492430
research-article2013
PSPXXX10.1177/0146167213492430Personality and Social Psychology BulletinAkhtar et al.
Article
Weak > Strong: The Ironic Effect of
Argument Strength on Supportive
Advocacy
Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin
39(9) 1214­–1226
© 2013 by the Society for Personality
and Social Psychology, Inc
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DOI: 10.1177/0146167213492430
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Omair Akhtar1, David Paunesku1 and Zakary L. Tormala1
Abstract
When people seek support for a cause, they typically present the strongest case they can muster. The present research
suggests that under some conditions, the opposite strategy may be superior—in particular, presenting weak rather than
strong arguments might stimulate greater advocacy and action. Across four studies, we show that when individuals already
agree with a cause (i.e., it is pro-attitudinal), receiving weak arguments in its favor can prompt them into advocating more
on its behalf. Perceived argumentation efficacy mediates this effect such that people exposed to weak arguments are more
likely to think they have something valuable to contribute. Moreover, consistent with the notion that it is driven by feelings of
increased efficacy, the effect is more likely to emerge when initial argumentation efficacy and attitude certainty are moderate
or low. Individuals with high argumentation efficacy and high certainty generally advocate more, regardless of the strength of
arguments received.
Keywords
advocacy, persuasion, message strength, efficacy, certainty
Received December 6, 2012; revision accepted April 18, 2013
A great deal of research has tested the effect of argument
quality—or message strength—on persuasion (for reviews
see Petty, Rucker, Bizer, & Cacioppo, 2004; Petty & Wegener,
1998). This vast literature consistently shows that, when
argument quality does exert an impact on persuasion (e.g.,
under conditions of high message processing), strong arguments produce more persuasion than do weak arguments.
Indeed, it is virtually a truism in the persuasion literature that
as long as message recipients are attending to and processing
the arguments contained in a message, strong arguments will
outperform weak ones. The general notion is that people will
form more message-consistent attitudes following strong
rather than weak arguments, and from a practical perspective
the hope is that these attitudes will translate into behavioral
intentions and, ultimately, actual behavior.
Weak > Strong?
The current research takes a different tack. We explore the
possibility that under specifiable conditions, weak arguments
can outperform strong ones. Of particular interest in the present research is the notion that weak arguments might sometimes prove more effective than strong arguments at
stimulating advocacy among message recipients. Consider
an example in which an individual supports a particular
cause (e.g., marriage equality) and attends a town hall
meeting at which the issue will be discussed. We submit that
this individual might be more likely to speak up and offer her
own arguments in support of gay marriage if she first hears
another person at the meeting make the case poorly—for
example, using weak arguments. In other words, the target
individual might be more likely to advocate for and promote
the cause herself after first observing another person do it
with weak rather than strong arguments.
Why would weak arguments be more effective than
strong ones at stimulating advocacy? Although there are a
variety of possible mechanisms for such an effect, we
examine one in the current work. Specifically, we explore
the possibility that individuals’ own perceived ability to
make the case, or their argumentation efficacy, can be elevated following exposure to other people’s weak arguments. For instance, when people observe others make a
poor case for something they care about, they might think,
“I could make this case more effectively . . . I better speak
up.” Stated differently, seeing others make weak arguments
for a cause might lead observers to feel as though they have
1
Stanford University, CA, USA
Corresponding Author:
Omair Akhtar, Stanford University,
655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA 94305, USA.
E-mail: [email protected]
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Akhtar et al.
something unique and valuable to contribute to help promote that cause. Seeing others make strong arguments,
however, might foster the impression that the cause is
already well-supported and that there is nothing unique or
important to contribute that would substantially impact the
outcome. If true, specious arguments by others on the same
side could lead an individual to advocate more aggressively
for the cause. Thus, ironically, weak rather than strong
arguments might be more effective at creating advocates
among like-minded message recipients.
If this is true, a variety of constraints on the effect seem to
be likely. First, the effect should only emerge under pro-attitudinal message conditions; that is, when individuals hear or
observe weak arguments promoting a position that they
already endorse. After all, if one receives weak arguments
promoting a counter-attitudinal position, those arguments
might also increase one’s perceived argumentation efficacy,
but there may be less motivation to actually advocate or
argue a case when the opposing side is already undermining
itself. When one receives weak arguments that are pro-attitudinal in nature, however, there could be an increase in perceived argumentation efficacy and an apparent need to
intervene and help promote the cause. Therefore, we submit
that the advantage of weak over strong arguments in stimulating advocacy will emerge under pro- but not counter-attitudinal message conditions.
Second, if indeed this advocacy effect is driven by perceived argumentation efficacy, as postulated, it should be
most likely to manifest under conditions in which argumentation efficacy or attitude certainty is not already high. First
consider argumentation efficacy. In general, perceived efficacy has been the subject of considerable research attention
over the past few decades. One consistent finding to emerge
from this literature is that people are more likely to take
action when they believe that they have the necessary skills
or ability to effectively execute that action (Bandura, 1982,
1993). Accordingly, we expect that individuals who feel
greater argumentation efficacy will be more likely than
individuals with lower argumentation efficacy to advocate
for a position or take other action to promote a cause they
support. If an individual is already high in argumentation
efficacy, there would be little additional benefit to gain
from the observation of others’ weak arguments. We therefore expect such individuals’ advocacy to be less affected
by the arguments they receive. However, if an individual is
initially lacking in argumentation efficacy, he should be
unlikely to advocate unless something in the immediate
context elevates his felt efficacy. We hypothesize that the
boost in perceived efficacy derived from others’ weak arguments will provide this elevation, creating the predicted
advocacy effect under low but not high initial efficacy
conditions.
Following a similar logic, we submit that the advantage of
weak arguments also will be moderated by attitude certainty.
Attitude certainty refers to the sense of confidence or
conviction one has about one’s attitude (Tormala & Rucker,
2007). This sense of confidence or conviction can emanate
from feelings of attitude clarity or attitude correctness
(Petrocelli, Tormala, & Rucker, 2007). Most germane to the
present concerns, attitude certainty has been shown to be
closely associated with advocacy-relevant action. For example, when people hold their attitudes with high rather than
low certainty, they are more likely to behave in ways that are
consistent with their attitudes (e.g., Fazio & Zanna, 1978;
Tormala & Petty, 2002). Furthermore, high attitude certainty
has been shown to directly increase willingness to vote and
sign petitions (Barden & Petty, 2008), and to encourage people to express their opinions and seek to persuade others
(Visser, Krosnick, & Simmons, 2003). Thus, in the current
research we expect that high certainty individuals will tend
to evince greater advocacy in general (i.e., unaffected by
argument quality), whereas low certainty individuals will
show greater advocacy under weak rather than strong argument conditions. Again, it is those individuals who initially
lack certainty who have the most room to increase in advocacy. We hypothesize that if weak arguments can foster
uncertain individuals’ perceived argumentation efficacy,
they will stimulate advocacy as well.
