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Herbert Hoover and
Federal Farm Board Wheat·
By C. Roger Lambert
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n recent years Herbert Hoover, the man and the President,
has been the subject of serious investigation and rein­
terpretation. No longer does any serious student porlray
Hoover as a nineteenth century laissez faire LOol of big
business or as a simple hard-hearted reactionary comenl
to see his fellow Americans slarve in depression. Was
Hoover the direct ar1d knowing precursor of Ire New Deal and ex­
pansion of the state, or was he so bound by his inflexible moral prin­
ciples that he could nol acl, or was he an incompetent politician
pushed by conditions and forces beyond his competency to direct'?'
The Federal Farm Board and the handling of the vast wheal surplus
provide some interesting suggestions.
As farmers experienced a chronic depression in the 1920s some
farm spokesmen demanded positive federal action to guarantee
equality of economic conditions for agriculture. Although there were
variations. the most popUlar expression of that position was the
McNary-Haugen proposal. Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce
from 1921 LO 1928. maintained, to the dismay of many farm spokes­
men, an active interest and role in the making of farm policy. Hoover
saw McNary-Haugenism as price tilting which he strongly oppo~d.
He preferred a program of long-term stabilization. Farmers must
follow the course of enlightened businessmen and build ··strong
voluntary associations" which under competenl managers could
provide the kind of guidance necessary to successful farming. The
governmenl role should be to assist farmers in achieving this "busi­
ness-like" solution rather lhan in assuming a supervisory role over
farming.'
After winning the presidency in 1928. Hoover called a special
session of Congress 10 legislate his farm program. Although the
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929 proclaimed the objective of
pUlling agricullure ··on a basis of economic equality with other in­
dUSlries," the measure was designed to do whal Hoover had advo­
cated-make agriculture efficient and create the Farm Board to help
eSiablish cooperatives but without significant federal involvement in
I
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lOver and
farming or marketing. Hoover viewed assistance to the farmer as a
long-term reform project and not a device for immediate price
loard Wheat­
relief. )
.ambert
over, the man and the President,
_ious investigation and rein­
oa any serious student portray
cntury laissez faire tool of big
ard-hearted reactionary content
:ans slarve in depression. Was
IIrSor of the New Deal and ex­
Ind by bis inflexible moral prin­
s be an incompetent politician
'ond his competency to direct?'
ldling of the vast wheat surplus
e depression in the 192()s some
: federal action to guarantee
.piculture. Although there were
ilion of that position was the
loover, Secretary of Commerce
e dismay of many farm spokes­
making of farm policy. Hoover
ing which he strongly opposed.
m stabilization. Farmers must
usinessmen and build "strong
::r competent managers could
Iry to successful farming. The
:Irmers in achicving this "busi­
tuming a supervisory role over
1928, Hoover called a special
farm program. Although the
9 proclaimed the objective of
:onomic equality with other in­
to do what Hoover had advo­
create the Farm Board to help
~ificanl federal involvement in
r ~ c""...."""";" Cktobor 1974 A. facUlty
"""III ofmlluioJ for lb.. ".dy_
In mid July L929, Hoover mel with his chairman of the Farm
Board, Alexander Legge of International Harvester. LO consider policy
guidelines for the Board. The President had prepared a .. Memo­
randum on possible procedures" which emphasized thai the "funda­
menial purpose .. is to build up farmer-owned and farmer-con­
trolled institutions for marketing the Carmer's crops and La use the
funds and authority provided to the Board for this purpose." He
suggested thaL wheat was the "firsl commodity" that the Board should
assist. In more than two legal size pages, the President outlined steps
to aid wheal producers-marketing cooperatives which "should be
gradually molded into cooperation and coordination with each
other" and a national wheat corporation to lend to member co­
operatives and to provide marketing facilities. The farmers were to
own and control these organizations but so long as they were in debt
Lo the Board they should be guided by its policies. The President did
not reject purchases of wheat for stabilization purposes but suggested
that it be done only with the approval of the Board:
During its first months of operation the Federal Farm Board
followed the cautious course envisioned by Hoover. Legge, who proved
a dominant force and claimed that even the President did not in­
Ouence Board policy, emphasized that the primary problem of farm­
ers was their e:o.:cessive individualism and "lack of organization."
