Genocide and Mass Killing: Origins, Prevention

Genocide and Mass Killing: Origins, Prevention, Healing and Reconciliation
Author(s): Ervin Staub
Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 367-382
Published by: International Society of Political Psychology
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791796
Accessed: 17-12-2016 00:06 UTC
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Political Psychology, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2000
Genocide and Mass Killing: Origins, Prevention,
Healing and Reconciliation
Ervin Staub
University of Massachusetts at Amherst
This article focuses on intense collective violence, especially mass killing and genocide.
briefly presents a conception of their origins, with new elements in the conception
comparisons with other approaches. Various aspects of genocide and mass killing a
considered, including their starting points (such as difficult life conditions and gr
conflict), cultural characteristics, psychological and social processes (such as destruc
ideologies), the evolution of increasing violence and its effect on perpetrators a
bystanders, and the roles of leaders and of internal and external bystanders. Actions t
might be taken by the community of nations and other actors to halt or prevent violence
described. In considering prevention there is a focus on processes of healing wit
previously victimized groups and reconciliation between hostile groups. A project
healing, forgiveness, and reconciliation in Rwanda is briefly described.
KEY WORDS: genocide, mass killing, healing by victimized groups, reconciliation between gro
Rwanda genocide, origins of genocide/group violence, prevention of genocide/group violence.
In addition to great and small wars, the 20th century has seen many genocide
mass killings, and instances of ethnic warfare often accompanied by mass kill
or genocide. An empirical report indicates a decline in the last few years in
numbers of such violent events (Harff, Gurr, & Unger, 1999). However, it is durin
this same period that the tragedies of Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Sierra Leon
have occurred, with continuing violence that destroys lives and communitie
Angola, the Sudan, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, and other countries around the wor
Without the creation of an international system that does not tolerate mass kill
and genocide and that engages in serious efforts to prevent violence between
groups, such violence is likely to continue.
The tremendous rate of change in the world places great demands on individ
als and groups. In many places, these changes are taking place in the context
continuing or even increasing poverty. Such conditions are instigators of violen
367
0162-895X @ 2000 International Society of Political Psychology
Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 IJF,
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368
Staub
In
additi
internati
by
minor
for
be
other
seriou
new countries that are created.
There is a recent trend to refer to varied kinds of violence between groups,
including genocide and mass killing, as ethnic or ethnopolitical warfare. But there
are many bases on which groups turn against each other apart from ethnicity, such
as religion, political differences, and social class membership. These divisions
often coincide with ethnicity, but not always. In Cambodia, for example, the Khmer
Rouge committed what I and others have referred to as "autogenocide" (Staub,
1989), the killing of huge numbers of Khmer who were regarded as political
enemies or incapable of contributing to the ideal of total social equality they
envisioned. At the same time they engaged in genocide against ethnic minorities
(Kiernan, 1999). There is a danger that ethnicity is overused and becomes a blanket
term for many differences.
In this article I briefly describe a conception of the origins of (or influences
leading to) genocide and mass killing, with occasional reference to specific
instances (see Staub, 1989, 1996, 1999a). These influences may at first give rise to
varied forms of "ethnopolitical" (or collective or group) violence, out of which the
extremes of mass killing or genocide evolve. An important question is why, in
certain instances when the conditions for intense violence are present, violence
remains limited. In the course of the discussion, I refer to some important concepts
and findings offered by others and discuss some issues in understanding, prediction,
and prevention. I also discuss reconciliation as a means of preventing renewed
violence and briefly describe a project on healing and reconciliation in Rwanda.
Definitions and Approaches
Genocide is an attempt to eliminate, directly by killing them or indirectly by
creating conditions (e.g., starvation) that lead to their death, a whole group of
people. The U.N. Genocide Convention, which defines genocide as "acts committed with the intent to destroy in part or in whole a national, ethnic, racial, or religious
group as such," does not cover the killing of members of a political group. This
was the result of political considerations that led some states at the time, especially
the Soviet Union, to resist the inclusion of political groups under the Genocide
Convention. Although some have called the elimination of groups identified by
their political affiliation politicide (Harff & Gurr, 1990), many scholars consider
it genocide, as I do.