Overview
Synthesizing the above logic, we predict that weak (vs.
strong) arguments will lead to greater advocacy among probut not counter-attitudinal participants. Moreover, we posit
that perceived argumentation efficacy will mediate this
effect, such that seeing others make weak arguments will
lead people to feel that they have something valuable to contribute to the cause, and this perception will motivate them to
advocate more. Following directly from this logic, we also
predict that the effect of weak arguments on advocacy will be
most likely to manifest when people are not already high in
argumentation efficacy or attitude certainty, because it is precisely these individuals for whom there is room to increase
perceived efficacy and, ultimately, advocacy. Among high
efficacy and high certainty individuals, we expect to observe
greater levels of advocacy in general, independent of the
strength of arguments they have received. We present 4 studies exploring these issues.
Study 1
Study 1 aimed to provide an initial test of the possibility that
weak arguments can lead to greater advocacy than strong
arguments. All participants were presented with persuasive
arguments on a topic (Barack Obama’s reelection bid) and
subsequently reported their intentions to advocate for their
position, or side, on that topic. We predicted that among probut not counter-attitudinal participants, those who were
exposed to weak rather than strong arguments would report
greater intentions to advocate. We also predicted that
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Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39(9)
perceived argumentation efficacy would mediate this effect,
such that those who saw weak arguments would feel greater
argumentation efficacy, which would in turn boost their
advocacy intentions. Of importance, we also measured attitude change and voting intentions in this study, but we did
not necessarily expect effects on these indices. Indeed, we
classified participants as pro- or counter-attitudinal according to their initial attitudes toward Barack Obama, meaning
they entered our experiment with preexisting opinions of the
president. We did not expect to change those opinions or
shape voting outcomes with our manipulation. Rather, our
focus was on whether we could influence participants’ intention to advocate.
Participants and Design
One hundred sixty-five participants, U.S. citizens from a
national pool maintained by Survey Sampling International,
took part in an online survey in exchange for being entered in
a raffle for a US$25 Amazon.com gift certificate. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of two argument quality conditions: strong or weak.
Procedure
Before the experiment began, participants were told that the
researchers conducting the study were part of a real national
initiative titled Voter’s Voice. The initiative was ostensibly
designed to inform Americans about why other citizens support or oppose particular political candidates. All participants
were told that the researchers were investigating the ways in
which voters view and make sense of their fellow citizens’
reasons for supporting and opposing those candidates.
Finally, to underscore our cover story that the Voter’s Voice
initiative was real and that their responses would have actual
consequences, all participants were told that the information
they provided would be used in future get-out-the-vote campaigns and political advertisements.
Initial attitude. Following this introduction to the study
(which was conducted several months prior to the 2012 presidential election), participants were asked to report their attitudes toward Barack Obama’s bid for reelection, using a
scale ranging from 1 (strongly oppose) to 9 (strongly support). Overall, the sample hovered near the midpoint of this
scale (M = 5.39, SD = 2.84). We defined participants as “proattitudinal” if they scored higher than 5 on the initial attitude
question (n = 93) and as “counter-attitudinal” if they scored
lower than 5 (n = 58). We removed 14 participants who chose
the midpoint of the scale (i.e., were neutral), leaving 151 participants for analysis.
Argument quality manipulation. Next, participants were asked
to read and rate “a representative sample” of their fellow
citizens’ arguments on this topic, which ostensibly had been
collected by the Voters’ Voice organization prior to the study.
Participants read that they would see arguments either in
favor of or against President Obama’s reelection bid (in reality, all participants received pro-Obama arguments), and
that when the study was complete, the top-rated arguments
would be used in the initiative’s get-out-the-vote promotional materials. Participants were then randomly assigned
to receive either three weak or three strong arguments in
support of Obama (see the appendix), which they rated one
at a time.
Argument quality rating. After reading each argument, participants rated the quality of that argument on a scale ranging
from 1 (not persuasive at all) to 9 (very persuasive). Ratings
were averaged to form a composite argument quality index
for strong (α = .82) and weak (α = .89) arguments.
Attitude change and vote preference. Next, participants again
reported their attitudes using the exact same scale as in the
beginning of the study. Attitude scores before the manipulation were subtracted from attitude scores after the manipulation to create an attitude change index; higher numbers
indicated more attitude change in the pro-Obama direction.
In addition, participants were asked to report their voting
intention on a scale ranging from 1 (definitely voting against
Obama) to 9 (definitely voting for Obama).
Advocacy intentions. Following the voting measure, we
assessed advocacy intentions. The first item was directed to
supporters and opponents of Obama. In particular, participants answered a question on a 1 to 9 scale assessing the
extent to which they would try to persuade others to their
view: “How likely would you be to try to persuade others to
your position on Barack Obama’s reelection?” (very
unlikely–very likely). The next two advocacy items were
directed specifically to Obama supporters, for whom the
persuasive arguments were pro-attitudinal: “How willing
are you to make phone calls for Barack Obama’s 2012 presidential campaign?” (1 = not at all to 9 = very much). “How
willing are you to donate money to Barack Obama’s 2012
presidential campaign?” (1 = not at all to 9 = very much).
For all subsequent analyses specific to pro-attitudinal participants (i.e., Obama supporters), these two items along
with the first persuasion intention item were averaged
together to form a composite index of supportive advocacy
(α = .87).
Argumentation efficacy. Finally, participants were asked two
questions about their perceived argumentation efficacy: “Do
you think you know a lot more or a lot less about this issue
compared with other people?” (1 = know a lot less to 9 =
know a lot more). “How effective do you think you are at
arguing for your side of this issue?” (1 = not effective at all
to 9 = very effective). Responses were averaged to form a
composite index (α = .84).
