EAST-WEST C E N T E R
SPECIAL R E P O R T
Chrysanthemum
and Sword
Revisited
Is Japanese
Militarism
Resurgent?
A Gateway in Hawaii Between Asia and America
RICHARD H A L L O R A N
Chrysanthemum
and Sword
Revisited
Is Japanese
Militarism
Resurgent?
T H E E A S T - W E S T C E N T E R J t H O N O L U L U , HAWAII
Contents
Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent?
1
Anxieties in America, Asia, and Japan
3
Measuringjapanese Military Power
6
Articulated Policy on National Security
9
Public Attitudes Toward Militarism
12
What Japan Could Do
17
What If?
20
Acknowledgments
21
Notes
21
Appendices
25
This Special Report is one of a series produced by the
staff and visiting fellows of the Special Projects unit
of the East-West Center. The series focuses on timely,
critical issues concerning the United States, Asia, and
the Pacific and is intended for a wide audience of
those who make or influence policy decisions
throughout the region.
This paper may be quoted in full or in part without
further permission. Please credit the author and the
East-West Center.
Please address comments or inquiries to: Special
Projects, East-West Center, 1777 East-West Road,
Honolulu, Hawaii, 96848.
Telephone: 808-944-7602. Fax: 808-944-7670.
Summary
For forty years, the Japanese have pursued a
policy on national security that has relied on
the military power of the United States, on
Japan's increasing economic strength, and on
what the Japanese call low posture in diplomacy. Even as Japan has been admitted to the
world's highest economic councils, the Japanese have assiduously sought to avoid taking a
political or military stance that might be considered controversial or aggressive. To borrow
from Ruth Benedict, the Japanese have almost
exclusively cultivated the chrysanthemum and
foresworn the sword ever since they sheathed
it at the end of World War II.
Today, however, some Americans, many Asians,
and most Japanese themselves are asking
whether Japan will once again turn to the sword
as an instrument of national policy. This is
perhaps the crucial question that overshadows
discussions of Japan's foreign policy. There is
widespread anxiety that the Japanese will expand their military forces and that those forces
might embark on the sort of ventures that set
Asia aflame between the invasion of Manchuria
in 1931 and the defeat of Japan in 1945. That
concern, in turn, invites intense scrutiny,
abroad and at home, of every proposal and
decision in Japan's international relations.
The fear of resurgent Japanese militarism was
clearly at the bottom of Japan's agonizing national debate in 1990 and 1991 over what part
it might play in the Persian Gulf crisis. Many
Americans, Asians, and Japanese themselves asserted that any action by Japan beyond economic support for the United States and its
allies would be seen as the first step toward the
revival of Japan as a military power.
But fifty years after the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor brought America into World War II, a
dispassionate examination of the evidence suggests that the danger of a resurgence in Japanese
militarism is remote.
Such a revival would be marked by three devel-
opments, none of which is seen on the horizon:
Japan would build a military force commensurate with the nation's population and economic power; the Japanese would be willing to use
that military power to obtain political and economic objectives; and military leaders in Japan
would play an influential role i n national life.
Japan's current military capabilities and those
planned for the foreseeable future, however,
indicate that Japan will remain a minor military power with little more than a modest,
defensive force. The articulated policies of all
Japanese governments since the end of the
Allied Occupation forty years ago show no plan
to build a military force commensurate with
Japan's economic strength or population.
Equally important, there is little evidence in the
Japanese public of any desire to see their nation
become a major military power. To the contrary, the pacifist streak that has run through
Japanese society for four decades after the devastation of World War II remains strong. Taken
together, the absence of government policies
and the public's resistance to militarism argue
that the requisite political will for militarism
does not exist in Japan today.
O n the other hand, the Japanese would undoubtedly have the money, technology, industrial capacity, and people to field a formidable
force if they decided to acquire military power.
A look at the "what if's" that might trigger such
a buildup strongly suggests that a withdrawal
of American forces from Asia would cause the
Japanese to reconsider their military posture.
Other developments, such as the emergence of
an aggressive C h i n a , would affect Japanese
thinking, but not to the degree that would be
caused by a shift in United States policy.
In sum, it seems that Japan will remain an
economic giant and a military pigmy relative
to the world's other major and middle-sized
powers.
R I C H A R D H A L L O R A N is director of Special Projects at the
East-West Center in Honolulu. He was a correspondent in Japan for
Business Week (1962-1964), The Washington Post (1966-1968), and
The New York Times (1972-1976). He was later a defense and
military correspondent for The Times in Washington (1979-1989).
Mr. Halloran has written four books: Japan: Images and Realities,
Conflict and Compromise: The Dynamics of American Foreign Policy,
To Arm a Nation: Rebuilding America's Endangered Defenses, and
Serving America: Prospects for the Volunteer Force. He was graduated
from Dartmouth College with an A.B. in governmentinternational relations in 1951 and earned an M.A. in East
Asian Studies at the University of Michigan in 1957. He also
studied-at the East Asia Institute at Columbia University
on a Ford Foundation Fellowship in 1964-1965.
Chrysanthemum
And Sword
Revisited
Is Japanese
Militarism
I
n her pioneering book, The Chrysanthemum
and the
Sword, the anthropologist R u t h Benedict asserted
that Japan was at one and the same time a l a n d of
peace and war. She said theJapanesenot o n l y heap h i g h
honors o n artists and lavishly tend to chrysanthemums
but bestow great prestige o n warriors a n d are equally
devoted to the cult of the sword. " B o t h the sword and
the c h r y s a n t h e m u m / ' Benedict c o n c l u d e d d u r i n g
W o r l d W a r II, "are part of the picture."
1
Resurgent?
RICHARD
HALLORAN
For a nation to present b o t h peaceful a n d warlike faces
to the w o r l d is not unusual. The s y m b o l i c American
eagle carries an olive branch i n one claw, arrows i n the
other. Britain produced W i l l i a m Shakespeare and A d miral Horatio Nelson, G e r m a n y was h o m e to J o h a n n
Wolfgang v o n Goethe and Field Marshal Erwin R o m mel, Russia bred Peter Ilyich Tchaikovsky a n d the Cossacks.
The difference i n this case is that the Japanese have
almost exclusively cultivated the c h r y s a n t h e m u m and
foresworn the sword ever since they sheathed it at the
end of W o r l d War II. Today, however, m a n y Americans,
Asians, and the Japanese themselves are asking whether
Japan is once again t u r n i n g to the sword as an instrument of national policy.
It is a critical issue, perhaps the crucial quest i o n that overshadows discussions of Japan's
foreign policy and national security. There is
widespread concern that an expanded Japanese m i l i t a r y force w o u l d not be defensive but
w o u l d be offensive and aggressive. That possibility causes anxiety that Japan might embark o n the sort of ventures that set Asia
aflame between the invasion of M a n c h u r i a
i n 1931 and the defeat of Japan i n 1945. That
anxiety, i n turn, invites intense scrutiny,
abroad and at home, of every proposal and
decision i n Japan's international relations.
The fear of resurgent Japanese militarism was
clearly at the b o t t o m of Japan's agonizing
n a t i o n a l debate i n 1990 a n d 1991 over what
part it m i g h t play i n the Persian G u l f crisis.
M a n y Americans, Asians, and Japanese themselves asserted that any action by Japan bey o n d e c o n o m i c support for the U n i t e d States
a n d its allies w o u l d be seen, or might even
be, the first step toward the revival of Japan
as a m i l i t a r y power.
In the end, the Japanese sent n o combatant
or non-combatant forces to the G u l f but l i m ited themselves to w r i t i n g checks totalling
$13 b i l l i o n to help pay for the expensive
military operation. The debate itself, however, appeared to have persuaded the Japanese that they could n o longer remain i n the
political c o c o o n i n w h i c h they had wrapped
themselves since 1945. Instead, Japan began
to take, ever so cautiously and tentatively, a
more visible but decidedly n o n - m i l i t a r y posture i n the international arena. After the war,
Japan dispatched four minesweepers and two
support ships to the G u l f to help clear shipp i n g lanes.
The question of Japanese militarism is a m o n g
the critical issues of international security i n
Asia today, along w i t h other issues such as:
• The certainty that the United States w i l l
reduce its military forces i n Asia and the
2
possibility that the U n i t e d States w i l l w i t h draw altogether f r o m Asia and turn to a
neo-isolationist foreign policy;
• The uncertain role of Soviet m i l i t a r y power
i n Asia and the Pacific as that troubled
n a t i o n decides its future;
• Plans that the leaders of C h i n a , especially
those w h o w i l l emerge over the next decade, have for their nation's military forces;
• The chances for reunification of South and
N o r t h Korea, w h i c h m i g h t join two of the
world's largest m i l i t a r y forces, or, conversely, the possibility that a new war
m i g h t erupt o n that divided peninsula;
• Vietnam's unpredictable objectives for its
military forces at h o m e and elsewhere i n
Southeast Asia;
• The potential for Indonesian or Malaysian
threats to Singapore and the s h i p p i n g lanes
between the South C h i n a Sea and the Indian Ocean.
• India's long-term military, and especially
naval, plans plus Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, a n d the chance of
renewed warfare i n South Asia.
The possibility of a revived Japanese militarism that arouses such fear a m o n g the Japanese themselves and all nations washed by the
Pacific and Indian Oceans w o u l d be marked
by three developments:
(1) Japan w o u l d build a military force commensurate w i t h the nation's population
and e c o n o m i c strength, m e a n i n g a force
a little over half the size of that of the
U n i t e d States;
(2) The Japanese w o u l d be w i l l i n g to use m i l itary power as an instrument of national
policy as they d i d f r o m 1868 to 1945, and
especially i n the 1930s and 1940s;
(3) The leaders of Japan's armed forces w o u l d
Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited
play an i n f l u e n t i a l role i n the political,
economic, and social life of their nation.
Fifty years after the Japanese attack o n Pearl
Harbor brought America into W o r l d War II,
the anxieties of some Americans, m a n y
Asians, and most Japanese over a possible
revival of Japanese militarism is palpable. A
dispassionate examination of the evidence,
however, suggests that the danger of such a
resurgence is remote.
Japan's current military capabilities and
those p l a n n e d for the foreseeable future i n d i cate that Japan will remain a m i n o r military
power w i t h little more than a modest, defensive force. The articulated policies of all Japanese governments since the end of the Allied
Occupation forty years ago show n o plan to
b u i l d a military force commensurate w i t h
Japan's economic strength or population.
Equally important, there is little evidence i n
the Japanese public of any desire to see their
nation become a major military power. To the
contrary, the pacifist streak that has r u n
through Japanese society for four decades
after the devastation of World War II remains
strong. Taken together, the absence of government policies and the public's resistance
to militarism argue that the requisite political
w i l l for militarism does not exist i n Japan
today. W i t h o u t that political w i l l , no nation
could acquire and m a i n t a i n a sizeable m i l i tary force.
O n the other hand, the Japanese w o u l d undoubtedly have the money, technology,
industrial capacity, and people to field a formidable force if their political w i l l changed
and they decided to acquire military power.
A look at the "what if's" that might trigger
such a b u i l d u p strongly suggests that a withdrawal of American forces f r o m Asia w o u l d
cause the Japanese seriously to reconsider
their military posture. Other developments,
such as the emergence of an aggressive
/s Japanese Militarism Resurgent?
C h i n a , w o u l d affect Japanese t h i n k i n g , but
not to the degree that w o u l d be caused by a
shift i n U n i t e d States policy and posture.
