luck, this
instrument is vital to RtoP coaxing. The Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Dr. Davies
noted, used the internet to tar and feather countries which violated RtoP precepts. It is therefore not
only preferential to accede the RtoP norm; it comes with social consequences if one refuses to, as
Finnemore and Sikkink point out.
UN – Civil Society
State law making
Model of Utilisticly
Legitimate Norm
Emergence
Domestic norm
emergence
Socialization
States
Model of Issue
Network
Artificial Civil Society
pressure
Constituencies
Social
engineering
Figure 7: Top-down Trajectory and
Legitimacy in Norm Emergence
Finnemore and Sikkink also note that norms change actor identities. Socialization is the best
example of this process. The most concrete impetus to conformity for states is the threat of UN
sanctions and possible intervention. Softer, vertical socialization occurs in the SG’s plans and his direct
Stefan Wermenbol – Master Thesis
July, 2012
engagement of states, as the PAO noted. The WFM also states as its purpose to strengthen the
acceptance of RtoP by promoting the norm’s implementation by the UN and regional and state actors.
As Ms. Shapiro noted, the ICRtoP does not engage individual states directly - only regional
organizations. The UN also actively engages regional organizations, as discussed above. One reason
the UN and civil societies see these organizations as partners in the embedding of RtoP may be
because the regional organizations can leverage member states more effectively, because their
authority might be perceived as more legitimate, or because the region might be able to exact
penalties more effectively. One thing is for certain, there must be some kind of ulterior motive seeing
as regional organizations lack much power to function as equal partners of the UN, at least in military
planning.
There is also a pervasive element of social engineering at play. The consensual knowledge in
capacity building, as seen in the ICISS Report, is to avert domestic conflict by building and reforming
legal and political institutions in risk countries. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink think that this process will
occur organically once states are socialized in the international system. In the case of RtoP however,
the WFUNA and Focal Point initiative plan actually engages in the process of stimulating this growth
artificially. The WFUNA plan is most flagrant herein, as it employs the media and local education to
inculcate RtoP values. Through this proselytization, the civil society and the subject state are expected
to become converts to the RtoP creed. When fully educated, they are themselves expected to become
recruiters and proselytizers of the RtoP evangelism. This is seen in the WFUNA plan to teach subject
CSOs to fundraise, for example. As a whole, the WFUNA program has various feedback mechanisms
and there is a great deal of control from New York. This tentacular activity is only paralleled by the UN
Exec, whose Early Warning Mechanism centralizes information production within its confines. This
authority is delegated voluntarily to the UN, as is clear from the Focal Points initiative and speaks to a
passive sacrifice of state sovereignty.
The spiral model offers us an analytical device through which to understand norm emergence
as it can occur in the domestic sphere. This thesis has however noted that RtoP was administered not
through a Boomerang pattern like tandem of domestic and global forces, but purely from the global
sphere to the domestic. Since RtoP is a top-down introduced norm, its legitimacy is questionable. This
is underlined by the lack of knowledge on RtoP of people not directly engaged with the UN. Moreover,
Stefan Wermenbol – Master Thesis
July, 2012
as the PAO noted, the fact that there is no democratic legitimacy for the UN Exec is a problem which
fazes all bureaucracies, placing this global conundrum squarely within Heclo’s theory.
Naming and shaming is therefore the socialization tool of choice in the RtoP discourse, as Dr. Davies
talked about and control is exerted top-down. The engaging of regional organizations is probably used
as leverage in this process. There is little direct evidence for this, just plausible argument and
reasonable doubt. On the other hand there is direct proof of at least intended social engineering in the
WFUNA plan. Hereby, we can discern how states are being pinched, from above and below, as
illustrated in figure 6. As a result of this top-down trajectory, the inexistence of a popular mandate for
the UN Exec and the distance of ordinary people not engaged in the UN from RtoP discussion, the
legitimacy of the norm is questionable.
Responsibility to Protect and Global Politics
This chapter has analyzed the narrative of RtoP with the help of theoretical concepts discussed in
chapter 1. Crucially this chapter has defined the RtoP issue network. First, however, a section was
devoted to defining the contextual circumstances of RtoP’s conception, gestation and nascence. Five
aspects to the RtoP narrative have been discussed.