Marketing difficulties and overproduction could only be resolved
through collective action. The Board would concentrate its efforls on
"the expansion and strengthening of the cooperative movement" and
would not buy commodities. Legge declared that the Board was not
a "relief organization" concerned with helping "those in distress"
but was concerned with the elimination of the "cause of distress,'"
As the first step in the long-term program for wheat, three board
members met with wheat marketing cooperatives and farm organiza­
tion leaders on 26 July 1929. The Board recommended the formalion
of the Farmers National Grain Corporation, a centralized wheat
marketing organization. It was emphasized by the Board that the
new corporation should concentrate on the efficient marketing of
grain and not on stabilization efforts to raise or .!iCt prices, although
stabilization. with Board approval, was not ruled oul.'
Even this cautious position put the Board in the middle, a position
it never really e5'=aped, Wheat farmers, faced with a large carryover,
a bumper crop and declining prices, exp«:ted a much more positive
approach to the resolution of their problems. Walter Newton, Secre­
tary to the President and friend of grain men in Minnesota, reported
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on )0 July thal some of his friends had been surprised by the creation
of Ihe Farmers National and fell "that il cannOl meet with Ihe chiefs
ideas." Throughout its life the Board would be attacked by the special
grain trade interests, the Chamber of Commerce. a commiuce of
the American Bar Auocialion, as well as many individuals. The
private grain men insisted that the Board ....as unfair, even trying to
destroy them. a charge which one member of the Board partially
verified. Others accused the Board of competing in private businesses,
socialism, un-Americanism, and Sovietization. Even before appoint·
men I of Ihc Board. a writer told Hoover that the legislation was "so
objectionable thal it's n:Juseating," that it was unfair special privilege
for farmen, and that Congress was a "bum:h" of "Bolsheviks.'" As
the Board became more active. farm interests allackcd it for not
doing enough or not doing the right things, while others attacked it
for doing too much.
The Board's cautious long·term policy was probably doomed
after the depression started. Wheat surpluses brought demands by'
farmers for more action; the stodrmarket collapse applied pressure
10 prices and to cooperative organizations~ and price declines brought
great political pressures as well as threatening the stability of the
cooperatives. Aller some months of careful, cautious loans [0 co­
operatives, in lale October the Board sought to mainlain wheal prices
through a vast loan program. As prices continued 10 decline, the
Board created the Gram Stabilization Corporalion in February 1930
to buy wheat. Arter three and one-half montns of attempts to peg
wheal prices and lhe acquisition or over sixty' million bushels of wheal
tn.e Board ceased purcnases and Chairman Legge announced that there
were no runher plans to stabilize wheat prices.'
Over lhe next five momhs members of the Board declared re­
pealedly thai the Board was not a relief organization. The Secretary
of Agriculture. Anhur M. Hyde, warned lhat "the Stabilization
Corporation cannot be used as a permanent remedy to rel1eve farm
surpluses"· Legge warned that farmers who continued the production
of surpluses for lhe Board to buv were in for a rude awakening ror
there would be no Curther purchases ofwheal.'"
