Decentralized Despotism: How Indirect Colonial Rule
Undermines Contemporary Democratic Attitudes
Evidence from Namibia
Marie Lechler1
Lachlan McNamee2
1 University
2 Stanford
of Munich
University
June 20th, 2016
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
1 / 27
Idea
During colonial times, southern and central Namibia were directly
ruled by the German and South African authorities while northern
Namibia was indirectly ruled.
As a consequence, the role of traditional authorities was much more
important in northern Namibia than in southern and central Namibia.
This influence of traditional authorities in northern Namibia persists
to the present day.
Idea: use division of Namibia as natural experiment to identify the
long-term effects of indirect colonial rule.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
2 / 27
Main result
We find that individuals living in the formerly indirectly ruled part of
the country have lower support for democracy and the rule of law.
⇒ Hypothesis: local governance structures, which are organized on a
’despotic’ basis (i.e. traditional leadership) undermine democratic attitudes
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
3 / 27
Table of contents
1
Motivation and historical background
2
Results
3
Conclusion
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
4 / 27
Motivation
Our project contributes to understanding of determinants of political
attitudes and of viability of democratic systems.
We are able to document an important effect of the ongoing influence
of traditional authorities in Sub-Saharan Africa, who play a uniquely
important role in the governance of these countries.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
5 / 27
Motivation
Adds to
literature about the importance of ’civic culture’ and individual
political attitudes for the viability of democratic institutions
Almond & Verba (1963); Inglehart (1988,1990); Persson & Tabellini
(2009) and Fuchs-Schündeln & Schündeln (2015)
literature about long-term effects of direct vs indirect colonial rule
Iyer (2010), Acemoglu et al (2000, 2001)
literature about role of traditional authorities in Sub-Sahara Africa
Mamdani (1996); Dusing (2002); Acemoglu, Reed & Robinson (2013);
Baldwin (2013, 2015); De Kadt & Larreguy (2014)
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
6 / 27
History of the border
Figure : Precolonial map of ethnicities (Murdock, 1967)
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
7 / 27
History of the border
1884: Namibia becomes German colony
Germans settle in central and southern Namibia
Rinderpest epidemic devastated cattle-dependent communities, which
were concentrated in central and southern Namibia in the 1890s
Strength tribes living in the North and inaccessibility of the North
hamper settlements in the north
⇒ Germans easily conquered southern and central Namibia
1905: Introduction of the ‘’Police Zone” (police protection cannot
cover entire protectorate)
Due to financial constraints German activities (administrative,
economic and military) focus on Police Zone
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
8 / 27
History of the border
Source: Miescher, Namibia’s Red Line, 2012
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
9 / 27
History of the border
1915: Police Zone boundary and German policies of restricting
movement were adopted by the South Africans.
1964: Police Zone boundary is formalized by Odendaal Commission
1990: Namibian independence. Transition to parliamentary
democracy and homogenization of policies north and south of the
border.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
10 / 27
Direct vs indirect rule
Indirect colonial rule in northern Namibia
Traditional authorities in the north were given a lot of political
autonomy
Despotic, hereditary and authoritarian system
Influence persists even after independence and constitutes a parallel
system of governance
Direct colonial rule in central and southern Namibia
German (and later South African) colonial administration directly
ruled over this part of the country
Traditional authorities were given little or no political role
Since independence, people only experience governance via elected
and accountable local representatives at all levels of government
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
11 / 27
Hypothesis
1. Indirect and direct colonial rule have persistent effects on democratic
attitudes (test with OLS).
2. The key mechanism underlying this relationship is the ongoing
influence of traditional authorities, which acts as a parallel despotic
governance structure (test with 2SLS).
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
12 / 27
Data
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
13 / 27
Data
Political attitude data: Afrobarometer (1999-2008, 4 survey rounds)
Covers 166 EAs and 1426 individuals
Questions
Contact traditional authority: During the past year, how often have you
contacted a traditional ruler? (Scale 0-3)
Support for democracy (Scale: 1-3)
Courts make binding decisions (Scale: 1-5)
How likely is law enforcement by authorities (Scale: 1-4)
Questioning leaders vs respect for authority (Scale: 1-4)
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
14 / 27
Data
Table : Balancing table for observations from buffer zone
(1)
Direct rule
(2)
Indirect rule
(3)
Difference
Contact traditional leader
0.24
0.79
0.55***
Age
33.4
36.3
2.90***
Gender
1.49
1.49
0.00
Education
3.80
3.82
0.02
Without food
1.31
1.10
-0.20**
Observations
254
1,164
1,418
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
15 / 27
The effect of indirect rule on political attitudes
Baseline estimation equation:
0
Yider = α + β · Indirectruled + Xider γ + ηe + µr + ider
Y expresses the outcome variables (the measures for democratic
attitudes) for individual i, living in enumeration area d, belonging to
the ethnic group e, being surveyed in round r.