In reflection of the discussed theory, a note was made on the commensurability of theory and
its environment. This chapter began with a brief evaluation of post-Cold War global politics. The
argument here was that since the two modes of thinking in Heclo, with regard to domestic governance,
and those of regime thinking and constructivism, with regard to global governance, were comparable,
an extrapolation of Heclo’s theory was applicable to the study of RtoP. A note was also made on the
diffusion of power in global politics and it was argued that RtoP developed from a Western
humanitarian norm to a universally negotiated regime.
In section one the centrality of the RtoP issue and its network in global politics was discussed.
The increased importance of the UN Exec and RtoP issue civil society was underlined. Critically, this
section noted the importance of coalitions and their facilitation through technology. The role of
information was emphasized here too. RtoP discourse, this section underlined, was an important
Stefan Wermenbol – Master Thesis
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feature of the network. It was also noted that states play a supplicant role in the RtoP issue network.
The Dutch state conforms to the stereotype of the state so ravenous for information; it pays too little
concern to what the food will do for its posture.
In section two the logic of appropriateness served as a commentary on the Western trajectory
of RtoP. Western countries have traditionally been strong proponents of humanitarian norms and
they were the first to support and implement RtoP. Moreover, the RtoP engaged CSOs are ostensibly
Western. Skepticism of Western intentions is understandable, this section found, though not
necessarily valid due to the good intentions of RtoP. Horizontal socialization was noted in Dutch intergovernmental norm entrepreneurship.
Sovereignty is in a state of disrepair vis-à-vis jus cogens and therefore RtoP, section three found.
RtoP should also be seen as a spoke in the larger wheel of humanitarian law development, as
manifested in the holistic thinking found in, notably, the documents.
The UN and RtoP are mutually re-enforcing. Both the norm and the organization recognize
themselves in cosmopolitanism and its global village and human security mode of thinking. This
section also found that RtoP is a compromise for most of the idealists engaged in it, particularly the
WFM.
RtoP functions top-down. Naming and shaming is used to discipline states who refuse to
comply and socialization likely occurs through leverage politics of the regional organizations. Extensive
evidence was found for social engineering by RtoP civil society. Therefore, a kind of pinch politics
exists through vertical socialization of the SG from above, and RtoP GANs vicariously through a state's
constituents.
The discerned aspects of RtoP encapsulate the norm thoroughly, but the concept remains fluid.
In some instances, one could argue that RtoP is morally imperialistic, as Ayoob does for example, this
being the other side of the cosmopolitan coin. Moreover, if the norm were not Western, it could
hardly be cosmopolitan as this mode of thinking is foreign to areas outside of the West; if the norm
were not a top-down mechanism, than it could not be the subject of the New York centered RtoP issue
civil society. In addition, if the norm were not a reflection of its time, it would not be a feature of the
deepening of humanitarianism, which also represents the global political climate. The Rubik’s cube
metaphor must therefore be remembered.
Stefan Wermenbol – Master Thesis
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A conclusion of this thesis and the promised theory, will now be offered below.
Stefan Wermenbol – Master Thesis
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5. Conclusion: Responsibility to Protect and Global Governance
This thesis has applied an inductive, holistic approach in which it sought to arrive at an understanding
(verstehen) of RtoP. Description and inclusion of indirectly related ideas have been central. This area
serves as a recap of what has been discussed in this thesis. In addition, it also offers a brief conclusion
of what has been learned about RtoP and its five aspects, what this means for norm research and a
proposal for further research. This area concludes with the general theory of the global issue network.
Chapter 1 examined the development from regime theory to the quantitative constructivists
and the causal dimension of norm thinking, by offering an overview and explanation of constructivist
thought on learning and teaching in the global sphere. Special attention was focused on the normative
aspect as found in constructivist thinking. Hereafter, the issue network model was introduced. The
chapter concluded with an analysis of process in international norm emergence through a glance at
international law and the constructivist take on legitimacy. We deduced that it would be necessary to
consider RtoP using both the regime and the constructivist prism. Chapter 1 also provided this thesis
with the conceptual tools through which to understand RtoP as a global norm. Crucially, it deepened
our understanding of the development of norms with regard to path dependence and contestation in
international law. Disclosure of the ontological underpinning of the theory posited below has been
central to this chapter.
