Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom
Author(s): Walter J. Petersen
Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Sep., 1986), pp. 269-294
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association
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International
StudiesQuarterly
(1986) 30, 269-294
Deterrenceand Compellence:
A Critical Assessment
of ConventionalWisdom
WALTER J. PETERSEN
Policon Corporation
Although the theoryof deterrenceis widely accepted, many of the important
propositionsderived fromthe general argument have yet to be tested against
the record of interstate conflict. The research reported here tests four
propositions that relate to hypothesized differencesbetween deterrence and
compellence. Based on the results from an analysis of 135 international
conflicts, I conclude that conventional wisdom regarding these assumed
differencesis faulty in some significant respects. Specifically, I find that
deterrenceof immediate threatsis usually no 'easier' than compellence, and
that compellence is not 'reckless' behavior in the sense that rash decisions are
made.
In his analysis of the birth and development of deterrence theoryJervis (1979: 301-302)
observed:
Perhaps the most startlingfactabout the development of the theoryis the lack
of supporting evidence . . . There has been insufficientprogress in two
opposing, but complementary,directions. First,therehave been fewattempts
to systematize and extend the theory. Scholars have not tried to tease new
propositionsfromit, have not triedto extend the basic logic on such important
questions as the relative ease of deterrence versus compellence, and have
rarely used a deductive approach to group togetherand explore well-known
bargaining tactics. There is much to be gained from doing so: greater
precision, new insights,and testingthe theory . . .
The theoryhas also relied too much on deduction. Until recently,we have
had almost no evidence on whether decisionmakers behave as deterrence
theorysays they should, and whethertheiractions have the expected results.
The questions raised by Jervis are certainly important. Do decisionmakers evaluate the
consequences of alternative courses of action when they issue, or are faced with,
note:I wishto thankBruceBueno de Mesquita,JamesD. Morrow,anidMadeleineT. Smithfor
Author's
their help during the research phase of this project. I also thanikthe anonymous reviewers and the editors of
International
Studies
Quarterly,
past and present,fortheircommentson earlierdraftsofthisarticle.
0020-8833/86/03 0269-26 $03.00 ? 1986 International Studies Association
270
Deterrence
and Compellence
deterrentthreats?What evidence exists to support the central premise of deterrence?
What differencesexist between deterrentand compellent situations? The fact is, we
know very littlein the way of answers to these questions because, as Jervis notes, we
have not looked forthem.
The purpose of the research reported herein is to attempt to fill some of the gaps
identifiedby Jervis. Specifically,four importantquestions relatingto possible distinctions between deterrenceand compellence are addressed:
1. Why do effortsto compel a change in the status quo result in war more oftenthan
effortsto deter one's opponent fromattemptingto change the status quo?
2. Is it easier to deter than to compel? If so, under what conditions is this the case?
3. If compellence is war-prone behavior, is it thereforerecklessactivity?
4. Does the target of a compellent threat have a bargaining advantage over the
initiator?
It should be noted at the outset that deterrenceis a term that can be, and has been,
formsof behavior. It is oftensuggested,for
employed to describe substantivelydifferent
example, that 'nuclear' deterrence differsin importantrespects from 'conventional'
deterrence,and that 'extended' deterrenceis more difficultto pursue successfullythan
attemptsto deter attackupon one's own nation. In thispaper the importantdistinction
is made between 'general' deterrence and 'immediate' deterrence. As defined by
Morgan, the formertermcan be used to describe the policies of opposing nations 'who
maintain armed forcesto regulate their relationshipeven though neitheris anywhere
close to mountingan attack' (1983: 11). In thisrelationshippolicypronouncementsmay
be issued fromtime to time that may be interpretedas militarythreats, such as the
speeches thatintroduced'containment', 'massive retaliation', and 'flexibleresponse' as
American policy. Such threats,however, are usually statementsof general intentand
theyoftensimplydenote a shiftin national strategy.'Immediate' deterrenceis practiced
when one nation issues a specificthreatto use militaryforceagainst an opponent who
has signaled, by its words or deeds, a willingnessto use forceto change the status quo
with respect to a specificissue in dispute.
In thisstudyI analyze the outcomes of a set of serious interstatedisputes in whichone
nation issued an explicit and specificthreatto use militaryforce in an efforteitherto
change the statusquo (compellence) or to deterthe opponent fromattemptingto change
the existing situation (deterrence). To the extent that this is a study of deterrence,
therefore,it is a studyof immediate deterrentthreats.The resultsof testspresented in
this paper should not be viewed as analyses of propositions derived from general
deterrencetheory,at least as it is described by Morgan. Indeed, in some instances the
factthat a specificthreatwas issued may be an indication that one's general deterrent
strategyhad failed. As Huth and Russett (1984) observe, however, immediatedeterrent
threatsare importantevents forstudy,and informationgained froman examination of
these actions can provide insightsinto crisis resolutionand general deterrencetheory.
The Approach
Because the outcomes of internationalcrises are the consequences of decisions made by
both the threat initiatorand the target, I approach the questions posed above froma
decisionmaking perspective. Consistent with many studies of deterrence and conflict
initiation,I assume the following:
271
WALTER J. PETERSEN
1. Crucial decisions made during crises can be viewed as iftheyare the product of the
calculations of a single decisionmaker.
2. Decisionmakers are rational, expected utilitymaximizers.
3. Crises begin with,and wars are preceded by, the initiationof an explicitthreatto use
military force by one nation, directed against another, for other than strictly
defensivepurposes.
4. The crisis initiatingthreatcan be issued in an efforteitherto deter a change in the
status quo with respect to the issue in dispute, or to compel the targetto make or
accept a change in the status quo.
5. War results froma crisis only if both the targetand the initiatorultimatelydecide
not to concede to the other.
To posit that national behavior is purposive (as deterrence theory does), it is
necessary to assume that the decisionmaking process is dominated by a central
authority. Except for situations in which some preference orderings are socially
unacceptable or when thereis unanimous agreementamong the membersof the group,
there is no guarantee that decisions made by collectives will furthernational interests
(Arrow, 1951). The unitaryactor assumption stipulatesthatwhen the crucial decisions
are made during crisissituationsone leader acts as a gatekeeper. While many members
of the governmentmay provide input into the process, ultimate responsibilityforthe
actions of the nation restswiththisperson. The choice of strategymust be approved by
him or her, and the leader's veto of any strategyis sufficientto preventits implementation (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; Huth and Russett, 1984).
National leaders are furtherassumed to be rational, expected utilitymaximizers.
This does not implythatdecisionmakersare omniscient,nor-doesit mean thattheyare
all risk neutral actors. This assumption states that decisionmakersweigh the costs and
benefitsthatwould accrue fromimplementationof alternativecourses of action and, on
the basis of pertinent information,choose the alternative that maximizes expected
utility.As Bueno de Mesquita (1981) and Huth and Russett (1984) indicate, the critical
decisions to be made under conditionsof crisisusually involve two alternatives(initiate
or not initiateconflict;concede or stand firm).
On the basis ofthe assumptionsofferedabove, an admittedlysimplifieddescriptionof
the outcomes of interstatecrises can be depicted as in Figure 1. As envisioned here the
sequence of interactionsbegins withthe initiationof a threatto use forceby nation i in
an attemptto change or to deter change in the status quo with respect to an issue in
i
a
Compel
chanpeanth
changein
the
statusquo
(n =67)
Concedes
(n =16)
~
~
Standsfirm
(n=51)
Concedes
i Concedes
FIG.
<n
iStns
=
(n25)as
/Wisa
Winswar
(n=20)
<
i's threatto:
Detera
changein the
statusquo
(n = 68)
iConcedes
(n =5)
i Standsfirm
(n=46)
Concedes
~~~~i
= 8)
imWswa
i Stands-firm
( n= 17)
1. The outcomes of internationalcrises.
i Winswar
= 26)
~~~~~~n
/ n war
( =4)
i Winswar
(n =13)
272
Deterrence
and Compellence
dispute. Once the threat has been communicated, a decision must be made by the
target,nationj. At thispoint in the sequence a bargaining process involvinga number
of decisions and counter-decisionsmay be initiated, or it may not. The target may
temporizehere, or it may not. Each side may escalate the dispute a littleat a time in titfor-tatfashion,or nothingof the sortmay occur. But, at some point, a keydecision must
be made: whetherto continue to stand firmand resistthe initiator's demands (if the
initiatordoes not back down at some point in the process) or to concede and give the
initiatorwhat it wants.
