The Coalition of the Willing:
An Exploration of the Security and Economic
Motivations Surrounding the Invasion of Iraq
By Jason Show
1
We Certify that we have read this professional paper and that, in our opinion, it is satisfactory in scope and quality
for the degree of Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies.
Committee
Approved: Russel Hart,_Ph.D.
Primary Reader 7/17/09
Approved: Carl Schuster, M.A.
Secondary Reader: 7/18/09
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
1
Part One: Security
19
Introduction
20
Chapter One: NATO and the Russian Factor
24
Chapter Two: United States Military Aid
46
Part Two: Economics
67
Introduction
68
Chapter Three: Trade Agreements
71
Chapter Four: Economic Necessity
87
Chapter Five: Reconstruction Contracts
93
Conclusion
111
Bibliography
129
3
Introduction
“There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation.”
George Washington in his 1796 Farewell Address1
In its most basic definition, foreign policy can be described as a set of goals that explains
how a particular country will interact on an official basis with other countries of the world across
a spectrum of issues relating to other countries.2 Foreign policy objectives almost universally
revolve around two core principles: the preservation of national security and the preservation
and/or acquisition of economic status. When the foreign policies of countries overlap, they often
formalize their exceptional relationship, resulting in defense treaties, trade pacts or similar
mutually beneficial arrangements. Conversely, when the policies of two countries collide there
is the potential for economic barriers as well as armed conflict. This study will examine how the
foreign policies of 46 countries aligned with the United States of America in the early months of
2003, enabling the invasion of Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein to be carried out under a
banner of the so-called “Coalition of the Willing.”
As quality foreign policy analysis must take into account the historical context
influencing a country‟s foreign policy goals, this study will begin by briefly reviewing the
historical events which culminated in the invasion of Iraq by the Coalition of the Willing. In the
1980s, the United States had financially and materially supported Iraq and its president, Saddam
Hussein, in Iraq‟s war with Iran.
However, when in 1990, Hussein invaded his southern
neighbor, Kuwait, he threatened the secure supply of oil out of the Persian Gulf and in turn, U.S.
economic security, something U.S. foreign policy could not allow.
Although the U.S. led an
international coalition of countries to liberate Kuwait, they did not use the war to depose
Hussein. Instead, the U.S. encouraged the United Nations to impose a litany of sanctions on
1
2
Wikisource. “Washington‟s Farewell Address.” http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Washington%27s_Farewell_Address
Wikipedia. “Foreign Policy.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy
4
Iraq, curtailing Hussein‟s ambition, while still maintaining his presence as a regional bulwark to
the expansion of another U.S. antagonist, Iran.
The U.S. and Hussein‟s Iraq continued to clash politically and militarily in the years after
the first Gulf War. The U.S. government eventually concluded that the only means of securing
peace with Iraq would entail the removal of Saddam Hussein. To this end, U.S. President Bill
Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998, in which the U.S. government officially adopted
a policy of regime change in Iraq.3
In the U.S. presidential election of 2000, George W. Bush, the Republican Party's
nominee, included as part of his campaign platform a pledge to fully implement the Iraq
Liberation Act and remove Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. The terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 distracted the Bush White House from taking immediate steps in this direction;
however, by early 2002 the Bush White House had regained its focus. It began publicly pressing
for regime change, indicating that the U.S. had reason to believe the Iraqi government had ties to
terrorist groups, was developing weapons of mass destruction and was not cooperating
sufficiently with United Nations weapons inspectors.4
In September 2002, Bush brought the matter of Iraqi regime change to the United
Nations‟ General Assembly. In his address Bush outlined the U.S. allegations against Saddam
Hussein‟s regime:
1) Defiance of United Nations Resolutions – Iraq had repeatedly violated sixteen United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions and tried to circumvent UN economic
sanctions.
3
Wikipedia. “Iraq Liberation Act.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_Liberation_Act
Wikipedia. “Foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy_of_the_George_W._Bush_administration
4
5
2) Development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) – Iraq continued efforts to
develop and stockpile biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.
3) Repression of the Iraqi People – Iraq refused to admit human rights monitors, carried
out government sponsored violence against women, carried out torture, executed and
repressed political opposition, abused children, withheld the freedoms of speech,
press and information, withheld food, and carried out crimes against Muslims.
4) Support for International Terrorism – The U.S. Secretary of State labeled Iraq as a
sponsor of terrorism.
5) Refusal to Account for Prisoners and Return Stolen Property from the Gulf War –
Iraq failed to return or account for both Kuwaiti people and property that disappeared
after Iraq‟s occupation of Kuwait in the Gulf War.5
These accusations led to a unanimous UNSC vote in November 2002, establishing Resolution
1441, which mandated an improved inspection system with the goal of bringing the process of
disarming Iraq to a verifiable conclusion. Resolution 1441 called on Iraq to disarm its weapons
of mass destruction and cooperate with UN inspectors; however, it did not include an
authorization for the use of force against Iraq. In the verbiage of Resolution 1441 the Security
Council indicated that it would remain 'seized' of the matter, meaning that it would continue to
assert its authority as the final international arbiter of the use of force.6 Perhaps sensing that the
matter might drag on in the UNSC, Bush used a November 2002 speech to introduce the term
“Coalition of the Willing.” Bush said, “Should Iraqi President Saddam Hussein choose not to
disarm, the United States will lead a Coalition of the Willing to disarm him."7
5
U.S. Department of State. “A Decade of Deception and Violence.” http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/13456.htm
Ramonet, Ignacio. “Before the War.” Le Monde Diplomatique. February 2003.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/law/2003/0203before.htm
7
CNN. “Bush: Join coalition of willing.” http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/11/20/prague.bush.nato/
6
6
During the months of December 2002 through February 2003, the U.S. would utilize a
flurry of diplomatic activity to lay the groundwork in support of an Iraq invasion. In December,
Iraq filed a 12,000-page weapons declaration with the UN in order to meet the requirements of
resolution 1441. However, Hans Blix, head of the UN weapons inspection team in Iraq, told
UNSC members that the declaration was essentially a “reorganized version" of information Iraq
had provided in 1997, and that it was “not enough to create confidence" that Iraq has abandoned
its WMD efforts.8 Diplomatic efforts continued in January, when the leaders of Britain, Spain,
Italy, Portugal, Hungary, Poland, Denmark and the Czech Republic rallied behind the U.S.,
releasing a statement to various newspapers saying that Saddam Hussein should not be allowed
to violate UN resolutions, that Saddam was a “clear threat to world security," and urging Europe
to unite with the U.S. to ensure that the Iraqi government was disarmed.9 On February 5 came
perhaps the most credible case for a military strike on Iraq when U.S. Secretary of State Colin
Powell addressed the United Nations. Powell, generally seen as a moderating influence in the
Bush White House, presented the U.S. government‟s case against the Hussein regime. His
presentation included tape recordings, satellite photographs and other intelligence data, which
aimed to prove the regime was in fact producing WMDs and evading weapons inspectors.
Powell also attempted to link the regime to Al Qaeda.10
Despite Powell‟s presentation and mounting support for the U.S. position, there was also
a growing voice of opposition to the Iraq invasion. These critics, both in the U.S. and abroad,
became increasingly vocal in early 2003.
8
Wikipedia. “Iraq disarmament crises timeline.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_disarmament_crisis_timeline_2001%E2%80%932003#December
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
7
Opposition to War
Opposition to the invasion of Iraq came for several reasons and in several forms. For the
purposes of this study, it is relevant to understand both why the war was opposed as well as the
scale in which the opposition was carried out. Pre-invasion critics of the invasion generally
opposed the war for one or more of the following reasons:
1) Middle East Instability - Advocates of this theory claimed that an invasion of Iraq and
the resulting chaos it would create would not only lead to the deaths of thousands of
Coalition soldiers and Iraqi soldiers and civilians, but it would dangerously affect the
stability of the Middle East with potential ripple effects across the globe. These critics
would say that if Iraq did in fact have weapons of mass destruction, an invasion and
resulting chaos would only act to increase the likelihood that these weapons would fall
into the wrong hands.
2) Right of Intervention - Another widespread reason for opposition to the invasion was
the idea that foreign governments should never possess a right to intervene in another
sovereign country‟s internal affairs. Advocates of this position would argue that the
U.S. did not possess the right to invade Iraq regardless of whether Iraq did or did not
possess weapons of mass destruction or did or did not affect human rights abuses on its
population.
3) Violation of International Law - Others opposed the invasion on the basis that if it was
conducted without UN approval, then it would be a violation of international law.11
According to this position, all signatory countries to the UN Charter are legally bound
from exercising military power without UNSC approval unless in self-defense.
11
Cox, Noel. “The Consequences of the World Legal Order of the War on Iraq.” New Zealand Armed Forces Law
Review. 2003. http://www.geocities.com/noelcox/Cox_Ira1.htm
8
4) Aiding Al Qaeda - There was criticism of U.S. policy by those who believed that an
invasion of Iraq would help Al-Qaeda's recruitment efforts by reinforcing the message
spread by Islamic extremists that Islam was being attacked by the West.
5) Control of Iraqi Oil - Both inside and outside the U.S., many believed that the Bush
Administration's rationale for war was to gain control over Iraq‟s oil resources. These
critics felt the real reason for the war was to secure this oil, ensure a steady supply to
U.S. markets and reduce the influence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC).12
6) No WMD - Some opponents of the war believed that after years of inspections and
sanctions there would be no WMDs found in Iraq or that any that were found would no
longer be functional.
Underlying many of these positions was a frustration at what was perceived as U.S. hypocrisy.
Some expressed bewilderment that the United States would consider military action against Iraq
for supposed possession of WMDs and not against North Korea, which was actively claiming it
had nuclear weapons. Pre-invasion critics also questioned the U.S. interest in Iraqi human rights
abuses as a reason for invasion when the U.S. would not take action against much larger abuses
such as the genocide of up to one million people in Rwanda or hundreds of thousands in
Darfur.13 Ultimately, the aggregation of these criticisms formed the base of a significant antiwar movement in the months leading up to the invasion.
The anti-war movement harnessed these criticisms and conveyed them on a global scale
in three primary ways: public protests, polling numbers and through public officials. The antiwar movement manifested itself most visibly in a series of global protests from January to April
12
Weafer, Chris. “OPEC, Russia and Iraq.” Moscow Times. September 27, 2002.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/758597/posts
13
Wikipedia. “Rwandan Genocide.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rwanda_genocide
9
2003. The first large-scale protests were held between January 16 and 18 in Russia, France,
United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, Germany, Italy, Norway, Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, Japan,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Argentina, and the United States. The larger U.S. rallies occurred in
San Francisco and Washington, D.C., with each city drawing up to hundreds of thousands of
protestors. The large-scale public protests continued on February 15, when millions of people in
some 800 cities around the world took part in the largest protest in human history. The largest
demonstration occurred in London, where an estimated 2,000,000 protestors gathered in Hyde
Park. One month later, on March 15, Spanish and Italian cities exhibited some of the largest
turnouts against their governments' alliance with the U.S., with more than 400,000 protesters in
Milan, more than 300,000 protestors in Barcelona, and more than 120,000 in the Spanish capital,
Madrid. Joining them were hundreds of thousands more protestors around the world from
Montreal to the Palestinian territories.14 According to the French academic Dominique Reynié,
between January 3 and April 12, 2003, 36 million people across the globe took part in almost
3,000 protests against the war.15
In addition to anti-war rallies, opposition to the war was captured by several polling
groups. Results available from Gallup International, as well as local polls across most of Europe,
reported that support for a war carried out by the United States and its coalition partners without
UN approval did not rise above 11 percent in any country. Polling results in traditionally proAmerican European countries did not alter this trend. Polls indicated that opposition to the war
reached 84 percent in Britain, 80 percent in the Netherlands, 75 percent in Poland and over 90
14
Wikipedia. “Protests against the Iraq war.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protests_against_the_2003_Iraq_war
Callinicos, Alez. “Anti-war protests do make a difference.” SocialistWorkeronline. March 19, 2005.
http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/article.php?article_id=6067
15
10
percent in Turkey.16 Opposition ran as high as 90 percent in Spain and Italy, also traditional U.S.
allies. Interestingly, polling groups indicated the war would still be unpopular if the U.S. had a
UN mandate, with opposition for such an attack ranging from 87 percent in Spain to 49 percent
in the Netherlands. Opposition to war without UN support was also expectedly high in France
and Germany, 76 and 90 percent respectively. The only country that statistically supported a
U.S. invasion of Iraq was Romania with 45 percent of the people polled in favor of invasion with
38 percent opposed.17
In step with global protests and polling results revealing the public’s opposition to the
war, several prominent members of the U.S. military, national security and diplomatic
communities criticized some of the Bush administration’s rationale for invading Iraq.
Beginning as early as July 28, 2002, the Washington Post reported that “many senior U.S.
military officers” including members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed an invasion on
the grounds that the policy of containing Saddam Hussein and his regime was working. 18
Dr. Morton Halperin, a foreign policy expert with the Council on Foreign Relations and
Center for American Progress and long-time member of the U.S. national security
community, warned that an invasion would foment unrest in the region and increase the
terrorist threat.19
16
Oja Jay, Dru. “A Coalition of the Willing?” Washington Post.
http://osdir.com/ml/politics.leftists.monkeyfist/2003-02/msg00009.html
17
Ibid.
18
Ricks, Thomas E. “Some Top Military Brass Favor Status Quo in Iraq: Containment Seen Less Risky Than
Attack.” Washington Post. July 28, 2002. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A10749-2002Jul27
19
Dao, James. “Experts Warn of High Risk for American Invasion of Iraq.” New York Times. August 1, 2002.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C05E3DA163BF932A3575BC0A9649C8B63
11
In a 2002 book, Scott Ritter, a nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991-98, argued
against an invasion and expressed doubts about the Bush Administration’s claims that the
Hussein regime had the capability to produce WMD.20
Brent Scowcroft, who served as National Security Adviser to President George H.W.
Bush was also critical. He wrote an August 15, 2002 editorial in The Wall Street Journal
entitled "Don't Attack Saddam," arguing that the war would distract from the broader
fight against terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which should be the U.S.'s
highest priority in the Middle East.21 Gen. Hugh Shelton, former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and Retired Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni, former head of Central
Command for U.S. forces in the Middle East, echoed Scowcroft’s assessment.22, 23
In January 2003, TIME Magazine reported that “as many as one in three senior officers
questioned the wisdom of a preemptive war with Iraq.”24
On February 13, 2003 Ambassador Joseph Wilson, former charge d'affaires in Baghdad,
resigned from the U.S. Foreign Service and publicly questioned the need for another war
in Iraq.25
John Brady Kiesling, another career diplomat with similar reservations,
resigned in a public letter in the New York Times on February 27. 26 He was followed on
March 10 by John H. Brown, a career diplomat with 22 years of service, and on March 19
20
Pitt, William R. War On Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn’t Want You to Know. New York: Context Books, 2002.
Scowcroft, Brent. “Don’t Attack Saddam: It would undermine our terror efforts.” The Wall Street Journal, August
15, 2002. http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110002133
22
Graham, Bradley. “Officers: Iraq Could Drain Terror War, Diversion of Afghan Forces To Gulf Raises
Concerns.” Washington Post. September 1, 2002. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A21639-2002Aug31
23
Boehlert, Eric. “I’m not sure which planet they live on.” Salon.com. October 17, 2002.
http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2002/10/17/zinni/index.html?pn=1
24
Duffy, Michael and Thompson, Mark. “Pentagon Warlord.” Time, January 27, 2003.
25
Wilson, Joeseph. “Republic or Empire.” The Nation. February 13, 2003.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20030303/wilson
26
Kiesling, John B. “U.S. Diplomat’s Letter of Resignation.” The New York Times. February 27, 2003.
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/27/international/27WEBTNAT.html?ex=1221019200&en=71b185c88f0baca6&ei=5070
21
12
by Mary Ann Wright, a diplomat with 15 years of service in the State Department
following a military career of 29 years.27, 28
Leading international officials would also take up the case against invasion. Following Colin
Powell‟s February 5 presentation, Hans Blix presented a report to the UNSC on February 14
giving a different perspective. Blix pointed out that the Iraqis were becoming more proactive in
their cooperation with weapons inspections and rebutted some of the Powell‟s arguments. For
instance, Blix questioned the interpretations of the satellite images put forward by Powell and
stated that alternate interpretations of the satellite images were plausible. He also rejected an
allegation by Powell that the Iraqis had received early warning of WMD inspectors visiting sites.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohammed El Baradei would
also question Powell‟s argument, indicating that he did not believe the Iraqis had a nuclear
weapons program, which Powell had claimed in his presentation to the Security Council.29
Coalition of the Willing
Despite the mounting protests, unpopularity of the war among the public and criticisms
by leading officials, a second UN resolution was being drafted with the intention that it would
find Iraq in "material breach" of Resolution 1441 and the "serious consequences" of the
resolution should be implemented.
On February 24, 2003, the U.S., the U.K. and Spain
presented a draft of the potential resolution to the Security Council which declared that Iraq had
failed to take the final opportunity to disarm afforded to it by Resolution 1441.30 If the draft was
approved by the UNSC, it would essentially give the U.S. a green light to invade Iraq. Instead,
27
Wikipedia. “John H. Brown.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_H._Brown
Commondreams.org. “Third U.S. Diplomat Resigns Over Iraq Policy.”
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0321-06.htm
29
Wikipedia. “Iraq disarmament crisis timeline 2001-2003.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_disarmament_crisis_timeline_2001-2003#December
30
U.S. Department of State. “Iraq: U.S./U.K../Spain Draft Resolution.” http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/othr/17937.htm
28
13
the resolution split the UNSC and led to serious diplomatic rifts, with the U.S. and the U.K.
coming under sustained criticism from France, Russia and Germany. The suggested resolution
was eventually withdrawn when it became clear that several permanent members of the Security
Council would cast “no” votes on any new resolution, requesting instead for more time for UN
weapons inspectors to complete their work.
Unable to gain UN approval but still focused on its goal, the U.S. set about consolidating
its Coalition of the Willing for imminent action against Iraq. The Coalition was of great
importance, as it provided the crucial appearance of international legitimacy for the invasion. On
March 18, two days before the invasion, Colin Powell announced a preliminary list of 30
countries that publicly aligned with the U.S. against Iraq.31
In the days after the invasion, the
list grew. On March 27 the White House released the official list of the Coalition of the Willing.
The 49 countries announced as publicly committing to the Coalition included:
Afghanistan
Angola
Azerbaijan
Colombia
Czech Republic
Dominican Republic
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Honduras
Iceland
Japan
Latvia
Macedonia
Micronesia
Netherlands
Palau
Philippines
Portugal
Rwanda
Slovakia
Albania
Australia
Bulgaria
Costa Rica
Denmark
El Salvador
Estonia
Georgia
Hungary
Italy
Kuwait
Lithuania
Marshall Islands
Mongolia
Nicaragua
Panama
Poland
Romania
Singapore
Solomon Islands
31
Schifferes, Steve. “US names Coalition of the Willing.” BBC News. March 18, 2003.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2862343.stm
14
South Korea
Tonga
Uganda
United Kingdom
Uzbekistan32
Spain
Turkey
Ukraine
United States
The list released by the White House generated immediate controversy.
The most
obvious was the omission of three global powers, France and Germany (traditional allies of the
U.S.) and Russia (at the time normalizing relations with the U.S.). All three had consistently
sided with public opinion in opposition to the U.S. position. In addition to publicly stating its
opposition, France had also it known that it would use its UN Security Council veto against a
proposed resolution enabling an invasion of Iraq.33 What were the motivations for France,
Germany and Russia to oppose the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq? Five theories have been put forth,
similar to the criticisms of the greater public, but distinctive enough to require a brief discussion.
1) Aversion to War – Many of the European public, having experienced the horrors of
military conflict on their continent and in their lifetime, held a widespread aversion to
conflict. They felt they had a better grasp on the impact of war than Americans and
therefore, their threshold for deciding when war as a last resort becomes necessary is
as a result much higher. After 50 years of integration and the overcoming of past
enmities, Europeans have also come to place more faith in diplomacy and cooperation
than Americans, whose lessons of the Cold War include a greater respect for the need
to threaten or use military force.34
2) Increase in Terrorism - Most Europeans believed that a U.S.-led invasion of an Arab
country, with its consequent civilian casualties and likely need for a long-term
32
The White House. “Coalition Members.” March 27, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030327-10.html
33
Wikipedia. “Governments‟ positions pre-2003 invasion of Iraq.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governments%27_positions_pre-2003_invasion_of_Iraq
34
Gordon, Philip H. “The Crisis in the Alliance.” Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.
February 24, 2003. http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2003/0224iraq_gordon.aspx?p=1
15
occupation, would more likely be a recruitment tool for Al Qaeda than a blow against
terrorism. The threat of an increase in Al Qaeda numbers was much more acute for
Europe due both to its closer geographic proximity to the Muslim world and the large
numbers of Muslims living in Europe (up to 10 percent in France, four percent in
Germany and six percent in Russia).35, 36, 37
3) Inability to Stabilize Iraq - Europeans were far more pessimistic about being able to
stabilize Iraq than the Bush administration. Spurred on by their immense power and
general historical optimism, Americans seem confident that they can meet the
challenge of bringing freedom, stability, and democracy to a post-Saddam Iraq.
Europeans, however, doubt that Iraq's ethnically divided population, artificial borders,
and unequally allocated natural resources lend themselves to future stability. The
French learned this lesson first hand in Algeria, Lebanon and Syria and the Russians
in Afghanistan.38
4) United States Global Hegemony - Opposition to the United States on Iraq, especially
from the French and the Russians, was a question of world order. While many
European leaders were willing to support the United States on Iraq even if most of
their public is opposed to war, French leaders in particular were simply not prepared
to accept that decisions about war and peace should be decided unilaterally by the
United States, especially if much of international opinion is against war. From this
perspective, Europe's internal divisions over Iraq have as much to do with different
35
Wikipedia. “Islam in France.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_France
Wikipedia. “Islam in Germany.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_Germany
37
Wikipedia. “Russia.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia#Religion
38
Gordon, Philip H. “The Crisis in the Alliance.” Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.
February 24, 2003. http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2003/0224iraq_gordon.aspx?p=1
36
16
countries' attitudes toward U.S. leadership as they do with different views about what
to do about Iraq.39
5) Loss of Oil Investments - It has been widely reported that France, Germany and
Russia would suffer significant losses in oil contracts if Saddam Hussein was
removed from power in Iraq. Both France and Russia had contracts with Hussein‟s
government to develop Iraqi oilfields.
It has been estimated that French oil
companies stood to profit close to US$100 billion over a seven-year period if their
contracts with Hussein‟s government were honored.40 Russia, in addition to losing
several oil contracts and a US$3.5 billion, 23-year deal to rehabilitate oilfields, would
also likely lose out on over US$8 billion in debt owed to it by Iraq.41, 42 In an oilrelated issue, France was also the leading supplier of goods to Iraq under the UN‟s
oil-for-food program.43
The potential loss of oil investments is noteworthy because it is the only theory that would have
lent itself to quantification prior to the invasion. If this theory held merit, France, Germany and
Russia could have decided their support for or against the invasion based on a simple profit/loss
analysis.
Beyond France, Germany and Russia, whose absence from the list of Coalition countries
was notable, there were several countries that were part of the Coalition, but for their own
domestic reasons did not want to be publicly named as such. These countries most likely
included Kazakhstan, Moldova, New Zealand, Thailand and Norway in addition to the Arab
Muslim countries of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United
39
Ibid.
Timmerman, Kenneth R. “The French War for Oil.” New York Post. March 16, 2004.
41
Beaumont, Peter and Faisal Islam. “Carve-up of Oil Riches Begins.” Guardian Unlimited. November 3, 2002.
42
Wikipedia. “Governments‟ positions pre-2003 invasion of Iraq.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governments%27_positions_pre-2003_invasion_of_Iraq
43
BBC. “Q&A: Who Will Control Iraq's Oil?” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2955789.stm
40
17
Arab Emirates.
The political repercussions and potential domestic backlash from publicly
supporting a U.S. invasion of Iraq was substantial for these countries. This was especially so for
the Arab countries, who had voted with the Arab League in February 2003 to oppose any Arab
country providing military assistance to a war on Iraq. However, at the time of this vote these
countries had already been providing the U.S. with basing rights, overflight rights and staging
areas. The leaders of these countries also relied significantly on the U.S. for arms purchases and
training. Total U.S. economic and military support to Middle East and North African countries
averaged some US$6 billion per year between 2000 and 2002 and would increase to over US$13
billion per year between 2003 and 2006.44 Specifically, between 2001 and 2003 the U.S. sold,
lent or gave away an estimated US$7.5 billion worth of weaponry, military equipment and
training assistance to Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. 45
Despite the threat of domestic instability and their pledge to the Arab League, these leaders were
unwilling or unable to relinquish the economic and security support provided by the United
States.
Notwithstanding the absence of France, Germany, Russia and Arab countries from the
official list, the White House touted the diversity of the Coalition, citing that Coalition countries
represented approximately 1.23 billion people, including every major race, religion and ethnicity
in the world and including countries from every continent on the globe.46 Despite the positive
and inclusive perception emanating from the White House, the Coalition list continued to create
confusion, raise objections and pose questions - not least of all from its own members.