Chapter 2 of this thesis introduced RtoP by starting with an overview of the history of the norm
and its context. Second, a look was taken at the relevant actors in RtoP politics and its issue network.
The ICISS Report, the Focal Points initiative and the WFUNA plan were discussed next. Lastly,
important legal documents were examined. The five aspects of RtoP became evident in this chapter as
well as the resemblance of this thesis's scope to the Dingwerth and Pattberg designed global
governance research agenda. This was seen in the accentuation of RtoP actor relations and the
activities of the UN. The chapter also highlighted the supplicant role of states in global rule-making,
stressing the importance of information provided by IOs and RtoP civil society. It relayed the legal path
walked by RtoP and revealed the axis of the SG and RtoP GANs which facilitated the norm's progress.
We also looked at the plans for RtoP implementation and the consequences of the norm for global
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politics and competing regimes.
In chapter 3 the interviews were relayed in narrative form. They served to buttress the thesis
and its research findings. Interviews were held with representatives of the Dutch foreign office, the UN,
the ICRtoP and the WFM in addition to the editor of GRtoP. The interviews underlined the importance
of technology for information diffusion, yielded proof for the RtoP issue network and its circumscribing
of state policy. Particularly the interview with the PAO gave evidence for the importance of the UN
Exec, which was a boon for the theoretical comparison to the adapted issue network theory. We
recognized Senator Bumper's quip in that what which we know to be true, was resoundingly denied by
the interviewed elite.
Chapter 4 has found evidence for the three-part thesis
The promotion of RtoP has occurred in part as a result of developments in global politics in
which the RtoP issue network and notably the RtoP civil society played a pronounced role.
The development of RtoP has been driven by pre-dominantly Western forces and should be seen
as a part of a deepening of humanitarian law in a larger humanitarian development in international
law.
Cosmopolitan thinking has been central to the RtoP project and RtoP has had a clear top-down
trajectory in global politics.
Five aspects to the RtoP narrative were discerned in this chapter, which are interrelated and internally
fluid. The first argument has been that an RtoP issue network exists, which consists of: 1) the UN; 2)
state apparatuses; 3) a global RtoP issue civil society consisting of RtoP GANs and an RtoP epistemic
community. The RtoP community consists of political executives, issue politicians and policy experts
who can respectively be found in the UN Exec and states, the RtoP GANs and the RtoP epistemic
community.
It has been argued that the role of the UN Exec has expanded significantly as a result of RtoP.
The inability to internally source sufficient information to satisfy their cravings has made states
dependent on the UN and the RtoP GANs. While their political independence as global decision
makers cannot be questioned, the bases on which they make their decision most certainly can. The
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GANs discussed here have been the GCRtoP, the ICRtoP, the WFM and WFUNA. These organizations
play a central role in the RtoP politics, namely by their ability to circumscribe state and UN policy.
Their main instrument for this is information politics. Notably, they have created an RtoP discourse
which disciplines dissidents. Naming and shaming is a common instrument for this. These
organizations know Western governance and are financed by Western countries. Central to RtoP has
been the just war thinking and Western countries were the first to promote and implement the norm.
Other regions do much less and an understandable question can therefore be raised about the
legitimacy of the norm, especially taking colonial history into consideration. Also, Western countries
are traditionally supportive of the humanitarian treaties regime. This regime has already sufficiently
challenged sovereignty as a principle, and RtoP thus faces a weak adversary. The norm should
therefore be seen as a part of a larger development in international humanitarian law. This approach
is commensurate with the more general cosmopolitan thinking in RtoP. Human security and global
village approaches are central to the RtoP project. The norm and the UN, in which this thinking is
enshrined, therefore re-enforce each other. In and around the UN in New York, RtoP pinch politics is
conducted. The norm has also allowed RtoP GANs to plan for the manipulation of domestic civil
societies and states. While their intentions might be altruistic, one must give pause to wonder how we
would feel if it was not WFUNA handing educational tools to politicians, but Nike, the NRA, or worse
still, Al Quaida. The implementation of the RtoP norm is therefore far from democratic and certainly
not very legitimate.