Anxieties in America,
Asia, and Japan
Concerns about a new Japanese militarism
have cropped up repeatedly i n America during the last several years. Former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger warned i n 1987 that
Japanese economic strength made it "inevitable that Japan w i l l emerge as a major m i l i tary power i n the not-too-distant future."
Geneva Overholser, an editorial writer for
The New York Times and later editor of the Des
Moines Register, returned f r o m Beijing i n 1988
to reflect Chinese fears of Japan. She quoted
a Chinese official worried about a "rightist,
racialist, ultranationalistic, militaristic" tendency i n Japan."
2
3
By 1990, American concern was expressed
w i t h increasing frequency. A senior M a r i n e
Corps officer i n O k i n a w a , M a j o r General
Henry C . Stackpole, arguing against a reduct i o n of American forces i n Asia, asserted: " N o
one wants a rearmed, resurgent Japan. So we
are a cap i n the bottle, if you w i l l . " D o v S.
Zakheim, a senior Pentagon official i n the
Reagan administration, cautioned: " O n l y
Japan is i n a position to f i l l any power
v a c u u m that a drawdown of U.S. and Soviet
forces m i g h t create." A Defense Department
report to Congress said: "Increases i n Japanese military strength undertaken to c o m p e n sate for declining U.S. capabilities i n the
region could prove worrisome to regional
nations."
4
5
6
Susumu Awanohara, a Japanese correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic
Review,
pointed out what he called an American
3
d i l e m m a . O n the one h a n d , he said, the
U n i t e d States wanted Japan to carry a greater
share of the b u r d e n for the c o m m o n defense
i n Asia. " O n the other h a n d , " he wrote, "the
Americans are realizing h o w m u c h of Asia
still resents Japanese militarism. Fear of resurgent Japanese military prowess is also extant
i n the U n i t e d States itself."
7
After the Persian G u l f crisis erupted i n A u gust, 1990, the issue boiled up i n f u l l force.
Japan joined w i t h other nations i n placing an
embargo o n trade w i t h Iraq and pledged $4
b i l l i o n i n aid and loans to assist nations that
were sending military forces to the region.
Later Japan pledged another $9 b i l l i o n i n aid.
But the sticking p o i n t throughout the debate
was whether Japan s h o u l d dispatch military
forces to j o i n the coalition c o n f r o n t i n g Iraq.
President Bush's administration urged the
Japanese to undertake a modest, non-combatant role. After the Pacific summit meeting i n
Hawaii i n October, Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard
S o l o m o n said the administration was trying
to get the Japanese "to participate i n this G u l f
crisis i n some w a y that goes beyond just
w r i t i n g checks for the tremendous cost of this
operation." He said Washington wanted
Japan "to engage i n peacekeeping operations
in m a n y parts of the w o r l d . "
But m a n y Americans disagreed. The retired
executive editor of The New York Times, A . M .
Rosenthal, argued against dispatching Japanese forces to the combat zone. If Japan deployed such forces, the onetime Tokyo
correspondent for the Times said i n a c o l u m n :
" C o u n t o n this: The Japanese A r m y w i l l soon
again become a military force at home, a
constant threat to the delicate, complex c i v i l i a n e q u i l i b r i u m that is n o w the base and
protection of Japan's democratic society."
9
A m o n g Asians, the fear of Japanese militarism ran through a special supplement of the
Japan Economic Journal o n Japan's ever more
4
influential place i n Asia. "Japan's role as Big
Brother is hindered by h a u n t i n g memories of
the Imperial Army's occupation 50 years
ago," the magazine said. " M e m o r i e s are especially bitter i n C h i n a a n d the Koreas, countries that l o n g suffered under Japanese
colonization." Chinese officials i n Beijing
and South Korean officials i n Seoul confirmed those fears. "I don't see it right now,"
said an official of H s i n Hua, the Chinese news
agency, "but I worry about it." The Chinese
expressed grave reservations about the deployment of Japanese minesweepers to the
Persian G u l f i n 1991. South Koreans said they
feared Japanese e c o n o m i c d o m i n a t i o n and
were concerned that renewed militarism
m i g h t be right b e h i n d i t . Officially, South
Korea d i d not object to the dispatch of the
Japanese minesweepers to the Persian Gulf,
but privately some Koreans had misgivings.
1 1
An
Indonesian
scholar,
Dorodjatun
Kuntjoro-Jakti, was quoted i n the Japan Economic Journal: "We saw the return of Japanese
capital, and that brought up all the memories
of the war p e r i o d . " Bilveer Singh, director
of the Singapore Institute of International
Affairs, said: "America can come and go. The
Russians can come and go. But Japan w i l l be
here. We have to live w i t h the Japanese but
we don't trust t h e m . . . . If they ever apply
their efficiency to the military i n the same
way they have applied it to their economy,
we've had i t . "
12
1 3
The question of Japanese militarism came up
during a meeting of Southeast Asian foreign
ministers i n Indonesia i n July, 1990. The
foreign minister of Malaysia, A b u Hassan
Omar, cited the decline i n tensions between
the U n i t e d States and the Soviet U n i o n and
wondered if Japan w o u l d replace the Soviet
U n i o n as a threat to Southeast Asian security.
The minister said after the meeting: "We
wanted to get an assurance f r o m t h e m that
they w o n ' t be any security threat." Foreign
Minister Taro Nakayama of Japan and Secre-
Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited
tary of State James Baker of the U n i t e d States
sought to give such assurances.
14
ment's proposal "was the carefully thoughtout first step of a master plan to turn Japan
i n t o a major m i l i t a r y p o w e r . "
19
A Western diplomat at the meeting said: " M a laysia was o n l y expressing publicly what
most Southeast Asian countries have always
said p r i v a t e l y . " Keith Richburg, the Washington Post's correspondent, wrote: "Omar's
remark here caused barely a ripple, i n part
because of the visceral suspicion of Japan i n
this region runs i n many ways deeper than
the concerns that Europeans have about a
unified Germany."
15
M a n y Japanese pointed to the fears of other
Asians. M a k o t o Kawanago, a staff researcher
at the Research Institute for Peace and Security, wrote: "Other Asian countries are scared
of Japan not s i m p l y because it m i g h t become
a military power, but because the Japanese
blamed the war o n their o l d m i l i t a r y leaders
and n o w act as if n o t h i n g at all h a p p e n e d . "
20
16
Sueo Sudo, a fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies i n Singapore, summed it
up: "The most contentious aspect of Japan's
role i n the region is security, as the region is
in the midst of a security debate concerning
the advent of a power v a c u u m . " Another
scholar at the institute, S. Javed Maswood,
agreed: "Their (nations i n the region) apprehensions of a revival of the past is accentuated by Japan's economic dominance and the
feeling that this dominance could, over time,
be juxtaposed w i t h military dominance unless ceaseless vigilance c o n t i n u e s . "
17
18
Perhaps no place, however, has the anxiety
been so intense as i n Japan itself. Early i n the
G u l f crisis, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu proposed legislation that w o u l d have permitted
the dispatch of units f r o m the Self-Defense
Force, as Japan's armed force is called, for
non-combatant duty under the flag of the
U n i t e d Nations. But the opposition was so
strong that the government was compelled
to withdraw the b i l l .
Yukiko Tsunoda, a lawyer, seemed to express
the fears of m a n y Japanese. She contended
that Japanese conservatives "want Japan to
have military muscle commensurate w i t h its
industrial and financial clout." M s . Tsunoda
argued that "the first step, as they see it, is to
legalize the deployment of troops abroad.
Saddam Hussein, provided the perfect pretext." M s . Tsunoda asserted that the govern-
Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent?
Yoichi Funabashi, a columnist for the Asahi
Shimbun, a leading newspaper i n Tokyo, also
asserted that Japanese have been reluctant to
face u p to their recent past, w h i c h generates
distrust all over Asia. "The perception that
Japan still has not come to terms w i t h its o w n
past," he concluded, "puts the most fundamental constraint on effective and successful
foreign p o l i c y . "
21
In the same vein, K u m a o Kaneko, professor
of international relations at Tokai University,
lamented that even though "Japanese insist
this country w i l l never again become a major
military power, . . . . our neighbors don't
trust us.
Yasuaki O n u m a , professor of i n ternational law at Tokyo University, said that
what prevents Japan f r o m f r o m p l a y i n g a
greater role i n the w o r l d "is the specter of
Japanese troops o n the march a g a i n . " The
deputy director general of the Self-Defense
Agency's policy bureau, Jiro Hagi, said: "We
t h i n k we should send the Self-Defense Forces
to the M i d d l e East, but most of the opposit i o n parties and most of the Japanese people
don't agree. A n d especially countries that
were occupied by Japan d u r i n g the war—they
have some critical feeling that Japan may
become a military power a g a i n . "
23
24
Not all Americans or Asians were so worried.
W i l l i a m Safire, a columnist i n The New York
Times, wrote: "Japan s h o u l d get serious about
getting i n v o l v e d " i n the G u l f crisis and
should send a large medical contingent.
5
"These Japanese citizens," he contended,
" w i l l be p u t t i n g their lives o n the line, reflecti n g h o n o r o n their n a t i o n . "
25
A former foreign minister of Malaysia, Tan Sri
M o h a m m e d G h a z a l i Shafie, told a Japanese
audience i n Tokyo i n M a r c h , 1990, before the
G u l f crisis, that "Japan's crude i m i t a t i o n of
Western c o l o n i a l i s m inflicted immeasurable
pain and suffering and aroused a general
feeling of outrage" i n Southeast Asia. But the
M a l a y s i a n leader went o n to contend that
c o l o n i a l i s m and militarism have become
"bad dreams of the past and Japan w i l l not
have t h e m again. O f that I feel c e r t a i n . "
26
A few p r o m i n e n t Japanese have also argued
that the threat of militarism has passed. During the debate over Japan's role i n the Persian
G u l f crisis, a former director of the Cabinet
Security Affairs O f f i c e asserted that Japanese
forces "should be used overseas for peaceful
purposes." Atsuyuki Sassa, w h o headed a
small Japanese version of the Central Intelligence Agency, contended: "Widespread opposition to direct i n v o l v e m e n t i n the G u l f
war shows h o w self-indulgent Japanese have
become. 'Let the other fellow do the dirty
work' is n o w a part of the national p s y c h e . "
27
But those voices were drowned i n a sea of
vocal protest against the dispatch of Japanese
forces. In the end, Japan d i d little more than
to write checks for the expensive operation.
D u r i n g a visit to Hawaii i n April, 1991, former Prime Minister Nakasone sought to explain that: "Since after W o r l d War II, the
p r o m i n e n t feeling of most Japanese is no
matter what happens, Japan w i l l sustain a
peaceful posture."
"At times, this posture of Japan, the doggedness of our non-combat attitude, may have
been looked u p o n as selfish or egotistical,"
M r . Nakasone c o n t i n u e d . "But the reality is
that so m u c h of the population of Japan
hated the war because of the disastrous experience they went t h r o u g h . "
28
6
Measuring Japanese
Military Power
A critical indicator of Japan's intentions is the
actual military power that Japan has acquired
since 1952, w h e n the Allied Occupation
ended and the Japanese regained their national sovereignty. Such military power does
not exist i n a v a c u u m and is significant only
w h e n measured against the armed forces of
other nations.