44
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants [Greenbook]. “Middle East and North Africa (Total).”
http://qesdb.usaid.gov/cgi-bin/broker.exe
45
Collins, Catherine and Stephen J. Hedges. “US Woos War Allies with Cash, Weapons.” Chicago Tribune.
February 2, 2003. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/2003/0202cash.htm
46
The White House. “Coalition Members.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030327-10.html
18
Angola, named on an early list of coalition members, was apparently unaware of joining
the fraternity, and was removed from the list by the White House less than a day after publication
without explanation.47 However, Angola reappeared on the coalition list published by the White
House on March 27, 2003.48 President Bush supposedly told Spanish Prime Minister Aznar in
late February that he would cut off aid to Angola to influence their support, however, it was
unknown if Angola‟s reappearance on the list was a result of Bush following through on this
threat.49 Meanwhile, the Solomon Islands were also completely unaware of supporting the U.S.led coalition. Solomon Islands Prime Minister Sir Allan Kemakeza quickly replied, “Thanks, but
no thanks,” to his country‟s inclusion on the coalition list. Perhaps most interesting is the
diplomatic drama that ensued between the United States and Turkey over U.S. efforts to entice
Turkey into joining the Coalition. Turkey, where some 95 percent of the country opposed the
war, stunned the White House by rejecting a US$15 billion offer to host 62,000 U.S. ground
troops for the invasion.50
The inclusion of the Solomon Islands on the coalition list raised another interesting point
given that it did not have a military. In fact, of the 46 countries publicly supporting the U.S.-led
Coalition, there were five countries without militaries: Costa Rica, Iceland, the Marshall Islands,
Micronesia and Palau. In fact, the only four coalition countries actually supplying combat forces
for the invasion were the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland. This reality
raised the question as to what the other 43 countries were doing?51 How were they contributing
47
Milbank, Dana. “White House Notebook: Many Willing, Few Are Able.” Washington Post. March 25, 2003.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A21268-2003Mar24?language=printer
48
The White House. “Coalition Members.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030327-10.html
49
Gomez, Edward M. “Secret Memo Revealed: Bush fixed on war, but could Saddam have been bought off?”
SFGate.com. September 27, 2007. http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/sfgate/detail?blogid=15&entry_id=20648
50
Boudreaux, Richard and Amberin Zaman. “Turkey Rejects U.S. Troop Deployment.” Los Angeles Times. March
2, 2003. http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/02/world/fg-iraq2
51
Wikipedia. “Governments‟ positions pre-2003invasion of Iraq.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governments%27_positions_pre-2003_invasion_of_Iraq
19
to the coalition? Exactly how could the Marshall Islands, an island country located in the middle
of the Pacific Ocean with a population of some 63,000 people and no military help with the
invasion of Iraq, a country on the other side of the world?52 Given what is known about how
countries conduct foreign policy – they typically only undertake endeavors that they feel will
help improve their national security or economic status – perhaps the more important question is
why did these 46 countries join in the U.S.-led effort to invade Iraq? Many members of the
coalition, geographically far from the Middle East, had minimal interest in Iraq with little stake
in the result of the conflict.53
With almost universal opposition to the war among global
populations and among numerous senior figures within the U.S. and international security
communities, there must have been compelling motivations to join this U.S.-led effort. What
were they? The goal of this thesis is to examine the motivations of the 46 publicly named
countries that joined the United States in the Coalition of the Willing to invade Iraq in March
2003. This exploration revolves around the two core elements of every country‟s foreign policy
- national security and economic status. Through understanding the historical context of how
Coalition countries have or have not met these needs coupled with an analysis of contemporary
issues confronting each country, we can begin to identify the motivations behind each country‟s
support for U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing.
To better understand the motivations of the Coalition, this study is organized in two parts,
national security and economic status. Individual member countries are then presented in either
of the two parts based upon which foreign policy objective appeared to be their primary
motivation for joining the coalition. Part one on national security is then subdivided into two
52
CIA World Factbook. “Marshall Islands.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/rm.html
53
Newnham, Dr. Randall E. “‟Coalition of the Bribed and Bullied?‟ U.S. Economic Linkage and the Iraq War
Coalition.” Paper presented at the 47 th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association San Diego, CA,
March 2006.
20
chapters. Chapter one examines the former Soviet Bloc and Soviet Republic countries seeking to
solidify their national security through Coalition membership while chapter two looks at those
countries whose national security was significantly influenced by U.S. economic and military
aid. Part two of the examination focuses on economics and is subdivided chapters three, four
and five. Chapter three examines those countries wanting to utilize membership to improve their
economic standing, while chapter four includes those countries whose economic standing
depended on coalition membership. Chapter five looks at the few countries that joined the
coalition based on a shared ideology with the United States. Each of the five chapters will, in
turn, analyze each individual country, aiming to present a succinct recent history of each country,
how this history has affected the formulation of their foreign policy and how their support for the
U.S. invasion of Iraq supported their own national security and/or economic interests. Only in
understanding these unique histories and foreign policies can we begin to fathom the magnitude
of the question posed to each government in late 2002 and early 2003. Should they trust the
United States to provide the security arrangements and economic incentives to make Coalition
membership viable or should they shun membership and in turn risk alienating the world‟s most
powerful country?
21
PART ONE: Security
22
Introduction
“We provided money so they could…participate in doing what we were asking them to do… Security assistance…is
a tool of U.S. national security and foreign policy.”
Bush administration official commenting on one of the most effective means of finding and sustaining foreign
support for the global war on terrorism. 54
As was previously discussed, the pursuit of national security and economic prosperity are
the twin pillars around which most countries formulate their foreign policy. When examining
the motivations of each of the 46 countries that joined the Coalition of the Willing, it is not
surprising that a majority of them were motivated primarily by a need to improve or maintain
their security relationship with the United States, upon whom they depended for national
security. For each of these 26 countries, the U.S. invitation to join the Coalition posed a very
ugly question. Would they support the U.S. in what was sure to be a widely condemned and
unpopular war and risk their political future or would they risk offending their primary
benefactor and risk national security? Each of the 26 countries chose to join the U.S.-led
Coalition, buy why? The purpose of the first section of this study is to examine the unique
security related variables each country faced when they were asked to join the Coalition. This
section is divided into two chapters, the first addressing the countries who joined the Coalition
to protect themselves from a resurgent Russia and the second examining the countries who
supported the U.S. out of regional or domestic security concerns or outright political necessity.
Each chapter presents an analysis of each country in which five questions are addressed:
1) How did the country come to find itself in its geopolitical situation?
2) What is the historical context of their relationship with the United States?
54
Collins, Catherine and Stephen J. Hedges. “US Woos WarAllies with Cash, Weapons.” Chicago Tribune.
February 2, 2003. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/2003/0202cash.htm
23
3) What were the specific variables that influenced their decision to join the Coalition?
4) Upon joining the Coalition, what did they provide in support of the invasion of Iraq?
5) What did they receive for their efforts?
Through the answers to these questions we can begin to identify the true motivations of each
member of the Coalition.
Before exploring the intricate security relationship shared between each country and the
U.S., it is important to distinguish between external and domestic or political security needs. For
the 13 ex-Soviet Bloc countries and Soviet Republics, the road to the decision to support the U.S.
in 2003 began in 1991. The years after the Soviet Union‟s dissolution in 1991 were volatile for
ex-communist states and republics. Many former communist countries faced political turmoil as
previously reticent factions were now free to compete for power. However, amid the turmoil
was the reality that a Soviet dissolution meant an opportunity for an independent future. In a
stroke, the former Soviet Bloc countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia [present day Czech Republic
and Slovakia], Hungary, Poland and Romania) and the former Soviet Republics (Azerbaijan,
Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) now found themselves asking how
they were going to secure this future. For other countries, external threats were not the primary
concern. Their longevity depended on their ability to control domestic problems. In the Balkan
countries of Albania and the former Yugoslav republic, Macedonia, long-suppressed ethnic
tensions threatened to ignite, potentially encompassing and destabilizing each country. Both
needed a stabilizing U.S. presence. Other countries like Colombia and the Philippines relied in
varying degrees on continued U.S. assistance to quell domestic violence spawned from terrorism
and narcotics. Still other countries, like Rwanda and Uganda needed U.S. assistance to help
sustain their fragile governments and maintain regional stability while others (Eritrea and
24
Ethiopia) were more devious, supporting the U.S. position with the hope of winning U.S. favor
in a border dispute. Finally, some countries (Afghanistan, Iceland, Kuwait, Portugal and South
Korea) had little choice in supporting the U.S. given their dependence, in varying degrees, upon
the U.S. for their national defense. With uncertainty over their national security, whether from
external or domestic threats, these 26 countries needed the backing of a strong partner.
25
26
CHAPTER ONE: NATO and the Russian Factor
Following the collapse of Soviet-era communism, the former Soviet Bloc countries and
Soviet Republics needed to develop a strategy to ensure their long-term national security. They
looked toward the United States and Euro-Atlantic organizations such as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Their hope was that a strong
partnership with the U.S., coupled with integration into NATO and the EU, would stabilize
national security and lay a solid foundation for future economic development.
For the United States, supporting these countries directly or through their integration into
Euro-Atlantic institutions was not an entirely altruistic endeavor. The U.S. stood to benefit from
the inclusion of these countries into the Western-sphere from both economic and security
perspectives. Economically, the inclusion of these countries into U.S.-led institutions presented
new export markets for Western goods as well as a source of inexpensive labor and raw
materials. However, of paramount importance was the impact on regional security. The U.S.
paid specific attention to the former Soviet-dominated countries, wanting to take advantage of
the Soviet (now Russian) weakness and integrate these countries into the Western security
sphere. There were several advantages for doing so.
First, the inclusion of the former Soviet
countries into NATO would augment the continuation of the containment policy against Russia.
Residing on the eastern flank of present NATO members, these countries would act as military
and geographic buffers should Russia ever become belligerent in the future. Additionally, the
inclusion the former Soviet Bloc and Soviet Republics into the Western sphere would provide
the U.S. with an infusion of new allies that zealously supported U.S. foreign policy. From the
perspective of these new countries, the support of U.S. foreign policy, popular or not, was a
small price to pay for the larger strategic goal of national security.
27
The U.S. utilized two principal means to develop security in their new allies: economic or
military aid and inclusion in NATO. U.S. economic and military aid often included military
training, grants to purchase military equipment or, in some situations, direct military support.
For the former Soviet-dominated states, however, NATO membership was the key to achieving
national security. The NATO military alliance, established in 1949, constituted a system of
collective defense whereby member states agreed to come to each others‟ aid in response to an
attack by any external party. Membership was a lengthy and bureaucratic process; however, the
system of mutual defense was seen as a powerful deterrent and therefore a worthwhile goal.
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary achieved membership in 1999, while Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania were invited to start membership talks in 2002. In
early 2003, Albania, Macedonia and Georgia were also hoping to begin the process towards
future membership, while Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan were active in NATO‟s
Partnership for Peace program, often a harbinger of future membership.55
Talks surrounding NATO membership were not taking place in a vacuum. Russia, the
impetus for these country‟s membership efforts, was bouncing back from its troubles of the
1990s. The 2000 election of Vladimir Putin, an ex-KGB officer, combined with Russia‟s
increasing economic strength from rising oil prices left the former Soviet Bloc countries and
Soviet Republics warily watching and all the more eager to solidify their security relationships
with the U.S. Thus, in early 2003, with Russia re-establishing itself as a strong regional power
and NATO membership talks still ongoing for several countries, the stage was set for the United
States to begin looking for allies to support its Iraq invasion. The following sections examine
each of the former Soviet Bloc countries or Soviet Republics and their unique motivations.
55
Wikipedia. “NATO.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO#Expansion_and_restructuring
28
Bulgaria
“Iraq refused to disarm as wanted by the international community, and hence chose to face the „serious
consequences‟... The weapons of mass destruction that Iraq possesses are a threat to peace and security...
The world community must counter this threat in a categorical manner.”
-- Prime Minister Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, March 19, 200356
In September 1944, Soviet troops entered Bulgaria, giving impetus to the defeat of the
Axis Powers in World War II.
Bulgaria soon became a Soviet-dominated satellite and
communism emerged as the dominant political force throughout the Cold War years. When
Soviet influence faded in the late 1980s, democratic change began when the first fully
democratic parliamentary elections were held in 1991. As Bulgaria emerged from its Sovietstyle centralized economy, it experienced a period of social and economic turmoil, culminating
in an economic and financial crisis in late 1996 through early 1997. However, with the help of
the international community, the government was able to initiate a series of reforms to help
stabilize the economy and maintain Bulgaria‟s integration path into Euro-Atlantic institutions.57
Although the U.S. and Bulgaria had some 100 years of diplomatic relations between
them, the relationship renewed itself after the fall of communism. With democratic governance
emerging, the U.S. moved quickly to encourage democracy and a market economy through a
bilateral investment treaty in 1994 and by giving Bulgaria most-favored-nation trade status in
October 1996. Bulgaria also received support from the Support for East European Democracies
Act (SEED), receiving over US$600 million.58
Trade between the two countries steadily
increased as the post-communism relationship solidified, with the U.S. importing close to
US$500 million in Bulgarian goods in 2003.59
56
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
57
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Bulgaria.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3236.htm
58
Ibid.
59
TradeStats Express. “Global Patterns of U.S. Merchandise Trade.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=zdh4qv45x2bunl31swyk2
h55-2008-8-18-11-2-25
29
Bulgarian leaders took great steps in the late 1990s, hoping for an increase in foreign
investment, trade and to accelerate their integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions. They sided
with NATO during the 1999 Kosovo crisis when NATO launched air strikes against their
western neighbor, Yugoslavia. With U.S. support they also began the process of applying for
NATO and EU membership. Following the September 11 attacks on the U.S., the government
took a key step toward NATO membership by contributing troops to the NATO contingent in
Afghanistan. When the U.S. asked for Bulgarian support for the Coalition of the Willing in
2003, Bulgarian leaders did not want to sacrifice the great strides they had taken over the last
decade toward their strategic foreign policy goals. However, weighing against their strategic
goals were up to 79 percent of the Bulgarian public who opposed the Iraq invasion.60 Despite the
public condemnation, Bulgarian decision makers chose to join the Coalition of the Willing.
Bulgaria granted Coalition forces use of their airspace and naval bases on the Black Sea,
which enabled refueling for U.S. warplanes. In addition, they deployed an initial 150 noncombat troops specializing in chemical and biological warfare decontamination.61 After the
invasion, they deployed some 400 soldiers to provide logistical support and guard duty. The
Bulgarians were well rewarded for their efforts. The Bush administration promised that post-war
Iraq government would repay US$1.7 billion owed to Bulgaria, dating back to the Cold War.
The U.S. signed a defense agreement with Bulgaria, providing for the development of up to four
joint U.S.-Bulgaria bases around the country.62,
63
Bulgaria was also rewarded with NATO
membership in March 2004 to be followed by EU membership in January 2007. Finally, the
U.S. promised to favor Bulgarian engineering and construction firms for Iraq reconstruction
60
Oja Jay, Dru. “A Coalition of the Willing?” Washington Post.
http://osdir.com/ml/politics.leftists.monkeyfist/2003-02/msg00009.html
61
Wikipedia. “2003 invasion of Iraq.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_invasion_of_Iraq#Multilateral_support
62
McClure, Laura. “Coalition of the billing – or unwilling.” Salon.com. March 12, 2003.
http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2003/03/12/foreign_aid/index2.html
63
Wikipedia. “Bulgaria.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgaria
30
contracts.64 Just in case, Bulgaria sent an official delegation to Bechtel‟s Washington office to
lobby for contracts.65
Czech Republic and Slovakia
“The Government of the Czech Republic states with regret that the Iraqi leadership has for so long been failing to
meet its obligations... The Government of the Czech Republic views the operation of coalition forces as the last
usable means leading to the fulfillment of the relevant UN resolutions..."
-- Statement by the Government of the Czech Republic, March 20, 2003
“In Iraq today one has to prevent further threats for mankind, to ensure more hope for peace and to terminate the
death cult at the stage when it can still be stopped.... Thus our government has been standing side by side with the
United States.”
-- Slovakia Prime Minister Dzurinda, March 20, 200366
Czechoslovakia was occupied by Soviet forces at the end of World War II, setting the
stage for Communist rule for the next 40 years. The waning of Soviet influence in the late
1980‟s coupled with the overwhelming disdain for the Communist Party ignited
Czechoslovakia‟s Velvet Revolution of 1989, a non-violent revolution that saw the overthrow of
the Communist government.67 A Slovakian desire for autonomy led to the dissolution of
Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1993 and the peaceful founding of the Czech Republic and
Slovakia.
Both states attained immediate recognition from the U.S. and their European
neighbors.
Since 1990, bilateral relations between the U.S. and the Czech Republic have prospered.
The U.S. has encouraged political and economic transformation in pursuing a democratic Czech
Republic while the Czech Republic has made integration into Western institutions a chief foreign
policy objective. The U.S. supported Czech accession to NATO in 1999 and has facilitated
increasing trade between the two countries, with the U.S. importing close to US$1.4 billion
64
McClure, Laura. “Coalition of the billing – or unwilling.” Salon.com. March 12, 2003.
http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2003/03/12/foreign_aid/index2.html
65
Becker, Elizabeth. “Companies From All Over Seek a Piece of Action Rebuilding Iraq.” New York Times. May
21, 2003. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/after/2003/0521companies.htm
66
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
67
Wikipedia. “Velvet Revolution.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Velvet_Revolution
31
worth of goods in 2003.68 In recent years, the Czech Republic has solidified its place in NATO
through participation in NATO-led Coalitions in Afghanistan and Kosovo and has been looking
to deepen its security relationship with the United States by hosting the radar tracking portion of
a U.S. missile defense system.69,
70
Meanwhile, in Slovakia, the election of a pro-Western,
reformist government in late 1998 boosted ties between the U.S. and Slovakia. After the
September 11, 2001 attack on the United States, Slovakia opened its airspace to U.S. military
planes on their way to Afghanistan. In June 2002, Slovakia announced that they would also send
an engineering brigade to Afghanistan in support of the NATO mission there. The U.S. has
facilitated Slovakian growth through extensive trade. Slovakian exports to the U.S. reached
US$1 billion in 2003, nearly 400 percent higher than the previous year.71 Additionally, the
United States has delivered more than US$200 million since the fall of communism in support of
democratic institutions and the development of a market economy. The U.S. Department of
Defense has also helped Slovakia progress toward NATO membership through programs that
have contributed to Slovak military reforms.72
When deciding whether or not to support the U.S. invasion in early 2003, Slovakia was
still working toward NATO membership while both Slovakia and the Czech Republic aspired
toward EU membership. Czech leaders also had to consider the prospect of hosting part of the
U.S. missile defense system. Although leaders from both countries faced significant public
opposition to the war, 67 percent in Czech Republic and 60 percent in Slovakia, in the end,
68
TradeStats Express. “Global Patterns of U.S. Merchandise Trade.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=zdh4qv45x2bunl31swyk2
h55-2008-8-18-11-2-25
69
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Czech Republic.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3237.htm
70
Wikipedia. “NATO.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO#Expansion_and_restructuring
71
TradeStats Express. “Global Patterns of U.S. Merchandise Trade.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=zdh4qv45x2bunl31swyk2
h55-2008-8-18-11-2-25
72
Wikipedia. “Slovakia-United States Relations.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slovakia-United_States_relations
32
security concerns won out.73 Slovakia joined the operation hoping to cement its future NATO
membership.
They opened their skies to U.S. flights, permitted U.S. military ground
transportation across the country and also deployed some 100 non-combat troops specializing in
chemical warfare decontamination to Kuwait.74,
75
Czech leaders also offered a measured
response. The Czech Republic would not take part in direct military operations; however, they
would assist the United States similarly to their eastern neighbor, providing basing and over
flight permission for all Coalition forces and sending up to 300 military personnel, mostly
doctors and nurses, to assist in non-combat roles such as nuclear-chemical-biological
decontamination and other emergency and humanitarian roles.76
The Czech and Slovak efforts did not go unrewarded. Slovakia achieved full NATO
membership in March 2004.77 Both became full members of the European Union on May 1,
2004.78 Finally, the Czech Republic, like many other Coalition partners, became involved in
intense lobbying efforts for Iraq reconstruction contracts.79
Hungary
“I am confident that peace will soon be reinstated in Iraq, the weapons of mass destruction will be destroyed and on
the basis of this we shall be able to live in a more peaceful and tranquil world in future. I would also like to add that
Hungary would be pleased to participate in the reconstruction of Iraq.”
-- Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy, March 20, 200380
73
Oja Jay, Dru. “A Coalition of the Willing?” Washington Post.
http://osdir.com/ml/politics.leftists.monkeyfist/2003-02/msg00009.html
74
Slovensko.com. “Slovakia Reacts to War in Iraq.” http://www.slovensko.com/news/326
75
OnlineAthens.com. “List of the „willing.‟” March 29, 2003.
http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/032903/war_20030329058.shtml
76
Jordantimes.com. “US Building a Motley Posse to Keep Peace in Iraq.”
http://www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2003/msg03367.html.
77
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Slovakia.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3430.htm
78
Ibid.
79
Becker, Elizabeth. “Companies From All Over Seek a Piece of Action Rebuilding Iraq.” New York Times. May
21, 2003. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/after/2003/0521companies.htm
80
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
33
Like its northern neighbor, Czechoslovakia, Hungary fell under Soviet-supported
Communist rule following World War II. When Soviet influence began to wane in the late
1980s, the United States offered assistance and expertise to help establish democratic governance
and a plan for a free market economy. Hungary capitalized on the subdued Soviet threat and,
with U.S. assistance, held its first multiparty elections in 1990. The U.S. continued to play a
large role throughout the early 1990s, providing Hungary with the expert and financial assistance
to develop modern Western institutions.81
Since embracing democracy, Hungary's top foreign policy goal was achieving integration
into Western organizations. To this end, Hungary joined NATO in 1999, with the support of the
United States.82 As their security situation stabilized relative to the old Soviet Union, their
economic growth blossomed. The U.S. had a large role to play here as well and by 2003,
emerged as one of Hungary‟s largest trading partners, importing close to US$2.7billion worth of
goods that year.83
The United States also contributed close to US$150 million in economic and
military aid between 2001 and 2003.84
Given the magnitude of U.S. support, especially on the security side, the Hungarian
government was faced with a significant dilemma in early 2003 as 82 percent of their population
was opposed to invading Iraq under any circumstances.85 The Hungarian answer was well
crafted. In March of 2003, while politically supporting the Coalition, they announced to the
public that they would not take part in military action against Iraq. Instead, they agreed to host a
81
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Hungary.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26566.htm
Wikipedia. “Hungary-United States Relations.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungary%E2%80%93United_States_relations
83
TradeStats Express. “Global Patterns of U.S. Merchandise Trade.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=zdh4qv45x2bunl31swyk2
h55-2008-8-18-11-2-25
84
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants. “Hungary.” http://qesdb.usaid.gov/cgi-bin/broker.exe
85
Oja Jay, Dru. “A Coalition of the Willing?” Washington Post.
http://osdir.com/ml/politics.leftists.monkeyfist/2003-02/msg00009.html
82
34
U.S. base where Iraqi exiles could be trained for post-war administrative roles. In addition,
Hungary sent 50 medical specialists to support the Coalition and provided equipment for the
Georgian military.86
In return, the U.S. supported Hungarian membership to the EU in 2004. Additionally,
Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy publicly offered his country‟s participation in the
reconstruction of Iraq, a move followed by an official Hungarian delegation sent to Bechtel‟s
Washington D.C. office to lobby for reconstruction contracts.87
Poland
“We are ready to use a Polish contingent in the international coalition to contribute to making Iraq comply with the
U.N. resolutions... It‟s clear that the problem of existing weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is a fact.”
-- President Kwasniewski, March 17, 200388
After World War II the Soviet Union installed a Communist government in Poland
similar to other governments it created in Soviet Bloc countries. This new Polish government
aligned itself with Soviet foreign policy and the Warsaw Pact throughout the Cold War.
However, as Soviet influence eroded in the 1980s, a democratically elected president came to
power in 1990. His election was quickly followed by other sectors of the government embracing
democratic reforms and a market economy.89 Despite their embrace of democracy and a market
economy the Poles maintained bitter memories of their Soviet occupiers and looked to the United
States to help with their security needs.
U.S.-Polish bilateral relations improved significantly as democratic reforms progressed in
Poland during the 1990s. Exceedingly aware of Russia‟s proximity to their eastern border, every
post-1989 Polish government has been a strong supporter of continued U.S. military and
86
OnlineAthens.com. “List of the „willing.‟” http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/032903/war_20030329058.shtml
Becker, Elizabeth. “Companies From All Over Seek a Piece of Action Rebuilding Iraq.” New York Times. May
21, 2003. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/after/2003/0521companies.htm
88
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
89
Wikipedia. “Poland.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poland#World_War_II
87
35
economic presence in Europe, and has been one of the staunchest allies of the United States.