It has been argued that RtoP should be seen as a feature of a rapidly changing social
environment. Information has been the mediating element of this change. Whereas states were the de
facto supreme global governors before the end of the Cold War, today, we must assert that this is not
necessarily the case. RtoP is an example of an issue in which no one seems to be in control. This thesis
implicitly questions the importance of power: if power is confounded without exogenous steering
what role will it play in the future of global politics? For norm research this means that we must
remain importers of new ideas and methods which analogously apply to the diverse and complex
social world we study, such as the model used here. As seen with the applicability of regime theory,
we should not forget to look to (long) existing theory to help us understand are social environment.
The global governance research project seems well suited to satisfy these demands. This thesis has
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buttressed it, by finding proof of the applicability of a domestic governance model at the global sphere.
A singular heuristic model has been offered here but it could also be looked into if RtoP and its
global politics is not just the tip of the iceberg of major transitions at the sub-state and transnational
level of politics. Price found that transnational social movements were responsible for the realization
of a prohibition on mines (1998: 639). Moreover, Klotz argues that the success of the anti-apartheid
regime was a result of a global consensus and subsequent movement against all forms of inequality
(1996: 174). Keck and Sikkink note that the 1960's caused a rise in global activism which was caused
by vastly increased opportunities for international contact (1999: 94). Applying this vein of thought to
RtoP, a transnational survey of social institutions at the sub-state level must be made. This could
inform a possible research topic.
A Theory of the Global Issue Network
As the constructivist and regime theorists have argued, all ideas have their expiration date. Dr. Davies
has argued that RtoP’s upward trajectory in institutionalization and embedding in global politics will
render the existing RtoP civil society obsolete. Once an issue is incorporated in standard operating
procedure, it is no longer an issue. RtoP will probably not be the last humanitarian issue to capture the
interest of those on the global stage zenith. A model for future issues has the following features.
The model has three pillars: 1) the UN and particularly the UN Exec; 2) state apparatuses; and 3)
a global issue civil society. This civil society will consist of an issue epistemic community and issue
GANs. Individuals engaged in the global issue network will be recognized in the definitions of political
executives, issue politicians and policy specialists. The GANs may be conglomerate coalitions from
across the globe and the network will be engaged in humanitarian norms, but may move into human
rights if normative integration progresses. Discourse and information will be central as methods of
control in this network and technology will facilitate it. The network may be global but its hub will be
in New York and its trajectory mechanism will be top-down through social engineering and
socialization. Ceteris paribus, the network will be Western due to Western affinity with humanitarian
norms.
The applicability of this theory might be tested with regard to the development of the ICC,
another project of the WFM. If there are resemblances, we will know that the RtoP issue network was
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not a one off.
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Websites
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org
(last consulted: June, 2012)
http://globalr2p.org/
(last consulted: June, 2012)
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/
(last consulted: June, 2012)
http://www.wfm-igp.org/site/
(last consulted: June, 2012)
http://www.wfuna.org/
(last consulted: June, 2012)
http://plato.stanford.edu/
(last consulted: June, 2012)
http://www.un.org/en/documents/
(last consulted: June, 2012)
http://www.utexas.edu/cola/laits/
(last consulted: June, 2012)
http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/rbins/ (CUNY website)
(last consulted: June, 2012)
http://africa-union.org
(last consulted: June, 2012)
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films/clinton/
(last consulted: July, 2012)
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Appendices
i
CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES
Article 2
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll
ii
CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND
ACTS OF AGGRESSION
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken
in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Article 40
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making
the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties
concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned.
The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be
employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to
apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
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Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
iii
Article 27
Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. Decisions of the Security Council on
procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members. Decisions of the Security
Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under
paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.
See for documents website: http://www.un.org/en/documents/
iv
Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations (Ezulwini Consensus)
ii. The Question of Legality

With regard to the use of force, it is important to comply scrupulously with the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, which authorise the use of force only in cases of legitimate selfdefence. In addition, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, in its Article 4 (h), authorises intervention in grave circumstances such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Consequently,
any recourse to force outside the framework of Article 51 of the UN Charter and Article 4 (h) of the
AU Constitutive Act, should be prohibited. Furthermore, it is important to define the notion of “collective danger” which would justify collective action.