Since numbers often count i n military
strength, an objective gauge of Japan's present military power must include several sets
of numbers. But no single number is conclusive. Most numbers expressed i n dollars vary
w i t h exchange rates. Some are not exact c o m parisons because Japanese accounting methods often differ f r o m those of other nations.
Taken together, however, the numbers all
point i n the same direction.
As a percentage of national wealth, Japan
spends o n defense the smallest amount, 1
percent of gross national product, of any
sizeable n a t i o n . G i v e n the size of the Japanese economy, however, that 1 percent puts
Japan i n a class w i t h other industrial nations
that spend 3 percent or 4 percent. Japan
spends about $30 b i l l i o n a year and ranks
between t h i r d and sixth i n the world, depending o n exchange rates. (The Soviet
U n i o n and the U n i t e d States are one and
two.) That sum puts Japan i n the same league
w i t h France, Britain, and West G e r m a n y before reunification w i t h East G e r m a n y .
29
30
But the growth rate of Japanese military
spending appears to be slowing. D u r i n g the
1980s, Japan's military spending increased'
an average of 6.4 percent a year, or roughly
the same rate as the expansion of the Japanese economy. The ratio of military spending
to gross national product thus remained
around 1 percent. The Mid-Term Defense
Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited
Plan f r o m 1991 through 1995, however, calls
for a growth rate of o n l y 3 percent a year, or
less t h a n the projected growth rate of the
economy.
Comparison of Military Expenditures
United States and Japan
(Percentage of defense budgets)
31
Moreover, r a n k i n g Japan w i t h the leading
industrial nations of Europe is misleading
because the Japanese do not get nearly so
m u c h military power for their money as do
the U n i t e d States and other Western nations.
The Japanese spend 40 percent of their m i l i tary budget o n p e r s o n n e l , compared w i t h
27 percent i n the U n i t e d States. A l t h o u g h
that p o r t i o n of the military budget has declined i n recent years, Japan is still left w i t h
fewer yen to buy weapons, equipment, and
a m m u n i t i o n . In addition, Japan spends 10
percent of its defense budget, or $3 b i l l i o n ,
o n support for American forces i n Japan, such
as land rent and wages for Japanese working
o n American bases. That is 50 percent of the
yen cost for those bases; by 1996, according
to an agreement between the Japanese and
American governments i n 1991, thejapanese
w i l l pay for 100 percent of the yen costs for
American forces i n J a p a n . N o t o n l y does
each yen spent for that support mean a yen
less for Japanese spending for its o w n military
forces, but the Japanese spend f u l l y one-half
of their defense budget before they buy the
first bullet.
Category
United States
japan
Personnel
27
40
Arms, Equipment
Supplies
27
28
Operations and
Maintenance
30
16
Research and
Development
13
2
Military Construction
3
3
Support U.S. Forces
in japan
0
10
32
33
Note: M a y not add due to rounding. Sources: U.S.
Department of Defense, Japan Self-Defense Agency.
34
35
the American taxpayer $4.4 m i l l i o n apiece as
the Pentagon buys 225 to 480 a year.
Japan's new Type-90 tank, w h i c h is lighter
and less capable, costs $8.6 m i l l i o n , w i t h o n l y
30 being ordered this year. The U n i t e d
States Navy is p a y i n g $713 m i l l i o n each for
its new D D G - 5 1 destroyers. A 7,200-ton
ship of roughly the same size, but w i t h less
capable equipment, costs $967 m i l l i o n i n
J a p a n . T h e U n i t e d States Air Force buys F-15
jet fighters for $50 m i l l i o n . In Japan, an
older version of the same plane costs $66
million.
37
38
39
40
4 1
In procuring arms, a m m u n i t i o n , and equipment, Japan spends about same ratio of its
military budget as the U n i t e d States, w h i c h is
27 percent. But Japanese costs per item are
higher i n m a n y cases because they buy
smaller numbers and do not get economies
of scale.
36
C o m p a r i n g costs i n a
of Defense report o n
and those i n Japan's
Paper illustrates those
1990 U.S. Department
the costs of weapons
1990 Defense W h i t e
differences.
For instance, an M - l tank like those employed by American forces against Iraq costs
/5 Japanese Militarism Resurgent?
4 2
In another category of Japan's military budget, thejapanese spend 16 percent o n operations and m a i n t e n a n c e , compared w i t h 30
percent i n the United States. That means
Japanese training and ability to sustain m i l i tary operations lag b e h i n d those of the
U n i t e d States, w h i c h has also become more
efficient i n recent years. American military
officers say, however, that Japan's maintenance is excellent, w h i c h keeps u p the readiness of equipment for use.
43
44
7
Allocations in Japan's Military Budget, 1985-1990
(Percentage)
Category
FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90
Personnel
45.1 45.1 43.9 42.7 41.2 40.1
Equipment
26.2 26.9 27.5 28.1
28.0 27.4
R&D*
1.6
1.7
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.2
Facilities
1.4
1.7
2.0
2.8
2.9
3.2
15.1 14.4 14.2 14.1
15.1
16.1
O & M**
power, by any means, as the quality of weapons and the skill of leaders and soldiers can
overcome shortages i n people. Even so, size
does give an i n d i c a t i o n of military strength.
The Pentagon, using a f o r m u l a that takes i n t o
account numbers of people, firepower, training, a n d other measures of m i l i t a r y power,
has compared Japan w i t h the 15 industrial
nations i n the N o r t h Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The study f o u n d that Japan
ranks eighth i n m i l i t a r y manpower, between
Spain and G r e e c e , a n d n i n t h , between
Spain a n d the Netherlands, i n g r o u n d
forces. In fighter and attack aircraft, Japan
ranks eighth, between Turkey a n d S p a i n
(Appendix C ) .
49
U.S. Bases
9.5
9.0
9.4
9.2
9.5
9.8
Other
1.2
1.2
1.1
1.1
1.2
1.2
50
5 1
*R & D = Research and Development
* * 0 & M = Operations and Maintenance
Sources: Japan Economic Institute, Defense White Paper
1990.
L o o k i n g to the future, the Japanese spend
o n l y 2.2 percent of their defense yen o n
research and d e v e l o p m e n t , compared w i t h
12.6 percent i n the U n i t e d States, w h i c h
indicates that they are not investing i n the
weapons of tomorrow. (Both nations get
some support f r o m technical innovations
generated by c i v i l i a n industry.)
45
46
In size, Japan's armed forces number
246,500, of w h i c h 156,100 are i n the army,
44,000 i n the navy, a n d 46,300 i n the air
force. Altogether, the Self-Defense Force has
a shortage of 27,200 people, of w h i c h the
army has a shortage of 23,900. Japan's army
and air force together are about same size as
the U n i t e d States M a r i n e Corps, the smallest
of America's four armed forces.
47
A r o u n d the w o r l d , 24 nations have armed
forces larger than those of Japan (Appendix
A). In Asia, Japan ranks 10th, after C h i n a ,
India, V i e t n a m , N o r t h Korea, South Korea,
Pakistan, Taiwan, Indonesia, and T h a i l a n d
(Appendix B). This does not count Soviet or
U . S. forces, b o t h of w h i c h are extensive i n
Asia.
Size is not everything i n military
48
8
O n l y i n one category, warships, does Japan
rank near the top. As might be expected of
an island, maritime n a t i o n , Japan ranks
fourth, between France a n d G e r m a n y . Even
so, Japan's navy is m u c h smaller t h a n those
of the U n i t e d States and the Soviet U n i o n ,
w h i c h have 3.2 m i l l i o n tons and 2.6 m i l l i o n
tons of combat vessels afloat respectively.
Japan, at 242,000 tons, compares w i t h France
at 229,000 t o n s (Appendix D).
52
53
A critical issue, and one that military observers i n the U n i t e d States a n d Asia have been
watching keenly, is whether Japan w i l l begin
b u i l d i n g aircraft carriers that could project
power. Japanese and American officials both
say there are n o plans o n the drawing
b o a r d . Nonetheless, speculation persists.
Two Australian naval officers, w r i t i n g i n the
Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, have
asserted: "It is increasingly apparent that the
question is n o longer if, but w h e n , the Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Force w i l l press for an
aircraft carrier."
54
55
Japan has m a n y high-tech weapons, but the
purpose a n d capabilities of those weapons
must be considered. The F-15, for instance, is
the world's most high-powered fighter i n
speed, t u r n i n g radius, and armament. But the
Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited
F-15J, the m o d e l i n Japan's A i r Self-Defense
Force, was designed to defend Japan by
shooting d o w n enemy aircraft heading for
Japan; o n l y w i t h an extensive overhaul could
the F-15J be turned into an offensive weapon.
wrote i n 1991: "The Self-Defense Forces,
w h i c h have been limited to certain types of
equipment w i t h an exclusively defensive
character, are not able to defend even Japanese territory autonomously, i.e., w i t h o u t the
U.S. security u m b r e l l a . " A Pentagon report
o n allied contributions to the c o m m o n defense made the same p o i n t .
61
Indeed, Japan has few weapons to project
power beyond the shores of Japan. The Japanese have n o nuclear arms. They also have
n o long-range bombers, n o long-range missiles, little long-range transport, no aerial
tankers. So far, there are no nuclear-powered
attack submarines and o n l y a h a n d f u l of amphibious ships, besides an absence of aircraft
carriers.
56
Moreover, Japan lacks the ability to organize
and deploy forces f r o m the army, navy, and
air force together. Japan's command-andcontrol apparatus is deficient. Katsukichi
Tsukamoto, a retired lieutenant general of
the Self-Defense Force and a specialist o n
communications, said that Japanese systems
"are some thirteen years b e h i n d " those of the
U n i t e d States because such systems have
been neglected by defense planners. American officers agreed. In addition, the ability
to gather and analyze combat intelligence is
almost nonexistent. Stocks of a m m u n i t i o n ,
spare parts, and supplies to sustain operations
are restricted. Shortages of people have cut
i n t o readiness, w i t h some ships unable to sail
because they have only half-crews.
57
58
59
Thus, Japanese and American observers say,
Japan's overall military capabilities are l i m ited. The Japan E c o n o m i c Institute, a research organization i n Washington financed
by the Japanese government, reported i n
1990: "Even w i t h c o m p l e t i o n of the F Y 1 9 8 6 FY1990 military b u i l d u p program and attainment of most of the outline's objectives,
Japan's military w i l l still not be able to provide an effective defense out to 1,000 nautical
m i l e s . " James Auer, a scholar at Vanderbilt
University and a former Defense Department
official specializing i n Japanese matters,
60
Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent?
62
D u r i n g the G u l f crisis, American officers understood w h y the Bush administration
wanted Japan to deploy forces to the region.
But N a v y officers said privately thejapanese
had neither the experience nor the training
to make a military contribution. "They would
not add to the force," said one officer. "They
w o u l d just be something to deal w i t h . "
6 3
In sum, Japan has a modest c o n v e n t i o n a l or
non-nuclear military force that is reasonably
well-armed and equipped but one that is
limited by h i g h costs and various deficiencies. Most important, Japan's force is defensive i n posture and lacks a capability to
project military power m u c h beyond its national shores.
Articulated Policy on
National Security
M a n y governments do not speak the truth
w h e n disclosing specific military policies i n
public. But over time, their pronouncements
and actions gradually provide a clear picture
of where they stand.
Japan's articulated military policy begins
w i t h Article IX of Japan's C o n s t i t u t i o n ,
adopted i n 1947. In its standard translation
into English, it says:
"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace
based o n justice and order, the Japanese
people forever renounce war as a sovereign
9
right of the n a t i o n and the threat or use of
force as a means of settling international
disputes.