If the target concedes (either immediatelyor aftera bargaining process that spans
some lengthoftime) the crisisis resolved peacefullyto the benefitofthe initiator.Should
the targetstand firm,however, the initiatormust then make a decision regardingwhat
to do. Once again, the sequence of events may involve numerous separate episodes of
back-and-forthbargaining involving threat and counter-threat.Or it may not. My
concernhere is not withthebargainingtacticsemployed or withthe number ofmessages
that were communicated between parties. My concern is with decisions, and the
initiatormust make a decision at some point whetherit too will continue to stand firmor
whetherit will withdrawits demands. If both continue to stand firm,war will be the
outcome. If, at some point, the initiatordecides not to press its position in lightof the
target's opposition, the crisis will be resolved peacefullyto the benefitof the target.
Two aspects of this simplifiedmodel of the sequence of interactionsduring crisis
situationsdeserve note. First, it may be argued thatthe fouroutcomes envisioned here
(target concedes, initiator concedes, target wins war, initiator wins war) are too
restrictiveto the extent that settlementsin which a 'fair' compromise is reached are
excluded. While such outcomes may be said to have occurred, the overwhelming
majority of crises have resulted in clearly identifiablevictories for one party. Crisis
situationsmay not be zero-sum games in the strictsense, but once the initiatorhas made
its intentionsclear it eithersucceeds in changing the target's behavior or it does not, in
which case the least value it loses is some credibility. In some instances of peaceful
conflictresolution(the Cuban missile crisis is one) a quid pro quo of sortswas reached;
the two sides reached an agreementon some side issue in PartyA's favorin returnfora
settlementfavorableto Party B on the main issue in dispute. My attentionin this study
is strictlyfocusedon the main issue in dispute. Finally, while compromisesolutionshave
occurred and would be interestingto examine, codification of such cases would be
between varyingshades of gray. The set
extremelydifficult-much like differentiating
of serious disputes analyzed here representscases in which there is widespread agreement as to victorsand losers.
A second limitationrelatesto the tacticsemployed by the disputants.The attentionof
thispaper is concentratedon crisisdecisions and outcomes, and the range of alternative
courses of action is narrowedto two in thisscheme. Obviously, numerous policyoptions
are available to leaders, ranging, as they did for the United States during the Cuban
missile crisis, from 'do nothing' to 'invade'. The most importantdecision problem,
however, is whetherto resistor not, and it is thesedecisions thatI wish to examine. Only
aftera leader has chosen to stand firm(or concede) must he or she consider a second set
of options. Thus, forthe purposes of this investigationonly, 'blockade' and 'air strike'
are qualitativelysimilar; theyboth representstand firmstrategies.(Obviously, forother
types of analyses and in a search for answers to other kinds of questions, it would be
unwise to equate these two options because theyrepresentsignificantlydifferentlevels
of response. I treat them similarlybecause-for the questions I am concerned with in
this paper-they are similar.) In each crisis the variety of policy alternativescan be
WALTERJ.
PETERSEN
273
divided into those that demonstratecontinued resistanceto the threat(stand firm)and
those that signal a willingnessto accede to the demands (concede).
To summarize, this model of the dynamics of crisis resolution assumes that key
decisions are made sequentially (though the precise number of moves is a functionof
both the tactics employed and the decisions made by the two parties), that the critical
decisions can be viewed as binary choices, and that these decisions determine the
outcome, both in terms of the victor and the method of crisis resolution. This is not,
therefore,a studyofhow(in termsof bargaining tactics)or preciselywhendecisions were
reached. This is a study of whatdecisions were made, whythey were made, and the
outcomes theyproduced. If decisionmakersare analytic actors, and ifthe model of the
sequence of interactionsunder crisissituationsis appropriate(if simple), thenwe should
be able to test the propositions addressed above by focusing on the conditions under
which both crisis participants choose to stand firm, thus resulting in war, and the
conditionsunder whichone side will opt to concede, thus ensuringa peaceful resolution
of the dispute at a cost of some policy loss.
Data and Operationalization:
The Dependent Variables
Phenomena studied by social scientistsare more open to significantlydifferentinterpretationsthan are most events observed by chemists,physicistsand other scholars and
researchers in the physical sciences. The systematic study of international conflict
requires precise definitionsof concepts such as 'threat', 'concession', and 'victory'.
Investigatorsand politicians alike, however, disagree on these very things. As a result
thereexists no universallyrecognized set of serious internationaldisputes, nor is there
consensus regardinginitiatorsand victorsin some conflicts.In collectingthe set of international crises I have relied on the effortsof otherswho have studied related questions
in the recent past. This set includes 135 cases spanning the time period from 1823
through 1973. Seventy-two of these serious disputes were resolved peacefully and
the remaining63 conflictswere interstatewars. The set of crises appears in Appendix I.
The instances of peaceful resolution are drawn fromthe study of status and major
power conflictundertakenby Gochman (1975). In collectinghis data Gochman relied
on historiescompiled by Dupuy and Dupuy (1970), Langer (1972), and a hostof annual
registersand officialdocuments. Each of these cases, which Gochman refersto as a
'threat', representsa conflictinitiatedby an:
on behalfofa memberstate's
. . .explicitverbalstatement
by a highofficial
government
declaringan intentto use militaryforceforotherthanstrictly
ofarmedforcesbya memberstate,
defensivepurposes;or overtmobilization
duringperiodsofdisputeorhightension,clearlydirectedagainstanotherstate
forotherthanstrictly
defensivepurposes(1975: A-5).
For each case Gochman identifiesthe initiator(s), target(s), issue in dispute, and
outcome. I employ his classificationswithout exception. Bueno de Mesquita (1981)
identified the victor in each of these peacefully resolved disputes and I use his
determinationsas well. Some cases involve multiple initiatorsand/or targetsand for
each of these disputes I treateach initiator-targetdyad as a separate observation.
The 63 interstatewars included in thisset are taken fromSinger and Small (1972) and
Bueno de Mesquita (1981). The classificationsof initiator,target,and victoremployed
here are taken fromBueno de Mesquita (1981).
The 135 cases include a small number of disputes between nuclear nations. It should
274
and Compellence
Deterrence
be emphasized at thispoint thatthisis not a studyofnuclear deterrence,nor do I wish to
compare nuclear to non-nucleardeterrence.I do not subscribeto the thesis,as some do,
that nuclear deterrenceis so differentfromconventional deterrenceas to preclude the
mixtureof cases. However, to prevent confusion,the reader should be aware that the
data are not sufficienteither to confirmor to disconfirmthat the findingspresented
below apply to instances of nuclear deterrencein general.
From the case historiescompiled by Dupuy and Dupuy (1970), Langer (1972), and
Gochman (1975), it is possible to determinewhetherthe initiator'smilitarythreatwas
issued in an effortto preserveor alter the statusquo withrespectto the issue in dispute.
Included in the set are crises touched offby essentiallyeconomic disputes (over such
issues as debt repaymenttermsand access to foreignmarkets)as well as differencesover
control of territory(including both expansion of political authoritypast one's border
and controlover colonies).
Coding is based on the nature of the initial threatto employ militaryforce. If, for
example, the initiator demanded economic leasing agreements where none had
previouslyexisted(as Britainand Russia demanded fromChina in 1898), militarybases
in a foreigncountrywhere none had previouslyexisted (as the Soviet Union demanded
fromFinland in 1939), or territoryunder the administrationof anothernation (as Italy
demanded fromTurkey in 1911), then the militarythreat was issued in an effortto
change the statusquo. In some cases the initiatorseeks to compel a change in thetarget's
behavior, such as Japan's demand that Britain close the Burma road in 1940 and
Germany's demand in 1903 thatthe Dominican Republic repay itsdebt at a rate faster
than previouslyagreed to.
If the initiatorthreatenedmilitaryforce in an effortto prevent an alteration of the
status quo-as interpretedby the initiator-such action was coded as an immediate
deterrentthreat.In some cases the initiatorsoughtto restrainthe targetfromexpanding
political influence. [For example, the Anglo-Japanese naval demonstration at
Chemulpo (Inchon) in 1897 was designed to deter Russia fromreplacing the imperial
financialministerwitha Russian.] In otherinstances 'extended' immediate deterrence
was practiced. (The Syrian crisisof 1957 provides two such examples: the Soviet Union
threatenedmilitaryaction against Turkey if the latter invaded Syria; and the United
States threatened the Soviet Union with retaliation if the Soviets attempted to make
good theirthreat.)
Oversimplification is a hazard one must confront in endeavors such as this.
Classificationof thesecases was, forthe most part, fairlystraightforward.
Nevertheless,
one concern should be stated, as it may impose a limitationregardingthe interpretation
oftestresults.In some instanceswhat representedthe statusquo withrespectto the issue
in dispute was somewhat unclear. For these cases I relied on treatyterms(where such
treatieshad been concluded), statementsof what would constitutea casus belli (where
such statementshad been issued), and, in the event of a series of protractedcrises, the
cause of the initial dispute. The classificationof cases is included in Appendix I.