Indirectrule is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual
lives in an enumeration area which belonged to the indirectly or the
directly ruled part of Namibia
X is a set of individual-level control variables
ηe are ethnicity fixed effects
µr are survey-round fixed effects.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
16 / 27
Identification
Treatment: indirect vs direct colonial rule
independent of other factors affecting political attitudes close to the
colonial border (location of border exogenous to pre-colonial political
attitudes)
Pre-treatment attitudes were the same within each ethnic group
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
17 / 27
OLS estimates
Table : Effect of indirect rule on political attitudes
VARIABLES
Indirect colonial rule
Constant
Observations
R2
Ethnicity FE
Survey round FE
Controls
# clusters
(1)
Support
for democracy
(2)
Support
for democracy
(3)
Courts make
binding decisions
(4)
Courts make
binding decisions
-0.178**
-0.189**
-0.169*
-0.178*
(0.0746)
(0.0757)
(0.102)
(0.105)
2.493***
2.660***
3.557***
3.844***
(0.0908)
(0.237)
(0.130)
(0.265)
1,347
0.019
yes
yes
no
165
1,329
0.036
yes
yes
yes
165
1,392
0.089
yes
yes
no
165
1,375
0.103
yes
yes
yes
165
Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. Control variables are age,
education dummies and income dummies. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors
(clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
18 / 27
OLS estimates
Table : Effect of indirect rule on political attitudes
VARIABLES
Indirect colonial rule
Constant
Observations
R2
Ethnicity FE
Survey round FE
Controls
# clusters
(1)
Law
enforcement
(2)
Law
enforcement
(3)
Respect
authorities
(4)
Respect
authorities
-0.272**
-0.298**
0.122
0.131
(0.115)
(0.116)
(0.0890)
(0.0899)
3.507***
3.134***
1.950***
1.978***
(0.127)
(0.304)
(0.121)
(0.279)
1,026
0.043
yes
yes
no
128
1,009
0.061
yes
yes
yes
128
1,396
0.096
yes
yes
no
165
1,379
0.110
yes
yes
yes
165
Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. Control
variables are age, education dummies and income dummies. The sample consists of buffer
zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. ***
p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
19 / 27
Robustness
Applying an ordered probit model
Link
Using observations for the entire country (not only buffer zone)
Link
Clustering observations on the constituency level (60 clusters instead
of 165) Link
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
20 / 27
Channel of causality
Identification of contact to traditional leaders as channel of causality by
applying 2SLS estimations.
→ instrument contact with traditional authorities with indirect colonial
rule dummy
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
21 / 27
Effect of indirect rule on contact with traditional leaders
Table : Effect of indirect rule on contact with traditional leaders
VARIABLES
Indirect colonial rule
Constant
Observations
R2
Ethnicity FE
Round FE
Region FE
Controls
F-Test
# clusters
(1)
Contact
traditional ruler
(2)
Contact
traditional ruler
(3)
Contact
traditional ruler
(4)
Contact
traditional ruler
0.555***
0.391***
0.373***
0.350**
(0.0700)
(0.104)
(0.103)
(0.166)
0.240***
0.887***
0.439
0.307
(0.0533)
(0.122)
(0.305)
(0.462)
1,418
0.045
no
no
no
no
62.67
165
1,418
0.142
yes
yes
no
no
18.36
165
1,400
0.178
yes
yes
no
yes
12.95
165
1,400
0.183
yes
yes
yes
yes
12.05
165
Results from OLS regressions. Control variables are age, education dummies and income dummies. The sample
consists observations for the buffer zone only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses.