"In order to accomplish the a i m of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as
w e l l as other war potential, w i l l never be
maintained. The right of belligerency w i l l
never be m a i n t a i n e d . "
Article IX has been open to m a n y interpretations.
General Douglas MacArthur, the
American proconsul of the Occupation under
whose guidance the article was written, was
a m o n g the first to proclaim that Japan was
not to be denied the right of self-defense. The
general said so after the C o l d War between
the U n i t e d States and the Soviet U n i o n had
broken out i n Europe i n the late 1940s but
before the Korean War began i n June, 1950.
In his N e w Year's message to the Japanese i n
1950, he stated: " B y no sophistry of reasoning can the constitutional renunciation of
war be interpreted as complete negation of
the inalienable right of self-defense against
unprovoked attack." The San Francisco Peace
Treaty i n 1952, w h i c h ended the state of war
between Japan a n d most Allied nations, also
recognized Japan's right to self-defense.
64
65
Japan's Supreme C o u r t , i n a r u l i n g o n Article
IX i n 1959, said: " C e r t a i n l y there is n o t h i n g
i n it w h i c h w o u l d deny the right of self-defense inherent i n our nation as a sovereign
power. The pacifism advanced i n our Constitution was never intended to mean defenselessness or non-resistance."
66
But not all Japanese, even the courts, agree
that the Self-Defense Force is constitutional.
The District C o u r t i n Sapporo, o n the northern island of H o k k a i d o , where a large portion
of thejapanese army is posted, ruled i n 1973
that the Self-Defense Forces were unconstitutional and violated the second provision of
Article IX because of their arms, equipment,
and capabilities.
67
10
The r u l i n g Liberal-Democratic Party has l o n g
asserted that the Self-Defense Force is legitimate. The Komeito, w h i c h is the political
arm of the Soka Gakkai sect of B u d d h i s m ,
declared during a party c o n v e n t i o n i n 1981
that the force was c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . But the
Japan Socialist Party, recently renamed the
Social Democratic Party i n its English version, i n its 1984 c o n v e n t i o n took the position, w h i c h may appear contradictory to the
Western m i n d , that the force was unconstitutional but l e g a l .
68
69
Nonetheless, the m a j o r i t y of the Japanese
seem to have accepted the existence of the
Self-Defense Force albeit, again, w i t h what
may appear to be tortured reasoning. M a n y
Japanese have argued that Article IX forbids
Japan f r o m h a v i n g armed forces to project
power, as stated i n the first paragraph of the
article. But, by i m p l i c a t i o n , they contend
that Article IX permits Japan to have armed
forces for other reasons, namely, self-defense.
It is almost as if there was a t h i r d provision
to Article IX that might read:
" N o t h i n g i n the above provisions, however,
denies Japan the sovereign right to m a i n t a i n
armed forces appropriate for the defense of
the n a t i o n . "
70
Thus, a N a t i o n a l Police Reserve of 75,000
people was established i n 1950; that became
the N a t i o n a l Safety Force of 117,000 people
i n 1952 and the present Self-Defense Force,
w i t h an initial c o m p l e m e n t of 152,000 people, i n 1954. The legislation establishing
those forces has been generally viewed as not
permitting the dispatch of Japanese forces
outside of Japan for combat operations.
71
The first p r o m i n e n t policy statement governing the Self-Defense Force was issued by the
cabinet i n May, 1957. T h e Basic Policy for
N a t i o n a l Defense said: "The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and i n d i rect aggression but, once invaded, to repel
Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited
such aggression." It said Japan w o u l d support
the U n i t e d Nations, promote love of country,
and develop "effective defense capabilities."
But the policy also said Japan w o u l d deal
" w i t h external aggression o n the basis of the
Japan-U.S. security arrangements, pending
the effective f u n c t i o n i n g of the U n i t e d N a tions i n the future i n deterring and repelling
such aggression." The cabinet thus suggested that not o n l y w o u l d Japan's forces
have no offensive capability but they w o u l d
depend o n the U n i t e d States for the security
of Japan, a departure f r o m sovereign responsibilities.
72
Subsequent Japanese cabinets elaborated o n
the defensive posture of Self-Defense Force.
In 1967, the cabinet of Prime Minister Eisaku
Sato said Japan w o u l d not make, acquire, or
allow nuclear weapons to be introduced into
Japan. The Japanese were slow to ratify the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 and
d i d not agree to it u n t i l 1976, largely because
the government thought it discriminated
against non-nuclear nations and that it
w o u l d i n h i b i t the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy i n J a p a n . A tacit transit agreement
w i t h the U n i t e d States made i n 1960, however, permits American warships to carry
their n o r m a l loads of nuclear weapons i n and
out of Japan, but not to store them there nor
to deploy t h e m f r o m J a p a n .
73
74
The cabinet of Prime Minister Takeo M i k i i n
1976 limited military spending to 1 percent
of gross national product. Successive cabinets
have kept military spending i n that range;
there are n o serious signs that Japan intends
to go beyond that limit even t h o u g h military
spending edged over 1 percent of G N P for
three years b e g i n n i n g i n 1 9 8 7 .
75
japan's Defense Budget, 1980-1990
In billions of yen
Fiscal Year
Budget
% of GNP
1980
2,230
0.90
1981
2,400
0.91
1982
2,586
0.93
1983
2,754
0.98
1984
2,935
0.99
1985
3,137
0.99
1986
3,344
0.99
1987
3,517
1.00
1988
3,700
1.01
1989
3,920
1.01
1990
4,159
0.99
Sources: Japan Economic Institute, Japan Self-Defense
Agency
stated that Japan w o u l d acquire enough m i l itary power to help, w i t h the cooperation of
the U n i t e d States, repel an armed i n v a s i o n .
76
U n d e r American pressure, Prime Minister
Zentaro Suzuki pledged to President Ronald
Reagan i n 1981 that Japan w o u l d acquire
enough military power to defend its air and
sea lanes out to 1,000 miles f r o m shore. As
seen earlier, Japan has yet to f u l f i l l that commitment.
77
In 1986, the Japanese government established a Security C o u n c i l w i t h i n the cabinet
to deliberate security issues. C h a i r e d by the
prime minister, it includes the foreign and
finance ministers, the director general of the
Self-Defense Agency, and several other m i n isters and agency directors g e n e r a l . But Japanese officials say privately the c o u n c i l does
little and is o n l y a rubber stamp for decisions
made elsewhere i n the g o v e r n m e n t .
78
Mr. M i k i ' s cabinet also discarded the threeand five-year plans that had governed Japan's
military spending and forged a National Defense Program O u t l i n e that still guidesjapanese military t h i n k i n g today. The outline
Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent?
79
The latest Defense W h i t e Paper, published i n
11
September, 1990, says Japan w i l l gradually
b u i l d u p its capacity for self-defense to reflect
its n a t i o n a l strength. But the descriptions of
ground, naval, and air forces are all i n defensive terms. Japan w i l l not become, it says, "a
m i l i t a r y power w h i c h might pose a threat to
other c o u n t r i e s / '
The white paper says
Japan cannot possess offensive weapons such
as " I C B M s (intercontinental ballistic missiles), long-range strategic bombers, and offensive aircraft carriers."
80
serted: "The Japanese people are f i r m l y resolved never again to repeat those actions,
w h i c h had tragic consequences."
84
In sum, there has been n o evidence i n articulated policy for 45 years that Japan again
intends to become an aggressive military
power.
81
Perhaps most unusual, since few other nations have been so explicit, is the acknowledged c o n t i n u a t i o n of the 33-year-old
reliance o n the U n i t e d States for the defense
of Japan if a m i l i t a r y threat appears. "It is
impossible," the white paper says i n its English version, "for Japan to establish its o w n
defense system capable of c o p i n g w i t h any
conceivable developments ranging f r o m allout warfare i n v o l v i n g the use of nuclear
weapons to aggression i n every conceivable
f o r m using c o n v e n t i o n a l weapons." Therefore, it says, Japan w i l l rely primarily for
security not o n its o w n forces but o n those of
the U n i t e d States under the M u t u a l Security
Treaty.
82
The white paper reaffirms the constitutional
provisions for civilian control of the Self-Defense Force and recalls the era before and
d u r i n g W o r l d War II w h e n militarists governed Japan. "Reflecting our self-criticism
and regret about the military's behavior u n t i l
the e n d of W o r l d War II," the paper says,
"Japan has adopted strict civilian control
similar to that i n other democratic countries."
83
In one of the few forthright statements f r o m
a Japanese since the end of W o r l d War II,
Prime Minister K a i f u expressed i n Singapore
i n May, 1991, "our sincere c o n t r i t i o n for past
Japanese actions w h i c h inflicted unbearable
suffering a n d sorrow u p o n a great m a n y people of the Asia-Pacific region." M r . Kaifu as-
12
Public Attitudes
Toward Militarism
A n a x i o m of international relations holds
that foreign policy, i n c l u d i n g that pertaining
to security and military policy, is rooted i n
domestic politics. That is true even i n authoritarian nations, as has been seen i n the Soviet
U n i o n i n recent years. It is all the more true
where governments are responsive to public
opinion.
Public attitudes toward a possible resurgence
i n Japanese militarism are rooted i n Japanese
history. A t first glance, Japan appears to have
had a l o n g warlike tradition. Under scrutiny,
however, that tradition is less i m p o s i n g and
aggressive than it first appears.
It is a striking fact that Japan has never produced a great military captain. M a n y Japanese have been good soldiers, brave warriors,
competent tacticians. But Japan has had n o
military strategists o n the order of Alexander,
Genghis Khan, or N a p o l e o n . N o r has Japan
produced a military thinker o n the order of
Sun Tzu or Clausewitz or Alfred Thayer
Mahan.
Moreover, before the o p e n i n g of Japan to the
West i n 1868, all but one of Japan's wars were
civil wars fought by a small class of warriors
k n o w n as samurai. The Japanese engaged i n
o n l y one invasion of another country, an
expedition to Korea i n the late 16th century.
Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited
Hideyoshi, the general w h o led that venture,
underscored the strategic ineptitude of
Japan's military leaders as he failed to protect
his supply lines across the sea between Korea
and Japan a n d was done i n by the Korean
navy. He also failed to foresee the resistance
of Korean guerrillas or the armed response of
the C h i n e s e .
85
The samurai w h o ruled Japan for 800 years
before the m o d e r n period comprised the top
5 percent of the nation's population and were
more often concerned w i t h governing the
country than w i t h soldiering. Like the knight
i n s h i n i n g armor of medieval Europe, moreover, the samurai was something of an idealized, romantic dream as most of his days were
spent i n the h u m d r u m of bureaucratic, administration.
Japanese military leadership. In the early
days, the Japanese showed operational skill
i n the attack o n Pearl Harbor, the invasion of
the Philippines, the conquest of Malaya and
Singapore. They w o n victories i n swift, caref u l l y planned and well-executed operations.
But there it ended, for the Japanese leaders
demonstrated little i m a g i n a t i o n for exploiting their victories i n sustained campaigns.
Indeed, Japan's rulers were proven to be strategically ignorant. G o i n g to war against the
U n i t e d States and Britain, after already havi n g been at war i n C h i n a for f o u r years and
always i n danger of being attacked by the
Soviet U n i o n , was madness. It w i l l surely go
d o w n i n history as the consummate military
blunder.of the 20th century.
