State Parties: Independent Partners
The Money Relationship
Sarah M. Morehouse
University of Connecticut
[email protected]
Prepared for delivery at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, August 31-September 3, 2000.
Copyright by the American Political Science Association.
ABSTRACT
This study examines the money flow relationship between the
state parties and their national partners. What impact does money
coming from the national parties have on the organization and
operation of state parties? This research examines state finance
reports from political parties in 15 states compared to their
reports to the FEC in 1996 and 1998. This time period covers both
presidential and gubernatorial election cycles in the 15 states and
30 state parties. The research answers several questions:1) State
parties raise, on average between 70 percent to 82 percent of all
federal (hard) money raised for their state and 2) 40 percent to 60
percent of all non-federal (soft) money raised as well. 3) They
contribute, on average, nearly half of all party money raised
within their borders in a presidential election year and 90 percent
of all money in mid-term election years. In view of this evidence,
it is clear that state parties are not dependent upon the national
parties but have maintained their autonomy as they become more
professionalized and "parties in service."
STATE PARTIES: INDEPENDENT PARTNERS
Most state parties are multi-million dollar organizations with
experienced executive directors and knowledgeable staffs. It is
fierce competition which has driven these state parties into
becoming service agencies which raise and spend millions on their
own or in partnership with the national parties. State parties have
regularized fundraising operations, candidate training programs,
issue development and public opinion polling. They provide
assistance to their candidates in other areas such as media
consulting, and coordination of campaign assistance. With their
greatly increased role in state-wide and congressional campaigns,
they
supplement
the
candidates'
own
personal
campaign
organizations. As the executive director of the Kansas Republicans
said:" We are necessary but not sufficient." (John Potter 1998).
Fifty years ago, a landmark report Toward a More Responsible
Two-Party System noted that the two parties operated:"as two loose
associations of state and local organizations, with very little
national machinery and very little national cohesion" (APSA
1950,v). There was no central figure or organ which could claim
authority to take up party problems, policies and strategy, the
report claimed. The report called for a change in state
organization, methods and objectives in the interest of creating a
higher degree of party responsibility. (APSA 1950,46).
Fifty years ago, most state parties were poor and weak. The
reformers of the early decades of the twentieth century succeeded
in emasculating the nineteenth century state party machines which
had controlled nominations and provided resources and voters for
the elections (Mayhew, 1986:212-237). Because state political
parties were primarily labor intensive organizations, dependent
upon patronage for party workers and funds, they were slow to adapt
to a technologically based electoral system. At first they could
not provide opinion polling, media advertising and fundraising
consulting that have become standard procedures for state
campaigns. Candidates had to buy these services elsewhere, and
became expert at raising money, declaring their candidacies and
running for office independently of the party.
Since that time, as the states and the nation became more
competitive between the parties, and technology made fundraising
possible on a massive scale, parties began to strengthen their
organizations, engage in sophisticated fundraising, and provide
campaign assistance to their candidates (Bibby 1998, Patterson
3
1993). The trend toward stronger organizations and financial power
which occurred earlier at the national level has resulted in a
partnership between the national and state parties. It is an uneasy
partnership at times, with the superior money raising power of the
national parties often in conflict with the state-controlled
fundraising capability of their state associates.
The national committees are widely perceived as dominating
their weaker partners in exchange for the money to function as
effective organizations. This research is concerned with the money
relationship between the state parties and their national partners.
What impact does money coming from the national parties have on the
organization and operation of state parties? Do the national
parties contribute a controlling proportion of the state party
financial resources?
Data and Methods
In order to understand this connection between the national
committees and their state parties, party executive directors in 30
political parties in 15 states (including nine of the largest) were
sent a questionnaire asking them about the impact of hard and soft
money coming from the national parties on their party's activities
and autonomy, their relationship with their legislative campaign
committees, and their views on campaign finance reform. The
response rate after a second badgering was 63 percent. These
questionnaires and the follow-up phone interviews are an extremely
valuable source of information about the condition of state parties
today, and I will quote the directors as frequently as possible.
A second line of inquiry consisted of the examination of the
30 state parties for contributions and spending for both state and
national candidates. The Federal Election Commission reports for
two-year election cycles, the year preceding and the election year,
for presidential and midterm elections. State reports filed for the
election cycles of 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 were studied
extensively. Campaign finance reports filed with the state election
agencies were also collected and examined. Therefore state money
raising in a presidential election year could be compared with
money raising in a gubernatorial election year (All 15 of the
sample states elected governors in the 1997-1998 cycle.)
In the presidential election of 1996, vast sums of "soft"
money were raised by the national parties for issue advocacy. Hence
this inquiry tests the monetary relationship between the state and
national party during an election cycle when the national party
4
would be expected to dominate as well as in a midterm election year
when gubernatorial elections claimed primary importance.
The following questions were asked:
1) What percent of federal money (hard) is raised by the state
parties?
2) What percent of non-federal money (soft) is raised by the
state parties?
3) What criteria do national parties use to give money to
state parties?
4) How dependent are state parties on money coming from their
national partners?
The Rules: Federal Money, Nonfederal Money, and State Money
Laws and regulations that apply to congressional and
presidential candidates are not the same as those in effect in
state legislative and gubernatorial elections. Laws that apply to
what parties on the state level may receive and spend are very
different from those that apply to what the national parties may
receive and spend. The constitutional mandate of federalism applies
to the financing of politics at the different levels of government.
Federal Money. To begin with, there are limits on how much
money may be given to national and state parties to support federal
candidates. Corporations and labor unions may not contribute or
spend money directly for candidates or parties in connection with
a federal election. PACs may give up to $15,000 and individuals may
give up to $20,000 a year to a national party for expenditures to
affect a federal election.(Both individuals and PACs may give
$5,000 to state parties to use for federal candidates.) This money
which may be given to parties for federal elections plus the money
that may be given to federal candidates by individuals, PACs or
parties is called federal money, or hard money, and is regulated by
federal law.
State and national parties are allowed to spend federally
regulated money on behalf of individual senate and house candidates
if it is spent independently of, or in direct coordination with the
candidate. The Federal Elections Campaign Act strictly limits the
amount a party committee may spend in coordination with a federal
candidate ($35,000 for a House candidate in 2000). State party
committees are allowed to spend the same coordinated amounts in
House and Senate races as the national party organizations. But a
state party may assign its spending authority to a national party
5
committee, in effect doubling the amount the national committee can
spend. These assignments, known as agency agreements, effectively
allow a national committee to spend the total amount allowed the
national and state party committees in a House race ($70,000).