Two dichotomous and qualitative dependent variables are constructedforeach of the
135 crises: method of resolution and the ultimate decision to stand firmor concede.
Crises resolved by recourse to war are coded (1) and those resolvedpeacefullyare coded
(0). Similarly,ultimatedecisions to stand firmare coded (1), and ultimatedecisions to
concede are coded (0).
In accord with the assumptions offeredabove, the 63 wars representcases in which
both the target and initiatorcontinued to stand firmand refused to concede to their
opponent. In 59 ofthe 72 crisesthatwere resolved peacefullythe initiatoris identifiedas
WALTER J. PE.TERSEN
275
the victor. As I have noted above, the sequence of interactionsbetween the participants
in thesecases could involve numerous decisions and responses, or just a few. The target
may have conceded immediately,or it may have stood firmforsome time beforegiving
in. As I am concerned only with the ultimatedecision(s), the decision(s) thatsealed the
outcome, I code each of these cases as a decision by the target to concede. Once the
targethas conceded, the initiatorneed not decide whetheror not to make good itsthreat
and-although it may have made a number ofdecisions to stand firmduringa crisisthat
went througha number ofstates-it is not creditedwithan 'ultimate' decision. (To code
such cases otherwise would, at least in some instances, give the initiator credit for
standingbehind a threatthatmay in facthave been a bluff.)The remaining 13 observations were victories for the target, and in each of these crises the target's ultimate
decision was to stand firmand the initiator's ultimate decision was to concede, and
withdrawthe threat.The numbers in parenthesesin Figure 1 representthe distribution
of cases across the various categories.
Data and Operationalization:
The Independent Variables
Actors are assumed to choose a course of action that they believe will produce the
greatestlikelihood of achieving results consistentwith their preferences.When faced
with decisions during crisis, decisionmakers weigh the value of a successfuloutcome,
which can be broughtabout only by a decision to stand firm,against the value of war,
which will resultifboth the targetand the initiatorcontinue to stand firm.Clearly, it is
impossible to constructa strict,all-inclusive,expected utilitydecisionmaking modelone that incorporates all considerations that decisionmakers weigh and one that
pinpointspreciselyhow different
decisionmakersperceived different
events. (Even ifwe
could do so, we probably would not want to constructsuch a model in the interestsof
parsimony.) Nevertheless,priortheorydoes afforda basic understandingof some ofthe
importantvariables that decisionmakersconsider in making choices between war and
peace and I now turn to a discussion of these factors.
Consider, by way of example, the decision problem faced by the targetof a threat
initiated by a nation that seeks to change the status quo. The targetcan guarantee a
peaceful resolutionof the dispute only if it chooses a strategyof appeasement. The low
value of thisoutcome is furtherreduced when the targetconsiders, as it must, the effect
of thisresponse on the initiator'sfuturebehavior. Schelling (1960, 1966),Jervis (1979),
and other theoristshave noted that failureto resistcurrentdemands may reduce one's
credibility,and the initiator,detectinga lack of resolve, may be encouraged to initiate
additional threats.In essence, a decision to concede is a decision to accept a new stateof
affairs,one thatinvolves some loss immediatelyand some probabilitythatthetargetwill
be confrontedwith additional demands forchange in its behavior.
The alternativestrategyis to resistthe demands, and thisresponse will produce either
a concession by the initiator,or war. To determinethe value of thisstrategy,the target
will consider both the probabilitythatthe initiatorwill eventuallyconcede and theutility
of a violentresolutionin the event thatthe initiatormakes the ultimatedecision to stand
firm.In estimatingthe utilityof war, the decisionmakercalculates the values of victory
and defeat, including an assessment of the costs associated with war, as well as the
probabilityof victory(Ellsberg, 1960; Russett, 1963).
The calculations that the target must make are based on a variety of tangible and
intangible factors. For example, the probabilitythat the targetwill emerge fromwar
victoriouslyis a functionofthecapabilitiesofboth nations (Organski, 1968), thepossible
276
Deterrence
and Compellence
interventionof third parties (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita, 1979), willingness to
suffercosts (Rosen, 1972), and efficiency.The intangibles,while obviously important,
are by definitiondifficultto assess. Operationalization of these factorsis made difficult
by a lack of data, and I am forcedto base the constructionof the independentvariables
on measures of capability and revealed policy preferences.
Operationalization of some of the independent variables makes use of the composite
capability data gatheredby the Correlates of War project. This index is recomputed to
account for each nation's share of the region's total capability and, if necessary, is
adjusted fordistance between the disputants (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981: 103-108).
Informationpertainingto the revealed policypreferencesofeach nation is taken from
Bueno de Mesquita (1981), in which he introducesa measure of the degree to which the
policies pursued by two nations are congruent. This calculation is based on a
comparison of the focal nations' alliance patternswithinthe region where the dispute
takes place. The summary statistic,tau-b, has limits at 1.0 (indicating a complete
harmony of interests)and -1.0 (indicating a complete disharmonyof interests).The
tau-b scores for each pair of nations can be thoughtof as each nation's utilityforthe
policies followedby the other.
Direct comparison of two nations' alignment patterns with actors in the region of
interestprovides a measure that is both consistentand sensitiveto shiftsin policy over
time. The expected utilityframeworkthat is made possible by the analysis of interest
communalityhas been used to examine a varietyof importantaspects of international
relations, including bargaining processes (Bueno de Mesquita, Newman, and
Rabushka, 1985), nuclear deterrence (Kugler, 1983; Kugler, Petersen, and Zagare,
1985), alliance composition and decomposition (Newman, 1982; Morrow, 1982;
Berkowitz, 1983), and conflict initiation and escalation (Altfeld and Bueno de
Mesquita, 1979; Bueno de Mesquita, 1981, 1984; Petersen, 1983a,b; Lalman, 1985).
The variables that comprise the predictive model constructed here include the
initiator'sprobabilityof victoryin war, an estimateof the costs of war each nation may
expect to suffer,the differencein the focal nations' expected costs of war, an estimateof
each nation's value forthe status quo, and the number of additional initiators.
The initiator'sprobabilityof victoryin war, Pi, is, of course, an importantvariable
thatboth disputantsmust consider as theymake theirchoices. Ceteris
paribus,the greater
the probabilitythatthe initiatorwill win the war, as estimatedby the target,the greater
the likelihood that the targetwill ultimatelychoose to concede. Should the targetstand
firm,the initiatorwill be more likelyto escalate the dispute to war when it believes that
the chances forsuccess are high. Operationalization of Pi is based on the capabilities of
the principal disputantsandthe capabilities of thirdpartiesthatmay enterthe dispute on
one side or the other. The calculation of the initiator's probabilityof victoryin war is
presented in Appendix II.
A second variable analytic decisionmakers are assumed to consider is the cost associated withwar. If the utilityone expectsto receive fromthe pursuitof a course of action
equals the gain minus the cost, thenthe greaterthe expected costs the lower theexpected
utilityof that option. When the expected costs of war are relativelyhigh, decisionmakers should be less inclined to pursue options that increase the likelihood of violent
conflictresolution.
My proxy measure of the costs a decisionmaker may expect to sufferfrom war is
based upon two factors:the capabilityofone's opponent and theopponent's incentiveto
commita large portionofthatcapabilityto the war effort.Operationalization of COSTS1
and COSTSj is based on the adjusted composite capability scores and on the revealed
277
WALTER J. PETERSEN
policy preferencesof the initiator and the target. The calculations are presented in
Equation [1] below:
COSTSi
=
(CAP-)
COSTSj
=
(CAP.) (Ui)-
where: CAPE,=j's capability at home;
UL i's estimateofj's utilityforj's
's estimateofj's utilityfori's
Uii
=
capability atj;
i's
CAPy
Uid j s estimateof i's utilityfori's
U,j= j s estimateof i's utilityforj's
((Uj-?)
[ 1]
Uij)
policies (equal to 1.0);
policies (ranges between -1.0 and 1.0);
policies (equal to 1.0);
policies (ranges from -1.0 to 1.0).
If the policies pursued by the initiatordiffergreatlyfromthose preferredby the target
[i.e., if(Uij- Uy) is large], thenthe targetcan logicallyassume thatthe initiatorvalues
a change in the target's behavior. As a result,the initiatorcan be expected to commit a
sizable portionof its capability to the war effortand COSTSj could be large. In general,
the costs expected by a decisionmaker will be greatest when it faces an extremely
powerful opponent that pursues policies that diverge significantlyfrom the policies
followedby the focal nation.
