Contemporary World and the Global Muslim Identity
By Saba Gill
This paper aims to explore the extent to which the concept of Muslim nationalism—preference
for a supreme religious identity at the expense of making all other identities secondary in
importance—and the unity of the Muslim Ummah is applicable in the contemporary world. Islam
was a leading civilization of the world for centuries. The anguish and distress of the modern day
global Muslim society can be attributed to the steady decline of Islamic civilization from its
height of glory to the pits of decay. The glorious past mocks the crippled state of a defensive
Muslim society that uses Islamist rhetoric to unite its rank and order in response to the rise of
Western civilization. At the forefront of this rhetoric is the supremacy of the religious identity of
Muslims and the unifying concept of “Muslim brotherhood” or “community” (Ummah). The
theoretical concepts of Islam have been given an absolute meaning by the rhetorical Islamist
reactionaries to make it a counter ideology opposing the Western liberal thought. The rhetoric does
not take into account the ground realities of the Muslim Ummah in that it neither specifies what is
the right ‘brand’ of Islam nor does it acknowldge the divisions within the Ummah or the myriad
of identities that Muslims espouse.
Two impediments that challenge these concepts are clear at the outset; other forms of
nationalism and sectarianism. While the former is an external influence, latter gives away the
internal divisions in the House of Islam. As a component of nationalism religion can be both a
force of unity as well as division. Important to the course of this research is the role Islamic
leaders and political elites play in mobilizing the masses by making them aware of their religious
sentiments to strengthen the in-group bonding and calling on them to define themselves along
religious lines. This paper aims to explore whether this external pressure to ‘act’ as a community
influences Muslims to adopt Islamic way of life and imagination, whether they succeed in
embracing and sustaining this sole identity irrespective of their racial and ethnic background or
realize that other identities are perhaps more important and relevant in defining who they truly
are.
While religious nationalism predates the Westphalian concept of statehood, contemporary
interest in religious nationalism, especially the global Islamic community, can be attributed to
the events following 9/11. The call of the religious extremists in the last decade has continually
been directed at the ‘global Muslim brotherhood’ irrespective of their state nationality. This call
has been answered by younger Muslim population who apparently believe in the sanctity of the
Ummah as a sacred collectivity to which all other group and individual identities become
subservient. In the face of globalization and the mass movement of people to advanced countries
driven by the need of better economics, appeal to religious identity among Muslims has
continued despite the highly secularized societies they live in.
My interest in the identity politics of the Muslim world is based on contemporary global events
that have fuelled the rhetoric of the supremacy of the identity of Muslim Ummah. Events in one
part of the Islamic world are bound to impact the politics of the rest of the Muslim world. The
self-determination struggles of Palestinians and Kashmiris gather mass support in the Muslim
world, Muslim states still refuse to recognize Israel as a sovereign state, wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan are perceived as the ‘Western’ assault on the Ummah and the controversial religious
outfits like Al-Qaeda and Hizbullah are treated, by some, as bodies representing the heroes of
Islam. On the surface, Muslims might appear to be one nation with a strong sense of in-group
bonding irrespective of where they live. Muslims living in secular states seemingly have the
same emotional attachment to the Muslim Ummah which might lead one to believe in the
existence of some divine bond that binds the Muslims together.
Islam represents a unique case in secular world—thriving on state centric nationalism—because
any form of nationalism that does not eventually lead to Muslim unity is an alien concept to Islam.
Islam’s objection to any other form of nationalism is mainly due to the inherent egoistic element of
nationalism that forces people to see their country and countrymen as superior to others.
Furthermore, it objects to the demands of absolute loyalty to the nation and view this as an
exaggeration of the importance people place on geographical, ethnic, national, and other differences
that drive people to national glorification and national self-aggrandizement. What Islam does
recognize is a solemn pledge of a Muslim’s loyalty to the Divine Being and a belief that the Muslim
community is one with ethnic, racial, color, geographic, tribal identities to be used for reference
purpose only. On the surface it would be logical to assume that in a political and social sense
Islam has prevailed in diverse cultures and societies over a longer period of time than any other
religion. The key question is whether it can continue to meet that challenge today when all
religious traditions are coming under the assualt of evolutionary global forces (Fuller, 2003).
This paper begins by exploring the role of religion in shaping human identity, in drawing
boundaries of inclusiveness and exclusivess in societies and its importance in the lives of people.