Because these expenditures are coordinated expenditures, both the
party and the candidate share control over them, giving the party
some influence over how these monies are spent. This fact is
considered by the state committees before they enter into agency
agreements with the national party committees. They want to be sure
a congressional or senatorial campaign committee will do justice to
their candidate.
Most of the executive directors who answered the questionnaire
were satisfied with the agency agreements, claiming that their
candidates could usually run their own campaigns. And most
executive directors said that the hard money coming from the
national committees had little impact on the autonomy of their
parties. However, the Illinois Republican Director said the
national party once wanted to run an issue ad in a southern
Illinois district which they did not approve, so they did not enter
into a cooperative arrangement with them for that district
(Christine Dudley 1998). The Connecticut Republicans prefer to
raise money within the state and the candidates' districts, but
recognize that coordinated spending "increases competitiveness"
(George Gallo 1998). Generally speaking, the national and state
party committees work together to determine how best to allocate
their resources to provide the greatest benefit to their candidates
in targeted races (usually challengers and open seat candidates)
(Corrado 1997). These coordinated expenditures are only made with
federally regulated monies.
A federal court ruling could alter the limits on coordinated
expenditures for congressional candidates. In 1999, Judge
Nottingham of the U.S. District Court for Colorado removed all
limits on how much the parties can spend for their federal
candidates. The ruling, in a long running case from Colorado, threw
out spending limits as an unconstitutional infringement on the
parties' freedom of speech. The Federal Election Commission voted
to appeal the case and lost the appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 10th Circuit in May, 2000. The Commission is appealing the
case to the Supreme Court. Note we are talking about federal money
here, money that is raised and spent for federal candidates
according to federal law.
In an earlier round of the Colorado case, the Supreme Court
ruled in 1996 that the parties could spend in excess of the federal
limits as long as they operated entirely independently of their
candidates. The National Republican Senatorial Committee set up
6
spending units to operate independently in the final few months of
the 1996 campaign, and Democrats later followed suit. Both parties
claim it is cumbersome to set up separate entities prohibited from
coordinating their activities with the candidates they are
supporting. The May, 2000 Appeals Court ruling removes the
requirement that the parties operate independently of their own
candidates if they spend beyond set limits. As the presidential
cycle of 1999-2000 began, political parties planned to raise as
much "hard" (federal) money as possible in anticipation of
unlimited
coordinated
or
independent
spending
for
their
congressional candidates.
Nonfederal Money. In general, nonfederal money, or "soft"
money as it is commonly called, refers to unlimited contributions
which are funneled through the soft money accounts of the national
parties and state party committees and are prohibited from being
used in connection with federal elections. Soft money may be used
for party overhead expenses as well as shared activities which
benefit all candidates. Soft money is raised in excess of the
federal contribution limits or from federally prohibited sources.
Soft money is subject only to the laws of the state where it is
spent. Thus if a state allows unlimited corporate
and union
contributions to state parties, then the non-federal portion of any
"generic" party activity in that state can be paid for with
unlimited corporate or union funds. On the other hand, if a state
imposed contribution limits on parties that were at least as strict
as the federal law, then there would be no soft money "loophole" in
that state. Twenty-four states place limits on contributions to
state parties, but some of them allow very generous contributions.
In the states these soft money funds are used to enhance the
whole national, state and local ticket by supporting volunteer and
grass-roots party building activities such as voter registration
and identification, certain types of campaign material (slate
cards), and voter turnout programs and issue advertising without
violating the limits imposed on party contributions and
expenditures made in connection with a federal election.
Federal court rulings handed down in the late 1980's required
the FEC to allocate the costs of state party administrative
expenses and the cost of generic (grass-roots) activities mentioned
above, that indirectly affect all candidates in ways that reflected
the proportion of federal and nonfederal candidates on the ballot.
This formula typically requires state parties to allocate one-third
of the costs of generic party expenses to their hard money accounts
(Common Cause 1998, 3) although this is not always the case. State
parties pay for these general overhead expenses out of two funds:
federal money for the federal portion and nonfederal money for the
7
state portion. In 1996, a presidential election year, Minnesota
parties paid out 60 percent in federal money and 40 percent in
nonfederal money for expenses incurred for administrative and
grassroots efforts. In 1998, a gubernatorial election year, the
allocation formula was 17 percent federal and 83 percent
nonfederal.
In 1996, both national parties also spent a significant amount
of soft money for the first time on issue advocacy ads designed to
promote party issue positions. These ads did not expressly advocate
the election or defeat of particular federal candidates and were
used to publicize the parties' position on the administration's
health care proposal, the 1995 federal budget debate, President
Clinton's first term record and issues related to the 1996
congressional races. Increasingly these ads have been run in states
and congressional districts with the obvious purpose of helping a
particular congressional candidate without explicitly urging people
to vote for or against any candidate.
These ads must be paid for with a combination of hard and soft
money according to the FEC formula. As I explained, in the states,
the soft money is spent according to state laws which may or may
not be stricter than the federal limits. For example, in 1996, the
Democratic national party committees transferred $1 million in soft
money to the Connecticut state party but it had to be raised
according to Connecticut law and be matched by the FEC formula.
Much of the money was spent on television ads promoting the record
of President Clinton and the Democratic party. The funds also were
used to help pay the salaries of a 15-member campaign staff that
worked on behalf of both federal and state Democratic candidates.
Some of the soft money was contributed directly to state
candidates. One candidate for state senate received $45,000 from
the party soft money account( Common Cause 1998, 6). While this may
sound sensational, this "soft" money came from the national party's
individual account because Connecticut law bans money raised from
corporations and unions. So the soft money that was transferred to
Connecticut was from an account which was raised from individuals
by the Democratic National Committee. Naturally the $1 million was
welcome to the Connecticut Democrats, but it was not raised in
unlimited amounts from corporations, and unions. Generally, soft
money is raised by both the state parties and the national parties
to pay for these issue ads.
State Money. Many state party executive directors speak of
money which is raised and spent according to state laws as "state
money," rather than nonfederal (soft money). There are 24 states
where contributions by individuals and PACs to political parties
are limited, and 12 of these states have stricter limits than the
8
federal ones (i.e. no soft money loophole). Table 1 shows what
these contribution limits are (for 1998). In these states, the
parties have to raise the money to pay for the nonfederal share of
administrative and generic activities according to the dictates of
state law. Furthermore, they may not accept "soft" money from the
national party unless it has been raised according to state law.