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Results
Argument quality rating. We began by submitting participants’
argument quality ratings to analysis. To allow for any effect
of initial attitudes on these ratings, we conducted a hierarchical linear regression analysis, in which the main effect terms
for argument quality (dummy coded: weak = 0, strong = 1)
and initial attitude (continuous) were included in the first
step, and their interaction was included in the second step. As
intended, argument quality ratings were significantly higher
in the strong rather than weak argument condition (β = .46, SE
= .05), t(145) = 8.57, p < .001.1 Not surprisingly, the main
effect for initial attitude was also significant (β = 1.38, SE =
.32), t(145) = 4.32, p < .001, such that the more participants
supported Obama, the higher they rated the quality of the
arguments made in favor of him. Finally, the interaction was
also significant (β = .24, SE = .11), t(144) = 2.28, p = .024. To
interpret the interaction, we examined pro-attitudinal and
counter-attitudinal participants—defined as being above or
below the midpoint of the initial attitude scale, respectively—
separately and tested for argument quality effects. That is,
rather than test the simple effects of argument quality at 1 SD
above and below the mean on initial attitudes, we dichotomized initial attitude to ensure that pro-attitudinal participants
scored 6 or higher on that index, and counter-attitudinal participants scored 4 or lower. This analysis revealed that the
argument quality effect was stronger among pro-attitudinal
participants (Mweak = 4.47, SDweak = 2.50; Mstrong = 6.19,
SDstrong = 1.22), t(90) = 4.10, p < .001, than it was among
counter-attitudinal participants (Mweak = 2.11, SDweak = 1.80;
Mstrong = 3.00, SDstrong = 1.48), t(54) = 2.04, p = .04. Of importance, though, the effect was significant and in the expected
direction (i.e., strong > weak) in both cases.
Advocacy intentions. We next submitted the advocacy intention data to analysis. First, we examined the persuasive intent
item, which applied to pro- and counter-attitudinal participants. Specifically, we conducted a hierarchical regression
analysis with argument quality (weak vs. strong), initial attitude, and their interaction predicting intent to persuade others. The main effect was significant neither for argument
quality (β = −.44, SE = .40), t(146) = −1.10, p = .27, nor for
initial attitude (β = .01, SE = .07), t(146) = .20, p = .84. As
illustrated in Figure 1, however, we did obtain the predicted
interaction (β = −.25, SE = .13), t(145) = −1.90, p = .05. Following the same approach we used with argument quality
ratings, we further explored the interaction by examining
pro- and counter-attitudinal participants separately. As
hypothesized, pro-attitudinal participants reported greater
intention to persuade others following weak (M = 6.49, SD =
2.05) rather than strong (M = 5.51, SD = 2.34) arguments,
t(90) = −2.13, p = .036. Among counter-attitudinal participants, argument quality had no effect on persuasive intent
(Mweak = 5.62, SDweak = 2.89; Mstrong = 6.06, SDstrong = 2.52),
t(55) = .63, p = .53.
Figure 1. Intention to persuade others as a function of initial
attitude and argument quality in Study 1.
Having established that the effect of weak over strong
arguments on our initial advocacy item occurred only among
pro-attitudinal participants, we focused our attention on proattitudinal participants and supportive advocacy in our subsequent analyses. Again, the latter two advocacy
items—pertaining to phone calls and donations—were specifically geared toward supporters of Obama (i.e., pro-attitudinal participants). Using the composite index including
these two items and the initial persuasive intent item, we
found the predicted effect among pro-attitudinal participants:
Weak arguments (M = 5.51, SD = 2.19) led to greater supportive advocacy than did strong arguments (M = 4.43, SD =
2.29), t(88) = −2.28, p = .025.
Argumentation efficacy. Conducting the same hierarchical
regression analysis on argumentation efficacy, we found
only a main effect for argument quality; weak arguments
produced higher argumentation efficacy scores than did
strong arguments (β = −.65, SE = .32), t(145) = −2.02, p =
.04. Neither the main effect for initial attitude (β = .09, SE =
.08), t(145) = 1.14, p = .25, nor the interaction (β = −.08, SE
= .11), t(144) = −.72, p = .47, was significant.
Mediation. Because argument quality influenced advocacy
only among pro-attitudinal participants, we restricted our
mediation analysis to pro-attitudinal participants to determine if perceived efficacy mediated the effect of argument
quality on advocacy. As noted previously, among pro-attitudinal participants, argument quality influenced advocacy.
Argument quality also had a tendency to influence proattitudinal participants’ argumentation efficacy (Mweak = 6.12,
SDweak = 1.99; Mstrong = 5.18, SDstrong = 1.91), t(89) = −1.72,
p = .089. When we entered argument quality and argumentation efficacy into a regression analysis predicting advocacy,
the relationship between argumentation efficacy and advocacy was strong and significant (β = .81, SE = .09), t(85) =
9.16, p < .001, whereas the relationship between argument
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Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39(9)
quality and advocacy was reduced (β = −.63, SE = .34), t(85)
= −1.82, p = .07. A bootstrapped mediation analysis
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004) confirmed that the mediated
effect of argument quality on advocacy through perceived
efficacy was significant, 95% confidence interval (CI) =
[0.03, 1.30]. Thus, among pro-attitudinal participants, weak
arguments led to greater perceived argumentation efficacy,
which in turn led to greater advocacy.
Attitude change and vote preference. Finally, we examined
whether argument quality influenced attitude change and
vote preference. First, a regression analysis with an argument
quality (weak vs. strong) × initial attitude interaction predicting attitude change showed no significant main effects (ps >
.77). There was a marginally significant interaction (β = .08,
SE = .05), t(146) = 1.84, p = .07. It appears that within the
strong argument condition, Obama supporters (but not opponents) showed some degree of positive attitude change; however, none of the simple effects were reliable (ps > .18). Of
greatest import, regardless of initial attitudes, the argument
quality manipulation had no impact on attitude change. Not
surprisingly, though, the same regression analysis predicting
vote preference did reveal a significant main effect for initial
attitude (β = 1.03, SE = .03), t(146) = 34.4, p < .001, such that
Obama supporters reported a stronger preference for voting
for him. Neither the main effect for argument quality, p = .26,
nor the interaction term, p = .55, affected vote preference.
Thus, although weak arguments did produce greater advocacy among pro-Obama participants, they did not appreciably alter attitudes or voting intentions.
Although our primary focus is on understanding pro-attitudinal advocacy, it is worth noting that there are a variety of
possible reasons why we did not find an advantage of weak
over strong arguments among counter-attitudinal participants. For example, even if counter-attitudinal participants
felt more efficacious after seeing weak arguments, they
might not advocate more because it is not their side that is
making the weak arguments and, thus, there is no need to
intervene or help the cause. Alternatively, for these participants, the argument quality manipulation might have had
conflicting effects. Perhaps some intended to advocate more
when they saw strong arguments because they perceived a
greater need to rise to the challenge, whereas others intended
to advocate more when they saw weak arguments because
they thought their own arguments would be more likely to
dominate those of the opposition. These two effects could
have canceled each other out. In any case, we found no overall effect of argument quality on advocacy in the counterattitudinal message case.