Although Legge insisled that lhe Board could not play the role
oC "San La Claus," he arlnounced on 17 November 1930 thal lhe
StabilizalJon Corporation nad resumed purcnases of wheat. For the
next six and one-half monlhs Ihe stabilizatIon effort continued at a
dizzy pace. By June 1931 the Board controlled approxImately 2:;0
million bushels of wheat. When the Board began ils massive loan policy
lale 1929, it fixed prices for no. I wheal at 1.18 in Chicago; by June
1931 wheat was less Ihan 57 cents in Chicago. It was reponed that
farmers were receiving 27 cents or less in Oklahoma." Obviously
~\abilization did no\ keep wheal prices at a reasonable level. but whal
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lid been surpriKd by the crealion
1'1 il cannot meet with the chief's
I would be attacked by the special
of Commerce, a committee of
wcJl al many individuals. The
Board was unfair, even trying to
mcmm of the Board partially
f wmpcling in private businesses,
wiclization. Even before appoint­
)Over tbat the legislation was "so
lbat it was unfair special privilege
,a "bunch" of "Bolsheviks.'" As
iI1D interests attacked it for not
.l things, while others attacked it
m policy was probably doomed
t lurpluses brought demands by
market collapse applied pressure
alions; and price declines brought
I threatening the stability of lhe
:>f careful, cautious loans 1O co­
d sought to maintain wheat prices
prices continued to decline, lhe
on Corporation in February 1930
>ohalf months of attempts 1O peg
Iver sixty million bushels of wheat
irman Legge announced that there
~t prices.'
mms of the Board declared re­
rclief organization. The Secretary
warned that "the Stabilizalion
ermanenl remedy to relieve farm
lClS who continued the production
i1iere in for a rude awakening for
:>fwheal.'"
he Board could nOt play the role
on 17 November 1930 lhal lhe
med purchases of wheat. For the
ilabil;zation effort continued at a
lrd controlled approximalely 250
.oard began its massive loan policy
~heat al \.18 in Chicago; by June
in Chicago. It was reported that
>r less in Oklahoma." Obviously
~ at a reasonable level, but what
prices would have been without purchases can not be determined.
Too, purchases apparently helped to save the wheat cooperatives. The
low wheat prices and the vast government slock of wheal would hang
over the farmer, the grain markel, the Farm Board, and the Hoover
Administration.
The explanation for (he desertion of the conservative. long-term
resolution of farm problems for the rather adventurous purchase
confused many observers. Farmer and political pressure for a more
positive aid program was constant, but there was little evidence to
indicate great responsiveness. During the first purchase period, Board
members insisted that wheal prices were unnaturally low and that
purchases were a reasonable investment This was designed to give
psychological relief as well as to maintain farm prices and purchasing
power. Arter the second great buying period, Board members talked
about relief for farmers, saving banks from collapse, and general de­
pression relief. All of these concerns may have exerted some influence
but the most recent scholarly study of the Board suggests that the
motive was to save the farm cooperatives. The Board had loaned vast
sums to wheat cooperatives. With the price decline, these cooperatives
were in danger of financial collapse thus threatening the whole long­
term farm policy. This was particularly true before the second pur­
chase period. Governor Clyde Reed of Kansas wired the Presidenl that
prices were "insufficient in many cases to cover loans already made"
and that the cooperativcs were in danger of bankruptcy. Others ex­
pressed the same fear." Thus, the Board probably made the stabiliza­
tion purchases to save the cooperative program which was the base
of its long-term farm policy. With the first purchase of wheal, the
problem became what to do about surplus production and with the
wheat owned by the government. Few saw lhe "staff of life" as a great
opportunity for good; most saw il as a great burden. For two years,
the Board devoted much time lo trying to control surplus production
and to ways of disposing of 250 million bushels of wheal without
further endangering the domestic or foreign markel or its own
existence.
In the spring and summer of 1930, the agriculture officials
launched a major acreage reduction campaign for wheat. By June the
Board held almost 70 million bushels of wheal, prices were going
down. farmers expected a bumper crop, and critics werc vociferous in
their attacks on the activities of the Board. The wheat stale- Kansas­
proved to be the center of connict for the Board. Some farmers
warned that they "would pile" their crops on the ground before
selling it at the depressed price. Legge supponed the idea of farmers
holding wheat off the m<lrket to help Ihe price situation, but he insisted
that the only permanent solution was to reduce output. Farmers, he
argued, should form cooperative groups which would give lhem con­
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nol not only over \he marketing bu\ also the prod\lc\ion of wheal.