Then it sets to explore the concept of nationalism in Islam and compares it with the
contemporary forms of nationalism by outlining the history of western colonial rule with on
Muslim societies and the creation of hybrid identities following the subsequent adaptation of the
Muslims to this new breed of nationalism. To investigate the reality of global Muslim Ummah or
community vis-a-vis its theoretical concept, internal divisions in the House of Islam that are
manifested in the form of sectarianism are discussed. In view of the competing sects of Islam the
research agenda then focuses on the ‘internal’ influences that obstruct the creation of a
community that transcends all differences. This paper uses Pakistan--the only Islamic ideological
state of our times, as a case study and critically analyzes the creation of Pakistan. Relevant to this
analysis is the role of political elities who use Islam as a tool for mobilizing masses to achieve
purely political ends. The political ambitions are cloaked in the spiritual dogma and religious
rhetoric to mobilize the masses. In case of Pakistan this proved to be successful for sometime
because in spite of being ethnically diverse, speaking different dialects and languages and being
embedded in regional cultures transcending religious communities, the Muslims of British India
responded to the call of political elites to create a ‘Muslim’ state where all Muslims could live
together as one homogenous community.
Religion and Identity:
Though religion is perceived to be very traditional in nature and all identity associations with it
are seen as orthodox, its continued relevance in contemporary times cannot be downplayed. In an
increasingly modern world where scientific facts and evidence are used to prove and disprove
theories, where Darwinian-ism is used to explain the existence of universe, it can be surprising
for some to see that religion continues to persist. Worldwide 85% of people report having at least
some form of religious belief (Zuckerman, 2005) while 82% report that religion constitutes an
important part of their daily life (Crabtree, 2009). In the U.S. 94% of respondents believe in God,
82% state that religion is fairly important to them, and 76% consider the Bible the actual or
inspired word of God (Gallup, 2008). In contrast, only 15% worldwide describe themselves as
nonreligious, agnostics, or atheists (Zuckerman, 2005)1.
Human identity as a concept is very fluid. There is nothing constant about it and it alters with
situations and circumstances. In this sense it is not always an independent entity and instead
depends on outside forces for its expression. Self-concept of individuals may be shaped by any
1
Quoted in Sedikides (2010)
number of social groups/sources; tribes, ethnic backgrounds, social class and castes, national
attachments, professional associations and religious affiliations.
Religious identity is not only a source of self-conception on an individual level but it is also a
means through which ideas of ‘self’ and ‘other’ take root. This is true for the creation of others’
perception of oneself based on latter’s religious affiliations. This shows a two-fold significance
of religious identity; while religion is used to create a sense of identity and cohesion among
members of faith, it can also be a reason for alienation of a group at the hands of an out-group.
Such identity politics manifests itself in the ongoing multiculturalism debates in the west.
Volkan (2005) suggests that identification with a large group (such as a religious, ethnic or
national one) begins in childhood and each member’s core personal identity is intertwined with
the large group identity. Attachment to one’s “own” identities induces a strong sense of rightness
and trueness with respect to one’s own beliefs and suggests a contrast between oneself as
enlightened and the “other” as backward (Metcalf, 1999). This perception of the “other” is based
on the assumption that one’s identity is somewhat superior and one’s beliefs are the ultimate
“truth”. Latter is true for religious group identities. Since the element of “faith” inherent in
religious beliefs and the belief system (existence of God) can be neither proven nor disproven, it
is easier for religious identification to flourish. Knowing the ‘ultimate truth’ is central to one’s
religious beliefs and though a unitary perception of ‘the’ truth is generally conceptualized as
fundamentalist, religious beliefs of an individual are premised on the assumption that their
religion is the correct one to follow.
The relative importance of social identities may vary among individuals with one or more
identities asserting dominance over the others. Large number of dominating identities might lead
to identity crisis and competition between social identities might be resolved by one identity
finally asserting dominance over the others (Deaux, 1996). So while an individual might define
himself as Conservative, Asian, Pakistani and a Muslim, the dominance of his religious idenity
of being a Muslim may take precedence over others. Therefore, in essence there is usually a
hierarchal organization of multiple identities in an individual’s subconscious.
Studies on dual identities, most often examining religious identification alongside national
identity, have offered valuable insight into the differential influences of those identities on
psychosocial functioning. Research on the competing relevance of national and religious
identities in self-perception of individuals in Northern Ireland (Muldoon et al, 2007) revealed
that self-categorization on the basis of religion remains extremely high. Religion may become an
important basis for identity in a society where religion is institutionalized and thus in addition to
fulfiling spiritual needs, it offers many non-religious material, psychological, and social benefits
including community networks, economic opportunities, educational resources, and peer trust
and support (Hurh & Kim, 1990). As positive benefits increase, it is more likely that individuals
will affiliate religiously.
Religious identity is unique in that it is based on the notion of divine ‘truth’. People identify with
religion because they believe that they have a purpose in life which eventually connects them to
some supreme authority. Erickson’s theory of pseudospeciation rejects the ‘truth’ in idenitities.
He contends that feelings of affiliation whether based on truth or not are very strong, influence
social behaviour in a number of ways and are especially central to the self-concept of humans.
There might not be any truth in the identities but the fact that they are perceived to be real by
people is enough to give meaning to them. Group identities initiate a process of continuous
reinforcement of the preceived importance of these individual identities.
Pseudo in this sense means that inspite of being same species humankind appears to be divided
in cloaked groups with a false appearance of being distinct and somewhat superior to each other.