There are situations in which the target may decide to stand firm, despite high
expected costs of war, if it perceives the initiator's expected costs to be even greater.
(The decision by the United States to resistthe Soviet Union's effortsin Cuba in 1962 is
one example.) To account forsuch a possibilityI include a variable, COSTDIFF, which
is simply(COSTSi-COSTS.).
Although the importance of one nation's value forthe status quo was recognized in
earlyworkson deterrence(Ellsberg, 1960; Snyder, 1960; Russett, 1963), littleefforthas
been made to operationalize thisvariable and determineits impact on choice. I measure
one nation's value forthe status quo as the degree to which the policies it pursues are
similar to the policies followedby other nations with interestsin the region concerned,
weightedby each othernation's capability. Presumably, decisionmakersvalue good (or
bad) relationswith more powerfulnations more than theyvalue equally good (or bad)
relationswithweaker nations. The calculations are presentedbelow in Equation [2]:
n
VSQ1
=
1
(Uikz)(CAPk)
[2]
k= i
n
VSQj =
where:
>
k= 1
(Uj7J) (CAPk)
k = actor with interestsin region;
Uik = i's estimateof i's utilityfork's policies;
CAPk= k's share of the region's total capability;
UjkJ=js estimate ofj's utilityfork's policies.
Although this measure does not estimate each nation's valuation forthe status quo
with respect to the issue in dispute, it is meant to representthe degree to which the
nation is satisfiedwiththe policies pursued by othersin the region in which the dispute
occurs. A high value forthe statusquo would indicate thatpolicies preferredby the focal
278
Deterrence
and Compellence
nation are also preferredby others,or at least powerfulothers. Hence, to the extentthat
my use of alliance patternsin the utilityscores is correlatedwith agreements/disagreernentson otherimportantpolicy issues, a general satisfactionon mattersof policy in the
particularregion should be reflectedin a high value forthe status quo.
The value for the status quo, as a variable in the decision calculi of conflict
participants,becomes meaningfulonly when one considers the purpose of the crisisinitiatingthreat.For example, an initiatorthatseeks to change the statusquo should be
more likelyto continue to stand firm,if necessary, when its value forthe status quo is
quite low. When VSQ. is high, however, the initiator's position cannot be improved
significantly.In this event the expected costs of war may outweigh the benefitsto be
obtained and the initiatorshould be more likely to withdraw the threat if the target
refusesto concede. Similar logic applies to the target's decisionmakingbehavior.
Finally, I include a variable that controlsforthe number of nations that initiatethe
threatin an effortto capture informationthatmay otherwisebe lost. Calculations of the
typediscussed above include estimatesof what is likelyto happen, based upon available
information.Uncertaintyabout each nation's behavior in the near futureis reduced,
however, when one or more of these nationsjoin the initiatorin issuing the threat,and
decisionmakersrevise theircalculations on the basis of this added information.
Other thingsbeing equal, the greater the number of additional initiators,NAI, the
more likelythe targetwill be to concede. Two considerationslead me to thisconclusion.
First, if more than one nation initiatesthe threatto use militaryforce,any war which
mightresultwould likelybe multilateraland perhaps take place on more than one front.
Avoidance of a two-front
war is a militarydoctrineof long standing. Second, the greater
the number of initiatorsthe greater the capability mustered against the target in the
event of war. The target's expected costs of war may be revised upward and the
initiators' probabilityof victorymightalso increase. Thus, the presence of additional
initiatorsshould reduce the target's value for a stand firmpolicy. For each initiatortargetdyad, NAI is the number of nations that initiate the threatminus one.
These independent variables have been constructed in such a way as to provide
consistent measures of factorsthat decisionmakers are assumed to consider as they
choose strategiesduring crisissituations.They represent,ifyou will, 'proxy' indicators
-but indicatorsthatare based on logical and, as near as possible, unbiased estimatesof
the factorsthat actors are assumed to weigh. We can now use these variables to test a
variety of propositions relating to differencesbetween effortsto deter and effortsto
compel. Althoughthe set of crises studied here representsneithera complete collection
of such disputes during the 150-yeartime span, nor a strictlyrandom sampling of such
conflicts(neither of which can be said to exist at this time), it does representa large
collection of observations and thereexists no systematicbias in data gathering.Nevertheless, the tests of statisticalsignificancediscussed below should be interpretedwith
some caution. I
I Each of the independent variables is constructed froman 'objective', unbiased point of view. However,
the point is often raised that decisionmakers do not (necessarily) have an objective view of the situation and
that, as a result, analyses based on objective measures will have limited validity. This argument has been
made by Rosen (1972) and a host of others. Let me make four points in response.
First, no systematic, empirical analysis of the degree to which 'misperception' is a problem has been
undertaken. We have some anecdotal evidence, but all of that is based on the personal evaluation of the
investigator(who, too, may misperceive things).
Second, it is fairto believe, nevertheless, that some decisionmakers perceive things (capability, resolve of
the opponent, etc.) differently
than others. Risk-averse actors may tend to overestimate the capability of their
WALTER J. PETERSEN
279
Deterrence and Compellence: Four Questions
1. WhyIs Compellence
War-prone?
A look at the outcomes of the 135 internationalcrises under analysis reveals thatefforts
to change the statusquo are much more likelyto resultin war than effortsto deterone's
opponent fromattemptingto change the existingsituation. Fully 46 of the 67 attempts
to change the status quo escalated to war, while only 17 of the 68 deterrentthreats
resulted in violent resolution. A number of possible explanations forthis phenomenon
have been proposed by deterrencetheorists,but very few of them have been tested
against the record of interstateconflict.
Three reasonable hypothesescan be proposed and tested here. First, it may be the
case that challenging initiators and status quo targets are less likely to base their
decisions on calculations of expected costs of war, number of additional initiators,or
othervariables thatI have constructedhere. What may be occurringinstead is thatboth
parties are playing the game of chicken. If both nations attemptto win by limitingtheir
options (i.e., by throwingout the steering wheel), then war is inevitable. Schelling
(1960, 1966), Young (1968), and others have emphasized the importance of this
bargaining strategyin theiranalyses of deterrencetheory.
A second explanation is based on the defending target's fear of the consequences
resulting from appeasement. As I have noted above, the direct and futurecosts of
conceding to the initiator'scompellentthreatmay be of such a magnitude as to make a
stand firmstrategythe more attractivealternative. The targetof a compellent threat
must make a positive response under duress, while the targetof a deterrentthreatmust
simply refrainfrom upsetting the existing situation. If defending targets stand firm
more oftensimplybecause appeasement is undesirable, then war is indeed more likely.
The research design employed here allows one to testa thirdand finalhypothesis.It
may be the case thateffortsto change the statusquo are made under conditionsthatare
significantlydifferentfromthe conditions under which nations will initiate deterrent
threats.This propositionassumes thatdecisionmakerschoose a strategyon the basis of
factorssuch as expected costs of war regardlessof the initiator'spurpose. If this is true,
thenwe mightfindthatcrises initiatedby challengingnations are more likelyto escalate
to war because the expected costs of war in these disputes are relativelylow forboth
sides.
For proponents of the analytic model of decisionmaking, the firsthypothesis is
disturbingbecause it suggeststhatthe choice fromthe set of alternativesis not made on
the basis of calculations of outcome value and probabilityof occurrence. To be sure, the
choice of strategydoes affectthe nature of the outcome; but are decisionmakersblind to
the consequences of their actions? Do they limit themselves to a stand firmstrategy
simplybecause theybelieve thattheiropponent will accept the last clear chance to avoid
war? The evidence suggests that this is not the case.
opponents, and risk-acceptan-tactors may underestimate their foes' capability. An-d we know that some
are ofwhichtype.
people are risk averse while others are risk acceptant. But, we do not know howmnany
Third, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it seems fair to assume that risk-takingbehavior is
normally distributedacross decisionmakers and that no strongbias (in eitherdir-ection)away from'objective'
estimates should exist when one looks at a large number of cases.
Finally, I did not adjust forriskin this study because: (1) I did not have the data necessary to compute risktaking behavior, as is done by Bueno de Mesquita (1985); and (2) even if I had such data, I probably would
not have done so because the computational costs would likely far exceed the anticipated gains in accuracy.
280
Deterrence
and Compellence
TABLE 1. Initiatorattempts
to changestatusquo.
Variable
MLE
MLE/SE
Summary
statistics
(a) Targets'decisions
Targetconcedes:dependentvariablecoded0 (N= 16).
Targetstandsfirm:dependentvariablecoded 1 (N= 51).
Constant
NAI
2.59
2.44
Pi
-0.64
--1.89
-2.28
-1.52
VSQj
-3.19
- 1.96
COSTDIFF
4.58
2.07
19.63 (X2)
84 (% correctly
classified)
0.31 (Aa)
(b) Initiators'decisions
Initiatorconcedes:dependentvariablecoded0 (N= 5).