Legge. Hyde, and experts from Washington toured the wheat bell.
especially Kansas, explaining the surplus and market condilions,
urging farmers to voluntarily reduce wheat acreage, and debating
wilh lhe governor and farm experts. Reduclion, the people from Wash­
ington insisted, was lhe only way farmers would ever get more from
their wheat. Allhough Governor Reed demanded lhat the Farm
Board buy more wheaL, the Administration spokesmen bluntly said
that they would not buy wheat and insisted lhat the fate of the farmer
wasup LO the farmer."
The wheat regions proved unreceptive to lhe reduclion campaign.
Legge engaged in a prolonged and at times bitter debate with Ma.\:
and Louis Levand. lWO Wichita newspaper publishers. In one of his
presentations Legge said that the "biggest hog will always lie in the
nough," and suggested that Kansas farmers should ask themselves
jf they were in the "hog trough." The Levand:; immediately charged
thal Legge had said Kansans were in lhe trough and demanded lhat
he resign. Legge attempled to explain but ended telling the Levand,
"logotohell."L4
More important was the farmer response to the reduction cam­
paign. The Karuas Cily Star polled ils readers and found 77 percent
opposed to reduction. Some farmers insisled that the Board proposal
was "bunk," "hot air" or warned that they would "boot the first
'white collar' that comes on my farm and tells me what to raise."
Others emphasized the moral issue. They talked about hunger in
America and throughout the world, pointed to under-consumption
"on account of the millions of unemployed thal cannot buy," and
e.\:pressed fear "of the wrath of God if I should slack my besl effort to
supply food." Others poked fun at Legge and Hyde and questioned
the wisdom of Lhe President;
What a pily our Herbert lacked the wisdom of thal old
Egyplian king! He could have found a Joseph who would
have known whal to do wilh that pesky surplus. Now provi­
dence with this awful drought is wiping oul all our surplus
grain with a vengeance that fairly lakes the hide off Mr.
Hyde and that leaves not a leg for Mr. Legge to sland On."
Some emphasized lhat the Department of Agriculture had spenl
money for many years helping farmers to increase production and
was now preaching just the Opposile. Agricultural e.\:perts from Kan­
sas Stale and Te.\:as A & M strongly opposed the reduction campaign.
There was no significant cooperalion with the effort. Although a few
farmers made slight reductions in acreage. the cuts came primarily
in the eastern wheat area (a long·time trend) and from lhe effecls of
the drought." The Farm Board continued to voice support for acreage
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at also tbe production of wheal.
.Ibington toured the wheat belt,
surplus and market conditions,
ICC wheat acreage, and debating
Reduction. the people from Wash­
InneT'S would ever get more from
Reed demanded lhal the Farm
listration spokesmen bluntly said
insisted that the fate of the farmer
:eptive to the reduction campaign.
at times bitter debate with Ma'l
••paper publishers. In one of his
biggest hog will always lie in the
La farmers should ask themselves
'he Levands immediately charged
in tbe trough and demanded that
Ilin but ended telling the Levands
:r response 10 the reduction cam­
I its readers and found 77 percent
• insisted that the Board proposal
tbat they would "boot the first
Inn and tells me what to raise."
Ie, They talked about hunger in
~, pointed to under-consumption
employed that cannot buy," and
if I should slack my best effort to
Legge and Hyde and questioned
ked tbe wisdom of that old
: found a Joseph who would
at pesky surplus. Now provi­
is wiping out all our surplus
airly takes the hide off Mr.
for Mr. Legge to stand on."
larlment of Agriculture had spent
'mc:rs to increase production and
t. Agricultural experts from Kan­
,opposed the reduclion campaign.
In witb the efTor\. Although a few
acreage, the cuts came primarily
me trend) and rrom the effects or
tinued to voice support ror acreage
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cuts" and according to some even threatened retaliation against those
who refused to cooperate, but the emphasis shifted in 1931 to the
disposal orthe wheat which had been purchased.