There are 24 states (including 13 of the above) where the
parties are limited in what they may contribute to state-wide
candidates. Twelve of the states without contribution limits to
parties have limits on party spending for candidates. Since they
cannot spend much money on their candidates, this offers an unusual
opportunity for the national parties to send soft money funds to
these states to be used for issue advocacy, for example.
One night the Democratic National Committee (DNC) wired
$150,000 to the Minnesota Democratic Party account with the
instructions that it be transferred the next morning to a New York
advertising agency. This appears to make the Minnesota Democrats
into a conduit for the DNC's purposes, but it must be remembered
that the issue ads had to be paid for according to the FEC formula
for Minnesota (40% soft money and 60% federal money).
Obviously the regulatory environment in a state structures the
way parties can support their candidates. Malbin and Gais report
that Minnesota's rules for political parties did not accomplish
their goal, which was to limit the power of interest groups and
increase the importance of parties. Minnesota parties may receive
unlimited contributions from individuals and PACs but may not
contribute more than $20,000 to the governor's campaign.
Both
these goals would be better served if contributions to the parties
were limited and contributions by the parties to candidates were
not. The writers anticipate that state parties faced with spending
limits may spend independently to help their state candidates, in
line with the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Colorado State
Republican Party v.Federal Election Commission which held that
unlimited independent spending by a political party has the same
First Amendment protection as unlimited spending by an individual
or group. (Malbin and Gais 1998, 123-130). The Colorado ruling
applied to federal money, but it may become the entering wedge in
a
universal
application.
And
indeed
it
has
because
in
September,1999 a Federal District Court Judge in Minnesota ruled
that state party independent spending could not be limited.
In total, 37 states have some limitations on contributions to
and/or spending by state parties. These parties may not accept or
spend national party "soft" money unless it is in conformity with
state law. For instance, New York parties can receive soft money
9
from the national committees if it is raised in $69,900 or smaller
amounts from individuals and PACs. There are seven states which
limit the total amount of money coming to the state party from the
national party. New Jersey has passed a law that limits the amount
of soft money from the national committees to a total of $59,000
per year: Hawaii limits soft money to $50,000 and Kansas limits
soft money to $25,000 per year. Other states which place much
stricter limits
of under $5,000 are: California, Colorado,
Vermont, and West Virginia. Some states (MA, SC, WA) specify that
soft money can be unlimited if it goes to administrative and
housekeeping accounts, which is not much of a limitation.
Connecticut passed a law in 1998 that bans the receipt of soft
money entirely from the national committees. The Connecticut bill
passed the state senate unanimously and the house by a vote of 1463. The Republican executive director said that: "We would prefer
not to have soft money exist as an option. We have been forced to
beg national officials for some funds simply to compete with the
opposition. Our position is that soft money takes the power away
from our local base" (George Gallo 1998).
The Governor said
proudly that Connecticut was the first state in the nation to
explicitly ban soft money from state politics.
It is important to recognize that the national parties are
able to raise unlimited nonfederal (soft money) funds from sources
that are not permitted under the federal contribution limits.In
1995-1996, the DNC raised $124 million and the RNC raised $138
million in soft money (about a third of what they raised in total
hard and soft). These funds, placed in nonfederal accounts, are
used to support national overhead and fundraising expenses as well
as support of state parties. National committees can raise this
money in the states but often do so as a joint fundraiser with the
state parties who have insisted that they are entitled to a
negotiated share of the "take." According to the Texas Democrats,
they are financing a lot of the DNC budget. Texas donors give to a
huge fundraiser and the Texas party asks for its share with the
threat that its donors may not be as generous the next time if the
share is not forthcoming (Jorge Ramirez 1998). The New York
Democratic party asked for 25 per cent of all the profits from DNC
fundraisers in 1998 but received 7.5 percent. Chair Judith Hope
said:"We raised over $1.2 million in 1997. Let me tell you what the
DNC contributed to the state party in 1997: $6,600" (Nagourney
1998,B1). No wonder the New York parties want to have their share:
more soft money is raised by the national parties in New York than
any other state.
This discussion was intended to emphasize the fact that the
rules under which each state party operates are sovereign with
10
respect to what the party may raise and spend for state candidates.
The national committees may not give money to a state party unless
it conforms to rules in that state. On the other hand, federal
rules with respect to congressional candidates are sovereign. State
parties may not support their congressional candidates with state
money (unless, of course, it is raised according to federal
standards). Areas of overlap are the administrative and generic
expenses to benefit the whole ticket which are paid out of both
federal and nonfederal (or state) money accounts according to a
formula set by FEC for each election cycle.
National Parties and State Parties: Financial Partners
Reported in Table 2 for the fifteen states and the thirty
parties is the state party percentage of federal (hard)
money raised and of non-federal (soft money) raised for the 1996
Presidential year and 1998, the midterm year. The funds represent
the total hard and soft money raised by state party committees,
national party committees, and senatorial and congressional
committees. The data were collected from each state party's
campaign finance reports filed with the FEC which contained
contributions and expenditures for combined state and national
party activity (allocated between federal and nonfederal money
according to ballot composition). Since 1990, the FEC requires
state parties to keep at least two accounts, federal and nonfederal, for every federal election cycle. The non-federal account
should reflect activities that relate solely to state electoral
activities. The federal account reflects any kind of activity that
might influence federal elections. There is a very high correlation
between raising and spending, and raising was used in Table 2.
Extreme care was used to make sure there was not double-reporting
in state and FEC reports.
The states are arranged by population. The first and second
columns give the total hard money funds raised in 1996 and 1998 by
both state and national parties and the percent of these funds
raised by the state parties. The third and fourth columns give the
total soft money funds raised in 1996 and 1998 by both state and
national parties and the percent of these funds raised by the state
parties.
Hard Money Raised
The 1950 Committee on Political Parties of the American
Political Science Association would gaze in amazement and approval
at the financial division of responsibility between the state and
national parties displayed in Table 2. "State party organizations
11
must raise at least enough funds under federal rules to pay the
federal portion of their general overhead expenses" (Biersack 1996,
111). Apparently this is not a great problem for the state parties
since the average state share contributed toward its federal money
total in 1996 was 70 percent. In the 1997-1998 cycle, the state
parties contributed an average 82 percent of the total raised in
hard money funds.
