“where two or more candidates are nominated and no candidate

Too clever by half, or less than half?
A P Reeler, RAU
Since Simba Makoni announced his candidature for the Presidential election in March, there have
been a wide range of theories speculating as to why he has done this. Ranging from being a
stalking horse for Mugabe through to the candidate for the ZanuPF disaffected and down to the
honourable man bent on saving his country, he has yet to make clear who are his backers. But
the big question remains unanswered: can he do it?
It is apparent to most Zimbabweans that it will take a miracle for any candidate to beat Robert
Mugabe, and not because Mugabe is so deeply loved by his people, but because the race is so
loaded in Mugabe’s favour that it is impossible for anyone but Mugabe to win. In 2002, Robert
Mugabe, despite extreme violence, disqualification of voters, delays rendering it impossible to
vote in the urban areas, and a plethora of other irregularities, beat Morgan Tsvangirai by the
exact margin of the supplementary voters roll – 400,000 votes. This result was then protected by
the additional strategy of ensuring that the subsequent election petition mounted by the MDC
never saw the light of day, and Zimbabwe will go to the polls in March 2008 with that case still
unresolved.
So why would it be any different in 2008? Mugabe faces the same problems, or does he?
However, it is paradoxically the mere fact of Simba Makoni’s candidacy, not the man himself, that
changes the picture, and it is simply because that having three substantial candidates creates
extreme problems for Robert Mugabe’s rigging strategies. The key lies in the Zimbabwe Electoral
Act.
The Electoral Act deals with what happens if no presidential candidate obtains a majority of the
total number of valid votes cast in the presidential election. Section 110(2) of this Act states that
“where two or more candidates are nominated and no candidate receives a majority of the total
number of valid votes cast, a second election ” must be held within 21 days after the previous
election.
Section 110(3) provides that in the second election only the two candidates who
received the highest and next highest number of valid votes cast at the first election will be
eligible to contest the second election.
If these two candidates receive an equal number of votes, Parliament must, as soon as
practicable after the declaration of the result of that election, meet as an electoral college and
elect one of the two candidates as President by secret ballot and without prior debate.
The question is what is meant by the phrase “ no candidate receives a majority of the total
number of votes cast.” Does this mean a “simple “majority and the candidate with the most votes
wins? If the Act meant this, it would not have added the words “ of the total number of valid
votes cast”. The Electoral Act clearly envisaged that, in the Presidential election, the winner had
to have an “absolute “ majority; that is, the winner must get more than 50% of the votes, and,
of course, this is very easy in a two horse race, but much more difficult where there are more
than two candidates, and especially where at least three of the candidates are serious
challengers, as are Mugabe, Makoni, and Tsvangirai.
If we look at a number of possible scenarios, we can see that the Election Act was referring to an
“absolute” and not a “simple” majority.
In scenario 1, only two candidates are standing. The two candidates receive an equal number of
valid votes. (Each receives 50% of the votes.) There would have to be a run off election at which
hopefully there would not again be an equality of votes, and resort would have to be the secret
ballot of Parliament.
In scenario 2, three candidates stand. Candidate one receives 33.5% of the vote, candidate two
receives 33.4% of the vote and candidate three receives 33.1%. Here, there would have to be a
run off between candidates one and two.
In scenario 3, five candidates stand. Candidate one receives 23%, candidate two receives 22.9%,
candidate three receives 20.1%, candidate four receives 18% and candidate five receives 16%.
There would have to be a run off between candidates one and two.
So this is what the legislators envisaged would have to happen in a Presidential election, and this
is different from Parliamentary elections. The Electoral Act uses a completely different
formulation to describe the majority that is needed to elect members of Parliament. In section 66
of the Electoral Act which section deals with the majority needed to be declared the winner, all
that is required is that a candidate must obtain the greatest number of votes, a “simple”
majority.
Thus in a constituency election, it is a winner-take-all approach. For example, there are three
candidates and candidate one receives 37%, candidate two receives 36% and candidate three
receives 27%, then candidate one will have received the greatest number of votes and will be
declared the winner. Thus, the Zimbabwean Electoral Act describes different courses for different
horses, and herein lies the dilemma for Robert Mugabe in Simba Makoni’s candidacy.
If Robert Mugabe does not get more than 50% of the vote, there will have to be a run-off
between the top two winners, and how might this work?
Assume that Mugabe gets less than 50%, and Morgan Tsvangirai comes second, just narrowly
beating Simba Makoni: Mugabe gets 37%, Tsvangirai gets 32%, and Makoni gets 31%. If the
Makoni supporters are determined to get rid of Mugabe, and are also confident that they have
strong support amongst the already elected MPs, then they might decide to vote for Tsvangirai in
the second round, and, if the numbers hold, Tsvangirai gets 63% of the vote to Mugabe’s 37%.
Here it is worth remembering that this is a harmonized election, and, if there had to be a second
round for the Presidency, the composition of the Parliament would be already known, because
that was resolved on the basis of “simple” majorities.
Now, if the Makoni supporters are confident that they can control the Parliament, they might well
not feel threatened by a Tsvangirai presidency, and obviously want Mugabe gone, so they
support Tsvangirai in the second round, and the rest, as they say is history. Of course, they may
throw their weight behind Mugabe in order to prevent an MDC presidency, but here we can
presume some kind of internal deal between the Mugabe and the Makoni factions to keep
ZanuPF in control. However, take a very long spoon to sup with this devil on past performance,
and remember that once Mugabe has power it will not be so easy to wrest it away. Also be very
sure that Parliament has not been packed with Mugabe supporters, and we can guess that the
ZanuPF “dissidents” know this better than the rest of us.
This may also work the other way round. Assume that Mugabe gets 37%, Makoni gets 32%, and
Tsvangirai gets 31%. Since the greatest impediment to MDC political power has always been
Mugabe, it is safe to assume that they will encourage their supporters to vote for Makoni, who
then wins by 63% to Robert Mugabe’s 37%, and again the rest is history.
Now, there have been situations where there were more than two candidates for the Presidential
election, as was the case in 2002. However, the split in the voting in 2002 was not interesting for
the purposes of comparison: according to the Registrar-General, Mugabe got 56% of the vote,
Tsvangirai got 42%, and the other three candidates less than 2% between them. This was
clearly not a three-horse race, as is the current situation, and we now have three very plausible
candidates.
Of course, Mugabe can get his 50% majority, just as he did in 2002: all the machinery remains in
place for getting the result he wants. However, this may be much more difficult than in 2002,
and very careful election observation could very well expose any rigging that takes place. This
would not require nation-wide observation, but merely the in-depth and total coverage of a
number of key constituencies.
And this is why the Makoni candidacy is so important. Not because he is some super-hero to save
the nation, but because his participation exposes Mugabe to serious challenge. If he makes 50%,
and rigging is exposed, then he will be in serious trouble, and not even SADC will save him. If he
gets less than 50%, then he is totally exposed to either the Makoni faction or the Tsvangirai
faction joining forces, not in an alliance, but merely in a vote. After all, elections are not only
about the transfer of power, but also about the test of public confidence. A betting man would
not believe that there are too many Zimbabweans with much love for their outgoing President,
and perhaps this time he has been too clever by way less than a half.