The serious drought of 1930 offered the Board hope for reducing
the stockpile of wheat. With weather conditions severely limiting feed
crop output and affecting wheat production. the Administration
leaders saw an opportunity to rid the nation of e'lcess wheal. Legge
declared that the Board was not a relief organization and could not
give wheat to drought victims, but he urged that farmers feed wheat.
The Board and the Department of Agriculture pointed out that wheat
was cheaper and equally as nutritious as corn. They issued pamphlets
on the feeding of wheat to livestock. Although some wheat was used
for feed purposes, by mid 193 L the ownership of 250 million bushels
of wheat was still a problem to the future of the Board. '3 That stock­
pile had a frightening innuence on the grain market and on the hopes
of farmers.
arly in 193L, the Board announced that it would sell its
wheat in such a way as not to harm the regular market.
This immediately brought widespread protests from
farmers and grain men who demanded that the Board set
a minimum price of 85 cents to one dollar and pledge that
i' would not sell wheat until the market price reached
that level. Senator Arthur Capper, Vice-President Charles Curtis,
farm spokesmen, and othen pressed the demand. One of the more
inleresting expressions came from Mrs. R. D. Rood of the Republican
National Committee from Oklahoma. After pointing out that farmers
were receiving only 27 cents for no. I hard wheat and accepting the
Board's assurance that the price guarantee would not help wheat prices.
Mrs. Rood warned that the Board's position had aroused "the active
hostility and opposition of the people . . . ." She urged that a
guarantee would have "great psychological and resultant political
value in showing that the Administration was willing to go the limit
to help the farmers in their extremity." Although in March the Presi­
dent urged that the Board push its sale of wheat. he reversed himself
and persuaded the Board to offer the appearance of compromise-a
pledge that sales would be limited to live million bushels a month."
Although some wheat was sold at very low prices and the Board
worked out some large sales to China and Germany on most unfavor­
able credit terms, and traded wheat to Brazil for coffee, lO the basic
problem remained.
From the IIrst e'lpression of concern about the wheat surplus,
Americans demonstrated interest in its use. The character of their
proposals indicates the depth of their feelings and also the confusion
that reigned in the country. One movement in 1930 was an "eat more"
campaign. Secretary Hyde declared that "there would be no farm
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surplus if there w~re {\Q diet e~peru
:. Others. touk up this
refrain and urged that each American eat "one more slice" of bread
a day in order to erase the surplus.. The Civic and Commerce Asso­
ciation of Minneapolis organized an energelic "eat more" drive. They
aUal'ked dieting. >Uggesled that AmeriLan~ did not eat enough, and
sloganiled "eat one more slice of bread each day and help the falmer."
When someone proposed that Hoover recommend the program, his
aide, GeLlrge Akerson, replied: "Frankly and confidenlially Perry,
I am wondering if the beal has been too much for your folks oUl
there."" Although the "eat more" campaign did not become the
great national mO\'ement its backers desired. similar proposal> can·
tinued to appear.
Many proposc::u thal tIlt: wheat be dona led to the hungry Chinese:
Americans seemed convinced that the Chinese were alwa)s hungry.
One proposed that every wheat grower give 20 percent of his output
10 the stan'ing Chinese; anoLher suggesLed thaL the Chamber of
Commerce lead a drive 10 collect one dollar !rom every American 10
buy wheat felf the hungr~ Chinese. It was suggested that every
American family buy a barrel of llour; the flour could be used at
home or donated ,0 charity. Others. orged Hoover to simply give the
unground wheat to the needy and teach them to boil iL with a little
salt to provide a good nutritious diel for only a couple of cents a
day.';
The use uf the surplUS wheat for relief was a significant issue
throughuul the Hauver Administr<llion. President Hoover. once c<llled
the "world's greatest Relief Administrator" by Senator Joe T. Rohin­
son of Arkansas, was nor prepared for the role of depression relieL"
Although some saw in the Farm Board wheat a gre<lt nppmlunil)' for
Hoover to aid the drought-stricken and unemployed. the President did
nut respond."