The Genocide Convention also creates other problems, for example, by
referring to killing a group "in part" as genocide. In my view, killing large numbers
of people without the apparent purpose of eliminating the whole group is best
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Genocide
regarded
and
as
Mass
mass
Killing
killing.
369
The
pur
leadership of a group, or to intim
dominance. Although the number
mass killing than in genocide, it c
The
influences
leading
to
mas
genocide
is often the outcome of a
genocide. Although the likelihood
the exact form of it is probably n
violence, not specifically at genoci
definitions
of
genocide
(see
Fe
understanding the origins and pr
because precise definitions of geno
to exactly define what is and what
Some scholars have also offered
(1999a) has proposed five ty
Smith
polistic,
and ideological. In part, th
influences and motives are often
types.
20th
According
century
to
has
Smith
been
the
(1999a)
monop
who
will have power and who wi
describe below-such as motives
history of antagonism between g
intensification
of
group
conflict-
genocide.
The
approach I have used in the
that normally contribu
influences that are most importan
identified. This can be done in bot
influences
The
Origins
Instigators.
conditions
in
of
Genocide,
There
a
are
society,
two
and
Mass
primar
group
c
likely to lead to collective or grou
combined with the other influen
to collective violence-is self-inter
called
to
one
utilitarian
of
two
genocide
kinds
of
(or
mas
violence:
v
group demanding more rights, a
from the intention to take their
(Hitchcock & Twedt, 1997; Staub,
Difficult life conditions and thei
lems, political conflict and disorg
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370
Staub
(separatel
frustrate
for
ident
(Tajfel,
1
other
gro
identity,
useful
(ev
violence,
arrangem
of
reality
action.
Un
Effective
and
scape
The
grou
actions
ag
its
memb
of
group
enemy.
T
The
viole
extended
of
intens
Cultural
more
lik
crucial
on
maintaine
more
dan
authority
times,
of
to
oppose
victim
gr
lithic
cul
a
limited
contribut
with
well
to
engage
The
past
importan
a
victimi
dangerou
another
g
(Staub,
1
Collectiv
always
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th
Genocide
and
Mass
Killing
371
seems
a good example of violence
unhealed wounds. The Serb
and
fairly
the
late
identity
of
in
Second
Serb
the
19th
World
and
century.
War
by
a
fasc
the
belief
in
the
culture.
When
Yugoslavia
nec
declared independence and the r
as the tide turned in the war ab
Croatia
(Hodge, 1999). Even thou
like victims again. (This was con
interaction with audiences in pu
The role of bystanders. As vio
another,
intensifies-and
perpetrators
to
the
on
destruction
their
own.
violence.
not
within
it)
of
Only
as
th
become
the
witnesses
Unfortunately,
i
other
both
or
int
joined the perpetrators) an
usually remain passive. T
groups)
not-infrequent
support
actions
1989,
and
comp
Such
and business relations as usual (
An extreme, but not unusual,
occurred in Rwanda. The Frenc
and
in
(Staub,
other
ways
1999a).
before
massacres of Tutsis (des
even after the genocide
most
call
of
the
its
Genocide
a
Tutsi
peacekeepers
killings
Group
Many
operate
Even
the
when
when
space,
tent
of
Conflict
genoci
gover
the
Or
psychological
the
instigator
conflict
psychological
and
the
as
th
thereby
The
opposing
gen
Forges,
began (
after
genocide,
Convention.
army
the
difficult
to
involves
"vi
elements
resolve
a
for
us
(Fish
is centrally connected to a group
This seemed to have been the cas
as well as the conflict around Kosovo.