Finally, it is important to reiterate that the argument quality manipulation (even among pro-attitudinal participants)
did not change participants’ attitudes or affect their voting
preference. The effect was constrained to measures of advocacy. Again, we do not propose that weak arguments are
more persuasive than strong ones, nor that they will boost
voting intentions, but rather that under some conditions they
can stimulate advocacy by elevating the perceived argumentation efficacy of the recipient. In the next study, we seek to
further delineate these conditions.
Study 2
Discussion
Study 1 provided an initial demonstration of the hypothesized advocacy effect. When participants received pro-attitudinal arguments, they ironically showed greater intention to
advocate for the cause (President Obama)—specifically, to
try to persuade others, to make phone calls, and to donate
money—when those arguments were weak rather than
strong. This effect appeared to stem from perceived argumentation efficacy. When participants received weak arguments, they believed they had more to contribute, and they
displayed more supportive advocacy. In essence, when participants came to perceive themselves as more efficacious
than their like-minded peers, they displayed greater willingness to promote, endorse, and advocate for their cause. The
novel finding is that this perceived efficacy was derived from
weak arguments.
As expected, this pattern did not hold for counter-attitudinal
participants, who had similar levels of advocacy regardless
of whether they saw weak or strong arguments. Exposure to
weak arguments led to greater perceived argumentation efficacy regardless of whether participants were pro- or counterattitudinal, but the boost in efficacy did not translate into
greater advocacy for counter-attitudinal participants.
The primary objectives of Study 2 were to replicate the
advocacy effect among pro-attitudinal participants and to
identify an important boundary condition. Specifically, we
explored the moderating role of argumentation efficacy.
Recall that in Study 1, we found that the advantage of weak
over strong was mediated by increases in perceived argumentation efficacy. As outlined earlier, if the effect is driven
by feelings of increased efficacy, it should be especially
likely to emerge under conditions in which people do not
already feel highly efficacious. To test this possibility, we
manipulated perceived argumentation efficacy such that
some participants would feel like they were highly effective
at argumentation, whereas others would feel like they were
only moderately effective at argumentation. We hypothesized that weak arguments would foster greater advocacy
under moderate but not high efficacy conditions. When participants felt just moderately efficacious, we expected weak
arguments from others to increase feelings of argumentation
efficacy as in Study 1, resulting in greater advocacy. In the
high argumentation efficacy condition, we expected that
participants would be more willing to advocate in general
and be less affected by the quality of arguments they
received. This is not to say that high argumentation efficacy
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Akhtar et al.
individuals would always advocate regardless of contextual
factors, but that in the current context they might generally
be more likely to do so and presumably would receive less
boost from weak arguments.
Participants and Design
Because our focus was on pro-attitudinal participants, we
pre-selected participants from a national online pool (maintained by Survey Sampling International) who were “proattitudinal” on the message topic (President Obama’s
reelection), using the same criteria as in Study 1. Ninety-five
pro-attitudinal participants then took part in exchange for
being entered in a raffle for a US$25 Amazon.com gift certificate. They were randomly assigned to one of two argument quality conditions (weak vs. strong) and one of two
argumentation efficacy conditions (moderate vs. high).
Figure 2. Advocacy intentions as a function of argumentation
efficacy and argument quality in Study 2.
Procedure
Results
The procedure for this study was virtually identical to the
procedure in Study 1, with two exceptions. First, we manipulated perceived argumentation efficacy. Before participants
received any arguments for Obama’s reelection, they were
told that the researchers conducting the study wanted to collect some information about participants’ argumentation
skills before they proceeded with the Voters’ Voice initiative.
Participants were asked to read an unrelated policy proposal,
regarding comprehensive exams as a university graduation
requirement (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and then write
their own arguments for or against the proposal. After writing their own arguments, participants were led to believe that
a reputable software program would analyze the content of
their writing and determine their argumentation skill level.
That skill level would be reported to the participant as a percentile score relative to a national sample.
After reading about the exam issue and writing their arguments, participants were randomly assigned to receive feedback that their argumentation efficacy was high or moderate.
Specifically, they were told that their argumentation skills
were either excellent and in the 91st percentile, or average
and in the 53rd percentile. The feedback read “91st percentile (Excellent)” or “53rd percentile (Average)” followed by
the statement “Based on an analysis of your arguments, you
scored in the [91st/53rd] percentile of argumentation skill.
That means that your argumentation skills are better than
[91%/53%] of our sample.”
After participants received their scores, they returned to
the Voters’ Voice initiative, evaluated either weak or strong
arguments, and then completed the study in the same manner
as in Study 1. The only difference was that we simplified the
measure of argumentation efficacy to one item to focus it
squarely on argumentation: “How effective do you think you
are at arguing for your side of this issue [i.e., Obama’s reelection]?” (1 = not effective at all to 9 = very effective).
Argument quality ratings. As in Study 1, we began by submitting the argument quality ratings to analysis. In this case, we
conducted a 2 (argumentation efficacy: moderate vs. high) ×
2 (argument quality: weak vs. strong) ANOVA predicting
perceived argument quality. First, the main effect of argument quality was significant, such that participants rated the
arguments as weaker in the weak (M = 3.47, SD = 2.08)
rather than strong (M = 6.55, SD = 1.22) argument condition,
F(1, 91) = 74.90, p < .001. Neither the main effect for argumentation efficacy, p = .66, nor the interaction, p = .58, was
significant, suggesting that argument quality ratings did not
differ as a function of efficacy condition.
Advocacy intentions. Next, we conducted the same 2 × 2
ANOVA on our advocacy intentions index, which used the
same three items as in Study 1 (α = .77). This analysis
revealed a main effect for argument quality, F(1, 91) = 5.70,
p = .019, such that weak arguments (M = 5.07, SD = 2.05) led
to greater advocacy intentions than did strong arguments
(M = 4.72, SD = 1.97). The main effect for argumentation
efficacy was not significant, F(1, 91) = 1.53, p = .22. Most
importantly, as depicted in Figure 2, the interaction was significant, F(1, 91) = 6.74, p = .011. As hypothesized, we found
that weak arguments (M = 5.43, SD = 2.17) led to greater
advocacy than strong arguments (M = 4.08, SD = 1.50) in the
moderate efficacy condition, t(46) = −2.50, p = .016, but not
in the high efficacy condition (Mweak = 4.75, SDweak = 1.91;
Mstrong = 5.50, SDstrong = 2.20), t(45) = 1.24, p = .22.