Hard money funds from the two national parties dropped
dramatically from 1996, a Presidential election year, in which they
contributed a total of $38,233,000 to their state parties to 1998
when their combined total was $10,303,000. Apparently, state
parties were able to make up the difference. In other words, state
parties contribute a very large share of the money raised according
to federal law for overhead expenses such as administrative and
generic expenses, fundraising expenses, issue advertising and voter
turnout programs.
Soft Money Raised
National party soft money raising increased continuously from
1992 until the 1995-1996 Presidential cycle (when it reached a high
of 124 million for Democrats and 138 million for Republicans).
Understandably, the election cycle of 1997-1998 showed a decrease
of 14 percent over the Presidential election cycle. In spite of
this, the amount of soft money more than doubled since the last
midterm election of 1994: Republican "soft money" accounts raised
$131.6 million, a 151% increase over 1993-1994 and Democrats
collected $92.8 million, an 89% increase.
Because the national parties have been raising nonfederal
(soft) money in huge amounts in the last four years,they are
running short of the federal funds needed to pay for congressional
races, for instance. Meanwhile the state parties raise money in
smaller contributions to conform to state law, or simply because
their citizens are not large donors and money raised this way
conforms to federal law as hard money. Some state parties such as
the Connecticut and Ohio Democrats "sell" federal money for
nonfederal money to their national partners and make a profit by
doing so--a 10 to 15 percent commission according to Common Cause
(1998).
Most state party executive directors claim that they are not
dependent upon soft money, even in a presidential election
year. According to the executive director of the Georgia
Republicans: "We are not addicted, but we take what we can get"
(Joe King 1998). Other executive directors claimed soft money was
a help, but that they could get by without it if it were cut off
12
for some reason. The Pennsylvania Republican Party executive
director said it was valuable for voter contacting, but that they
were not very dependent upon soft money (Hank Hollowell 1998).
State parties do not raise nonfederal money as avidly as
federal money, and the average percent contributed by the state
parties in our sample to the soft money account in 1996 was about
41 percent and in 1998 the average was about 59 percent. There is
a great diversity among the states with regard to this form of
funding, which leads to speculation about which states are most
likely to receive this federal largesse. These are the funds which
make up a large portion of the administrative and generic
activities and issue advertising. La Raja tested for the impact of
transfers of national party soft money on the organizational growth
of state parties, and found that these party transfers are not used
to support off-season operations of state parties, suggesting that
they are used primarily for federal electoral activities, not
organizational support (La Raja 1999).
According to the Illinois Republican executive director,
national parties use several criteria in deciding how to bestow
nonfederal money upon a state party, but the principle one is
closeness of the race for President, Senator and members of
Congress (Christine Dudley 1998). If the Presidential race is
close, then soft money is usually forthcoming in large amounts. In
1996, California was a targeted state because of the closeness of
the race (13% margin of victory for President Clinton). New York,
with a 28 percent margin for the President, was not targeted and
had to raise most of the modest amount of nonfederal money itself.
I found that the state parties with close Presidential races (a
margin of 13 percent or under) raised an average 25 percent of the
total soft money funds from both national and state parties, while
their sister states where the race was secure, raised an average 65
percent of the total funds. Apparently, the national parties
allocate scarce resources where they think they will make a
difference.
A regression performed on the thirty state parties using the
presidential election margin as the independent variable and the
share of the nonfederal money contributed by the national party as
the dependent variable, yielded an adjusted R square of .267 with
a significance level of .002. (Table 3A). This is a start toward
explaining the causes of national party assistance to state parties
in a presidential election year. Using 100 parties in all 50 states
and quantifying other determinants are possible as we proceed
toward an understanding of the national-state party relationship.
The midterm election year of 1998 was not as robust for the
13
national committees as Table 2 shows. The amounts and the
percentages of transfers dropped. This is particularly noticeable
in the nonfederal transfers to all 50 states. The Democrats, whose
soft money fundraising dropped from $124 million to $93 million,
dropped its national committee transfers from $54 million to $12
million. The Republicans, whose national soft money account dropped
from $138 million to $132 million went from $48 million to $21
million in state transfers. The hard money transfers from the
national committees also dropped from 1996 to 1998: for the
Democratic National Committee from $20 million to $3 million and
for the Republicans from $18 million to $7 million.
The national Congressional parties focus on races for the
Senate and House in midterm election years and gave much more
generously to the state parties in the 1998 cycle than they had in
1996. The Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee increased its
federal and nonfederal transfers from $10.5 million to $28.5
million in the effort. The Senate Republicans increased their money
on behalf of their senators from $2 million to $15 million. The
Democratic and Republican Congressional Committees also increased
their totals, from $9 million to $10 million for the Democrats and
from $400 thousand to $5 million for the Republicans
In these midterm elections, the closeness of the Senate and
House races may determine the amount of nonfederal money
transferred to the state parties. Glasgow tested for the impact of
election margins on the allocation of national and state party
money to Congressional races and found that the Democrats and more
recently the Republicans have distributed their resources
strategically (Glasgow 2000).In addition to aiding closely
challenged Senators and House members, helping a closely challenged
gubernatorial candidate may bring a friendly occupant to the
governor's mansion which would be an asset two years hence.
Since 11 states in the sample of 15 had both Senate and
Gubernatorial elections, I tested for the impact of the electoral
margin for both senator and governor on the percentage of the total
soft money transferred to the state parties which was given by the
Republican and Democratic senatorial campaign committees. I assumed
that the senatorial committees targeted close races and put their
money into them. I also tested the relationship of a close
gubernatorial race on the total percentage of soft money given by
Senatorial committees, assuming that the national committees might
target gubernatorial races for funding, hence lowering the
proportion of the total for the Senate race.
The second regression in Table 3B reveals that the closeness
of a Senate race has a large impact on the percent of the total
14
soft money transferred by the Democratic and Republican senate
campaign committees for that state. The standardized coefficient is
-.836 (significant at .000) indicating that as the electoral margin
goes down, the funding goes up. The adjusted R square is .526.
Interestingly, the impact of the closeness of the gubernatorial
race is not significant, but the coefficient is in the right
direction (as the electoral margin goes down, so also does the
percentage of senate money). Apparently, the closeness of the
governor's race is not considered a major reason to send money to
a state party.
It appears that state parties are not the dependent partners
which was predicted. They raise an average of 70 percent of the
hard money funds and 41 percent of the soft money funds in
Presidential election years. When the noise of the Presidential
election subsides and the mid-term election cycles begin, the
parties forage for an average 82 percent of the hard money and 59
percent of the soft money to keep the office open, pay for
utilities, pay for national party issue advertising. Also on their
minds at this time is a gubernatorial campaign with an underticket
and state legislatures to keep or challenge and the need to raise
state money to pay for it all.