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372
Staub
A
frequ
and
subo
tina,
m
genocide
at
least
the
i
conf
well-bein
relative
Frequen
violence
their
po
status,
b
Sidanius,
in
their
Othe
A
numb
scholars,
concepts
Helen
Fe
obligatio
psychol
primaril
logical
The
f
im
motivati
to
certai
destruct
conditio
group
is
ship.
At
group
in
respond
destruct
ness
of
t
the
grou
victimization).
That violence evolves has been noted. For example, the increasing harm
inflicted on Jews in Germany, one of the most straightforward examples of
evolution, has been described (Hilberg, 1961). But the crucial and possibly central
role of such evolution (Staub, 1989) has not been stressed, with psychological
changes in individuals and a collectivity and changes in group processes, group
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Genocide
norms,
of
and
and
Mass
Killing
institutions.
historical
continuities
373
Even
in
a
cultu
flare-ups can occur after interv
case of the genocide of the Arm
In the former Yugoslavia, past
during
the
communist
(consisting
of
the
country)
the
historical
violence
Two
on
the
(Bennett,
some
influences
of
a
p
thre
contr
elements
form
com
and
of
intensely
separate
identified:
This
of
1995)
background
Serbs)
important
explicit,
era.
collapse
in
war,
th
oft
transition
in regimes where the
of these have sometimes been r
1996; Harff et al., 1999; Melson
A
civil
from,
war
as
devaluation
antagonism
The
represents
well
or
as
group
engenders,
an
con
dif
especially int
1989). Nation
(Staub,
evolution
of
increasing
violen
and the failure of that governm
country (e.g., to create positive
important
A
degree
of
suggests
is,
specific
positive
the
these
economic
that
less
indicators
factor
the
(Harff
it
is
other
to
interconnections
reducing
one
type
d
al.
interconnecti
more
likely
of
et
of
stat
engage
the
econ
instigation
However, even states that isol
After the fundamentalis
Baha'i flared up. More than 200
is reasonable to expect that wit
violence would have increased. H
actions.
Iran,
and
representations
by
them
to a number of resolutions by
condemning the persecution of
persecution continued, the exec
resumed,
Is
it
above
The
unfortunately, although
possible that there are co
are
unnecessary
behavior
of
in
leading
conquerors
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in
ea
374
Staub
conquere
P
seen,
com
tion
(Kel
the
inte
1999a).
matter
w
places,
a
still allow such violence to become routine.
There are many different forms of group or collective violence that can and
do lead to genocide or mass killing. The approach I have described focuses on broad
influences that, in my view, underlie most of them. In part, this emphasis on
generality of causes has been a response to early genocide research, with its sharp
differentiation between genocide and other kinds of violence by groups against
other groups. More important, it is empirically based. Various genocides and the
less focused, and limited violence in Argentina in the late 1970s (Staub, 1989,
1999a), as well as the violence in Bosnia in the 1990s (Staub, 1996), seemed to be
the result of the kinds of influences described above. In considering important
differences in the groups that become violent with each other, conflicts between
groups based on ethnicity or religion deeply involve identity, but so can politically
based violence. The heresy of religious divergence and the heresy of even minor
political difference can both lead to violent fury.
Nevertheless, as recent commentators have suggested, distinctions among
different kinds of group violence may advance our understanding of origins.
Distinctions can be made, for example, among forms of violence such as official
persecution, revolution, and ethnopolitical warfare (civil war) (Suedfeld, 1999);
among types of genocide; or among motives for group violence such as conquest,
revenge, purification, and so on (Smith, 1999b). Such distinctions and research
based on them may help to establish the extent of communality in the influences
proposed above, as well as additional influences in specific forms of conflict and
violence. It may be, for example, that out of the influences identified earlier, the
specific combination that is present in a particular instance, together with additional
conditions, will determine the motives, aims, and forms of violence.