See website:
http://www.google.nl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CEQQFjAA&url=http
%3A%2F%2Fwww.africaunion.org%2FNews_Events%2FCalendar_of_%2520Events%2F7th%2520extra%2520ordinary%2520se
ssion%2520ECL%2FExt%2520EXCL2%2520VII%2520Report.doc&ei=yVvfT96UIIq6-AaEzTXBw&usg=AFQjCNFatBwoSUXJTf4PX3_QNf-YeFlRDw&sig2=fcQE8rRP7F9eXHFutxTpUg
V
RtoP and the West RtoP and the West
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See website:
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Dec%2021%202011%20Revision%20RtoP%20National%20level%20
endorsements.pdf
vi
Ralph Bunche Institute
The Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies engages in research, graduate training,
and public education about international affairs and contemporary global problem-solving with a
focus on multilateralism and international institutions. Founded in 1973 as the Ralph Bunche Institute
on the United Nations, it was renamed in 2001 and given a broader interdisciplinary scope with the
mandate to support and further strengthen international studies at The Graduate Center. Under the
directorship of Thomas G. Weiss, presidential professor of political science, the institute provides a
congenial setting for the activities by faculty and visiting scholars with international portfolios and
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research; and it facilitates the mentoring of graduate students.
Located minutes from UN headquarters in mid-town Manhattan, the institute draws not only on a
distinguished faculty across The City University of New York and other universities and colleges in the
metropolitan area and worldwide but also on analysts, policymakers, and practitioners. The institute
houses a number of projects that seek to improve the understanding and practice of international
cooperation. It also hosts visiting scholars and graduate students from around the world who wish to
take advantage of the institute’s unusual access to international organizations and expertise.
See website: http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/rbins/about/
vii
Staff GCRtoP:
Simon Adams is the Executive Director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.
Dr. Adams has previously worked with NGOs, governments and community organizations in South
Africa, East Timor, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and elsewhere. He is a former
anti-apartheid activist and member of the African National Congress. Dr. Adams is the author of four
books and numerous academic articles with a focus on international conflict. He has also written for
the Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, Kuwait Times, The Australian, Huffington Post, New York
Times and many other publications.
Dr. Adams studied at the University of Witswatersrand in South Africa and at the University
of New South Wales in Australia, where he received his Ph.D. He is also a graduate of the Executive
Leadership Program at the Harvard Business School. Dr. Adams has lectured at a number of
international universities. He served as Pro Vice Chancellor (International Engagement) at Monash
University and as Vice President of its South African campus between 2008-2010.
Among his other commitments, Dr. Adams is currently Special Advisor to the Monash-Oxfam
Partnership and a member of the board at Catalpa International, an East Timorese not-for-profit
information technology and development organization
Savita Pawnday is the Project Manager for the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
where she oversees and manages GCR2P's fundraising and development activities and acts as a lead
on all of its projects including the Focal Points initiative, forums with regional organizations, and
ministerial level meetings at the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. Prior to joining the
Global Centre, she was a research associate at the Program on States and Security at the Ralph Bunche
Institute for International Studies. Savita has worked in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi with Catholic
Relief Services, in New York with Trickle Up, a microfinance NGO, and in India at Akanksha. She
holds a M.A. from Fordham University in political economy and development, with a specialization
in political economy of civil wars and a B.A. in Economics from St. Xavier's College, University of
Mumbai.
Angela Deane leads the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect's fundraising activities
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and oversees its Development and Outreach efforts. Prior to joining the team, Angie served as the
Development Director with the Genocide Intervention Network in Washington, D.C., an advocacy
organization working to implement structural change in the way governments prevent and respond
to genocide and mass atrocities. She has also worked as Development Director for non-profit
organizations in South Bend, Indiana and Chicago, Illinois, and served as an AmeriCorps Volunteer in
Seattle, Washington. Angie is currently completing her Master’s degree in Global Affairs at New York
University and graduated from Miami University with degrees in French and Public Relations
Jaclyn Streitfeld-Hall is a Research Associate at the Global Centre for the Responsibility to
Protect where she does research for the Centre’s work on populations at risk of mass atrocities. Prior
to joining GCR2P she was a Research Assistant at the Cline Center for Democracy and taught
International Relations courses at the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign. She holds a B.A. in
Political Science and English from the University of Maryland, Baltimore County and a M.A. in
Political Science with a specialization in International Relations from the University of Illinois. She is
currently a Doctoral student at the University of Illinois studying International Organizations.