State Parties and State Money
Reported in Table 4 for the fifteen selected states and thirty
parties is the state money raised for state elections according to
state rules. The data were gleaned in part from each state party's
campaign finance reports filed with the state elections division.
The table details the amount raised by the state parties as well as
that raised by their senate and house legislative committees for
the 1996 and 1998 election cycles. The 15 Democratic state parties
were collectively about 18.5 million dollars richer in 1998 (total
$91 million). The 15 Republican state parties collectively raised
about the same in both periods (Total $104.5 million). The Pearson
Correlation between the 15 Democratic state parties' funds in 1996
and 1998 was .769, indicating that they grew proportionately. This
was not as true with the 15 Republican parties since the Pearson
Correlation was .620 indicating that some parties had different
growth rates. The New York Republicans doubled in size and the
Florida Republicans grew one and a half times larger.
In order to control for state size, I divided state party
money by the state's electoral vote. Some party treasuries are
large when compared this way such as both parties in Florida,
Georgia, New Jersey and Minnesota, the New York Republicans, the
Illinois Democrats. I hypothesized that the closeness of the
15
governor's race could account for state fund raising. However,
Table 3C, the third regression, shows that the closeness of the
governor's race had a minor impact on money raised by the state
parties in 1998 (Adjusted R Square=.18; significance=.011).Perhaps
there is a better measure of the dependent variable than the one
used i.e. the amount of money raised divided by the electoral vote.
Other factors such as party strength, party label, campaign finance
laws, may account for these variations. Perhaps some differences
may be largely idiosyncratic.
For instance, the Texas Republicans in 1998 were a puny
organization compared to their New York, New Jersey and Florida
sisters. Why is this? Governor Bush was incensed when Republican
Party Chair Tom Pauken openly criticized his tax increases in the
1997 tax-reform package. He and his campaign chair Rove cut off the
party's funding by directing most of the big contributions into a
separate political fund controlled by Bush and Rove (Ivins
2000,83). That helps explain why the Texas Republican Party has so
little money.
In New York where parties may spend as much as they want to
back candidates in the general election, Governor Pataki's
fundraising for reelection had reached $12 million by February 15
of the 1998 election year. Six and a half million dollars were from
the state Republican Party and $5.7 million were from his own
efforts. The Pataki campaign asked large donors, both interest
groups and individuals to give to the State Republican Party
($69,900 or unlimited to housekeeping account), which then funneled
the money to the campaign. That strategy allowed the campaign to
get around individual and interest group limits for gubernatorial
candidates since the state party is unlimited (Levy 1998). This
generous funding to the Governor's reelection campaign by the state
Republicans was unprecedented in New York and may well be a
predictor of the future. It may have accounted for the fact that
the Governor set a record by spending nearly $20 million for his
reelection.
Both parties in New Jersey raised large amounts of money in
1997. Governor Christine Todd Whitman's job rating hovered at no
more than 50% in a state that had voted strongly for President
Clinton the year before. The Democratic party sensed that it could
win and built up a campaign chest. The President helped raise money
for the candidate, state senator and mayor of Woodbridge James
McGreevey, who concentrated his attacks on property taxes and auto
insurance rates. The Republican National Committee paid $760,000
for an issue advocacy ad urging voters to remember the tax-hiking,
welfare boosting days of past Democratic governors. Whitman's
victory margin was less than one percent. Clearly the closeness of
16
the governor's race influenced money raising in New Jersey.
Contrary to the dire predictions that infusions of soft money
to the state parties would render them dependent on their national
party, they appear to have a life of their own. Between 1996 and
1998 nine of the 15 Democratic parties increased their fund raising
and Florida remained rich. Some of the 15 Republican parties
appeared to increase their coffers in response to close
gubernatorial races, but this was not universally true. The state
parties are service agencies for state candidates from the state
legislator to the governor. Candidates benefit from candidatespecific services such as phone banks, fundraising, research,
polling, advertising and media advice.
State Party Organizations and Legislative Campaign Committees
In many states state legislative campaign committees play a
major role in raising funds for state legislative candidates.
Legislative party leaders are expected to assume much of the
responsibility for raising these funds, largely because they are
better able to extract funding from interest groups than rank-andfile legislators can. Table 4 compares the funds raised by the
state party (and reported to state regulatory agencies) and those
raised by legislative campaign committees, for each party for both
the 1995-96 and 1997-98 periods. In three of the fifteen states
legislative campaign committees do not function, in California and
Florida because they are banned by law, and in Texas because until
recently the legislative parties have been relatively weak. The
state party organizations in these three states raise funds for
legislative candidates.
The table shows substantial variation among the legislative
campaign committees in the twelve states where they operate. Most
state party organizations raise more than the legislative
committees. The Illinois Republican legislative committees,
however, raised more than the party organization and more than
their Democratic counterparts in both election years, a period when
Republicans were very narrowly ahead in the Senate and slightly
behind in the House. Likewise, the Ohio legislative committees in
both periods raised more than the comparable Democratic committees
and more than their state party organization. It is probably no
coincidence that in the 1996 and 1998 elections House Republicans
enlarged the narrow lead they had won in 1994, after 22 years of
Democratic control of the House.
New York Democratic legislative parties raised more than their
state parties in both periods, while their Republican counterparts
17
raised more in both elections than any other Republican legislative
party, though less than their Republican state party. Although New
York Democrats held the Assembly and the Republicans the Senate by
60% or more, both put large amounts of funds into the relatively
few races expected to be close.
In several of the smaller states legislative campaign funding
is at a relatively low level, partly because legislative campaigns
in smaller districts are less costly. In the southern states
included in this sample of 15, there are fewer legislative campaign
committees and lower levels of spending for the committees that
exist--although the Tennessee and Georgia Democratic legislative
committees showed signs of more activity in the 1997-98 period.
The data in Table 4 do not show what proportion of funds
raised by state party organizations was spent on legislative races.
A study (Gierzynski and Breaux 1998) of party funding of
legislative races in the 1992 elections showed that in about half
of the cases the state party provided more funding for legislative
races than did the legislative campaign committee, and this was
particularly true in Republican parties. Moreover, in a number of
the southern states where strong legislative parties have been slow
to emerge, the state party organization has assumed most of the
responsibility for recruiting and funding legislative candidates.