As the 1930 drought developed, many well·meaning citizens
suggested that the wheat either be given or sold on fa~'orable terms til.
the druught nCllm~ Set:rel:H!' Hyde insisted, all. the contrar). that the
government should no more feed droughl victims than others who were
needy. To start such a program would be "treading all. dangerous
." IL WOUld, he warned, "constitute a dangerous step
ground
toward the dole system."
Pre5~ure In 19)0 came from the Economic Conserv:Hion Com­
millee he<lded by J. R. McCleske) and from Democratic poJiti..:ians
such as William Gibb, McAdDo. McAdM warned thal i\ would be "a
trave.Hy if deserving hut unfortunate people are permitted to suffer
hunger because the government hoard," wheat. JLle T. Robinson.
Senator from Arkansas, at McAdoo's sogge.~tion, pressed Congress
for relief use of the wheat John Pollard, Governor of Virginia. told
Hoover that all j{ would take to get relief use of the wheat was a wurd
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perts
.." Others took up this
'jean eat "one more slice" of bread
ts. The Civic and Commerce Asso­
m energetic "eat more" drive. They
,mericans did not eat enough, and
rread each day and help the farmer."
lover r«ommend the program. his
'Frankly and confidentially Perry,
been too much for your folks oUl
re" campaign did not become the
ers desired. similar proposals con­
1 be donated to the hungry Chinese:
I the Chinese were always hungry.
'ower give 20 percent of his outpUt
suggested thaI the Chamber of
"ne dollar from every American to
l:Se. 11 was suggested that every
Dour; the nour cOlild be used at
r5 urged Hoover to simply give the
leach them to boil It with a little
diet for only a couple of cents a
I fOr relief was a significant isslle
tion. President Hoover. once called
iillrator" by Senator Joe T. Robin­
I fOr the role of depression relief.'"
"ard wheal a great opportunity' for
and unemployed, the President did
perl, many well-meaning citizens
riven or sold on favorable terms to
e insisled, on the contrary, that the
)ught victims Ihan oLhers who were
~ould be "treading on dangerous
led, "constitute a dangerous step
he Economic Conservation Com­
and from Democratic politicians
cAdoo warned that it would be "a
lie people are permitted to suffer
oards" wheaL Joe T. Robinson,
)O'S suggestion, pressed Congress
()lIard, Governor of Virginia. told
relief use of the wheat was a word
from the President. McCleskey warned that "the desperation born of
hunger breeds a mental attitude which cannot be permitted to gain a
foothold among so large a mass of our people as are now destitute."
was that the
He also tOld Hoover that the "public thought
President should do something definite and practical and immediate
to help feed the people who are hungry now." Alexander Legge re­
emphasized that the Board was not a relief agency and that it had no
authority to give its wheat or money away, but he did indicate his
willingness to sell the wheat to charity organizations for relief pur­
poses.
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1n 1931 the drive for relief use of surplus wheat continued with
one of the interesting efforts that of Isaac Sprague and the Porto Rico
Child Health Committee. Sprague told Theodore Roosevelt. governor
of Porto Rico and son of the former President. that he had donated
one dollar to the Committee and that this was enough for 20 meals.
He considered this good use of money but reported that he had been
able, using unground wheat "boiled into porridge" Lo prepare
"reasonably palatable. and unquestionably nutritious meals" for
"three tenths or u cent per meal.'· A number of people came up with
the idea of using unground wheat as a cheap but healthy food for the
needy. Sprague also contacted the Farm Board and Walter Gifford.
chairman of the President's Commillee on Unemployment Relief.
The Farm Board responded that it was not a relief agency and could
not "give away any of the whear," Roosevell considered the suggestion
worthy and wrote:
You have hit the nail on the head, Why should some be starving because they
have nothing to eat, and others broke because they cannot sell their wheat.