James Traub is a contributing writer for The New York Times Magazine, where he has worked
since 1998. He has written extensively about international affairs as well as national politics, urban
affairs, and education. In recent years, he has reported from among other places, Afghanistan, Iraq,
Pakistan, Egypt, Iran, Sudan, Guinea Bissau, Congo, Sierra Leone, Angola, Georgia, Kosovo and Haiti.
His weekly column on foreign policy, "Terms of Engagement," appears on foreignpolicy.com, the
website of Foreign Policy Magazine. His most recent book is The Freedom Agenda: Why America
Must Spread Democracy (Just Not The Way Bush Did). In 2006 he published The Best Intentions: Kofi
Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power. He teaches a class on American foreign policy
as part of New York University's Sheikh Mohammad Scholarship Porgram in Abu Dhabi. He is currently
writing a biography of John Quincy Adams, to be published by Basic Books. He is a senior fellow of the
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, a fellow of the Center on International Cooperation
and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations"
See website: http://globalr2p.org/whoweare/staff.php
The WFM
‘The World Federalist Movement–Institute for Global Policy (WFM-IGP) works to advance the global
promise of peace and is committed to building a safer and more just world. WFM-IGP includes a
comprehensive set of programs that work to protect civilians from the threat of genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity; facilitate transparency in governance; increase access to justice; and
promote the application of the rule of law. We work in partnership with the United Nations,
governments, and other international and regional institutions around the globe—as well as with
thousands of committed individuals and world leaders—to advance a mission of peace, prosperity,
and security for all’
viii
See website: http://www.wfm-igp.org/site/
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July, 2012
WFM Secretariat
Bente Nielsen - FN Forbundet - Denmark
Don Kraus - Citizens for Global Solutions - United States
Edward Chobanian - United States
James Christie- World Federalist Movement- Canada
Keith Best - United Kingdom
Lucio Levi - Union of European Federalists Italy
Lucy Law Webster - Citizens for Global Solutions United States
Takahiro Katsumi - World Federalist Movement of Japan
Tony Fleming Citizens for Global Solutions - United States
W. James Arputharaj - South Asian Federalists - Sri Lanka
William Pace Executive Director International Secretariat (Ex-Officio)- United States
See website: http://www.wfm-igp.org/site/
x
ICRtoP Coalition Members
Act for Peace (Sydney, Australia)
Aegis Trust (London, UK)
Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Brisbane, Australia)
Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (New York City, USA and Poland)
Canadian Lawyers for International Human Rights (CLAIHR) (Toronto, Canada)
Centre for Media Studies & Peace Building (CEMESP) (Monrovia, Liberia)
Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (Sydney, Australia)
Centro de Investigacion y Educacion Popular (CINEP) (Bogota, Colombia)
Citizens for Global Solutions (Washington, DC)
Coalition for Justice and Accountability (COJA) (Freetown, Sierra Leone)
Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (CRIES) (Buenos Aires, Argentina)
Droits Humains Sans Frontieres (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo)
East Africa Law Society (Arusha, Tanzania)
Fundacion para la Paz y la Democracia (FUNPADEM) (San Jose, Costa Rica)
Genocide Alert (Köln, Germany)
Global Action to Prevent War (New York, USA)
Human Rights Watch (New York, USA)
Human Rights Network Uganda - HURINET (Kampala, Uganda)
Initiatives for International Dialogue
(Davao city, Philippines)
International Crisis Group (Brussels, Belgium)
International Refugee Rights Initiative (New York and Uganda)
Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists (Nairobi, Kenya)
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Accra, Ghana)
Minority Rights Group International (London, United Kingdom)
Oxfam International
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Pan Africa Lawyer’s Union (Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia)
Réseau de Développement et de Communications de la Femme Africaine (FEMNET) (Bamako, Mali)
Semillas para la Democracia (Asuncion, Paraguay)
STAND Canada (Toronto, Canada)
The Stanley Foundation (Muscatine, USA)
United Nations Association of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kishasa, DRC)
United Nations Association of Denmark (Copenhagen, Denmark)
United Nations Association of Spain (Barcelona, Spain)
United Nations Association of Sweden (Stockholm, Sweden)
West Africa Civil Society Forum (Abuja, Nigeria)
West Africa Civil Society Institute (Accra, Ghana)
West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) (Accra, Ghana)
Women's Refugee Commission (New York)
World Federalist Movement-Canada (Ottawa, Canada)
World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy (New York and The Hague)
World Federation of United Nations Associations (New York andGeneva)
See website: http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-coalition/currentmembers
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ICRtoP staff
William Pace
Executive Director
'Mr. Pace is the Executive Director of the World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy.