Initiatorstandsfirm:dependentvariablecoded 1 (N = 46).
Constant
13.30 (x2)
1.96
4.72
COSTSi
VSQ1
-9.37
-2.16
-2.64
-1.60
94 (7% correctlyclassified)
0.40 (Aa)
Table 1 displays the results froma probit analysis of (ultimate) decisions made by
both targetsand initiatorsafterthe initiatorhas issued a militarythreatto change the
status quo. The findingsare consistent with the interpretationthat decisions made
during thistypeof dispute are based on an assessmentof outcome value and probability
of occurrence. Consistent with what one would expect from analytic behavior,
defendingtargetsare more likelyto concede to challenginginitiatorswhen the initiator
is explicitlyjoined by othernations, when the initiator'sprobabilityof victoryin war is
relativelyhigh, and when the target'sexpected costs of war exceed the costs expected by
the initiator. Interestingly,the greaterthe defendingtarget's value forthe status quo,
the more likelyit will be to concede. This result is somewhat puzzling and suggests an
interestingtopic for futureresearch: Do high levels of satisfactionwith the status quo
promoteconciliatorybehavior on the partof defendersbecause theycan 'affordto give a
little'? This combination of variables correctlypredicts 84 percent of the 67 decisions
and reduces errorover a naive best guess by 31 percent. (See Appendix III forresultsof
probit analyses conducted with other combinations of independent variables.)
In the event that the targetcontinues to stand firm,the initiatormust at some point
decide whetherto withdrawthe threat(concede) or to stand firmas well. The combination of variables depicted in Section (B) of Table 1, including the initiator's expected
costs of war and value forthe statusquo, correctlypredicts94 percentof the 51 decisions
and reduces errorby 40 percent. As expected, the lower the initiator'sexpected costs of
war, and the lower the challenging initiator'svalue forthe status quo, the more likely
the initiatorwill be to continue to stand firmand escalate the crisis to war.
These results are consistent with the interpretationthat defending targets and
challenginginitiatorsbase theirdecisions on factorssuch as theirexpected costs of war
and estimatesof theiropponent's expected costs. It would appear that national leaders
do not choose to give their opponents 'the last clear chance' if they expect to suffer
greatlyin the event that the opponent chooses to stand firmas well.
The second proposed explanation certainlyhas merit. Ceterisparibus, targetsare more
likelyto stand firmwhen the initiatorseeks a change in the statusquo. A truetestof this
281
WALTER J. PETERSEN
TABLE 2. Initiatorattempts
to changestatusquo: peacefulresolution
or war?
Variable
MLE
MLE/SE
Summary
statistics
Peacefulresolution:dependentvariablecoded 0 (N= 21).
War: dependentvariablecoded 1 (N= 46).
Constant
NAI
COSTSi
COSTSj
Pi
2.85
2.78
-0.52
-2.04
-7.61
-3.72
-7.81
-1.44
-1.90
28.60 (X2)
84 (0%correctly
classified)
0.48 (A,)
-1.30
hypothesiswould require one to collect informationpertainingto each decisionmaker's
evaluation of the costs associated with appeasement. Even if such informationwere
available, it would require a Herculean effort(and scores of research assistants) to
obtain and evaluate the data. Nevertheless,logic and anecdotal evidence support the
argumentthatthe costs of appeasement are potentiallygreat, thus making a stand firm
strategymore appealing.
If the factthatthe initiatoris attemptingto change the status quo is the dominant, as
opposed to a contributing,factorin determiningthe methodof crisisresolution,thenwe
should find that the remaining predictive variables constructedhere contributevery
littleto an explanation of whycompellentthreatsare so likelyto escalate to war. Table 2
displays the results obtained from a test of the model's ability to determine the
conditions under which compellent threatsescalate to war.
The findingsreportedin Table 2 suggestthatthe initiator'spurpose (deter or compel)
is not the only importantvariable in thedeterminationof the methodof crisisresolution.
Indeed, the numberof additional initiators,the initiators'expected costsofwar, and the
target's expected costs of war all help to definethe conditionsunder which compellence
will resultin war. The probitanalysis resultsindicate thatthe greaterthe expected costs
of war for both parties, the lower the probabilitythat the crisis will escalate to war.
Althoughthereis good reason to believe thatthe highcost associated withthe strategyof
appeasement makes it more likelythat the targetwill stand firm,this factoralone does
not explain why war resultsso much more oftenwhen the initiatorattemptsto change
the status quo.2
The thirdhypothesisposits that compellence is more likelyto result in war because
such effortsare initiatedunder the veryconditions that make violent conflictprobable.
If the tendencyof targetsto shy away fromappeasement is only a partial answer to the
question of why compellence is war prone, and assuming that decisions are made by
rational expected utility maximizers, then it might be the case that significantdifferencesexist between the structuralenvironmentssurroundingcrises initiated in an
attemptto change the statusquo and the environmentsthatsurroundcrises initiatedin
an attemptto deter such change.
Because the expected costs of war for the target and the initiator are factorsthat
2 Although the variable does not appear to be significant,some may wonder why the sign forPi is negative,
indicating that the greater the initiator's probability of victoryin war, the lower the probability that the crisis
will escalate to war. The answer is that, again, it takes two to go to war and if the initiator's probability of
victory is relatively high the target will be likely to concede. If the target concedes, there will be no war.
Hence, the higher the value of Pi, the lower the probability of war.
Deterrence
and Compellence
282
TABLE
3. Crisisinitiation:expectedcostsofwar,controlling
forinitiator'spurpose.
(a) Initiator'sexpected
costs
COSTSi>0.054
idefendsSQ
i changesSQ
(b) Target'sexpected
costs
COSTS>0.134
COSTSi<O.054
30
38
16
51
x2(1)=6.01;p<0.05.
(68)
(67)
COSTS.<0. 134
39
29
16
51
x2(1)= 15.66; p<O.001.
(68)
(67)
appear to influence decisions significantly,I test the hypothesis by comparing each
side's expected costs, controllingforthe initiator'spurpose. The mean value of COSTS;
is 0.054; forCOSTS. the mean is 0.134. I partitionthe set of disputes into those in which
the costs exceeded the mean and those in which the expected costs of war were lower
than average. Table 3 presentsthe distributionof cases.
The findingssuggestthat initiatorsthreatento use militaryforceto change the status
quo under conditions that are significantlydifferentfromthe conditions under which
theywill initiatethreatsto defend the status quo. Thirtyof the 68 immediate deterrent
threatsin this set of crises were issued by initiatorswhose expected costs of war were
greaterthan average. In sharp contrast,only 16 of the 67 crises initiatedin an effortto
change the statusquo were startedby nations thatfaced expected costs of war thatwere
higherthan average. The differencein distributions,forthis set of crises, is statistically
significant.
Similar resultsobtain fromthe analysis of the target's expected costs of war. Fully 39
of the 68 targetsof immediate deterrentthreatshad expected costs of war thatexceeded
the average for all targets,while only 16 of the 67 targetsof compellent threatsfaced
relativelyhigh costs. Again, the differencein distributionsis in the anticipateddirection
and is statisticallysignificant.
The evidence presentedhere is consistentwiththe propositionthatcompellentthreats
produce war more oftenthan immediate deterrentthreatsbecause, at least in part, the
formerare initiatedunder the precise conditionsthat make violent resolutionthe likely
outcome. We cannot say forsure, asJervis (1979) notes, what role fearof appeasement
plays in determiningthe outcome of crises initiatedby challengingnations. However, it
seems reasonable to suggestthatotherfactorsplay a veryimportantpart in determining
why compellence is comparativelywar-prone behavior.
2. Is It Easier toDeterThan to Compel?
To put the findingsdiscussed above into proper perspective, it would be helpful to
review some of the conventionalwisdom regardingthe war-pronenessof crises initiated
by nations thatseek to change the statusquo. Schelling(1960, 1966), Young (1968), and
others argue that a deterrentthreathas a major advantage over a compellentthreatin
that it represents'the initiativethat forcesthe opponent to initiate' the use of force. In
other words, the deterrentthreat is one that draws a line and, if properly executed,
resultsin war only ifthe opponent triesto cross it. If the initiatorcannot be budged from
itspositionby the use of 'salami tactics' or othernonviolentmeans, thenthetargetmust
eitherconcede or go to war. The initiatorof a compellent threat,however, must deal
with the same disadvantage that the targetof a deterrentthreatfaces. The challenger
must forcethe defendingtargetout of a position that it currentlyholds. Recognizing
283
WALTER J. PETERSEN
that compellence is more likelyto resultin war, the conclusion drawn by these investigators is that,otherthingsbeing equal, 'it is easier to deter than to compel' (Schelling,
1966: 100).