86
Bashido, the Way of the Warrior that has
influenced the life and culture of Japan, was
less a call to military action and more a code
for a way of life. It prescribed a disciplined set
of values such as loyalty, obedience, respect
for parents and the aged, compassion for the
young, moderation i n all things, returning
good f o r evil, a n d a willingness to die for a
cause.
87
In modern times, bushido was corrupted by
the militarists w h o accrued power i n the
1920s and 1930s as they sought to justify
their actions w i t h historical precedent. Benedict said m o d e r n bushido was "a publicist's
inspiration." She wrote: "It became a slogan
of the nationalists and militarists and the
concept was discredited w i t h the discrediting
of those leaders" after the defeat of W o r l d
War I I . The historical virtues of bushido,
however, m a y still exist i n contemporary
Japan.
88
After 1868, Japan competed w i t h Western
nations and Russia for imperial power i n Asia
and was successful i n wars against C h i n a and
Russia. But Japan's experience d u r i n g W o r l d
War II is instructive about the quality of
Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent?
General Hideki Tojo, Japan's wartime prime
minister, reflected the provincial outlook of
m a n y Japanese leaders of that era i n his ignorance of the outside w o r l d . The son of an
army officer, Tojo had himself risen through
the ranks of the officer corps i n steady but
notably unspectacular fashion through hard
work. He served i n M a n c h u r i a , where he
acquired the nickname "Razor" for his sharp
staff work, but was little exposed to the w o r l d
outside the army, to say n o t h i n g of the world
outside of Japan. He became prime minister
largely as a compromise candidate w h o had
made few enemies i n his career.
89
A d m i r a l Isoroku Yamamoto, w h o had studied at Harvard and had been a naval attache
i n Washington, warned Japan's other m i l i tary leaders not to attack the U n i t e d States
because that w o u l d o n l y awaken a sleeping
giant. But even he was u n w i l l i n g to go against
the tide of his compatriots, some of w h o m
threatened to assassinate h i m , a h i g h l y plausible menace at the time. Moreover, he was
also a gambler w h o thought maybe Japan
could pull it off despite the o d d s . Yamam o t o was shot d o w n i n the South Pacific i n
1943.
90
13
O n the contemporary scene, the enthronement of the new emperor, A k i h i t o , i n 1990
gave little h i n t of militarism. The emperor
emphasized his allegiance to the Constitut i o n , a n d there was n o review of troops o n
white horseback as i n earlier years. The m i l i tary was l i m i t e d to f i r i n g a twenty-one gun
salute a n d h a v i n g the Self-Defense Force
band play. T h e m a i n security problem during
the ceremonies was not f r o m would-be m i l i tarists but f r o m left-wingers protesting
against the imperial system and, by implicat i o n , resurgent m i l i t a r i s m .
91
industry. In 1991, that figure c l i m b e d to 19
percent w h e n 94 of the 494 graduates turned
d o w n commissions after the taxpayers had
paid for their educations. T h e graduates
had n o obligation to serve; i n the U n i t e d
States, a graduate of the service academies
owes the taxpayers at least five years of active
duty. (In 1992, that obligation becomes six
years.)
4
95
A n official i n the American Embassy i n Tokyo
may have s u m m e d u p t h e j a p a n e s e attitude
best w h e n he said: "There is a rampant susp i c i o n of the m i l i t a r y by other Japanese."
96
Polls suggest Japanese attitudes toward m i l i tary power. In 1989, the Dentsu Institute of
H u m a n Studies f o u n d that o n l y 13 percent
of t h e j a p a n e s e thought their nation should
take a role of leadership i n the world. O n l y
0.7 percent thought that Japan should be
responsible for a larger share of military support i n line w i t h its e c o n o m i c resources.
92
The 1990 Defense W h i t e Paper reported that
77 percent of thejapanese surveyed said the
most useful role of the Self Defense Force was
not n a t i o n a l security but disaster relief; o n l y
8 percent thought the forces were intended
to defend the country. That 77 percent is an
astonishing figure as most people i n most
other nations consider the mission of their
armed forces to be the defense of the nation
or, i n some authoritarian countries, to keep
a regime i n power. In response to another
question, 67 percent said the status quo w i t h
the SDF a n d the security treaty w i t h the
U n i t e d States is best for Japan—only 7 percent said the security treaty should be abolished and the SDF r e d u c e d .
93
Some Japanese are v o t i n g w i t h their feet. Not
o n l y is the SDF h a v i n g recruiting problems,
but 15 percent of the 425 graduates of the
N a t i o n a l Defense Academy Qapan's c o m bined West Point, Annapolis, and Air Force
Academy) turned d o w n commissions w h e n
they graduated i n 1990 to take better jobs i n
14
That p u b l i c sentiment i n Japan, as i n other
modern nations, is often reflected by serious
writers. H i r o s h i M i y a z a k i , a senior executive
at Bungei S h u n j u , a prestigious p u b l i s h i n g
house, said: "It is obvious that there are o n l y
a very small m i n o r i t y w h o dream about
Japan as a great military power or w h o advocate militarism. In f i c t i o n , I don't k n o w of
any novelist w h o advocates the rise of m i l i tarism."
97
The last p r o m i n e n t writer to urge that Japan
again become a m i l i t a r y power was Yukio
M i s h i m a i n 1970. "Prewar Japan banished
the c h r y s a n t h e m u m f r o m our national life,"
he once wrote, "but postwar Japan has outlawed the sword and by so d o i n g has broken
the totality of Japanese c u l t u r e . "
98
M i s h i m a went to the Self-Defense Agency i n
November that year and appeared o n a balcony to exhort the staff, m a n y of w h o m were
m i l l i n g about outside o n a mid-day break. He
urged t h e m to restore the prestige of the
emperor, purge corrupt politicians, and revive the h o n o r of military service. Joyce
Lebra, an American scholar w h o was an eyewitness, wrote later: " M i s h i m a ' s hoarse harangue was nearly d r o w n e d out by the shouts
and jeers of his incredulous audience and by
the noise of helicopters already circling overhead." After about seven minutes, M i s h i m a
went inside to c o m m i t ritual suicide, called
Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited
seppuku or hara-kiri. Lebra said his last words
before disemboweling himself were: "I don't
t h i n k they heard me very well." Of the cold
response to M i s h i m a by members of the SelfDefense Agency staff, Lebra concluded:
"They are soldiers of contemporary Japan
and they, if anyone, should have responded
if militarism were resurgent i n Japan today."
99
Mishima's works are still read, but his advocacy of military force has fallen on barren
ground. A year after his death, o n l y a h a n d f u l
of his followers and a few of the curious
showed up to wash his grave and pay their
respects.
O n the 20th anniversary of his
death, a small right-wing c o m m e m o r a t i o n
went almost unnoticed. D o n a l d Keene, the
cultural critic w h o has lived i n Japan for
m a n y years, was quoted recently as saying: "I
can't t h i n k of a single lasting effect (his
death) h a d . "
100
1 0 1
In the movies and television, the chambara,
or period pieces about samurai swordplay, are
as popular as ever. A l o n g - r u n n i n g show is
"Abarenbo Shogun," w h i c h could be translated as "Reckless Supreme Commander." It
features a handsome y o u n g shogun w h o disguises himself as a free-spirited warrior w i t h
a sense of justice. He goes about w i t h two
" n i n j a " black-suited guardians to right
wrongs and p u n i s h evil. W i t h his swift sword,
the hero dispatches a score of bad guys each
week before slipping away to his c a s t l e .
102
Viewers w h o remember the Lone Ranger and
his f a i t h f u l sidekick, Tonto, w o u l d have n o
trouble recognizing Abarenbo Shogun. Such
plays should be seen for what they are, eastern westerns that are a f o r m of escapism.
They are like J o h n Wayne movies—fun to
watch and the good guys always w i n , or at
least die n o b l y i n the best Japanese tradition.
Japanese m o t i o n picture producers have
been noticeable i n abstaining f r o m m a k i n g
films about the nation's modern armed force.
So m u c h so that Toru Murakawa, a director
Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent?
with the Toei C o m p a n y , caused a m i n o r stir
i n 1990 by t u r n i n g out a f i l m entitled, Best
Guy. The story is about a hotshot fighter pilot
i n the A i r Self-Defense Force and features
swirling scenes of aerial combat training
above the Chitose A i r Base i n H o k k a i d o . For
the first time i n memory, the ASDF cooperated w i t h the filmmakers by putting f o u r F-15
jet fighters at their disposal, rigging them
w i t h cameras to record the action i n the
s k y . As w i t h the television show about the
shogun, movie-goers w h o have seen T o m
Cruise i n Top Gun w o u l d understand Best Guy.
103
At the box office, the picture was a modest
success at best. As a reviewer wrote i n the
Yomiuri Daily News, an English-language
paper i n Tokyo, a movie about the Self-Defense Force "is about as popular a subject for
New Year's films as overthrowing the monarchy."
Indeed, the best films of 1990 were
about as far f r o m military themes as could be
imagined. If anything, they were anti-war
and anti-military. The top 10, as rated by an
authoritative f i l m magazine, Kinema Junpo,
were films about the trials of an all-girls h i g h
school, the evacuation of a y o u n g b o y f r o m
Tokyo i n W o r l d War II, and a failing marriage.
Another was Akira Kurosawa's Yume, or
Dreams. In a comedy, a h i g h school boy seeks
to become an O l y m p i c swimmer. Others are
about the 1960s student movement, the
yakuza, or organized gangsters, a chambara
period piece, a suspense story around a
spoiled girl, and the friendship of a schoolboy for a d y i n g y o u n g w o m a n .
1 0 4
1 0 5
A m i l i t a r y m u s e u m adjacent to the Yasukuni
Shrine, the m e m o r i a l to Japan's war dead,
was refurbished i n 1986 after h a v i n g been
closed since the end of W o r l d War II. The
museum is filled w i t h memorabilia f r o m
Japan's m o d e r n wars, i n c l u d i n g W o r l d War
II. Here are rising sun battle flags, rifles and
artillery pieces, replicas of the kamikaze suicide bombers, and u n i f o r m s and pictures of
A d m i r a l Yamamoto and General Korechika
15
A n a m i , w h o c o m m i t t e d seppuku early i n the
m o r n i n g of the day Japan surrendered. The
theme of the exhibitions and videos s h o w n
regularly is factual a n d straightforward, w i t h
n o attempt to glorify Japan's military past.
Rather, they appear to be a requiem for the
war d e a d .
106
The m u s e u m , however, is notable for what it
does not display. W h i l e there are pictures of
the surprise attack o n Pearl Harbor and the
s t u n n i n g Japanese defeat at sea near the island of M i d w a y , no m e n t i o n is made of
Japan's atrocities f r o m 1931 to 1945. O m i t t e d
are any record of the rape of N a n k i n g i n
C h i n a i n w h i c h u n k n o w n thousands of C h i nese died, the Bataan death m a r c h i n w h i c h
hundreds of A m e r i c a n prisoners of war perished i n the Philippines, or the death of
13,000 A l l i e d prisoners of war and 80,000
Asian laborers b u i l d i n g a railway through the
jungles of T h a i l a n d a n d B u r m a .
Just as most Japanese history textbooks gloss
over that period, so the military m u s e u m
seems to be another example of thejapanese
seeing themselves as the victims of W o r l d
War II instead of the aggressors. The museum
does not signify a resurgence of militarism,
by any means, but neither does it urge the
Japanese to c o n f r o n t the realities of the war
i n w h i c h they set Asia aflame f r o m 1931,
w h e n Japan invaded M a n c h u r i a , u n t i l their
defeat i n 1945.