He has served as the Convenor of the Coalition for an International Criminal Court since its founding in
1995 and is a co-founder and steering committee member of the International Coalition for the
Responsibility to Protect. He has been engaged in international justice, rule of law, environmental
law, and human rights for the past 30 years. He previously served as the Secretary-General of the
Hague Appeal for Peace, the Director of the Center for the Development of International Law, and the
Director of Section Relations of the Concerts for Human Rights Foundation at Amnesty International,
among other positions. He is the President of the Board of the Center for United Nations Reform
Education and an Advisory Board member of the One Earth Foundation, as well as the co-founder of
the NGO Steering Committee for the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development and the
NGO Working Group on the United Nations Security Council. He is the recipient of the William J.
Butler Human Rights Medal from the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights and currently serves as
an Ashoka Foundation Fellow. Mr. Pace has authored numerous articles and reports on international
justice, international affairs and UN issues, multilateral treaty processes, and civil society participation
in international decision-making."
Sapna Chhatpar Considine
Deputy Director
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Sapna Chhatpar Considine is the Deputy Director of the International Coalition for the
Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP). Ms. Considine started working on RtoP in 2006 under the World
Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy's R2PCS project and managed the successful transition
of the R2PCS project into the Coalition in 2009. Over the past 5 years, Ms. Considine has spoken at
numerous international conferences and seminars and published several articles and papers on the
subjects of the Responsibility to Protect, genocide and mass atrocities prevention, protection of
civilians, and the role of civil society. Prior to R2PCS/ICRtoP, Ms. Considine worked for a United States
Congressman as the international affairs staffer where she worked to mobilize Congressional leaders
against the war in Iraq and draw attention to a variety of human rights crises. She also worked at a DCbased civil rights law firm which specialized in class action employment discrimination law. A human
rights advocate for the past 13 years, Ms. Considine holds a Master of International Affairs, focusing
on Human Rights, from Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs and a
Bachelor of Arts in International Studies from the American University in Washington, DC.
Rachel Shapiro
Associate
Rachel Shapiro graduated in 2011 from New York University with a B.A. in Mathematics and
Political Science. Focusing much of her academic career and extracurricular life on international
development, conflict prevention, and human rights, Rachel interned at the ICRtoP from September
2009 until May 2010. She also interned at Global Solutions Education Fund, Pittsburgh, and has
worked on several projects combining the arts with conflict prevention campaigns.
Megan Schmidt
Outreach Officer
Megan Schmidt is a Consultant with the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect.
Prior to joining the Coalition in December 2011, Ms. Schmidt interned with ICRtoP from September
2010 to May 2011 and received a summer fellowship with the Secretariat through August 2011. She
holds a Master of Arts in Human Rights and Genocide Studies from Kingston University-London and
is in the process of completing a Master of Arts in Humanities and Social Thought at New York
University. Ms. Schmidt has previously interned with the Kurdish Human Rights Project and received
a Graduate Research Fellowship with the Wiener Library where she conducted a comparative study on
the Holocaust and the Rwandan Genocide.
Evan Cinq-Mars
Blogger and Social Media Coordinator
Evan Cinq-Mars is the Blogger & Social Media Coordinator for the International Coalition for
the Responsibility to Protect. Evan will be graduating from Carleton University with a degree in Public
Affairs and Policy Management, specializing in International Studies, in September. Prior to this
position, Evan was an intern with ICRtoP in the Summer of 2010. Evan is currently a Board Member
with the World Federalist Movement - Canada, and has held a number of positions with Stand
Canada, a student-led anti-genocide advocacy organization. His primary areas of research interest
include international relations, genocide prevention, global governance, and Canadian foreign policy.