After the U.S. supported Poland‟s NATO membership bid, achieved in 1999, Poland supported
U.S. operations in the Global War on Terror and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
Poland also supported U.S. foreign policy on issues such as democratization, nuclear
proliferation, human rights, regional cooperation in central and Eastern Europe, and UN
reform.90 Economically, the U.S. became a major Polish trading partner, importing over US$1.3
billion worth of goods in 2003.91
Given their geographic proximity to Russia and their strong strategic partnership with the
U.S., Poland‟s steadfast support of the U.S.-led Coalition is not surprising, despite 63 percent of
the public voicing their opposition to sending Polish troops to Iraq.92 However, Polish decision
makers had several variables to take account of that the general public remained unaware of.
First, the U.S. was offering Poland a US$3.8 billion dollar loan to purchase 48 Lockheed-Martin
F-16‟s with repayment terms of up to 15 years.93 Negotiations were also underway for the
purchase of some 450 new Humvees in a deal worth US$45 million, also with generous U.S.
financing. Additionally, the U.S. was courting Poland to host a portion of its missile defense
system. If agreed upon, the stationing of a U.S. missile defense system on Polish soil would
further deepen the security relationship and provide added economic benefits to Poland. Finally,
90
Wikipedia. “Poland-United States relations.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poland%E2%80%93United_States_relations
91
TradeStats Express. “Global Patterns of U.S. Merchandise Trade.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=zdh4qv45x2bunl31swyk2
h55-2008-8-18-11-2-25
92
Oja Jay, Dru. “A Coalition of the Willing?” Washington Post.
http://osdir.com/ml/politics.leftists.monkeyfist/2003-02/msg00009.html
93
Allen, Bob. “Assembling the Coalition of the Willing/The Invasion of Iraq is already underway.” Campaign to
End the Sanctions. http://www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2003/msg00086.html
36
like other Coalition member, the Polish leadership wanted a taste of the spoils – post-war
reconstruction and oil contracts.94
In March of 2003, the Polish government announced that it would participate in the
invasion of Iraq and contributed about 200 personnel. Poland also sent a special forces unit to
defend oil platforms against potential Iraqi sabotage, and 74 anti-chemical contamination
troops.95 Poland eventually contributed about 2,500 soldiers as part of a stabilization force,
although the U.S. airlifted the Poles to Iraq, built their camps and provided their equipment.96
Poland recognized immediate benefit from joining the Coalition. In September 2003, the
Polish national airline, LOT, was among several European carriers given rights to operate flights
to Iraq and the Polish Bank, Millennium, was one of a consortium of 13 banks chosen to run the
Iraqi Trade Bank. Additionally, the Poles had 116 suppliers and subcontracting firms registered
with Bechtel Corp., the U.S. contractor charged with rebuilding much of Iraq. Finally, in July
2003, more than 20 companies from Poland signed a memorandum of understanding with
Kellogg, Brown and Root, the construction subsidiary of the Houston-based oilfield services firm
Halliburton, to prepare contracts to rebuild the Iraqi oil industry.97
Romania
“We have already made a decision. The decision made by us is valid, it is in effect, we have responded to a demand
coming from the United States and this does not mean that we get involved in a military conflict but the assistance
which we grant to our allies.”
-- President Ion Iliescu, March 19, 200398
94
IslamOnline. “Poland Wants Slice of Iraqi Cake.” http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/200307/04/article08.shtml
95
Wikipedia. “Governments‟ positions pre-2003 invasion of Iraq.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governments%27_positions_pre-2003_invasion_of_Iraq
96
Krane, Jim. “Coalition partners ready for Bush to return the favor.” Associated Press. September 28, 2003.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030926-iraq2.htm
97
Ibid.
98
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
37
After the close of World War II, Soviet forces remained in Romania until 1958. During
this time they pressed for the inclusion of the Communist Party in Romania‟s post-war
government and facilitated the payment of massive war reparations by Romania, allied to the
Axis powers, to the Soviet Union. After the collapse of communism across Eastern Europe in
late 1989, country-wide protests led to an impromptu Romanian government, which promised
the restoration of democracy and freedom. The new government dissolved the Communist Party
and began the process of democratic and free market reforms. Since December 1989, Romania
has actively pursued a policy of strengthening relations with the West in general and specifically
with the U.S. and the European Union.99, 100
As Romania's policies became unequivocally pro-Western, the United States moved to
deepen relations with the former communist state. The two countries initiated cooperation on
many shared goals, including economic growth, political development and defense reform. For
Romania, this represented a major evolution, with decisive influence on the foreign and domestic
policy of the country. Romania was the first country to enroll in NATO‟s Partnership for Peace
program, a coordinated plan to help facilitate cooperation between individual partner countries
and NATO.
Based on Romania's rapid progress in modernizing its armed forces and its
contributions to allied peacekeeping and other military operations, NATO member states invited
Romania to join the Alliance in 2002. Romanian leaders saw NATO membership as a guarantee
of security, vital for ensuring the prosperous development of the country.101, 102 Also important
was the Romanian response following the September 11 attacks. Romania fully supported the
U.S. in the Global War on Terror by making its airspace, ground infrastructure and naval
99
Wikipedia. “Romania.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romania
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Romania.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35722.htm
101
Ibid.
102
Wikipedia. “Romania.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romania
100
38
facilities available to U.S. and NATO forces.103 The positive security relationship has facilitated
economic ties with the U.S. importing more than US$1.1 billion from Romania in 2003.104
Positive U.S.-Romanian relations and the pro-U.S. stance of the government trickled
down into public opinion more so than other traditionally pro-U.S. countries. When the U.S.
asked for Romanian support for the Iraq invasion, 45 percent of the population agreed with the
government‟s affirmative response.105 In the lead-up to the invasion, Romania allowed Coalition
forces access to their airspace, air and naval bases. They also provided some 700 non-combat
troops, specializing in chemical decontamination, medicine, engineering and military police
functions.106 With this level of participation, Romania won the rights to bid on Iraqi
reconstruction contracts.107 More importantly, their nation secured NATO membership in March
2004 and EU membership in January 2007.108
Azerbaijan
“Azerbaijan is an active participant in the US-led international anti-terror coalition in all its forms and
manifestations... Azerbaijan supports the efforts of the international coalition aimed at the speediest resolution of
the Iraqi crisis and calls for respect for the principles of international humanitarian law during the implementation
of the military operation in Iraq... Azerbaijan is expressing its readiness to take part in the humanitarian
rehabilitation in post-conflict Iraq…”
-- Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 21, 2003109
After nearly 70 years of Soviet rule, Azerbaijan regained its independence with the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The early years of independence were marred by conflict
103
Wikipedia. “Romania.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romania
TradeStats Express. “Global Patterns of U.S. Merchandise Trade.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=zdh4qv45x2bunl31swyk2
h55-2008-8-18-11-2-25
105
Oja Jay, Dru. “A Coalition of the Willing?” Washington Post.
http://osdir.com/ml/politics.leftists.monkeyfist/2003-02/msg00009.html
106
OnlineAthens. “List of the „willing.‟” March 29, 2003.
http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/032903/war_20030329058.shtml
107
Becker, Elizabeth. “Companies From All Over Seek a Piece of Action Rebuilding Iraq.” New York Times. May
21, 2003. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/after/2003/0521companies.htm
108
Wikipedia. “Romania.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romania
109
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
104
39
with their western neighbor, Armenia, over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. Previously limited
Azerbaijani-U.S. relations developed as the United States took a leading role in facilitating a
peaceful, negotiated resolution to the conflict. In the United States, Azerbaijan saw a partner who
could help enable several of its foreign policy goals: the promotion of security and stability in the
region, integration into European and Transatlantic security and cooperation structures, and the
promotion of trans-regional economic, energy and transportation projects. These were also U.S.
goals for Azerbaijan and the region.110, 111
The U.S. worked to help its new partner both economically and militarily. In 1995, the
two countries signed a bilateral trade agreement and the U.S. conferred upon Azerbaijan the
status of most favored nation and began investing in Azerbaijani‟s oil sector.112 The U.S. also
addressed Azerbaijani security and stability concerns. Beginning in 1997, the United States
supported Azerbaijan‟s involvement in NATO‟s Partnership for Peace program through which
Azerbaijan was able to significantly enhance its military capabilities.113 Azerbaijan utilized their
newly trained forces in support of NATO peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and
Afghanistan.114
Given the recent economic and military support from the U.S., decision makers in Baku
took several variables into account when debating their decision to join the Coalition of the
Willing. First, there was a debt of gratitude owed toward the U.S. for the role they played in
brokering the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Second, a Coalition of Western oil
companies was building a US$4 billion pipeline from Baku to Turkey's Mediterranean port of
Ceyhan. The economic impact of this project was significant and decision makers did not want
110
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Azerbaijan.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2909.htm
Wikipedia. “Azerbaijan.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azerbijan
112
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Azerbaijan.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2909.htm
113
NATO. “The Partnership for Peace.” http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html
114
NATO. “NATO‟s relations with Azerbaijan.” http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-azerbaijan/practice.html
111
40
to run the risk of losing a significant source of future revenues.115 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, Azerbaijan needed U.S. support if Russia ever aspired to take back the former
Soviet republic. With these inescapable realities, Azerbaijani authorities made the only decision
they could. They did, however, minimize their political cost by declining to provide troops for
the invasion and limiting their participation to post-war humanitarian efforts.116 The U.S., in
turn, continued economic and military aid programs in Azerbaijan, totaling some US$270
million between 2003 and 2006.117
More importantly, the Baku to Ceyhan pipeline was
completed in May 2005, producing up to 1 million barrels of oil per day.118
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
"We understand the need for disarming Iraq. The world needs to be convinced that there are no
weapons of mass destruction on Iraqi territory. This is important for world security. It is deeply regrettable that
Iraq did not make use of the opportunity, which existed, to solve the problem peacefully... Estonia is ready, based
upon the needs of the situation and its own capabilities, to help regulate the post-conflict situation and participate in
the reconstruction of Iraq."
-- Statement by the Government of Estonia, March 20, 2003
“The Parliament of the Republic of Latvia has taken the decision „On the Support of the Implementation of the UN
Security Council Resolution Nr 1441‟ pledging support to and readiness to join the efforts of the international
coalition aiming at disarmament of Iraq. We support the military forces of our coalition partners who, in risking
their lives, are averting threats to peace and international security.”
-- Statement of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 20, 2003
"Lithuania's possible contribution to the settlement of the Iraq crisis will be not military but humanitarian
participation, aimed at dealing with adverse consequences, by sending doctors, servicing staff and other specialists,
as well as by participating in international programs aimed at helping the Iraqi people, including food aid."
-- Lithuanian President Rolandas Paksas, Letter to President George Bush, March 19, 2003119
The World War II years were costly for the Baltics in both blood and autonomy.
Between 1940 and 1944, Lithuania alone reportedly lost over 780,000 residents while after the
war Soviet authorities organized mass deportations of Baltic nationals and the immigration of
115
CIA World Factbook. “Azerbaijan.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/aj.html
OnlineAthens. “List of the „willing.‟” http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/032903/war_20030329058.shtml
117
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants. “Azerbaijan.” http://qesdb.usaid.gov/cgi-bin/broker.exe
118
Wikipedia. “Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baku-TbilisiCeyhan_pipeline#Cost_and_financing
119
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
116
41
Russians as the three countries were socially and economically re-organized to support Soviet
goals. These experiences were not forgotten by the Baltic people. When Soviet influence began
to fade in the early 1990s, all three countries declared independence in an effort to escape the
Soviet yolk. Lithuania was the first Soviet republic to do so, in March 1990, followed by Estonia
in August 1991 and the Latvians a month later. The United States assisted in this process,
helping to negotiate the departure of the last Red Army troops in August 1994.120, 121, 122
Baltic States quickly moved away from the political and economic structures that the
Soviets had established. In doing so they pursued a foreign policy which aligned with their
Western European neighbors, while seeking NATO and EU membership. As the United States
was crucial in securing both of these goals, the Baltic countries did everything in their power to
facilitate positive bilateral relations. Latvia became one of the largest contributors, per capita, to
international military operations, including troop deployments to Afghanistan and the Balkans.
Lithuania also proved to be a staunch U.S. ally in the War on Terror by contributing to military
operations in Afghanistan. All three Baltic States were also strong supporters of the promotion
of democracy, providing developmental assistance and advice to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.
In turn, the U.S. supported the Baltic States in their NATO and EU membership goals, while
facilitating trade with and investment in each country.123, 124, 125
The Baltic States choose to support the U.S. war in Iraq for obvious strategic reasons.
They desired NATO membership to ensure protection from Russia.
The desire for this
protection was so great that they supported the U.S.-led invasion despite 70 percent of the
120
Wikipedia. “Lithuania.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithuania
Wikipedia. “Latvia.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latvia
122
Wikipedia. “Estonia.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonia
123
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Lithuania.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5379.htm
124
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Estonia.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5377.htm
125
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Latvia.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5378.htm
121
42
population opposing the war in Estonia and 74 percent in Latvia.126
The three countries
attempted to marginalize the political fallout from their decision by limiting their support to
opening up their airspace and deploying a combined 250 soldiers to Iraq, chiefly doctors and
logistical personnel.127 They also offered to help with Iraq‟s post-war reconstruction.128 For
these provisions, all three achieved NATO membership in March 2004 promptly followed by EU
membership in May of the same year.
Georgia
“Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction. As long as such a regime exists, the world cannot live in
peace.”
-- President Eduard Shevardnadze, March 20, 2003129
Georgia emerged from Soviet rule on April 9, 1991. Independence, however, instigated
several years of ethnic and civil unrest that was compounded by economic difficulties. The
country slowly began to stabilize by the mid-1990s, although low-level ethnic unrest continued
in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. With U.S. assistance, democratic, economic and
security reforms began to take effect in the late 1990s.130, 131
U.S.-Georgia relations flourished during this reform period. The U.S. continued to be a
prime Georgian benefactor into the 21st century, contributing close to US$500 million in the
years 2001 to 2003 in economic and military aid, hoping to promote stability and ensure the
success of the soon to be built Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
132, 133
Georgia, in turn, became a
staunch U.S. ally. Georgia's decision to join the U.S.-led Coalition was widely seen as a bid to
126
Oja Jay, Dru. “A Coalition of the Willing?” Washington Post.
http://osdir.com/ml/politics.leftists.monkeyfist/2003-02/msg00009.html
127
U.S. Department of State. “Patterns of Global Terrorism.” http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2003/
128
OnlineAthens. “List of the „willing.‟” http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/032903/war_20030329058.shtml
129
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
130
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Georgia.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5253.htm
131
Wikipedia. “Georgia.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia_(country)
132
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants. “Georgia.” http://qesdb.usaid.gov/cgi-bin/broker.exe
133
Wikipedia. “Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan_pipeline
43
improve Georgia's standing with the United States and pave the way for eventual NATO
membership. Georgia Defense Minister David Kezerashvili said, "If we seriously want to
become members of the alliance [NATO], naturally we have to assume partial responsibility and
operate like the alliance members do."134
Initial Georgian support for the Coalition of the Willing was relatively limited, including
political backing, access to its airspace and use of its military bases. 135 However, Georgian
support increased as the conflict in Iraq continued, largely due to U.S. training and logistical
support. Their support was rewarded in 2005 with a five-year U.S. assistance package worth
close to US$300 million to help promote security and counter-terrorism projects.136 The U.S.
also became a strong supporter in Georgia‟s NATO membership bid. Although Georgia has not
yet been invited to begin the membership process, NATO members assured Georgia that they
will eventually become a member. Russia‟s invasion of Georgia in August 2008 promises to
make Georgia‟s NATO aspirations a noteworthy geo-political event in the years to come.
Ukraine
“We are against war as a means of solving international problems and we believe everything should be done to
avoid large casualties among civilians and the military on both sides. But in my opinion, we should not forget about
the actions of Saddam Hussein. By his aggressive policies and ambition to possess weapons of mass destruction he
has called this great tragedy upon his people.”
-- President Leonid Kuchma, March 26, 2003137
Ukraine achieved its independence in August 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR.
Although Ukraine was thought to have emerged from the Soviet-style economy with favorable
economic conditions relative to the other new independent states, the transition to a market
economy was a difficult one, triggering an eight year recession. This economic slowdown was
134
Liklikkadze, Koba. “Iraq: As Third-Largest Contingent, Georgia Hopes To Show Its Worth.” Radio Free Europe.
September 10, 2007. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1078614.html
135
ProCon.org. “Coalition Forces in Iraq.” http://usiraq.procon.org/viewresource.asp?resourceID=677
136
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Georgia.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5253.htm
137
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
44
compounded by a legacy of state controlled industry and endemic corruption.138 It was not until
1999 that the economic reforms and privatization of the early 1990s resulted in economic
growth.
The United States worked closely with the Ukrainian government to assist them during
their delicate transition period.
With the second largest military in Europe after Russia,
Ukraine‟s successful transition to a democratic state and market economy represented a key
foreign policy goal for the U.S. In pursuit of this goal, the United States provided more than
US$3 billion to help promote political, security and economic reforms in Ukraine. The U.S.
would also work to promote Ukrainian integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO
and the EU.
139,140
Among Ukraine‟s Western-oriented leaders, there was the shared perception
that NATO membership would help modernize the country‟s armed forces and provide the added
economic benefits of increased foreign direct investment and growth in Ukraine‟s arms exports.
More importantly, they felt NATO membership would guarantee Ukraine‟s independence
against a potentially resurgent Russia. To this end, Ukraine pursued close cooperation with
NATO and became an active member of the NATO-sponsored Partnership for Peace program.141
Ukraine was forced to walk a fine line in early 2003 concerning Iraq. They were
balancing a need to appease a resurgent Russia (who opposed the invasion), from whom they
imported nearly 75 percent of their oil and gas, against a need to maintain positive relations with
the U.S., their primary NATO sponsor and economic bastion. The need to maintain positive
relations with the United States won out. Ukraine sent chemical and nuclear decontamination
experts to the region during the initial invasion, followed by 1,800 peacekeeping soldiers in
138
CIA World Factbook. “Ukraine.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html
Wikipedia. “Ukraine-United States Relations.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine-United_States_relations
140
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Ukraine.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3237.htm
141
Ibid.
139
45
August 2003.142 In return for their commitment in Iraq, the United States sent close to US$600
million in economic and military assistance to the country between 2003 and 2006. In addition,
Ukrainian exports to the U.S. increased almost 600 percent between 2003 and 2006.143 Finally,
in 2008, Ukraine received a commitment by NATO that they would eventually become a
member.144
Uzbekistan
"We unambiguously support the position of the United States to resolve the Iraqi problem... If this genie is let out of
the bottle, it won't be possible to put it back. It's necessary to take the most coordinated measures to make sure that
the genie isn't out of the bottle....The global community has no right to play with this situation for the sake of its
future. I believe the U.S. has grounds for the stance it has assumed, and therefore radical measures need to be
taken."
-- President Islam Karimov, March 7, 2003145
Like many other of the Soviet Republics, Uzbekistan seized the moment with the collapse
of the Soviet Union to declare its independence in September 1991. In the country‟s first
elections, Islam Karimov, former First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek SSR
Communist Party, was elected to a five-year presidential term, winning 88 percent of the vote.
Karimov managed to stay in power through the next two decades through what many have
described as less than fair means. Partly as a result of this perception and partly as a result of the
suppression of human rights and basic freedoms, a low-level insurgency began in the late 1990s.
The insurgency, led by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), would launch small scale
raids from across the border in Afghanistan. The IMU eventually allied itself with Afghanistan‟s
142
Jordantimes.com. “US Building a Motley Posse to Keep Peace in Iraq.”
http://www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2003/msg03367.html.
143
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants. “Ukraine.” http://qesdb.usaid.gov/cgi-bin/broker.exe
144
NATO. “Evolution of NATO-Ukraine Relations.” http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/evolution.html
145
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
46
ruling party, the Taliban, in the summer of 2001, supporting the Taliban in the battle against U.S.
and Coalition forces who invaded Afghanistan in November 2001.146
Although they certainly shared a common enemy in 2001, the U.S. had already taken
steps to develop a relationship with the Uzbek government. Beginning in the late 1990s, the
United States began to develop Uzbek security forces, seeing Uzbekistan as a potentially
stabilizing force in the region, if not a truly democratic one. In the three years before the Iraq
invasion, U.S. economic and military aid to Uzbekistan exceeded US$600 million. These seeds
began to bare fruit after the September 11 attacks, as Uzbekistan became an active supporter of
U.S. efforts against worldwide terrorism and joined the Coalition combating terrorism in
Afghanistan. The most important aspect of this support was a status of forces agreement (SOFA)
between Uzbekistan and the U.S., which provided for the use of Uzbek airspace and up to 1,500
U.S. troops to use a Soviet-era airbase (termed Karshi-Khanabad or K2) 90 miles north of the
Afghan border. In exchange, the United States provided security guarantees and agreed that
terrorists belonging to the IMU would also be targeted in the Afghan campaign.147
Taken in this context, the Uzbek decision to support the U.S. in the Coalition of the
Willing was largely pragmatic and was probably made by Karimov directly with input from a
limited number of close advisors. The variables held under consideration provided a relatively
easy choice. For their political support of the Iraq invasion, the U.S. would continue to lease K2,
continue to provide economic and military assistance and continue targeting IMU members in
Afghanistan.148
146
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Uzbekistan.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2924.htm
Nichol, Jim. “Uzbekistan‟s Closure of the Airbase at Karshi-Khanabad: Context and Implications.” Congressional
Research Service. http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/data/2005/meta-crs-7519.tkl
148
Iraqtimeline.com. “This Far and No Further.” http://www.iraqtimeline.com/mar03/mar03week1.html
147
47
This mutually beneficial relationship continued until 2004, when the U.S. soured
relations by, first, supporting the democratically inspired “color revolutions” across central Asia
and then calling for an independent investigation into the government‟s violent suppression of
protestors in the Uzbek city of Andijan. These two events led Karimov to align Uzbekistan‟s
foreign policy more closely with Russia and China, withdraw support for the U.S.-led Coalition
in Iraq and order the U.S. to vacate K2 in July 2005.149
149
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Uzbekistan.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2924.htm
48
CHAPTER TWO: United States Military Aid
The 13 countries discussed in chapter one joined the U.S.-led coalition of the willing
primarily out of a desire to be included in NATO or its security umbrella. The catalyst behind
their motivation was a resurgent Russia. The 13 countries discussed in chapter two are similar in
that they faced security concerns. Some (Albania, Macedonia, Colombia, the Philippines and
Afghanistan) needed U.S. support to maintain or establish domestic security. Others (Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda) coveted U.S. aid in order to gain an upper hand in simmering
regional conflicts, while still others (Iceland and Portugal) simply did not want to lose the
security and economic benefits afforded by hosting U.S. bases. Those countries that did face
external threats could not risk an unsuccessful invasion of Iraq (Kuwait) or risk facing a
militarily stronger neighbor without U.S. support (South Korea). The following chapter will
analyze each of the 13 countries in turn, with the goal of understanding their unique foreign
policy goals and motivations for joining the Coalition of the Willing.
Albania
“We give unreserved support to the efforts by the United States and we are proud to be alongside our allies in the
fight for liberation of Iraqi people…”
-- Albanian Prime Minister Nano, March 20, 2003150
Albania allied with the USSR after World War II, but broke with the Warsaw Pact in
1968, while remaining committed to communism. However, when communist governments
began to fall in the early 1990s, Albanians would also choose to embrace democracy, holding
their first democratic elections in 1992. In subsequent years, the country sought closer ties with
the West in order to overcome its historical isolation, underdevelopment and improve economic
150
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
49
conditions.
Like the Soviet Bloc countries, integration in the Euro-Atlantic security and
economic communities through NATO and EU membership became the ultimate goal.151
Since 1991, the U.S. worked to facilitate Albania‟s integration goals by providing more
than US$616 million in economic and military assistance. With a defense budget of only US$56
million in 2002, this aid was instrumental.152
Not surprisingly, pro-U.S. sentiment was
widespread among the general population as Albanians also remembered how U.S. President
Woodrow Wilson had protected Albanian independence after World War I. They also credited
the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 with saving thousands of Kosovar-Albanian lives, and
appreciated the U.S. Government's commitment to resolving the status of Kosovo. Sentiment
was so high that Albanian Ambassador Satos Tarisa said, “We‟re the most pro-U.S. nation in
Europe.” 153
As Albania was already supporting U.S. counter-terrorism efforts by freezing terrorist
assets, shutting down non-governmental organizations with possible links to terrorist financing,
expelling extremists, and providing military and diplomatic support for U.S.-led action in
Afghanistan, their decision to join the Coalition was not surprising. With the U.S. voicing strong
support for Albania‟s integration into the EU and NATO, Albanian support for the invasion of
Iraq was almost certain.154
The Albanian government offered the U.S. use of its airspace, land and ports.155 They
also sent some 70 troops to the northern Iraqi city of Mosul to undertake convoy escort duties,
151
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Albania.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3235.htm
Newnham, Dr. Randall E. “‟Coalition of the Bribed and Bullied?‟ U.S. Economic Linkage and the Iraq War
Coalition.” Paper presented at the 47 th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association San Diego, CA,
March 2006.