At its most benign "pseudo" means only that something happens to appear to be what it is not.
This "pseudo" aspect of man's collective identities can become dominant under the impact of
historical and economic displacements, which make a group's self-idealization both more
defensive and more exclusive (Erickson, 1985).
The appeal of religion is so strong that individuals tend to place their religious identity on top of
their social identities hierarchy. Empirical analysis of multiple identities that include religion are
rare; however, one study focusing on the Sinhala Buddhist population in Sri Lanka found that
religious identity was rated as more salient to individuals’ self-concept than any of ten other
identities (including race, nation, caste, political affiliation, town, age, gender, occupation,
education, and class; Freeman, 2003).
In a similar research on development of Muslim religious identity it was observed that
sometimes people asserted their religious identity in order to reject ethnic, national or cultural
identities that appear to be in contrast to their religious beliefs (Peek, 2005). According to this
research, religious affiliation among the sample population of American Muslim students
increased after 9/11 when they felt outcasted as the “other” and felt a need to choose their
identities. Because of rejection from one social identity group, they chose another which seemed
more inclusive and accommodating.
The development of a strong religious identity involves heightened reflection and self-awareness,
individual choices, and the acknowledgment of others. Religious boundaries and meanings are
constructed both from within and without, in response to internal conflicts and choices and
external pressures and rewards that drive identity formation. Relevant here is Portes and
Rumbaut (2001) concept of "reactive ethnicity" – the formation of defensive identities and
solidarities in response to adverse native mainstream. Aaron C. Kay et al., (2009) use their
compensatory control mechanism to alter the feelings of personal control among people in
situations to guage their level of anxiety and reliance on external forces to bring control to
situations and environment. Religion in this sense is a defense mechanism used by people to
bring normalcy in their life and relieve the uncertainty of a random and chaotic world (pp. 38).
This argument implies that threats to personal control should increase religious conviction and
belief in the existence of a controlling God, which should, in turn, relieve the anxious
uncertainty.
Religious identity carries a sense of perceived uniformity over time and place. The absolutist
religious definitions presuppose that religious identity formation is a one time process. Unlike
cultural, ethnic, linguistic and national identities, a religious identity can be discarded with
relative ease mainly because it is based on a ‘belief’ system which is very personal in nature. The
creation of religious identities is an on-going process of construction and reconstruction
following internal conflict and choices, external pressures and rewards etc (Peek, 2005).
Islam and Nationalism:
Defining “nation” with an aim to contain the vastness of the term will undoubtedly result in a
very narrow notion of the term. It will not be an exaggeration to suggest that all scholars make
use of their own definition and interpretation in their works.
For Ernest Renan statist definition of nation is too narrow. The nation, he declares, is a daily
plebiscite, a solidarity sustained by a distinctive historical consciousness (Ernest Renan, 1994).
Stalin’s conception of a nation is a mixture of objective and subjective elements; a historically
constituted stable community of people with a common language, territory and economic life and
cohesion (Joseph Stalin, 1994). Political objective enjoys centrality in Max Webber’s (1994)
definition of a nation. He examines the nation as a ‘prestige community’ endowed with a sense
of cultural mission. Nations, according to him, are too various to be defined in terms of one strict
criterion.
Most relevant to the project of nationalism in Islam is the concept of Muslim Ummah
(community). The conceptual debate over the literal meaning of Ummah is as diverse as the
interrogation of the concept of ‘nation’. Dr. Israr Ahmad (2002) argues that the Quran and
Hadith (words and deeds of Prophet Muhammad) state clearly that all Muslims, from any part of
the world, form one Ummah or Hizb (community or party). They are unified in an indivisible
religious communion term 'nation', denoting an individual’s allegiance to the state in the Western
political sense should not be applied to them.
The Islamic concept of nationalism is unique in that it abolishes historic attachment to common
descent, language, race, ethnicity, history or political institutions all of which contribute to the
building of a legal definition of nationality (Ramadan, 1963). It considers such divisions as
artificial, man-made barriers that undermine ethnological oneness of all men and promote
prejudice and false sense of superiority. Of all the gradually developed conceptions of
nationality, only administrative concept of nationality is acceptable to Islam.
Nationality in Islam neither creates separation among Muslims nor does it base nationalism on an
alleged supremacy of linguistic or ethnological ties (Ramadan, 1963). This unique nationalism is
then a sworn competitor of secular nationalisms because it rejects the holiness of all objects
central to them. The main texts of Islam are silent on whether the societies should be organized
around nationalism or pan-Islamism. Islam does not outline the circumstances in which a state
should be opposed or supported, whether there should be one state or many (Halliday, 2003).
The notion of Ummah as a distinct community separated by geography but bound together in
faith stem from the early history of Islam when Arabs of Mecca and Medina were united in faith
as followers of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).