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See website: http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/
xii
WFUNA staff:
Bonian Golmohammadi
Bonian Golmohammadi was elected Secretary-General of the World Federation of United
Nations Associations (WFUNA) in August 2009. Previously, Mr. Golmohammadi served as SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations Association (UNA) of Sweden for eight years. Under his leadership,
UNA-Sweden increased its budget from $1 million to $5 million, and expanded its staff from 10 to 30
full-time employees.Since 2005, Mr. Golmohammadi has served as President of the UNA Europe
Network, coordinating United Nations Associations from all over Europe. He has served or is serving
on various advisory boards for Swedish Ministers for Development, international development
corporations, UN entities, and civil society organizations. Prior to joining UNA-Sweden, Mr.
Golmohammadi worked with consultancy and private businesses in Sweden and the Czech Republic,
including developing a national globalization project for high schools, working with publishing as well
as project management.
Mr. Golmohammadi earned a degree in Political Science, and has studied International Law,
Human Rights and Philosophy, from Stockholm and Uppsala University.
Kimberely Hall
Youth Program Officer
Kimberely Hall is the Youth Program Officer at WFUNA. She is responsible for developing and
coordinating youth programs and the youth network, as well as integrating youth initiatives in
WFUNA’s policy areas. Kimberely brings with her experience in youth programming, communications,
research, and social media. She holds a M.A. in Korean Studies from Yonsei University, with a focus
on Asian regionalism, migration, and international security, and a Bachelor of Arts in International
Relations.
Wiebke Harms
Human Rights Education Program Officer
Wiebke Harms is the Human Rights Education Program Officer at the WFUNA office in Geneva.
She is responsible for the implementation of WFUNA’s educational programs, the development of
information and educational materials, as well as the strengthening of WFUNA’s links with relevant
actors in Geneva. Wiebke has several years of experience in the management and monitoring of
humanitarian and development projects in the areas of education and health and has worked for
human rights training programs in Geneva. She holds a M.A. in International Relations from the
Graduate Institute in Geneva and in International Humanitarian Action from Uppsala University.
Irene Martinetti
Director of Programs
Irene Martinetti is the Director of Programs of the World Federation of UN Associations Office
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Stefan Wermenbol – Master Thesis
July, 2012
in Geneva. She holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University, and a B.A. and M.A.
in East Asian Studies from Ca’ Foscari University, Italy. Her previous work experiences include
employment as Senior Research Associate at the Center for UN Reform in New York and as Business
Development Manager for Panalpina China Ltd, and internships with BBC Beijing and UNDP. She is
fluent in English, French and Mandarin Chinese and has a working knowledge of Spanish.
Laura Spano
Responsibility to Protect Program Officer
Laura is the Responsibility to Protect Program Officer coordinating WFUNAs program to raise
awareness on and advocate for the prevention of mass atrocities. She has many years experience
coordinating international advocacy and awareness raising projects. Laura has worked closely with
grassroots organisations in Rwanda, South Africa, Kenya, DRC, Armenia, China, USA and Australia on
civilian protection issues. Experiences range from working with local Rwandan human rights
organizations to increase advocacy skills of youth to working for the Darfur Australia Network in
Austraila on protection issues - analyzing refugee policy and implementing community engagement
activities. Additionally, she currently coordinates youth-organized projects implementing education
opportunities in Rwanda. Laura has spent time in the field researching civilian protection and postconflict integration. She has a post-graduate Honours Degree in Development specializing in postconflict reconstruction and genocide prevention, a B.A. (International Relations and Development),
and a Diploma of Modern Languages (French) from the University of Melbourne, Australia and
McGill University, Canada.
See website:
http://www.google.nl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CFIQFjAA&url=http%3
A%2F%2Fwww.wfuna.org%2Fstaff&ei=UCTiT7qUBMfY0QWZkeyrAw&usg=AFQjCNERSYOO1C
KwYbOY3eW3nSwonJbECQ&sig2=nzSs1d0zotAUUAD9dQHBMg
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