153
Graham, Bradley and Robin Wright. “U.S. Works to Sustain Iraq Coalition.” Washington Post. July 15, 2004.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A50417-2004Jul14.html
154
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Albania.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3235.htm
155
OnlineAthens. “List of the „willing‟.” http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/032903/war_20030329058.shtml
152
50
man checkpoints, patrol the city, and support the Iraqi Police in maintaining public order.156 For
this level of support, the Albanian government was well rewarded. In exchange for sending
troops, the country landed US$3 million in U.S. military aid. Washington also covered the costs
of the Albanian deployment. Most importantly, NATO extended Albania formal membership in
April 2008.157
Macedonia
“As a peace-loving member of the community of democratic nations, Macedonia did not want this war, but the
regime of Hussein, despite the commitment of the international community did not leave any option but to be
disarmed by force... I would like to take this opportunity to express the support of Macedonia, to the troops of the
United States, the United Kingdom and other coalition forces who have put themselves in harm in order to
accomplish the crucial task of disarming the regime of Saddam Hussein and bringing democracy to the longoppressed people of Iraq.”
-- President Trajkovski, March 20, 2003158
A republic within Yugoslavia for much of the 20th century, Macedonia declared its
independence from Yugoslavia in late 1991. Macedonia was the only republic of the former
Yugoslavia whose secession was not clouded by armed conflict and Macedonia remained at
peace through the Yugoslav wars of the early 1990s. Although not at war, the conflict in
neighboring Kosovo brought an estimated 360,000 ethnic Albanian refugees into the country in
1999. The refugees largely returned to Kosovo after the war, however, their presence dredged up
the grievances of Macedonia‟s own minority ethnic Albanians over their ability to participate in
Macedonian government. Mounting tensions erupted into an open insurgency in February 2001.
The insurgency spread through northern and western Macedonia during the first half of 2001
until NATO intervened to facilitate an agreement whereby the Macedonian government agreed
to provide greater political power and cultural recognition to the Albanian minority.
156
Centcom.mil. “International Contributions to the War on Terror.” http://www.centcom.mil/
Krane, Jim. “Coalition partners ready for Bush to return the favor.” Associated Press. September 28, 2003.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030926-iraq2.htm
158
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
157
51
The 2001 ethnic Albanian insurgency had dire economic consequences. The decrease in
international demand for Macedonian products and canceled contracts in the textile, iron and
steel industries had significant impact on an already struggling economy. Prior to the 2001
uprising, successive Macedonian governments viewed integration into Euro-Atlantic political,
economic, and security institutions as the country's primary foreign policy goal. The Albanian
uprising acted to reinforce the need for greater integration into these institutions and catalyzed
Macedonian efforts in this endeavor. In pursuit of these goals, the Macedonian Government
would look to increase its cooperation with the United States.
The United States and Macedonia enjoyed strong bilateral relations since Macedonia
gained its independence in 1991, with the U.S. supporting Macedonia's full integration into
Euro-Atlantic institutions. The United States also supported Macedonia's progress in democratic,
economic and defense reforms with foreign assistance, totaling over US$440 million from 1990
to 2008. In turn, Macedonia supported U.S. and NATO efforts in Kosovo and contributed troops
to the NATO mission in Afghanistan.159, 160
In early 2003, when the U.S. asked for Macedonian support for the Coalition of the
Willing, Macedonian leaders had one thing on their mind – NATO. Although they had been
supporting NATO missions, their membership was not secure. New NATO members had to be
admitted unanimously by existing members and one current member, Greece, indicated they
would veto Macedonia‟s membership bid. Greece objected to the name Macedonia (also the
name of a northern Greek region), indicating the name implied a territorial claim on the Greek
region. Macedonia denied the accusation, but knew they needed U.S. support to trump the Greek
objection. Recognizing the strategic importance of NATO membership and the U.S. capacity to
159
160
Wikipedia. “Republic of Macedonia.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Macedonia
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Macedonia.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26759.htm
52
influence this, the Macedonian government joined the Coalition despite the opposition of 90
percent of its population.161 They opened the use of their airspace and contributed some 35
troops to post-invasion peacekeeping duties. Their reward came in April 2008 with a conditional
invitation to join NATO, predicated on their resolving their naming issue with Greece.162
Eritrea and Ethiopia
“The decision taken by the Bush Administration to complete an unfinished job is very much welcome... The task is
indeed one of completing an unfinished job for the sake of the stability and security of the Middle East and the
permanent removal of a serious threat without losing another opportunity. In this vein, Eritrea continues to
maintain that the necessary measures must be taken without equivocation.”
-- Statement by the Government of Eritrea, March 12, 2003163
Eritrea and Ethiopia are not cordial neighbors. Their mutual animosity began to develop
in 1952 when Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia under a UN mandate, despite Eritrean calls for
independence.164 Continued unrest in Eritrea over its federation with Ethiopia led Ethiopia to
annex Eritrea as its 14th province in 1962. The annexation fomented further unrest, eventually
igniting a civil war that lasted for 31 years. Although Eritrea achieved international recognition
for its independence in 1993, tensions between the neighbors remained high.165 Conflict erupted
again in 1998 over Badme, a contested border town. A peace agreement ended hostilities in
December 2000, albeit after 100,000 lives were lost. Part of the agreement included a provision
for an independent commission to establish a final and binding border demarcation. Although
the commission presented its decision in April 2002, neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea has taken steps
to demarcate the border, leaving the dispute ongoing.166, 167
161
Oja Jay, Dru. “A Coalition of the Willing?” Washington Post.
http://osdir.com/ml/politics.leftists.monkeyfist/2003-02/msg00009.html
162
Makfaxonline. “Over 85% of Macedonia‟s populations supports NATO entry.”
http://www.makfax.com.mk/look/novina/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=2&NrArticle=125334&NrIssue=
769&NrSection=10
163
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
164
Wikipedia. “Ethiopia.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopia
165
Wikipedia. “Eritrea.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eritrea
166
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Ethiopia.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2859.htm
53
The border dispute, or rather resolution of the border dispute in their respective favor,
was the primary motivating factor for each country to support the U.S.-led Coalition of the
Willing.
Journalist Alan Perrott wrote, “Neighboring African states Ethiopia and Eritrea
reportedly raced each other to the dotted line [joining the Coalition] in anticipation of getting a
helping hand in their border dispute."168 Although the border dispute was important, both
countries did have other motivations for joining the Coalition. Eritrea was trying to position
itself as a prime location for a U.S. military base. Ethiopia, already a strategic partner of the U.S.
in the Global War on Terrorism, was working to maintain positive relations with the U.S. and
enable the continuation of economic and military aid valued at some US$2.3 billion between
1991 and 2003.169
In the end, support for the U.S. war in Iraq by Eritrea or Ethiopia was certainly
not due to any overlap of their respective countries‟ policies with the U.S. towards the Hussein
regime. They were looking for U.S. support against each other and for their own economic and
security concerns. Public statements of support for the U.S.-led Coalition entailed the extent of
their involvement.
Rwanda and Uganda
“They should act when they are right to act because the Security Council can be wrong. It was wrong in Rwanda...
You might avoid war and have a worse situation... That is why I was giving a comparison with our case. People
avoided a war or doing very much and it ended up with a genocide.”
-- President Paul Kagame, March 8, 2003
"The cabinet sitting under the chairmanship of HE Yoweri Museveni, the president of Uganda, on 21 March 2003,
decided to support the US-led coalition to disarm Iraq by force. The cabinet also decided that if need arises,
Uganda will assist in any way possible."
-- Minister of Foreign Affairs James Wapakhabulo, March 24, 2003170
167
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Eritrea.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2854.htm
SourceWatch. “Coalition of the Willing.” http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Coalition_of_the_Willing
169
Wikipedia. “Ethiopia-United States Relations.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopia%E2%80%93United_States_relations
170
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
168
54
Rwanda and Uganda share similar concerns as neighbors in a very volatile central
African region. Rwanda‟s recent history is defined by the genocide perpetrated by ethnic Hutus
against ethnic Tutsis between April and July 1994, which resulted in over 800,000 deaths and
some three million displaced. The international community, largely silent during the actual
genocide, responded afterwards with one of the largest humanitarian relief efforts ever mounted.
The United States was one of the largest contributors in this effort. In the years after the
genocide, U.S. support switched from strictly humanitarian concern to one focused on security
and sustainable development.171 In support of these efforts, U.S. financial aid totaled close to
US$50 million in 2002.172 Due to these labors, Rwanda has become one of the United States‟
principal allies in Africa.173
Relations between Uganda and the United States took a positive turn in 1986 with the
Ugandan election of Yoweri Museveni as President. Unlike his predecessors, Museveni began to
take the necessary steps to end human rights abuses and pursue economic reforms.
His
government also became a strong supporter of the U.S. Global War on Terrorism. In return for
Museveni‟s reforms and support, the U.S. government provided economic and military
assistance totaling near US$100 million per year in 2001 and 2002 in support of these reforms, in
addition to U.S.-led programs to fight the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Uganda.174, 175
Upon agreeing to provide political support for the Coalition in 2003, Rwandan and
Uganda leaders realized rapid economic returns. In Rwanda, economic and military aid from the
171
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Rwanda.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.htm
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants. “Rwanda.” http://qesdb.usaid.gov/cgibin/broker.exe?_program=gbkprogs.country_list.sas&_service=default&unit=N
173
AFROL. “Eritrea markets role in “Coalition of the Willing.” http://www.afrol.com/articles/12766
174
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Uganda.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2963.htm
175
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants. “Uganda.” http://qesdb.usaid.gov/cgibin/broker.exe?_program=gbkprogs.country_list.sas&_service=default&unit=N
172
55
U.S. increased by 200 percent between 2002 and 2006.176 While Rwanda continued to receive
substantial international aid, they also obtained IMF-World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Country
(HIPC) initiative debt relief in 2005-06.177 Militarily, the U.S. trained about 7,000 Rwandan
troops and spent more than US$17 million dollars to equip and transport the newly trained
soldiers to Darfur to act as peacekeepers.178
In Uganda, U.S. economic and military aid
increased nearly 300 percent between 2002 and 2006.
179
In addition, Uganda companies were
named as subcontractors for security forces in Iraq. Not a bad return for the investment of
political support.
Colombia
“We are part of the coalition, along with countries such as the U.S., Spain, England... Many of these peoples, such
as Colombians, have withstood terrorism and, like us, they know that this scourge -- terrorism -- must be made to
end so that we can live peacefully... Fellow countrymen: To request solidarity, we have to express solidarity.”
-- President Uribe, March 20, 2003180
Colombia has had a constitutional government dating back over 160 years, however,
tensions between the two primary political factions have often resulted in violence. These
tensions have led to an almost continuous state of conflict since the 1960s. Fuelled by the
cocaine trade, the conflict saw a dramatic escalation in the 1990s. In 1998 and 1999, Colombian
President Andrés Pastrana took steps to stem this violence, beginning to implement what was
dubbed the Plan Colombia initiative, known in the U.S. as the „war on drugs.‟ The plan had the
dual goals of ending the domestic conflict and promoting a strong anti-narcotic strategy, thus
176
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants. “Rwanda.” http://qesdb.usaid.gov/cgibin/broker.exe?_program=gbkprogs.country_list.sas&_service=default&unit=N
177
CIA World Factbook. “Rwanda.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html
178
Taylor, Darren. “Top Editor says Rwanda Grateful for US aid.” VOA. February 19, 2008.
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-02/Top-Editor-says-Rwanda-Grateful-for-USAid.cfm?CFID=49141203&CFTOKEN=60862437
179
Ibid.
180
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
56
enabling social and economic revitalization. The primary funding for Plan Colombia came from
the United States, the primary market for Colombian cocaine.181, 182
Colombia and the United States have historically shared good relations, however, it was
not until 9/11 and the blurring of the line between counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism efforts
that the relationship evolved to its present form. Prior to 9/11, the U.S. provided intelligence,
military and economic aid to the Colombian government in support of Plan Colombia. The 9/11
attacks changed the paradigm for the U.S.-Colombian relationship. In July 2002, the U.S.
Congress passed a bill that lifted a previous provision limiting U.S. assistance to counternarcotics efforts and enabled U.S. supplied training and equipment to be used in both counternarcotics and counter-terrorism. In November of the same year, the U.S. began sending advisors
to Colombia under a US$94 million counterinsurgency program to protect hundreds of miles of
oil pipeline. 183, 184
Colombian decision makers looked at several variables when considering the impact of
supporting the U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing. The U.S. was providing military training and
equipment for both the Colombian military and police. U.S. economic and military aid to
Colombia was estimated at close to US$900 million between 2001 and 2002.185 Beyond security
matters, the U.S. was also an important market for Colombian goods; exports to the U.S. totaled
US$5.6 billion in 2002.186 Given the importance of U.S. dollars for both their national security
and economic prosperity, not supporting the U.S.-led Coalition was most likely not an option.
181
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Colombia.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm
Wikipedia. “Colombia.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colombia
183
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Colombia.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm
184
Wikipedia. “Colombia.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colombia
185
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants. “Colombia.” http://qesdb.usaid.gov/cgibin/broker.exe?_program=gbkprogs.country_list.sas&_service=default&unit=N
186
TradeStats Express. “Global Patterns of U.S. Merchandise Trade.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=zdh4qv45x2bunl31swyk2
h55-2008-8-18-11-2-25
182
57
For their political support, the Colombian government was well rewarded. Total U.S.
economic and military assistance between 2003 and 2006 reached some US$3.6 billion.187
Through the increased U.S.-supported Colombian focus on security, attacks conducted by
illegally armed groups against rural towns decreased by 91 percent between 2002 and 2005.
Between 2002 and 2007, Colombia also saw a decrease in homicides by 37 percent, terrorist
attacks by 63 percent, and attacks on the country's infrastructure by 60 percent. 188 Improved
domestic security conditions helped foster improved economic conditions. Exports to the U.S.
increased by almost 200 percent between 2002 and 2007, reaching US$9.4 billion.189 The U.S.
has become the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Colombia particularly in the
areas of coal and petroleum, with total U.S. FDI tripling since 2002. 190 The icing on the cake is
an impending free trade agreement between the two countries, still awaiting U.S. Congressional
approval.
Philippines
“The Philippines is part of the coalition of the willing... We are giving political and moral support for actions to rid
Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. We are part of a long-standing security alliance. We are part of the global
coalition against terrorism.”
-- President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, March 19, 2003191
As a result of the Treaty of Paris, which ended the Spanish-American War in 1898, the
United States took control of the Philippines from Spain. Since that time, the U.S. has retained
some form of military presence in the Philippines and Filipinos have fought alongside U.S.
187
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants. “Colombia.” http://qesdb.usaid.gov/cgibin/broker.exe?_program=gbkprogs.country_list.sas&_service=default&unit=N
188
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Colombia.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm
189
TradeStats Express. “Global Patterns of U.S. Merchandise Trade.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=zdh4qv45x2bunl31swyk2
h55-2008-8-18-11-2-25
190
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Colombia.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm
191
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
58
troops in World War I and World War II. After achieving independence in 1946, Filipinos
continued to fight alongside U.S. forces in Korea and Vietnam.192
In recent years, the Philippines has considered the U.S. its closest economic, military and
political ally. Therefore, its foreign policy largely reflects that of the United States. Following
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the Philippines was quick to join in
the global war on terrorism, as it faced threats from at least three groups on the U.S.
Government‟s Foreign Terrorist Organization list. As allies in the War on Terror, the two
countries share intelligence and engage in joint military exercises.193 In support of these efforts,
the U.S. provided the Philippines with over US$360 million in 2001 and 2002.194
When confronted with the decision to join the U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing in early
2003, the Filipino government faced several realities.
First, they needed continued U.S.
economic and military support to secure their borders and combat terrorist groups operating in
the southern Philippines.195 They also hoped to encourage the U.S. to build a military base in the
Philippines, which would augment the country‟s security and provide economic benefits.196
Additionally, the government did not want to risk disruption of the near US$10 billion in
remittances it received annually, largely from Filipinos in the U.S. Finally, Filipino President
Gloria Arroyo hoped Coalition membership would win the Philippines a “first crack at the
development efforts.”197
192
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Philippines.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2794.htm
Wikipedia. “Philippines-United States Relations.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_the_Philippines
194
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants. “Philippines.” http://qesdb.usaid.gov/cgibin/broker.exe?_program=gbkprogs.country_list.sas&_service=default&unit=N
195
Iraqtimeline. “This Far and No Further.” http://www.iraqtimeline.com/mar03/mar03week1.html
196
Ibid.
197
Newnham, Dr. Randall E. “‟Coalition of the Bribed and Bullied?‟ U.S. Economic Linkage and the Iraq War
Coalition.” Paper presented at the 47 th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association San Diego, CA,
March 2006.
193
59
The Philippines initially limited their involvement to political support. However, by
2004 they had over 50 troops on the ground aiding in the training of the Iraqi Border Police,
conducting joint patrols and providing medical outreach. The U.S. rewarded this support. In
February 2003, the U.S. announced it would send another 1,700 troops to the southern
Philippines to escalate the fight against the terror groups based there. To sustain this deployment
the U.S. also provided some US$760 million in economic and military aid between 2003 and
2006.198 The effects of this „surge‟ were profound. By 2007, successes in capturing or killing
wanted terrorists led to a peace accord with one group and a cease-fire and peace talks with
another. In addition to leveraging Coalition membership in order to realize greater domestic
security, the Philippines also secured economic benefit in the form of reconstruction contracts.199
Afghanistan
“The Muslim people of Afghanistan, who have suffered much hardship from dictatorial regimes of the last two
decades, want the elimination of despotism by the liberated will of the people of Iraq... The emergence of a united
and independent Iraq, based on the will of the people, will be helpful to peace and stability of the region and the
world.”
-- Statement by the Government, March 20, 2003200
The context of Afghan support for the U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing has its roots in
the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Following the attacks, organized by Osama
bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization, the U.S. demanded that Afghanistan‟s Taliban
government hand over Bin Laden. With the Taliban‟s refusal, the U.S. launched a military
campaign to topple the Taliban, hunt down Bin Laden and his al Qaeda members. Following the
overthrow of the Taliban, the U.S. supported the formation of a new Afghan government, led by
Hamid Karzai. Meanwhile, unable to completely destroy the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the U.S. and
198
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants. “Philippines.” http://qesdb.usaid.gov/cgibin/broker.exe?_program=gbkprogs.country_list.sas&_service=default&unit=N
199
Becker, Elizabeth. “Companies From All Over Seek a Piece of Action Rebuilding Iraq.” New York Times. May
21, 2003. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/after/2003/0521companies.htm
200
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
60
its NATO allies have been forced to maintain thousands of troops in Afghanistan to assist
Karzai‟s fledgling government in establishing security across the country in the face of incessant
attacks.
In addition to providing thousands of ground troops, the United States has also
championed the effort to rebuild Afghanistan. The international community, primarily led by the
U.S., has provided some US$30 billion dollars toward the reconstruction of Afghanistan. These
dollars have fostered more than 14,000 reconstruction projects, many of which are being
supervised by U.S.-led reconstruction teams.201 The combination of international assistance, an
improved security environment and improvements in agricultural production have allowed the
Afghan economy to slowly improve since 2002.202
Despite the progress of the past few years, Afghanistan remains extremely poor,
landlocked, and highly dependent on foreign aid, agriculture, and trade with neighboring
countries. Much of the population continues to suffer from shortages of clean water, housing,
electricity, jobs and medical care. The government‟s inability to extend the rule of law to all
parts of the country poses a challenge to future economic growth. Most experts agree that it will
probably take the remainder of the decade and continuing donor aid and attention to significantly
raise Afghanistan's living standards from its current level, among the lowest in the world.203 This
is to say nothing of the Taliban-led insurgency and Afghanistan‟s domestic militia rivalries, both
of which continue unabated and contribute to a climate of violence and fear.
Well aware of their country‟s situation and their own inability to affect change (the
central government had a budget of only US$350 million in 2003 – all provided through donor
money), Afghan leaders had no choice but to support the guarantor of their national and
201
Wikipedia. “Reconstruction in Afghanistan.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistan_reconstruction
Wikipedia. “Afghanistan.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistan#2001-present_war_in_Afghanistan
203
CIA World Factbook. “Afghanistan.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html
202
61
economic security.204
They endorsed U.S. efforts politically and allowed the use of their
airspace. Their reward was a continuation of the U.S.-led foreign military presence in their
country and a hope that these foreign forces might stabilize Afghanistan and enable a better
future.
Iceland
“The United States now considers its security to be gravely endangered by the actions and attacks of terrorists and
because of various threats from countries governed by dictators and tyrants. It believes that support from this small
country makes a difference... The declaration issued by the Icelandic Government on the Iraq dispute says that we
intend to maintain the close cooperation we have had with our powerful ally in the West. First of all, this involves
flyover authorization for the Icelandic air control area. Secondly, the use of Keflavik Airport, if necessary. In third
place, we will take part in the reconstruction of Iraq after the war ends. Fourthly, we expressed political support for
Resolution 1441 being enforced after four months of delays."
-- Prime Minister Oddsson, March 18, 2003205
Previously ruled by the Danish crown, Iceland became an independent republic in June
1944. A charter member of NATO, Iceland was the only member country not to have a standing
army.
In order to provide for the island‟s defense, authorities signed a bilateral defense
agreement with the United States in 1951, allowing U.S. military forces to be stationed on the
island. The perceived threat from the Soviet Union was the large driver behind this agreement.
After the Cold War, the U.S. looked to reposition these forces, a move objected to by Icelandic
officials who had come to rely on the U.S. security umbrella. A 1994 negotiated agreement,
known as the Agreed Minute, committed the U.S. to maintaining four to six interceptor fighters
in Iceland until 2006.206 This agreement remained in effect until 2003, when the U.S. announced
that it would remove the four remaining jets to cut costs.207
204
Wikipedia. “Afghanistan.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistan#2001-present_war_in_Afghanistan
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
206
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Iceland.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3396.htm
207
Wikipedia. “Agreed Minute.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Minute
205
62
After the U.S. announced it would remove its jets, and despite much controversy and
public condemnation in Iceland, the government decided in 2003 to support the U.S.-led
Coalition of the Willing. This decision coincidentally preceded an announcement by the U.S. to
re-examine their previous decision to remove the interceptor fighters, and maintain the fighter‟s
presence while the two sides negotiated a resolution. Meanwhile, while not directly taking part
in the invasion of Iraq, Iceland contributed two bomb disposal experts and a medical expert to
aid the Coalition.208 They also offered to help in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts.209 In
2006, Iceland decided to withdraw its bomb experts and medical advisor. Interestingly, the U.S.
also decided to unilaterally withdraw its interceptor fighters in 2006, arguing that Iceland was no
longer in need of the U.S. military presence.210
Kuwait
The White House did not publish a quote by Kuwaiti officials supporting the Coalition
Kuwait has played a key role in the evolution of U.S. and Iraqi relations over the last 25
years. Along with the U.S., Kuwait supported Saddam Hussein‟s regime during Iraq‟s eight-year
long war with Iran (1980-1988). Burdened with large debts after the war, Saddam Hussein asked
Kuwait to forgive the US$65 billion debt Iraq had accrued while fighting the Iranians. Kuwait
refused. Tensions mounted between the two countries until August 1990, when Hussein invaded
the small kingdom, presupposing a passive U.S. response.
Whether through faulty
communication by the U.S. or an invalid assumption by Hussein, the U.S. did not react passively
to Iraq‟s aggression. The U.S. led a Coalition of 34 countries to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi
forces. During their retreat, Hussein‟s forces set nearly 700 Kuwait oil wells ablaze, resulting in
208
Wikipedia. “Multinational Force in Iraq.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multinational_force_in_Iraq
OnlineAthens. “List of the „willing.‟” http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/032903/war_20030329058.shtml
210
Wikipedia. “Agreed Minute.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Minute
209
63
a major environmental disaster and devastating the Kuwaiti economy, which relied on petroleum
production for 95 percent of its export revenues.211, 212
The U.S.-Kuwaiti relationship took great strides during the post-Gulf War period. The
United States played a prominent role in rebuilding Kuwait and cleaning up the environmental
disaster left by the retreating Iraqi army. The U.S. and Kuwait worked together closely to
monitor and enforce Iraqi compliance with UNSC resolutions. The U.S. also began to provide
Kuwait with significant military and defense-related technical assistance – some 100 military
sales contracts between the two countries have been valued at US$8.1 billion. The U.S. also
became Kuwait‟s largest supplier of goods and services, valued at US$1 billion in 2002. 213 For
its part, Kuwait became an important partner in the U.S.-led campaign against international
terrorism, providing assistance in the military, diplomatic, and intelligence arenas and also
supporting efforts to block financing of terrorist groups.214
Given its hostility towards Hussein‟s regime stemming from the events surrounding the
Gulf War, Kuwaiti support for the Coalition of the Willing was both necessary and certain. The
public appeared to consider Saddam to be as much of a threat in 2003 as he was in the past,
making the government‟s decision to publicly support the U.S. easier than in other Arab
countries.215 Kuwait opened up 60 percent of its total land area for use by Coalition forces,
enabling most U.S. troops and equipment to flow through Kuwait on the way to Iraq.216
211
Wikipedia. “Kuwait.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuwait
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Kuwait.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35876.htm
213
TradeStats Express. “Global Patterns of U.S. Merchandise Trade.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=zdh4qv45x2bunl31swyk2
h55-2008-8-18-11-2-25
214
Wikipedia. “Kuwait.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuwait
215
Wikipedia. “Governments‟ positions pre-2003 invasion of Iraq.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governments%27_pre-war_positions_on_invasion_of_Iraq
216
OnlineAthens. “List of the „willing.‟” http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/032903/war_20030329058.shtml
212
64
Kuwaiti rewards from joining the U.S.-led Coalition came in two forms. In the shortterm, Kuwait benefited economically from the Coalition presence on its soil and the
reconstruction and support contracts it received, sometimes reportedly at inflated prices.217
However, the more important long term benefit was the deposing of Saddam Hussein and his
regime. With a U.S.-supported Iraq as a regional ally, Kuwait had the freedom to focus on its
economic development without the fear of Hussein‟s regime on their border. Since 2001,
Kuwait‟s GDP at purchasing power parity has gone up nearly 500 percent from about US$30
billion to US$140 billion.218
Portugal
“The responsibility falls exclusively on the Iraqi regime and its obstinacy in not complying with the resolutions of
the United Nations for the last 12 years... On this difficult hour, Portugal reaffirms its support to his Allies, with
whom it shares the values of Liberty and Democracy, and hopes that this operation will be as short as possible and
that it will accomplish all its objectives.”