In striking contrast to this unifying concept of Ummah, Muslims of diverse backgrounds,
ethnicities, languages and cultures across the globe are divided in modern Muslim states with a
strong sense of national (state) bonding and group cohesion. Foreign and economic policies of
these states are devised keeping in view national rather than religious interests. With advances in
communication technology and desirability of western education system, the dominant view of
nation and nationalism has seeped in Muslim societies with relevant ease in the wake of
realization of the power of ethnic, tribal, social, cultural and language ties that bind people
together. Because of segregation in bordered states since centuries and the absence of a binding
religious body, differences among Muslims have become a reality and the diverse patterns which
have now become a part and parcel of the Islamic society will have to be taken into account
while discussing the concept of a universal Muslim community in 21st century. While Islam
forwarded a bold and progressive idea in pre-Islamic Arab tribes, it has fallen victim to
modernization and Westphalian concept of statehood. In this sense Ummah is not a reality, it is a
vision. It is an ideal state that seeks to unite Muslims spiritually and creates a physical
environment where Muslims are no longer confused about their allegiance to either the Ummah
or the nation state.
Some practical problems confront the concept of global organization of Muslims; Firstly, a
global Islamic community has always been a dream to be fulfilled by Muslims. The concept of
community in Islam is based on religious texts in Qur’an and a politico-legal system called the
Shari’a. It covers social, economic and political life matters and lays down guidance for Islamic
constitution and law. Despite this entire framework, the global Muslim population being one
community or Ummah remains a myth perpetrated by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. This has
never been true of the Islamic world since the early days of Islam. The variety of practices in
Islamic countries and the differing social and individual identities make it difficult to explain
Muslims as a single community. So while in theory Islam only recognizes difference on the basis
of religion and not on the basis of nationality (Ayubi, 1980), it is a reality that study of
communities cannot be based on the sociology of religion alone. In order to understand the
nature of Islamic community it is important to find out how it interacts with other ethnic, cultural
and political forces (Halliday, 2003).
Secondly, in the absence of an Islamic Caliphate or a single Muslim Empire housing the entire
Muslim world under the leadership of a popular Caliph, the concept of one Muslim community
and the applicability of Islamic political thought in modern times seem far from reality. The
history of political thought in Islam has always been a complex interplay of ideal concepts and
social realities. Even in the absence of any practical machinery to give shape to this political
doctrine, the idea of a glorious Muslim Caliphate still haunts the imaginations of Muslims and
appeals to their emotions (Gibb, 1970). The gap between reality and this ideal state of
community in Islamic thought is often bridged to meet political ends by the leaders of Muslim
political parties and states.
Thirdly, the socio-economic and political scenario of the world demands states to act as rational
actors and pursue individual goals. In recent times the world has seen Muslim states forging
alliances with non-Muslim governments against their co-religionists. Preference is given to
political pragmatism instead of religious affiliation in making foreign policy decisions. Iran acted
in state interest when it did not voice concerns for Chechens in Russia and Uyghur in China
simply because it had important strategic ties with both China and Russia. Iran has also shown
support for Christian Armenia against Shi’ite Azerbaijan and lent limited support to Tajiks in
Tajikistan (Fuller, 2003). Recently, the Bahrain unrest saw both Saudi Arabia and Iran fighting
for regional influence through a covert proxy war in Bahrain. In this sense the Muslim state
governments are no different from the average politically motivated world leaders who give
preference to national interest over any other commitments.
One wonders if Muslim governments are indeed at fault for doing so. It is a reality that the world
is geographically demarcated into states with competing goals and ideologies. Among these
states are numerous Muslim states that cannot be conceived of as a single large community due
to cultural differences, political processes, social issues and relationship between groups,
differing ideologies and extent of westernization. Most important among these differences is the
difference of culture among Muslim states.
Why did the traditional Muslim societies start giving importance to their secular dimensions of
identity? The answer lies in the complexities of history starting from the ‘westernization’ of
Muslim population which some scholars date back to early nineteenth century (Tibi, 1981).
Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt, ‘an exhausted, paralysed and degenerate country’ in 1798 marks
the beginning of the history of modern Middle East. This expedition also brought with it
European ideas, scientists, literature and a printing press in Arabic type.
Egyptian students started going to France to learn secular subjects like history and geography.
Among these students was al-Tahtawi, impressed by the development and living standards of the
French, he embarked on a mission of translating French literary works in Arab and hence
imported European bourgeois ideas. In his writings he becomes the first Arab to use the term
nation in a secular sense and ‘social’ for him takes precedence over ‘religious’. While writing
about equality, justice and patriotism in a liberal-democratic sense he unintentionally gives
preference to bonds of nationality over religiosity.
Tibi (1981) is right when he contends that outside forces were instrumental in generating the
secular-national literal and political renaissance that occurred in the Arab provinces of the
Ottoman Empire in the early nineteenth century. This renaissance which set the foundation of
Arab nationalism was largely developed under the influence of Europe.