Perceived argumentation efficacy. On the perceived efficacy
item, there was no main effect for argument quality, p = .96,
but we did find a marginal tendency for perceived argumentation efficacy to be higher in the high (M = 6.47, SD = 1.78)
rather than moderate (M = 5.83, SD = 1.93) efficacy condition, F(1, 91) = 2.88, p = .09. This tendency was qualified by
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Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39(9)
a significant interaction between argument quality and argumentation efficacy, F(1, 91) = 5.47, p = .022. As predicted, in
the moderate efficacy condition, weak arguments (M = 6.28,
SD = 2.05) tended to produce greater perceived argumentation efficacy than did strong arguments (M = 5.43, SD =
1.74), t(46) = −1.64, p = .11, though this simple effect was
not significant. Interestingly, in the high argumentation efficacy condition, we found an unexpected reversal of this tendency, such that strong arguments (M = 6.96, SD = 1.59)
produced marginally greater perceived efficacy than did
weak arguments (M = 6.04, SD = 1.84), t(45) = 1.72, p = .09.
Although we did not anticipate this reversal, the overall
interaction suggesting that weak arguments tended to foster
greater perceived efficacy than strong arguments under moderate efficacy conditions was consistent with our predictions.
Also noteworthy, the means for perceived efficacy were
above the scale midpoint (5) in each condition, consistent
with our intention to create “moderate” and “high” efficacy
conditions.
Mediation. To examine whether perceived argumentation
efficacy mediated the Argument Quality × Argumentation
Efficacy interaction on advocacy, a mediated moderation
analysis was conducted (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005). As
noted above, the interaction between argument quality and
argumentation efficacy was significant on perceived argumentation efficacy and advocacy intentions. When we submitted the advocacy index to a regression analysis with
argument quality, argumentation efficacy, and their interaction as predictors, controlling for perceived argumentation
efficacy, the relationship between perceived efficacy and
advocacy remained strong and significant (β = .49, SE =
.10), t(90) = 4.89, p < .001, but the direct effect of the interaction was reduced (β = 1.23, SE = .74), t(90) = 1.66, p =
.10. Most important, a bootstrapped mediation analysis
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004) indicated that the mediating pathway was significant, 95% CI = [0.18, 1.75]. Thus, when participants were initially induced to have moderate levels of
argumentation efficacy, seeing weak rather than strong arguments led to greater perceived efficacy, which in turn fostered advocacy.
Attitude change and vote preference. Finally, using the same
measures of attitude change and vote preference as in Study 1,
we found no significant effects on either index (all ps > .19).
Discussion
Study 2 replicated the key advocacy effect from Study 1
while also highlighting a boundary condition. Participants
advocated for a cause more when they believed they would
be effective at doing so, whether that belief came from our
efficacy manipulation or the fact that their peers had made
weak arguments. In fact, in comparing the perceived efficacy
ratings from the moderate efficacy/strong arguments
condition with the ratings in the other three conditions (in
which high perceived efficacy was induced through our efficacy manipulation or through weak arguments), we found
that perceived efficacy was significantly lower in the former
condition (M = 5.42, SD = 1.74) than in the latter conditions
(M = 6.39, SD = 1.86), F(1, 93) = 5.10, p = .026, which did
not differ from each other, F(2, 68) = 1.55, p = .22. The same
pattern of results held for advocacy. Advocacy intention was
lower in the moderate efficacy/strong arguments condition
(M = 4.08, SD = 1.50) than in the other three conditions (M =
5.19, SD = 2.08), F(1, 93) = 5.76, p = .018, which did not
differ from each other, F(2, 68) = .97, p = .38. It could be that
when participants were told that they were excellent at arguing, they felt no need to observe the quality of others’ arguments to make an inference about their own argumentation
skills. However, when participants initially were made to
feel less confident about their argumentation skills, seeing
others make specious arguments made them feel more effective at arguing, which in turn made them more willing to
advocate.
Notably, the advocacy effect among those in the moderate
efficacy condition of Study 2 paralleled the effect among all
participants in Study 1. Indeed, the mean and median argumentation efficacy ratings among all participants in Study 1
were 5.78 and 6.00, respectively, which were essentially
equivalent to the argumentation efficacy scores among participants in the moderate efficacy condition of Study 2 (M =
5.83, median = 6.00). Participants in the high argumentation
efficacy condition in Study 2 had mean and median argumentation efficacy scores of 6.47 and 7.00, respectively.
Collectively, then, Study 1 and Study 2 suggest that when
one is only moderately confident about one’s argumentation
skills, seeing others make weak rather than strong pro-attitudinal arguments can lead to greater advocacy.
Study 3
Our goals in the third study were to replicate the advocacy
effect in a completely different paradigm and determine its
relationship with a well-established, conceptually related
moderator. As noted previously, individuals high (compared
with low) in attitude certainty generally are more likely to
behave in ways that are consistent with their attitudes (Fazio
& Zanna, 1978), express willingness to vote and sign petitions (Barden & Petty, 2008), and try to persuade others to
their views (Visser et al., 2003). In this respect, attitude certainty bears some relation to argumentation efficacy and
advocacy as we have described them. In Study 3, we directly
explored the role of attitude certainty in moderating the
effect of weak (pro-attitudinal) arguments on advocacy.
Based on past research, we generally expected individuals
high in attitude certainty to express a willingness to advocate
and to show little influence of argument quality (Tormala &
Rucker, 2007). By contrast, individuals lower in attitude certainty were expected to advocate to a greater extent when
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they received weak rather than strong arguments. Again, the
logic was that for individuals lacking maximal certainty,
receiving weak arguments in support of their own views
might boost their perceived argumentation efficacy, producing greater advocacy under weak rather than strong argument
conditions. In addition to investigating the role of attitude
certainty in this study, we changed the attitude issue to establish the robustness of the advocacy effect. Specifically,
whereas the previous studies involved pro-attitudinal arguments for a political candidate, Study 3 presented pro-attitudinal advocacy against a social policy (i.e., arguments that
took the same side as participants, but were against a
policy).
Participants and Design
An initial sample of 141 participants from a national online
pool (maintained by Survey Sampling International) took
part in exchange for being entered in a raffle for a US$25
Amazon.com gift certificate. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of two argument quality conditions: strong or
weak.
Procedure
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were asked
to imagine that officials in their town recently had proposed
a policy that would make all school cafeterias vegetarian by
law. According to this policy, all existing K-12 (i.e., primary
and secondary) schools would have to change their menus to
provide only vegetarian options, and all future schools within
the same districts would only be allowed to provide vegetarian options for students.