State party executive directors were generally satisfied that
their relationships with the legislative campaign committees were
cooperative. In some states, the legislative campaign committees
are housed in the state headquarters (OH-D, OR-D, MN-D).The Georgia
Republican state committee and the legislative campaign committees
meet once a week. The Connecticut Democratic legislative campaign
committees are autonomous and raise money on their own (Robert Ives
1998). Only among the Colorado Democrats was there a bad
relationship between the state committee and the senate campaign
committee.
State Parties: Independent Partners
Table 5 provides a summary of the 30 state parties and their
proportional share of the total funds raised from all sources in
1996 and 1998. Included in the totals reported in the Table are
funds raised for state election accounts (Table 4) which include
funds raised by the state party committees as well as state
legislative campaign committees. In addition the totals include
what was raised by the state party committees and the national
party committees (National, Senate, House) for the "allocable"
activity (activity allocated between federal(hard) and nonfederal
18
(soft) funding) presented in Table 2. The second column under each
election cycle gives funds raised by the state parties as a
percentage of the total funds raised from all sources.
For those who predict the dependence of state parties on the
national largesse delivered during Presidential election years,
Table 5 offers a denial of this hypothesis. In the first column of
the Table are the total amounts raised by all national and state
parties for a national election year. None of the fifteen states
had gubernatorial elections during that period that might have
demanded a greater share of state funding. The major effort on the
state level was elections for the state legislature. Thus it is
impressive that the 30 state parties contributed an average 47
percent of the total fundraising in a presidential election year,
and some states contributed a great deal more than that. Except for
the Oregon parties, which are obviously dependent upon their
national parties for sustenance, the other parties maintain their
autonomy while substantially helping their national parties.
Table 5 also details the condition of state parties in the
non-presidential year of 1998. Recall that the national party
transfers to their state parties dropped dramatically in this
election year. Overall the Democrats dropped from $94 million
transferred to their state parties in 1996 to $54 million two years
later. The national Republicans dropped from $69 million to $47
million. Despite this, nearly half the state parties in our sample
of 15 increased their funds in 1998 and the average amount raised
per state party was the same in both election periods: $14 million.
As we would suspect in a non-presidential year, the state
contribution of the total funds raised averaged 89 percent. This
means that the average state party in our sample raised almost all
of hard money, soft money and, of course, all of the state money.
This is not the picture of dependency.
CONCLUSIONS
Many state political party organizations are becoming
stronger, not weaker.
The old style patronage driven, labor
intensive party operation has disappeared. For those who bemoan its
demise, the executive director of the Minnesota DFL said: "Even my
church uses caterers for funerals" (Kathy Czar 1998). Parties have
adapted themselves to the new technology and provide valuable
services to state and national candidates. They began this process
of adaptation well before the infusion of money from their national
committees. In fact, party development within state parties
paralleled the resurgence of national party organizations. As the
national parties became stronger and richer, they needed strong
19
state partners because of the increasing competition in every
state. This remedy was suggested 50 years ago by the APSA report:
Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System.
The relationship between the national parties and their state
parties has never been closer than it is today. Ironically, it was
also predicted that the state parties would become "nationalized"
and would lose their independence as they became financially bound
to their wealthy national partners. Since the late 1970s the
national parties have reinforced their state parties providing cash
grants, professional staff, data processing and consulting
services, expertise in fund-raising, campaigning, media and
redistricting. State parties now are proficient in voter list
development and get-out-the-vote efforts.
Far from the predicted party decline, however, they have
become "parties in service" (Aldrich 1995). They have developed
mutually beneficial relationships with candidate centered campaigns
and legislative campaign committees. In our sample of 30 state
parties,they raise, on average, between 70 percent to 82 percent of
all federal (hard) money raised for their state and 40 percent to
60 percent of all non-federal (soft) money raised as well.
And they contribute, on average, nearly half of all party money
raised within their borders in a presidential election year and 89
percent of all money in mid-term election years.
In view of this evidence, it is clear that state parties are
not decomposing, as the academics and journalists have been
predicting, but have been adapting to the media-driven society in
which they find themselves. They provide needed technical
information and financial resources to candidates. They have
maintained their autonomy as they became more professionalized and
durable.
NOTES
I owe a great debt to Robert Biersack of the Federal Elections
Commission who provided many tables for my use and patiently
explained the intricacies of the financial relationship between the
state parties and the national parties.
To my husband Malcolm Jewell who helped me from start to
finish and summarized the data and computed relationships and wrote
the section on state legislative parties.
Jennie
Drage,
an
innovative
20
and
cheerful
Legislative
Management analyst from the National Conference of State
Legislatures helped me update Table 1, with recent state Campaign
Finance regulations.
Christopher Burnett, Ph.D. candidate at Colorado State
University helped by collecting state party campaign finance data
from the Elections Division, Colorado Secretary of State as well as
showing an interest in the project.
I also want to thank the following executive directors for
completing the questionnaires I sent them. Many of them gave me the
answers over the phone and thus spent much more time on
explanations and anecdotes:
AZ-D, Melodee Jackson; CO-D, Darryl Eskin; CT-D, Robert Ives;
CT-R, George Gallo; FL-R, Randy Enwright; GA-D, Steve Anthony; GAR, Joe King; IL-R, Chris Dudley; KA-D, Brett Cott; KA-R, John
Potter; KY-R, Cathy Bell; MN-DFL, Kathy Czar; MN-R, Tony Sutton;
NV-R, Charles Muth; NJ-D, Richard Thigpen; NY-D, David Cohen; OH-D,
Amy Young; OH-R, Thom Whatman; OK-D, Pat Hall, OK-R, Quineta Wylie;
OR-D, Robert Sacks; PA-R, Hank Hallowell; SC-R, Trey Walker; SD-R
Patrick Davis; TX-D, Jorge A. Ramirez; TX-R, Barbara Jackson; VT-D,
Tom Hughes.
REFERENCES
Aldrich, John. 1995. Why Parties? Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
APSA (American Political Science Association) Committee on
Political Parties.1950. :"Toward A More Responsible Two-Party
System." American Political Science Review 44: Supplement.
Bibby, John F. 1998. "State Party Organizations: Coping and
Adapting to Candidate-Centered Politics and Nationalization." In
The Parties Respond, 3d ed., ed. L. Sandy Maisel. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
Biersack, Robert.1996. "The Nationalization of Party Finance, 19921994." In
The State of the Parties: The Changing Role of
Contemporary American Parties .2nd ed., eds. John C. Green and
Daniel M. Shea. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Common Cause.1998.