The Ottoman Empire inspired nationalist and religious movements because of the feudal rule
marked by plunder, exploitation, and oppression. The Ottomans made use of the universal
ideology of Islam; appeal of Shari’ah to appease the masses and by using religion to serve purely
political ends, the Ottoman succeeded in ensuring the loyalty of their Arab subjects in spite of
plundering their resources and ravaging their culture. But this loyalty was short lived.
Movements like Wahabism and Islamic Modernism in eighteenth and nineteenth century
respectively created new notions of religious and secular nationalism.
Several movements have revitalized and redefined the concept of nationalism in Islam. Islamic
Modernism of Al-Afghani (1839–97) was formed in response to European colonialism aimed at
revitalizing Islam. Al-Afghani was aware that the tendency towards the formation of national
states was increasing with the internationalization of capitalism. In his attempt to adjust Islam to
this development, Al-Afghani borrowed the European idea of the nation, purified it of its secular
connotations and declared that all Muslims were a single nation (Bassam Tibi, 1981).
These movements asserted the importance of multiple identities on one hand and inspired other
bents of thought giving preference to cultural identities over the religious ones on the other. For
Al-Hursi (1882-1968) reality is the existence of nationalities; wishful thinking is the notion of a
homogeneous Islamic Ummah (Tibi, 1981). His writings developed Arab nationalism as a social
movement. It is clear from his bent of thought that he views cultural communities (language
being the most important binding factor) as more homogeneous than social groups united on the
basis of religion.
Similarly, Mustafa Kamil of Egypt launched ‘Local Nationalism’ in opposition to British
colonial rule. In Kamil’s political theory, Islam is subordinated to nationalism. He was prepared
to include everyone irrespective of their religious affiliation and racial background into the
Egyptian nation. However, he was opposed to Arab nationalism and viewed Pan-Arab
nationalists as ‘intruders’ and outsiders. Though he died in 1908, he left behind a legacy of
European liberal thought which found many adherents in the following years. Territory and rich
Egyptian past instead of religion became a source of pride for masses.
Even though Islam and its institutions were instrumental in the mobilization of masses during the
liberation struggle against European imperialism and colonialism, they were generally viewed by
the leaders as largely irrelevant, backward, negative or possibly even hostile to the cause of
modernity and national power. Ataturk in Turkey, Jinnah in Pakistan, Sukarno in Indonesia,
Nasser in Egypt, Bourgiba in Tunisia, Ben Bella in Algeria were all westernized leaders who
presided over the newly liberated states in a distinctly secular spirit (Fuller, 2003).
The immigration reforms in Europe and America that opened doors for immigrants from the so
called Third World countries saw huge numbers of Muslims leaving Muslim states for the former
colonial and secular states in hope of bettering their economics. Subsequent generations of
Muslim who were born and brought up in secular states had a distinct hybrid identity. In addition
to being Muslims they were Germans, Americans, British, Italian, and French etc. A third of the
world's Muslims live in countries where they form a minority (Boer, 2005). Globalization with
its initial charm that stimulated homogenization on the economic, cultural and political level
contributed to the varied intensity of solidarity felt in the Ummah. Muslims as part of a minority
population in foreign societies had to reinvent what it meant to be a Muslim: a logical
consequence of the slow disappearance of the social authority and relevance of religion as a
result of globalization and rise of capitalism. Other sources of identities not only became
available to Diaspora Muslims but also to the Muslims living in modern Muslim states. While
the Diaspora Muslims embraced new identities through the process of acculturation, state politics
influenced the social identities of Muslims living in Muslim states.
Religious identity which was supposed to be the most powerful source of self-identification,
according to their belief system, became just one of the many sources of self-conception. In the
free societies of progressive states where they were ‘outsiders’, Muslims had to culturally adapt
to an extent. The modern Muslim Ummah spread all over the world, divided in modern day
Muslim and secular states thus faces the challenge of externally enforced pluralism2 in its ranks
with the creation of hybrid identities. Here a new ‘nation’ (strictly based on state citizenship) is
being created through attaching new meaning and value to the national culture as opposed to the
group culture. This is not to suggest that Muslims have completely disregarded their religious
identity as unnecessary but that their religious identity has become one of the many identities
that they have acquired over time.
In addition to the external influences on Islamic thought, the project of nationalism in Islam has
also readjusted itself to the internal sectarian politics. While the externally imposed perpetual
differences may be construed as uncontrollable and Muslim Ummah may defend itself on the
same grounds, internal (and therefore controllable) divisions in the House of Islam in the shape
of sectarianism shake the very foundations of a unified Muslim community. The underlying
2
Two distinctions are made for the sources of pluralism; external (ethnic and national), internal (sects and
diverging Islamic schools of thought)
causes of difference in the House of Islam are numerous but they generally spring from historical
differences in interpretation of the religious text, belief in the importance of creating analogies in
answering questions related to theology in the absence of a single spiritual leader and the
difference in religious temperament.