Examining specific regional or local conditions-for example, the mass
killings of Hutus by the dominant Tutsis in Burundi, and their effects on the
psychology and actions of the Hutu leadership in Rwanda that engineered the
genocide in 1994 (Wessells, 1999)-can help in understanding specific instances
of mass killing or genocide. Paying attention to the specific nature of violence, and
to culture and local custom in dealing with its aftermath, is also quite important
with regard to prevention (Wessells, 1999). In Rwanda, for example, efforts to
further healing and reconciliation require an awareness of the nature of the genocide
there, in which the killers included not only the army and paramilitary, but also
neighbors and even relatives (Staub & Pearlman, in press).
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Genocide
and
Mass
Killing
Preventing
The
role
of
375
Collective
bystanders
is
cruc
preventing group violence (Staub
that is already in progress, at leas
when the conditions exist that m
progressed
the
to
influence
With
some
halting
or
regarded
distant)
This
is
mass
of
this
that
substantial
and
power
engagement
country
as
killing
include
of
the
strong
the
i
Uni
moral
oblig
own
the
international
as
v
popu
Cambodian
to
v
"interven
because
their
disappearances
e
the
collective
or
a
level,
of
exceptions,
preventing
shortsighted,
in
the
a
inc
Falklan
response
transgressions by Germany in t
contributed to the manifold viole
that
a
early,
strong
in
a
committed
commitment
given
nation,
reactions
to
could
an
violence
usually
h
Halting violence. Halting vio
(Carnegie Commission, 1997; S
proval
of
the
continues.
resolution,
leaders
to
international
They
can
also
engagement
find
ways
to
commu
offer
with
lead
respond
violence.
The engagement of high-level international leaders, their direct contact with
leaders of potentially genocidal groups, may at times be crucial. Because issues of
identity, security, and connection to others are often central among those who
perpetrate genocide, the involvement of important international figures can help
by affirming the identity of a group and a feeling of importance by the group's
leaders. It can enhance a feeling of security and create a sense of connection to the
rest of the world.
When necessary, sanctions and boycotts need to follow. These might be more
effective and create less suffering among a population if they are more focused on
leaders-for example, targeting their assets in foreign countries (Carnegie Com-
mission, 1997). Finally, military action can be essential in certain instances,
especially when no prior action has been taken, to stop mass killing or genocide.
Both to halt violence and to prevent it, it is necessary to develop a conception
of when action is needed, what kind of action, who is to perform these actions, and
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h
376
a
Staub
related
recent
early
f
act
to
infor
violence
1998;
St
Prevent
nomic
d
and
time
ought
to
society,
groups,
preve
conflict
to
&
Kelma
Staub,
1
such
gro
Healing
tive
and
viol
reco
1996,
in
healing
b
member
their
ex
condition
and,
idea
They
ne
outside
t
acknowl
Various
them,
f
ca
human
c
security,
expressi
Pearlman
When
m
groups
t
essential
coexiste
interacti
groups
c
an
other
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Genocide
and
Mass
Killing
377
This also requires forgiving. Fo
be offensive after horrible even
the
genocidal
forgiving
pated
they
in
violence
those
in
members
Tibet.
of
I
the
violence, either because
passive bystanders. No
were
reconciliation possible. And whe
without reconciliation, feelings
present.
Not only victims but perpetrators need to heal for reconciliation to take place,
as do those who have been both victims and perpetrators. Members of the perpetrator group are also wounded, often by prior victimization, but at the very least as
a result of the violence they or others in their group have perpetrated. Without
engagement with their own pain, perpetrators are likely to continue to blame and
devalue their former and potential future victims. Only as they begin to heal can
the protective psychological shell they create around themselves weaken. This in
turn can open them to the people they have harmed and allow a process of
reconciliation to begin.
Healing, reconciliation, and forgiveness mutually support each other. An
advance in each can facilitate advances in the others. Separately and together, they
contribute to the fulfillment of basic human needs: for security, positive identity,
positive connection to other people, and a comprehension of reality that offers hope.