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
22 / 27
2SLS results
Table : Effect of contact with traditional leaders on political attitudes
VARIABLES
Contact traditional leader
Observations
Ethnicity FE
Survey round FE
Controls
# clusters
First-stage F statistic
(1)
Support
for democracy
(2)
Support
for democracy
(3)
Law
enforcement
(4)
Law
enforcement
-0.429**
-0.484**
-0.684**
-0.772**
(0.216)
(0.237)
(0.329)
(0.356)
1,347
yes
yes
no
165
20.90
1,329
yes
yes
yes
165
18.53
1,026
yes
yes
no
128
14.57
1,009
yes
yes
yes
128
13.50
Results from 2SLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects using indirect colonial rule as
an instrument for contact with traditional leaders. Control variables are age, education dummies and income
dummies. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. First-stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
reported. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p
<0.1.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
23 / 27
2SLS results
Table : Effect of contact with traditional leaders on political attitudes
VARIABLES
Contact traditional leader
Observations
Ethnicity FE
Survey round FE
Controls
# clusters
First-stage F statistic
(1)
Courts make
binding decisions
(2)
Courts make
binding decisions
(3)
Respect
for authority
(4)
Respect
for authority
-0.433*
-0.480*
0.336
0.391
(0.263)
(0.281)
(0.243)
(0.252)
1,392
yes
yes
no
165
20.10
1,375
yes
yes
yes
165
18.18
1,365
yes
yes
no
165
17.72
1,348
yes
yes
yes
165
15.75
Results from 2SLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects using indirect colonial rule as an
instrument for contact with traditional leaders. Control variables are age, education dummies and income dummies.
The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. First-stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. Standard
errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
24 / 27
Robustness checks
Exclusion restriction: Living north of the border is uncorrelated with any
other determinant of political attitudes.
Potential concerns:
geography and culture
political socialization
Link
Link
selective spatial sorting
Link
contemporary institutions
income and education
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Link
Link
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
25 / 27
Effect on voting behavior
Table : Effect on voting turnout
VARIABLES
Indirect colonial rule
(1)
OLS
(2)
Probit
-0.137***
-0.455**
(0.0463)
(0.182)
Contact traditional leader
(3)
2SLS
-0.527**
(0.225)
Constant
Observations
R2
Ethnicity FE
Survey round FE
Controls
# clusters
0.328**
0.371
(0.147)
(0.295)
723
0.277
yes
yes
yes
91
721
723
yes
yes
yes
91
yes
yes
yes
91
Results from OLS, Probit and 2SLS regressions including ethnicity and
survey round fixed effects. Control variables are age, education dummies
and income dummies. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only.
Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p
<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
26 / 27
Conclusion
Indirect colonial rule has persistent effects on contemporary political
attitudes and political behavior.
Key mechanism: influence of traditional authorities
⇒ Parallel despotic governance structure undermines support for
democracy and the rule of law and and encourages to respect leaders
rather than to question them.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
27 / 27
Appendix
Table : Summary statistics for observations from buffer zone
Contact traditional leader
Courts make binding decisions
Support for democracy
Enforce law: crime
Respect authority
Age
Education
Without food
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Mean
SD
Min
Max
Obs
0.7
3.9
2.4
3.3
2.5
35.8
3.8
1.1
1.0
1.0
0.8
0.9
1.1
14.8
1.8
1.2
0
1
1
1
1
18
0
0
3
5
3
4
5
92
8
4
1426
1399
1352
1034
1404
1421
1414
1425
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
1 / 18
Robustness OLS: Ordered probit
Link
Table : Ordered probit model
VARIABLES
Indirect colonial rule
Observations
Ethnicity FE
Survey round FE
Controls
# clusters
(1)
Support
for democracy
(2)
Courts make
binding decisions
(3)
Law
enforcement
(4)
Respect
authorities
-0.273**
-0.200
-0.364**
0.132
(0.124)
(0.128)
(0.165)
(0.0943)
1,329
yes
yes
yes
165
1,375
yes
yes
yes
165
1,009
yes
yes
yes
128
1,379
yes
yes
yes
165
Results from ordered probit regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample
consists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses.