AtleaSl if it cannot be sold it can be ealen. I will make another attack on that
formidable animal, the serpent of red tape, and sec if there is anything else I
can do to diseotangle its tails."
Roosevelt, if he made any real effort, had no mOre success than others.
E. N. Hopkins of the Meredith PUblishing Company led another
efforl to get the wheat "dislributed to the worthy poor" through some
charity group. Hoover was warned about the "violent talk from per­
sons of the industrial and agricuhural classes," and possible "class
strife:' Hopkins emphasized the necessity of feeding "starving
humanit~,,, and ~uggested that Hoover could not only gain credit but
also "stabilize farm prices and stop the mouths of thousands of
people who are criticizing the governmenl."" \\/arnings of this type
were common in 1931. but the President either refused to hear them
or was unable 10 unders\and them. Hoover's attitude was best
summed up in a January 1932 letter to Walter Gifford. After stating
that relief seemed well in hand through the traditional local authorities
except ror "cerlain sore spots," Hoover continued:
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H we could have the sum of fhe 10 len milljc<'l~ of dollars pl~ted al your dig­
posallo be used 10 supplemem lhe efforts 01 local commjtt~s under your di­
rection. we .:vuld cerlainly &.Void all lhe infinile evih or the Federal Go.'ern­
ment enlering inlo lhi~ problem. 11 seenu 10 me a malt!!"! ...,lTthy of consider­
ation by subslanlial men in lhis coumry thatlbey should place you in position
10 assure the passage or the wimer Wilh lhe same success thaI we p3ssed lasl
winler and without a breakdown in our fundamental ideas of governmenl. It
seems 10 me thaI it is worth the effort or your calling upon .uch men \0 learn
if lhey will not pledge Ihemsel~es 10 give you this supporl which is needed for
lhis purpose,"
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Wilh this declaration of belief, Hoover made no errort to use the wheat
or to seize the relid iniliative. Clearly, keeping the federal govern­
ment out of relief and relying on wealthy individuals look priority over
assistance to the needy.
Congress took up the wheal question in the winler of 1931-1932.
Again the Farm Board emphasized that the wheat should be paid for,
and President Hoover waS understood to oppose donalion of the wheal
for relief. Congress, however, approved in two grants the donation of
85 million bushels of wheat to the Red Cross for distribUlion to the
needy with no restriction on origin of the need.'· The Presidenl, White
House reporls indica led, opposed the measure but would sign the bill;
as lhe government would be giving a commodity ralher than cash
il was nOl considered a dole.'o Chairman James C. Stone of the Farm
Board termed it an "extremely bad principle" to use money provided
for aid to agriculture jn general relief. AnOlher member of lhe Board
argued that jf there was need to save "anyone anywhere from being
hungry we should lake anything anywhere and give il" but the Board
should be repaid for the wheal.""
In a year, the Red Cross approved for dislribution over eight and
one-half million barrels of flour to 5,140,955 families in all bUl 45 of
the 3,072 counties of the nalion. It committed over seventy-three
million bushels of the donted wheal. ll Allhough Hoover ilpparently
disliked the idea, by 1932 it would have been all but impossible lo
refuse this most limited relief effort.
The distribution was a major turning point in thal it initiated the
role of the government in federal food relief. In 1937, larry Richey,
an aide to president Hoover, claimed the "Hoover Administration
bought eighty-five million bushels of wheat . . . and distributed
them to the people on relief as a gift." Although his statemenl was
not quile accurate, it indicated the marked change in atmosphere
that five years had brought
President Hoover was convinced thill an expanded bureaucratic
governmenl which actively involved itself in the farming industry and
provided dircel aid lo needy individuals represented a "clear and pres­
ent danger" lo the American System. He said thaI he would never per­
mit Americans to slar~·e and that when necessary he would lake action.