The debate over the Japan's role i n the Persian G u l f crisis was perhaps the best indicator
of the deep Japanese resistance toward acq u i r i n g m i l i t a r y power. A law that w o u l d
have permitted the deployment of Japanese
non-combatant troops to the G u l f had to be
w i t h d r a w n because of strong opposition.
Even a p l a n to send several military air transports to ferry refugees was shot d o w n by the
political and p u b l i c protest. The dispatch of
the minesweepers after the war drew o n l y
grudging p u b l i c approval.
16
As b o t h a leader of public o p i n i o n and a
reflector of Japanese attitudes, the press i n
Tokyo vigorously opposed a military role for
Japan i n the G u l f . In a n editorial, the Asahi
Shimbun admonished Prime Minister Kaifu
on the crisis: " H e must articulate precisely
that Japan's policy is to absolutely reject the
use of arms i n keeping w i t h the spirit of the
constitution."
107
Asahi surveyed what it called o p i n i o n leaders,
almost all of w h o m agreed that Japan's contribution to the gulf situation s h o u l d be n o n military. Later, i n an editorial entitled "Keep
the SDF Out of It," the newspaper asserted
that a i d i n g refugees was a "humanitarian
measure that our n a t i o n can carry out." But
the editorial contended: "The C o n s t i t u t i o n
does not allow the overseas dispatch of the
SDF."
1 0 8
In an interview w i t h Nihon Keizai Shimbun, a
newspaper like the Wall Street Journal, the
ruling Liberal Democratic Party's secretary
general, Ichiro Ozawa, argued for some f o r m
of Japanese c o m m i t m e n t : "The question is
not over the use of m i l i t a r y power as a
national right but whether we s h o u l d shoulder a burden as part of a U n i t e d Nations
peacekeeping activity." But he was overruled
by the m a j o r i t y of his party.
About 80 writers, television personalities, liberals a n d l e f t w i n g activists, members and
former members of the Diet, C h r i s t i a n leaders, women's leaders, and scholars calling
themselves C o n c e r n e d Citizens of Japan took
out a full-page advertisement i n The New York
Times i n M a r c h , 1991, to vent their views o n
the question of sending Japanese troops to
the Persian Gulf:
"We do not want Japan to m o v e closer to
translating its awesome e c o n o m i c power i n t o
military power. We are surprised at the short
memories of Americans w h o see n o danger
i n this. O u r neighbors i n Asia are less forgetful."
1 0 9
Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited
A l l told, there is little evidence that any Japanese, w i t h the possible exception of fringe
groups, wants to see his nation become a
military power again. A scholar i n Germany,
Hanns W. M a u l l , wrote i n the journal Foreign
Affairs: "Democracy i n Japan and G e r m a n y
today may not be perfect, but it looks strong
enough to prevent any return toward militarism, fascism, or nationalistic authoritariani s m . " In Japan, he wrote, "there are few signs
of a serious radical or militaristic threat to the
present political system, and there remains a
powerful undercurrent of pacifism w i t h
w h i c h the experience of the Second W o r l d
War i m b u e d Japanese s o c i e t y . "
military power because it is situated i n one of
the most heavily armed regions i n the w o r l d .
The Soviet U n i o n , the U n i t e d States, the two
Koreas, C h i n a , Taiwan, a n d V i e t n a m all have
large armed forces surrounding Japan. O n l y
against the weakest nations i n Asia could an
aggressive Japanese military force, as constituted n o w or even w i t h a massive b u i l d u p i n
the future, be used w i t h any expectation of
success.
Moreover, Japan has no real need for more
t h a n m i n i m a l military power. The nation's
basic security is provided by the U n i t e d
States, as the government has acknowledged
i n the Defense W h i t e Paper. Japanese econ o m i c interests throughout Asia are protected by a balance of power. N o one nation
has the military strength to dominate the
region, and thus it is not necessary for Japan
to have the flag f o l l o w trade. Since Japan has
already become the pre-eminent economic
power i n the region, Tokyo w o u l d have n o t h ing to gain and m u c h to lose by military
action.
Setting aside questions of political w i l l and
national strategy, thejapanese clearly could
build a powerful military force if they so
decided. Japan has the e c o n o m i c strength,
the managerial and labor skills, the technology and industrial base to become a first-class
military power.
110
After the G u l f war and the criticism aimed at
Japan for not h a v i n g taken part i n the coalition, Japanese leaders began searching for
ways i n w h i c h their nation could exert political influence i n the international arena. But
the u n d e r l y i n g theme of that search was reliance o n economic, not military, power and
o n actions such as disaster relief and peacekeeping operations.
Even if Japan succeeds i n becoming a forceful
political power, and that is far f r o m certain,
it is most difficult to imagine a Japanese
leader advocating an adventure like that of
W o r l d War II. Beyond all other reasons, Japan
w o u l d f i n d it hard to w i n m u c h if it employed
Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent?
What Japan Could Do
W i t h its financial means, Japan could lift its
military spending f r o m the present 1 percent
of national wealth to 3 percent or 4 percent.
In economies less robust than that of Japan,
Britain today spends 4.2 percent of its G N P
for defense, France 3.8 percent, G e r m a n y 2.9
percent. Per capita, thejapanese spend o n l y
$236 a year o n military power compared w i t h
$574 i n Germany, $608 i n Britain, and $646
in France.
111
Higher levels of military spending i n Japan
w o u l d mean large tax increases a n d a diversion of investment f r o m civilian pursuits,
and that w o u l d take something off Japan's
international competitive edge. But it could
be done if the example of the industrial nations of the West are valid.
Japan also has the financial and technical
resources to make nuclear weapons. A Japanese strategic thinker said years ago, and recently reaffirmed it, that "Japan is N m i n u s
17
six m o n t h s . " He meant that Japan could
b u i l d a nuclear weapon w i t h i n six m o n t h s of
a political decision to do s o .
N o t h i n g to
date, however, suggests that the Japanese,
w h o suffered f r o m atomic b o m b i n g at Hiros h i m a a n d Nagasaki at the end of W o r l d War
II, are even remotely considering nuclear
arms. Japan's "nuclear allergy" is still pervasive.
1 1 2
For Japan to b u i l d a conventional, non-nuclear m i l i t a r y force commensurate w i t h its
e c o n o m i c strength and the size of its population w o u l d require a force slightly over half
the size of that of the U n i t e d States. But
Japan's armed forces w o u l d be weighted toward seapower rather than l a n d forces because Japan is a m a r i t i m e nation dependent
o n trade. Japan is especially dependent o n
imports of food, fuel, and raw materials because it is poor i n those natural resources.
The cost of that force, w h i c h Japanese and
American officials say has not been calculated by the Japanese g o v e r n m e n t ,
could
be approximated by measuring it against
American costs. That w o u l d produce a conservative estimate because Japanese costs for
arms, a m m u n i t i o n , equipment, and supplies
are higher than those i n the U n i t e d States.
113
T h e U n i t e d States spends about $300 b i l l i o n
a year f o r defense. If Japan spent 50 percent
to 60 percent of that amount, it w o u l d come
to $150 b i l l i o n to $180 b i l l i o n a year. G i v e n
the t i m e needed to b u i l d m o d e r n weapons,
it w o u l d take t h e j a p a n e s e about 10 years to
acquire a proportionate force.
A Japanese military budget could also be calculated by assembling a hypothetical or notional force and determining the cost by
a p p l y i n g American costs; this again w o u l d
underestimate the cost to J a p a n .
114
To protect its sea lanes, especially through
the South C h i n a Sea, the Straits of Malacca,
the Indonesian archipelago, and the Indian
18
Ocean, this imaginary Japanese navy w o u l d
need eight aircraft carriers as f l o a t i n g bases
for 800 fighter and attack planes. Following
an American m o d e of operations, Japan at
any one time w o u l d have two carriers i n
h o m e port, two i n training near Japan, two
deployed i n the South C h i n a Sea and two
deployed i n the Indian Ocean. Japan has n o
carriers today. Each carrier, w i t h its planes,
escort ships, and trained flight a n d ship
crews, w o u l d cost $20 b i l l i o n .
In addition, this n o t i o n a l Japanese fleet
w o u l d require 60 nuclear-powered attack
submarines, each costing $1.5 b i l l i o n , to
protect the surface fleet f r o m other submarines and to threaten ships of potential adversaries. Japan today has 14 diesel-electric
submarines whose mission is coastal patrol
and gathering intelligence o n submarines
around Japan.
O n the surface, Japan w o u l d be required to
quadruple its fleet of 63 warships today to
about 250. N o t o n l y w o u l d thejapanese navy
need 190 new vessels, m a n y w o u l d be bigger
and more heavily armed than the 2,000-ton
to 3,000-ton frigates that comprise the m a j o r
part of Japan's fleet today. Japan's biggest
ship is a 7,200-ton destroyer. The average cost
of the new ships w o u l d be about $500 m i l l i o n
each.
In addition, Japan w o u l d need amphibious
ships for troops; combat support ships for
a m m u n i t i o n , supplies, and fuel; c o m m u n i cations and auxiliary vessels. Some 50 ships
w o u l d average $300 m i l l i o n each. C o m m u nications, supplies, and other operating costs
w o u l d come to $3 b i l l i o n a year, based o n U.S.
Navy costs.
To project power f r o m Japan, the hypothetical Japanese air arm w o u l d need a fleet of 100
long-range bombers like the American B - l
bomber, of w h i c h Japan has n o n e now. Each
B - l costs $280 m i l l i o n . Japan today has 250
older fighter planes and w o u l d require 1,000
Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited
newer, more high-powered aircraft. About
500 planes w o u l d cost $50 m i l l i o n each w h i l e
another 500 could be had for $20 m i l l i o n
apiece.
The key to aerial power projection w o u l d be
a fleet of f l y i n g tankers. Japan's n o t i o n a l air
force w o u l d require 100 at a cost of $200
m i l l i o n each and 100 aerial transports at a
cost of $300 m i l l i o n each. Fuel, missiles, and
other costs, based o n U.S. Air Force budgets,
w o u l d come to about $4 b i l l i o n a year.
O n the ground, the imaginaryjapanese army
w o u l d have smaller forces t h a n those of large
land powers but w o u l d still need six parachute, amphibious, and air assault divisions
where it has o n l y a few battalions today.
Standing up and sustaining an American d i vision costs about $3 b i l l i o n a year. Based o n
40 percent of other U.S. A r m y annual costs,
the Japanese army w o u l d spend between $5
b i l l i o n and $6 b i l l i o n a year.
This hypothetical Japanese military force
w o u l d expand f r o m today's 247,000 m e n and
w o m e n to about one m i l l i o n . Training and
m a i n t a i n i n g each of those 750,000 new m e n
and w o m e n w o u l d require an average of
about $15,000 a year. Over 10 years, that
w o u l d come to a total of $112.5 b i l l i o n .
T h e n the n o t i o n a l force w o u l d need a new
apparatus for communications, a logistics
system, war reserve supplies, new facilities
and people for research and development,
additional construction of bases, and an extensive apparatus to gather and collate intelligence. The cost w o u l d r u n into tens of
billions and w o u l d double the cost of weapons and people.
Therefore, it could take Japan $150 b i l l i o n a
year for 10 years to build, train, a n d assemble
an armed force commensurate w i t h its population and economy. That w o u l d be five
times the current military budget and 5 percent of GNP, compared w i t h 1 percent now.
Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent?
Moreover, the cost easily could reach $200
b i l l i o n a year, especially i n the early years, for
research and development and start-up costs.
W i t h o u t doubt, Japan has the technological
k n o w - h o w to b u i l d world-class ships, tanks,
and planes. At first, Japan w o u l d need heavy
investment i n research and development to
modernize its forces. A n industry observer,
for instance, has said that Japanese radar lags
b e h i n d that of the U n i t e d States by 10 to 15
years.
115
But a n a t i o n outpacing the w o r l d i n shipbuilding, truck manufacture, and electronics
could do it. Japan has or could b u i l d sufficient industrial plant to produce a flow of
arms and equipment. This, too, w o u l d mean
diverting resources f r o m existing p r o d u c t i o n
lines or f r o m new lines intended for civilian
products. It w o u l d also mean diverting technical and management skills.
In recent years, Japan has steadily increased
its self-reliance i n defense p r o d u c t i o n . In
1979, Japan produced 85 percent of its equipment. That is n o w over 90 percent. The Japan
E c o n o m i c Institute i n Washington, w h i c h is
financed by Japan, said i n a report: "The
Japanese government actively promotes selfreliance i n arms p r o d u c t i o n . Tokyo has accepted the diseconomies inherent i n military
work i n order to b u i l d a viable defense industrial b a s e . "
116
W h i l e technically o n a par w i t h American
defense contractors, Japanese companies differ i n one significant respect—they are far less
dependent o n military contracts for sale and
income. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, w h i c h
is perennially the top defense contractor i n
Japan, gets o n l y 21 percent of its revenues
f r o m m a k i n g weapons such as the Type-90
tank or the F-15 jet fighter, o n license f r o m
the U n i t e d States. Kawasaki Heavy Industries,
the number two contractor, gets 20 percent
of its revenues f r o m defense work. In contrast, General D y n a m i c s and M c D o n n e l l -
19
Japan's Defense Contractors
Defense Revenues in Billions of Yen
1989
1990
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
363
440
Kawasaki Heavy Industries
174
147
Mitsubishi Electric Corp.
100
118
Ishrkawajima-Harima Heavy Ind.
63
78
Toshiba Corp.
68
60
NEC Corp.
71
55
Japan Steel Works
31
35
Komatsu
24
22
Fuji Heavy Industries
22
22
Hitachi
26
20
Company
Sources: Japan Economic Institute, Japan Economic
journal.
Douglas, two leading American defense c o n tractors, get 50 percent to 70 percent of their
revenues f r o m military c o n t r a c t s .
117
Japanese defense contractors have occasionally been alleged to be eager to export arms.
But the Japanese government has m a i n tained a f i r m ban o n such trade and does not
appear w i l l i n g to lift it. After the Toshiba
M a c h i n e C o m p a n y was caught selling c o m puter-controlled machine tools to the Soviet
U n i o n that b a n has been all the more f i r m .
The Toshiba sale, through a Norwegian company, enabled the Soviet navy to make submarines quieter and therefore harder to
detect, according to American submariners.
T h e Japan Economic Journal said i n
A p r i l , 1991, that Japanese companies were
reluctant to sell "dual-use" technology for
fear of being accused of fostering arms industries i n nations that bought such technology.
Dual-use equipment, w h i c h could be
simple, such as trucks, or advanced, such as
computers, is intended for civilian use but
c o u l d be put to military use.
118
1 1 9
20
For Japan to obtain the personnel for a larger
military force w o u l d require conscription,
w h i c h w o u l d divert labor f r o m civilian industry. Today, Japan has o n l y 0.2 percent of its
population i n the armed forces, compared
w i t h 0.57 percent i n Britain, 0.81 percent i n
Germany, and a f u l l 1 percent i n F r a n c e .
120
In sum, Japan has the resources to assemble
a powerful armed force. But little i n the foreseeable future suggests that the Japanese
w o u l d be w i l l i n g to pay the price, not to say
the cost of social and e c o n o m i c disruption,
of b u i l d i n g a first-class force.
What If?
N o t h i n g , however, is forever a n d a list of
"what if's" is not d i f f i c u l t to conceive:
• W h a t if the U n i t e d States, w h i c h has already begun to reduce its forces i n Asia,
withdraws completely and abandons its
posture as a Pacific power?
• W h a t if the Soviet U n i o n rejects perestroika
and reverts to an aggressive military role i n
Asia?
• W h a t if Korea is reunified under a government hostile to Japan, w i t h two enormous
Korean armies merged? Or a war breaks out
and threatens to f l o o d j a p a n w i t h refugees?
• W h a t if C h i n a resolves its e c o n o m i c and
political problems a n d again becomes an
aggressive military power under new leaders?
• W h a t if V i e t n a m or Indonesia or India
threatens the oil lifeline t h r o u g h Southeast
Asia and the Indian Ocean to the Persian
Gulf, whence comes more than half of
Japan's oil? That could take Japan back to
the 1930s w h e n the perceived prospect of
Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited
losing its sources of o i l was a m o n g the
elements that drove Japan into aggression.
• Or what if there is a threat to Japan unseen
today?
Under present circumstances, it w o u l d probably take two developments to drive Japan
into rebuilding a large military force. The
most decisive w o u l d be the withdrawal of
American forces f r o m Asia, as that w o u l d
remove Japan's acknowledged m a i n line of
defense a n d the guarantor of Japanese security. A withdrawal of that order w o u l d i n clude American ground and air forces f r o m
South Korea; air, sea, and ground forces f r o m
Japan and O k i n a w a ; and air and naval forces
f r o m the Philippines. U n i t e d States forces
w o u l d retire to G u a m and Hawaii.
A n American withdrawal w o u l d most likely
cause thejapanese to reconsider their present
defensive posture. If coupled w i t h any of the
other "what if's," that w o u l d almost certainly
cause Japan to acquire a m u c h larger military
force. Where that development w o u l d lead is
impossible to predict.
In any case, it w o u l d be more external circumstances, rather than what happens inside
Japan, that w o u l d determine Japan's military
future. Absent an American withdrawal and
aggressive moves by Japan's neighbors i n
Asia, the Japanese w i l l most likely continue
for m a n y years w i t h a small, reasonably wellequipped force that is i n a distinctly defensive posture.
In sum, it seems that Japan w i l l remain an
economic giant and a military pigmy relative
to the world's other major and middle-sized
powers. A resurgence of Japanese militarism
is not o n the h o r i z o n .
Acknowledgments
I would like to acknowledge the most helpful
assistance of many people who commented on
this paper at various stages.
Colleagues at the East-West Center who offered
incisive suggestions included John Bardach, Richard Baker, Derek Davies, Robert Hewett, Bruce
Koppel, Michael Manson, Charles Morrison,
Keith Richburg, and John Schidlovsky. Jacqueline
D'Orazio was most helpful in designing the cover
and printing the report.
In addition, perceptive criticism was received
from James Auer of Vanderbilt University and a
former official of the Department of Defense;
Admiral Ronald Hays, USN (retired), a former
commander-in-chief of United States forces in the
Pacific; James Kelly, a consultant on Asia and
Pacific affairs who is a former senior official in the
Defense Department and the White House; Lieutenant General Claude Kicklighter, former commanding general of United States Army forces in
the Pacific; Colonel Charles Kinsey, of General
Kicklighter's senior staff; and Colonel William
Wise, USAF, a senior staff officer at the Pacific
Command's headquarters in Hawaii.
Several others who requested anonymity also reviewed the paper. As ever, my wife, Fumiko Mori
Halloran, who is an accomplished writer, was
supportive and critical at the same time. To all I
am deeply grateful, but they must be absolved of
any responsibility for the facts and assessments—
and mistakes—in the paper, for that is minealone.
Notes
1. Ruth Benedict, The Chrysantfiemum and the
Sword (Charles E. Tuttle Company, Tokyo,
1954), p. 2.
2. The Washington Post, Jan. 29, 1987, op-ed page.
3. Vie New York Times, April 11, 1988, p. 18.
4. Quoted in the Los Angeles Times, Aug. 19,1990,
p. A22.
Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent?
21
5. 77ie New York Times, June 27, 1990, p. A19.
6. U.S. Department of Defense, "A Strategic
Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim," Report
to Congress, Washington, April 1990, p. 3.
7.Susumu Awanohara, Tlie Burden-Sharing Issues
in U.S -Japan Security Relations: A Perspective
from Japan (Honolulu: East-West Center, March
1990), p. 5.
8. Richard Solomon, Address to the Friends of the
East-West Center, Honolulu, Oct. 27, 1990.
9. Quoted in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Oct. 29,
1990, p. A12.
10. The Rising Tide: Japan in Asia, supplement to
Japan Economic Journal (winter 1990), p. 5.
11. Background conversations with the author
duringjune, 1990.
12. The Rising Tide, p. 10.
13. Ibid., p. 19.
14. Jim Mann, Los Angeles Times News Service, as
quoted in the Honolulu Sunday Star-Bulletin &
Advertiser, July 29, 1990, p. A22.
15. Keith Richburg, "Many Asians fear military
threat from Japan," Washington Post; reprinted in the Honolulu Sunday Star-Bulletin
& Advertiser, Aug. 5, 1990, p. A35.
16. Ibid., p. A35.
17. "Towards the Pacific Century," Par Eastern Economic Review, Jan. 31, 1991, p. 16.
23. "Japan can help keep the peace in gulf crisis,"
Mainichi Shimbun, translated by the Asia
Foundation's Translation Service Center, Honolulu Star Bulletin, Jan. 2, 1991, op-ed page.
24. Gwenda lyechad, "Japan's Defense Dilemma:
Should it send troops to gulf?," Honolulu StarBulletin, Nov. 6, 1990, p. A-6.
25. William Safire, The New York Times, Sept. 27,
1990, op-ed page.
26. Address to the Toshiba International Foundation Symposium, March 5, 1990, reprinted in
Speaking of Japan (September, 1990), p. 11.
27. "Japan's Calling: Global Samaritan," Sankei
Shimbun, as translated by the Asia Foundation's Translation Service Center, Feb. 18,
1991, pp. 3-4.
28. Quoted in Honolulu Star-Bulletin, April 12,
1991, p. A4.
29. U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Allied
Contributions to the Common Defense (Washington, D.C., April, 1990); Japan Self-Defense
Agency, Boei Hakusho (Defense White Paper)
(Tokyo, September, 1990).
30. Defense White Paper, p. 305; Report on Allied
Contributions, p. A-17.
31. Japan Self-Defense Agency, quoted in JEI Report Qapan Economic Institute Report), Jan.
11, 1991, pp. 8-11.
32. Defense White Paper, p. 304.
18. S.JavedMaswood, Japanese Defence: The Search
for Political Power (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), p. 81.
33. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to
the President and Congress (Washington, D.C.,
Jan. 1990), p. 69.
19. "Japanese women show their political clout,"
Shinano Mainichi Shimbun, translated by the
Asia Foundation's Translation Service Center,
Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Jan. 30, 1991, p. A14.
34. Defense White Paper, p. 304.
20. "A Defensive Stance," Look Japan, November,
1990, p. 7.
21. YoichI Funabashi, "Japan's International
Agenda for the 1990s," background paper prepared for the Eighth Shimoda conference,
Nov. 15-17, 1990, p. 12.
22. "Keeping the Security Treaty with Washington," Asahi Shimbun, translated by Asia
Foundation's Translation Service Center, June
18, 1990.