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
2 / 18
Robustness OLS: Observations for entire country
Link
Table : Observations for entire country
VARIABLES
Communal
Constant
Observations
R2
Ethnicity FE
Survey round FE
Controls
# clusters
(1)
Support
for democracy
(2)
Courts make
binding decisions
(3)
Law
enforcement
(4)
Respect
authorities
-0.0889***
-0.0456
-0.111**
0.124***
(0.0331)
(0.0416)
(0.0545)
(0.0416)
2.263***
3.388***
3.128***
1.775***
(0.117)
(0.166)
(0.178)
(0.167)
4,598
0.027
yes
yes
yes
571
4,826
0.057
yes
yes
yes
571
3,263
0.053
yes
yes
yes
407
4,134
0.097
yes
yes
yes
509
Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample consists of observations for the entire country. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in
parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
3 / 18
Robustness OLS: Cluster on constituency level
Link
Table : Cluster on Constituency level
VARIABLES
Indirect colonial rule
Constant
Observations
R2
Ethnicity FE
Survey round FE
Controls
# clusters
(1)
Support
for democracy
(2)
Courts make
binding decisions
(3)
Law
enforcement
(4)
Respect
authorities
-0.189**
-0.178*
-0.298**
0.136*
(0.0792)
(0.0925)
(0.123)
(0.0700)
2.660***
3.844***
3.134***
1.960***
(0.273)
(0.276)
(0.390)
(0.277)
1,329
0.036
yes
yes
yes
44
1,375
0.103
yes
yes
yes
44
1,009
0.061
yes
yes
yes
40
1,348
0.140
yes
yes
yes
44
Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample consists
of observations for the buffer zone. Standard errors (clustered by Constituency) in parentheses. *** p
<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
4 / 18
Potential concern: Geography and culture
We only focus on individuals living within a 100km buffer zone of the
boundary to ensure comparability between individuals surveyed on
several dimensions (e.g. proximity to ports, the capital and the national
border, geographic characteristics)
We include ethnicity fixed effects to account for differences in ethnic
cultures
We include regional fixed effects as a robustness check, which does
not change our results
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
5 / 18
Potential concern: Geography and culture
Link
Table : Effect of contact with traditional leaders on political attitudes
VARIABLES
Contact traditional leader
Constant
Observations
Ethnicity FE
Survey round FE
Region FE
Controls
# clusters
(1)
Support
for democracy
(2)
Courts make
binding decisions
(3)
Law
enforcement
(4)
Respect
authorities
-0.695*
-0.870*
-0.681
0.636
(0.361)
(0.509)
(0.425)
(0.411)
2.908***
4.308***
3.034***
1.695***
(0.401)
(0.498)
(0.404)
(0.422)
1,329
yes
yes
yes
yes
165
1,375
yes
yes
yes
yes
165
1,009
yes
yes
yes
yes
128
1,348
yes
yes
yes
yes
165
Results from 2SLS regressions including ethnicity, survey round and regional fixed effects using indirect colonial
rule as an instrument for contact with traditional leaders. The sample consists of buffer zone observations
only. First-stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area)
in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
6 / 18
Potential concern: Different political socialization
Link
Indigenous population did not experience democracy in either the
direct or indirectly ruled areas of Namibia during colonial times.
Since the governance system of the south enabled the exploitation of
the local indigenous population, if anything, the bias from different
experiences with western institutions during the colonial era should
bias against our hypothesis.
If this concern was true the effect should be larger for older people.
Interaction effect is however insignificant.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
7 / 18
Potential concern: Different political socialization
Table : Effect of interaction between age and indirect rule on political attitudes
VARIABLES
Indirect colonial rule
Indirect rule x Old dummy
Old dummy
Constant
Observations
R2
Ethnicity FE
Survey round FE
Controls
# clusters
(1)
Support
for democracy
(2)
Law enforcement
(3)
Courts make
binding decisions
(4)
Respect
authority
-0.182**
-0.320**
-0.231*
0.0464
(0.0828)
(0.123)
(0.118)
(0.116)
-0.000124
0.0850
0.109
0.171
(0.107)
(0.123)
(0.114)
(0.143)
-0.00334
-0.132
0.138
-0.171
(0.0957)
(0.114)
(0.102)
(0.131)
2.628***
3.443***
3.920***
2.020***
(0.225)
(0.311)
(0.252)
(0.279)
1,334
0.039
yes
yes
yes
165
1,013
0.055
yes
yes
yes
128
1,379
0.111
yes
yes
yes
165
1,352
0.138
yes
yes
yes
165
Results from OLS regressions including interaction terms between colonial rule and a binary age dummy as well
as ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The old dummy equals one if an individual is older than 31 years.
The sample consists observations for the buffer zone only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in
parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
8 / 18
Potential concern: Different political socialization
Table : Effect of interaction between age and indirect rule on political attitudes
(1)
Support
for democracy
(2)
Law
enforcement
(3)
Courts make
binding decisions
(4)
Respect
authority
-0.0750
-0.308
-0.122
-0.00732
(0.159)
(0.200)
(0.169)
(0.211)
Indirect rule x age
-0.00347
0.000334
-0.00170
0.00439
(0.00450)
(0.00458)
(0.00404)
(0.00521)
Constant
2.557***
3.143***
3.794***
2.091***
(0.254)
(0.334)
(0.277)
(0.333)
1,329
0.036
yes
yes
yes
165
1,009
0.061
yes
yes
yes
128
1,375
0.103
yes
yes
1,348
0.140
yes
yes
yes
165
VARIABLES
Indirect colonial rule
Observations
R2
Ethnicity FE
Survey round FE
Controls
# clusters
165
Results from OLS regressions including interaction terms between colonial rule and age as well as
ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample consists observations for the buffer zone only.
Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
9 / 18
Potential concern: Selective spatial sorting
Link
During the German and South African colonial rule, permanent
migration between the two parts of the country was prohibited.
We cannot rule out selective sorting after independence in 1990,
however we believe this is unlikely to act as an important confounder.
In northern areas of Namibia, land is communally held and ties to one’s
family, one’s community and to ancestral land rights are extremely close
Moreover, migration statistics from the Namibian Statistics Agency
suggest that permanent migration from the north, where it has
occurred, has been economic in nature and primarily inter-regional as
poor laborers move to the larger cities of the south
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
10 / 18
Potential concern: Different contemporary institutions
Link
People living north and south of the border do not systematically
evaluate the effectiveness of government institutions differently.
Inclusion of regional fixed effects ensures that we only compare
individuals living close to each other on the same part of the
boundary, who are governed by the same national and regional
institutions nowadays.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
11 / 18
Same contemporary institutions
Table : Balancing table
Government officials listen
Trust in police
Trust in courts
Fear of unjust arrest
Observations
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
(1)
Direct rule
(2)
Indirect rule
(3)
Difference
1.22
[1.06]
1.78
[0.85]
1.83
[0.92]
3.93
[0.73]
1.26
[1.08]
1.91
[0.88]
1.91
[0.95]
3.83
[0.93]
-0.048
(0.11)
-0.13*
(0.070)
-0.085
(0.067)
0.097
(0.091)
253
1,163
1,416
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
12 / 18
Potential concern: Income
Link
Table : Effect of indirect rule on income
VARIABLES
Indirect colonial rule
(1)
OLS
(2)
OLS
(3)
OLS
(4)
Ordered Probit
-0.204
0.0398
0.0147
0.0191
(0.134)
(0.163)
(0.146)
(0.148)
-0.106***
-0.109***
(0.0333)
(0.0360)
Contact traditional leader
Constant
Observations
R2
Ethnicity FE
Survey round FE
Controls
# clusters
1.307***
1.216***
0.804***
(0.126)
(0.184)
(0.229)
1,417
0.004
no
no
no
165
1,417
0.055
yes
yes
no
165
1,400
0.130
yes
yes
yes
165
1,400
yes
yes
yes
165
Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample
consists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in
parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
13 / 18
Potential concern: Effect of education
Table : Effect of indirect rule on education
VARIABLES
Indirect colonial rule
(1)
OLS
(2)
OLS
(3)
OLS
(4)
Ordered Probit
0.0147
-0.274
-0.158
-0.0892
(0.189)
(0.193)
(0.150)
(0.0987)
Contact traditional leader
Constant
Observations
R2
Ethnicity FE
Survey round FE
Controls
# clusters
0.0492
0.0293
(0.0481)
(0.0308)
3.802***
4.038***
5.068***
(0.176)
(0.225)
(0.360)
1,406
0.000
no
no
yes
165
1,406
0.025
yes
yes
yes
165
1,400
0.240
yes
yes
yes
165
1,400
yes
yes
yes
165
Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample
consists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in
parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
14 / 18
Afrobarometer questions
Contact traditional leader
During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the
following persons about some important problem or to give them your
views: A traditional ruler?
0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
15 / 18
Afrobarometer questions
Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?
1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be
preferable.
0=Statement 2: Sometimes non-democratic preferable, 1=Statement
1: Democracy preferable
Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
1: Citizens should be more active in questioning the actions of leaders
2: In our country, citizens should show more respect for authority.
1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1,
3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree very strongly with Statement 2,
Please tell me whether you disagree or agree: The courts have the
right to make decisions that people always have to abide by.
1=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree,
4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree
How likely do you think it would be that the authorities could enforce
the law if a person like you committed a serious crime?
1=Not at all likely, 2=Not very likely, 3=Likely, 4=Very Likely
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
16 / 18
Afrobarometer questions
Education
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling, 2=Some primary schooling,
3=Primary school completed, 4=Some secondary school, 5=Secondary school
completed, 6=Post-secondary qualifications, 7=Some university, 8=University
completed,9=Post-graduate
Income
Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone
without: Enough food to eat?
0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times,
4=Always
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
17 / 18
Afrobarometer questions
How much of the time do think the following try their best to listen to
what people like you have to say: Elected Local Government Councillors?
0=Never 1=Only Sometimes, 2=Often, 3=Always
How much do you trust each of the following: The Police?
0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot
How much do you trust each of the following: Courts of Law?
0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot
M.Lechler and L.McNamee
Decentralized Despotism:
June 20th, 2016
18 / 18