Attitude. After reading the introduction and set up, participants were asked to indicate their attitudes toward the vegetarian-only school policy on a 9-point scale anchored at
strongly oppose (1) and strongly support (9). Because we
sought to obtain a sample of pro-attitudinal participants to test
our focal hypotheses, we pretested the issue to confirm that
most participants’ attitudes toward the policy would be in the
same direction as the arguments to which we would later
expose them. In this case, most participants opposed the policy, and all participants were subsequently exposed to arguments against it later in the experiment. Thus, in this study,
pro-attitudinal participants were defined as those who scored
lower than 5 on the attitude measure—that is, they opposed
the policy and later received arguments that also opposed the
policy. Our sample included 118 pro-attitudinal participants,
and all subsequent analyses included only those participants.
Attitude certainty. Immediately following the initial attitude
item, participants were asked five questions assessing their
attitude certainty on 9-point scales (adapted from Petrocelli
et al., 2007): “How certain are you about your attitude toward
this policy?” (1 = not certain at all to 9 = very certain). “How
certain are you that you know what your true attitude toward
this policy really is?” (1 = not certain at all to 9 = very certain). “To what extent is your true attitude toward this policy
clear in your mind?” (1 = not clear at all to 9 = very clear).
“How certain are you that your attitude toward this policy is
the correct attitude to have?” (1 = not certain at all to 9 very
certain). “To what extent do you think other people should
have the same attitude as you about this policy?” (1 = not
certain at all to 9 = very certain). These five items were averaged together to form a composite index (α = .86).
Argument quality manipulation. Next, participants were told to
imagine that their local government was going to hold a town
hall meeting in which members of the community would be
able to express support for or opposition to the vegetarianonly policy, and that the government would take these opinions into consideration when making a decision on whether or
not to enact it. All participants were told to imagine that they
were at this town hall meeting and that some community
members were expressing their views about the policy. Participants were told that on the next screen of the experiment
they would read the views expressed by these community
members. When participants continued, they were exposed to
either three weak or three strong arguments opposing the vegetarian-only schools policy (see the appendix).
Argument quality rating. After reading all three arguments
presented in their condition, participants gave those arguments one overall rating on a scale ranging from 1 (very low
quality) to 9 (very high quality).
Advocacy intentions. Finally, participants were asked three
questions assessing their advocacy intentions: “How likely
would you be to try to persuade others to your position on
this policy?” (1 = very unlikely to 9 = very likely). “How
much effort would you be willing to put into supporting or
opposing this policy in the future?” (1 = none at all to 9 = a
lot). “To what extent would you share your views on this
policy with your friends?” (1 = not at all to 9 = very much).
Responses to these items were averaged to form a composite
advocacy index (α = .85).
Results
Argument quality ratings. Again, we started by submitting
argument quality ratings to analysis. As in Study 1, we conducted a hierarchical linear regression analysis. In this case,
however, the main effect terms for argument quality (dummy
coded: weak = 0, strong = 1) and attitude certainty (continuous, mean centered) were included in the first step, and their
interaction was included in the second step. As expected, the
main effect for argument quality was significant (β = 3.45,
SE = .42), t(115) = 8.15, p < .001; strong arguments were
rated as significantly stronger than weak arguments. There
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Figure 3. Advocacy intentions as predicted by attitude certainty
and argument quality in Study 3.
was no main effect for attitude certainty, p = .40. The interaction between argument quality and attitude certainty was significant (β = .73, SE = .31), t(114) = 2.38, p = .019. To
interpret this interaction, we examined the effects of argument quality among high (1 SD above the mean) and low
(1 SD below the mean) attitude certainty participants (Aiken
& West, 1991).2 This analysis revealed that the argument
quality effect was greater among high (β = 4.50, SE = .60),
t(114) = 7.43, p < .001, rather than low (β = 2.49, SE = .58),
t(114) = 4.29, p < .001, certainty participants, though it was
significant and in the predicted direction in each case.
Advocacy intentions. Having established that our argument
quality manipulation was successful, we examined the advocacy effect. Here too, we conducted a hierarchical regression
analysis in which argument quality, attitude certainty, and
their interaction predicted advocacy intentions. This analysis
revealed a main effect for attitude certainty (β = .54, SE =
.10), t(115) = 5.21, p < .001, such that higher attitude certainty generally led to greater advocacy. Although participants also tended to advocate more in the weak rather than
strong argument condition, the main effect for argument
quality was not significant, p = .12. Most germane to our
primary concerns, the interaction was significant (β =.61, SE
= .21), t(114) = 2.94, p = .004. As illustrated in Figure 3,
among low certainty participants (1 SD below the mean),
weak arguments led to greater intent to advocate than did
strong arguments (β = −1.25, SE = .39), t(114) = −3.20, p =
.002. Among higher certainty participants (1 SD above the
mean), there was no effect of argument quality on advocacy
intentions (β = .43, SE = .41), t(114) = 1.05, p = .30, which
were generally high irrespective of argument quality.
Discussion
As in the previous studies, Study 3 showed that weak proattitudinal arguments can under specifiable conditions
increase people’s intent to advocate for a cause they support.
In particular, we found that participants who were low in attitude certainty expressed greater intent to advocate when they
saw others’ weak rather than strong arguments. By contrast,
participants who were high in attitude certainty expressed
generally greater advocacy intention and were insensitive to
the quality of arguments others made. Thus, we replicated
the advocacy effect in a new context and with a different
moderator. Although we had no direct process evidence in
Study 3, we suspect that the mechanism was the same as
observed in Studies 1 and 2. That is, uncertain individuals
presumably felt themselves to be less-efficacious arguers for
their position but could be made to feel as though they had
something unique and useful to contribute when exposed to
others’ specious arguments. Highly certain individuals, by
contrast, presumably did feel as though they could argue for
their position, and thus expressed greater intent to do so
regardless of the arguments others made.
Study 4
Studies 1 to 3 tested the proposed advocacy effect by measuring advocacy intentions. In Study 4, we assessed participants’ actual attempts at generating advocacy. Specifically,
we replicated Study 3 but replaced the measure of advocacy
intentions with a measure of actual argumentation, recording
participants’ self-generated arguments in support of their
position. In accord with past research (e.g., Gal & Rucker,
2010), we gauged advocacy by assessing how much participants wrote in support of their views when they were given
an opportunity to do so. In accord with Study 3, we hypothesized that individuals low in attitude certainty would argue
more for the cause when they received weak rather than
strong (pro-attitudinal) arguments, whereas individuals high
in attitude certainty would be unaffected by argument
strength.
Participants and Design
An initial sample of 388 participants, recruited using
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, took part in exchange for credit
toward Amazon.com purchases. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of two argument quality conditions: strong or
weak.