22
35. Conversations with American diplomats and
Japanese officials, Tokyo, May, 1991.
36. Defense White Paper, p. 304; Defense Department, Annual Report, p. 69.
37. U.S. Department of Defense, Procurement Programs (PI) (Washington, D.C., January, 1990),
p.A-12.
38. Defense White Paper, p. 302.
39. Procurement Programs, p. N-19.
40. Defense White Paper, p. 303.
41. Procurement Programs, p. F-2.
42. Defense White Paper, p. 303.
Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited
43. Ibid., p. 304.
44. Department of Defense, Annual Report, p. 69.
45. Defense White Paper, p. 304.
46. Department of Defense, Annual Report, p. 69.
47. Defense White paper, p. 293.
48. International Institute of Strategic Studies,
Military Balance, 1990 (London, 1990).
49. Report on Allied Contributions, p. A-20.
50. Ibid., p. A-28.
51. Ibid., p. A-33.
52. Ibid., p. A-29.
53. See International Institute of StrategicStudies,
Military Balance, 1990.
54. Conversations with the author in Tokyo in June,
1990, and in Honolulu in November, 1990.
55. J. V. P. Goldrick and P. D.Jones, "Far Eastern
Navies," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
(March, 1990), p. 150.
56. See Defense White Paper; Jieitai Sobi Nenkan
(Self-Defense Force Equipment Annual) (Tokyo:
Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1990); and three volumes by Kazuhisa Ogawa, an independent
military analyst, Zusetsu Riku no Jieitai, Zusetsu
Umi no Jieitai, and Zusetsu Sora no Jieitai
(Tokyo: Kodansha, 1990). These volumes are
guides to the technology and training of the
Ground, Maritime, Air Self-Defense Forces,
respectively.
57. Japan Times, March 9, 1991.
on the Constitution of Japan, Duke University, Sept. 16, 1989.
65. Theodore McNelly, "General MacArthur's Pacifism," International Journal of World Peace
Oanuary-March 1989), p. 47.
66. Quoted in John K. Emmerson, Arms,. Yen &
Power: The Japanese Dilemma (New York:
Dunellen, 1971), p. 53.
67. Richard Halloran, The New York Times, Sept. 8,
1973, p. 1.
68. Japan Self-Defense Agency, Defense of Japan,
1990 (Tokyo, 1991; English version of Boei
Hakusho), p. 331.
69. Ibid., p. 332.
70. This formulation is the author's, but it has
been tested with thoughtful Japanese.
71. See Emmerson, pp. 55, 77.
72. Defense of Japan, 1990, pp. 86-87.
73. Defense of Japan, 1990, p. 330. See also Emmerson, pp. 344-350.
74. Richard Halloran, The New York Times, April
25, 1971, p. 1; Oct. 13, 1974, p. 9; Oct. 27,
1974, p. 1.
75. Defense of Japan, 1990, p. 291.
76. Ibid., pp. 90-94, 247-251.
77. Report on Allied Contributions, p. 3-12.
78. Defense of Japan, 1990, pp. 83-84..
79. Conversations with Japanese officials in
Tokyo, May, 1991.
58. Conversations with American officers in
Tokyo, June, 1990, and May, 1991.
80. Defense of Japan, 1990, p. 87.
59. The New York Times, July 29, 1990, p. 3.
82. Ibid., p. 95.
60. "Japan's Defense Planning in an Era of Global
Change," JEI Report (Sept. 14, 1990), p. 8.
83. Defense White Paper, p. 101.
84. Japan Times, May 4, 1991, p. 1
61. James E. Auer, "Japan's Past, Present and Future Defense Vision," English version of article written for Shinchosa Foresight magazine
in Tokyo, 1991.
85. For a detailed account of Hideyoshi's invasion
of Korea, see Sir George Sansom's A History of
Japan 1334-1616 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1961), pp. 352-361.
62. Report on Allied Contributions, pp. 3-12.
63. Conversations with American officers in Honolulu, November, 1990.
86. George Sansom, Japan: A Short Cultural History
(London: The Cresset Press, 1946), pp. 292293.
64. For a detailed exposition on Article IX, see
James E. Auer, "Article Nine of Japan's Constitution," paper prepared for the Symposium
87. For a full exposition on samurai and bushido,
see George Sansom, A History of Japan to 1334
(Stanford, California: Stanford University
Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent?
81. Ibid., p. 85.
23
Press, 1958), pp. 358-366.
88. Benedict, op. cit., p. 175.
104. James Bailey, Yomiuri Daily News, Dec. 8,
1990, p. 9.
89. Japan at War (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life
Books, 1980), pp. 54-56.
105. Janet Ashby, "Time Out Japanese," Japan
Times, May 11 and 17, 1991.
90. For an analysis of Yamamoto's role, see Ronald
H . Spector, Eagle Against the Sun (New York:
Macmillan, 1985), pp. 40, 64-65, 78.
106. The author spent several hours in the museum in May, 1991.
91. Cable News Network, other television coverage, Nov. 1990.
92. Dentsu Institute of Human Studies, "A New
Partnership: New Values and Attitudes of the
New Middle Generation In Japan and the
U.S.A." (Tokyo, 1989), p. 22.
93. Defense White Paper, p. 333.
94. The New York Times, July 29, 1990, p. 3.
95. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, March 25, 1991, p. A10.
96. Conversation with the author, Tokyo, May,
1990.
97. Conversation with the author in Honolulu,
Oct. 6, 1990.
98. Quoted in Emmerson, p. 105.
99. Joyce C. Lebra, "Mishima's Last Art," Literature
East & West, 15, no. 2 (1971), pp. 279-298.
100. Richard Halloran, The New York Times, Nov.
27, 1971.
107. Asahi Shimbun, as translated by Asahi News
Service; quoted in Honolulu Star-Bulletin,
Sept. 27, 1990.
108. Asahi Shimbun, Jan. 24, 1991, English translation in Asahi Evening News.
109. The New York Times, March 18, 1991.
110. Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and Japan," Foreign Affairs (winter 1990/91), pp. 94, 97.
111. Report on Allied Contributions, p. A/40.
112. Conversations with the author in
1990, 1991.
1976,
113. Interviews with the author in Tokyo and
Honolulu, 1990 and 1991.
114. Cost figures in this passage are based on the
Department of Defense's 1990 publication,
"Program, Acquisition Costs by Weapon System," also known as P - l .
115. "Japan's Defense Industry," JEI Report, Aug.
3, 1990, p. 14.
116. Ibid., p. 7.
101. Quoted In the Honolulu Sunday Star-Bulletin
& Advertiser, Nov. 25, 1990.
117. Ibid., p. 5.
102. Seen in Tokyo; reruns are also seen regularly
in Hawaii.
118. Conversations with the author over several
years in Washington and Honolulu.
103. "Cameras Roll on Premises of Self-Defense
Forces," Japan Times, Sept. 11, 1990.
24
119. Japan Economic Journal, April 6, 1991.
120. Report on Alllied Contributions, p. A/25.
Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited
Appendix A
World Military Powers (1988)
Number in
Spending
Spending
.Armed Forces
($ billion )
Rank
Nation
Soviet Union
5,100,000
200.0
2
China
3,000,000
5.3
11
United States
2,100,000
260.3
1
India
1,300,000
8.2
8
Vietnam
1,300,000
n/a
Iraq
1,0 00,000
7.1
9
North Korea
1,000,000
3.9
14
South Korea
650,000
6.3
10
Turkey
635,000
2.2
18
Iran
604,000
2.7
16
Pakistan
520,000
2.6
17
West Germany
489,000
20.8
5
France
457,000
21.9
4
Egypt
445,000
3.2
15
Poland
406,000
1.6
19
Taiwan
406,000
4.0
13
Syria
404,000
1.5
21
Italy
386,000
11.2
7
Brazil
319,000
0.8
22
Britain
317,000
22.6
3
Ethiopia
316,000
n/a
Spain
309,000
4.2
Indonesia
284,000
n/a
Thailand
256,000
1.6
20
247,000
15.3
6
Japan
Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies, Military
Is Japanese Militarism
Resurgent?
Balance,
12
1990.
25
Appendix B
Military Forces in Asia
Nation
Total
Forces
Ground
Troops
Tanks
Artillery
Aircraft
Carriers
Attack
Submarines
China*
3.0 mii
2.3 mil
9,000
18,300
0
92
56
58
550
5,200
420
India*
1.3 mil
1.1 mil
3,250
4,120
2
17
26
10
10
860
185
Vietnam
1.3 mil
1.1 mil
1,600
n/a
0
0
7
7
0
380
135
N. Korea
1.0 mil
930,000
3,500
7,200
0
23
2
0
80 .
560
280
S. Korea
650,000
550,000
2,550
4,280
0
3
28
15
0
320
37
Pakistan
520,000
480,000
1,750
655
0
6
17
0
0
420
20
Taiwan
405,000
270,000
580
1,375
0
4
36
27
0
520
98
Indonesia
285,000
215,000
140
240
0
2
15
15
0
60
75
Thailand
283,000
190,000
480
375
0
0
5
10
0
65
35
Japan
247,000
156,000
870
0
14
63
6
0
320
50
Malaysia
114,500
105,000
26
200
0
0
4
2
0
50
35
Philippines 112,000
68,000
41
490
0
0
3
18
o.
35
35
Australia
69,600
31,300
145
195
0
6
12
1
0
70
70
Singapore
55,500
45,000
350
75
0
0
0
5
0
160
15
1,200
*Known to have nuclear capability; weapons not included here.
Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies, Military
Balance,
1990.
Surface
Warships
Amphibious
Ships
Bombers Fighters Transports
Appendix C
Rankings in Indicators of Military Power
Japan and Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Manpower
Ground Power
Tactical Air
Navy Tonnage
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
France
Turkey
W. Germany
Britain
Britain
W. Germany
France
Turkey
France
France
Britain
W. Germany
France
W. Germany
Japan
Japan
Italy
Greece
Italy
W. Germany
Italy
Britain
Italy
Greece
Canada
Spain
Britain
Turkey
Turkey
Spain
Spain
Japan
Spain
Japan
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium
Greece
Japan
Spain
Greece
Netherlands
Netherlands
Canada
Canada
Canada
Belgium
Netherlands
Netherlands
Norway
Spending
Greece
Norway
Belgium
Norway
Belgium
Turkey
Portugal
Denmark
Denmark
Portugal
Denmark
Norway
Canada
Portugal
Denmark
Portugal
Denmark
Portugal
Norway
Belgium
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Allied Contributions
Is Japanese Militarism
Resurgent?
to the Common
Defense, April
1990.
27
Appendix D
Combat Naval Tonnage
Nation
Tonnage
Vessels
Soviet Union
7,666,000
2,990
United States
6,428,000
1,350
China
1,000,000
2,060
Britain
977,000
420
France
492,000
340
Japan
303,000
170
Peru
277,000
70
India
255,000
150
Germany
246,000
290
Taiwan
222,000
620
Turkey
206,000
240
Italy
198,000
210
Brazil
191,000
130
Indonesia
156,000
150
Spain
148,000
250
Canada
147,000
80
Source: Jane's righting
Ships 1990-1991,
as reported in Japan Self-Defense Agency, Defense of japan,
1990.
Note: Figures may differ from other reports because coastal patrol ships, auxiliaries, and other vessels are counted in
some accounts but not in others.
28
Chrysanthemum
and Sword Revisited
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