Healing, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation in Rwanda
Genocide and its impact. In 1994, in a 3-month period from April through
June, perhaps as many as 800,000 people were killed in Rwanda, most of them
Tutsis, but including about 50,000 "politically moderate" Hutus, or Hutus who
were regarded as enemies for other reasons. The genocide was perpetrated primarily by the army, by paramilitary groups, but also by neighbors and even by relatives
of Tutsis who were either married to Hutus or were of mixed ethnic background
(des Forges, 1999). The influences leading to the genocide, the evolution of
violence over an extended period, and (as noted earlier) the behavior of bystanders
were all consistent with the model presented here (Staub, 1999a).
The great impact of the genocide on survivors provides the background for
efforts toward healing, reconciliation, and forgiveness. On trips to Rwanda I
interviewed some Tutsi survivors who were helped by Hutus. We gained further
information about the experience and impact on survivors in the course of an
ongoing project on healing, forgiveness, and reconciliation in Rwanda (Staub &
Pearlman, in press).1
1 This project has been supported by the John Templeton Foundation.
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378
Staub
Everyone
she
her
was
t
in
but
took
in
a
psycholo
impaired.
genocide
events
on
Rwanda
other
b
cou
descendan
influence
program
In
our
(Staub,
on
pr
Pe
healin
work,
or
componen
experienc
with
part
course
of
genocide
learning
a
and
learn
This
last
Learning
a
influence
several
If
co
these
t
processes
them
fro
seemed
to
operate
in
condition
perhaps
t
influence
violence
m
possibility
to
the
as
a
We
disc
whol
have
communit
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Genocide
and
Mass
Killing
379
Although experiences in small g
creation of processes that pro
people or the whole society, is esse
nies, testimonies, and memorials c
the
join
in
grief
and
sorrow.
reinforce
woundedness,
with
other
each
Other
societal
organized
need
for
that
will
by
a
in
ways
better
unity
are
and
economic
with
nature
help
that
processes
the
help
The
but
p
point
also
i
reconc
situation
reconciliation.
killed, said: "How can I forgive, w
pay for the schooling of my
is difficult in Rwanda and in othe
place, an increase in social justice
healing, reconciliation, and forgiv
economic aid by other countries c
even
When
There
are
the
some
Evolution
instances
in
Does
which
inhibited. The influences I discus
genocide have a role in this.
Action
by bystanders is usually
to an end in South Afric
international events contributed, f
community of nations helped to s
hesitation, NATO took military ac
Both bystanders and internal soc
apartheid
instances. This was the case in South Africa. It was also the case in Northern
Ireland. The relatively limited violence in this seemingly intractable conflict, just
over 3,000 deaths from the 1960s to the late 1990s, was probably to a significant
extent because of the presence of the British army and a substantial police force
Both Britain and the United States had significant roles in starting and helping t
maintain the recent peace process. Along the way, positive leadership has improve
the quality of life of the Catholic minority. Internal bystanders were also active
Community groups and schools have created many contacts between Catholics and
Protestants (Cairns & Darby, 1998). Similarly, violence between Israelis an
Palestinians may have remained limited because of the involvement of externa
bystanders, especially the United States, as well as both inside and outside partie
working on creating positive contact between Jews and Palestinians (Kelman,
1990; Rouhana & Kelman, 1994).
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380
I
Staub
have
no
ability
toward
any
pers
group,
to
o
t
an
speak
Conclusions
The prevention of collective violence requires a multifaceted approach. O
essential issue is to develop knowledge of how to do this. Another even more
difficult problem is to mobilize the international community-nations, nongove
mental organizations, concerned individuals-to take action. Without an estab
lished system that has the task of preventing collective violence, the actions t
are taken will be ad hoc, usually too late for prevention, and often even too late
halt violence once it begins. The essential task of scholars includes further stu
of the origins of collective violence, the development of knowledge about prev
tion, and working as activists to bring a preventive system into existence.
AUTHOR'S ADDRESS
Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to Ervin Sta
of Psychology, Tobin Hall, University of Massachusetts, Amherst,
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