We know, however, that other things are seldom equal. Indeed, the ceteris paribus
asssumption that underlies much of deterrencetheorygreatlyrestrictsthe applicability
of some of the theory'spropositions.The vast majorityof serious internationaldisputes,
forexample, are initiatedunder conditions thatdecidedly favorthe initiator(Bueno de
Mesquita, 1981). Because militarythreats designed to compel are usually initiated
under conditionsof low expected costs of war forboth participants,it would be wise to
testSchelling's proposition-as it relatesto immediate deterrentthreats-by controlling
forboth the initiator's purpose and each participant's expected costs of war.
If thehypothesisthatit is easier to deterthan to compel has a more precise meaning, it
is that targetsof deterrentthreatsare more likelyto concede than targetsof compellent
threats.Ignoring forthe momentinformationregardingthe participants'expected costs
of war, we find ample support for this proposition. Only 16 of the 67 targets of
compellentthreats(or 24 percent)eventuallychose to concede. Fully 43 of the 68 targets
of immediate deterrentthreats (or 63 percent) ultimately decided not to resist the
initiator's demands. Does this result hold when one controls for each participant's
expected costs of war? I partitionthe data set into four groups:
1. Where the expected costs of war are higher than average forboth parties.
2. Where the expected costs of war are lower than average forthe initiator,but higher
than average forthe target.
3. Where the expected costs of war are higherthan average forthe initiator,but lower
than average forthe target.
4. Where the expected costs of war are lower than average forboth parties.
Table 4 presentsthe distributionof targets' decisions to concede or stand firmwithin
each group, controllingin each case forthe initiator's purpose.
TABLE
4. Targets' decisions,controlling
foreach participant'sexpectedcostsof war and the
initiator'spurpose.
i defends SQ
i changes SQ
i defends SQ
ichanges SQ
(a) COSTS1>0.054 and
COSTSj>0. 134
(b) COSTSi<0.054 and
COSTS.>0. 134
j concedesj stands
firm
j concedesj stands
firm
11
8
(19)
4
2
(6)
X2(l) = 1.01 not significant
17
3
(20)
7
3
(10)
X2(l) = 0.94 not significant
(c) COSTSi>0.054 and
COSTSj< 0. 134
(d) COSTSi<0.054 and
COSTSK 0. 134
j concedesj stands
firm
j concedesj stands
firm
4
5
7
5
( 11)
(10)
X2(1) = 0.40 not significant
7
11
2
39
x2(1) = 23. 10 P<O. 001
(18)
(41)
284
Deterrence
and Compellence
The resultssuggest the conditions under which immediate deterrenceis easier than
compellence. Although the number of cases is somewhat small in some of the subdivisions (thus making any conclusion a bit tenuous), only when the expected costs of
war are lower than average forboth the initiatorand the targetwill the targetbe significantly more likely to resist the initiator's effortsto compel a change in the target's
behavior. In each of the remaining situations,which include 76 of the 135 crises under
analysis, itwould appear to bejust as easy, or difficult,to compel as it would be to deter.
This is an intriguingfinding.Evidence presentedup to this point can be interpreted
in a fashionconsistentwithtwo of deterrencetheory'scrucial arguments: thatdecisionmakersare analyticactorsand that,as such, theycan be deterredfrompursuingpolicies
iftheybelieve that the costs of doing so outweigh the benefitsto be obtained. Many of
the specificpropositions deduced fromthe theory,however, have gone untested and
unrefined. Within the limitationsof this study, and to the extent that I address only
effortsof immediate deterrence, the evidence suggests that the proposition that 'it is
easier to deter than to compel' may not hold true under conditions that are commonly
witnessed.
3. Is CompellenceReckless?
The factthateffortsto compel are more likelyto escalate to war than effortsto deterhas
encouraged at least one scholar to characterize compellence as reckless behavior
(Snyder, 1978: 349). While compellence may be reckless in that the method of
resolution is likely to be violent, does this characterization also imply that decisionmakers are less inclined to consider the costs of such an outcome? If so, then we should
find that targets of compellent threats choose to stand firm despite relatively high
expected costs more often than targets of immediate deterrent threats, and that
initiators,ifforcedto decide, are more likelyto escalate compellentthreatsin the face of
higher expected costs than they are to escalate immediate deterrentthreats. Table 5
displays the resultsof these two tests.
The findingsare consistentwith the argument that stand firmdecisions made by
targets of compellent threats are not made capriciously. Indeed, only 7 of the 51
ultimatedecisions to stand firmin such crises were made when the expected costsof war
were higherthan average fortargets.In crises initiatedin defenseof the statusquo, 11 of
the 25 decisions to stand firmwere made under conditions of higher than average
expected costs of war.
The same pattern obtains for decisions by initiatorsto stand firmand escalate the
crisis. In 7 of the 17 decisions to escalate deterrentthreatsthe initiatorfaced expected
TABLE
for
5. Relationshipbetweenexpectedcostsofwar and decisionsto standfirm,controlling
initiator's
purpose.
(b) Initiatorstandsfirm
(a) Targetstandsfirm
COSTSj>O.134
idefends SQ
i changes SQ
11
7
X2(l)
COSTSi>O.054
COSTSj<0.134
14
44
= 8.51; p<O.01
(25)
(51)
COSTSi<O.054
7
10
41
5
X2(l) = 7.38; p<O.01
(17)
(46)
WALTER J. PETERSEN
285
costs of war that were higher than average. Only 5 of the 46 decisions to escalate
compellent threatswere made under similar circumstances.
Attemptsto compel are likelyto failto the extentthat, in most instances,such efforts
increase the likelihood that war, and not negotiation, will be the method of crisis
resolution. However, the evidence presented above in no way suggests that ultimate
decisions by targets and initiators of compellent threats are made without a prior
considerationof theirexpected costs of war. The idea thatcoercive diplomacy is in some
way 'reckless' behavior should not be taken to mean that nonanalytic behavior
dominates the decisionmaking process.
4. Do Targetsof Compellent
ThreatsHave a BargainingAdvantage?
An important proposition relating to possible differencesbetween deterrence and
compellence is that targetsof compellentthreats,having made the ultimatedecision to
stand firm,have a bargaining advantage over initiators.Before I testthishypothesisit
would be helpfulto review the rationale upon which it is based.
Three sources of this bargaining advantage for targets of compellent threatshave
been noted by various studentsof conflictbehavior. First,it has been argued thatwhile
the targetwould lose somethingof value and increase the probabilityof having future
demands thrustupon it in the event that it concedes, the initiatorcan drop its demands
with comparativelylittlecost and can always tryto change the status quo again in the
future(Snyder and Diesing, 1977: 25). This argument assumes that appeasement is
more costlyforthe targetthan 'called bluff'is forthe initiator,a propositionthathas yet
to be examined systematically.Other thingsbeing equal, this asymmetryin the costs of
concession, if it exists, would work to the target's advantage.
A second source of thisbargaining advantage can be found in the nature of the game
being played. Schelling (1960: 37) argues thatifthe targetcommitsitselfto a stand firm
strategythen the 'last clear chance' to avoid war lies withthe initiator.Ceteris
paribus,if
the game is 'chicken' or a typical deterrence game the target will necessarilyhave a
bargaining advantage over the initiator.
The final source lies in the legitimacyof the status quo. Jervis has argued that:
becausebothsides
. . .the defending
poweris likelytohavegreatercredibility
have livedwiththestatusquo forsome time.The statusquo side can often
makea convincingcase thattheexpansionist's
proposalsare intolerable;but
dislikesthestatusquo, hehas shownthat
no matterhowmuchtheexpansionist
he can in factlive withit (Jervis,1979: 298).
The challenger thus has the burden of proving its case against the existingsituation, a
burden that is not easy to overcome. The conclusion drawn is that, other thingsbeing
equal, initiatorswill be more likelyto withdrawtheircompellentthreatsthan go to war.
If targetsof compellent threatshave a bargaining advantage over initiatorsthen we
should findthat initiatorsof compellentthreatsare more likelyto concede in the face of
resistancethan initiatorsof immediate deterrentthreats.Table 6 presentsthe distribution of initiators' ultimate decisions to concede or stand firmand escalate the crisis,
controllingforboth the initiator'spurpose and the expected costs of war forthe target
and initiator.
The small number of cases in some of these subdivisions makes interpretation
difficult,but the resultsdo not indicate thattargetsof compellentthreatsgain a bargaining advantage over initiatorssimply because the initiatoris attemptingto change the
status quo. When one controlsforthe expected costs of war forboth parties one finds
286
TABLE
Deterrence
and Compellence
6. Initiators'decisions,controlling
foreach participant'sexpectedcostsof war and the
initiator'spurpose.