30
•
III millions of dollars placed al your dis­
Allhough he accepted Reconslruclion Finance Corporation relief
loans to state governments, he never accepted that the time for federal
relief had come." He was not without support in hjs opposition to
federal aid. As one correspondent declared:
fforu oflox:aJ commitlees under your di­
the infinite evils or the Federal Govern­
III!mI 10 me II matler worthy of consider_
try thai they should place you in position
rith Ihe same IUCCesS Lhlll we passed la.1
:JUl
mlldamental ideas or governmenl. II
, oryouT calling upon such men to learn
pYe you this support which is nceded fOT
lOver made no effort to use the wheat
::tcarly, keeping the federal govern­
fealthy individuals took priority over
question in the winter of 1931-1932.
d tbat the wheat should be paid for,
ood to oppose donation of the wheat
...oved in two grants the donation of
c Red Cross for distribution to the
of the need":' The President, White
tbe measure but would sign the bill;
iDg a commodity rather than cash
urman James C. Stone of the Farm
.d principle" to use money provided
Wef. Another member of the Board
Jive "anyone anywhere from being
nywhere and give iI" but the Board
ovcd for distribution over eight and
15.140.955 families in all but 45 of
. It committed over seventy-three
81.'1 Although Hoover apparently
Id have been all but impossible to
turning point in that it initiated the
rood relief. In 1937, Larry Richey,
imed tbe "Hoover Administration
Is of wbeat .. and distributed
lift. 1I Altbough his statement was
he marked change in atmosphere
::cd tbat an expanded bureaucratic
t ibelf in the farming industry and
:uaIs represented a "clear and pres­
n. He said that he would never per­
~en necessary he would take action.
D
We Americans don't give doles 10 unemployed labor a. the Engli~h. do
","'hen II man ceases [0 be able [0 suppon himself, If he caUs this condition tu
those in charge
loral P0I}T law~, he will be senL Lo lhe poor house, not for hiS
benefit and advamage. for he lose. hil right to VOlt, bUI for the benefit of so­
l'ie'>'. w he rna)' be SlIl'ed from the temptation 10 steal and thereby injure hi.
neighbor's pro'r'C'r1l~'.
or
I
\
I
Another correspondent urged Hoover to slop "helping the Farmer.
It is too bad how the Government is being swindled helping these burn
farmers
,.. He continued:
The more you help people lhe more hcJplc5~ lhey become. Folks lhallhe Red
Croh helped and olher charitable instilulions are jU~l getting back from
plea~ure lrip~ lo lhe RockY5 and Calirornia. The Red Crou !lour lO the needy
i~ II huge joke. Ha. Ha."
Another urged that Hoover stand firm against the "Senate Demo­
gogs" for the "Roman Nation and Civilization fell when they fed the
mob from the public crib."l' Hoover's views were not that simplistic
nor was he a disciple of William Graham Sumner, but there was a
reluctance to change to meet new conditions and an apparent reluc­
tance to recognize new conditions.
Clearly the Depression changed the rules for both farm policy
and relief to the needy and presented an even greater "clear and
present" danger to the ~ystem as the expanded state Hoover feared.
It was in their own beu intere~ts for farmers 10 reduce wheat acreage
voluntarily but to expect them to do so in the midst of the depression
wa~ terribly unrealistic. Local government and charitable relief were
more in the American tradition !han federal aid. but to have expected
five or ten million dollars, given b}' wealthy individuals. to see the
country through the winter of 1932 was equally unrealistic. With his
reputation as a relief administralor. Hoover could have seized upon
the drought crisis in 1930 and the growing unemployment problem,
and used the Farm Board wheat to launch a vast national voluntary­
federal humanitarian relief movement. With a minimum of federal
involvement, he could have maintained the initiative and perhaps
limited the development of the "stalism" which he so feared. Instead
he quoted the Grover Cleveland maxim lhat "lhe people support the
government. the government should nol support the people."!' He
could have led. but he refused.
There is no simple explanation as to why he forfeited leadership
in the Depression. Clearly Hoover as nol a laissez faire President.
He initiated the Farm Board in 1929 before the Depression. He sought
31
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