-- Prime Minister José Manuel Durão Barroso, March 20, 2003219
Portuguese has historically been forced to largely define its foreign relations by its
geographic position on the Iberian Peninsula and the threat of larger European neighbors to its
east. To this end, Portugal allied with England in 1386, an alliance that is still in place today. 220
The Portuguese-British alliance gave British and American forces basing rights at Lajes Field in
the Azores during World War II and allowed for these forces to protect Allied shipping across
the Atlantic.221
Post-World War II, Portugal defined itself as "Atlanticist," emphasizing its support for
strong European ties with the U.S., particularly on defense and security issues. Recognizing the
emergence of the United States, Portugal sought membership in U.S.-led intergovernmental
217
Phinney, David. “Contract Quagmire in Iraq.” CorpWatch. April 27, 2005.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/contract/2005/0427quagmire.htm
218
Indexmundi. “Kuwait-GDP.” http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=ku&v=65
219
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
220
Wikipedia. “History of Portugal.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Portugal
221
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Portugal.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3208.htm
65
organizations such as the UN and NATO. Portugal was a founding member of NATO and has,
over the years, sent peacekeeping forces in support of NATO missions in the Balkans and
Afghanistan. Portugal‟s primary NATO contribution has been enabling access to Lajes Air Base
in the Azores, strategically located in the middle of the North Atlantic Ocean. For 50 years,
Lajes Air Base has played an important role in supporting the U.S. military in operations ranging
from the first Gulf War, to counter-terrorism, to humanitarian efforts.222 U.S. use of Lajes was
formalized in the 1995 U.S.-Portuguese Agreement on Cooperation and Defense (ACD). This
agreement provided for U.S. access to Lajes Air Base in return for the U.S. provision of excess
defense articles to the Portuguese military and cooperation in the fields of science and
technology.223
Since 1943, the use of Lajes by the U.S. military has allowed Portugal to strengthen
diplomatic relations with the U.S., as well as to obtain military equipment for the Portuguese
armed forces. From a Portuguese perspective, supporting the U.S.-led Coalition was a necessity
for the continuation of this strong relationship and the ACD. Beyond the use of Lajes, Portugal‟s
contribution to the Coalition included 128 military police deployed in November 2003 – a small
price for a continued security relationship with the U.S.224
South Korea
“Just a short while ago, I called a meeting of the National Security Council and reaffirmed the position of our
Government to support the measure taken by the international community, including the United States. At a time
when diplomatic efforts have failed to resolve the Iraqi problem peacefully, I believe that the action is inevitable to
quickly remove weapons of mass destruction. Koreans tend to join forces when things get tough. The challenges
lying before us may be tough, but we have ample potential to tackle them.”
-- President Roh, March 20, 2003225
222
Ibid.
The White House. “U.S.-Portugal Bilateral Issues.” http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Europe-0005/factsheets/usportugal-bilateral-issues.html
224
Wikipedia. “Multinational force in Iraq.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multinational_force_in_Iraq
225
The White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
223
66
Korea is one of the oldest civilizations in the world dating back more than four thousand
years. Its recent history has been defined by the division of the Korean peninsula at the end of
World War II into a Soviet backed communist North and a U.S. backed capitalist South. North
Korea attempted to militarily unite the country in 1950, leading to a three year war with the
South, which eventually ended with an armistice that split the country along a demilitarized
zone.226 Since the end of the war, South Korean foreign policy has had the goal of enhancing
political legitimacy, military security, and economic development by maintaining close ties with
the West in general and the United States in particular.227
Ties between South Korea and the U.S. date back to post-World War II, when U.S.
military forces administered the country for three years until the South Korean government was
established. The U.S. later sent soldiers to defend the South during the Korean War. Since then,
the two countries have had strong economic, diplomatic and military ties.
Militarily, the
relationship is defined by the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty in which the United States agreed to
help South Korea defend itself against external aggression. In support of this commitment, the
United States has maintained military personnel in Korea. Diplomats in both countries have
argued that stability in the Korean peninsula has been maintained over the years through strong
military cooperation and South Korean support for the U.S. military presence in their country.228
Economically, the U.S.-South Korean relationship is very strong. Korea is the United States'
seventh-largest trading partner with bilateral trade worth US$58 billion in 2002.229
226
Wikipedia. “History of South Korea.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_South_Korea
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: South Korea.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm
228
Ibid.
229
TradeStats Express. “Global Patterns of U.S. Merchandise Trade.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=zdh4qv45x2bunl31swyk2
h55-2008-8-18-11-2-25
227
67
South Korea had two strong motivations for supporting the U.S.-led Coalition of the
Willing. Militarily, the U.S. was moving from a leading role to a supporting role in South Korea,
reducing and relocating military forces within the country. Still largely dependent on the U.S. to
protect it from its North Korean neighbors, South Korea wanted to minimize the impact of the
U.S. reduction of forces as much as possible.230 Economically, a free trade agreement with the
U.S. was on the horizon.
South Korea did not take part in the initial invasion of Iraq, however, they quickly
deployed some 3,600 troops in the country to engage in reconstruction efforts.231 South Korea
realized a significant return on its investment both militarily and economically. Militarily, the
U.S. spent some US$11 billion on force enhancements in Korea and at regional facilities to
bolster deterrent and defense capabilities while it redeployed its troops. Economically, the
successful completion of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement was signed into effect June 30,
2007. The agreement is expected to stimulate billions of dollars of trade through the removal of
trade barriers and increased investment.232 Even prior to the agreement, U.S.-South Korea
bilateral trade reached over US$82 billion in 2007, an increase of 141 percent since 2002.233
Beyond the free trade agreement, South Korea also benefited from Iraq reconstruction
contracts.234
230
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: South Korea.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm
Schifferes, Steve. “US says „Coalition of willing‟ grows.” BBC News. March 21, 2003.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2870487.stm
232
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: South Korea.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm
233
TradeStats Express. “Global Patterns of U.S. Merchandise Trade.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=zdh4qv45x2bunl31swyk2
h55-2008-8-18-11-2-25
234
Becker, Elizabeth. “Companies From All Over Seek a Piece of Action Rebuilding Iraq.” New York Times. May
21, 2003. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/after/2003/0521companies.htm
231
68
Conclusion
In the early months of 2003 leaders of countries around the globe debated the merits of
joining the U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing. Those nations facing acute security threats,
whether from external powers or domestic groups, turned toward the United States to fulfill their
security needs. In return for membership in U.S.-led security alliances and/or foreign aid, the
U.S. would require membership in the Coalition of the Willing. The goal of Part One of this
examination has been to understand exactly which variables motivated each country‟s decision to
choose to join the Coalition of the Willing.
To present this analysis Part One divided the 26 countries that joined the Coalition
primarily out of security concerns into those facing external threats in Chapter One and those
facing domestic ones in Chapter Two. Each individual country was then analyzed to understand
its geopolitical history, its historical relations with the United States and any present-day issues
affecting their decision to join the Coalition. Each analysis was also augmented by a comparison
of what each country contributed to the Coalition versus what they received for their
membership. The summation of each country analysis presents less-than-altruistic motivations
for Coalition members.
Almost all of the 26 countries supporting the U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing for
security needs had publics opposing the war. One can almost hear decision makers in Warsaw or
Tallinn grumbling over their idealistic populace even when faced with a very realistic Russia on
their border. The realists, rightly or wrongly, ignored public opinion and gorged on U.S. offers
of security guarantees and foreign aid, seen by most as the prerequisite for long-term economic
growth, the subject of part two of this paper.
69
PART TWO: Economics
70
Introduction
“The law does not pretend to punish everything that is dishonest. That would seriously interfere with business.”
Clarence S. Darrow
The U.S. economy is the largest and most technologically powerful economy in the
world. Its gross domestic product (GDP) of over US$13 trillion accounts for nearly 20 percent
of the global total and its per capita GDP of US$46,000 ranks ten globally, profound for a
country with such a large population.235 The enormous size, stable growth, low unemployment
and high levels of research and capital investment of the United States economy, has given the
U.S. a unique ability to influence the foreign policies of nations around the world. In its efforts
to compile a Coalition of the Willing to invade Iraq in 2003, the U.S. utilized this economic
authority. Economic influence came in three distinct forms: the leverage of trade agreements,
U.S. aid and Iraq reconstruction contracts.
The U.S. used preferential access to the U.S. market through trade agreements as a
persuasive foreign policy tool when recruiting Coalition members. The U.S. administration was
able to do this because of the unique extent to which the U.S. economy is driven by
consumerism. Consumer spending constitutes some 70 percent of the U.S. economy.236 Of
relevance to foreign countries, U.S. consumers also seem to have an insatiable appetite for
foreign-made goods or imports. The U.S. consumer accounts for nearly 15 percent of all world
imports, over double the share of Germany, the second-ranking state, with about 7 percent.
235
CIA. “The World Factbook.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2004rank.html
236
Hoover Institution. “Facts on Policy: Consumer Spending.”
http://www.hoover.org/research/factsonpolicy/facts/4931661.html
71
Foreign countries are intensely interested in entering the U.S. market, as U.S. consumers possess
both substantial wealth and a high propensity to buy foreign products.237
Economic aid was also utilized to influence support for the Coalition.
Like many
countries, the U.S. has a history of utilizing foreign aid for political purposes. For example, after
Yemen‟s U.N. envoy voted against the first Gulf War in 1991, a U.S. diplomat reportedly said to
him, “that will be the most expensive „no‟ vote you ever cast.” Three days later, Saudi Arabia
deported thousands of Yemeni workers, and the United States cut off US$70 million in aid to
Yemen.238 Similar methods were available to the U.S. when assembling the Coalition.239
The lure of profitable Iraq reconstruction contracts was a final important component of
economic leverage over Coalition countries. After the initial invasion, the U.S. and its Coalition
allies administered the Iraqi government until June 2004, giving them complete control over all
Iraq government spending. This U.S.-led Iraqi government, or Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA), was generous in awarding reconstruction contracts to Coalition countries. CPA policy on
reconstruction contracts was clarified in December 2003 when U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz, a well-known advocate of the war, issued a „Determination and Findings‟
document which formally limited bidding on US$18.6 billion of U.S.-funded reconstruction
contracts to “firms from the U.S., Iraq, Coalition partners and force-contributing nations.”240
Wolfowitz said that the policy was designed to reward Coalition members and “encourage [their]
continued participation” as well as to win the support of anti-war states or “encourage the
237
Newnham, Dr. Randall E. “‟Coalition of the Bribed and Bullied?‟ U.S. Economic Linkage and the Iraq War
Coalition.” Paper presented at the 47 th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association San Diego, CA,
March 2006.
238
United Nations Foundation. “United States Reportedly Gaining Security Council Support.”
http://www.unwire.org/unwire/20021025/29875_story.asp
239
Newnham, Dr. Randall E. “‟Coalition of the Bribed and Bullied?‟ U.S. Economic Linkage and the Iraq War
Coalition.” Paper presented at the 47 th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association San Diego, CA,
March 2006.
240
Wolfowitz, Paul. “Determination and Findings.” Washington Post. December 5, 2003.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/documents/iraqcontracts_dod20031205.pdf
72
expansion of international cooperation in Iraq.”241 When large reconstruction contracts began to
be awarded, Wolfowitz‟s economic threat was indeed followed.
A review of the prime
contractors in 2003 and 2004 contracts shows only Coalition members. Most contracts went to
U.S. companies, with significant representation from British, Spanish and Dutch companies.
The U.S. also clarified that after June 2004 any spending from U.S. taxpayer sources would go
only to Coalition contractors.242
Whether through trade, aid, or reconstruction contracts, this section will examine how the
U.S. utilized its economic muscle to influence each country‟s decisions to join the Coalition of
the Willing. This section is divided into three chapters. Chapter three examines those countries
whose prime motivation for joining the Coalition seemed to be securing trade agreements.
Chapter four introduces the countries whose existence was almost entirely dependent on U.S.
aid, while chapter five analyzes the countries that had a vested interest in reconstruction
contracts. Each chapter includes an individual analysis of each country. The goal of these
analyses is to (1) present a historical context of the country, (2) examine how the United States
became involved in the nation‟s economy, (3) observe how the U.S. was able to influence each
country to join the Coalition, and finally, (4) what each country contributed to the Coalition and
received from its membership.
241
242
Ibid.
Ibid.
73
CHAPTER THREE: Trade Agreements
For any country, but especially for smaller ones, a trade agreement with the largest
economy in the world is a financial boom. The small countries of Central America were
obviously hopeful when in January 2002 U.S. President George Bush announced that a Central
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) would be a priority of his administration. The
purported aim of CAFTA was to liberalize U.S. and Central American markets, creating a freetrade zone similar to that created between the U.S., Mexico and Canada as a result of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The CAFTA countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua recognized the unprecedented opportunity of a trade
agreement with their largest export market; however, they all also recognized CAFTA passage
would not come freely.
The region had been fighting for some time to win U.S. trade preferences under the
proposed CAFTA. With Bush now supporting CAFTA, members found themselves completely
dependent on the Bush administration and U.S. Congress to finalize negotiations and win
passage of the treaty. Their economies, all heavily dependent on the U.S., were effectively
hostage to its success. The U.S., seeking to augment international support for the Iraq invasion,
could have easily required Coalition membership for CAFTA passage. Regardless of how the
U.S. asked for support, all five CAFTA countries declared support for the Coalition, despite
having no strategic interest in the war and facing strong domestic public opposition. A sixth
country, the Dominican Republic, was so desperate to be included in CAFTA, with near 84
percent of its exports going to the U.S., it also declared support for the Coalition. Soon after it
announced its support, the CAFTA agreement was politely renamed DR-CAFTA.243
243
Wikipedia. “Dominican Republic – Central American Free Trade Agreement.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DRCAFTA
74
The small countries of Central America were not the only ones looking for improved
trade relationships with the U.S. in return for Coalition support. The carrot of a trade agreement
or the stick of withholding one was also a vital tool in recruiting Panama, Mongolia and
Singapore.
The following sections introduce and analyze each country whose primary
motivation for joining the Coalition of the Willing appeared to be improved trade.
DR-CAFTA
Costa Rica
“Our vocation for peace must not be interpreted as indifference or tolerance in the face of terrorism. In addition, in
the conflict between peace and terrorism, we are not neutral. Costa Rica is and will be a loyal, firm, and resolute
ally in favor of those who look for peace, freedom, democracy, and respect for international law.”
-- Communiqué signed by both President Abel Pacheco and Foreign Minister Roberto Tovar, March 19, 2003 244
The United States and Costa Rica have a history of positive bilateral relations based on
their shared democratic values, respect for human rights and free trade. During the 1980s, a time
of economic difficulties for Costa Rica, the U.S. provided more than US$1.1 billion in economic
aid to stabilize the Costa Rican economy and enable its continued development. By the 21st
century, the United States had emerged as Costa Rica's most important trading partner,
accounting for almost half of Costa Rica's exports, imports, and tourism, and more than twothirds of its foreign investment. Costa Rica has, in turn, generally supported the U.S. on foreign
policy issues, especially in the areas of democracy and human rights.245
When the United States looked to Costa Rica in early 2003 for support in the U.S.-led
Coalition of the Willing, Costa Rica decision makers had one thing on their mind, the economy
and specifically DR-CAFTA. DR-CAFTA was less popular in Costa Rica than other Latin
American countries that did not have the benefit of a highly literate population and an already
244
White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
245
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Costa Rica.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2019.htm
75
prosperous economy. Opponents of the agreement feared the deal would put small farmers out
of business and give foreigners too much control over the economy. Proponents, including Costa
Rican President Óscar Arias, argued that DR-CAFTA would boost economic growth, cut
unemployment and largely aid the country‟s poor.
Arias warned that turning down the
agreement would be “collective suicide,” since the U.S. accounted for some 40 percent of Costa
Rican exports equaling about US$3.4 billion.246
With their economy largely dependent on the United States, Costa Rica chose not to
strain relations in the midst of DR-CAFTA negotiations. Having no standing army of their own
and relying entirely on the U.S. for their own national defense, they offered political support for
the U.S.-led Coalition. An implicit return for their political support, DR-CAFTA was approved
by the United States in August 2005.247 Since approval, Costa Rican imports to the U.S. have
increased by over US$500 million annually.248
Dominican Republic
“The Dominican Government is standing beside the people and the Government of the United States in the present
situation of war with Iraq... No one wants war, no one anywhere in the world wants war, especially not in the
United States, but within the framework of the policy of being a good neighbor, our closest friends are, precisely, the
Government and people of the United States.”
-- Government Spokesman Gonzalez Fabra, March 20, 2003249
The United States has long taken an active role in the Dominican Republic, intervening
several times in the 20th century to provide stability in the face of both external and domestic
threats. These interventions point to the vested interest the U.S. has in maintaining a democratic,
246
AFP. “Costa Rica backs free trade with US: president.”
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gprLG9_pgiIldXQpXfxXSU7vycUw
247
Wikipedia. “Dominican Republic – Central American Free Trade Agreement.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DRCAFTA
248
TradeStatsExpress. “Costa Rica.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=f5ad1ginvk4t1145bki1mn
55-2008-11-18-12-58-8
249
White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
76
stable and economically healthy Dominican Republic. Underlying its importance to the U.S. are
the country‟s large economy, large population and proximity to the United States. Given these
factors, the U.S. has facilitated positive relations with the Dominican Republic and supported the
country‟s continued democratic and economic development.
In turn, the Dominican
Government has been supportive of many U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as counternarcotics efforts, the extradition of fugitives and reducing illegal immigration.250
Although there is cooperation on several shared foreign policy goals, bilateral trade is the
glue that binds the U.S. and Dominican Republic together. Many U.S. firms have utilized
inexpensive Dominican labor and recently turned the country into a manufacturing hub. As a
result, U.S. firms account for much of the foreign direct investment in the country. These firms
have also driven Dominican exports to the U.S., which had reached US$4.5 billion by 2002.251
To help secure its investment on the island, the United States provided the Dominican some
US$125 million in economic and military aid between 2001 and 2003.252
When posed with the U.S. request to join the Coalition of the Willing, Dominican leaders
probably saw much to lose from denying support. The U.S. accounted for nearly 75 percent of
Dominican export revenue, provided some US$40 million a year in economic and military aid
and served as the country‟s largest foreign investor. Perhaps most importantly, Dominican
leaders did not want to risk being left out of a CAFTA agreement, which promised significant
economic benefits. When the Dominican Republic joined the U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing,
they initially limited their involvement to political support; however, they eventually deployed
250
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Dominican Republic.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35639.htm
Wikipedia. “Dominican Republic.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominican_republic
252
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants. “Dominican Republic.” http://qesdb.usaid.gov/cgibin/broker.exe?_program=gbkprogs.country_list.sas&_service=default&unit=N
251
77
some 300 troops in 2004 under Spanish command.253, 254 As a result, economic and military aid
from the U.S. has continued at a clip of about US$40 million a year and, most importantly, DRCAFTA was approved, stimulating investment and driving economic growth of 10 percent in
2007 and five percent in 2008, among the highest rates in Latin America.255
El Salvador
“The Government of El Salvador laments that the negative and dilatory attitude of Saddam Hussein has brought
war to the people of Iraq... In this regard, the Government of El Salvador continues to provide its political and
diplomatic support to the coalition headed by the United States and Great Britain as well as its commitment to
provide specialized forces for work in postwar Iraq.”
-- Statement by the Government of El Salvador, March 19, 2003
“El Salvador is giving diplomatic support (to the United States) and also is willing to give support in a post-conflict
phase, when a possible war is over, in reconstruction or de-mining tasks at which we already have experience."
-- Foreign Ministry Communications Director Cesar Martinez, March 19, 2003256
El Salvador‟s civil war between 1980 and 1992 has largely defined its recent history and
has had an important impact on its relationship with the United States. The war, primarily fought
between the government (backed by the U.S.) and a coalition of leftists and communists (backed
by the Soviet Union), left up to 180,000 people dead and many thousands more displaced. In
1992, a negotiated resolution paved the way for peaceful future growth by allowing the former
guerrillas to participate in democratic elections as a legitimate political party. 257 Since the end of
the war, the economy has grown steadily and poverty has been cut in half. Many credit the
country‟s economic strides to the privatization of several industries, an effort encouraged by the
United States.258
253
OnlineAthens. “List of the „willing.‟” http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/032903/war_20030329058.shtml
International Herald Tribune. “Hungary Joins Others in Pulling Troops from Iraq.”
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/occupation/2004/1104hungary.htm
255
DominicanToday. “DR-CAFTA pays dividends in Dominican Republic after a year.”
http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/economy/2008/5/18/28015/DR-CAFTA-pays-dividends-in-DominicanRepublic-after-a-year
256
White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
257
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: El Salvador.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2033.htm
258
Wikipedia. “El Salvador.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/El_salvador
254
78
The U.S.-Salvadoran relationship remained strong after the civil war. The U.S. continued
to support the development of El Salvador‟s democratic institutions, contributing over US$350
million in economic and military aid between 2001 and 2003. 259 The U.S. also supported the
privatization of El Salvador‟s electrical and telecommunications markets, which enabled greater
U.S. investment in the country. The increase in foreign investment resulted in increased exports
to the United States, worth some US$2 billion in 2003.260 The Salvadoran government has been
grateful for U.S. investment in their country and has reciprocated through supporting U.S.
foreign policy, especially when it pertains to the U.S.-led war on terrorism.
Despite the economic gains El Salvador reaped from recent U.S. investment, the idea of
joining a U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing to invade Iraq remained widely unpopular in the
country. The general public, however, might not have been aware of three inescapable economic
variables decision makers were faced with. First, nearly one-third of native-born Salvadorans
were living and working in the U.S. in early 2003. The Salvadoran government relied on
remittances from this group valued at up to US$3 billion per year as an important source of
income that supported over 20 percent of domestic families. These remittances also accounted
for over 17 percent of gross domestic product.261 The Salvadoran government could not risk the
deportation of these illegal immigrants.
Second, El Salvador‟s economy was, and still is,
precariously dependent on access to U.S. trade and markets. The United States is its foremost
partner for both imports (32.6 percent) and exports (54.3 percent). Finally, El Salvador did not
259
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants. “El Salvador.” http://qesdb.usaid.gov/cgibin/broker.exe?_program=gbkprogs.country_list.sas&_service=default&unit=N
260
Tradestats Express. “El Salvador.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=qxfgav45o1mfc2551h1dd
5by-2008-7-2-16-22-8
261
Council on Hemispheric Affairs. “El Salvador Dispatches Additional Contingent to Iraq.”
http://www.coha.org/2006/08/el-salvador-dispatches-additional-contingent-to-iraq/
79
want to strain relations with the U.S. in the midst of DR-CAFTA negotiations, which would
provide El Salvador preferential access to U.S. markets.262
El Salvador‟s dependence on the United States for its economic survival all but
guaranteed its support for the U.S.-led Coalition. Initially providing diplomatic support, El
Salvador eventually deployed some 375 troops to Iraq and became one of the U.S.‟s most
steadfast allies. The return for this political and military support was significant. In addition to
maintaining its present favorable economic situation with the U.S., DR-CAFTA went into effect
in 2005. Additionally, in 2006, the Government of El Salvador and the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) signed a five-year, $461 million anti-poverty plan to stimulate economic
growth and reduce poverty in the country's northern region.263
Honduras
[The Government of Honduras] “supports the Government of the United States of America's war against terrorism
and calls on the Government of Iraq, in order to avoid further suffering by the Iraqi people, to accept the demands
proposed by the United States of America.”
-- President Maduro, March 18, 2003264
Recent United States-Honduras relations can be dated to the early 1980s when Honduras
supported a U.S. policy that actively opposed a Soviet-backed Marxist government in Nicaragua
and a leftist insurgency in El Salvador, also Soviet-backed. Honduras aided the United States in
their opposition efforts by allowing the United States to establish a military presence in
Honduras with the purpose of supporting the anti-Sandinista Contras fighting the Nicaraguan
government, and to support the El Salvador military fighting against the leftist guerrillas.265 The
U.S., with Honduran support, was eventually successful in preventing a communist foothold in
Latin America.
262
Ibid.