Procedure
The procedure for Study 4 was identical to that of Study 3,
except that in place of the advocacy intention items, we
asked participants to imagine that they had an opportunity at
the town hall meeting to express their own arguments. We
then provided them with a text box in which they could enter
any arguments that they would want to make at the meeting
(“In the space below, please write down everything that you
would say at this point in the town hall meeting.”). Following
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Akhtar et al.
past research (Gal & Rucker, 2010), we created an advocacy
index by tallying the number of words each participant typed
into the text box (range = 7-244 words, M = 57.40, median =
49, SD = 34.90). Attitudes, attitude certainty (α = .88), and
argument quality ratings were assessed in the exact same
manner, and at the exact same point in the study, as in Study 3.
Of importance, using the same criteria from Study 3, we
identified 315 pro-attitudinal participants in our sample. All
subsequent analyses focused on these participants.
Results
Argument quality ratings. Following the same procedure as in
Study 3, we found a main effect for argument quality on
argument quality ratings (β = 4.98, SE = .18), t(310) = 27.4,
p < .001, showing that strong arguments were rated as stronger than weak arguments. There also was a main effect for
attitude certainty (β = .23, SE = .07), t(310) = 3.53, p < .001,
such that participants who were more certain of their attitudes perceived the arguments as stronger than did participants who were not as certain. In addition, as in Study 3, the
interaction between argument quality and attitude certainty
was significant (β = .39, SE = .14), t(309) = 2.87, p = .004.
The argument quality effect was greater among high (β =
5.50, SE = .26), t(309) = 21.5, p < .001, rather than low (β =
4.42, SE = .47), t(309) = 16.6, p < .001, certainty participants,
though it was significant and in the predicted direction in
each case.
Advocacy effort. Most germane to our central concerns, we
conducted another hierarchical regression analysis in which
argument quality, attitude certainty, and their interaction predicted actual advocacy effort, operationalized in terms of
word count. Although participants tended to write more in the
weak rather than strong argument condition, the main effect
for argument quality was not significant, p = .13. The main
effect for attitude certainty was not significant either, p = .35.
Most important, the interaction was significant (β = 6.22, SE
= 3.01), t(309) = 2.07, p = .039. As expected, among low certainty participants, weak arguments led to greater advocacy
effort than did strong arguments (β = −14.91, SE = 5.87),
t(309) = −2.54, p = .012. Among high certainty participants,
there was no effect of argument quality on advocacy effort (β
= 2.32, SE = 5.63), t(309) = .41, p = .68 (see Figure 4).
Discussion
Study 4 demonstrated that the advocacy intention effect
observed in Study 3 can also manifest in terms of actual
advocacy behavior. As hypothesized, uncertain individuals
actually argued more after receiving weak rather than strong
pro-attitudinal arguments. This finding extended the earlier
results by moving beyond mere intentions to advocate for a
cause and studying the actual arguments people generate—
or the persuasion effort they mount—after receiving weak
Figure 4. Actual advocacy effort (number of words typed) as
predicted by attitude certainty and argument quality in Study 4.
arguments from someone else. Of importance, replicating
Study 3, this effect did not obtain among high certainty individuals. Interestingly, it did not appear to be the case that
high certainty individuals actually advocated at an exceptionally high level compared with other individuals, as
observed in Study 3 and with argumentation efficacy in
Study 2. Nevertheless, the overall pattern was consistent
with our primary hypothesis that the benefit of weak over
strong arguments in fostering advocacy would be limited to
relatively uncertain individuals.
General Discussion
Across four studies, we found evidence for the proposed
advocacy effect. Specifically, we found that weak arguments
could sometimes outperform strong arguments in attituderelevant contexts. As hypothesized, we observed this effect
on measures of advocacy intentions (e.g., individuals’ willingness to try to persuade others, to share their views with
others, and to donate to their preferred cause) and actual
advocacy (i.e., the amount people wrote while arguing for
their cause). In contrast, we did not observe any advantage
for weak arguments on measures of voting intentions or attitude change. Thus, we do not mean to suggest that weak
arguments are more persuasive than strong ones. Rather, we
submit that they can be more effective at generating advocacy. Importantly, this effect appears to be restricted to proattitudinal persuasion contexts—that is, settings in which
people are exposed to weak arguments supporting their own
positions. There was no apparent benefit of weak arguments
over strong ones when people received counter-attitudinal
messages.
In addition to documenting a conditional advantage for
weak over strong arguments, we also provided evidence for
its mechanism. In Studies 1 and 2, we found that weak arguments stimulated advocacy via their effect on perceived argumentation efficacy. In Study 1, for instance, when participants
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received weak rather than strong arguments supporting their
own opinions, they perceived their own argumentation efficacy to be higher. This feeling of argumentation efficacy, in
turn, fostered advocacy intentions. Moreover, as predicted,
given this mechanism, the advocacy effect occurred primarily
when participants’ initial feelings of argumentation efficacy
(Study 2) or attitude certainty (Studies 3-4) were not already
high. Indeed, when message recipients start off feeling uncertain about their attitudes or their argumentation skills, there is
more room for growth on these dimensions. The boost from
weak arguments thus applies primarily when individuals initially feel inefficacious or uncertain. When initial feelings of
efficacy or certainty are high, people tend to advocate more in
general (Studies 2-3) and are less sensitive to the strength of
arguments they receive from their like-minded peers (Studies
2-4).
Taken together, these findings reveal that weak arguments can play an important role in stimulating advocacy.
They suggest, counterintuitively, that it might sometimes
behoove advocacy groups to expose their supporters to
weak arguments from others—especially if those supporters are initially uncertain about their attitudes or about
their ability to make the case for them. Weak arguments
appear to be capable of bolstering such supporters’ appraisals of their own abilities to advocate effectively, and perhaps also of the need to advocate in the first place.
Ironically, then, prompting supporters to advocate on
behalf of a cause might be facilitated by the strategic use
of weak arguments. This suggestion might be somewhat
radical, but the current results indicate that it is at least
worth considering the potential benefits of weak arguments in advocacy contexts.
Although our studies focused on perceived argumentation
efficacy as a mechanism by which weak arguments can
increase advocacy, other possible processes could contribute
to this effect. As one example, hearing others make weak
arguments in favor of a cause could lead fellow supporters to
think that the cause will fail without their intervention. Other
recent research has shown that when people’s own view or
preferred position is being promoted by a poorly organized
source or by a nonexpert, they pay more attention to that
message out of a concern that the source may fail to adequately support their view and/or persuade others (Clark &
Wegener, 2009; Clark, Wegener, Habashi, & Evans, 2012). It
is possible that seeing one’s own position argued weakly, as
in the current studies, creates the same kind of concern that
those weak arguments will fail to persuade others. In
response, supporters might sometimes step in and advocate
more themselves if they believe that it is up to them to intervene and make a more compelling case.