Party Soft Money.Washington,DC: Common Cause.
Gierzynski, Anthony, and David A. Breaux. 1998. "The Financing Role
of Parties." in Campaign Finance in State Legislative Elections,
edited by Joel A. Thompson and Gary F. Moncrief. W a s h i n g t o n
21
D.C.:CQ Press.
Glasgow, Garrett. 2000. "Strategic Distribution of Party Resources,
1997-1998." Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association.
Ivins, Molly. 2000, "Shrub: The Short But Happy Political Life of
George W. Bush." New York:Random House.
La Raja, Raymond J. 1999. "The Impact of Soft Money on State Party
Behavior: Do Soft Money Transfers Strengthen the Party?" Paper
prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association.
Levy, Clifford J. 1998. "Led by Pataki, Fund Raising in Governor's
Race Outstrips the Past." The New York Times, 15 February:35.
Malbin, Michael J, and Thomas L. Gais. 1998. The Day After Reform:
Sobering Campaign Finance Lessons from the American States Albany,
NY: The Rockefeller Institute Press. Distributed by the Brookings
Institution Press.
Mayhew, David. 1986. Placing Parties in American Politics:
Organization, electoral settings, and Government Activity in the
Twentieth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Nagourney, Adam. 1998 "Fight Widens Over Keeping Party Funds: New
York's Democrats Demand a 25% Share."New York Times, 17 January,
B1.
Patterson, Samuel C. 1993. "The Persistence of State Parties." In
The State of the States, ed. Carl E. Van Horn. Washington D.C. :
Congressional Quarterly.
22
TABLE 1. Contribution Limits to State Parties and from State Parties, 1998
State Parties
Alaska
Annual Individual
Contributions
to Parties
$500
Annual PAC
Contributions
to Parties
Contributions from Parties
to Candidates for Governor
$1,000
$100,000
California
5,000
5,000
Unlimited
Colorado
25,000
25,000
400,000
5,000
5,000
Unlimited
Delaware
20,000*
20,000*
Hawaii
50,000
50,000
Kansas
15,000
5,000
Kentucky
2,500
2,500
Louisiana
100,000*
100,000*
Connecticut
Limited by office
50,000
Unlimited in general election
1,000 per slate
Unlimited
Unlimited
Maryland
4,000**
6,000**
Massachusetts
5,000
5,000
New Hampshire
5,000
Unlimited
100 for publicly funded; 35,000 in-kind;
$3,000 for non-publicly funded
Unlimited for publicly funded
New Jersey
30,000
30,000
2,100 per primary and general elec.
New York
69,900**
69,900**
Ohio
15,500
15,500
5,000
5,000
Oklahoma
Rhode Island
South Carolina
1,000
(Limit: 10,000)
3,500**
1,000
(Limit: 10,000)
3,500**
Primary-prohibited; general electionunlimited
515,000 per primary or general elec.
5,000
25,000; in-kind unlimited***
50,000
South Dakota
3,000
Unlimited
Unlimited
Vermont
2,000
2,000
400
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Unlimited
1,000
10,000
(Limit: 10,000)
25,000
(Limit: 25,000
2,875**
1,000
0. 58 per voter
1,000 per primary or general election
Unlimited
6,000
Unlimited
Primary: prohibited; general electionunlimited
TABLE 1 (cont.) Contribution Limits to State Parties and from State Parties
State Parties
Annual Individual
Contributions
to Parties
Annual PAC
Contributions
to Parties
Contributions from Parties
to Candidates for Governor
None for publicly funded;
68,144 for non-publicly funded****
2,500
Arizona
None
None
Arkansas
None
None
Florida
None
None
Georgia
None
None
50,000 for publicly funded;
in-kind unlimited***
5,000
Idaho
None
None
10,000 per primary or general elec.
Maine
None
None
Michigan
None
None
Minnesota
None
None
20,000
Missouri
None
None
10,700
Montana
None
None
15,000
Nebraska
None
None
750,000 for publicly funded
Nevada
None
None
5,000 per primary or general election
None for publicly funded;
500 for non-publicly funded
68,000
None in primary; unlimited in gen. elect.
None
None
New Mexico
Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission. 1998. Campaign Finance Law ‘98: A Summary of State Campaign
Finance Laws with Quick Charts. Washington, D.C.: FEC; and Jennie Drage, Research Analyst, Legislative
Management, National Conference of State Legislatures.
NOTE: Corporations and labor unions are prohibited from contributing in: AK, AZ, CT, MI, MN, NC, NH,
ND, OH, OR, PA, RI, SD, WI, WY. Corporations only are prohibited from contributing in: IA, KY, MA,
MT, OK, TN, WV. Corporations and labor unions are limited the same as PACs in: CA, CO, DE, HI, LA, NJ,
SC, VT, WA. OK and WV: Labor unions only. In KA corporations and unions are limited the same as individuals.
In KY and MA, labor is limited like individuals. In AL, IN, MS, and NY there are varying limits on
corporate and labor contributing.
* Delaware contributions are for a two-year cycle and Louisiana contributions are for a four-year period.
**MD, NY, SC, and WA limit cash contributions but not contributions to overhead expenses, therefore
allowing unlimited contributions to the party administrative and housekeeping account.
***In Florida and Rhode Island, cash contributions are limited but in-kind contributions are not. Therefore,
they are treated as if they permit unlimited party contributions.