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: El Salvador.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2033.htm
264
White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
265
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Honduras.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1922.htm
263
80
Since their partnership in the 1980s, the U.S. has taken steps to help strengthen Honduran
democratic institutions and improve living conditions there, largely through foreign aid and trade
links. Historically one of the largest donors to Honduras, the U.S. provided over US$100 million
in economic and military aid between 2001 and 2002.266 This aid helped to augment a small
U.S. military presence at a Honduran base out of which the two countries conduct joint
operations in peacekeeping, counternarcotics, humanitarian aid and disaster relief.267
Economically, the United States has also assisted in Honduran development, accounting for
nearly two-thirds of the foreign direct investment in the country. Additionally, the U.S., as
Honduras‟s chief trading partner, accounts for over 70 percent of Honduran exports and provides
60 percent of imports to the country.268 Not surprisingly, Honduras has been a main ally of the
U.S. in international relations and has been a strong supporter of the U.S. global war on
terrorism.
Honduras, the second poorest country in Central America and one of the poorest
countries in the Western Hemisphere, was in an unenviable position when asked to join the U.S.led Coalition of the Willing. Honduran decision makers had three economic realities to face
when contemplating their decision. First, up to one million Hondurans living in the United
States, up to 70 percent illegally, accounted for over a quarter of Honduran GDP through
remittances.269 Second, with the U.S. accounting for such a high percentage of both imports and
exports, any economic growth remained dependent on continued economic relations with the
U.S. Finally, a key to improving economic growth was the pending DR-CAFTA deal, and
266
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants. “Honduras.” http://qesdb.usaid.gov/cgibin/broker.exe?_program=gbkprogs.country_list.sas&_service=default&unit=N
267
Wikipedia. “Honduras-United States Relations.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Honduras-United_States_relations
268
Wikipedia. “Economy of Honduras.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Honduras
269
MSNBC. “Honduras fears U.S. immigration crackdown.” http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19748371/
81
Honduras did not want to strain relations with the U.S. in the middle of negotiations. Honduran
leaders made the only decision they could, supporting the U.S. decision to invade Iraq.
Honduras did not send troops to participate in the invasion, but deployed around 370
soldiers specializing in mine clearing and medical care in the summer of 2003.270 Like other
Coalition members, Honduran support was well rewarded. In June 2005, Honduras became the
first country in the hemisphere to sign a Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) compact with
the U.S. Under the compact, the Millennium Challenge Corporation began investing US$215
million over five years to help Honduras improve its road infrastructure, diversify its agriculture,
and get its products to market. Of greater strategic importance, the DR-CAFTA agreement was
approved by the U.S., eliminating tariffs and other barriers to trade in goods, services,
agricultural products, and investments.271
Nicaragua
“The position of our ambassador to the UN has been clearly in support of Security Council Resolution 1441, which
calls for disarming the Iraqi regime, even through the use of force, as the resolution clearly states. Peace and the
peaceful coexistence of the free peoples of the world are now threatened by the widespread global scourge of
terrorism. That is why Nicaragua has been a firm ally of the United States in its fight against terrorism... we cannot
ignore threats from those who, sheltered by military dictatorships and the oppression of their peoples, jeopardize
international security and world peace.”
-- President Bolaños, March 20, 2003272
The United States has a long history of involvement with Nicaragua. U.S. military forces
occupied the country between 1912 and 1933, providing security for the ruling conservative
government. After withdrawing military forces in 1933, the U.S. supported a string of dictators
that ruled the country until 1979. In that year the Sandinistas, a leftist group espousing Marxist
beliefs, took control of the country. In response, the U.S. supported a guerrilla movement that
270
CNN. “Honduras rushes to pull out troops.” http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/04/19/spain.withdraw/
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Honduras.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1922.htm
272
White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
271
82
fought against the Sandinistas throughout the 1980s, eventually pressuring the Sandinistas into a
nationwide election in 1990.273 A coalition of anti-Sandinistas won the controversial election.274
Since the 1990 election, the United States has been the driving force behind efforts to
stabilize the country. The U.S. has provided over US$2 billion in economic aid to Nicaragua in
the form of debt relief, balance of payment support, humanitarian aid and counter narcotic
efforts.275 The U.S. has also played a significant role in Nicaragua‟s economic development. As
Nicaragua‟s largest trading partner, the U.S. provides 23 percent of Nicaragua‟s imports and
accounts for 66 percent of its exports.276
Nicaraguan officials were well aware of their dependence on the U.S. economy when
organizing their response to the U.S. request for Coalition support. In addition to a reliance on
the U.S., Nicaragua also relied heavily on foreign assistance to service persistent trade and
budget deficits. The U.S. had the ability to help facilitate this aid or hinder the process.
Nicaraguan leaders were also negotiating DR-CAFTA with the U.S. and, like other Central
American countries, did not want to strain relations. With such extreme economic dependence
on the United States, Nicaragua had no choice but to support the U.S.-led Coalition.
Nicaragua initially offered political support, which it augmented with 230 peacekeeping
troops in September 2003.277
The Nicaraguan contribution to the Coalition and the U.S.
appreciation of such paved the way for considerable economic progress in Nicaragua. In early
2004, Nicaragua secured some US$4.5 billion in foreign debt reduction under the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.278 The HIPC was followed in 2005 with a US$175
million compact with the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation to reduce poverty and spur
273
Wikipedia. “Nicaragua.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaragua
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Nicaragua.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1850.htm
275
Ibid.
276
Wikipedia. “Economy of Nicaragua.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Nicaragua
277
Wikipedia. “Nicaragua.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaragua
278
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Nicaragua.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1850.htm
274
83
economic growth.279 Also, in 2007, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a new
poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF) program worth US$110 million that should enable
Nicaragua to dedicate more of its budget to social programs and long-term investments. Finally,
the 2005 passage of DR-CAFTA has expanded export opportunities for many Nicaraguan
agricultural and manufactured goods.280 Between 2005 and 2007, Nicaraguan exports to the U.S.
grew by some US$420 million.281
Bilateral Free Trade Agreements
Panama
“My government understands your decision to grant to the Iraqi people the chance to enjoy democracy, peace and
respect for human rights.”
-- President Moscoso, March 17, 2003282
Modern Panamanian history has been shaped by the Panama Canal, which had been a
dream since the beginning of Spanish colonization. After an initial attempt by the French to
build a canal in the late 19th century, the United States took up the project in 1904 and finished
construction in 1914. Part of the Hay/Bunau-Varilla Treaty that enabled the canal‟s construction
granted the U.S. sovereignty over the Canal Zone as well as the rights to administer, fortify and
defend it in perpetuity.283
The Hay/Bunau-Varilla Treaty and its impact on the western
hemisphere defined future U.S.-Panama relations.284
The importance of Panama stemmed from the canal and the economic and strategic value
the canal provided. Previously, if ships wanted to pass through the Americas, they had to go all
279
Wikipedia. “Nicaragua.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaragua
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Nicaragua.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1850.htm
281
TradeStats Express. “Nicaragua.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=ztz0mnramqqkj0zjx1h2ho
uc-2008-10-22-15-17-12
282
White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
283
Wikipedia. “Panama.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panama
284
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Panama.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2030.htm
280
84
the way around the most southern tip of South America. The Panama Canal connected the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans directly at the narrowest point, reducing the travel time for a ship
going from New York to San Francisco from 13,000 miles to 5,200 miles. Economically, the
canal generated millions of dollars of toll revenue. Strategically, it allowed the U.S. to dictate
who could and who could not use it. The U.S. enjoyed a complete monopoly over control of the
canal until 1977 when the Torrijos-Carter Treaty began the process of returning the canal to the
Panamanian government.285
Since the Torrijos-Carter Treaty, the United States has taken an active role with the
Panamanian government to help promote economic, political, security, and social development.
Security initiatives have focused on maritime law enforcement, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and stolen vehicles.
The cornerstone economic achievement was a bilateral
investment treaty signed between the U.S. and Panama in 1982. The treaty assisted Panama in
its efforts to develop a stable economy by creating conditions more favorable for U.S. private
investment, thereby strengthening the development of Panama‟s private sector. The treaty also
laid the foundation for strong bilateral trade (US$2.1 billion in 2003) and U.S. foreign direct
investment in Panama (US$25 billion).286
When the U.S. asked for Panamanian support for the Coalition, Panamanian leaders had a
similar set of variables affecting them as their Latin American neighbors. They did not want to
risk losing the foreign direct investment from the U.S. or access to the U.S. market. Although
Panama was not part of the DR-CAFTA agreement, it was involved in its own bilateral free trade
agreement with the U.S. and, like its Latin neighbors, did not want to risk the agreement by
stressing its relationship with the United States. Panamanian leaders decided to limit the extent
285
Wikipedia. “Panama.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panama
USTR. “Panama Trade Promotion Agreement.”
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Panama_FTA/Section_Index.html
286
85
of their assistance to political support. The U.S. and Panama Trade Promotion Agreement,
although approved in Panama in July 2007, is still awaiting ratification in the U.S. Congress.287
Mongolia
“The Iraqi regime has been highly reluctant to implement the successive resolutions of the United Nations Security
Council and unable to prove to the international community that it has fully destroyed its weapons of mass
destruction. Thus it failed to fully meet its obligations vis-a-vis the United Nations. This is where, as we see it, lies
the main reason for the emergence of the crisis situation in the region.”
-- Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2003288
History of a Mongolian state dates back as far as 1206, when Genghis Khan ruled and
became renowned for his Asian and European conquests. Unlike Khan‟s armies who were not
restricted by borders, Mongolia in the 20th and 21st centuries has been defined by its geography,
located between the two great powers of Russia and China. Russia and China would compete for
power and influence in Mongolia until 1924 when autonomy was established under a Sovietbacked communist government. The Soviets held sway in Mongolia until the late 1980s, when
communism came under pressure as the Soviet Union began to disintegrate. With the Soviet
demise, Mongolia held its first democratic elections in 1990.289
Beginning in the late 1980s, the United States sought to assist Mongolia's movement
toward democracy and market-oriented reforms. Specific steps toward these goals included a
1991 trade agreement and a 1994 bilateral investment treaty. The U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) played a leading role in providing bilateral development assistance to
Mongolia, focusing on sustainable, private sector-led economic growth and more effective and
accountable governance. Total USAID assistance to Mongolia from 1991 through 2008 was
about US$174.5 million.290 In recent years, the United States has also supported Mongolian
287
Wikipedia. “Panama.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panama
White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
289
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Mongolia.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2779.htm
290
Ibid.
288
86
defense reform and an increased capacity by Mongolia's armed forces to participate in
international peacekeeping operations.291
Mongolia, keenly aware of its two powerful neighbors, has embraced relations with the
U.S. as part of a strong third neighbor policy designed to limit the influence of Russia and China.
Setting the precedent by supporting the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, Mongolia also declared
support for the U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing. Mongolia sent up to 180 troops post-invasion
to take part in reconstruction and logistics activities.292 Their involvement was by no means
altruistic, as the U.S. paid Mongolia US$11 million to cover deployment costs.293 In addition to
deployment monies, Mongolia achieved three economic benefits by supporting the U.S.-led
Coalition. First, they positioned themselves as a future provider of international peacekeepers,
which would be a revenue generator for the government. Secondly, in July 2004 the U.S. signed
a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with Mongolia to promote economic reform and
more foreign investment.294
Finally, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
completed negotiations for a Compact with Mongolia in 2007, providing for US$285 million to
be spent over a five-year period beginning in July 2008.295
Singapore
Singapore is a member of the „coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq‟... Singapore has a memorandum of
understanding with the US which was signed in 1990 whereby we allow US aircraft to over fly Singapore and we
allow US military assets, ships and aircraft to call at Singapore... It is a matter of grave concern that the Iraqi
291
Wikipedia. “Mongolia.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mongolia
The Guardian. “Mongolians join multinational force.”
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/sep/29/iraq.rorymccarthy
293
CNN. “Bush thanks Mongolia for support in Iraq.”
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/11/21/mongolia.us/index.html
294
GlobalSecurity. “Coalition partners ready for Bush to return favor.”
http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030926-irhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_StatesMongolia_relationsaq2.htm
295
Wikipedia. “United States-Mongolia Relations.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States-Mongolia_relations
292
87
people do not suffer, and if any measures can be taken to alleviate their suffering, Singapore will do its part.”
-- Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan, March 21, 2003296
Originally the site of a trading post of the British East India Company, Singapore became
one of the most important commercial and military centers for the British Empire during the 19th
and early 20th centuries. After briefly being occupied by the Japanese during World War II,
Singapore briefly became part of Malaysia before achieving independence in 1965.297
Upon achieving independence, the United States established formal diplomatic relations
with Singapore. Since that time, Singapore‟s efforts towards economic growth, political stability
and regional cooperation have consistently aligned with U.S. foreign policy, thus enabling a solid
foundation for positive relations between the two countries in both military and economic
matters. Singapore has consistently supported a strong U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific
region and has facilitated this goal by opening their airspace and air and naval bases to the U.S.
military. The United States and Singapore also have a strong relationship as trade partners. The
U.S. is the 5th largest trade partner of Singapore, while Singapore is the 15th largest trading
partner of the U.S., accounting for about US$30 billion per year.298, 299 Meanwhile, the U.S. is
also the leader in foreign investment in Singapore, accounting for 19 percent of new
commitments to the manufacturing sector. The U.S. also has some 1,500 firms operating in
Singapore.300
When asked to join the Coalition, Singaporean leaders faced several economic realities.
They did not want to risk the national security provided by the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific
region or the opportunity for economic prosperity through the United States – Singapore Free
296
White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
297
Wikipedia. “Singapore.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore
298
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Singapore.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2798.htm
299
TradeStates Express. “Singapore.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=ll4ri0e4ksbf1e5544ewys5
5-2008-10-24-14-26-40
300
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Singapore.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2798.htm
88
Trade agreement. If passed, the trade agreement would lower tariffs on goods between the two
countries and allow easier movement of citizens between the two nations.
Singapore went a step farther than many Coalition countries who contributed small levels
of troops. Singapore deployed a ship to the Persian Gulf to help protect waters around oil
terminals, provide logistics support, and conduct patrols and boarding operations. They also
deployed a C-130 transport aircraft and a KC-135 tanker aircraft to aid in logistical support.301
Through these efforts, they achieved several strategic goals. Although probably not a causal
link, the U.S. maintained a presence in the Asia-Pacific region. From an economic perspective, a
United States – Singapore Free Trade Agreement went into force in January 2004, resulting in an
increase of more than US$3 billion of exports to the U.S.302,
303
Additionally, Singaporean
contractors were able to bid for reconstruction contracts.304 Finally, in July 2005, the U.S. and
Singapore signed a Strategic Framework Agreement to expand cooperation in defense and
security.305
301
American Forces Press Service. “Coalition Partners Increase Support in Iraq.”
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=24733
302
Wikipedia. “Singapore-United States Relations.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore-United_States_relations
303
TradeStats Express. “Singapore.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=no0h1555k1cs4bjt2ebaun
55-2008-11-19-15-41-26
304
Global Policy Forum. “Companies From All Over Seek a Piece of Action Rebuilding Iraq.”
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/after/2003/0521companies.htm
305
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Singapore.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2798.htm
89
CHAPTER FOUR: Economic Necessity
As the previous chapter demonstrated, many countries chose to support the U.S.-led
Coalition hoping for economic gain.
However, some countries did not have a choice in
supporting the Coalition due to simple economic realities. This was the case for many small
Pacific Island nations, whose small economies were dependent on United States aid or revenue
from basing rights to cover a significant portion of their budgets. Refusing to support the
Coalition entailed risking the loss of these critical revenue streams. This was not a risk any of
these nations could afford to take. The following sections introduce each of these economically
dependent nations, their historical association with the U.S. and the circumstances that mandated
their support for the Coalition of the Willing.
Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau
The White House did not publish a quote by Marshall Islands, Micronesia or Palau officials supporting the
Coalition
During World War II, the United States, on its way to Japan, invaded and occupied the
islands encompassing the present day Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and
Palau. After the war, the three became part of the United Nations Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands to be administered by the United States. U.S. administration of the territory continued
until 1986 when the Marshall Islands and Micronesia became sovereign states, followed by Palau
in 1994. Upon each nation‟s independence, they entered into a Compact of Free Association
(COFA) with the United States under which the U.S. provided guaranteed financial assistance
over a 15-year period in exchange for certain defense rights. The COFA agreements also gave
these nations access to many U.S. domestic programs, including disaster response and recovery
and hazard mitigation programs under the Federal Emergency Management Agency.306
306
Wikipedia. “Compact of Free Association.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compact_of_Free_Association
90
The COFA agreements proved to be mutually beneficial to both the island nations and the
United States. In the Marshall Islands, as a result of the agreement the U.S. continued the use of
its missile testing base at Kwajalein Atoll. The base was also important to the local economy, as
Marshallese land owners received rent for the base, and a large number of Marshallese worked
there.307 Through the COFA the Marshall Islands also received more than US$1 billion in aid
from the U.S. between 1986 and 2002, the main source of revenue for the economy - critical to
an island with few natural resources.308 Micronesia also benefited appreciably from the COFA,
receiving some US$1.3 billion in grant aid between 1986 and 2001. 309 This aid, nearly US$100
million per year, made up an estimated 57 percent of the government‟s budget in the late
1990s.310 Palau, where the government is the major employer on the island, also relies heavily
on the US$700 million it has received since 1994 as a result of the COFA.311
Although the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau are each sovereign nations and full
members of the UN, their governments are almost entirely dependent on the U.S. for funding
through the COFA. In fact, they have always voted with the U.S. with respect to UN General
Assembly resolutions. Weighing the pros and cons of supporting the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq
was probably not a lengthy or difficult process for the three island nations. As the Marshall
Islands and Micronesian COFA expired in 2001, intense negotiations had been underway for two
307
Wikipedia. “Marshall Islands.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_islands
CIA. “World Factbook: Marshall Islands.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/rm.html
309
CIA. “World Factbook: Micronesia.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fm.html
310
Newnham, Dr. Randall E. “‟Coalition of the Bribed and Bullied?‟ U.S. Economic Linkage and the Iraq War
Coalition.” Paper presented at the 47 th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association San Diego, CA,
March 2006.
311
CIA. “World Factbook: Palua.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ps.html
308
91
years toward amending a new COFA.312 They rightly recognized that an anti-war stance might
incite a negative U.S. reaction.
All three nations limited their Coalition involvement to political support - none
possessing a military of their own. Palau symbolically offered its ports and airfields to the effort,
but the offer was declined as Palau is thousands of miles away from Iraq. 313 In return for their
support, U.S. President George W. Bush signed an amended COFA in December 2003,
providing US$3.5 billion in financial aid to the Marshall Islands and Micronesia over the next 20
years and allowing the continued use of Kwajalein Atoll as a U.S. military missile tracking
station.314 Palau positioned itself nicely for a new COFA when its present one expires in
2009.315
Tonga
The White House did not publish a quote by Tongan officials supporting the Coalition
Tonga was a British protectorate from 1900 until 1970 when it achieved independence.
A small island nation in the South Pacific, the country remains dependent on external aid and
remittances from Tongan communities overseas to offset its trade deficit (predominantly from
Australia, New Zealand and the United States).316 In addition to the United States, major aid
donors include neighbors New Zealand and Australia who also support the Tongan Defense
Forces (TDF) with small in-country detachments of military technicians.317 The United States
provides military training to the TDF while conducting humanitarian civic action projects in
312
Newnham, Dr. Randall E. “‟Coalition of the Bribed and Bullied?‟ U.S. Economic Linkage and the Iraq War
Coalition.” Paper presented at the 47 th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association San Diego, CA,
March 2006.
313
Global Policy Forum. “Many Willing, But Few Able.”
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/armtwist/2003/0325manywill.htm
314
Pacific Islands Report. “Bush Signs $3.5 Billion Pacific Compact.”
http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2003/December/12-18-01.htm
315
Wikipedia. “Compact of Free Association.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compact_of_Free_Association
316
CIA. “World Factbook.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html
317
Wikipedia. “Tonga.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tonga
92
Tonga through the U.S. Peace Corps. Their close contact and investments in Tonga have
facilitated U.S. and Tongan cooperation on a range of international issues.318
Subsequently, when the United States and its allies, Australia and United Kingdom,
asked for Tongan support for the Coalition of the Willing, the Tongan government readily gave
it. Out of the 450-man TDF, Tonga offered a 45-man contingent to participate in the post-war
reconstruction of Iraq. The U.S. paid for much of the expense of sending, equipping and
maintaining the Tongan troops in Iraq.319 For Tonga‟s defense forces, the troop deployment was
numerically significant, however the political risk was minimal and the contribution enabled
Tonga to maintain positive relations with the U.S., the U.K. and the two regional powers
Australia and New Zealand.
Angola
The White House did not publish a quote by Angolan officials supporting the Coalition
Angola achieved independence from Portugal in 1975, only to spend the next 27 years in
civil war as it became one of the many fronts on which the United States and the Soviet Union
confronted each other during the Cold War years, each vying for influence through competing
factions. Fighting ended in 2002, with the U.S.-supported Lusaka Protocol, establishing a fragile
peace. The war years had devastated the country, leaving up to 1.5 million people dead and four
million displaced.320, 321
Since war's end, the U.S. helped Angola establish security, encourage transition to
democratic governance and promote economic prosperity. Of paramount interest to the U.S.
were Angola‟s rich oil reserves. In these reserves lay Angola‟s future. In fact, they prompted a
318
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Tonga.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/16092.htm
Honoluluadvertiser.com. “Tonga troops prepare for Iraq duty.”
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2007/Sep/03/ln/hawaii709030308.html
320
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Angola.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6619.htm
321
CIA. “Anglola.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html
319
93
visit by United States Secretary of State Colin Powell in September 2002. Already the ninthlargest supplier of oil to the U.S., the U.S. saw in Angola an opportunity to develop a largely
untapped resource and diversify U.S. oil supply out of the Middle East.
The years following 2002 revealed increasing U.S. influence in the resource-rich but
impoverished Angola. Angola began to increasingly rely on the U.S. market as U.S. imports
from Angola increased over 400 percent between 2001 and 2007, from US$3 billion to US$12.5
billion per year.322 With the boom in exports to the U.S., Angola‟s gross domestic product
(GDP) rose sharply, growing more than 15 percent per year from 2004 to 2007. The increase in
exports to the U.S. and Angolan economic growth were almost entirely supported by increases in
oil production, the revenues of which accounted for some 85 percent of Angolan GDP. 323 The
economic growth was largely stimulated by an estimated US$26 billion in U.S. investment in the
Angolan oil sector between 2003 and 2007.324
When Angola chose to politically support the U.S.-led Coalition in 2003, these economic
rewards were still future projections. The Angolan government needed the U.S. to ensure the
stability of the country, enable U.S. foreign investment, and begin pumping oil. If this was not a
large enough incentive for Angolan leaders, there were also purported threats by the U.S. to
curtail some US$20 million in humanitarian assistance if Angola did not support the Coalition.325
Utilizing U.S.-led development of the Angolan oil reserves as a carrot and the threat of
322
TradeStatsExpress. “Angola.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=eg3lio45fbvlc045yb45ada
y-2008-10-2-12-32-51
323
Wikipedia. “Angola.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angola%E2%80%93United_States_relations
324
Newnham, Dr. Randall E. “‟Coalition of the Bribed and Bullied?‟ U.S. Economic Linkage and the Iraq War
Coalition.” Paper presented at the 47 th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association San Diego, CA,
March 2006.
325
Salon.com. “Coalition of the billing – or unwilling?”
http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2003/03/12/foreign_aid/index2.html
94
withholding humanitarian aid as a stick, the U.S. was able to guarantee Angolan support for the
Coalition of the Willing.
95
CHAPTER FIVE: Reconstruction Contracts
A final group of Coalition countries were not motivated by U.S. trade agreements or aid.
That is not to say that they did not need to preserve their economic status and maintain or
maximize their economic ties with the United States; however, they could exist without these
carrots and were economically independent enough to weather a U.S. stick. These countries
were among the strongest U.S. supporters in the Coalition. Collectively, they have been referred
to as the ideological allies of the United States. The term „ideological ally,‟ implies a shared
conviction that Saddam Hussein was a major threat. However, the word „threat‟ is ambiguous.
Was Hussein a physical „threat‟ to the national security of countries such as the United States,
Japan or the United Kingdom? No, these nations were thousands of miles away and militarily
more powerful than Iraq. Hussein did, however, pose a threat to the global free market economy
of which the U.S. was the primary guarantor of and which these countries had all profited
immeasurably from. Specifically, Hussein was a threat to the steady flow of oil emanating from
the Persian Gulf and oil was the grease that enabled the stable functioning of the global free
market economy. From this perspective, these nations were ideological allies in the sense that
they had a vested interest in the security and maintenance of the global free market economy and
would assist the U.S. to maintain it to the extent that was necessary and politically feasible.
These ideological partners of the U.S. also saw the invasion of Iraq as an investment opportunity.
They would see short term gains in the form of reconstruction contracts, which were being doled
out by the U.S. However, for all the attention reconstruction contracts have received, the real
prizes in post-Hussein Iraq were in developing and maintaining the country‟s oil sector. The
dividends from this investment had massive long-term potential. The following sections will
96
examine each of these so-called “ideological” allies in order to better understand their unique
motivations for supporting the U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing.