Muslims haven’t been ‘one community’ ever since the death of Prophet Muhammad. The death
of Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D. and the subsequent question of succession became the focal
point of earliest division in the Ummah. The debate centered on whether the leadership should be
transmitted purely on the basis of bloodline to Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet’s cousin or given to
a more experienced and qualified person of the tribe. The question was settled initially when
community leaders elected Prophet’s companion named Abu Bakr as a successor. Resultantly the
Ummah disjointed and became sub-divided into sects, each with a belief and culture of its own.
The conceptual framework of Muslim “nationalism” became ambiguous at this point.
The modern Muslim world is divided in two major sects Sunni and Shi’a. Sunnis are the
overwhelming majority of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims while Shi’ites represent
approximately 130-195 million people or 10-15 percent of total Muslims. A cursory glance over
the modern day Muslim states shows that each state has a majority sect that is perceived as the
‘aggressor’ by the minority sect. The religious lobbyists and their ritualistic approach towards
Islam often dictate the foreign policy of Muslim states and the treatment of the minority sects
within their borders. It is a reality that modern day Muslim states are recognized as much by their
sectarian affiliations as they are by the popular ethnic group and geographic location. When the
state has to be closely identified with a narrowly conceived precept of Islam, minority sects were
bound to feel insecure and vulnerable (Saeed, n.d.).
How can there be a unified Muslim community when the object of nationalism is not unified;
what it actually means to be a “Muslim” varies across the rank and profile of the Ummah.
Moreover, the sects formed following various divisions in the House of Islam are hostile to each
other, some stripping the right of others to view themselves as Muslims. Muslim nationalism
needs a unified Muslim Ummah for its expression and in the absence of such a unified body, all
claims of a united Muslim front are either political; on a state or party level or nostalgic; on an
individual or collective level where the glorious past serves as a means to reshape self-perception
for a specific purpose. It can be argued that the sentiments of Muslim Ummah in 21st century are
more often than not aroused to be used as a means to an end.
These divisions are not symbolic, nominal or superficial. They are central to a Muslim’s belief,
hence all Muslims can be said to adhere to a common religion but whether that religion
automatically results in the formation of a community that transcends differences is debatable.
Historically, Muslims have fought with each other with the same determination and resolve that
they have displayed in their fights with non-Muslims. It is said that when Sultan Selim I. set out
for the war against Persia, which was to be a religious war, a contest between Sunni and Shi’a,
the Ulema at Constantinople, the highest religious body of the state, declared an opinion that
there was more merit in killing one Shi’a than in putting seventy Christians to death (Walker,
1983). With the creation of modern day states, this animosity among the members of Ummah
was cloaked in carefully designed foreign and internal politics that created the great divide
between the majority and the minority sect.
The argument for a theoretical conception of a single Muslim community is further weakened by
the state behavior in modern times. Muslim states are no different from other states when it
comes to making foreign policy decisions. State centric approach is adopted by Muslim countries
even at the expense of infuriating other Muslim states. The divisions in the Muslim Ummah are
indeed legitimized and institutionalized because the Muslim states are also recognized as Sunni,
Shi’a, Wahhabi, Zaydi, or Alawites etc. The state provides a framework for nationality, sect and
ethnic affiliations to work together and put a legitimate strong defense against religion. This
interplay of identity crisis was evident in the Iran-Iraq and Iraq-Kuwait war. Prior to the Iran-Iraq
war of 1980-1988 Saddam Hussein tried to legitimize his claim as the defender of the “Arab”
nation, supporting the Iranian separatist elements like Iranian Kurds and the Arabs in Khuzestan.
On the other hand in Iran Khomeini called on the Iraqi Shi’ites to overthrow “Saddam’s
government” (Karsh, 1988) The eight long years of war between two Muslim states both
pursuing greater influence in the region by engaging in a military conflict with an aim to reduce
the perceived threat, followed by the Iraq-Kuwait conflict3 showed the secondary importance of
religion in the external affairs of the modern day Muslim states.
In the face of all this, it remains unclear what is meant by being a “Muslim”. While all Muslims
may claim Islam to be their religion, not all Muslims agree on a single definition of Islam and
this relegates the concept of one ‘united’ community to a purely symbolic level with no
contemporary practical usage. Muslim Ummah then is a rhetorical concept which is only used
from time to time to serve specific purposes.
Creation of a State for the ‘Muslims’:
The closest example of formation of a modern state following a huge wave of Muslim
nationalism is of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Carved out of united India in 1947, Pakistan
comprised of distinct people with no history of national unity. The people of Pakistan spoke
3
There was no sectarian animosity involved in this conflict. Iraq was eyeing Kuwait’s wealth for its reconstruction
following a long war with Iran.
different languages, adorned distinct cultures and did not even exist as one geographic unit. The
newly formed state was divided into two separate wings, East and West with more than a
thousand miles of Indian Territory in-between. Their independence struggle was based on the
popular belief that Muslims of India did not identify with the Hindus because they were a distinct
community bound together on the basis of their faith. This reactionary brand of nationalism
surfaced to counter the growing fear of a Hindu majority and the British colonial rule. I call this
‘reactionary nationalism’ because instead of driving strength from preexisting internal
community bonds its manifestation demanded an external threat. This nationalism was hence not
a natural expression of the unity of the Islamic community; in fact Islam as a religion and
Muslim community as a concept were used as spectacular political tools to achieve goals that
were not necessarily religious in nature.