(a) COSTSi>0.054
and
(b) COSTS1<0.054 and
COSTS.>0. 134
COSTS.>0. 134
i concedes i standsfirm
ichanges SQ
i defends SQ
1
3
(4)
3
5
(8)
X2(1) = 1.50 not significant
0
3
(3)
0
3
(3)
X2(l)= ?0.00not significant
(c) COSTS>>0.054 and
COSTSj<0. 134
(d) COSTS,< 0.054 and
COSTSj<0. 134
i
ichanges SQ
idefends SQ
i concedes i standsfirm
i concedes i standsfirm
concedes i standsfirm
1
5
X (1)=_267
4
2
(5)
(7)
not significant
1
0
X2(1)=0.18
38
7
(39)
(7)
not significant
thatinitiatorsappear to be just as likelyto withdrawimmediate deterrentthreatsas they
are to withdrawcompellentthreats.Withinthe limitationsof the frameworkestablished
here, it can be said that the ceterisparibus assumption is too restrictiveand that the
proposition may have limited applicability. Indeed, perhaps more than anythingelse,
theseresultsand theevidence presentedelsewherein thispaper suggestthata systematic
studyof appeasement and 'called bluff'may provide valuable insightsintothedynamics
of crisis resolution and conflictdecisionmaking. The results of such an analysis may
assist in explaining the anomalies uncovered here.
Summary
I have examined fourpropositionsderived fromdeterrencetheoryand I have presented
some evidence thatis consistentwiththe centraltheme of deterrencetheory.However,
to the extent that this study concerns immediate deterrentthreats (and not general
deterrencestrategy),it offerslittlesupport forthe more specificpropositionsthat have
been derived fromthe theory.
The war-pronenessof crises initiatedby the issuance of compellentthreatscannot be
explained fully by the fact that targets usually reject the strategyof appeasement.
Instead, the evidence presented here is consistentwith the argument that compellent
threatsare more likely to escalate to war because they are usually initiatedunder the
very structuralconditions that make violent conflictprobable. Specifically,threatsto
use militaryforceto change the statusquo are issued much more oftenunder conditions
of low expected costs of war forboth the initiatorand the target,as here measured, than
are threatsissued in defense of the status quo.
Second, forthe 135 crisesanalyzed here, itappears thatthepropositionthatit is easier
to deter than to compel may have limitedapplicability.When the expected costs of war
are lower than average forboth the initiatorand the target,supportforthe proposition
was found. In this subset of cases, targets are significantlymore likely to offer
WALTER J. PETERSEN
287
continuing resistance to the initiator's effortsto compel a change in the status quo.
However, in every other situation, which included a majority of' the crises under
observation,targetsare just as likelyto stand firmin the face of deterrentthreatsas they
are to resistcompellent threats.
Althougheffortsto change the statusquo are more likelyto escalate to war, thisstudy
cannot support the view that such effortsconstitute'reckless' or nonrational activity.
Far fromit. This studyhas proceeded fromthe interpretivehypothesis-consistent with
the evidence examined-that decisions to stand firm(or concede) can be viewed as if
theyare the product of the calculations of outcome value and probabilityof occurrence.
Finally, no support was found forthe proposition that targetsof compellent threats
have a bargaining advantage over initiators.When one takes into account information
relating to each participant's expected costs of war, no noticeable differencein the
behavior of crisis initiatorsis found.
Two preliminaryconclusions can be reached as a result of the evidence presented
here. First,it would appear thatthe ceteris
paribusassumption upon which so many of the
more specific propositions derived from deterrence theory are founded may significantlylimit the applicabilityof these statements.Little evidence is found in support of
the fourpropositionsaddressed in this paper when one controlsforthe factorsthat, in
fact,are rarelyequal in the real world of interstateconflict.
The second conclusion followsfromthe first.If useful policy prescriptionsare to be
derived fromthe basic theoryof deterrence,then the specificconditions under which
theymay be said to apply need to be sharplyspecified.Unfortunately,as thelimitations
of this research make clear, specification is a most difficulttask. I believe that the
approach employed here provides a useful method forthe analysis of deterrencetheory
propositions. While many problems need to be solved, specificationof the conditions
under which deterrence(and compellence) work is both a worthyendeavor and doable.
Deterrence
and Compellence
288
Appendix I: List of Cases and Data for Independent Variables
(a) InitiatorChangesStatusQuo and TargetConcedes.
Date
Initiator
Target
Date
Initiator
Target
1898
1898
1899
1900
1903
1906
1921
1921
UK
RUS
RUS
FRN
GMY
UK
BEL
FRN
CHN
CHN
KOR
DOM
DOM
TUR
GMY
GMY
1921
1921
1934
1940
1960
1960
1960
1965
ITA
UK
ITA
JAP
USR
USR
USR
CHN
GMY
GMY
ALB
UK
NOR
PAK
TUR
IND
(b) InitiatorChangesStatusQuo and InitiatorConcedes.
Date
Initiator
Target
1821
1840
1840
1856
1962
RUS
FRN
FRN
GMY
USR
TUR
UK
GMY
SWZ
USA
(c) InitiatorChangesStatusQuo and TargetWins War.
Date
1848
1862
1865
1870
1897
1913
1913
1914
1919
1939
Initiator
ITA
FRN
SPN
FRN
GRC
BUL
BUL
AUH
GRC
JAP
Target
Date
Initiator
Target
AUH
MEX
CHL
GMY
TUR
GRC
YUG
YUG
TUR
MON
1939
1939
1948
1948
1948
1948
1948
1950
1973
1973
JAP
GMY
EGY
IRQ
JOR
LEB
SYR
PRK
EGY
SYR
USR
POL
ISR
ISR
ISR
ISR
ISR
ROK
ISR
ISR
289
WALTER J. PETERSEN
(d) InitiatorChangesStatusQuo and InitiatorWins War.
Date
1860
1860
1866
1866
1866
1866
1866
1866
1866
1866
1877
1898
1909
Initiator
ITA
ITA
GMY
GMY
GMY
GMY
GMY
GMY
GMY
GMY
RUS
USA
SPN
Target
Date
PAP
SIC
AUH
BAD
BAV
HAN
HSE
HSG
SAX
WRT
TUR
SPN
MOR
1911
1912
1931
1935
1937
1939
1956
1962
1962
1962
1967
1967
1971
Initiator
ITA
YUG
JAP
ITA
JAP
USR
ISR
EGY
EGY
CHN
ISR
ISR
IND
Target
TUR
TUR
CHN
ETH
CHN
FIN
EGY
SAU
YAR
IND
JOR
SYR
PAK
(e) InitiatorDefendsStatusQuo and TargetConcedes.
Date
Initiator
Target
Date
Initiator
Target
1826
1850
1853
1854
1860
1861
1865
1876
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880
1880
1890
1895
1895
1895
1897
1897
1897
1897
RUS
AUH
AUH
AUH
FRN
UK
USA
RUS
AUH
FRN
GMY
ITA
RUS
UK
UK
FRN
GMY
RUS
JAP
JAP
UK
UK
TUR
GMY
TUR
RUS
ITA
USA
FRN
TUR
TUR
TUR
TUR
TUR
TUR
TUR
POR
JAP
JAP
JAP
RUS
KOR
KOR
RUS
1898
1898
1898
1898
1898
1899
1911
1912
1912
1913
1921
1922
1922
1922
1934
1956
1956
1956
1957
1957
1958
FRN
ITA
RUS
UK
UK
RUS
GMY
AUH
RUS
RUS
USA
FRN
ITA
UK
ITA
USR
USR
USR
USA
USR
USA
TUR
TUR
TUR
TUR
FRN
KOR
FRN
YUG
BUL
TUR
PAN
GRC
GRC
GRC
GMY
FRN
UK
POL
USR
TUR
CHN
and Compellence
Deterrence
290
(f) InitiatorDefendsStatusQuo and InitiatorConcedes.
Date
1878
1881
1885
1900
Initiator
UK
TUR
UK
JAP
Target
Date
RUS
FRN
RUS
RUS
1908
1911
1940
1940
Initiator
YUG
UK
FRN
UK
Target
AUH
GMY
USR
USR
(g) InitiatorDefendsStatusQuo and TargetWins War.
Date
1859
1965
1965
1965
Initiator
AUH
USA
VTS
IND
Target
ITA
VTN
VTN
PAK
(h) InitiatorDefendsStatusQuo and InitiatorWins War.