Australia
“The Government has decided to commit Australian forces to action to disarm Iraq because we believe it is right, it
is lawful and it's in Australia's national interest. We are determined to join other countries to deprive Iraq of its
weapons of mass destruction, its chemical and biological weapons, which even in minute quantities are capable of
causing death and destruction on a mammoth scale.”
-- Prime Minister Howard, March 20, 2003326
A British colony during the latter half of the 18th and 19th century, Australia gained
independence from Britain in 1901 but chose to remain part of the Commonwealth. Australia
has been active participant in international affairs since World War I and fought beside the
United Kingdom and United States in World War I and II. However, the shock of the British
defeat in Asia in 1942 and the threat of Japanese invasion forced Australia to turn from the
British to the United States as its most important ally and protector. Since 1951, Australia has
been a formal military ally of the U.S. under the auspices of the Australia, New Zealand and
United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) and has fought beside the U.S. in every significant
conflict to the present day.327, 328
The World War II experience, similarities in culture and historical background, and
shared democratic values have made U.S. relations with Australia exceptionally strong. The
friendship is reinforced by the wide range of common interests and similar views on most major
international questions.
Cooperation on security and economic issues is especially strong.
Australians across the political spectrum share the view that Australia's security depends on firm
326
White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
327
Wikipedia. “Australia.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australia
328
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Australia.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2698.htm
97
ties with the United States. Economically, the United States is Australia‟s third largest export
market, its largest source of imports and the largest investor in Australia.329
Given Australia‟s history of supporting the U.S. in international affairs, Australian
leaders were likely leaning towards the U.S. position on Iraq even before the U.S. asked for
support. However, there were at least three factors that nearly guaranteed Australian support.
First, Australia‟s Prime Minister of seven years, John Howard, was a strong supporter of U.S.
policy. He was well aware of the importance of ANZUS to Australia‟s future, especially in the
face of a rising China. Second, the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), a
preferential trade agreement between Australia and the United States modeled on the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), was under negotiation in 2003 and Australia did not
want to strain relations with the U.S. so close to completion. The third and perhaps most
important factor to Australia was maintaining stable oil supplies from the Middle East.
Australian Defense Minister, Brendan Nelson said, “Maintaining resource security in the Middle
East was a key factor behind the presence of Australian forces in Iraq.”330 The culmination of
these variables led Australia to become one of the most steadfast supports of the U.S.-led
Coalition of the Willing.
Australia, along with Poland, the U.K. and the U.S., was one of four nations to take part
in the initial invasion of Iraq. They committed 2,000 military personnel, including a squadron of
F/A-18 Hornet fighters and 150 SAS troops.331 The Australians were quickly rewarded for their
support. AUSTFA was put on a fast track and put into law by January 2005.332 As a result,
329
Wikipedia. “Australia-United States Relations.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australia%E2%80%93United_States_relations
330
BBC. “Australia „has Iraq oil interest.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6272168.stm
331
Wikipedia. “Governments‟ positions pre-2003 invasion of Iraq.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governments%27_positions_pre-2003_invasion_of_Iraq
332
Wikipedia. “Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AUSFTA
98
U.S.-Australian trade increased by some US$8 billion between 2003 and 2007.333 Australia also
leveraged its position as a strong ally to lobby for Iraq reconstruction contracts. Australian
Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, during his visit to Washington in early April 2003, lobbied
for Australian companies to be included in the initial US$1.9 billion in contracts to be put out for
tender by USAID.334
Denmark
"Only the Americans have the military strength to disarm Saddam and liberate Iraq. But we have an obligation to
help. We cannot just sail under a flag of convenience and let others fight for freedom and peace. There has in fact
been too much of that kind in the past in Denmark. If we mean anything seriously about our democratic values, then
we should also be ready to make a small contribution to the international coalition."
-- Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, March 26, 2003335
The Danish people have a long history dating back to the 8th century. Their more recent
history has been defined by their occupation by Nazi Germany during World War II. The
German ambivalence to Danish neutrality and the atrocities committed during the occupation
years convinced the Danes that neutrality was no longer a viable option. 336 Therefore, after the
war, Denmark became a leading proponent of international security organizations such as NATO
and the United Nations.337
Denmark‟s overarching foreign policy objectives and shared economic goals helped
develop strong U.S.-Danish relations. Like the U.S., Denmark has been a proponent of NATO
expansion and NATO activities in the Balkans. Denmark has also played an active role in the
War on Terrorism and Danish troops have supported U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Economically,
333
TradeStats Express. “Australia.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=zvibdc45rnveun55qpar0b2
4-2008-10-27-15-18-36
334
Global Policy Forum. “Australian Firms Eye Spoils of War in Post-Saddam Era.”
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/2003/0407aussie.htm
335
White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
336
Wikipedia. “Denmark.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark#20th_and_21st_centuries
337
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Denmark.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3167.htm
99
U.S.-Danish relations have developed through positive trade links.338 The U.S. is Denmark‟s
largest non-European trading partner, accounting for over US$5 billion in trade in 2002. 339
Given their shared foreign policy objectives it is not surprising that Denmark was one of
the first countries to join the Coalition of the Willing in 2003. What is interesting to note are two
motivations, perhaps overlooked, that assisted the Danes in arriving at this decision. The first
motivation was Thule Air Base, a U.S. Air Force base in Greenland, a Danish self-governing
territory. The U.S. wanted to use Thule to host an early warning radar facility as part of the U.S.
ballistic missile defense system. From a Danish perspective, hosting the base would bring
economic benefit and further tie Greenland and Denmark to the U.S. security apparatus. The
Danes did not want to strain relations with the U.S. before an agreement on Thule was
reached.340 A second Danish motivation for supporting the U.S.-led Coalition revolves around
the relationship between the Danish and U.S. governments and the Danish energy and shipping
company, A.P. Moller-Maersk Group. Maersk became involved with the U.S. Army and Navy
during the first Gulf War, when they provided the U.S. with the service of several ships at no
charge to transport some 500,000 U.S. troops to the Persian Gulf region.341 The U.S. Army and
Navy continued to use Maersk after the Gulf War, with Maersk winning transport contracts
worth US$257 million in 2000 and US$246 million in 2001. By August 2002, Maersk‟s
container ships had already delivered a third of all U.S. military equipment to the Gulf region in
anticipation of the 2003 invasion.342 If the U.S. invaded Iraq, Maersk stood to receive U.S.
338
Ibid.
TradeStats Express. “Denmark.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=1ruhd5eh2t5wlhnc0jncble
e-2008-10-27-16-43-32
340
Wikipedia. “Denmark-United States Relations.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark%E2%80%93United_States_relations
341
Newsvine. “Why Denmark Joined the Coalition of the Willing.”
http://benno.newsvine.com/_news/2007/06/15/783657-why-denmark-joined-the-Coalition-of-the-willing
342
Corpwatch. “Iraqi Port Weathers Danish Storm.” http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=13196
339
100
shipping contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars per year.
Maersk's position as
Denmark's largest company, as a dominant regional player in the North Sea oil and gas industry
and as the owner of the world's largest container shipping company, provided it with a
significant influence on Denmark's policy making to the extent that the company and its owners
have been accused of using this influence to advance their own motivations.343
Initially, Denmark did not offer overwhelming military support, sending only a
submarine and up to 70 soldiers in March 2003.344 They did, however, have close to 500 troops
in Iraq by March 2004.345 The Danes reward was three fold. First, in August 2004, the U.S.,
Danish, and Greenland Home Rule governments agreed on the basing of the early warning radar
to be updated at Thule Air Base in conjunction with agreements between the U.S. and Greenland
to enhance economic, technical and environmental cooperation.346 Second, as a member of the
Coalition, Danish companies were allowed to bid for Iraqi reconstruction contracts. Finally,
Maersk received contracts from the U.S. Army and Navy worth close to US$1.8 billion between
2003 and 2006.347
Italy
“The game is in play between those who historically have been committed to the liberty of men and those who have
transformed their country into a chamber of torture.”
-- Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, March 19, 2003348
Italy and its capital, Rome, have been a center for Western civilization for centuries.
Italy‟s recent history has been defined by its involvement in World War II. Invaded by both
343
Wikipedia. “A.P. Moller-Maersk Group.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maersk
OnlineAthens. “List of the „willing.‟” http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/032903/war_20030329058.shtml
345
Wikipedia. “Multinational force in Iraq.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multinational_force_in_Iraq
346
Wikipedia. “Denmark-United States Relations.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark%E2%80%93United_States_relations
347
Wikipedia. “A.P. Moller-Maersk Group.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maersk
348
White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
344
101
Nazi Germany and the Allied powers in 1943, the country became a battlefield for the remainder
of the war. Exhausted from years of fighting and occupied by the U.S. after the war, Italy
embraced the Marshall Plan, which was designed to help rebuild post-war Europe. The influx of
aid helped revive the Italian economy, which enjoyed steady grown through the 1950s and
1960s.349
The United States and Italy have enjoyed good relations in the post World War II
environment, largely defined by their military and economic cooperation. The two are NATO
allies and, through this relationship, Italy hosts important U.S. military forces, including the U.S.
Navy‟s Sixth Fleet. In addition to being a leading partner of the U.S. in the war against
terrorism, Italy has supported NATO operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania and Afghanistan. 350
The U.S. and Italy are also close economic partners. In 2002, total trade between the U.S. and
Italy totaled some US$34 billion.351
Despite their history of military and economic cooperation, Italian commitment to the
U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing was not a certainty. The Italian public was strongly opposed to
the war with some surveys indicating public opposition to the war as high as 88 percent. 352 What
the public did not fully comprehend, however, were the future realities facing Italy. Silvio
Berlusconi, the Italian Prime Minister, fully understood Italy‟s geostrategic situation. Italy had
few natural resources, with no substantial deposits of iron, coal or oil. Most raw materials
needed for manufacturing and more than 80 percent of the country's energy sources were
349
Wikipedia. “Italy.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italy#Prehistory_to_Roman_Empire
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Italy.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4033.htm
351
TradeStats Express. “Italy.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=l3j0jc55qfo2ij55pcn14fjy2008-10-28-14-33-16
352
European Political Science. “Public Views on the Iraq Crisis.”
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/publications/eps/onlineissues/autumn2003/feature/kritzinger.htm
350
102
imported.353 Berlusconi, a realist and seeing the world through a paradigm of neo-conservative
values, saw the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq as an opportunity to secure a steady supply of energy
resources, essential for Italy‟s continued economic growth.
Berlusconi‟s Italy became one of U.S. President George W. Bush‟s strongest backers in
the Coalition. Initially, Italy offered logistical help and the use of military bases. However,
throughout the first year of occupation, Italy substantially increased their role, deploying some
3,000 troops to Iraq.354 Beyond the maintenance of the global economic order, quantifiable
benefits for Italian support included an increase in bilateral trade between Italy and the U.S. by
144 percent between 2002 and 2007.355 In addition, Italian companies have taken part in Iraq
reconstruction contracts.
Japan
From the time of the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, until last year's UN Resolution 1441,
there has been a strong consciousness of the threat of weapons of mass destruction, not only against the American
people, but also against the rest of the world, including the Japanese people. How to rid the world of such weapons
of mass destruction is now a major challenge for the international community and will continue to be in the future...
President Bush has said that the U.S. is seeking to disarm Iraq and to liberate the Iraqi people. I agree with that
strategy. Japan, too, supports the policy course of President Bush.”
-- Prime Minister Koizumi, March 20, 2003356
Japanese history, dating back thousands of years, has been defined recently by their
defeat by the United States and the Allied powers during World War II. The U.S. occupied and
administered Japan in the immediate post-war years, using the time to enact political, economic
and social reforms. In 1960, the two nations signed the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which stated
that the two countries would develop their defense capacities in tandem and that the U.S. would
353
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Italy.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4033.htm
Wikipedia. “Multinational force in Iraq.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multinational_Coalition_in_Iraq
355
TradeStats Express. “Italy.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=l3j0jc55qfo2ij55pcn14fjy2008-10-28-14-33-16
356
White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
354
103
come to Japan‟s defense should it come under attack. It was understood, however, that Japan
could not come to the defense of the United States because it was against Japan‟s new pacifist
constitution to send armed forces overseas. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, based on the two
countries‟ shared vital interests, including the stability of the Asia-Pacific region and the
promotion of political and economic freedoms, would define the U.S.-Japanese relationship for
decades to come.357, 358
Japan‟s economy grew rapidly from the 1950s until the early 1990s creating a level of
economic tension with the U.S. The friction dissipated by the early 1990s as China displaced
Japan as the greatest perceived economic threat to the U.S. and the U.S. and Japan rallied
together against a potential security threat in North Korea. The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the
cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy and the two countries maintain close economic and
military relations. Bilateral trade between the two countries reached US$175 billion in 2002.359
In military matters, Japan has strongly supported U.S. counter-terrorism efforts after September
11, 2001, in large part by providing logistical support for U.S. and Coalition forces in the Indian
Ocean.360
Japanese support for the U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing marked a significant turning
point in Japan's history, as it represents the first foreign deployment of Japanese troops since the
end of World War II, excluding deployments conducted under United Nations auspices. Japan
was able to skirt its constitutional ban on Japanese military involvement overseas by not taking
part in the invasion itself. Instead, Japanese forces engaged in logistical support for the U.S.
357
Wikipedia. “History of Japan.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Japan#Second_SinoJapanese_war_and_World_War_II
358
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Japan.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4142.htm
359
TradeStats Express. “Japan.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=53s5vhy3b5xd0m45hdh0x
d45-2008-10-28-16-32-34
360
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Japan.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4142.htm
104
Navy and reconstruction efforts, which the Japanese government interpreted as non-combat
operations. The deployment was largely symbolic as it came at relatively little financial or
human cost to Japan and had a negligible effect on the strategic situation in Iraq. Japanese
motivations were geared toward maintaining positive relations with the U.S. so as to perpetuate a
favorable economic relationship and encourage a continued U.S. military presence in Japan.361
A second motivation for Japanese support of the Coalition revolved around Japan‟s almost
complete dependence on foreign sources of oil imports. Japan, like the U.S., was wed to Middle
Eastern oil for the near future and needed a secure supply of this resource well into the 21st
century.362 In addition to securing the necessary oil supplies for their economic future and
assuring a continued U.S. presence in Japan for their future security, the final Japanese
motivation was the receipt of Iraqi reconstruction contracts.363
Netherlands
“Peace is vulnerable. That is shown when a regime chooses for years the path of threat and terror. The
international community must then patiently abide by international agreements and thus try to dispel the threat.
That patience can be very great but not endless. Because then the basis of law and peace is itself jeopardized.
Saddam Hussein is a great danger to law and peace. Virtually all the countries in the world are in agreement on
that... he takes no notice of the agreements which the international community has made time after time with him...
Hence the Netherlands gives political support to the action against Saddam Hussein which has been started... The
action is now getting under way. But, hopefully, a time will very quickly come when the weapons will fall silent.
Then we will have to do everything in our power to help the people in Iraq with their country's reconstruction.”
-- Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, March 20, 2003364
The Netherlands remained neutral in World War I and intended to do so again in World
War II. However, Nazi Germany disregarded Dutch neutrality and invaded the country in 1940,
overrunning it in five days. The country was liberated in by the Allied powers in May 1945. It
was a bitter celebration, with much of the country in ruin from fierce fighting during the war. In
361
Iraqtimeline. “This Far and No Further.” http://www.iraqtimeline.com/mar03/mar03week1.html
Ibid.
363
BBC. “US says „Coalition of the Willing‟ grows.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2870487.stm
364
White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
362
105
need of considerable reconstruction, the Netherlands was a prime recipient of aid from the U.S.
Marshall Plan.365
After the war, the Dutch aimed to restore their economy and solidify their security ties
with neighboring states. Dutch foreign policy reflected these goals, focusing on developing
Euro-Atlantic relationships through organizations such as NATO and the UN.
Active
involvement in these organizations augmented a shared liberal economic outlook and a
commitment to trade that fostered positive bilateral relations between the U.S. and the
Netherlands. The United States and the Netherlands shared similar positions on an array of
international issues, resulting in a wide array of military and economic cooperation. Militarily,
the Dutch allied with the U.S. in the Korean War and the first Gulf War and have been active in
global peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan. They have also played a
leading role in the global fight against terrorism, contributing personnel and material.366, 367 The
U.S. and the Netherlands have also become strong economic partners. The Netherlands is the
third-largest direct foreign investor in the United States, while the U.S. is the third-largest direct
foreign investor in the Netherlands.368 Bilateral trade between the two nations reached some
US$28 billion in 2002.369
The Dutch decision to join the Coalition of the Willing can largely derived from their
desire to maintain positive relations with the U.S.
The Dutch hoped that continued good
relations would yield two dividends. First, they hoped for preferential trade deals from the
365
Wikipedia. “Netherlands.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netherlands
Ibid.
367
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Netherlands.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3204.htm
368
Ibid.
369
TradeStats Express. “Netherlands.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=xiy4ftfis4vykteqmt4gyz45
-2008-11-20-15-59-3
366
106
lucrative rebuilding of Iraq.370 They also likely recognized the U.S. as the only power able to
provide the security that was necessary to maintain a stable supply of Middle Eastern oil.
To achieve these ends the Dutch provided three Patriot missile defense systems to
Turkey, its NATO ally, during the initial invasion of Iraq.371 After the invasion, the Dutch sent
some 1,400 troops to southern Iraq with a mandate to help with reconstruction and to provide
security and stability in a region.372 In conjunction with their support for the Coalition, there has
been an increase in bilateral trade between the U.S. and the Netherlands by 182 percent since
2002. The Dutch have also been a benefactor of Iraq reconstruction contracts.373
Spain
“Right up until the end, the Iraqi regime defied international law by ignoring its obligations to disarm... it threw
away its last chance... With a full sense of our responsibilities, the government of this nation supports the reestablishment of international law so that conditions for peace and security prevail.”
-- President Jose Maria Aznar, March 20, 2003374
Unlike much of the rest of Europe, Spain was able to retain its neutrality throughout
World War II. It did, however, follow a pro-Axis policy, leading to Allied isolation at the
beginning of the postwar period, and preventing Spain‟s inclusion into institutions such as the
UN. However, as the Cold War intensified it became strategically important for the U.S. to
create a military presence on the Iberian Peninsula, next to the Mediterranean Sea and the Strait
of Gibraltar, in order to protect southern Europe. This strategic necessity resulted in a 1953 visit
to Spain by U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, resulting in the Pact of Madrid.375 The 1953
370
Iraqtimes. “This Far and No Further.” http://www.iraqtimeline.com/mar03/mar03week1.html
NATO. “NATO defensive assistance to Turkey.” http://www.nato.int/issues/turkey/index.html
372
Aljazeera. “Dutch troops in Iraq to stay until 2005.”
http://english.aljazeera.net/archive/2004/06/2008410113036507985.html
373
Crouch, Gregory. “Dutch Send 1,100 Troops to Iraq, Relieving as Many U.S. Marines.” New York Times. April
2, 2003. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9506E5DF133EF931A3575BC0A9659C8B63
374
White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
375
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Spain.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2878.htm
371
107
accord called for the U.S. to contribute economic and military aid to Spain and in return the U.S.
was to be permitted to construct and utilize air and naval bases on Spanish territory.376
The Pact of Madrid initiated the process of integrating Spain into Western institutions.
Spain was admitted to the UN in 1955 and in 1959 became the recipient of an International
Monetary Fund stabilization plan geared toward liberalizing trade and improving foreign direct
investment. Spain took even greater strides toward integration with the West following the death
of its authoritarian president, General Franco in 1975.
After his death, Spain embraced
democracy, sought to expand diplomatic relations and entered the European Community. In
1982 they cemented security relations with the West after achieving NATO membership.377
Building on their NATO relationship, Spain authorized the United States to use certain facilities
at Spanish military installations under the 1989 Agreement on Defense Cooperation. 378 In
recognition of U.S. security support, Spain backed U.S. interventions in the former Yugoslavia in
the 1990s and Afghanistan in 2001.
Despite their alliance with the U.S. a majority of the Spanish population was against the
invasion of Iraq. In the face of strong public opposition, the Spanish government still chose to
support the U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing, most likely for three strategic reasons. First, Spain
wanted to build upon its recent support of U.S. security policies and to maintain a U.S. military
presence in Spain. Second, Spain had become a key ally in the fight against terrorism and
wanted to ensure U.S. and Western support in its efforts to suppress its own domestic terrorist
groups. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar shared
the same neo-conservative ideology as U.S. President George W. Bush and the two shared
376
Wikipedia. “Pact of Madrid.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pact_of_Madrid
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Spain.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2878.htm
378
Wikipedia. “Spain-United States Relations.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish-American_relations#cite_noteautogenerated4-35
377
108
exceptionally good relations.
Aznar actively encouraged and supported the Bush
administration's foreign policy and the U.S. invasion of Iraq, defending it on the basis of secret
intelligence allegedly containing evidence of the Iraqi government's nuclear proliferation.379
The Spanish initial contribution to the Iraqi invasion was minimal, including use of
NATO bases and medical support vessels. By 2004, however, they deployed up to 1,300 troops
to southern Iraq. In return for their commitment to the Coalition, the U.S. revised the 1989
Agreement on Defense Cooperation, reflecting a continued assurance of a U.S. military presence
in Spain. Spain also received economic benefits from Coalition membership. They realized a
nearly 200 percent increase in U.S. imports from Spain between 2002 and 2007.380 Spain also
became eligible for lucrative Iraq reconstruction contracts.381
United Kingdom
"If the only means of achieving the disarmament of Iraq of weapons of mass destruction is the removal of the
regime, then the removal of the regime has to be our objective. It is important that we realize that we have come to
this position because we have given every opportunity for Saddam voluntarily to disarm, that the will - not just of
this country but of the United Nations - now has to be upheld."
-- Prime Minister Tony Blair, March 20, 2003382
One of the most storied countries in the world, British culture has touched almost every
corner of the world. The United Kingdom developed the world‟s first industrialized economy,
enabling it to govern a global empire from a small island nation. The British Empire played a
leading role in global affairs for some 300 years until the economic costs of two world wars and
the decline of its empire in the latter half of the 20th century diminished its influence. Since the
end of the Second World War the U.K. has sought to remain a leading actor in global issues by
379
Ibid.
TradeStats Express. “Spain.”
http://tse.export.gov/MapFrameset.aspx?MapPage=NTDMapDisplay.aspx&UniqueURL=4n43vzzgdgif35552njjhh5
5-2008-10-31-14-38-9
381
Global Policy Forum. “Companies From All Over Seek a Piece of Action Rebuilding Iraq.”
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/after/2003/0521companies.htm
382
White House. “Statements of Support from Coalition.” March 26, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030326-7.html
380
109
closely aligning itself with the U.S.383 The two countries have continually consulted on global
problems while sharing major security policy objectives.384
The exceptionally close relationship between the U.S. and U.K. reflects the common
language, ideals and democratic practices of the two nations. The United States maintains close
relationships with many countries; however, the level of cooperation and sharing between the
U.S. and U.K. in military planning, execution of military operations, nuclear weapon technology
and intelligence has been described as "unparalleled.” Military relations have been strengthened
through their alliance during both world wars, their roles as founding members of NATO, the
shared experience in the Korean conflict, and the first Persian Gulf War.385 Economic relations
between the two nations are also extremely strong. The United Kingdom is the fifth-largest
market for U.S. exports and the sixth-largest supplier of U.S. imports. U.S. exports of goods and
services to the United Kingdom in 2006 totaled US$92 billion, while U.S. imports from the U.K.
totaled US$93 billion.386
Beginning with early efforts to get U.N. approval for an Iraq invasion all the way through
to the present day, the U.K. has been and continues to be the strongest supporter of the U.S. in
the Coalition of the Willing. Officially stated motivations for the invasion were identical to
those of the U.S., including, “to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to end
Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people."387 Unofficially, there must
have also been a very real need to on the part of UK officials to demonstrate their loyalty to the
relationship with the U.S. and through that loyalty have a voice in the reshaping of a post383
Wikipedia. “United Kingdom-United States relations.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_KingdomUnited_States_relations
384
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: United Kingdom.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3846.htm
385
Wikipedia. “Special Relationship (U.S.-U.K.).” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Relationship_(US-UK)
386
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: United Kingdom.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3846.htm
387
The White House. “President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom.”
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html
110
Saddam Hussein Middle East. Another unstated motivation, although a very powerful one, was
a desire to capitalize on Coalition membership to receive lucrative Iraq reconstruction contracts
as well as position themselves for contracts as Iraq privatized certain industries.
The British committed some 45,000 troops, planes and warships to the invasion. Their
involvement in the invasion and post-invasion peacekeeping and reconstruction activities was
second only to the U.S. The return on their investment is still uncertain. Although they profited
an estimated US$1.6 billion from security and reconstruction contracts, 388 the war has been
longer, more expensive and more unpopular than could have been anticipated. With the end of
the conflict yet to be written, history will no doubt reserve judgment on the British as they will
the Americans.
388
Verkaik, Robert. “British Companies Making a Fortune out of Iraq Conflict.” Independent. March 13, 2006.