The pre-independence era saw the rise of ideological politics in British India. The vague slogans
like "Islamic state," "Islamic government," "Islamic constitution," and "Islamic ideology" were
successfully utilized to mobilize mass support for Pakistan. The ideology of Pakistan, apart from
distinguishing a Muslim nation from the Hindus, at best remained vague (Islam, 1981). The
course of events following the creation of Pakistan dealt a deadly blow to the very concept of
Muslim nationalism when it witnessed the ‘Muslim’ identity of Pakistanis being demoted to the
level of secondary importance. The suspension of all corresponding identities during the
temporary phase of community building and reactionary nationalism turned out to be
momentary. Religious ideology was used as a means to an end and after the elimination of the
threat of rising Hindu nationalism and British imperialism the sole objective of the reactionary
Muslim nationalism was achieved. In the absence of any other collective goal the dormant
linguistic, ethnic, cultural and regional identities resurfaced. Interestingly, over time, for ethnic
groups, especially the Bengalis and Baloch, over arching identity of ‘Pakistani Muslim’ became
the ‘other’. Ethnic, regional and linguistic identities replaced the collective group identity of the
Muslim society showing that the single identity derived from Islam was not viewed as sufficient
and instead preference was given to independent identities based on language, culture and
historic.
The practical limitations of a single Muslim community were further exposed when Bangladesh
was carved out of Pakistan in 1971 after a Bengali nationalism wave. The ‘colonial masters’ in
West Pakistan failed in their attempts to assimilate Bengalis under the popular Pakistani identity
cloaked in Muslim nationalism. Though the creation of Bangladesh was a result of a variety of
causes from foreign intervention to Bengalis intrigues, the real problem was that of identity
(Hussain, 1976). Their self-determination struggle was based on ethnic nationalism demanding a
separate homeland for “Bengalis”. Over time ethnic nationalism had developed strong
dimensions enough to defy national and religious identity and destroy the state. This split
showed that colonial inspired government system was possible in an Islamic state where the
colonial masters and the colonized both were Muslim.
The events following the creation of Pakistan exposed Muslim nationalism as being ephemeral.
It could not envelope the very differences among the Ummah that it theoretically aspired to
supersede. For its expression it required external impetus, seeming almost incapable of
maintaining an internally driven allegiance to the broader Ummah over time. With the successful
achievement of a common goal, feelings of allegiance abated only to be replaced by an acute
realization of being starkly different from each other. The subjugation of religious identity to
tribal, linguistic, geographic, clan identities exhibited the limited practicality of the concept of a
universal Ummah.
Islam (1983) outlines some factors that explain why Islamic appeal gradually lost its
effectiveness for the purpose of national integration and why the ideology of Islam failed in
uniting Pakistanis despite their differences. First, the subsequent years following the creation of
Pakistan showed that an ideological concept without a geographic base becomes vague over
time. The geographic association, especially, is a concrete reality for people while broad
concepts of “nation” and “state” are mere abstractions (Islam, 1983). Within Pakistan it was
taken for granted that religious identity of being a Muslim would triumph eternally. Second, no
attempts were made by the successive ruling elites to create and build institutions around Islam. 4
Over reliance on religion to create a group identity obstructed the creation of a state identity
independent of religion. In the absence of a geographically contingent ‘state’ identity people
looked towards their historic associations with territories to shape group identities.
Sixty-four years after independence the current state of Pakistan is still confused about its
“Pakistani” identity. Provincial and ethnic nationalism has filled the aforementioned void created
through identities like Sindhi, Pashto, Baloch, Punjabi, Serieki, Hazara etc. Despite the complete
disregard for the multi-ethnic dimensions of a Pakistani identity shown on state level, people
continue to have layers of various identities. These different levels of identities become salient
depending on the sociopolitical situation. The Bengalis of East Pakistan who in 1947 gave
preference to their religious identity in order to help Jinnah ‘wrench religious geography out of
history’ (quoted in Qureshi, 1973) twenty-four years later rejected ideological Pakistani
4
The military dictatorship of Zia-ul-Haq in late 1970s and 80s tried to Islamize the society by introducing Shari’a in
Pakistan. The laws were randomly enforced, discriminated against women and oppressed the masses. In short it
had disastrous impact on the society of Pakistan in the shape of Islamic radicalism.
nationalism and repudiated Muslim nationalism by giving preference to their cultural identity
and seeking support from India.