Date
1823
1827
1827
1827
1828
1848
1849
Initiator
FRN
FRN
RUS
UK
RUS
GMY
FRN
Target
Date
Initiator
Target
SPN
TUR
TUR
TUR
TUR
DEN
PAP
1853
1856
1864
1904
1956
1967
TUR
ENG
GMY
JAP
USR
ISR
RUS
IRN
DEN
RUS
HUN
EGY
Abbreviations
Used in AppendixI.
ALB
AUH
BAD
BAV
BEL
BUL
CHL
CHN
CUB
DEN
DOM
EGY
ETH
FIN
Albania
Austria-Hun-gary
Baden
Bavaria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Chile
China before1949;
People's Republicof
China
Cuba
Denmark
DominicanRepublic
Egypt
Ethiopia
Finland
FRN
GMY
France
Prussiabefore1870;
Germany1870-1945
GRC Greece
HAN Hanover
HSE
Hesse Electoral
HSG Hesse Gran Ducal
HUN Hungar-y
IND
India
IRN
Iran
Israel
ISR
ITA
Italyafter1860;
Sardiniabef'ore1860
JOR Jordan
JAP Japan
LEB
Lebanon
MEX Mexico
MON Mongolia
MOR Mor-occo
NOR Norway
PAK Pakistan
PAN Panama
PAP Papal States
POL Poland
POR Portugal
PRK People's Republicof
Korea
ROK RepublicofKorea
RUM Rumania
RUS Russia before1917
SAU Saudi Arabia
SAX Saxony
WALTERJ.
SIC
SPN
SWZ
SYR
TUR
The Two Sicilies
Spain
Switzerland
Syria
Turkey
UK
USA
PETERSEN
United Kingdom
United States of
Amer-ica
Soviet Union, 1917present
USR
291
VTN
VTS
WRT
YEM
YUG
North Vietnarn
South Vietnam
Wuerttemberg
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Appendix II: Operationalization of Pi: Initiator's Probability of Victory in War
Ignoring forthe moment all nations withinterestsin the focal region otherthan the targetand the
initiator,Pi is the simple ratio of the initiator'scapability, adjusted fordistance to the target,to the
combined capabilities of both parties:
Pi = CAPi./(CAPi. + CAP)
[1]
When the initiatorconsiders the possibility that other actors, nations k, might intervene or
otherwise support one of the disputants, three questions arise: Which party will k favor? How
much support can be expected? What effectwill such action have on the initiator's probabilityof
victory?The addition of one thirdparty's total capabilityto one of the two sides altersequation [1]
to read:
Pikz
= (CAP.I + CAPk)/(CAP.j+ CAPk + CAP..)
[2]
PIkj = CAPi./(CAPi.+ CAPk + CAP..)
where:
Pzki= Pz given kjoins i;
CAPk= k's capability, either CAPktor CAPkj,whichever is greater;
Pikj= Pi given kjoins j.
Just as the initiatorand targetevaluate the utilityof alternativecourses of action by calculating
the value of possible outcomes and their probabilities of occurrence, so too much third parties
estimatethe utilityof a decision to supportor not supportone ofthe disputants(Altfeldand Bueno
de Mesquita, 1979). The initiator'sestimate of the value to be gained by thirdparties is based in
part on the policy preferencesrevealed by all nations k. The calculation of the utilityto be derived
froma decision by k to join i is expressed as:
E (U)k
=
(Piki)(Uk) + (1 -Piki)(Ukj )
[3]
where: E(U)kh = i's estimate of k's utilityfora decision to support i;
Uk= i's estimate of k's utilityfori's policies;
Ukt-= i's estimate of k's utilityforj's policies.
It is clear fromequation [3] thatthe greaterthe probabilitythati will win a war in which it receives
support from k, and the more k's policies are similar to those of i and dissimilar from those
preferredby j, the greater the value of a decision to support the initiator. Equation [4] is the
initiator'scalculation of the utilityto be derived by k froma decision tojoin forceswiththe target:
E(U)kj
=
(Pik) (Uk)
+ (1 -Pik) (Uki )
[4]
The initiator's estimate of the degree to which k is likely to support one of the parties and the
amount of support that can be expected, SUPPORTk., is expressed as:
SUPPORTki = (E(U)k1-
E(U)kj)
(CAPk)
[5]
and Compellence
Deterrence
292
The firsttermin equation [5] is the initiator'sassessment of k's incentiveto join the conflict.A
positive value will result if i expects k will decide to support the initiator. If the thirdparty has
revealed no strong preference for either i or j, the term will approximate zero. Of course, a
negative value indicates thatthe initiatorbelieves the thirdpartywill aid the target.I multiplythe
incentivetermby k's capability to determinethe level of supportlikelyto be offered.Presumably,
the greaterthe incentiveto join the conflict,the greaterthe level of supportthe thirdpartycan be
expected to offer.
When summed across all nations k, the resultis the net capability to be added to the capabilities
of eitherthe targetor the initiator.If the resultis positive, the capability is added to the initiator's
capability; ifnegative, the absolute value of the resultis added to the target's capability. Thus the
multilateralcalculation of the initiator'sprobabilityof victoryin war is:
Pi = (CAP.. + SUPPORTk-1)/(CAPUj+ SUPPORTk-1 + CAP.. + SUPPORTkji)
[6]
where: SUPPORTk = i's estimateof the net capability to be added to i's capability by all nations
k;
SUPPOR Tk. = i 's estimateof the net capability to be added toj's capability by all nations
k.
NOTE:
If SUPPORTk > 0 then SUPPORTk.' = 0
= 0
If SUPPOR Tk < 0 then SUPPOR7'
n
< 0 then SUPPORT,)
If SUPPOR Tk/1
SUPPOR TJi
=
k =1
Appendix III
For the interested reader, the tables below present the results obtained from probit analyses
conducted with other combinations of independent variables.
Target concedes or stands firm: Initiatorchanges status quo
Target concedes: Dependent variable coded 0 (N = 16)
Target stands firm:Dependent variable coded 1 (N = 51)
Variable
Constant
NAI
Pi
COSTSj
COSTDIFF
1
2.87
(2.98)
-0.61
(-2.44)
-1.63
(-1.58)
-6.16
(-3.39)
2
3
2.10
(2.46)
-0.49
(-2.12)
-1.00
(4.84)
-0.32
(-2.20)
(-1.03)
5.89
(3.05)
1.53
4
1.31
(4.93)
-0.31
(-2.24)
-5.79
(-3.32)
6.10
(3.16)
VSQj
Chi-square
Correct(%)
16.57
79
14.40
78
13.51
78
13.23
81
5
6
7
3.68
1.37
1.14
(2.93)
-0.85
(-2.62)
-2.81
(4.05)
-0.32
(-2.16)
(4.06)
-0.31
(-2.18)
(-2.08)
-5.73
(-2.69)
(-2.67)
-3.42
(-2.10)
-2.16
(-1.57)
22.56
81
-5.16
16.45
79
5.47
(2.55)
-2.44
(-1.66)
16.68
81
293
WALTER J. PETERSEN
Initiatorconcedes or stands firm:Initiator changes status quo
Initiatorconcedes: Dependent variable coded 0 (N= 5)
Initiator stands firm:Dependent variable coded 1 (N = 46)
Variable
Constant
Pi
COSTSi
COSTDIFF
VSQi
1
2
4
5
2.58
3.28
1.21
0.94
1.91
(1.75)
-0.80
(1.97)
- 1.67
(4.51)
(1.61)
0.45
(4.96)
(-0.47)
-10.65
(-0.93)
- 13.24
(-2.10)
(-2.26)
13.56
94
(0.51)
- 1.67
(-0.47)
-1.46
(-1.10)
-1.83
(-1.19)
Chi-square
Correct (%)
3
12.20
92
1.37
90
-1.02
- 10.18
(-2.43)
(-0.27)
-1.17
(-1.17)
1.62
90
11.75
92
Note that Pi and COSTDIFF are poor predictorsof the initiator'sbehavior in this subset of cases.
There is a fairlysimple reason forthis seeminglyanomalous result. Recall that the initiatorneed
not make an ultimatedecision to continue to stand firm(go to war) or concede in the event thatthe
target has chosen to concede. As Table l(a) indicates, the greater the initiator's probabilityof
victoryin war and the more the target's expected costs of war exceed those of the initiator,the
more likelythe targetwill be to concede. Therefore, a number of cases in which the initiatorhad a
high probabilityof victoryand/ormuch lower expected costs of war than the target's are taken out
ofthe set ofobservationsforthe testof initiators'decisions. Hence, in the vast majorityofobservations remaining, Pi is around 0.500, plus or minus 0.050, and there is also little variance in
COSTDIFF. Thus, one should expect those variables to be poor predictors in this subset of
observations.
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