****Total from political party and all political organizations combined.
NOTE: There are 13 states that do not limit individual or PAC contributions to or contributions from the parties:
AL, IL, IN, IA, MS, NC, ND, OR, PA, TN, TX, UT, VA
TABLE 2. State Party Percentage of Hard and Soft Money Raised in 1995-96 and 1997-98 (in 000s)
State
Party
California
Dem
Rep
Texas
Dem
Rep
New York
Dem
Rep
Florida
Dem
Rep
Pennsylvania
Dem
Rep
Illinois
Dem
Rep
Ohio
Dem
Rep
New Jersey
Dem
Rep
Georgia
Dem
Rep
Tennessee
Dem
Rep
Minnesota
Dem
Rep
Colorado
Dem
Rep
Connecticut
Dem
Rep
Oregon
Dem
Rep
Kansas
Dem
Rep
Hard Money Raised
for Federal Account
1995-96
Total % St. Party
Hard Money Raised
for Federal Account
1997-98
Total % St. Party
Soft Money Raised
for Federal Account
1995-96
Total
% St. Party
Soft Money Raised
for Federal Account
1997-98
Total
% St. Party
8,110
7,900
88
68
8,160
7,345
53
65
11,889
7,002
36
0
9,410
5,893
68
74
4,617
5,093
65
90
1,722
4,163
66
98
5,141
3,496
55
40
4,371
2,543
39
79
1,912
2,328
86
98
4,275
5,027
34
56
1,534
4,256
96
80
6,259
13,082
31
84
3,306
5,756
37
85
1,075
4,874
87
96
5,459
6,471
29
78
2,176
7,244
68
73
2,495
2,570
36
69
730
2,297
71
91
4,776
2,630
0
8
612
616
8
63
2,854
3,265
56
68
1,756
2,084
75
90
3,662
1,882
32
6
3,075
1,879
1
51
3,259
6,357
51
77
2,153
4,529
87
99
5,399
4,448
25
27
2,864
2,706
30
52
1,969
3,313
78
87
1,085
1,730
90
97
1,855
4,348
90
96
1,152
3,906
90
86
3,174
2,497
83
73
1,076
1,752
86
98
3,125
2,900
54
16
1,575
1,649
68
49
1,443
2,944
22
75
654
2,593
72
100
1,478
1,376
0
0
744
758
65
11
4,512
3,069
70
95
2,296
3,203
98
100
2,968
1,664
47
71
2,379
4,474
65
73
2,496
2,256
55
73
704
541
94
89
3,080
1,362
38
14
66
751
100
98
1,360
1,134
75
75
975
423
89
55
1,059
557
7
100
1,273
814
38
50
2,480
1,694
65
72
652
605
69
80
1,785
335
4
25
741
106
51
29
1,542
684
64
68
435
509
83
84
886
79
87
70
388
230
87
78
Source: State campaign finance reports filed with the FEC.
TABLE 3. Predicting the Magnitude of Soft Money Raising
A. The Effect of Presidential Election Margin on Transfers of National Party
Soft Money, 1995-96
Variables
Constant
Presidential margin
Regression Coefficients
Unstandardized Standardized
85.846
-2.414
-.541
T-score
9.044
-3.404
Significance
.000
.002
Number of cases 30
Adjusted R2 = .267
Dependent variable: National party percent of all non-federal funds transferred to state party
B. The Effect of Senate and Gubernatorial Election Margins on Transfers of SCC
Soft Money, 1997-98
Variables
Constant
Senate margin
Governor margin
Regression Coefficients
Unstandardized Standardized
.715
-.028
.005
-.836
.207
T-score
6.524
-4.750
1.176
Significance
.000
.000
.255
Number of cases 22
Adjusted R2 = .526
Dependent variable: Senate Campaign Committee Percent of all non-federal funds
transferred to state party
C. The Effect of Gubernatorial Election Margins on Size of State Party Funds, 1997-98
Variables
Constant
Governor margin
Regression Coefficients
Unstandardized Standardized
508.189
-9.163
-.458
T-score
6.084
-2.725
Significance
.000
.011
Number of Cases 30
Adjusted R2 = .181
Dependent variable: State party funds divided by state electoral vote.
TABLE 4. Funds Raised by State Party Organizations and by Legislative Party Campaign Committees, 1995-96
and 1997-98 (in 000s)
State
1095-96
California
Texas
New York
Florida
Pennsylvania
State Democratic
Party Organization
12,878
4,683
4,219
14,473
6,686
Democratic Legislative
Campaign Committee
State Republican
Party Organization
Republican Legislative
Campaign Committee
.......
.......
7,908
.......
1,919
9,245
1,109
10,900
19,724
5,936
........
........
10,193
........
3,703
Illinois
Ohio
New Jersey
Georgia
Tennessee
3,303
6,844
3,574
6,411
1,495
6,645
1,811
2,603
195
656
3,506
6,556
9,328
25,747
3,394
8,569
7,045
4,754
214
178
Minnesota
Colorado
Connecticut
Oregon
Kansas
3,332
2,894
1,012
212
359
1,533
355
327
22
302
4,713
2,391
908
73
179
2,139
465
525
69
256
1997-98
California
Texas
New York
Florida
Pennsylvania
18,294
6,174
2,681
13,264
2,059
........
........
7,862
........
2,162
11,062
3,615
22,477
29,579
5,258
.......
.......
8,881
.......
4,490
Illinois
Ohio
New Jersey
Georgia
Tennessee
9,354
4,843
6,513
14,183
1,083
5,044
1,907
3,980
1,118
1,634
1,914
3,280
9,114
5,418
2,213
8,829
6,758
4,855
82
503
Minnesota
Colorado
Connecticut
Oregon
Kansas
9,047
417
1,696
746
554
1,761
61
456
850
434
7,231
511
2,482
168
190
1,739
13
245
995
248
Source: Campaign finance reports filed with Secretaries of State, Elections Division.
TABLE 5. Party Funds from All Sources and Percentage Raised from State Party
State
Party
California
Dem
Rep
Texas
Dem
Rep
New York
Dem
Rep
Florida
Dem
Rep
Pennsylvania
Dem
Rep
Illinois
Dem
Rep
Ohio
Dem
Rep
New Jersey
Dem
Rep
Georgia
Dem
Rep
Tennessee
Dem
Rep
Minnesota
Dem
Rep
Colorado
Dem
Rep
Connecticut
Dem
Rep
Oregon
Dem
Rep
Kansas
Dem
Rep
Funds Raised in 1995-96 (in 000s)
Total Funds
% from State Party
Funds Raised in 1997-98 (in 000s)
Total Funds
% from State Party
32,877
24,147
39
38
35,864
24,300
81
83
14,441
9,698
32
11
12,267
10,321
73
94
15,573
27,641
78
76
21,077
49,467
66
91
23,238
31,951
62
62
16,515
41,697
95
95
15,840
14,839
54
65
5,563
12,661
86
97
16,464
17,222
60
70
19,231
14,706
82
92
17,311
24,406
50
56
11,749
17,273
81
92
10,001
21,743
62
65
12,730
19,605
98
97
12,905
31,358
51
83
17,952
8,901
96
90
5,072
7,892
42
45
4,115
6,267
89
86
12,345
11,585
39
59
15,483
16,647
94
93
8,825
8,432
36
34
1,248
1,816
96
96
3,758
3,142
35
46
4,400
3,964
80
85
4,499
2,171
5
7
2,988
1,874
81
90
3,089
1,198
21
36
1,811
1,177
93
89
Sources: Campaign finance reports filed with Secretaries of State, Elections Divisions, as well as state reports
filed with the FEC.