International struggles like Kashmir, Bosnia or Palestine will most definitely bring the Muslim
identity at the forefront but in domestic matters sub national identities continue to divide people
in clusters. These clusters represent people belonging to tribes, clans, and race etc. who have a
long history of their independent identities. Because this self-identity has become so strong
through generational reinforcement, people experience a unique sense of differentiation between
‘them’ and ‘others’. Their secular identities (cultural, geographical, linguistic etc.) define who
they are and religion is just one of their identities.
Conclusion:
Muslim nationalism presupposes the existence of a uniform imagination of what it means to be a
nation. For Muslim nationalism to exist it is therefore imperative that there is some kind of a
universal idea of what it means to be a ‘Muslim’. If this sense of uniqueness and similarity is not
found in the rank and order of the members of House of Islam then the project of Muslim
nationalism carries little significance and meaning. Seen through the lens of national identity
Muslims would appear as a single block joined together by Divine order and equality of faith. As
demonstrated during the course of this paper it is not necessarily true.
Muslim nationalism at best is an abstract concept. It dwarfs in the face of other physical and
concrete realities like geographical association or state centric nationalism, family, tribal and
clan history or ethnic affiliation, sectarianism or what it means to be the ‘right’ or ‘true’ Muslim.
It is an abstract concept because it rejects the internal divisions in the House of Islam which are a
reality. Because of this conceptual nature, the idea of a Muslim Ummah is symbolic which finds
its expression in rituals. The daily five time prayers and the annual pilgrimage brings Muslims of
the world together in a show of solidarity and unite them in a spiritual bond. Each phenomenon
can be easily classified as a ‘mass ceremony’ – i.e. the central force necessary to bind a modern
nation (Anderson, 1991) yet social realities continually break that bond only to temporarily build
it again when circumstances demand.
One may argue in favor of the existence of Muslim Ummah in view of global reactions to events
that directly affect Muslims/Islam or in the case of Muslims struggling for self-determination.
Popular recent examples of international manifestation of “Muslim nationalism” include the
Rushdie Affair and Danish cartoon controversy. While the publication of Rushdie’s Satanic
Verses drew the Muslims to issue a fatwa5 against him, the cartoons depicting Prophet
Muhammad in late 2005 mobilized the global Muslim community to protest violently against the
insult. The cause of a Palestinian state in Middle East and a free Kashmir ignite feelings of
solidarity that transcends borders. Events like these show that more than the ‘existence’ of
Muslim Ummah, it is the ‘idea’ of Muslim nationhood that is used by contemporary Muslim
elites to build effective coalitions and achieve concrete outcomes.
The gap between ideals and social realities is exploited by religious and political elites and used
to their own advantage. This reactionary approach taken by the global Muslim community does
not signify the existence of Muslim Ummah. This show of universal solidarity is short-lived and
is almost always accompanied by a goal. Upon the successful achievement of that goal the
feelings of solidarity are replaced by the realization of differences in sub-ideologies and other
social realities. The feelings of Muslim nationalism experienced in the Muslim world are not
enduring or timeless; they are superficial and need-based; usually born out of a need to counter
an external threat.
5
A religious verdict.
Increased interaction among people of different background and faiths is slowly changing the
dynamics of the world. When it comes to issues of global concern the world population adopts a
cosmopolitan identity due to the wide agreement on the universal moral principles. With the
creation of states and demarcation of boundaries within the Muslim world, the Muslim countries
continue to work on their separate agendas. Turkey has recently agreed to host an early warning
radar system as part of NATO’s missile defense system to protect against Iranian ballistic
missiles (Huffington Post)6. The ethnic and cultural differences still continue to exist and
Muslims like all others give importance to the ‘worldly’ identities. Even though Muslims can be
treated as one ‘nation’ for theoretical purposes, in view of all this contradictory evidence
Muslims neither act nor appear to be one ‘nation’. Faith alone is not an enduring binding factor
because what it means to be a Muslim is subjective in the face of internal divisions in the House
of Islam.
The history of Islam has always been a complex interplay between ideal concepts and social
realities. Muslims have historically been more divided than united. The very diversity that Islam
rejects has worked against the realization of the Ummah. Political borders, tribal rivalries,
sectarian disputes, geographic barriers, and linguistic diversity have created hurdles in the
uniform imagination of one community. On a broader level, it can be argued that in the absence
of a Muslim Empire (led by a popular Muslim Caliph), giving practical shape to the Muslim
community and reinforcing the ideals of Muslim Ummah is a far cry from reality. The fact that
Ottoman Empire failed in creating cohesion among Muslims and instead caused a string of
reactionary nationalisms in the Muslim world in the form of Arab nationalism, local nationalism
in Egypt, Wahhabism/Salafism in Saudi Arabia further weakens the case of a universal Muslim
Empire and hence of Muslim nationalism.
6
News item from <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/02/turkey-early-warning-radar_n_947205.html>
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