In fact, one of our advocacy items in Studies 1 and 2
tapped participants’ willingness to donate money to Barack
Obama’s campaign, which is perhaps less about argumentation efficacy and more about the perception that help is
needed or that something must be done. That we obtained the
predicted effect on this measure as well as on more argumentation-type measures (i.e., trying to persuade others and making phone calls on the campaign’s behalf) is consistent with
the possibility that weak arguments might have worked
through more than one channel in our studies. Our mediation
and moderation findings suggest that perceived argumentation efficacy played an important role in making weak arguments more effective than strong ones, but the door remains
open to exploring whether other mechanisms might also be
involved.
In addition to providing new insights and raising new
questions for research in attitudes and persuasion, the current
work has implications for understanding self-efficacy and
attitude certainty. In particular, our studies uncover ways that
people who lack these states can be motivated to act. For
instance, although previous research has shown numerous
ways to increase perceived self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977),
our studies demonstrate for the first time that persuasive
messages—particularly weak ones—can play a role in this
regard. Indeed, simply by observing others make weak arguments, people can come to perceive that they themselves are
more effective at arguing. Thus, whereas past research has
shown that observing similar others perform tasks successfully can boost self-efficacy (Bandura & Barab, 1973),
observing them perform tasks poorly might in some instances
do so as well.
Finally, our findings point to a number of interesting and
potentially important questions for future research. As but
one example, in each of the present studies, the ostensible
source of the arguments participants received was a peer, or
at least there was no mention of the source having any relevant expertise. Perhaps the presumed similarity of the source
to the recipient made it relatively easy for participants to feel
as though they could draw inferences about themselves by
observing the source’s arguments. Indeed, the perceived
argumentation efficacy effect in our studies likely revolved
around a social comparison process (Corcoran, Crusius, &
Mussweiler, 2011; Festinger, 1954), whereby participants
inferred greater efficacy after observing the relatively poor
efficacy (i.e., weak arguments) of others. It remains to be
seen how participants would respond if the source of the
arguments were an established expert on the subject. Weak
arguments from an unambiguous expert, for instance, might
elicit the inference that the best arguments on the topic are
truly unconvincing, which seems unlikely to motivate advocacy. Consistent with this general notion, there is evidence
from past research that high (versus low) expertise can backfire when the source presents weak arguments (e.g., Bohner,
Ruder, & Erb, 2002; Tormala, Briñol, & Petty, 2006), though
that effect has been observed on persuasion rather than advocacy. We can only speculate for now, but it would be useful
to explore the effects of source variations in the current context as well.
In closing, we submit that in addition to uncovering a
novel and counterintuitive effect, the present studies make a
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broader contribution to the literature. In particular, they suggest that in at least some cases it may be important for persuasion research to shift the focus away from attitude change
or persuasion per se, and onto other outcomes such as attitudinal advocacy. Over the past several years, persuasion
researchers increasingly have moved away from emphasizing attitude change as the sole or primary outcome of interest following a persuasive appeal. With this shift, we have
seen a greater focus on metacognitive processes and outcomes such as increased or decreased attitude certainty,
among other things (see Petty, Briñol, Tormala, & Wegener,
2007; Tormala & Rucker, 2007). The current work underscores this departure. We contend that considering other
outcomes beyond attitudes and attitude change can deepen
our insight into persuasion and expand our understanding of
the many important outcomes that can vary following exposure to a persuasive message. We hope that our findings will
generate interest in studying advocacy among attitude and
persuasion researchers, as understanding how to motivate
action and change behavior remains a core goal of our
discipline.
Appendix
Stimuli in Studies 3 and 4
Weak arguments opposing the vegetarian-only schools policy:
The vegetarians in our town are really annoying, and I don’t
want my children to learn that kind of behavior.
My grandfather and great-grandfather were pig farmers. People
in my family are good people, and we shouldn’t do things that
they would’ve disapproved of, like this policy.
I’m skeptical of these vegetarian policies. I just recently read a
novel about a group of vegetarians. I don’t remember the name
of the novel, but the vegetarians in the story turned out to make
a lot of serious mistakes and things didn’t turn out so well for
them.
Strong arguments opposing the vegetarian-only schools policy:
It is unethical for the town to force schools to provide vegetarianonly options. Schools should have the right to decide for
themselves what’s best for their students, and students should be
able to choose between vegetarian and meat options for
themselves as well.
This policy might be expensive. By forcing schools to change
their existing policies, we don’t know how much it’ll cost to
implement.
Stimuli in Studies 1 and 2
Weak arguments for Obama’s reelection:
One reason I support Obama is that when he gives speeches, he
looks right at the camera to connect with voters at home, or
sometimes stares off into the distance like he can see a better
future. I find that inspiring.
A vegetarian-only diet has a lot of problems that come with
it. It’s much harder to get all the nutrients you need, like
protein. If all the schools in town were vegetarian-only, then
it would become much harder for our students to have
balanced diets.
Obama has my support in the 2012 election because he had my
support even back in 2007, back before he was even popular.
Four more years!
Editor’s Note
One reason I support the president is that he has such a wonderful
family. You can tell a lot about a person from the way they raise
their kids, and his daughters are absolute darlings! And his wife
is so well-dressed. You can tell he makes great choices.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
Strong arguments for Obama’s reelection:
I support President Obama because he has done a great job
under extremely difficult circumstances. He inherited a broken
economy, two wars, and an America with a battered international
reputation. He’s made significant progress towards reversing all
of these problems.
Obama has my support in the 2012 election because he’s stood
his ground and pushed for important social changes, like health
care reform and gay rights, even when they weren’t popular.
One reason I support the president is because he’s done so much
to restore America’s reputation abroad. Other countries look at
us more favorably with such a thoughtful, well-spoken leader.
Dr. Greg Maio served as guest action editor for this article.
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article .
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Notes
1. In Study 1 and all subsequent studies, a slight variation in the
reported degrees of freedom stems from missing values on the
different dependent measures.
2. In Study 1, we classified participants as either pro- or counterattitudinal in a dichotomous fashion based on their responses
to the attitude scale, because that scale was bipolar and had an
interpretable neutral midpoint that separated our two groups
of interest. In Studies 3 and 4, we were interested in relative
differences in attitude certainty as determined by participants’
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Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39(9)
responses on a series of unipolar certainty scales without
meaningful midpoints. Thus, in these latter studies, we examined predicted means at +1 and −1 SD on the attitude certainty
index.
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