111
Conclusion
The United States, through its tremendous economic wealth, wielded sizable
influence in the formation of the Coalition of the Willing. In creating the Coalition, the U.S.
utilized three primary economic tools: trade agreements, economic aid and Iraq reconstruction
contracts. Part two of this study looked specifically at how the United States was able to
accomplish this task. Organizationally, Part two was presented in three chapters, one devoted to
each of the primary economic tools utilized by the U.S, trade agreements, economic aid and
reconstruction contracts. Each chapter then presented an analysis of the Coalition countries that
joined in the invasion of Iraq out of lust for trade agreements with the U.S., economic aid and/or
Iraq reconstruction contracts, respectively. When examining each country, it was relevant to
answwer five basic questions:
1) How has the history of the country contributed the paradigm through which its people
and leaders see the world?
2) What is the history of U.S. involvement in their economy?
3) What variables was the U.S. able to manipulate to influence the country‟s decision
makers?
4) What did each country contribute to the Coalition‟s effort in Iraq?
5) What was each country‟s return on their investment in Coalition membership?
Through understanding the answers to these questions it becomes possible to grasp the
impact of the receipt or withholding of U.S. economic largesse had on the formation of the
Coalition. These economic incentives combined with security enticements enabled the United
States to create a Coalition to invade Iraq, while perpetuating the appearance of international
112
legitimacy for the U.S.-led invasion and addressing the security and economic desires of its
fellow Coalition members.
113
CONCLUSION
114
“The enjoyment of power inevitably corrupts the judgment of reason, and perverts its liberty.”
Immanuel Kant
In March 2003, 46 countries publicly committed (up to 13 more made non-public
commitments) to support the United States in its efforts to topple Saddam Hussein, bring
democracy to Iraq and eliminate the presumed threat of weapons of mass destruction. Nearly six
years later, Hussein had been found, tried and executed, and democratic elections were taking
place in Iraq. At the same time, however, the search for weapons of mass destruction had proved
unsuccessful and sectarian violence had at times threatened to engulf the country in near
anarchy. Through these successes and struggles, some countries have joined the Coalition of the
Willing in Iraq (Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Moldova, New Zealand,
Norway and Thailand). Despite these additions, most of the original Coalition has pulled out of
Iraq. In fact, by January 2009 only five Coalition countries remained, all of whom were to set to
pull out by July 31, 2009, leaving the United States as the only country with forces in Iraq.
The goal of this examination has been to understand the motivation for countries to join
the U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing in its invasion of Iraq despite widespread opposition to the
invasion among global leaders and the greater public. The first step in understanding these
motivations was to introduce the historical context of each country, each country‟s relationship
with the United States within this context, and uncover some of the variables influencing each
country in their decision to join the Coalition. Universally, these variables proved to revolve
around national security and economic status.
This is relevant because the evidence that
countries joined the Coalition entirely for security and/or economic reasons exposes any
statements made by countries when they joined the Coalition in March 2003 (quoted throughout
this paper) as false, or at least of secondary importance. A timeline of Coalition withdrawals
from Iraq will further illuminate each country‟s true motivations.
115
WHO LEFT THE COALITION
If understanding the context behind each country‟s support helps reveal each countries
motivations for joining the Coalition, contextualizing each countries‟ time commitment to Iraq
reveals their level of need or want of the United States. It is relevant to briefly define what is
meant by needs and wants and how the United States is able to address these issues. A need is
something that you have to have. The example of a need relevant for this study would be national
security. A country needs national security; else all other concerns are moot. They also need a
certain level of income to sustain basic governing responsibilities. A want is something you
would like to have. In our study, many countries wanted U.S. military aid to combat domestic
insurgencies, while others wanted trade agreements or reconstruction contracts. The United
States is able to provide for these needs and wants through a combination of security and trade
agreements and foreign aid. It is important to note that the distinction between countries with
wants and others with needs is that countries with wants could have said, “No” to the U.S.
request to join the Coalition. Countries needing the U.S. for security or economic reasons had no
such luxury.
Of the original 46 countries announced in the U.S.-led coalition of the willing in March
2003 and the seven countries that publicly joined after the invasion, only five remained with
troops in Iraq by January 2009. The events and circumstances contributing to these 48 nations
decisions to leave Iraq and the timing of their departure shed some light on their motivations for
joining the Coalition and warrant some exploration.
Coalition Withdrawals 2003
Interestingly, all of the 14 countries that left the Coalition in 2003 never contributed
forces to Iraq. Uzbekistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, Colombia, Afghanistan, Kuwait,
116
Costa Rica, Panama, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau and Angola only offered political
support. From the perspective of this paper, their contribution to the Coalition, or more properly
stated, to the U.S. policy, was to embellish the perception of international support for the U.S.
invasion of Iraq. Having escaped the fate of Yemen, which after its 1990 UNSC “No” vote
against authorizing military action against Iraq lost US$70 million in U.S. aid, the initial conflict
subsiding and the occupation underway, these 14 countries easily drifted off the radar after their
individual goals had been achieved. The graph below provides a consolidated perspective
regarding the number and type of Coalition withdrawals beginning in 2003. The bar is divided
by the five motivation types presented in this paper: security from Russia and military aid, which
were presented in chapter one as security concerns and three forms of economic motivation
including trade agreements, necessity and ideology or reconstruction contracts, presented in
chapter two.
Chronology of Coalition Countries Leaving Iraq
16
14
12
4
Ideology/Reconstruction Contracts
10
2
Economic Necessity
8
Trade Agreements
6
4
Military Aid
7
Security from Russia
2
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
117
On aggregate, the majority of countries which left the Coalition in 2003 follow an easily
observed trend. These 14 largely fell into one of two categories; (1) those that wanted military
aid and (2) those that needed to support the Coalition out of economic necessity. Costa Rica and
Panama, both wanting trade agreements, were exceptions. However, instead of being viewed as
an exception they should be seen as the harbinger for the 2004 exodus from Iraq of other DRCAFTA countries. Since neither Costa Rica nor Panama contributed military forces, leaving the
Coalition was logistically much easier for them than other DR-CAFTA countries. Uzbekistan, a
former Soviet Republic, was also an outlier to the 2003 trend. Remember, however, that
Uzbekistan was never fully in the U.S. camp of supporters. Perhaps seeing evidence of U.S.
support for the impending color revolutions across central Asia Uzbekistan did not want to tie
itself down with the U.S. in Iraq. Also influencing Uzbek decision making were Russian efforts
to bring Uzbekistan back into its circle of influence, and limit the U.S.‟s growing footprint in
Central Asia.
Coalition Withdrawals 2004
The remaining 34 members of the Coalition all contributed forces to Iraq in some
fashion. Most of these countries have since pulled their troops, although at varying times and for
varying reasons. The first departures began in early 2004 with ten countries leaving, including
Spain, Nicaragua, Honduras, Dominican Republic, the Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand,
Iceland, Norway and Hungary. The exodus was led by one of the U.S.‟s strongest initial
supporters, Spain. The Spanish departure from the coalition was unexpected. Three days before
Spain‟s general elections, a Muslim terrorist group, with reported links to Al Qaeda, bombed the
Madrid train station, killing 191 people.389 The bombing tipped the scales against incumbent
389
Wikipedia. “2004 Madrid train bombings.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madrid_Train_Bombing
118
Prime Minister José María Aznar, who had strongly supported the Bush administration in the
lead up to the invasion, and resulted in the election of socialist José Luis Rodríguez-Zapatero as
Prime Minister.
Zapatero had campaigned on a platform opposing the Iraq invasion and
promptly withdrew Spanish soldiers from Iraq less than a month after taking office, a move
supported by massive public support.390
The Spanish withdrawal prompted the countries with troops under Spanish command
including Nicaragua, Honduras, and Dominican Republic to also exit Iraq, citing financial
reasons, lack of domestic support or unwillingness to participate in combat operations. 391 Other
countries followed in 2004, citing increasing violence, the need for troops elsewhere or an
expiration of mandate as reasons for leaving.
For instance, the Philippines brought their
contingent home to secure the release of a Filipino hostage. Regardless of their stated reasons
for leaving, these countries did share some notable similarities.
Most of them were more economically sound than the previous 14 nations to leave,
indicating that the U.S. could probably not rely entirely on economic and military aid to
influence these countries‟ membership in the Coalition. These countries largely contributed noncombat troops including engineers, doctors and aid workers.
When they achieved their goals
of securing trade agreements or reconstruction contracts, they departed Iraq. Their relatively
small numbers of non-combat troops were not missed by the Coalition. The exception to this
trend in 2004 was Spain, whose government could not have foreseen the events leading to their
exit. The Spanish fate was a forewarning to other Western democracies who struggled to
maintain their support for the Coalition in the face of increasingly hostile public opinion. The
Zapatero administration fulfilled their election mandate to pull its troops from Iraq; however, the
390
Wikipedia. “Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_Luis_Rodr%C3%ADguez_Zapatero
391
Wikipedia. “Multinational force in Iraq.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multinational_force_in_Iraq
119
motivations for joining the Coalition were still very real. Spain became one of the largest
contributors to the Iraq Stabilization and Reconstruction Fund (US$248 million).392
In total, with the exception of the Spanish, who experienced an unexpected change in
government, the countries pulling out of the Coalition in 2004 did so in a coordinated manner
after achieving their goals. These goals appear to primarily be of an economic nature, including
securing trade agreements and Iraq reconstruction contracts.
Chronology of Coalition Countries Leaving Iraq
16
14
12
4
Ideology/Reconstruction Contracts
10
2
8
Economic Necessity
5
Trade Agreements
6
4
Military Aid
7
2
0
Security from Russia
3
1
1
1
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Coalition Withdrawals 2005
The trend of Coalition withdrawals in 2005 took a noteworthy change with only two
countries leaving, Portugal and the Netherlands.
Portugal‟s withdrawal of 128 military
policemen in February was negligible. Like Iceland, who pulled its three troops in 2004, the
Portuguese commitment had been small, primarily driven by a desire for the United States to
maintain a military base on each country‟s respective soil. The Netherlands also followed a
392
Blanchard, Christopher M. and Catherine Marie Dale. “Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Stabilization and
Reconstruction.” Congressional Research Service. December 26, 2007.
120
trend set in 2004, that of Spain.
A strong initial supporter of the invasion, Netherlands Prime
Minister Jan Peter Balkenende had been facing strong public opposition toward the increasingly
violent war in Iraq and a stretched military which was also deploying troops to Afghanistan and
Bosnia-Herzegovina.393
Sensing his own potential demise if the trend in Iraq continued,
Balkenende succumbed to domestic political pressures and agreed to pull Dutch troops from Iraq
beginning in March 2005.
Chronology of Coalition Countries Leaving Iraq
16
14
12
4
Ideology/Reconstruction Contracts
10
2
8
Economic Necessity
5
Trade Agreements
6
4
Military Aid
7
2
0
Security from Russia
3
1
1
1
1
1
2003
2004
2005
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
Coalition Withdrawals 2006
Similar to 2005, 2006 would see only two Coalition withdrawals, Italy and Singapore.
The year also witnessed a new trend in which Coalition countries continued to face domestic
pressure against the war, but instead of pulling out of the Coalition, found creative loop holes to
legitimize their contribution. This deft act of balancing public opinion with the desire for
reaping the rewards of a reconstructed Iraq was personified by the Japanese.
393
Bnet. “Dutch plans for pullout from southern Iraq remains unchanged.”
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_/ai_n6270413
121
A Japanese reconstruction mission was operating in the southern Iraqi city of Samawah
in Muthanna province with Dutch forces providing security.394 With the 2005 Dutch withdrawal,
the Japanese had an opportunity to appease public opinion and leave the Coalition. However,
unlike the Dutch, the Japanese did not leave the Coalition. Still a strong supporter of U.S.
policy, the Japanese instead pulled their ground forces out of Iraq, but only as far as Kuwait.
This mollified the Japanese public and enabled Japan‟s continued support of the Coalition by
airlifting personnel and materials from Kuwait to Iraq.395
Like the Japanese, the Italians also withdrew ground forces from Iraq in 2006. The
Italian decision seems to have been influenced by their domestic politics as well as the security
situation in Iraq. Silvio Burlusconi, the Italian Prime Minister in 2003, had shared George W.
Bush‟s reasoning for invading Iraq and had supported the U.S.-led Coalition despite
overwhelming public opinion against the war. In April 2006, Burlusconi lost his office to
Romano Prodi, a center-left politician, who had been elected largely on his campaign promise to
withdraw troops from Iraq. By September 2006, the Italians handed over control of Dhi Qar
province to the Iraqi security forces and left the Coalition.396 However, like the Spanish, the
Italians recognized the value in supporting the Coalition; they continued to support the Iraq
Stabilization and Reconstruction Fund, contributing US$835 million.397
Singapore also effectively ceased support for the Coalition in 2006, even if they officially
maintained one officer in Baghdad until 2008. For three years, the Singapore Navy had been
394
Bnet. “Japan wary of possible Dutch pullout from Iraq.”
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_/ai_n6264476
395
Wikipedia. “Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_Iraq_Reconstruction_and_Support_Group
396
Wikipedia. “Multinational force in Iraq.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multinational_force_in_Iraq
397
Ibid.
122
protecting Coalition and Iraqi ships in the Persian Gulf, enough time for the U.S.-Singapore Free
Trade Agreement to settle into place in January 2004. 398, 399
Chronology of Coalition Countries Leaving Iraq
16
14
12
4
Ideology/Reconstruction Contracts
10
2
8
Economic Necessity
5
Trade Agreements
6
4
Military Aid
7
2
0
Security from Russia
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2003
2004
2005
2006
0
2007
2008
2009
Coalition Withdrawals 2007
Mounting public opposition and the resulting political pressure led to the withdrawal of
two more western democracies, Slovakia and Denmark, in 2007. In the case of Slovakia, a new
government came to power led by Robert Fico. Rising to the post of Prime Minister in July, he
had promised to bring their troops home.400 For the Danes, an improved security situation in
southern Iraq allowed their leaders to acquiesce to mounting domestic political pressure. They
were aided by the fact that the British, whose command they were serving under, were beginning
a gradual draw-down of forces.401 Out of an estimated 8,500 British troops in southern Iraq,
398
Ibid.
Wikipedia. “US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USSingapore_Free_Trade_Agreement
400
Wikipedia. “Robert Fico.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fico
401
DefenseTalk.com. “Britain, Denmark to Pull Out Troops from Iraq.”
http://www.defencetalk.com/news/publish/wars/Britain_Denmark_to_Pull_Out_Troops_from_Iraq130010623.php
399
123
1,600 were withdrawn in February 2007 and a further 1,000 by December 2007. Denmark
withdrew all of its near 500 troops by December 2007.402
Arguably, the countries withdrawing in 2007 achieved both their goals and assisted the
U.S. in stabilizing Iraq, making the split more amenable. Motivated to solidify their national
security, Slovakia pulled out after having achieved its strategic goal of NATO membership. The
Danes were largely motivated by reconstruction contracts. Prior to their withdrawal from the
Coalition, Denmark‟s A.P. Moller-Maersk Group received over US$1.8 billion in U.S. contracts.
Although Denmark‟s governing officials were no longer able to support operations on the ground
in Iraq due to domestic pressures they did, like the Spanish and Italians, continue their financial
support, contributing US$62 million to the Iraq Stabilization and Reconstruction Fund.403
Chronology of Coalition Countries Leaving Iraq
16
14
12
4
Ideology/Reconstruction Contracts
10
2
8
Economic Necessity
5
Trade Agreements
6
4
Military Aid
7
2
0
402
403
Security from Russia
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Wikipedia. “Multinational force in Iraq.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multinational_force_in_Iraq
Ibid.
124
Coalition Withdrawals 2008
With 22 remaining members, the Coalition of the Willing saw 17 more departures in
2008, almost entirely from countries motivated by security concerns.
The security group
consisted largely of former Soviet republic or Soviet Bloc states including Poland, Lithuania,
Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Azerbaijan, Czech Republic, Ukraine, Moldova and
Bulgaria. Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and South Korea also exited in 2008.
Their long standing commitment to the Coalition reflected their true need for U.S. security
assistance. Two countries, Mongolia and Tonga, do not fit in with the trend of 2008 departures
but the exoduses of both are readily explained. Mongolia‟s 100 troops were guarding the main
Polish base, Camp Echo, and most-likely synchronized their pull-out with the Poles who also left
in 2008. For the Tongans, their withdrawal has more to do with their small numbers (55), the
improved security conditions around Camp Victory where they were assigned guard duty, the
general draw-down of U.S. forces in Iraq and most prominently the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces
Agreement, which required all non-U.S. troops to leave the country by July 2009.404
The nature of Coalition withdrawals in 2008 changed markedly from earlier years. From
the U.S. government‟s perspective, these withdrawals were not viewed as abandoning the
mission, but rather evidenced the success of the U.S. surge strategy, which began in early 2007,
and the improved capacity of the Iraqi security forces to control parts of the country. Two
important characteristics are relevant to note. First, the withdrawal of a majority of the countries
toward the end of the year signaled a coordinated withdrawal based on the end of the UN
mandate and not one dictated by any individual country‟s political motivations or dwindling
capacities. Their longevity in the face of international and domestic criticism suggests that these
countries would have stayed in Iraq as long as the U.S. needed them there. Secondly, at least 15
404
Wikipedia. “Multinational Force in Iraq.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multinational_force_in_Iraq
125
of the countries which withdrew in 2008 joined the Coalition, originally or belatedly, with
prominent security concerns. A further common denominator was geographic proximity to
Russia. As many were former Soviet Republics or Soviet Bloc states, their need for an American
security umbrella dominated their decision making process to the end.
The early returns on investment that each of the 15 nations received by joining the
Coalition were mixed. The U.S. helped Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria achieve NATO
membership and assisted with Macedonia‟s membership aspirations. They U.S. also acted as a
stabilizing force in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and South Korea, while investing in both
security and economic initiatives in Armenia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Azerbaijan and Moldova.
Some motivations for joining the coalition remained unmet, such as Poland and the Czech
Republic‟s desire to host parts of the U.S. missile defense shield, the completion of which
remains ambiguous and embroiled in a web of complicated international issues. Finally and
perhaps most distressing was the fate of Georgia.
Despite their prolonged Coalition
membership, they were left to fend for themselves when invaded by Russia in July 2008.
Chronology of Coalition Countries Leaving Iraq
18
1
1
16
14
12
5
4
Ideology/Reconstruction Contracts
10
Economic Necessity
2
8
Trade Agreements
5
Military Aid
6
4
Security from Russia
3
2
0
10
7
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
0
2008
2009
126
Coalition Withdrawals 2009
Nearly six years after the United States assembled a 46-nation strong Coalition of the
Willing, five members remain in Iraq: Estonia, El Salvador, Romania, Australia and the United
Kingdom. Their combined troop contribution is slightly more than 5,000 (40, 200, 500, 350 and
4,100 respectively). An Iraqi law requires their complete withdrawal from the country by July
31, 2009. Compared to the 144,000 American troops, their relative contribution to maintaining
stability in Iraq is minimal. In the case of the small Estonian, Salvadoran and Romanian
contingents, their prolonged stay in Iraq is probably linked more closely to maintaining positive
relations with the U.S. than any other variable. All three remain dependent on the U.S. for
security. Similar to the countries departing Iraq in 2008, they would have probably stayed in
Iraq as long as the U.S. required. Their commitment has been worthwhile. In addition to the
continuation of U.S. military and economic aid, all three countries‟ return on Coalition
membership fit their strategic motivations. Estonia achieved NATO membership in March 2004
promptly followed by EU membership in May of the same year. Romania also secured NATO
membership in March 2004 and EU membership in January 2007. Meanwhile, in March 2006,
El Salvador ushered in a new economic era with the passage of DR-CAFTA.
Australia and the United Kingdom, perhaps the strongest ideological allies of the U.S.,
were the only countries, aside from the U.S. and Poland, to contribute forces for the initial
invasion. The shared struggles of the three nations, including two world wars, combined with
similarities in culture, historical background, and shared democratic values have led to a strong
bond. Despite this bond, the governments of Australia and the U.K. could not escape the
massive unpopularity of the war; the ultimate effects were realized through democratic elections.
127
The Australians eventually suffered a fate similar to the Japanese. Frustrated with
Prime Minister John Howard and his association with George W. Bush, Australia elected Kevin
Rudd as Prime Minister in November 2007. Rudd, who had initially opposed the invasion of
Iraq, promptly ordered all combat troops out of Iraq. However, despite the popularity of his
opposition to Australian involvement in Iraq and his order of withdrawal, Rudd recognized the
paramount importance of continued positive relations with the United States. The Australian
withdrawals were from Muthanna province, in the relatively stable southern part of Iraq, thus
limiting the impact on security.
Rudd also enabled a continued Australian military presence in
Iraq of some 350 support troops until July 31, 2009 and contributed US$77 million to the Iraq
Stabilization and Reconstruction Fund. 405
Like Australia, the U.K. underwent a change of leadership during the occupation of Iraq.
A strong supporter of the Iraq invasion and continued occupation, U.K. Prime Minister Tony
Blair was pressured to resign from office by his own party, which he did in June 2006. Blair‟s
successor, Gordon Brown, did not distance himself from Blair‟s policy toward Iraq though.
Brown remained committed to Iraq (and the special relationship with the U.S.), while overseeing
force reductions there of 1,600 in February 2007 and a further 1,000 by the end of 2007. Like
other Coalition forces based in southern Iraq, these reductions coincided with the increased
capacity of the Iraqi security forces to assume peacekeeping duties. The U.K. was also one of
the largest contributors to the Iraq Stabilization and Reconstruction Fund (US$650 million).406
The Australian and U.K. long standing commitments to the U.S.-led Coalition have so far
resulted in tactical successes. Australia achieved its free trade agreement with the United States,
405
406
Ibid.
Ibid.
128
and both Australia and the U.K. have benefited from Iraq reconstruction contracts. The strategic
success of the invasion, occupation and subsequent control of Iraq, remains for history to judge.
Chronology of Coalition Countries Leaving Iraq
18
1
1
16
14
12
5
4
Ideology/Reconstruction Contracts
10
Economic Necessity
2
8
Trade Agreements
5
Military Aid
6
4
2
3
Security from Russia
1
2
0
10
7
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2
2008
2009
Final Remarks
This study has demonstrated that, far from their statements in March 2003, the true
motivations of the Coalition of the Willing boil down to national security and economics. If we
take these motivations as a given two important conclusions reveal themselves.
First, the study exposes the theory that countries were abandoning the Coalition over the
course of the occupation as false. Individual countries were simply leaving the Coalition after
fulfilling their security and/or economic agreements with the United States.
For example,
countries such as Eritrea, who had no strategic interest in Iraq and were simply looking to win
favor with the U.S., ended their diplomatic support the moment the invasion began, having
served their purpose of perpetuating the façade of international legitimacy. Others countries
such as Poland joined the Coalition out of a greater need – security. Needing the U.S. security
129
umbrella for protection from Russia, Poland was understandably more committed to the
Coalition than countries like Eritrea.
As discussed earlier and displayed graphically, the
departure of countries from the Coalition is rationally explained. There is one hick-up in the
explanation, however - democracy. In the years after the invasion public opinion voiced what
had been muted in early 2003. Publics in countries with strong democracies voted out leaders
who had taken them to Iraq in favor of leaders running on “pull the troops out of Iraq” platforms.
Beginning in Spain in 2004, the wave of democratic elections forcing out pro-Coalition leaders
spread through the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Australia and the United Kingdom. In
November 2008, the wave crested in the United States as George W. Bush‟s Republican Party
was routed in Congressional elections in addition to losing the presidency to Barack Obama, a
Democrat whose electoral campaign included a vow to bring U.S. troops home from Iraq.
The second and more lasting conclusion of this examination brings us back to the
beginning of this study and its opening quote from George Washington‟s 1796 Farewell Address,
“There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to
nation.”407 Although Washington‟s warning was intended to keep the United States out of
European entanglements, it is easily applied to the present study. The fate of Georgia is a prime
example. After gaining independence in 1991, Georgia had slowly worked towards inclusion in
Western economic and security organizations with the goal of escaping its Soviet past and
Russian yolk. It joined the U.S.-led Coalition in 2003 in line with this policy, with the hope of
one day gaining full NATO membership and the U.S. security umbrella this entailed. The
United States supported all of these efforts and had helped Georgian with military training and
407
Wikisource. “Washington‟s Farewell Address.”
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Washington%27s_Farewell_Address
130
US$1.7 billion in assistance since 1991.408 However, when Georgia was invaded by Russian
forces in August 2008, the United States did little more than transport Georgian forces serving in
Iraq back home to defend their beleaguered country. No doubt the lack of U.S. military action in
defense of Georgia was not lost on other countries aspiring for U.S. security support.
Conversely, the United States must have become acutely aware of the limits of their own
economic and security incentives and their ability to hold a Coalition together in an age of mass
media, the internet and almost instantaneous communication.
In this information age
governments‟ ability to dictate foreign policy without electoral implications has vanished in
democratic countries. Right or wrong, the democratic elections beginning in Spain in 2004
removed pro-Coalition leaders from power and proved that the general public is less concerned
about trade agreements or reconstruction contracts than the repercussions of invading a sovereign
country without just cause. The final history on the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of
Iraq has yet to be written, but early indicators are that it will not look fondly on the U.S.-led
Coalition of the Willing and its less than altruistic motivations.
408
U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Georgia.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5253.htm
131
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